AUTONOMY IN THE GLOBAL ERA: EURO-REGIONALISM AND NEW POLICY SPACES IN EDUCATION

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Introduction

Education has long been considered central in the construction of the modern nation-state system, through the building of core institutions and infrastructure and the binding of citizens under an assembled and forged sense of common national identity (Green, 1997). Yet, in recent years, this idea has been challenged by a number of global processes, including increased global economic competition, new migration patterns of people across borders, and a range of new regional\(^1\) and supranational educational actors and political arrangements. In Europe, devolutionary processes that have opened up avenues for greater regional autonomy in many countries at the same time as Europe has been further integrated and expanded. This has both "facilitated a post-sovereignist politics conductive to the accommodation of minorities" and offered a space for regions to have a legitimate voice outside of the central state (McGarry, Keating & Moore, 2006, p. 8). As a result, the nation-state itself is being rescaled both from "from above" and "from below," sparking new spaces of education and transformed conceptions of citizenship (Telò, 2002).

Framed by a critical discussion of methodological nationalism, this paper explores the intersection of new and evolving regional, central state, and supranational education policy spaces through examples drawn from post-Franco Spain. This work is situated within the broader literature on the development of a European Education Policy Space, which aims to understand changing governance structures in European education (cf. Grek et al., 2009; Lawn & Lingard, 2010).

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\(^1\) Eurostat defines a region as "an administrative unit below the level of the nation-state," which is noted for particular features, such as landscape, climate, language, ethnic origin and/or shared history. Consistent with EU Studies literature and EU terminology, region is used in this paper to signify national regional communities or region-states within and across nation-state territorial and political boundaries (cf. Anderson, 2001). In this paper, region is used rather than sub-nation, sub-state, or "nations without states" (Guibernau, 1999) for consistency and clarity, although it is important to note the wide range of uses of these terms across different bodies of literature.
2002; Nóvoa & Lawn, 2002). Using policy documents since 2000 and interview data, the paper first examines Spanish and regional (Catalan) education policy related to devolution, namely Catalonia’s recently revised Statute of Autonomy. The paper then places devolution in Spain and Catalonia in a broader context of Euro-regionalism, which has deepened and legitimized regional autonomy. Together these shifts in educational governance and the development of new education policy spaces have promoted a concept of the multi-scalar, European “ideal citizen” (Engel & Ortloff, 2009). The last section presents an overview of the recent influx of immigrants into Catalonia and Spain, exploring whether and to what extent recent education policy promoting the “ideal citizen” has taken non-European immigrants into account.

Methodological nationalism

The study of educational devolution and increased regional autonomy in Spain challenges traditional ways of thinking about the nation-state and national policy, requiring a conceptual framework that reaches beyond methodological nationalism. As first discussed by Martins (1974), methodological nationalism is “the assumption that the nation/state/society is the natural social and political form of the modern world” (Wimmer & Glick Schiller, 2002, p. 302). The nation-state, in this framework, is thought to be the appropriate primary unit of analysis, with clear-cut boundaries denoting it as the container of societies, an assumption that has come to dominate the social sciences.

Comparative education and international education policy are certainly not immune to methodological nationalism. Rather, they have been dominated by perspectives that have

*promoted* as well as assumed the nation-state as the basis of analysis, and prescription, through the close link between the discipline and modernisation theories of development and (significantly) ‘nation-building’. These theories saw modernisation and economic development dependent on *individual states’* following the path to growth, and adopting
the values, that had been adopted by the developed nations. States were, and frequently still are, seen as the means through which their nations would be built. (Dale, 2005, p. 126)

In much of the current research in international and comparative education, particularly in studies of the impact of political, economic and cultural dimensions of globalization on education and education policy, there is a prioritization of the nation-state as the unquestioned, predominant unit of analysis. This is shown through a reliance on zero-sum frameworks pitting the “national” against the “global” (Dale, 2005) and binary opposition models, such as global-nation, Europe-nation, region-nation (Engel, 2009). These models tend to rely on taken for granted assumptions about the nation-state as a clearly defined and demarcated territory, in which the state has exclusive control over its people united by a common cultural set of traditions and history.

Yet, with the formation of new regional and supranational education actors and partnerships, different patterns of educational governance are being developed, thus challenging traditional conceptions of state sovereignty and autonomy in education policy. To extend beyond methodological nationalism, this paper attempts to frame a process of state reterritorialization (cf. Brenner, 2001; Sassen, 1996) by examining educational trends that involve new layering of governance across various political spaces that are not automatically situated within state functions (Robertson, Bonal & Dale, 2002). By situating policy analysis within state reterritorialization, education policy can be examined at and across multiple “scales” (Brenner, 2004), including from the local, regional, central national state to the European. Moreover, by looking at education policy from outside traditional national frameworks, education policy itself offers a unique framework for understanding processes of globalization and new state formations.
This paper draws on a case of Spain, which in the post-Franco era (post-1975) has undergone tremendous changes. With democratization, it has been transformed from a highly centralized country to a decentralized Estado de Autonomías (State of Autonomies) and one of the European Union’s (EU) core democracies. It has also gone from what was once considered an underutilized economy to the ninth largest economy in the world and the fifth largest economy in the EU (IMF, 2009). Central to these major societal changes is Spain’s education system, rapidly transformed to take into account democratization, decentralization and Europeanization, and charged with the creation of a new citizenry to reflect the new political, economic, social and cultural realities.

Data sources used in this paper included official, public education policy documents and legislation since 2000 from three sites: Barcelona, Madrid and Brussels. The selection of regional, national, and supranational sites corresponded with the paper’s theoretical framework. The paper also drew on a secondary source of data from an empirical study conducted from 2005-2008, which including over 40 semi-structured interviews with regional and national government officials and policy-makers, representatives of education agencies, education experts, and policy analysts and representatives of the Organisation of Economic and Co-operation and Development (OECD) and the European Commission. Interview data were utilized to triangulate and contextualize data from policy documents (Berg, 2004) and to gain further information into the process of education policy formation. Interviews focused on individual system agent’s perceptions and experiences with contemporary education policy formation, their views towards recent policies of educational decentralization, and attitudes towards local, regional, national, and EU education policy priorities. Statistics and indicators on immigration
were obtained from national, European, and international sources (IMF, 2009; National Institute of Statistics, Spain, 2007; OECD, 2009).

**Regionalism “from below”**

Devolutionary processes have been commonplace in the late 20th century Europe, for example in the United Kingdom, with powers transferred to Scotland, Northern Ireland, and Wales, in Belgium, between Walloons in the south and Flemish in the north, and in Spain, in the “historical nations” of Catalonia and the Basque Country. In some of these cases, regions have continued to express greater demands on the central state in order to gain political strength and expand their autonomy, at times at the expense of the central government. Spain is a unique case, as it has long been considered a successful “miracle” model for its rapid transition to democratization and its relatively peaceful process of territorial, political, economic and educational devolution.

During the Francoist dictatorship (1939-1975), Spain was a highly centralized state, territorially divided into 50 provinces, but with power strictly centralized around Franco. The central values underpinning the Francoist political project included nationalist rhetoric, little political and cultural freedom, the creation of a strong central state concentrated on the political and military power of one man, “el generalismo,” the declaration of the state as officially Catholic, with the Catholic Church having extensive cultural and educational control, a lack of political mobility among citizens, and intellectual and cultural poverty as a result of censure and the exile of many intellectuals (Muñoz & Marcos, 2005, p. 151). Under a strict centralized state, regional language and expressions of culture were completely banned.
In the transition into democratization after Franco’s death in 1975, Spain became a “semi-federal” state, with the legal and political recognition of 17 regions, or Autonomous Communities (CCAA). The Spanish Constitution of 1978 recognizes both Spanish unity and the diversity of the nations and regions within Spain. As stated by Bengoetxea (2005), the Spanish “quasi-federalism” is based upon “the indissoluble unity of the Spanish nation, the common and indivisible homeland of all Spaniards, and recognizes and guarantees the right to autonomy of the nationalities and regions which make it up and the solidarity among all of them” (p. 49). The semi-federal nature of the Spanish state extends into education, as the state, the CCAA, and local administration share educational competencies, including shared control over curriculum. The process of asymmetrical decentralization and the evolution of regional-central state dynamics have been contentious throughout the 1980s, 1990s and today (Engel, 2009). Among these shifts is the extension of regional autonomy in Catalonia.

Guibernau (2006) wrote that “the advent of democracy marked the transition from a clandestine Catalanism of resistance to a Catalanism in favour of restoring Catalonia’s rights” in the Constitution of 1978 and Statute of Autonomy of 1979 (p. 217). Since the mid-1970s, there appear to be five historical periods that represent the Spanish government’s different positions towards increased regional autonomy in Catalonia: Recognition, disenchantment, bargaining time, against national diversity, and the beginning of a new era with the 2003 election of a regional Tripartit government (Guibernau, 2006). Using recent policy documents, I add a sixth

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2 The division between regions with a strong national identity and regions with aspirations for self-government was defined early in the transition process as a way of guiding decentralization. Decentralization in Spain was not a blanket process across all regions. Rather, it was asymmetrical, including in education.

3 The 23-year long reign of Convergència i Unió (CiU) came to an end in the 2003 elections, with the retirement of Jordi Pujol and a combination of left-wing parties defeating the CiU for the first time. On November 16, 2003, Pasqual Maragall, head of the PSC became president of the Generalitat, while the ERC and the ICV-EUiA won parliamentary seats. This created a coalition between the Partit dels Socialistes de Catalunya (PSC; Socialists’ Party of Catalonia), ERC, and Iniciativa per Catalunya Verds (ICV-EUiA; Initiative for Catalan Greens), known as the “Tripartite government,” which was not always a smooth alliance. The broad agenda of the new Catalan government
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period to include the 2006 revision of Catalonia’s Statute of Autonomy. This is significant given that the Statute of Autonomy outlines citizen rights and obligations, defines Catalan nationality, details competences of the regional governance with respect to the rest of Spain, and specifies regional financing. This is also an important period, as the revised Statute demonstrates further extension of regional autonomy, a new conception of the Spanish state, and deepened Europeanization. Notably, analysis of the 2006 revised Statute reveals statements of the official status of Catalonia as a “nation within a plurinational Spain” and “a nation within the EU” (Generalitat de Catalunya, 2006a).

Following Franco’s death in 1975, Catalonia pushed to have the Generalitat (the Catalan government) re-established (1977) and to ratify a new Statute of Autonomy (1979), in order to represent the individual rights, capacities, competencies and responsibilities of the region. There was an unwritten pledge during the development of the 1978 Constitution that allowed for possible future revision to the structure of the State of Autonomies, including revision of a regional Statute of Autonomy. The move to revise the 1979 Statute of Autonomy was not a political project until roughly 25 years later in 2003, with the new regional government. Also in 2003, a report, Informe Sobre la Reforma del Estatuto was produced by the Institute of Autonomous Studies, which included analysis of the Statute’s key objectives, concluding that many of its goals were not reached (Generalitat de Catalunya, 2003). A member of the Catalan government stated, “the conclusion was not very positive in the sense that there were so many expectations, so much hope and so many ideas in 1979 that we thought we [Catalan citizens] would be able to achieve” (personal communication). The report laid out several important

was a commitment to reforming Catalonia’s Statute of Autonomy to increase the level of autonomy both within Spain and the EU.
deficits, including in the areas of exclusive regional competencies, Catalonia’s role in the EU, and Catalan nationhood and identity in a global era.

Based on these deficits, a new regional government dedicated itself to extending Catalonia’s autonomy and in 2004, with a new Socialist leadership in Spain under President Zapatero, Catalonia began drafting and negotiating a new Statute. As legal teams began a process that was “all about precision, detailing and removing” what is exclusive to the Generalitat from the central state, the Catalan regional government developed a campaign in support of the project (personal communication). Its central discourse during the revision process pointed to the new imperatives of the global era and the challenges that political, economic and cultural globalization posed to a Catalan nation: “Because these are new times. New challenges. New Statute” and “The times are changing. Change the Statute” (Generalitat de Catalunya, 2005).

From the beginning, the process initially was highly contentious, particularly the drafted Statute’s official recognition of Catalonia as a nation in Article 1 and Spain as a plurinational state (Generalitat de Catalunya, 2006a). Although the Catalan government argued its declaration of a Catalan nation did not contradict the Spanish Constitution, the proposal came under heavy criticism from Madrid and the rest of the Spain, particularly the conservative Popular Party (PP), which rejected the project on the grounds it was unconstitutional and threatened the unity of Spain. In the subsequent negotiation process in Madrid, prior to the final Catalan citizen vote on the Statute, Catalonia’s status as nation was removed and replaced by nationality.

The revised Statute also aimed to further normalize the Catalan language by placing it on equal legislative footing in Catalonia with Castilian Spanish, as shown in Article 6.1:

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4 The leader of the PP at the time, Mariano Rajoy criticized the revised Statute of Autonomy as “an outrageous fraud” (Mead, 2006, p. 18).
5 Article 1 of the Statute was changed to, “Catalonia, as a nationality, exercises its constituted self-government as an autonomous community in accordance with the Constitution and this Statute” (Generalitat de Catalunya, 2006b, Preliminary Title, Article 1, para. 1).
the language of Catalonia is Catalan. As such, Catalan is the language of normal and preferred use in public administrations and means of public communication in Catalonia, and it is also the language normally used as the lingua franca and the language of instruction. (Generalitat de Catalunya, 2006a)

Article 6.2 states, “Catalan is the official language of Catalonia. Castilian Spanish is also an official language, as it is the official language of the Spanish state” (Generalitat de Catalunya, 2006a). The prioritizing of the Catalan language as the official language of the region was resisted, with arguments that both Catalan and Castilian Spanish characterize the multicultural identity of Catalonia. Opponents deemed the Statute discriminatory against the substantial proportion of second and third generation citizens in Catalonia whose native language is Castilian Spanish (the dominant language of Spain), linked historically with the mass migration of native Spaniards from the south to the north during the 20th century. Furthermore, opposition to the new Statute’s position on language policy argued that children from other parts of Spain and immigrant children from Latin American countries would be further discriminated in schools.

While competences related to compulsory education are shared between the central state and Autonomous Communities, as laid out in the 1978 Constitution, the Statute dictates exclusive regional control over a number of areas of education. These include post-compulsory teaching that does not lead to state academic or professional certification and over the institutions at which this teaching is carried out (Generalitat de Catalunya, 2006b, Article 131.1), early childhood/infant education (Generalitat de Catalunya, 2006b, Article 131.2), and executive power, in non-university education, over the issue and approval of State academic and

6 The organization, Seispuntouno, aimed to substitute the following for Article 6.1: “the languages of Catalan citizens are Catalan and Castilian Spanish. As such, both are the languages of normal and preferred use in public administrations and means of public communication in Catalonia, and they are also the languages normally used as the lingua franca and the languages of instruction.”
professional qualifications (Generalitat de Catalunya, 2006b, Article 131.4). It also further clarifies areas of shared control between the central state and the Generalitat.

Although the process was highly contentious and regional political parties voiced mixed opinions on the new Statute of Autonomy, late on June 18, 2006, President of the Generalitat, Pasqual Maragall publicly announced “Ja Tenim Estatut” (We have a Statute) in an institutional declaration. With roughly 75% of voters in support of the Statute, the referendum was passed. In Castilian Spanish, as a message to the rest of Spain, Maragall stated, “Catalonia will initiate a new stage in its self-government that will be long and positive. It will also be a stage in which Catalonia will feel more comfortable and understood by a plural Spain” (Aroca, 2006, p. 17). However, since the initial passing of the Statute, it has been legally challenged by the Popular Party and several other Autonomous Communities, who brought a constitutional challenge against the revised Statute to the Spanish Constitutional Court.

On June 28, 2010, after four years of deliberation, the Spanish Constitutional Court released its assessment. Although roughly 95% of the Statute was found to be constitutional, the Court’s decision deemed a number of articles unconstitutional, including in areas of language, justice, immigration, and fiscal policy. Specifically, according to the Court’s decision, 14 articles in the Statute of Autonomy were rewritten, 27 articles were to have their interpretation dictated, and the term “nation” used in the Statute was deemed to have no legal standing. This decision was widely opposed in Catalonia. In one of the largest demonstrations in Catalonia in the post-Franco era, on July 10, 2010, up to 1.5 million Catalan citizens (roughly 20% of the total population in Catalonia) held a protest against the Spanish Constitutional Court’s decision.

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7 Data from the June 19, 2006 report in La Vanguardia and the June 20, 2006 report in El País show that voter participation was low, with votes cast by only 49.4% of the total population in Catalonia. In the 1979 vote on the Statute of Autonomy in Catalonia, 59.3% of the population voted. Even with the low participation, President Maragall and the government in Catalonia interpreted the new Statute of Autonomy as the beginning of a new era for Catalonia.
particularly its decision regarding the status of a Catalan nation. Over 500 groups, including trade unions, migrant, community and cultural organizations, and the main regional political parties making up 88% of the Catalan Parliament, endorsed the demonstration.

This on-going process of negotiating devolution and regional autonomy signals significant shifts for citizenship, nationalism, and education policy. In the case of Catalonia’s Statute of Autonomy, the region represents a new and developing education policy space, in which ideas about redefining notions of the nation and nationhood are both formulated and enacted. Yet, as also shown in the example of Catalonia’s Statute of Autonomy, national and regional policy spaces represent clashing views about the core values and identity of 21st century Spanish citizenry. The following section further explores the intersection of regional and national spaces in a broader European context.

**Euro-regionalism “from above”**

In the EU’s rapid development and expansion to its 27 current member states, it has established itself as a prominent supranational actor. Dale (2005) noted that “the concept supranational (literally above nations) denotes a separate, distinct and non-reducible level or scale of activity from the national” (p. 125). Dale went on to state that the EU is a distinct scale of political activity, irreducible to the aggregate of the interests of the member states that make it up. This does not mean that all members have equal influence on the decisions by which they are all equally bound, but it does entail recognising that the EU is more than an extension of particular national interests. Decisions made, and policies agreed, at the European scale are not reducible to, or explicable in terms of, the intentions and interests of individual member states. (p. 125)

It is useful here to draw on Beck and Grande’s (2007) concept of “cosmopolitan Europe,” which breaks the “either/or logic of Europeanization, with the national outlook and methodological
nationalism" and "opens up new possibilities of social organization and political participation" (p. 5). Beck and Grande argue that cosmopolitanism calls for new concepts of integration and identity that enable and affirm coexistence across borders, without requiring that distinctiveness and difference be sacrificed on the altar of supposed (national) equality...a cosmopolitan Europe would thus be, in the first instance, a *Europe of difference*, of accepted and recognized difference. (p. 14; emphasis in original)

Yet, as they go on to argue, "European cosmopolitanism also signifies the need to restrict and regulate differences. Thus, a cosmopolitan Europe means simultaneously both difference and integration" (p. 14-15). This perspective is particularly useful in exploring not only regionalism in Europe and the EU, but also in framing the overlap of regional, national and supranational policy spaces in education.

As early as the 1957 Treaty of Rome was a statement of reducing regional differences as means to unify the economies of the original six members. In 1975, there were attempts to develop the poorest regions of Europe, in part through the establishment of the European Regional Development Fund. This was followed by the 1980s accession of southern states into the European Community, many of which were decentralized and possessed regional diversity, which led to new attention given to the role of regions (Jones & Keating, 1995). This continued through the early 1990s, in which "spending by the Community on regional policy had increased to around a quarter of its budget" (p. v). Keating (1995) wrote,

> Economically, these [regional policies] were justified in terms of the need to tap under-utilized resources in peripheral and declining regions and increase national output. Politically, they served to enhance national solidarity and secure support from peripheral regions for the State regime or the party in power. (p. 2)

With the Maastricht Treaty of 1992, the EU focused on the economic development of the various regions in Europe. In addition, social cohesion became an increasingly significant objective, growing emphasis was placed on the development of regions.
One way that the EU seeks to increase the participation of regions, cities and local levels is through institutions in Brussels, such as the Committee of the Regions (COR), a consultative body in the EU. While established in 1994, its foundations can be traced back to the 1960 proposal by the European Parliamentary Assembly to set up a committee that could be consulted on matters of regional economies. The COR provides a forum for local and regional government authorities and representatives to participate in EU decision-making, albeit a merely consultative role. The EU emphasizes the role of the COR as furthering European integration by increasing local and regional engagement. The Commission of the European Community’s (2000) document, *Working for the Regions* stated, “Europe’s regional policy is above all a policy of solidarity...Regional policy is also a policy for people” (p. 3). Moreover, as states in Europe, such as Spain, have devolved greater responsibility to local and regional levels, “the European principle of subsidiarity, in which decisions are to be made at the most de-centralised level possible, pushes in the same direction” (McGarry, Keating & Moore, 2006, p. 8). Here, “supranational approaches lead to new competences that are, for instance, reflective in the ‘subsidiarity principle’ of the European Union. These developments lead to new approaches to problem-solving and, in so doing, reinforce local and other subnational identities” (Safran, 2000, p. 3).

Therefore, at the same time as Europe has emphasized regional development policies for economic and political purposes, many regions have reasserted their “historical claims for regional and national distinctiveness” (Keating, 1995, p. 3). As Giordano and Roller’s (2002) argued, “regional entities as well as nationalist political parties have increasingly been able to further their demands within the international arena and to attract support for their causes both at home and abroad” (p. 101). In the politics of European integration, the supranational scale has
become a forum with “the umbrella of the EU as encouragement to bid for autonomy,” in which regions have the potential to gain greater autonomy from the central state (Wright, 2000, p. 179). Linked to the Statute of Autonomy in Catalonia, the region has continued to aspire and push politically for status as a nation within the EU and Catalan to be an official EU language.

Moreover, the EU’s emphasis on decentralization and regional governance demonstrates a political and ideological shift toward Euro-regionalism, in which regions acquire “greater protagonism in the political, economic, social and cultural arenas” (Borrás-Alomar, Christiansen, & Rodríguez-Pose, 1994, p. 28). Again, in this way, the supranational often legitimizes regional nationalism and claims for greater autonomy. This overlap of regional, central state, and European levels can also be seen in recent shifts in the conception of citizenship in Europe, demonstrating the acceptance and promotion of a set of values the new multiscalar “ideal citizen” should possess.

**A multiscalar citizenry and education**

The EU has recently pushed for the consolidation of European citizenship in member state’s citizenship education (Council of the European Union, 2003). With arguments about a pluralist society in Europe, “there is a conception of the ideal citizen as flexible, multilingual, accepting of broader European ideals of democracy, and having a plural sense of belonging that embraces the local, the regional, the central-nationalist state, and the European” (Engel & Ortloff, 2009, p. 188). This is increasingly reflected in discourses around education and citizenship in both Catalonia and Spain. As devolution deepens, emphasis is placed on Catalan nationalism within a plurinational Spanish state, highlighting values of multiculturalism, multilingualism and democracy. Moreover, in 2006, the Socialist Party in Spain introduced new

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8 Currently Catalonia is considered a region in the EU, the Catalan language is not an official EU language, and it “is not a European electoral constituency and lacks direct access to EU decision-making institutions” (Guibernau, 2006, p. 217).
educational legislation, the Organic Law of Education (LOE), which promotes fundamental equality of rights and freedoms, democratic notions of peace, human rights, social cohesion, respect and expansion of a multilingual and multicultural Spain, and principles of coexistence, solidarity and cooperation (MEC, 2006).

Demonstrating the importance placed on developing a democratic, decentralized, Europeanized Spain, a revised approach to citizenship and citizenship education is highlighted in the LOE. For the first time in educational legislative history in Spain, citizenship education is now included as a separate area of primary education. The LOE’s mandate of “Education for citizenship and human rights” (Article 24) within the last cycle of primary education and the integration of citizenship education in secondary education demonstrates the policy shift away from Castilian Spanish nationalism and Catholicism (the dominant focus throughout the Francoist era) towards an image of Spain as a multicultural, democratic, and modern European state. This push, emanating from the 2003 Council of Europe recommendation, has resulted in Spain redefining its approach from a strictly nation-state based definition of citizenship to one aligned with the concept of the multi-scalar, European “ideal citizen.”

This new definition of the “ideal citizen” reflects the realities of simultaneous processes of devolution and Europeanization in Spain, which as these processes are opening up new spaces of educational governance and shifting state autonomy in education, they are also restructuring of traditional central state conceptions of citizenship. The new spaces place particular value on the creation of a citizenry that is cohesive in its multidimensionality. In other words, the new ideal citizen in Europe is to be multilingual, multicultural, flexible and mobile, pluralist in its identification as regional, national and Europe, and thus embodies European ideals of democracy and human rights. Yet, in a context of transnational migration, it is increasingly significant to
critically examine these developments in light of the recent influx of non-European immigrants into Catalonia, Spain, and Europe.

Transnational migration

During the 20th century, Spain experienced mass migration from the south to the north into regions, such as Catalonia and the Basque Country, which both experienced early industrialization and modernization (Hueglin, 1986), and more recently, have experienced a large influx of non-European immigrants. Over the past 15 years, there have been significant changes in migratory processes and tendencies in Spain. The flow of transnational migration has been reversed, as Spain throughout much of its history has been a country of emigration, both to Latin America with colonial interests and to other European countries in the 20th century. Safran (2000) writes,

a more recent challenge to the homogenous nation-state came with the migration of massive numbers of people from one country to another, whether voluntarily, in search of better economic opportunities, or forcibly, as a result of expulsion or of flight from political oppression...it had to be acknowledged that in most countries, state and nation were no longer congruent. (p. 2)

Across regional, national and European spaces of education, transnational migration presents a particular set of challenges, in terms of realizing democratization, citizenship and Europeanization.

The rate of transnational migration into Spain is currently among the highest in the EU. Table 1 shows the growth of the percentage of non-EU citizens residing in Spain and EU-27 countries from 2007 to 2009 (Eurostat, 2009).
Table 1: Growth in percentage of non-EU citizens residing in Spain and EU countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>EU-27 countries</th>
<th>Spain</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>6.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>7.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>7.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


As shown in the table above, in comparison with the EU as a whole, Spain has experienced significant growth in the percentage of persons from outside the EU residing in country. Compared to 1997, in which 1.6% of the total population was foreign, in 2006, 10.3% of the total population in Spain was considered foreign (OECD, 2009). Currently, official figures from the National Institute of Statistics show that there are 4,526,522 immigrants in Spain, which is roughly 15% of the total population in Spain. According to the National Institute of Statistics’ National Immigrant Survey (2007), 2.16 million households in Spain include at least one foreign-born individual over the age of 16, of which 1.02 million of Spanish households were solely comprised of immigrants and 1.14 million were comprised both of immigrants and non-immigrants.

A large proportion of immigrants in Spain are considered non-Europeans, as they originate from Latin America and North Africa, with large proportions from Ecuador and Morocco. Catalonia in particular has seen a large influx of non-European immigrants. The following table shows immigrants\(^9\) according to their countries of origin in three CCAA: Andalucía, Catalonia and the region of Madrid.

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\(^9\) The National Statistics Institute, Spain defines an immigrant as a foreign-born individual, who is older than 15 years of age and lives in Spain (or has the intention of living in Spain) for one or more years. This excludes Spanish citizens who were born outside of Spain, but arrived to Spain under the age of two.
Table 2: Immigrants in three regions of Spain by country of origin

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>African countries</th>
<th>American countries (excluding the US and Canada)</th>
<th>Asian and Oceanic countries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Andalucia</td>
<td>124,423</td>
<td>145,571</td>
<td>20,191</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catalonia</td>
<td>211,998</td>
<td>388,417</td>
<td>77,875</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madrid (region)</td>
<td>103,855</td>
<td>458,610</td>
<td>47,225</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 2 shows that Catalonia has received higher numbers of immigrants from African and Asian and Oceanic countries compared to the other two regions. Against this influx of immigrants, although regional, national and European policy all advocate for the construction of socially cohesive, inclusive and multicultural societies, policy documents reveal a tendency to view immigration “as a possible ‘threat’ to ‘social cohesion’” (Dooly & Unamuno, 2009, p. 230), as an “immigrant problem,” and in some instances, as a matter of war (Agrela, 2002).

Agrela (2002) traces shifts in public discourse, legislation, and immigration policy beginning in the 1980s. With the Ley de Extranjería (Immigration Law) in 1985, Spain’s accession into the EU in 1986 and the Reglamento of 1986, public discourse, as well as policy and legislation, reflected the idea of Spain as a gateway into Europe. The distinction between Europeans and non-Europeans in terms of citizenship came in the early 1990s with the Treaty of Maastricht in 1992, which provided basic rights for EU citizens. With the First National Immigration Plan of 1991, the Maastricht Treaty and the idea of free movement of European citizens within Europe with the Schengen Agreement of 1995, immigration of non-Europeans in
the European space began to be associated with security issues, terrorism and drug trafficking, which Agrela (2002) pointed out, was completely void of discussions of integration of non-Europeans.

Also in the mid-1990s were policies related to quotas, limiting entry and allocating particular jobs for immigrants that native Spaniards would not find desirable. With the Treaty of Amsterdam (1998), Agrela (2002) found that a basis for the social aspects of European common policy was developed, including discussions of equality and pluralism; yet, again there was no mention of immigrants. As the internal borders within Europe have continued to recede and social cohesion among Europeans has been consistently emphasized, discourse, policy and legislation have looked at tightening Europe’s external borders, drawing out the relationship between crime, insecurity and immigration of non-Europeans (Agrela, 2002). In Spain, since 2000, there have been a series of new state-wide immigration plans developed to address border control, approaching immigration of non-Europeans largely as a threat and a problem. These have included mass plans for controlling borders and deportation, with increasing attention on illegal immigration, which Spain has begun to approach with airplanes and ships, pointing to the fact that immigration had become a matter of war (Agrela, 2002). Moreover, during this period, public discourse highlighted the cultural differences of non-European immigrants as preventing their integration into Spain and the “problem” of integration of immigrant groups into the Spanish education system (Calero, 2005). Yet, at the same time, new citizenship education policies developed in Spain and in Europe highlight multiculturalism and social cohesion.

Inclusiveness of a multiscalar citizenry and education

As the Spanish state has reconfigured itself in relation to pressures from below with devolution and Europeanization from above, new educational legislation and new citizenship
education policy, as described above, aims to promote a multicultural and multiscalar society. Yet, these policies are often limited to three key, cultural, political and economic spaces: the nation-state, through the ‘citizen’ figure; the Autonomous Community, in recognition of regional cultural diversity; and Europe, as the international community par excellence for the discourse on progress in the law. (Teasley, 2004, p. 255; emphasis in original)

What is noteworthy here is the exclusion of a number of ethnic groups, including the Roma, as well as many non-European immigrant groups. Further analysis of the new citizenship education policy, curriculum, and textbooks is required to understand how each will address transnational migration of non-European immigrants and related issues of diversity, multiculturalism, and social cohesion. However, from political discourse and the current focus of immigration policy, tensions surrounding immigration from non-European countries appear to be prevalent in education.

In the case of Catalonia, this especially relates to issues of language (i.e. the tension surrounding an influx of Castilian-speaking communities) and Catalan national values, where the Catalan language represents national heritage and the maintenance of an identity autonomous from Castilian Spain. Although Catalonia has utilized linguistic normalization laws since the early 1980s to promote and secure the Catalan language (Generalitat de Catalunya 1983, 1998) and has attempted to promote and normalize Catalan through the new Statute of Autonomy, new waves of Latin American immigrants into Catalonia have led to increased discussions about language as it relates to Catalan national identity. As shown in Dooly and Unamuno’s (2009) study of language, immigration and social cohesion in Catalan schools, this tension emerges in official education policy, in which “‘immigration’ is conceptualized as a possible ‘threat’ to ‘social cohesion’ and as a ‘threat’ to the ‘vehicular language’ (Catalan)” (p. 230). Moreover, there are a number of tensions surrounding the secularization of the new citizenship education
As other European countries currently wage debates about national citizenship, religion, identity, and specifically, Islamic religious and cultural practices, new educational research is necessary to study these issues as they relate to the context of Spain and Catalonia and the proposed multi-leveled, multicultural, European “ideal citizen.”

Conclusion

This paper offers a perspective of education policy, which looks beyond methodological nationalism and traditional conceptions of national policy to focus on the burgeoning spaces of education policy both below and above the central state. These overlapping spaces in education illustrate that in the 21st century global world, state autonomy in relation to education and education policy formation is increasingly influenced by a range of regional, supranational and more recently, transnational pressures. In exploring the simultaneous processes of devolution and Europeanization in post-Franco Spain, using Catalonia as a central regional example, it appears apparent that as Catalonia aims to deepen its autonomy through engagement with the EU, the supranational scale has continued to legitimate regional nationalism. As such, this calls into question the assumptions embedded within methodological nationalism, namely the supposition “of the congruence of nation and state [and] centralized notions of power and absolute notions of sovereignty...[which are] becoming increasingly anachronistic in a world of overlapping sovereignties and identities” (McGarry, Keating & Moore, 2006, p. 4). In addition, in these new forms of educational governance, traditional conceptions of education’s role in creating a national citizenry are being reformed. In their place is a general acceptance of a pluralist European citizenry that is multilingual, multicultural, flexible, mobile, and representative of
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regional, central nation-state and European scales. Yet, as shown in the recent influx of non-European immigrants in Spain and the response of public discourse, policy and legislation, new conceptions of the “ideal citizen” have largely been exclusive to non-Europeans.
References


