


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Supporting the Revolution:
America, Democracy, and the End of the Cold War
in Poland, 1981-1989

By

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For Mira

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Abstract

Early on the morning of December 13, 1981, General Wojciech Jaruzelski, the leader of the communist Polish United Workers' Party (PZPR), declared martial law, ending the so-called "Polish Crisis," which began with the creation of the Independent Free Trade Union "Solidarność" in August 1980. Over the next eight years, the Communist government and the opposition struggled over power, culminating in 1989 with the creation of a Solidarność-led government which ended fifty years of Communist rule in Poland and led the way to further democratic revolutions throughout Eastern Europe. The purpose of this dissertation is to utilize newly available and underutilized archival sources as well as oral history interviews, from both international and American perspectives, to fully chronicle American policy toward Poland from the declaration of martial law until the creation of the Solidarność government.

Rather than explaining Polish-American relations in bilateral terms, the dissertation illuminates the complex web of influences that determined American policy in Washington and affected its implementation within Poland. This includes descriptions of internal tensions within the Reagan administration, differences between American decisions in Washington and implementation in Warsaw, lobbying from Polish-American groups, clashes between Capitol Hill and the White House, coordination with American labor organizations to support Solidarność, disagreements with West European allies in NATO and international financial organizations, cooperation with the Vatican and the Polish Catholic Church, synchronization with American humanitarian organizations working in Poland, limitations caused by the realities of Soviet power in Eastern Europe, and complications caused by domestic Polish concerns. By taking a broad view of

American policy and highlighting internal Polish decisions, with both the Communist government and the democratic opposition, the dissertation provides concrete examples of America's role in Poland's transformation, arguing, however, that this role was very limited. These conclusions are relevant to arguments about the end of the Cold War, the nature of American power, as well as current discussions about possibilities to promote democracy within hostile regimes.

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Abbreviations

Abbreviations in Text:

- AID: United States Agency for International Development
APF: American Political Foundation
BIB: Bureau for International Broadcasting
CIA: Central Intelligence Agency
CCC: Commodity Credit Corporation
CMEA: see COMECON
COMECON: Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, also CMEA
CPSU: Communist Party of the Soviet Union
CRS: Catholic Relief Services
CSCE: Commission for Security and Cooperation in Europe
CSS: Committee in Support of Solidarity
DCI: Director of Central Intelligence
DOD: Department of Defense
EEC: European Economic Community
EUR: Department of State Bureau for European and Soviet Affairs
Ex-Im Bank: Export-Import Bank
FTUI: Free Trade Union Institute
FY: fiscal year
G-7: Group of Seven
GSP: Generalized System of Preferences
ICA: International Communications Agency
IDEE: Institute for Democracy in Eastern Europe
IMF: International Monetary Fund
IPA: Independent Poland Agency
KCEP: *Komisja Charytatywna Episkopatu Polski* or Charitable Commission of the Polish Episcopate
KOR: *Komitet Obrony Robotników* or Workers' Defense Committee
MHZ: *Ministerstwo Handel Zagranicznych* or Ministry of Foreign Trade
MSW: *Ministerstwo Spraw Wewnętrznych* or Ministry of Internal Affairs
MSZ: *Ministertwo Spraw Zagranicznych* or Ministry of Foreign Affairs
NAC: North Atlantic Council of NATO
NGO: non-governmental organization
NSC: National Security Council
NSDD: National Security Decision Directive
NSPG: National Security Planning Group
NSR: National Security Review
OKN: Committee for Independent Education, Culture, and Science, from the acronym for *Oświaty, Kultura, Nauk*
OPIC: Overseas Public Investment Corporation
OPZZ: *Ogólnopolskie Porozumienie Związków Zawodowych* or All-Polish Trade Unions Agreement
PAC: Polish American Congress
PACCF: Polish American Congress Charitable Foundation

PAX: Christian Social Association
PIASA: Polish Institute of Arts and Sciences in America
PISM: *Polski Instytut Spraw Międzynarodowych* or Polish Institute for International Affairs
PNG: *persona non grata*
PRON: *Patriotyczny Ruch Odrodzenia Narodowego* or Patriotic Movement of National Rebirth
PWAf: Polish Workers' Aid Fund
PZKS: *Polski Związek Katolicko-Społeczny* or Polish Catholic-Social Union
PZPR: *Polska Zjednoczona Partia Robotnicza* or Polish United Worker's Party
SB: *Służba Bezpieczeństwo* or Security Services
SD: *Stronnictwo Demokratyczne* or Democratic Party
TKK: *Tymczasowa Komisja Koordynacyjna* or Interim Coordinating Commission
TR: *Tymczasowa Rada NSZZ "Solidarność"* or Temporary Council of NSZZ Solidarność
UchS: *Unia Chrześcijańska-Społeczna* or Christian-Social Union
USIA: United States Information Agency
WiP: *Wolność i Pokój* or Freedom and Peace
WRON: *Wojskowa Rada Ocalenia Narodowego* or Military Council of National Salvation
ZOMO: *Zmotoryzowane Odwoły Milicji Obywatelskiej* or Motorized Reserves of the Citizens' Militia
ZSL: *Zjednoczone Stowowictwo Ludowe* or United People's Party
ZWID: *Zespół Wideo* or Video Association

Abbreviations in Footnotes:

AAN: *Archiwum Akt Nowych* or Archive of Modern Records
AFL-CIO: AFL-CIO unprocessed records
Amembassy: American embassy
CBOS: *Centrum Badań Opinii Społecznej* or Center for Public Opinion Research
CRS: Catholic Relief Services Archive
CSS: Committee in Support of Solidarity office files
GMMA: George Meany Memorial Archives
Hoover: Hoover Institution for War and Peace Archives
ISPPAN: *Instytut Studiów Politycznych Polskiej Akademii Nauk* or Institute of Political Studies of the Polish Academy of Sciences
KARTA: Karta Archives
KM: *Kolekcja Miedzeszyn* or Miedzeszyn conference collection
MSZ: Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs Archive
NED: National Endowment for Democracy Headquarters Library
NSA: National Security Archive
PAC: Polish American Congress office files
RRPL: Ronald Reagan Presidential Library
SecState: Secretary of State

Introduction: Supporting the Revolution

Early on the morning of December 13, 1981, General Wojciech Jaruzelski, the leader of the communist Polish United Workers' Party (PZPR), declared martial law, ending a sixteen-month period of openness, liberalization, freedom, and fluidity often referred to as the "Polish Crisis." The crisis began with the formation of the Independent Free Trade Union "Solidarność" in August 1980, and ended with Polish government forces implementing a nation-wide military operation to capture and intern thousands of Solidarność and affiliated activists. Martial law ended the Polish Crisis and brought a tense calm to the nation, but the opposition was not vanquished. Under the gaze of the United States and within the constraints of the bi-polar Cold War world, the Communist government and the opposition struggled over Poland's future for the next eight years. In 1989, officials from a PZPR-led coalition sat across a round table from Solidarność and Catholic Church leaders to negotiate a power-sharing agreement that directly led to semi-free elections in the summer of 1989 in which a long-time Solidarność activist became Poland's prime minister. In less than a decade Poland transformed from a Communist dictatorship which utilized massive military force to maintain control over its population into a transitional democracy with an independent executive branch and a bi-cameral parliamentary system of government, complete with competing political blocs. In contrast to earlier reform movements in Eastern Europe, Poles completed their democratic

transformation non-violently, sparking other revolutions and bringing an end to the Cold War in Eastern Europe.

Existing public accounts including newspaper articles and memoirs provide a broad narrative for understanding American policy toward Poland from 1981 to 1989. In its barebones form, the storyline unfolded as follows: In the wake of martial law, President Ronald Reagan announced a series of economic and political sanctions, some of which were also implemented by NATO allies, to pressure the Polish government to return to the liberalizing path it had pursued prior to December 1981. In determining its policies, America maintained three basic objectives: the end of martial law, the release of all political prisoners, and the resumption of negotiations between the PZPR, representatives of the Catholic Church, and leaders from the opposition, all meant to move the country toward the final stated goal of national reconciliation. Over the course of the 1980s sanctions were lifted and further imposed to push the PZPR toward accepting these objectives. Simultaneously, the United States led a concerted effort to support Solidarność and rebuild the opposition movement. Martial law was lifted in July 1983, all political prisoners were finally released in September 1986, and representatives from the government, Church, and Solidarność sat down to negotiate Poland's future during the Round Table process from February through April 1989, fulfilling all three American objectives. American conventional wisdom is that American goals were accomplished because the United States caused meaningful changes within Poland.

The primary purpose of this dissertation is to utilize newly available and underutilized sources, from international as well as American perspectives, to fully chronicle American policy toward Poland from the declaration of martial law until the

creation of the Solidarność government, and to take a sober accounting of American influence on internal Polish developments.

A Complex Web

Defining the parameters of "American policy" over this period, however, is difficult. First, policy was aimed at two separate constituencies within Poland: the Communist government and the democratic opposition. So, American efforts were really two concurrent policies with overlapping concerns. In conceptualizing this structure it is more helpful to think of a triangle with the United States, the PZPR, and Solidarność at the three corners, than envisioning a bilateral relationship with Poland and the United States at opposite ends.¹ Further confusing the picture, American policies occasionally focused directly on the Polish people, who fell somewhere between the two corners of Solidarność and the PZPR.

Second, it is misleading to think about a singular policy pursued by the American government. Voices within the executive branch often disagreed among themselves. The State Department frequently advocated steps that the Defense Department or the Central Intelligence Agency argued vehemently against (particularly in the first years after the declaration of martial law). Most of these disagreements came to a head at the White House in the National Security Council with the president making a final decision; however, prior to these definitive decisions the individual departments often pursued policies at odds with viewpoints in other parts of the government. Moreover, American representatives in the embassy in Warsaw sporadically pursued their own independent ideas, consistent with the broad outlines of government policy. Further complicating the

¹ Within the text, the term "bilateral relations" refers to U.S. governmental policy toward the PZPR.

image of a cohesive governmental policy, Congress actively shaped American reactions to events in Poland. Often White House policies needed budgetary approval from Capitol Hill or were forced to acquiesce to criticisms from congressmen and senators. Domestic American political concerns also influenced decision making within the White House.

Third, American policy toward Poland was shaped by numerous public groups who operated on the fringes of government. Powerful constituencies like the AFL-CIO labor union and the Polish-American Congress lobbied both Capitol Hill and the White House on policy toward Poland, each advocating for their own constituencies and goals. Both of these groups, as well as smaller organizations like the Committee in Support of Solidarity, also acted independently and in conjunction with the government to support Solidarność and the wider opposition movement by sending needed money and material to them. American business leaders with financial commitments in Poland also advocated their own approach to the situation. In addition, private humanitarian organizations including Catholic Relief Services, CARE, and Project HOPE played an essential role by sending hundreds of millions of dollars in aid, staving off a humanitarian crisis and simultaneously affecting America's image in Poland.

Fourth, Americans were not the only people concerned with events in Poland. The U.S. government frequently butted heads with leaders within the Western alliance over the best moves to make. Confrontations often occurred within NATO, but also spilled over into organizations like the International Monetary Fund and international lending groups. With Solidarność activists spread throughout the West following the declaration of martial law, American activities were influenced by Polish émigré organizations, most notably the Solidarność Coordinating Office Abroad in Brussels. The Vatican too, with a

Polish Pope at its head and an overwhelmingly Catholic population in Poland, pursued policies that both limited and amplified the actions Americans took. Finally, given Poland's position behind the Iron Curtain, Soviet actions and the pace of their own internal transformation greatly limited the scope and effectiveness of American policy.

Fifth, both the PZPR and Solidarność had their own domestic Polish concerns. Although they were not elected, Jaruzelski and his comrades regularly acted to dissipate domestic tensions or to curry favor with the public. Similarly, as an underground political movement Solidarność was only as formidable as the constituency it could claim to represent: without the support of the Polish people they would be powerless. As an important third column, the Polish Catholic Church mediated between the state and the opposition, but certainly not without their own interests. Simply, it is impossible to look at American policy without taking into account how Polish concerns on the ground affected that policy.

Mapping out all these influences and limitations on "American policy" produces a picture that looks more like an intricate web of overlapping and conflicting threads than a simple triangle. However it is only possible to get an accurate view of American policies and their effects in Poland by taking into account as many of the disparate opinions, arguments, viewpoints, goals, constituencies, and perspectives as possible. Oddly, complexity provides clarity rather than confusion. Therefore, one of the goals of this dissertation is to not only describe American policy as it looked finally formed, but to explore how that policy came to be, investigating the many leaders, groups, organizations, countries, and common people who shaped it in Washington, Warsaw, and points beyond.

Filling in the Gaps

In terms of existing scholarship, no comprehensive review has been published about American-Polish relations between the declaration of martial law in December 1981 and the collapse of the Communist government in 1989. On the tenth anniversary of Poland's democratic revolution in 1999, the journal *Polish Review* published a number of short pieces by American officials who worked in Poland during the 1980s (including Ambassador John Davis). In addition, Prof. dr. hab. Andrzej Paczkowski has published a single chapter weighing the importance of the superpowers' international policies on Poland's political transformation ("The Playground of the Superpowers, Poland 1980–89"). This essay acted as a guide for the research and conclusions drawn here. Near the end of the 1980s, John Resenbrink wrote *Poland Challenges a Divided World* and Arthur Rachwald published *In Search of Poland: Solidarity's Response to the Superpowers, 1981-1989*, but both lacked access to declassified Western governmental sources or Communist archives. Similarly, the most in-depth study of U.S.-Polish relations in English, Piotr Wandycz's *The United States and Poland* was published in 1980, before the events chronicled here had even occurred.²

Nonetheless, a large cache of scholarship and excellent journalism already exists on developments within Poland in the 1980s. This includes a wide range of materials, from Timothy Garton Ash's *The Uses of Adversity* and Michael Kaufman's *Mad Dreams, Saving Graces* to Janine Wedel's anthropological study of mass dissidence, *Private Poland*, each attempting to explain the rise of the Solidarność trade union and the

² Full citations for the books and articles in this section can be found in the bibliography at the end of the dissertation. English translations of Polish titles are provided there as well.

opposition movement. A number of Polish leaders from the period have also written personal accounts, including Lech Wałęsa, Wojciech Jaruzelski, and Mieczysław Rakowski. In the past decade, Polish scholars have incorporated new materials from government and private archives to help explain the successful conclusion of Poland's long march to democracy. These studies include Antoni Dudek's *Reglamentowana Rewolucja*, Andrzej Garlicki's *Karuzela*, and Paczkowski's *The Spring will be Ours*, among others. Drawing from the proceedings of an oral history conference on the events of 1989, the Institute of Political Studies in Warsaw published a three-volume set, *Polska 1986–1989: Koniec Systemu*, comprised of documents, conference transcripts, and commentary. Political scientists like Marjorie Castle have also written scientific studies on Poland's revolution, attempting to understand the mechanisms for change. Unfortunately, these sources emphasize domestic political concerns without fully explaining international influences. Moreover, much of the literature on Poland's transformation focuses on the last three years of the decade, leaving out crucial trends and events from the preceding years.

A similar criticism can be made about another significant body of work on Poland. Scholars including Wojtech Mastny, Mark Kramer, Doug MacEachin, Helen Sjursen, Matthew Ouimet, Malcolm Byrne, and Paczkowski have spent considerable energy exploring the domestic issues and international pressures surrounding the Polish Crisis; however, these books and articles only follow developments in Poland through the first few months of 1982, ending where this study begins.

There is also a growing amount of work on Solidarność's underground activities following the declaration of martial law, most notably Andrzej Friszke's *Solidarność*

Podziemna 1981-1989, translated works by Adam Michnik, and Maciej Łopiński, Marcin Moskit, and Mariusz Wilk's translated ruminations on life in the underground, *Konspira*. As with other literature, these studies look for answers internally; discussions about the U.S. role are either neglected or underdeveloped.

In the fifteen years since the end of the 1980s, officials and biographers have had plenty of time to provide book-length studies of the careers of Washington officials and insiders like Secretaries of State Alexander Haig, George Shultz, and James Baker; AFL-CIO President Lane Kirkland; Carter National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski; Reagan National Security Council official Richard Pipes; and Bush National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft, among others. There is also a growing historiography on Reagan, including insightful biographies by Lou Cannon, Reagan's own autobiography, and collections of Reagan's writings, diaries, and speeches edited by Kiron Skinner and Douglas Brinkley. More generally, scholars have written extensively on American foreign policy during the 1980s including: studies on American intelligence activities by Bob Woodward and Robert Gates, accounts focusing on Reagan's policies (namely, work by Frances Fitzgerald, Michael Dobbs, and Beth Fischer, among others), and important works by Robert Hutchings, Condoleezza Rice, and Philip Zelikow with sections on the Bush administration's policies throughout 1989. Relevant studies of the broader forces for change in Eastern Europe include work by Charles Gati, Vladimir Tismaneau, and Kramer. Padraic Kenney and Timothy Snyder have also completed wide-ranging studies on the role of nationalism and transnational movements in the collapse of the Soviet power in Eastern Europe. Unfortunately for readers interested in Poland's transformation, most of these works contain either only passing references to or incomplete accounts of

American policy toward Poland. When works on American foreign policy do discuss policy toward Poland, they follow the story only in 1981 or 1989, overlooking important transitions and significant shifts in the years between crises.

There is also a substantial body of literature on the international confrontation and cooperation between the United States and the Soviet Union during the 1980s. Authors such as Michael Beschloss, Jack Matlock, Don Oberdorfer, and Raymond Garthoff concentrate on the relationship between Reagan and Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev, seeking a framework to understand the dissolution of Cold War tensions within the actions of these two men. Moreover, a number of monographs and books available in English take a more Moscow-centric view of the end of the Cold War, including: analysis by Jacques Levesque, the memoirs of Gorbachev's advisor Anatoly Chernyaev, collections of speeches and writings by Gorbachev, and numerous biographies of the former general secretary. However, by focusing on the larger superpower confrontation, all of these studies lose the nuances of American policy toward Poland.

One of the schools of thought that bubbled up from this collection of literature is what some have termed "triumphalism." Triumphant accounts argue that the United States won the Cold War, beating the Soviet Union because of the strength of democratic capitalism and because of the Reagan administration's tough policies against Gorbachev and his predecessors. Memoirs and retrospective accounts by policy makers from the Reagan administration initially presented these arguments, and proponents of this viewpoint are often linked with the neo-conservative political movement in the United States. Importantly, these arguments have had a pervasive effect on American public perceptions of the end of the Cold War and have been furthered by respected scholars

including John Lewis Gaddis. The movement found its purest mouthpiece, however, in Peter Schweizer, whose books *Victory* and *Reagan's War* unapologetically chronicle Reagan's long-suffering "struggle and final triumph over Communism" as well as his administration's "secret strategy that hastened the collapse of the Soviet Union."³

Triumphalist histories come in many gradations but consistently maintain a few central arguments. Accounts typically focus on Reagan's moral leadership to redefine the Cold War, not as a negotiated global system with two legitimate political-economic systems, but as a contest between two competing systems, one right and one wrong: democracy versus totalitarianism, capitalism versus communism, West versus East, good versus evil. Triumphalist narratives also stress Reagan's push to intensify the arms race, which both intimidated and bankrupted the Soviet Union. Other arguments concentrate on the Reagan administration's economic policies to revitalize the West by introducing stronger market mechanisms, and conversely to wage economic war against the East by cutting off access to Western technology, decreasing foreign currency infusions into the Communist world, and imposing economic sanctions to punish the Soviet Union. Finally, proponents of triumphalism view American efforts to support proxies (the Mujaheddin in Afghanistan, the Contras in Nicaragua, for example) to undermine Soviet power in the developing world as an essential move to strain and then defeat communism's global reach.

American policy toward Poland plays a central role within the triumphalist cannon. Poland led the way in the race toward democracy that culminated in 1989. Schweizer's more nuts and bolts accounts describe American efforts to morally and

³ These quotes are taken from the sub-titles of Schweizer's two books, *Reagan's War* (New York: Anchor Books, 2002) and *Victory* (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 1994), respectively.

financially support the Solidarność trade union, as a central part of the Reagan administration's policy to undermine and overthrow Soviet power in Eastern Europe. Further, American economic sanctions effectively punished the Polish Communist government and successfully pressured the government to pursue negotiations with the democratic opposition. The argument follows that without American leadership and support, Poland's democratic revolution would not have occurred. However, triumphalist accounts of American foreign policy during the 1980s provide an oversimplified view of Poland's transformation and rely heavily on American sources, much to the detriment of Polish and European perspectives.

One of the other dominant strains of thought that has emerged from the historiography on the 1980s is the argument that the end of the Cold War can be best explained by looking for answers within the Soviet Union. The Cold War did not end because of American actions but because of the Communist system itself. This school includes arguments which emphasize the importance of Gorbachev and his "New Thinking" on Eastern Europe. It also includes arguments which place prime importance on the inherent or exposed weaknesses of the Communist system, meaning the Soviet Union and its empire crumbled from within, not because of pressures from outside. However, as Beth Fisher argues in her essay, "The United States and the Transformation of the Cold War," dismissing the importance of Reagan and his administration's policies is an oversimplification, as well.

This dissertation seeks to fill numerous holes in the current historiography to provide a more complete and nuanced account of American policy toward Poland. By taking a "sober accounting" of the influence of American policy, this work engages

honestly with both triumphalist and other literature to move beyond ideological arguments and seek concrete examples and instances when American policy had a causal effect in Poland's transformation. Proving causal links is often very difficult. But, by exploring all of the disparate influences on American policy and their interconnections (explained above), instances of effective American influence do become apparent. However, it is only possible to show specific causal effects through gathering as many sources as possible, from a wide variety of perspectives.

Research Methodology

The research process for this dissertation began nearly eight years ago and combines an international array of private and governmental archival sources with interviews of people who participated in events on all sides of the story. Regarding Polish government sources, this account utilizes materials from the PZPR, particularly Politburo files, foreign department materials, and Jaruzelski's files, located at the Archiwum Akt Nowych (Archive of Modern Records). The author was also given special permission to review materials in the Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' files from their North American department, which was responsible for contacts with the United States. Other government documents were culled from the Miedzyszyn Collection, gathered by the Institute for Political Studies. To understand the democratic opposition's changing perspectives over the 1980s, this study draws heavily on the collection of underground literature, pamphlets, and weeklies collected by the KARTA foundation in their Archiwum Opozycji (Opposition Archive). To understand the Polish people's changing attitudes, the dissertation relies on research reports from the Centrum Badania Opinii

Spolecznej (Center for Public Opinion Research), a government-sponsored polling organization. Former members from both the government and the opposition were also interviewed.

In the United States, extensive efforts were made to draw from both governmental and private collections. For government papers, the dissertation relies mainly on declassified materials from the Ronald Reagan Presidential Library in Simi Valley, California, and declassified records held at the National Security Archive at The George Washington University, in their National Endowment for Democracy, Soviet Flashpoints—Polish Crisis, and The End of the Cold War collections. The author also filed personal Freedom of Information Act requests which led to further document declassifications. These documents are located in the National Security Archive's collections.

Most non-governmental archival sources for the dissertation were drawn from the Washington, D.C., area. The library at the National Endowment for Democracy's headquarters provided some general information on that institution's history and inner workings. Catholic Relief Services maintains an impressive administrative archive on their humanitarian efforts at their headquarters in Baltimore, Maryland. Former members of the Committee in Support of Solidarity (now closed) made some of their older files available at the offices of a successor institution in Washington. Casimir Lenard of the Polish American Congress graciously gave permission to view his private archive of records chronicling the congress's humanitarian efforts and their work supporting the opposition in Poland with funds from the National Endowment for Democracy. To better understand the AFL-CIO's viewpoint, the dissertation relies on Executive Council and

Press Release files available at the George Meany Memorial Archive located in Silver Spring, Maryland. Following a special request to the Secretary-Treasurer of the AFL-CIO, the author was also allowed to view unprocessed records from the Office of the President and the International Affairs Department, which had not been opened previously to researchers. The dissertation also draws upon records at the Hoover Institution for War and Peace's archive located at Stanford University. Of particular interest were collections from Polish security services files, the personal papers of Zdzisław Najder, files from Radio Free Europe, and records from American charitable groups working in Poland.

To supplement these written records, participants from the American side were also interviewed. Irena Lasota provided particularly fascinating material on American groups supporting *Solidarność*. For American government perspectives, Ambassador Davis provided numerous opportunities to talk, as did a number of his staff who worked at the Warsaw embassy over the course of the 1980s. Finally, higher-level officials from the executive branch were interviewed when possible.

When studying events in very recent history, a researcher can often be challenged to find enough material on which to base conclusions. It is true that the majority of U.S. government documents from the 1980s remain classified, and were this study based only on materials available at governmental archives it would not be very successful. This problem was best remedied by collections at the National Security Archive, which has done an amazing job using the Freedom of Information Act to get materials on American policy toward Poland and general American policy toward Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union released, well before the usual thirty-year declassification period. Moreover while

Reagan's correspondence with AFL-CIO president Lane Kirkland may be classified in government collections, it is readily available in AFL-CIO collections. The Polish American Congress, Committee in Support of Solidarity, Hoover Institution, and Catholic Relief Services archives all included gems like this.

More importantly, Polish archives from the Communist period are almost completely open. Whatever records have not been destroyed or hidden are available to see, offering a fascinating "back door" view into American policy. For example, while American accounts of high-level visits to Poland remain under lock and key, one can read the full transcript of the meeting in Polish. This provides an interesting set of problems for analysis; however, by beginning research in Polish rather than American collections, it was possible to recreate a complete chronology of important meetings between Poles and Americans. These Polish records also provided outward evidence of important shifts in American policy. Armed with this detailed information, it was possible to compose specific and knowledgeable Freedom of Information Act requests which were processed quickly and yielded important insights. Finally, with this detailed information from Polish archives, material from memoirs, leaked papers, and unattributed statements in the public record (which are often too vague to be used conclusively on their own) could be placed in a more concrete framework, providing useful insights into American policies. Therefore, this dissertation also draws heavily from contemporaneous newspaper accounts.

Undoubtedly, secrets and revelations remain to be found in classified American records and undiscovered Polish files. However, studying recent events holds one very important advantage over waiting until all records are declassified: personal interviews.

Less than twenty years after the historical events in question, many of the participants, both major and minor, are still alive. Waiting thirty or more years after 1989 would have meant that important memories would have been lost with participants' deaths or, at least, dulled by age. Acting sooner opened up an immense amount of information that would have been unavailable otherwise. Importantly, when dealing with sensitive events and underground opposition activities, many meetings, conversations, and exchanges were never recorded on paper. The same is true for opinions, anecdotes, or retrospective reevaluations that were never recorded in diplomatic cables. Once the memories disappear, so does the information. Of course memories are imperfect and malleable. But, by basing questions on and verifying information in available documentation (a method often referred to as critical oral history) it was possible to get an accurate picture that is more vivid than one which comes only from written and archived sources.

Overview

The chapters in this dissertation are arranged chronologically. Chapter 1 begins with an overview of the Polish Crisis from August 1980 to December 1981 and then focuses on the month directly following the declaration of martial law, stressing government-to-government relations during this critical period. It also follows American attempts to coordinate policy with its Allies, while explaining the deep rift caused in Polish-American relations by the declaration of martial law. Chapter 2 begins in January 1982 and describes some of the broader concerns sparked by December 13, including the growth of humanitarian aid to Poland and early efforts by American trade unions to support *Solidarność* as it was rebuilt as an underground organization. This chapter also

traces internal American government arguments about the efficacy of sanctions, as well as the increasing role played by Congress and concerns about international propaganda. Finally, this chapter shows how policy toward Poland slowly became embroiled in Allied disagreements over building a natural gas pipeline from the Soviet Union to Western Europe, eventually causing the Reagan administration to re-evaluate policy toward Poland and take a more pragmatic approach.

Chapter 3 begins in September 1982 and ends in January 1985, following the ups and (mainly) downs of Polish-American relations. Specifically, it examines how decisions to lift American sanctions were used to push for gradual reforms in Poland as part of what was known as the "step-by-step" policy. This chapter also explains continuing work by humanitarian organizations, as well as the creation of the National Endowment for Democracy which greatly increased resources available to support the Solidarność underground. This chapter explores the role of Radio Free Europe and the Catholic Church within Poland, as the PZPR took small steps to liberalize and reform the system.

Chapter 4 backs away from purely Polish-American relations to take a broader view of the effects of Poland's international situation on changes within its borders. This includes both Soviet bloc and West European pressure on Poland, with a particular emphasis on how foreign relations became linked to the internal economic situation. This chapter ends with a discussion of the international influences on the PZPR's decision to declare a complete amnesty for all remaining political prisoners in September 1986.

Chapter 5 returns to Polish and American concerns, and follows efforts by both countries to normalize relations through a series of high-level negotiations. This chapter explains the American decision to lift all remaining economic sanctions on February 19, 1987, and

details Vice President George Bush's visit to Warsaw in November 1987. The chapter concludes with a visit by American diplomat John Whitehead, demonstrating just how much the bilateral relationship had improved since 1985.

Chapter 6 recounts the growing tension within Poland as expressed through massive strikes in spring and summer 1988. The chapter also argues that America's longstanding position linking economic aid with Polish steps to resume negotiations to move toward national reconciliation empowered the opposition during the secretive Magdalenka meetings in fall 1988. It then balances Washington's decision to pause and redefine American foreign policy under the new Bush administration, as the Round Table negotiations progressed under their own momentum. The pace of events continued to accelerate through the spring and summer of 1989, despite American attempts during President Bush's July trip to restrain the pace of change by becoming directly involved in Poland's crisis over electing Jaruzelski to the newly formed office of president. The chapter ends by discussing American elation at the creation of the Solidarność-led government. Chapter 7 summarizes the dissertation's key findings and evaluates American influences on Poland's internal developments. This final chapter also provides a few key lessons from Poland for American efforts to promote democracy in the future.

* * *

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All of the inaccuracies, missing diacritics, lapses of reason, and limitations contained within are, of course, my own.

Chapter I

"A watershed in the political history of mankind":

The Reaction to Martial Law

December 1981 to January 1982

At 11:30 p.m. on Saturday night, December 12, 1981, elite units of the Polish People's Militia and other units of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MSW), backed by the Polish Army, took to the streets of Poland to round up and imprison the leadership of the Solidarność trade union. They cordoned off regional Solidarność headquarters, captured union leaders who had been meeting in Gdańsk, set up road blocks and checkpoints throughout the country, and cut all lines of communication. At 6:00 a.m. on Sunday, December 13, General Wojciech Jaruzelski went on Polish radio to announce that martial law had been imposed, declaring: "Our homeland was on the edge of a precipice . . . , we found ourselves facing a difficult test. We must show ourselves equal to this test, we must show that 'We are worthy of Poland.'"

Word from the American embassy in Warsaw about irregular military movements first reached Secretary of State Alexander Haig at 3:00 a.m. in Brussels, where he had spent the previous evening dining with other Western diplomats before a NATO meeting was scheduled to begin on December 13. On the other side of the Atlantic, President Ronald Reagan was away from the White House at Camp David. When Haig spoke with Vice President George H. W. Bush, the two decided not to whisk Reagan back to

Washington. Haig also asked if he should rush immediately to Washington, but the vice president reassured him that there was no hurry to get back, saying, "Nothing will happen in Washington for now, Al."¹ Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger was somewhere over the Atlantic in a plane headed to London. The National Security Council staff lacked a permanent national security advisor—Richard V. Allen had left Washington and would not be officially replaced by William Clark until January 5, 1982. President Reagan was not told of the news until the next morning. As Haig recalls, the Reagan Administration found itself in a "surprised state" without a clear plan for how to react.²

Washington was caught off guard by General Jaruzelski's announcement on December 13. The U.S. initially responded with caution, but soon anger in the White House produced punitive measures. A week after the declaration of martial law, the Reagan administration declared economic sanctions on Poland and extended similar punishment to the Soviet Union a few days later. Washington also actively advocated for sanctions within the NATO framework and eventually succeeded in getting a tough public response from their European allies, but little immediate action. In Poland, for the first thirty days after the declaration, Warsaw's martial law policy successfully controlled the opposition, much to the relief of the Soviets and Poland's neighbors. Warsaw, however, did not expect a concerted or forceful Western response. The American response of surprise followed by anger was replayed within the Polish Communist Party which responded with surprise and then anger of their own at Western sanctions. In the first month after the declaration of martial law, both sides took unexpected steps which

¹ As quoted in Alexander M. Haig, Jr., *Caveat* (New York: MacMillan Publishing Company, 1984), 248.

² In his memoirs, NSC staff member Richard Pipes writes about a lack of knowledge of intelligence on martial law. *Vixi* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2003), 169-170. For the quote regarding State, see *Caveat*, 248.

created a deep wound in U.S.-Polish relations, one that would leave lasting scars.

The Polish Crisis

December 1981 was the final act of what was known outside of Poland as the "Polish Crisis." The crisis began in the Lenin Shipyards in Gdańsk in August 1980, when Polish workers went on strike. As with earlier strikes and crises in 1956, 1970, and 1976, the workers were responding to food price increases, this time announced on July 1, 1980. Unlike previous strikes, this time the workers in the Lenin Shipyard included political not just economic demands as part of their strike announcement. They also elected Lech Wałęsa, an electrician who was active in the free trade union movement and who had been fired for political activity in 1976, as their head negotiator. Joining with other strikers along the Baltic Coast in an Inter-Factory Strike Committee, the Gdańsk strikers laid out a list of twenty-one demands, including the right to form independent trade unions, a right to strike, freedom of expression, and the adoption of measures to address the national economic crisis. Deciding against the use of force, the PZPR Politburo sent negotiators to Gdańsk and Szczecin (also on the Baltic Coast). With Bronisław Geremek, Andrzej Gwiazda, Bogdan Lis, and Tadeusz Mazowiecki at his side, Wałęsa successfully negotiated and signed the Gdańsk Agreements with the government on August 31, 1980, allowing unprecedented political concessions, including: independent trade unions, the right to strike without reprisals, the right to "freedom of expression", pay increases, improved working conditions, Saturdays off, and Sunday Masses broadcast over loudspeakers.

Well aware of the ramifications of the historic deal, both superpowers watched

developments attentively. On August 25, the CPSU Politburo created a special commission to oversee policy toward Poland headed by party ideology secretary Mikhail Suslov. In accordance with the advice of the Suslov Commission the Soviet Ministry of Defense readied three tank divisions and one motorized rifle division to be prepared to intervene in Poland at the end of August if necessary.³ The troops were never mobilized, but after the agreements were signed the Kremlin continued to signal its disapproval and nervousness about events by making strong recommendations to their Polish colleagues on the best methods for the PZPR to regain control of the domestic situation.

On the same day the Suslov commission was created, President Jimmy Carter solicited reactions from British prime minister Margaret Thatcher, West German chancellor Helmut Schmidt, and French president Valery Giscard d'Estaing about events in Poland. With tensions rising between the Soviets and the Poles in the first weeks of September, Carter's Polish-born national security advisor, Zbigniew Brzezinski, called a Special Coordinating Committee meeting on Poland for September 23. The main purposes of this meeting were to explain the most recent intelligence on events in Poland, to discuss whether or not the Soviets were preparing to intervene militarily, and to decide how American contingency planning for such an intervention should proceed.⁴

From August 1980 until December 1981, the question of Soviet intervention dominated discussions in both Washington and Moscow. As with Czechoslovakia in 1968, General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev authorized Soviet-led Warsaw Pact exercises

³ See "CPSU CC Politburo Commission Order to Enhance Readiness of Military Units for Possible Use in Poland, August 28, 1980," in Andrzej Paczkowski and Malcolm Byrne, eds., *From Solidarity to Martial Law: The Polish Crisis of 1980-1981 A Documentary History* (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2006), 64-65.

⁴ See "Special Coordination Committee, Summary of Conclusions, 'Meeting on Poland,' with attachment, September 23, 1980" in *ibid.*, 87-90.

(Soyuz 80 and Soyuz 81) to remind Poles of the realities of power in Eastern Europe and to pressure the Polish leadership to act decisively against the opposition. The Kremlin never made a final, definitive decision to intervene militarily, but the option remained a real possibility throughout the crisis.⁵ In response to Soviet actions and statements, the Americans focused most of their public efforts on keeping the events in Poland an internal process without "external interference." Washington closely watched Soviet troop movements and build-ups with spy satellites, looking for any outward signs of an invasion. When American analysts and politicians feared that an invasion was imminent in both December 1980 and March 1981, they used a full array of diplomatic tools to make sure the Soviets understood the detrimental consequences of invading Poland. This included both public and private pronouncements explaining the punitive steps the United States would take if the Soviets intervened.

On the ground, the Inter-Factory Strike Committee quickly expanded into a national movement, with Wałęsa at its head. Other regional leaders including Zbigniew Bujak from Warsaw and Władysław Fransyniuk from Wrocław joined with their colleagues to create a national trade union, the Independent Self-Governing Trade Union NSZZ "Solidarność" (referred to simply as Solidarność or the English equivalent,

⁵ The question of whether the Soviet Union was planning on invading Poland during the crisis has been a major focus of many of the studies on the period. For literature on the possibility of Soviet intervention, see particularly: Mark Kramer, *Soviet Deliberations during the Polish Crisis, 1980-1981*, Special Working Paper No. 1 (Washington, D.C.: Cold War International History Project, 1999); Wojtech Mastny, *The Soviet Non-Invasion of Poland in 1980/81 and the End of the Cold War*, Working Paper No. 23 (Washington, D.C.: Cold War International History Project, 1998); Matthew Ouimet, *The Rise and Fall of the Brezhnev Doctrine in Soviet Foreign Policy* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina, 2003); Greg Domber, "The Rise and Fall of the Brezhnev Doctrine in Soviet Foreign Policy," *Journal of Cold War Studies*, 7:3 (Summer 2005): 186-188; Andrzej Paczkowski and Andrzej Werblan, "On the Decision to Introduce Martial Law in Poland in 1981": *Two Historians Report to the Commission on Constitutional Oversight of the Sejm of the Republic of Poland*, Working Paper No. 21 (Washington, D.C.: Cold War International History Project, 1997); and *Wejda nie Wejda. Polska 1980-1982. Konferencje w Jachrance* (London: ANEKS, 1999). *Wejda nie Wejda* published the transcripts from an oral history conference held outside of Warsaw in 1997 with testimony by Russian, American, and Polish policy makers involved in events in the Polish Crisis.

Solidarity). Over the course of the crisis the trade union grew to include nearly 9.5 million members or more than one-in-four Poles. Once formed Solidarność focused on consolidating the concessions agreed to in Gdańsk. The process of officially registering the union, alone lasted until mid-November 1980. Once officially registered, the union began to push for the economic reforms that had been agreed to in Gdańsk, including work-free Saturdays. With Solidarność as an example, other groups including peasants and students called for greater pluralism in society and created their own organizations: the Independent Self-Governing Trade Union of Individual Farmers (Rural Solidarność), and the Independent Union of Students (*Niezależny Zrzeszenia Studentów*, or NZS), respectively.

Overall, the sixteen months prior to martial law involved a precarious tug-of-war between the people and the Party to determine Poland's future. Solidarność's main demands remained relatively consistent and included calls to "cease all attacks on the union, pass the law [legalizing independent] trade unions, hold democratic elections to national councils, establish a Social Council for National Economy [an independent group of union and government officials who would take control of reforming the economy], and give Solidarity access to the media."⁶ In this confrontation, the union's main tool to pressure the government to move toward reform was the ability to call intermittently for regional or national work stoppages and strikes. For example, in a tense atmosphere caused by the government's unwillingness to recognize Rural Solidarność (and following a provocation between PZPR officials and local Solidarność activists in Bydgoszcz in which three opposition members were severely beaten), a four-hour general

⁶ Andrzej Paczkowski, *Spring Will be Ours*, trans. by Jane Cave (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2003), 442.

strike was held on March 27, 1981. A follow-up strike for March 30 was called off when the PZPR agreed to register Rural Solidarność and publicly stated that those responsible for the Bydgoszcz beatings would be punished.

In addition to Solidarność, the Polish people had another advocate during these tense days: the Catholic Church. Unlike other Communist countries where the church had been eviscerated (as in the Soviet Union) or co-opted (as in Hungary), the Polish Catholic Church retained a strong, independent voice throughout the Communist period. During the Polish Crisis, the Church (led by the Archbishop of Warsaw, Cardinal Stefan Wyszyński until his death on May 28, 1981, and then by his successor Cardinal Józef Glemp) viewed itself as an intermediary between the opposition and the PZPR. In this role, during tense periods the Church often called publicly for moderation and met frequently with both Solidarność and PZPR members. The Church's attitude toward the opposition, however, should not be confused by its willingness to work with the PZPR: "although the Church did not encourage radical actions or demands, it was nonetheless unambiguous in its support for the union."⁷

The Vatican also took an active role in the Polish crisis, seeking to influence events both within Poland's borders and beyond. As a Pole and a national hero, Pope John Paul II (the former Bishop of Kraków, Karol Wotyła) had both a personal interest in events and an immense influence on public opinion. During the crisis, he spoke publicly about the need for calm and moderation as did other Catholic officials in Poland. Reflecting the Church's preference for Solidarność, behind the scenes the Pope played an

⁷ For an in depth analysis on the role of the church see sections seven and eight of Antoni Dudek and Ryszard Gryz, *Komuniści i Kościół w Polsce* (Kraków: Wydawnictwo ZNAK, 2003). For document collections on state-church relations see *Tajne dokumenty: Państwo-Kościół 1980-1989* (London: ANEKS, 1993); as well as numerous works by Peter Raina listed in the bibliography. For quote see Paczkowski, *Spring*, 420.

active role to help undermine Communist rule in Eastern Europe. During Carter's term, Brzezinski was in regular contact with the Pope about developments in their shared homeland; under President Reagan, this working relationship intensified to the point where the U.S. government was exchanging highly classified intelligence (spy satellite photos, closely held analysis, etc.) with the Pope on a regular basis in return for information and analysis from the Church. With parishes, churches, and cathedrals in every town and city throughout an almost homogeneously Catholic country, the Vatican was extremely well informed. As National Security Advisor Allen remarked, "An ideal intelligence agency would be set up the way the Vatican is. Its intelligence is absolutely first rate." Both during and after the crisis, Director of Central Intelligence William Casey and Ambassador-at-large General Vernon Walters traveled frequently to Rome acting as liaisons between the White House and the Vatican, sharing intelligence and briefing the Pope on American policy. The Pope's delegate to Washington, Pio Laghi, and Philadelphia bishop John Krol, a Polish American who had been close with the Pope since Vatican II, both worked as the Pope's representatives in Washington.⁸

On the other side of the barricades from the forces for change, the PZPR was under constant pressure from the Kremlin to make sure that reforms did not go too far. Soviet officials were in frequent contact with their Polish colleagues pushing them to hold strong against Solidarność and to regain control of the situation. Regular high-level meetings of Polish and Soviet officials—including Brezhnev, Suslov, Marshall Victor Kulikov (commander of Warsaw Pact troops), Stanisław Kania (who replaced Edward Gierek as PZPR first secretary on September 5, 1980), Józef Czyrek (Polish foreign

⁸ For the best exploration of the Reagan administration's relationship with Pope John Paul II, see Carl Bernstein and Marco Politi, *His Holiness* (New York: Double Day, 1996); particularly on the Polish crisis: 260-288, 280-282; Allen quoted at 270.

minister) and Jaruzelski (who was both minister of defense and prime minister after February 9, 1981)—took place in Warsaw, Moscow, the Crimea, and even a railroad car in Byelorussia. At each meeting the Soviets spoke about the threat of counterrevolution, telling the Poles that they needed to take decisive action against the opposition and warning of grave consequences.

Within the PZPR, the possibility of martial law became a major focus of attention as a proper form of decisive action and a possible way out of the crisis soon after the Gdańsk Agreements were signed. On October 22, 1980, Jaruzelski personally began preparations to update plans for instituting martial law. The CPSU Politburo also openly discussed the desirability of imposing martial law at a meeting on October 29, 1980.⁹ This option remained on the table throughout the months leading to December 1981, with the PZPR holding war games to practice implementing military rule in February 1981. But it was not until September 13, 1981, that final preparations for Operation X, the imposition of martial law, were in place.¹⁰

As the Soviets were pressuring the Poles to take steps to crush the opposition, the newly elected Ronald Reagan utilized a second lever to American policy vis-à-vis Poland; not only did Reagan keep pressure on the Soviets to stay out of Poland, but he continued the Carter administration's policy of offering carrots for the Polish regime if they allowed liberalizing trends to continue.¹¹ During the Gierek era, Poland accepted large Western loans to prop up its economy artificially. By the end of 1980, Polish debt to

⁹ See *Documentary History*, 123-128.

¹⁰ "Protocol No. 002/81 of a Meeting of the Homeland Defense Committee," dated September 13, 1981, in *ibid.*, 350-356.

¹¹ For an excellent overview of the Carter administration's policy toward Poland during this period, see: Patrick Vaughan, "Beyond Benign Neglect: Zbigniew Brzezinski and the Polish Crisis of 1980," *The Polish Review* vol. 44, no. 1 (1999): 3-28.

the West had risen to about \$23 billion and was beginning to come due, weighing down an already weak economy that was experiencing major shortages. The cost of living rose 15% in the first six months of 1981 and in July a 20% cut in meat rations was announced, evidence of just how weak the Polish economy had become. These weaknesses were only exacerbated by the strain of strikes and political instability. To help alleviate some of this economic strain and to reward the PZPR for its concessions to Solidarność, in August 1981 the Reagan administration signed an agreement to delay payment of 90% of Poland's debt to the United States for eight years. In the fall of 1981 other agreements were being negotiated to increase American food and humanitarian aid. U.S. policies aimed to alleviate some of the pressure the PZPR was feeling from its population because Kania and Jaruzelski continued to allow reform to move forward, however slowly.

In the weeks prior to December 1981, Poland remained in a precarious position: Solidarność continued to call for political and economic reforms consistent with goals articulated earlier in the crisis, Moscow continued to push the PZPR toward action against the opposition, and Washington continued to try to keep foreign interference at bay and internal reforms moving forward. In this laboratory of pressures, the Solidarność's National Congress met from September 26 to October 7, 1981, to decide on how to proceed. Overruling Wałęsa's calls for moderation, the National Congress called for significant political reforms including increased self-government for workers. The congress also approved a "Message to the Working People of Eastern Europe," actively promoting the creation of free trade unions beyond Poland's borders. Tensions remained high as a confrontation with the PZPR appeared more and more likely. In the late fall of 1981, localized strikes and work stoppages were being called almost daily with little if

any coordination with Solidarność's central leadership. Generally, the opposition was growing increasingly impatient with the government's lack of responsiveness to its long-standing grievances. In this atmosphere of frustration regional leaders from around Warsaw called for a protest rally in the capital city on December 17.

During its fourth Plenum from October 16 to 18, 1981, the PZPR Central Committee took steps to respond to the increasing tension. Reacting to Solidarność's congress, the group removed Kania from his leadership position and elected Jaruzelski to a third office: Party first secretary. The Soviets interpreted this change as a sign that the party was steeling itself to implement martial law. Jaruzelski did, in fact, begin to take concrete steps towards declaring martial law including extending the period of military service for conscripts and dispersing military operational groups around the country. In November and early December the general took the further step of launching a strong anti-Solidarność propaganda campaign, accusing the union of breaking with the Gdańsk agreements and making a grab for greater political power. Pressure from the east remained steadfast in favor of martial law, with Marshal Kulikov arriving in Warsaw on December 7 to keep an eye on Jaruzelski. In the hours and days before the final decision, Jaruzelski was agitated and nervous, vacillating about taking the final steps toward military rule, but by 2:00 p.m. on December 12, the general made the final call for Operation X to go into motion.¹² Tanks and militia were fully mobilized ten hours later, overtaking the country and rounding up the opposition.

¹² On General Jaruzelski's state of mind prior to implementing martial law, see his *Stan Wojenny Dlaczego* (Warszawa: BGW, 1992), esp. pp 1-10, 377-405; Mark Kramer, "Jaruzelski, the Soviet Union, and the Imposition of Martial Law in Poland: New Light on the Mystery of December 1981," *Cold War International History Project Bulletin* no. 11 (Winter 1998), 5-14; "The Anoshkin Notebook on the Polish Crisis, December 1981" *Cold War International History Project Bulletin* no. 11 (Winter 1998), 17-31; and Jaruzelski, "Commentary," *Cold War International History Project Bulletin* no. 11 (Winter 1998), 32-39.

Missed Intelligence and Mixed Signals

Jaruzelski's move toward martial law was not a total surprise to the Americans. The Reagan administration had been well informed about the possibility and specifics of implementing military rule, months before the final moves. Since the early 1970s, a Polish Army officer named Ryszard Kuklinski had been working for the CIA, sending valuable information to Langley on the Warsaw Pact's war plans with the West. During the Polish Crisis, Colonel Kuklinski was a member of the planning group charged with preparing for martial law. Intelligence from Kuklinski had been a major factor in the December 1980 and March 1981 intervention scares that created a flurry of anti-Soviet posturing in Washington. Kuklinski also sent regular intelligence on preparations for martial law, including detailed information on war games plans from February 1981. He also sent numerous warnings in the fall of 1981 about the imminent threat of martial law. His reporting came to an end, however, about a month before martial law was declared. In October, Kuklinski's colleagues, who had become aware that high-level information about martial law was being leaked to the Americans, confronted him. When the colonel began to see signs that he was being trailed by internal security service personnel and he believed martial law was imminent and unstoppable, he asked to be taken out of Poland.¹³ On November 7, 1981, the CIA whisked Kuklinski and his family away from Warsaw and gave them asylum in the United States.¹⁴

Armed with this intelligence, the Reagan administration was at least partially

¹³ Kuklinski first gave details of his work in an interview from 1987 reprinted as "The Suppression of Solidarity," in *Between East and West*, ed. Robert Kostrzewa (New York: Hill and Wang, 1990), 72-98. For his state of mind before asking to be removed, see 92-94.

¹⁴ For comprehensive information on Kuklinski's life and reporting on martial law see Benjamin Weiser's biography, *A Secret Life* (New York: Public Affairs, 2004).

prepared for martial law. Eight days after Reagan entered office, the Department of State prepared a memo on U.S. policy in response "to the use of force by the Polish government against the Polish people," advocating a flexible policy calibrated to optimize American leverage.¹⁵ The Reagan administration also made explicit statements to the PZPR about negative consequences if the PZPR utilized force against their own people. The president, the White House, and Congress provided a flurry of this kind of statement in March 1981, during one of the intervention scares that peaked on the weekend of March 28. Specifically, a March 26 White House statement read:

We would like to make clear to all concerned our view that any external intervention in Poland, or any measures aimed at suppressing the Polish people, would necessarily cause deep concern to all those interested in the peaceful development of Poland, and could have a grave effect on the whole course of East-West relations. At the same time, we would emphasize our continuing readiness to assist Poland in its present economic and financial troubles, for as long as the Polish people and authorities continue to seek through a peaceful process of negotiation the resolution of their current problems.¹⁶

In Warsaw, this and other statements warning against the use of force against the Polish people were consistently monitored from late winter 1981 forward by the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MSZ).¹⁷

It is important to note the complexity and nuances of the March 23 statement. The

¹⁵ Department of State Memo, "U.S. Policy Response to Use of Force by the Polish Government Against the Polish People," dated January 28, 1981, National Security Archive (hereafter NSA), Soviet Flashpoints Originals, Box 4. Robert Gates also wrote that he wrote a brief on January 23, 1981, on the possibility "that the Poles would enforce coercive measures themselves as a way to keep the Soviets out." See Gates, *From the Shadows* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996), 228.

¹⁶ *Public Papers of the President of the United States* (1981), "Statement by the Press Secretary on the Situation in Poland, March 26, 1981" (available on the Reagan Library's website: www.reagan.utexas.edu).

¹⁷ For Polish reporting on these statements, see a number of reports from Department III to high-level PZPR officials, including the minister of foreign affairs, in "Stosunki Bilateralne PRL-USA" [Bilateral U.S.-PRL Relations], Archive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, files of Department III (hereafter referred to as MSZ, D. III), (1981), Zespół 49/84, W 1, AP. 22-1-81; and "Stanowisko USA Wobec Sytuacji W Polsce" [U.S. Position on the Situation in Poland], MSZ, D. III, (1981) 49/84, W 1, AP. 22-1-81. At the Jachranka Conference in 1997, Jaruzelski produced a large amount of Western press on the issue of martial law, most likely prepared during the 1980-1981 period, see *Wejda nie Wejda*.

American government rarely, if ever, solely condemned the possible use of force by the Polish military against the Polish people. Rather, the message was wrapped in warnings about outside interference, alluding to—at least from the American perspective—Soviet intervention. Warning messages also consistently included statements about America's willingness to continue to reward the PZPR for moves towards reconciliation and negotiation with the opposition. More often than not (although not in the strongly worded statement above), American statements also expressed sympathy for the Polish situation and referred to the development of the situation as a Polish affair, in which the United States would not interfere.¹⁸ This complex message, therefore, contained a certain ambiguity about how exactly the United States would react to the imposition of martial law.¹⁹

This ambiguity in American policy—warning primarily against external intervention and only secondarily against the Polish use of force—appeared in American statements throughout 1981. On September 19, 1981 a week before Solidarność's National Congress, Warsaw embassy official Howard E. Wilgis presented Head of MSZ Department III, Józef Wiejacz, with a statement from Haig that read, "In the present situation we think it extremely important that Poland's leadership realize the devastating effect that repressive measures taken by them could have on United States attitudes towards Poland." This statement, however, was preceded by paragraphs condemning Soviet pressure on Poland, mentioning American sympathy toward the government of Poland, explaining that the United States did "not wish to interfere in Poland's internal affairs," and elucidating American fears that instability in Poland could lead to greater

¹⁸ For example, see statements in the next paragraph.

¹⁹ The PZPR's analysis of American statements appears later in this chapter.

instability in Europe and "unforeseen consequences"—i.e., civil war and expanded conflict.²⁰ So, while the Reagan administration was concerned about martial law, their messages to Warsaw were encased in other language about external interference and an attempt to show some kind leniency or sympathy toward Poland's economic predicament. The Reagan administration's messages about martial law, therefore, never had the clarity of their statements about the consequences of a Soviet intervention.

This ambiguity reflected the Reagan administration's internal dynamics. Based an account by the director of the Soviet and East European desk in the NSC, Richard Pipes, the Reagan administration did not have a united policy on Poland before the declaration of martial law. In Pipes' account, even the "vice president did not agree with the president" on the proper approach to Poland.²¹ Moreover, because the administration assumed power in the middle of the crisis, policy took on a reactive quality. The NSC did not have time to prepare overriding guidance on policy toward Eastern Europe until well after December 1981, and the administration was often split between more ideological perspectives advocated by neo-conservative members of the cabinet and more pragmatic approaches advocated by voices like the vice president and officials in the State Department.²² Reagan's own attitude toward policy making bred divided action within the foreign policy machinery. According to Pipes, "President Reagan had many virtues, but he didn't take up his time with the details of government. . . . He gave a lot of freedom to members of his administration. They would do, as a matter of fact, what they wanted and

²⁰ "Notatka Informacyjna z rozmowy z charge d affairs HE Wilgisen z 19 bm" [Information Note from the Conversation with H. E. Wilgis on the 19th of this month], dated September 19, 1981, MSZ, Dept III (1981), 49/84, W 1, AP 22-1-81/B. Unless otherwise noted, all translations of Polish documents and sources were made by the author.

²¹ *Wejda nie Wejda*, 290.

²² For further discussion of the creation of a national security decision document on policy toward Eastern Europe, as well as the split between neo-conservatives and pragmatists, see chapter 2.

therefore there was confusion."²³ The ambiguity of American statements about martial law, therefore, reflected the lack of a coherent, concise policy within the Reagan administration.

The PZPR was also receiving conflicting advice from American business leaders. For businessmen the most important issue was simple: stability. In a report to Warsaw about a September 1981 conference at the Woodrow Wilson Center which brought together Polish government officials and executives from private American banks, the Poles paraphrased the bankers' position as follows:

Private banks have to guide their decisions about financial credits only with economic criteria. Especially at present, improved interest rates [on loans] would require an end to difficult conditions for economic efficiency. [These needed] conditions do not exist in Poland today. And therefore in today's situation banks cannot safely engage in Poland with new money. . . . Today the central source of uncertainty regarding the Polish economy resides in the lack of social-political stability.²⁴

Similarly, in a memo about meetings in Warsaw from September 17-19 between PZPR officials and a delegation from the U.S. Commerce Department led by Eric Lawson, the Americans made the point that the most important factor to improve chances for increased economic contacts with Americans was Poland "moving toward a clear, effective program of stabilization." ("Effective program of stabilization" is underlined in the Polish original.)²⁵ As one retrospective analysis concludes, "The Western banking community [expressed] its uneasiness about the growing instability, which could undermine the economic fabric of the country. Because their primary concern was to

²³ *Wejda nie Wejda*, 308.

²⁴ "Sprawozdanie z pobytu służbowego w Stanach Zjednoczonych AP w dniach od 14 do 19 września" [Report from an Official Trip to the United States from 14 to 19 September], MSZ, D. III (1981), 49/84, W 1, AP. 22-1-81.

²⁵ "Komisja Mieszana D/S Handlu X Sesja [Tenth Session of the Joint Commission of the Department of Trade], Wizyta Wicepremiera Jagielskiego w USA [Visity by Vice Premier Jagielski to the U.S.A.], Wizyta Wicepremiera Z Sladeja w USA [Visit by Vice Premier Z Sladej to the U.S.A.], Memo from A. Karas, September 25, 1981, both in MSZ, D. III, (1981) 49/84, W 2, AP. 23-8-81.

have their [loans repaid], the bankers looked favorably on the alternative of a Soviet invasion. . . . Ironically, Western big business sided with the communists."²⁶

Adding to the ambiguity of government statements and the conflicting messages from Western businesses, in the month prior to the declaration of martial law, the U.S. government was silent about martial law. The United States issued no explicit warnings despite the fact that Kuklinski had been removed from Poland—an obvious signal to the PZPR that the Reagan administration knew about their specific plans for martial law. The main issue in Polish-American relations during early December 1981 was not the prospect of martial law, but the possibility of increased aid. Warsaw applied for \$740 million in aid to purchase agricultural commodities and \$200 million in emergency food aid, and they were hoping for lenient terms to reschedule debts due in 1981 and 1982. In an attempt to gauge his government's chances of receiving this much-needed aid, Deputy Premier Zbigniew Madej visited Washington from December 7 to 10. While the Department of State briefing memo for Madej's meeting with Deputy Assistant Secretary Jack Scanlan mentions the negative impact that the use of force would have on bilateral relations, the memo also states that the United States respects "the course followed by Polish authorities over the past year which had permitted the peaceful resolution of many critical problems and which is in our view facilitating resolution of Poland's many problems. [The United States has] carefully avoided interfering in Poland's internal affairs, and we plan to continue that policy in the future."²⁷ The Polish record of the

²⁶ Arthur Rachwald, *In Search of Poland: The Superpowers' Response to Solidarity, 1980-1989* (Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, 1990), 50. The question of American businessmen's effects on PZPR thinking is an area I hope to clarify in my continuing research on the topic and presents an excellent opportunity for a concentrated oral history project.

²⁷ Briefing Memorandum from H. Allen Holmes to Amb Stoessel, "Your Meeting with Polish Deputy Prime Minister Zbigniew Madej, December 7," NSA, Soviet Flashpoints Originals, Box 3.

meeting reports on the later points, but does not mention any warnings about martial law, presumably because Scanlan did not bring up that talking point.²⁸ The Polish record of Madej's conversation with Bush does not mention martial law either, only that the vice president inquired about the "possibility of the government cooperating with the union movement to realize an economic program for exiting the crisis."²⁹ If the U.S. had been looking for a chance to quietly or vocally signal America's disapproval of plans for martial law, these meetings with Madej presented just such an opportunity. There is no evidence on either side, however, that strong or even muted warnings were made in the month before December 13.

The main reason martial law was not a major focus in Polish-American relations in December 1981 was that Washington had never viewed martial law as a likely outcome. From the beginning of the crisis until December 1981, the White House, the Department of State, and the CIA remained myopically focused on Soviet military intervention. Public statements were ambiguous about martial law partially because they reflected the White House belief that Soviet intervention was the main problem. It was a "strongly held conviction of both U.S. intelligence analysts and policy officials before martial law was imposed, that the Poles would not impose martial law."³⁰ American

²⁸ "Notatka Informacyjna z rozmowy z Johnem Scanlanem, Zastępcą Asystenta Sekretarza Stanu d/s Europy Wschodniej w Departamencie Stanu w dniu 9 bm." [Information Note from the Conversation with John Scanlan, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Eastern Europe in the Department of State on the 9th of this month], MSZ, 49/84, W-2, Dep III (1981), AP 23-8-81. In conversations about the events, General Jaruzelski has mentioned that there were cables from Madej that dealt with the meeting in more detail. While I was able to gain access to all confidential and secret materials in the MSZ Archive's Department III files, I was not able to review the top secret szyferogram files that would have included the cables Jaruzelski has referred to. It is possible that sensitive material sending warnings about martial law may have only been transmitted in the more highly classified szyferograms.

²⁹ Notatka Informacyjna [Information Note re Madej trip to Washington, sent to Czyrek on December 17, 1981], MSZ, 49/81, W-2, D. III, (1981), AP 23-8-81.

³⁰ Doug MacEachin, *U.S. Intelligence and the Polish Crisis, 1980-1981* (Washington, D.C.: Center for the Study of Intelligence, 2000), 195. MacEachin's work is the best source on American intelligence activity in Poland from 1980-1981 and is the only comprehensive attempt to understand the intelligence failure

analysis of Jaruzelski consistently cited his standing as a patriotic Polish officer who was famous for saying that "Poles won't shoot Poles."³¹ Finally, raw intelligence from Kuklinski was closely guarded, so information about specific preparations for martial law did not receive a wide audience. Pipes claims that he and Haig had not seen the intelligence prior to December 13. Only National Security Adviser Richard Allen, who left the White House around November 23 under the shadow of a bribery scandal, and Defense Department officials knew the specifics of Kuklinski's reporting, so Pipes "like the rest of the administration" was "ignorant that throughout the year the Polish government...was laying the groundwork for a military crackdown."³²

Another reason martial law was not at the forefront of American policymakers' minds was that, from the American perspective, tensions between Solidarność and the PZPR appeared to be lessening. Although October had been a very tense month—with Solidarność's National Congress and a series of strikes and clashes with police—in November Jaruzelski appeared to be pursuing a conciliatory policy. On November 4, Jaruzelski, Glemp, and Wałęsa met to discuss the possibility of a Front of National Accord. Although this meeting "yielded nothing apart from some curt communiqués,"³³ this presumed move toward negotiation and reconciliation was received by the Washington intelligence community with "cautious optimism."³⁴

Therefore, in the two weeks prior to martial law, Washington's main concern was

surrounding the declaration of martial law; see esp., 179-203. This book was re-published in a revised form as *U.S. Intelligence and the Confrontation in Poland, 1980-1981* (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2002).

³¹ For an example of American analysis on Jaruzelski, see "Memorandum from Lawrence Eagleburger to Secretary of State, 'General Wojciech Jaruzelski,' December 16, 1981," in *Documentary History*, 478-479. For a reference to Jaruzelski's comments from 1976 about violence against Poles, see Ash, *The Polish Revolution*, 248.

³² Pipes, *Vixi*, 169-170, quoted 170.

³³ Paczkowski, *Spring*, 441.

³⁴ As quoted in MacEachin, *U.S. Intelligence*, 169.

not repression against the Polish people, but Poland's deteriorating economic situation. The Cabinet Council on Economic Affairs met on November 30 to discuss Poland, with a State Department briefing memorandum arguing that "Poland's economic outlook is extremely grave" and that "economic collapse may offer the best chance to restore Soviet domination."³⁵ Writing to Reagan on December 1, Haig's main concern was to maintain the recent calm by strengthening Wałęsa's hand in negotiations with the PZPR by providing necessary aid to Poland and averting the possibility of further economic decline precipitating a crisis—"the sort of crisis that could demoralize and discredit the democratic forces and lead to the re-imposition of an inflexible Soviet-style Communist dictatorship." With this in mind, the NSC held a meeting on December 8 to discuss \$740 million in long-term agricultural aid, including \$100 million in emergency aid in the form of corn and soybean meal destined for Poland's poultry industry which the Cabinet Council on Economic Affairs had already approved.³⁶ Writing to DCI Casey on December 4, Director of the DCI/DDCI Executive Staff Robert Gates stated that investing foreign aid was a risky proposition, but "that our national security interests are well served by gambling \$740 million (or other sums) in credits in the hope that it will allow the Polish experiment to continue and in the knowledge that the experiment's very survival will contribute to the long-term unraveling of the Soviet position in Eastern Europe."³⁷

In international circles, the main topic of conversation vis-à-vis Poland in the days

³⁵ Memorandum for the Cabinet Council on Economic Affairs from Roger B. Porter, dated November 27, 1981, NSA, Soviet Flashpoints Originals, Box 1.

³⁶ See, "Memorandum from Alexander Haig to President Reagan, 'U.S. Assistance Program to Poland,' December 1, 1981," in *Documentary History*, 409-411.

³⁷ Memorandum from Robert M. Gates to the Director of Central Intelligence, "Assistance to Poland: Tuesday's NSC Meeting," dated December 4, 1981, NSA, Soviet Flashpoints Originals, Box 1. This sentiment was reiterated by the CIA in a Memorandum, "Poland," dated December 10, 1981, NSA, Soviet Flashpoints Originals, Box 1.

prior to the imposition of military rule was also aid. At a December 10 dinner in Brussels, French, German, British, and American foreign affairs officials, martial law was not mentioned. According to American reporting, the quadripartite group "emphasized the necessity of continuing Western assistance to Poland in order that the Polish experiment in pluralism would continue."³⁸ As late as December 11, the Department of State reported to the secretary's team in Brussels that "tensions in Poland have lessened in the wake of the government's apparent decision not to submit an 'emergency measures' law . . . and the increasingly active role played by the church."³⁹ Twenty-four hours after this message was sent to Haig, however, tensions spiked; by December 12 they had passed a breaking point.

Shock, Anger, and Protests

When word reached Washington late on December 12 that tanks and armored vehicles were moving around Warsaw and surrounding Solidarność headquarters there, Washington officials emanated a unanimous sense of shock. As the Secretary of State recalled, "the timing of [martial law] . . . came without forewarning to the United States."⁴⁰ Echoing this, a few days after Polish troops had been deployed the *New York Times* noted, "High officials here have made no secret that the repression so swiftly and stunningly imposed last Sunday morning by General Jaruzelski caught them by surprise."⁴¹ Assistant Secretary of Defense Richard Perle went as far as to refer to "a

³⁸ Cable from SecState to Amembassy Bonn, "Quadripartite Dinner Highlights, December 10, 1981," dated December 11, 1981, NSA, Soviet Flashpoints Originals, Box 2.

³⁹ Cable from Secstate Washington to Amembassy Brussels for Eagleburger/Price, dated December 11, 1982, NSA, Soviet Flashpoints Originals, Box 2.

⁴⁰ Haig, *Caveat*, 248.

⁴¹ Hedrick Smith, "U.S. Stick and Carrot," *New York Times* (Dec. 18, 1981): A17.

collective failure" in intelligence gathering and assessment prior to December 12.⁴²

This sense of surprise in Washington was, perhaps, only matched by a feeling of anger. Policy makers on all sides of the political spectrum were truly upset by Jaruzelski's decision, none more so than the commander-in-chief himself. Upon hearing the news, Reagan was "absolutely livid" and decided to take a stand, allegedly saying to Pipes that "something must be done. We need to hit them hard and save Solidarity."⁴³ Reagan's anger was equally apparent when he met with Polish-American leaders on December 21. One participant reported that "'the President was awfully angry' about the events in Poland."⁴⁴

In this atmosphere of equal parts surprise and anger, the Washington policy community began to decide on the best response to martial law. First however, they needed to understand just what was going on. As part of martial law, Polish troops cut off both internal and international phone communications, so the American embassy in Warsaw and consulates in Kraków and Poznań could only report on what they saw themselves; they could not readily receive information on the situation beyond these three cities. As Andrzej Paczkowski writes, "The crackdown had. . . disrupted virtually all channels of communication, not only between regions, but also within individual towns."⁴⁵ Poland was blanketed with a heavy cloud cover, so satellites and photographic intelligence were of no help. Even the Vatican, which had been such an important source of intelligence during the crisis remained in the dark in the first few days.⁴⁶

⁴² Drew Middleton, "Soviet Action inside Poland Being Studied; Military Analysis" *New York Times* (Dec. 21, 1981): A19.

⁴³ Peter Schweizer, *Reagan's War* (New York: Anchor Books, 2002), 165-166.

⁴⁴ Bernard Gwertzman, "The President Weighs Steps on Poland," *New York Times* (Dec. 22, 1981): A1.

⁴⁵ Paczkowski, *Spring*, 450.

⁴⁶ Bernstein and Politi, *His Holiness*, 340-341.

In this news blackout, Jaruzelski had the first word on the situation in Poland. In his remarks that began broadcasting every hour on Polish radio beginning at 6:00 a.m. on December 13, the leader of the party and the state argued that Poland was deep in crisis, saying: "Our country is on the verge of an abyss. . . . Chaos and demoralization have reached the level of defeat. The nation has reached the border of mental endurance . . . now, not days but hours are nearing a nationwide catastrophe." This so-called catastrophe was precipitated by the growing "aggressiveness of extremists, clearly aiming to take apart the Polish state system." In response, the communist Party was acting to control growing extremism, announcing that he had declared martial law and created a Military Council of National Salvation (*Wojskowa Rada Ocalenia Narodowego* or WRON). Jaruzelski, however, lamented the use of force against the Polish people and declared his intention was not a military takeover of the government: Democracy (such as it was) was not abandoned; WRON was formed only "to create guarantees of reestablishing order and discipline." For this reason, "a group of people threatening the safety of the country [had] been preventively interned" including "extremists in Solidarity," "members of illegal organizations," and "sharks of speculation gaining illegal profit." Jaruzelski said that he took these actions with a heavy heart knowing that this would not be an easy time for Poland. Invoking a long tradition of benevolence in the Polish armed forces, the general asked Poles to accept his decision. Only a stark change could move Poland away from the precipice of instability and confrontation.⁴⁷

In private the Polish government reiterated these points to Washington in even more specific terms. Meeting with Scanlan on December 14, Polish ambassador Romuald

⁴⁷ For a nearly complete translation of Jaruzelski's remarks, see "Text of Polish martial law declaration," *United Press International* (Dec. 13, 1981), available via Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe. All quotes in the previous paragraph are from this text.

Spasowski referred specifically to his government's belief that Solidarność had been "leading the nation into civil war" and action was taken to "avoid an internal tragedy which could have had a serious impact . . . on European security"—a clear assertion that Jaruzelski acted to preclude a Soviet military intervention. Referring to Poland's sovereignty, the ambassador hoped that "other countries will understand the situation" and that Poland remained "interested in good relations with Western countries."⁴⁸ With their initial statements the PZPR attempted to ease concern about the situation and to show that they had the situation under control. In both public and private Jaruzelski argued that martial law was the lesser of two evils. The country had been on the edge of a precipice, a spiral toward chaos that could only lead to civil war, or worse, a Soviet invasion. In his messages to both the people of Poland and the international community, Jaruzelski sought sympathy and understanding, because he and Poland's military had acted to save Poland from worse consequences than military rule.

Soon after the first reports of martial law, however, accounts began to seep out that workers were clashing with government forces. Prior to December 13, Solidarność planned to call for a continuous general strike immediately if the government took extreme action. In line with this policy "union militants called for a general strike" to respond to the government's provocation, raising the possibility of open conflict.⁴⁹ The CIA's National Intelligence Daily for December 14, 1981, reported that the real test for Jaruzelski's government would be when workers returned to factories, raising the

⁴⁸ Cable from Secstate to Amembassy Warsaw, "Polish Government Statement on Situation in Poland; U.S. Suspension of Aid to Warsaw," dated December 15, 1981, NSA, Soviet Flashpoints Originals, Box 2.

⁴⁹ Associated Press, Dateline Warsaw, Poland (Dec. 13, 1981, PM cycle), available via Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe.

probability that "[Solidarność] members are not likely to passively accept defeat."⁵⁰ News from Moscow papers also fanned the flames of concern, emphasizing Solidarność's militancy and reporting that some activists had openly called for seizing power from the PZPR in the hours before martial law was declared.⁵¹

On December 14, the *Washington Post* began reporting that the call for a general strike had been followed in large steel mills and mining operations, with Polish troops massing around the striking workplaces.⁵² Sit-in strikes were held in "hundreds of the largest enterprises: in all the shipyards, ports, mines, iron and steel works, and in most factories in the metal and light industries."⁵³ Most of these strikes were broken on the night of December 14-15 by forces from the MSW backed by elite military units, who stormed the factories using explosives to break down doors and gates and tear gas and flood lights to overcome the strikers. Strikes in mines in Silesia proved to be harder to break, with miners holding sit-in strikes in the mine-shafts. At the Wujek mines, this led to the bloodiest episode of martial law when government forces stormed the mines and fired on workers, killing six immediately and mortally wounding three others.

For Poles living in the United States sporadic reports of clashes between workers and troops and the uncertainties of martial law led to an atmosphere of near panic. Polish students and citizens who had either emigrated from Poland or who were stranded in the United States on trips gathered together for shots of vodka, "voiced [their] worst fears, listened to the continual newsbreaks, and anxiously speculated about the fate of family,

⁵⁰ "CIA National Intelligence Daily, 'Poland: Test of Government Measures,' December 14, 1981," in *Documentary History*, 476-477.

⁵¹ See in particular, BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, Part I: USSR (Dec. 14, 1981), available via Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe.

⁵² "Some Polish Workers Defying Martial Law; Polish Workers Reported Striking Against New Rule," *Washington Post* (Dec. 15, 1981): A1.

⁵³ Paczkowski, *Spring*, 451.

friends, and Poland. . . . Most . . . imagined the worst—civil war, Soviet invasion, or both."⁵⁴

In response, Poles in America and Polish-Americans began to organize. In New York City, Eric Chenoweth, Irena Lasota, and a few members of Solidarność stranded in the United States formed the Committee in Support of Solidarity, with the intention of keeping the American public aware of events and trying to help the opposition in any way possible. The AFL-CIO issued a press release on December 14 proclaiming: "The AFL-CIO pledges its full support to our Polish brothers and sisters. We do not presume to recommend what Solidarność should or should not do. . . . Whatever the decisions of these courageous people, we shall do what we can to assist them. . . . We call upon the governments and peoples of the free world to raise their voices in protest against the ongoing destruction of human rights in Poland."⁵⁵ Spontaneous or at least loosely organized public protests took place almost immediately in New York. Outside the United States, crowds took to the streets to protest outside Polish embassies in Paris, Vienna, London, Brussels, Milan, Rome, Lisbon, Athens, Toronto, and Tokyo.⁵⁶ On Monday, December 14, these protests in the U.S. expanded to the Polish embassy on 16th Street in Washington, D.C. and the Polish consulate in Chicago. In Paris 3,000-4,000 protesters took to the streets to march in support of Solidarność, with smaller events taking place in Milan, West Berlin, Madrid, Copenhagen, Vienna and The Hague.⁵⁷

⁵⁴ Janine Wedel, *The Private Poland* (New York: Facts on File Publications, 1986): 1.

⁵⁵ "Press Release, Monday, December 14, 1981," George Meany Memorial Archives (hereafter referred to as GMMA), AFL-CIO Press Releases 1981 (December), Box 47, Folder 47/6.

⁵⁶ "West Rallies Behind Solidarity," United Press International (Dec. 13, 1981), accessed via Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe.

⁵⁷ Loren Jenkins, "Western Europeans Demonstrate Against Crackdown in Poland," *Washington Post* (Dec. 14, 1981): A19.

First Steps

In reaction to the slow pace of information and rising public concern, the U.S. government took a decidedly cautious approach in its initial comments. Reagan did not return to the White House until Sunday morning and Haig lingered in Brussels to keep from showing too much anxiety and triggering alarms in Moscow. Speaking in Brussels on December 13, Haig emphasized that the U.S. was deeply concerned about events in Poland and was watching the situation carefully. Reagan took a similar tact when responding to reporters upon returning from Camp David, stating, "We're monitoring the situation. Beyond that, I can't have any comment."⁵⁸ This caution was mirrored by America's NATO allies and pursued in private correspondence as well.⁵⁹ When the under secretary of state and former ambassador to Poland, Walter Stoessel, met with the Soviet deputy chief of mission in Washington on December 13 he

emphasized that the U.S. was deeply concerned about developments in Poland and their effect on stability in the region. [Stoessel] said the U.S. urged all parties to exercise the maximum degree of restraint, prudence, and caution in their approach to the Polish situation. The USG [U.S. government], in briefing congressional leaders and other public figures, had urged them to be cautious in their public statements. The U.S. did not want to see an over-reaction or excess excitement.⁶⁰

In calling for a measured response without inflammatory comments, the U.S. government was taking a cue from the history of Soviet interventions in Eastern Europe. Following American inaction in November 1956 and tacit American acceptance of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968, Poles, Americans, and the world

⁵⁸ John Goshko and Don Oberdorfer, "Wałęsa is Summoned to Warsaw; U.S. Expresses 'Serious Concern' to Poland and Russia," *Washington Post* (Dec. 14, 1981): A1.

⁵⁹ Leonard Downy, Jr., "NATO Allies, Reacting Cautiously, Consult on Polish Crackdown," *Washington Post* (Dec. 14, 1981): A12.

⁶⁰ Cable from Secstate to U.S. delegation Secretary, "Under Secretary Stoessel's meeting with Bessmertnykh, December 13," dated December 13, 1981, NSA, Soviet Flashpoints Originals, Box 1.

knew that the United States would not react militarily to events in Poland. At the same time, Washington had learned from the Eisenhower administration that they did not want to incite violence to cause needless bloodshed. More practically, the Reagan administration did not want to give the Soviets an excuse to move in troops, which any increase in violence could provide. Earlier contingency planning for the Polish government's use of force against the Polish people had, in fact, noted that the use of force by Warsaw could be "staged as a pretext for greater Soviet involvement."⁶¹ U.S. government comments, therefore, were kept to a minimum.

The Catholic Church also decided to emphasize caution. Speaking to a crowd of pilgrims outside his Vatican window on December 13, Pope John Paul II prayed, "Polish blood cannot be shed, because too much of it has been shed . . . Everything possible must be done to peacefully build the future of the Homeland."⁶² Speaking at Częstochowa on the morning of December 13, Cardinal Glemp took a similar tone: "We must calmly reflect on the situation, the aim of which should be peace and the saving of lives, so that we avoid bloodshed." Later that same day, Glemp went further in a sermon in Warsaw, explaining, "I am going to call for reason even if it means laying oneself open to insult, and I shall ask, even if I have to go barefoot and beg on my knees: Do not begin a fight of Pole against Pole. Do not lose your heads brother workers."⁶³

In private, however, Washington's policy wheels began to take measured first

⁶¹ For document reference see footnote 15. It is interesting to note that a similar awareness of history shaped American signaling to the Soviets during 1980-1981. National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski was keenly aware of American policy toward Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968. He did not want "stir up the pot" to incense the Soviets. Nor did he want to repeat the mistake of remaining quiet on the possibility of Soviet intervention for fear of promoting that outcome. "Special Coordinating Committee, Summary of Conclusions, 'Meeting on Poland,' with attachments, September 23, 1980," *Documentary History*, 87-90.

⁶² "Speech by Pope John Paul II Concerning Martial Law, December 13, 1981," *Documentary History*, 475.

⁶³ As quoted in Paczkowski, *Spring*, 451.

steps. On December 13 a meeting was held in Deputy Secretary of State William Clark's office in the morning, and Vice President Bush chaired a special emergency group on Poland that afternoon. The following morning, December 14, Scanlan met with Ambassador Spasowski to receive a message from Jaruzelski on his reasons for declaring martial law, to which Scanlan responded with his own written statement announcing: "U.S. government aid and economic support activities for Poland will be placed on hold for the time being. This means that further consideration of the Polish government's request for 740 million dollars in agricultural assistance is being suspended."⁶⁴ This included \$100 million in emergency aid that had just recently been approved. By the time American Ambassador to Poland, Francis Meehan (who had been in West Germany when martial law was declared), returned to Warsaw and met with Foreign Minister Czyrek on December 16, the Poles had taken notice of the United States first move; Czyrek "argued vigorously" that he could not understand the decision to suspend agricultural aid. Meehan, however, saw no change in the PZPR's position: "I do not believe my broader comments had any particular impact on Czyrek But at least he is in no doubt that [U.S.] economic assistance is not on. That kind of language he understands."⁶⁵

Five days after the implementation of military rule, the Defense Intelligence Agency took stock of the situation. Their initial point was that "martial law has been implemented in Poland with more efficiency and less resistance than had been expected." The DIA summarized reports that Polish police and military units had been breaking

⁶⁴ Cable from Secstate to Amembassy Warsaw, "Polish Government Statement on Situation in Poland; US Suspension of Aid to Warsaw," dated December 15, 1981, NSA, Soviet Flashpoints Originals, Box 2.

⁶⁵ Cable from Amembassy Warsaw to Secstate, "Meeting with Czyrek," dated December 17, 1981, NSA, Soviet Flashpoints Originals, Box 4.

strikes in a "methodical fashion" but that as of the past two days they have been confronted with serious, violent opposition, with reports of 324 injuries in the Gdańsk shipyards and the death of miners in Silesia. The report concluded rather bleakly that "the situation in Poland under martial law has by no means been clarified. . . . Having taken the gamble, Jaruzelski must pursue his present course until he wins or loses." Despite the administration's first punitive move, the situation had continued to deteriorate with increased clashes and no reports signaling that the Communist party was looking to negotiate with either the Church or Solidarność to come to some kind of new national reconciliation.

The same day the DIA released its report, Reagan made his first in depth public statement, raising pressure on the Polish leadership. He began his December 17 remarks by focusing on human rights concerns, declaring the arrest and imprisonment of thousands of union leaders and intellectuals a "gross violation of the Helsinki pact." The president viewed the situation in "the gravest of terms." Turning to the question of aid, he said: "We have always been ready to do our share to assist Poland in overcoming its economic difficulties, but only if the Polish people are permitted to resolve their own problems free of internal coercion and outside intervention." Reagan stated that martial law would have to be suspended, prisoners would need to be freed, and free trade unions would need to have their previous rights restored for the United States to return to helping "Poland solve its economic problems." Later in the press conference, however, he refused to discuss options and tactics for future actions.⁶⁶

In a private meeting on the same day, American frustration with the PZPR

⁶⁶ For a full record of President Reagan's remarks, see "President's New Conference, December 17, 1981," *Public Papers* (1981), available on the Reagan Library's website: www.reagan.utexas.edu.

surfaced more fully. Meeting with Spasowski on December 17, Scanlan echoed the president's public statements, but made the possible outcome clearer. Scanlan explained:

when the U.S. suspended aid to Poland, we called attention to the fact that it was for the "time being" because we hoped that the military regime that was being introduced would indeed be moderate and permit the social and political process of renewal to continue. Unfortunately . . . we do not see that happening. Massive force has been used, and thousands of Poland's most patriotic and devoted workers and intellectuals have been arrested. There is no indication whatsoever that the new Polish military regime intends to seek a politically negotiated accommodation with all of the social, spiritual and political elements of Polish society. . . . When the U.S. sees the Polish military regime move toward a genuine political accommodation by permitting a free atmosphere of negotiation by free men, we will be prepared to help economically.⁶⁷

As before the declaration of martial law, bilateral relations with Poland focused on economic aid, this time with the White House dangling continued economic aid to mitigate the PZPR's repressive policies.

Imposing Sanctions

With frustration increasing, the Reagan administration took stock of its options. As the senior policy maker on Eastern Europe in the NSC, Pipes found himself scrambling to put together a possible list of actions.⁶⁸ According to contingency planning from January 1981 for the use of "significant force by the Polish government," the Americans could choose from the following responses: threaten the Polish ambassador with a severe economic cutback; recall the American ambassador; restrict debt rescheduling; cut off Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) agricultural credits; withhold Export-Import Bank (Ex-Im Bank) financing; signal to private banks to restrict financial

⁶⁷ Cable from Secstate to Amembassy Warsaw, "Polish Ambassador on Situation in Poland," dated December 18, 1981, NSA, Soviet Flashpoints Originals, Box 2.

⁶⁸ *Wejda nie Wejda*, 308.

agreements; decrease fishing allocations; restrict trade through export controls and COCOM; raise the issue in the CSCE, International Labor Organization (ILO), and the U.N. Human Rights Commission; intensify consultations with NATO, Yugoslavia, and Romania; send a private message to the Soviet Union advocating restraint and non-interference in Poland's internal affairs; and make strong public statements urging against interference in Poland's internal affairs.⁶⁹

The first and last steps had already been taken, so most actions available now fell within the realm of economic sanctions. However, the Americans knew that their economic leverage in Poland was limited. Writing on December 17 to Haig, Assistant Secretary for European Affairs Lawrence Eagleburger and Assistant Secretary for Economic and Business Affairs Robert Hormats explained that the primary point of Western leverage came from debt servicing payments to Western governments and private banks. Poland was also reliant on the West for cash and Western industrial and agricultural goods. According to the memo, the Poles could probably meet their obligations to purchase Western goods with funds from their own exports in 1982, "but they cannot finance their debt service payments." Therefore, "Western governments have maximum economic leverage as long as the Poles continue to accept an obligation to pay their western currency debt." For any economic sanctions on the contingency list to be effective, private banks would have to be convinced not to declare Poland's loans in default. This is exactly what Haig recommended for Secretary of the Treasury Don Regan to tell American bankers, under strict secrecy.⁷⁰

⁶⁹ For document info see footnote 15.

⁷⁰ Memorandum from Lawrence Eagleburger and Robert Hormats to the Secretary, "Western Economic Leverage on Poland and Secure Phone Call to Regan," dated December 17, 1981, NSA Soviet Flashpoints, Box 26, Dec 1-22, 1981.

Full NSC meetings were called on December 19, 21, 22, and 23 to discuss Poland. By this point, however, the response to martial law was no longer just a matter of reacting to Poland and the Poles. From the beginning of the martial law crisis, the Reagan administration believed that the Kremlin should be punished for its complicity in the crackdown. Although intelligence from Kuklinski was not employed to predict martial law, it was quickly exploited to confirm Soviet involvement in Poland. On December 15, Haig reported to the Western Allies that, "for some time our government has been holding very sensitive intelligence which convincingly confirms that the Soviets were intimately involved with the Polish government from the outset in the planning of this weekend's operation."⁷¹ Marshal Kulikov had, in fact, traveled to be in Warsaw on December 11. The White House interpreted this as further evidence of Soviet complicity. As State explained to the Allies, Jaruzelski was a "tool of the Soviets. . . . No reasonable man can believe that this tragedy would be happening without Soviet pressure. The degree of their direct involvement . . . is largely irrelevant."⁷² At his December 17 press conference, Reagan went public with a simple but persuasive argument: "It would be naive to think [that martial law could be declared] without the full knowledge and the support of the Soviet Union. We're not naive."⁷³ These sentiments were repeated in private the following day when Under Secretary Stoessel met with Soviet ambassador to the United States Anatoly Dobrynin, to warn that "if the present situation continued . . . it would inevitably have an adverse impact on U.S.-Soviet relations, since the influence of

⁷¹ Cable from Secstate to Amembassy Bonn, London, and Paris, "Message from the Secretary," dated December 15, 1981, NSA, Soviet Flashpoints Originals, Box 1.

⁷² Cable from Secstate to Amembassy Paris, London, and Bonn, "Messages for Cheysson, Carrington and Genscher from the Secretary," December 19, 1981, NSA, Soviet Flashpoints Originals, Box 2.

⁷³ See footnote 66.

the Soviets in Poland was overwhelming."⁷⁴

Moreover, these internal discussions and Reagan's public comments about Soviet complicity were consistent with Reagan's longstanding opinions of the Communist system. In Reagan's worldview, Moscow treated Eastern Europe as a colonial possession, so it would be inconsistent to believe that Jaruzelski had acted on his own to promote his own conception of Polish national interests.⁷⁵ This view at least partially explains the fact that the Reagan administration had not done more to prepare for martial law. The Soviet Union had been the focus of American statements on the Polish crisis, because Washington assumed that any resolution to the crisis would be imposed by Moscow.

More importantly, Reagan and neo-conservative members of his administration viewed the declaration of martial law as a real opportunity to act proactively to decrease Soviet capabilities in the world, possibly even to change the global balance of power. Reacting to martial law gave the Reagan White House a chance to intensify their battle against Communism in general. As Reagan wrote in his diary, "This may be the last chance in our lifetime to see a change in the Soviet empire's colonial policy re Eastern Europe."⁷⁶ Reagan and his advisors viewed Solidarność as the kind of organization that could undermine Communist power in Eastern Europe, and they certainly were not going to abandon their hopes now that Solidarność was under attack. Even more grandly,

⁷⁴ Cable from Secstate to Amembassy Moscow and Warsaw, "Poland: Discussion with Ambassador Dobrynin December 18," dated December 22, 1981, NSA, Soviet Flashpoints Originals, Box 1.

⁷⁵ For an excellent study of Reagan's longstanding views on Communism and his struggle against it, see Schweizer's *Reagan's War*. The internal Polish-Soviet struggle over martial law was much more complex than Reagan's simplistic characterization. As Hope Harrison and other scholars have convincingly argued in other situations, Eastern European leaders did not simply do as they were told by the Soviets. This was certainly the case in Poland in 1981. Interestingly, Jaruzelski has argued similarly to Reagan's point: he imposed martial law under extreme pressure from the USSR and only did so to preclude the introduction of Soviet troops. The question of whether the Soviet's would have sent troops into Poland remains a matter of historical debate. The central point, however, is that Reagan believed that martial law was declared in response to Soviet pressure. There is nothing in the historical record to dispute this interpretation.

⁷⁶ As quoted in *Reagan's War*, 166. For the full entry, dated December 21, see: Reagan, *The Reagan Diaries*, ed. by Douglas Brinkley (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 2007), 57.

Reagan believed that they had been handed an historical opportunity to turn back Communism. Reagan considered this opportunity akin to Franklin Roosevelt's decision to lead America into World War II to defeat fascism. He was inspired by his "mounting fury against the communists" and his sense that Poland was "the last chance of a lifetime to go against this damned force."⁷⁷ Reagan believed himself to be charged with the historical mission of defeating Communism, and the declaration of martial law and the possibility of supporting Solidarność gave him the opportunity to push this mission. As Pipes recalls, "The president was gung-ho, ready to go."⁷⁸

This call for a proactive response to martial law was not only confined to the more neo-conservative members of Reagan's cabinet. Looking toward global geopolitical options in the first days after martial law, the State Department sought indirect means to punish the Soviets, including: to look into ways to send more direct U.S arms aid (included shoulder-fired surface-to-air missiles, mines, and explosives) to Afghan rebels; to discuss with other government agencies covert aid to Central America, Ethiopia, and other areas; to increase Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty broadcasts targeted against the Soviets and the Warsaw Pact; and to plan for "strategic consultations" with the Chinese.⁷⁹ The declaration of martial law was seen as much as an opportunity to "take it to" the Soviets as it was seen as a setback for Poland and the Poles.

A week after the declaration of martial law as it became clear that martial law would not be temporary, the White House grew more vocal about Soviet complicity and the NSC began to discuss the possibility of sanctions against both Poland and the USSR.

⁷⁷ Pipes, *Vixi*, 171.

⁷⁸ As quoted in Schweizer, *Reagan's War*, 165.

⁷⁹ Memo from Richard Burt to the Secretary, "Poland: Current U.S. Geopolitical Options," dated December 19, 1981, NSA, Soviet Flashpoints Originals, Box 2.

The president was the most vocal proponent for tough action on sanctions. On the other side, Haig was concerned about relations with the Allies, and Commerce Secretary Malcolm Baldrige, Agriculture Secretary John Block, and Treasury Secretary Regan worried about the effects of economic sanctions on American businesses.⁸⁰ The main discussions, therefore, revolved around the extent of sanctions. On December 19 the NSC resolved to suspend the remaining shipment of surplus dairy products to Poland (which had been previously allocated), suspend renewal of Ex-Im Bank insurance and activate "international organizations (U.N. Secretary General, U.N. Human Rights Commission, and the ILO) to weigh in on human rights questions." The NSC also opted against declaring Poland in default on its debt agreement and in favor of delaying an International Harvester license for exports to the USSR. Additional options under consideration at the December 21 NSC meeting vis-à-vis Poland included: suspending its request to join the IMF, invoking tougher COCOM standards, reconsidering fishing allocations in American waters, writing a presidential letter to Jaruzelski, advising private banks not to declare Poland in default, and calling for a Papal visit.⁸¹

While disagreements in the NSC about sanctions policy regarding Poland were mild, the NSC was more deeply divided about how to respond to the Soviets. In meetings chaired by Acting Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Admiral John Nance, DCI Casey wanted "forceful measures," with Regan, Baldrige, and Block arguing for either massive punishment or no punishment at all (in effect arguing for no punishment, given that it was unlikely that extreme measures would be employed). Al

⁸⁰ Pipes, *Vixi*, 171.

⁸¹ Memorandum for James Nance, "Discussion Paper for NSC Meeting," dated December 21, 1981, NSA, Soviet Flashpoints, Box 26, December 1-22, 1981." It is interesting to note that almost all of these provisions are drawn from the January 1981 contingency plans for martial law.

Haig took a "centrist" position, somewhere between the two.⁸² At the December 21 NSC meetings, these three groups were given a laundry list of eighteen possible actions to consider against the Soviets. They included: a letter to Brezhnev; recalling Ambassador Arthur Hartman from Moscow; suspending or delaying new talks on long-term grain agreements and maritime agreements; arranging high-level consultations with NATO allies, Japan, and China; suspending Aeroflot flights; halting "the export of oil and gas equipment to the Soviet Union"; reconsidering export licenses for American pipe-laying equipment; strengthening American and Allied agreements for COCOM restrictions; an embargo on all new contracts for exports to the USSR; and denying new official credits, credit guarantees, and credit insurance for exports to the USSR. Regarding internationally coordinated actions against the Soviets, the December 21 discussion included the possibility of calling an emergency sessions of NATO foreign ministers and the U.N. Security council, postponing the resumption of CSCE talks in Madrid, conducting an "extensive campaign of public condemnation," postponing INF negotiations, and suspending MBFR negotiations.⁸³

The NSC met again on December 23 to continue discussing options against the Soviet Union and to approve a final list of sanctions against Poland. The Department of State created a comprehensive list of economic sanctions ordered from "limited" to "severe." In addition to options explained earlier, the list included limited steps such as suspending activities of the Joint American-Polish Trade Commission, requesting suspension of activities by the private Polish-U.S. Economic Council, canceling both government and private American participation in the Poznań Trade Fair, reducing the

⁸² Pipes, *Vixi*, 171.

⁸³ Memorandum for James Nance, "Discussion Paper for NSC Meeting," dated December 21, 1981.

number of personnel allowed at the Polish commercial office in New York, and suspending all LOT flights. The "medium" range of options comprised steps to suspend technology transfer, to restrict Polish access to American ports, and to complicate business contact between the two countries by calling on American businesses to curtail their contacts and by limiting visas for Poles coming to the United States. "Strong" options included withholding fisheries and restrictively enforcing an agreement on import quotas for Polish textiles. "Severe" options included continued suspension of funds for agricultural aid, concerted opposition to IMF membership, pushing for hard requirements on Poland's international debt and rescheduling agreements to force default, working with private banks to force default, calling for a full embargo on Polish imports, and suspending Poland's MFN status.⁸⁴

The final decision on imposing economic sanctions on Poland was articulated on December 23 and drew from all four levels of options. In a letter sent to Jaruzelski that day, Reagan recognized the "considerable external pressure to roll back reforms" and maintained that the United States was not questioning Poland's choice of political system or military alliances. However, he wrote "the United States government cannot sit by and ignore the widespread violation of human rights occurring in Poland. To do so would make us party to the repression of the rights of the Polish people." He then went on to list economic sanctions taken against Poland, making clear that his government was no longer considering the request for \$740 million in agricultural aid (including \$100 million in emergency aid that had already been approved), nor would the United States deliver remainder (about 10 percent) of \$74 million in dried milk and butter that the U.S. had

⁸⁴ Briefing Paper, "Possible Economic Sanctions against Poland," revised December 23, 1981, NSA, Soviet Flashpoints, Box 27, December 23-25, 1981.

agreed to provide the previous April. The letter also threatened to take further action if repression continued unchanged or increased. The letter ended on an optimistic note stating that Washington would reconsider these sanctions once the PZPR had "taken concrete steps to end repression, freed those who have been subject to arbitrary detention, and begun a search for reconciliation and a negotiated accommodation with the true representatives of all of the social, spiritual, and political elements of Polish society . . .

"85

Addressing the American public in a prime-time message on the same night, the president spoke about the meaning of Christmas and made public his decision to impose economic sanctions on Poland. Focusing again on human rights violations and in a clear reference to both Poland and the Soviet Union, the president said, "I want emphatically to state tonight that if the outrages in Poland do not cease, we cannot and will not conduct 'business as usual' with the perpetrators and those who aid and abet them." He then went on to outline the specific new steps taken to respond to martial law: halting the renewal of Export-Import Bank insurance credits, suspending all LOT flights to and from the United States, suspending Poland's rights to fish in American waters, and working with NATO to "increase restrictions on technology trade with Poland." Again, Reagan threatened further steps if repression continued, and elucidated a slightly different set of conditions necessary for reconsidering sanctions. In the public formulation, the president called for the PZPR to "free those in arbitrary detention, to lift martial law, and to restore the internationally recognized rights of the Polish people to free speech and association." The president concluded his message with symbolic flair, calling for all Americans to place a

⁸⁵ Letter from Ronald Reagan to General Wojciech Jaruzelski, dated December 23, 1981, MSZ, 30/85, W-1, Dep III (1982), AP 22-2-82.

candle in their window "as a beacon of our solidarity with the Polish people. . . . Let the light of millions of candles in American homes give notice that the light of freedom is not going to be extinguished."⁸⁶

Thus, on December 23, the White House ended its period of cautious non-comments on Poland. The White House took actions it considered "severe" by suspending previously approved agricultural aid and suspending consideration of future aid. It also took the "strong" step of suspending fishing rights and the "medium" steps of suspending LOT flights and weakening Polish-American commercial relations by suspending consideration of Export-Import credit insurance. Smaller actions regarding joint trade commissions and trade fairs did not merit announcement during prime time, but were exercised quietly. Importantly, the White House also kept its strongest options in reserve: declaring Poland in default, rescinding MFN, and blocking Poland's entrance into the IMF. Reserving these options gave the administration flexibility to take future steps in the situation worsened. IMF membership and default issues also had implications for multi-lateral agreements, complicating the possibility of unilateral action. Over the coming years, however, each of these strongest options was reconsidered and either acted upon or discarded (see chapter 2).

Sanctioning the Soviets

By December 23, the Reagan administration had already begun moving beyond sanctions against Poland and was focusing on the Kremlin. Reagan's Christmas speech had, in fact, noted that "through its threats and pressures" the Soviet Union "deserves a

⁸⁶ "Address to the Nation about Christmas and the Situation in Poland, December 23, 1981," in *Public Papers* (1981), available on the Reagan Library's website: www.reagan.utexas.edu.

major share of blame for the developments in Poland." Reagan also publicly acknowledged that he had sent a letter to Brezhnev urging him to allow the Poles to take steps to end repression and threatening punitive actions against the Soviets if the situation did not improve.⁸⁷ This letter outlined American arguments about Soviet interference in internal Polish matters and invoked the Helsinki Final Act to justify American policy towards the Poles. In his response, Brezhnev rebuffed Reagan's arguments, completely rejecting claims of Soviet interference. The first secretary also condemned the United States for interfering in sovereign affairs by declaring sanctions in response to an internal Polish decision. The CPSU leaders also "resolutely" rejected calls for changes in the Communist system and claimed that American statements in support of change in Poland, both before and after the declaration of martial law, constituted American interference in Polish and Communist bloc affairs. Brezhnev further rejected Reagan's use of the Helsinki Final Act, reminding the president that this international accord "stipulates the refraining from any interference in affairs which come under the internal competence of another state" and arguing that American sanctions are "thoroughly amoral, and no sort of word game regarding the rights of man can conceal this fact." Brezhnev concluded by insinuating that the tone of Reagan's letter was offensive and inappropriate for superpower communications, but that the Soviet Union hoped to continue conversations about the arms race and attempts to "preserve peace on earth."⁸⁸

As Pipes recalls, this response "made sanctions against the USSR inevitable."⁸⁹

⁸⁷ "Address to the Nation about Christmas and the Situation in Poland, December 23, 1981."

⁸⁸ A translation of the Russian version of Brezhnev's letter to Reagan can be found as "Hotline Communication from Leonid Brezhnev to Ronald Reagan regarding Martial Law in Poland, December 25, 1981," in *Documentary History*, 496-498. The quotes in this paragraph are taken from: Cable from Secstate to Amembassy Moscow and Warsaw, "Brezhnev—Reagan Letter," dated December 26, 1981, NSA, Soviet Flashpoints Originals, Box 1.

⁸⁹ Pipes, *Vixi*, 173.

NSC members and State officials met on December 27 to discuss the letter, and on December 28 Vice President Bush chaired a meeting of a Special Situation Group to discuss the proper response. The next day, Haig sent a letter to Soviet foreign minister Gromyko that "in light of President Brezhnev's response . . . we can only conclude that thus far your government is unwilling to help bring about the process of national reconciliation" in Poland. The letter then explained the list of economic sanctions that would be taken.⁹⁰ In a statement later that day, President Reagan made these sanctions public. Arguing that the "Soviet Union [bore] a heavy and direct responsibility for the repression in Poland." The list of steps taken by the United States included:

- All Aeroflot service to the United States will be suspended.
- The Soviet Purchasing Commission is being closed.
- The issuance or renewal of licenses for the export to the U.S.S.R. of electronic equipment, computers and other high-technology materials is being suspended.
- Negotiations on a new long-term grains agreement are being postponed.
- Negotiations on a new U.S.-Soviet Maritime Agreement are being suspended, and a new regime of port-access controls will be put into effect for all Soviet ships when the current agreement expires on December 31.
- Licenses will be required for export to the Soviet Union for an expanded list of oil and gas equipment. Issuance of such licenses will be suspended. This includes pipelayers.
- U.S.-Soviet exchange agreements coming up for renewal in the near future, including the agreements on energy and science and technology, will not be renewed. There will be a complete review of all other U.S.-Soviet exchange agreements.⁹¹

President Reagan concluded by saying that the United States was willing to pursue improved relations, but in a jab at policies pursued under détente, he said that "American

⁹⁰ Cable from Secstate to Amembassy Moscow, "Letter from Secretary Haig to Foreign Minister Gromyko," dated December 29, 1981, NSA, Soviet Flashpoints Originals, Box 2.

⁹¹ "Statement on U.S. Measures Taken Against the Soviet Union Concerning Its Involvement in Poland, December 29, 1981," in *Public Papers* (1981), available on the Reagan Library's website: www.reagan.utexas.edu.

decisions will be determined by Soviet actions." With this announcement, the Reagan administration completed a second decisive unilateral policy, imposing sanctions on both Jaruzelski in Belvedere Palace and his overseers in the Kremlin.

As with sanctions imposed against Poland the final list of actions against the Soviet Union was not as harsh as it could have been. Most notably, the White House decided only to suspend negotiations on new grain agreements (rather than imposing a grain embargo as the Carter administration had following the invasion of Afghanistan) and did not take moves to suspend arms negotiations for either INF or MBFR. Regarding grain sales, Reagan had lifted the embargo the previous April because he had long felt that the embargo overly burdened American farmers. Given the recentness of the decision and Reagan's convictions, the option of reinstating the embargo in response to martial law was never on the table.⁹² On the issue of suspending arms negotiations, pragmatists in the Department of State convinced the president that stepping away from arms negotiations would severely alarm European allies, decreasing the likelihood that they would come into line with Washington's more reserved list of sanctions. As Haig explained to Genscher in a December 29 letter, "We have taken no decisions that would affect the INF negotiations. The president recognizes the special character of these negotiations, and we do not intend to alter our stance under present conditions."⁹³ The president and the NSC were not such convinced unilateralists, nor angry enough over two weeks after the declaration of martial law to risk torpedoing the entire sanctions policy by

⁹² For a discussion of the decision to lift the embargo, see Raymond Garthoff, *The Great Transition* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1994), 45-46.

⁹³ Cable from SecState to Amembassys Bonn, Paris, and London, "Poland: Message for the Foreign Minister," dated December 29, 1981, NSA, Soviet Flashpoints Originals, Box 1. This decision is also indicative of Reagan's emphasis on the special importance of arms reductions, even early on in this first term.

pushing a wildly unpopular policy. As the Reagan administration knew, sanctions would not be as effective without Allied coordination.

Getting the Allies in Line

Even before the martial law crisis, the Department of State had been working hard to communicate and coordinate with NATO members on their response to events in Poland. A full year before the declaration of martial law, the North Atlantic Council (NAC) of NATO met to discuss how to respond to the use of force in Poland. This earlier coordination with NATO focused on contingency plans for responding to a direct Soviet intervention in Poland: in December 1980, the Carter administration recognized the possibility of "Polish use of force against elements of the population" but felt that for the NAC it was "more profitable to focus our attention on the issue of what we would do in response to full-scale Soviet intervention." These contingency agreements were meant to be flexible according to the exact situation that arose, and the agreements included incremental steps for situations that did not involve Soviet troops directly—known as "gray area" scenarios.⁹⁴ So while NATO did not have contingency plans if martial law was imposed without a clear Soviet intervention, NATO did at least have a basic list of actions with which to begin the conversation.

When martial law was declared, Haig was already in Brussels for an annual meeting of the NAC. British foreign secretary Lord Peter Carrington was also in Brussels, with German foreign minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher and French foreign minister Claude Cheysson on their way. With a distinct lack of information, there was a

⁹⁴ Cable from Secstate to USMission NATO, "Guidance on Poland Contingencies," dated December 4, 1980, NSA, Soviet Flashpoints Originals, Box 1.

frenzy of activity in Brussels on December 13, but little concrete action was taken. Haig focused instead on maintaining close contact with the Allies and to "lead the alliance in these early hours." On the evening of December 13, Joseph Luns, NATO secretary general, called a meeting of the "quad"—the foreign ministers of Britain, France, West Germany, and the United States—to facilitate coordination and exchange intelligence and early assessments. After these meetings, which were more symbolic than substantive, Haig left Brussels to return to Washington.⁹⁵ In Warsaw, the envoys from NATO countries also met to swap intelligence and reports on what they knew.⁹⁶

In the first days after the declaration of martial law, each ally took individual public stances on Poland, mixing tough talk with sympathetic words. President Francois Mitterand's government issued a statement that France "deplores the chain of events," but Cheysson added that "the matter remained an 'internal Polish affair that must be handled by the Poles."⁹⁷ Lord Carrington issued a statement that the British "shall observe a policy of strict non-intervention, and we expect the same of all signatories of the Helsinki Final Act."⁹⁸ West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, who had been meeting in Berlin with East German leader Erich Honecker when martial law was declared, took a similar tact that "all the nations that signed the Helsinki declaration on European security should adhere to its non-intervention principle." The West Germans went a step further, releasing a statement that West Germany was following events in Poland with "sympathy

⁹⁵ For Haig's account of these first few hours see, *Caveat*, 247-251, quoted 249.

⁹⁶ Cable from Amembassy Warsaw to Secstate, "NATO Ambassadors' Report," dated December 15, 1981, NSA, Soviet Flashpoints, Box 26, December 1-22, 1981.

⁹⁷ Maureen Johnson, "Deep Concern in the West, Protests at Polish Embassies," *Associated Press* (Dec. 13, 1981), accessed via Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe.

⁹⁸ Mark S. Smith, "International News," *Associated Press* (Dec. 14, 1981), accessed via Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe.

and concern."⁹⁹ By invoking the sovereignty clause of the Helsinki Accords, the West Europeans were signaling to the Soviets that they should not intervene militarily in Poland. However, the West Europeans were simultaneously acknowledging that martial law was an internal, sovereign matter implicitly accepting part of General Jaruzelski's argument for how and why martial law was declared.¹⁰⁰ These signals, particularly when combined with declarations of sympathy, called into question whether the West Europeans would be willing to impose sanctions on the Poles, let alone the Soviet Union.

In Washington, Reagan's cabinet received the Europeans' comments with trepidation. European statements did not evoke the anger felt by Washington or the American belief that events in Poland presented an opportunity for the West to stand up against the injustice and tyranny of Communism in Eastern Europe. So, the State Department moved to bring the NATO allies more in line with the American position.¹⁰¹ This offensive began on December 15, when Haig sending a letter to Cheysson, Carrington, and Genscher pointing out that "for some time our government has been holding very sensitive intelligence which convincingly confirms that the Soviets were intimately involved . . . in the planning of this weekend's operation." This information was not for public pronouncements, but was to show the Europeans "the realities of the situation . . . and about the general environment in which [they were] operating."¹⁰² A similar letter sent the following day questioned the validity and relevance of Jaruzelski's

⁹⁹ "International," *United Press International* (Dec. 14, 1981), accessed via Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe.

¹⁰⁰ See discussion of December 14 meeting with Ambassador Spasowski above, as well as footnote 48.

¹⁰¹ For a more recent criticism of the European allies' reaction which reflects thinking at the time see, Schweizer, *Victory* (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 1994). For a broader discussion of West European statements and trans-Atlantic tensions see Helene Sjursen, *The United States, Western Europe and the Polish Crisis: International Relations in the Second Cold War* (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2003), esp. 63-89.

¹⁰² Cable from Secstate to Amembassy Bonn, London, and Paris, "Message from the Secretary," dated December 15, 1981.

argument that martial law was "established by Polish nationalists in order to avoid Soviet intervention." The secretary's point was to push the three allies to increase pressure on the Poles "to restore the reform process" and "a genuine process of negotiation and reconciliation," and not regress to a pre-August 1980 situation.¹⁰³

In Brussels, the NAC was simultaneously discussing possible NATO responses, with negotiations focusing on implementing the "gray area" contingencies agreed to earlier in 1981. The State Department took an incremental view that coordination with the NAC was not meant to move the Europeans to a particular position on Poland, but to exchange information and act "as a stage-setter for possible follow-on consideration of alliance actions as events in Poland unfold."¹⁰⁴ However, the Americans faced an uphill climb; Canada, West Germany, and Norway all agreed with Jaruzelski's argument that martial law was imposed to prevent chaos from engulfing Poland. The French, British, and Italians appeared closer to American thinking, but U.S. reporting gave a clear sense that it would be difficult to push economic sanctions through the NATO framework.¹⁰⁵

The Americans' full-court press on NATO began in earnest following Reagan's initial statement on Poland on December 17. U.S. Ambassador to NATO William Bennet, Jr. focused conversation on the worsening situation and "clear and gross violation of the Helsinki Final Act," as well as violations of standards of diplomatic conduct. (NATO members were unanimously upset that the Poles had cut telecommunication lines for

¹⁰³ Action Memorandum from Lawrence Eagleburger to the Secretary, "Consultations with the Allies on Poland," dated December 18, 1981, from Byrne, Malcolm, Pawel Machcewicz and Christian F. Ostermann, eds., *Poland 1980-1982: Internal Crisis, International Dimensions, A Compendium of Declassified Documents and Chronology of Events* (Washington, D.C.: The National Security Archive, 1997). Copies are available through the National Security Archive.

¹⁰⁴ Cable from Secstate to USMission NATO, "Poland: Dec 16 NAC on 'Gray Area' Scenario," NSA, Soviet Flashpoints Originals, Box 1.

¹⁰⁵ Cable from USMission NATO to Secstate, "Poland: Dec 16 NAC on Gray Area Scenarios," NSA, Soviet Flashpoints Originals, Box 1.

foreign embassies.) Bennet blamed both the PZPR and the CPSU for these developments. The American ambassador also asked that each national government intensify their statements. In coordination with the Americans, both the French and the British planned to make strong protests at an upcoming meeting of the CSCE in Madrid. Canada and West Germany remained reluctant to toughen their rhetoric, although most other Europeans were beginning align with the American position.¹⁰⁶

American pressure also continued directly from Washington. On December 19, Haig sent another letter to Cheysson, Carrington, and Genscher, warning that the West was "facing a critical, possibly tragic juncture in Poland." The letter stated:

To forestall further repression, disintegration, and possible Soviet intervention, we must act urgently and simultaneously on two fronts:

— We must bring pressure to bear on Jaruzelski to make some move toward reconciliation with the Church and Solidarity.

— And we must take steps to make clear to the Soviets that we understand the key role they are already playing and to make more credible our deterrent to their own intervening. . . .

. . . We do need political and economic measures which we can take now and which we could take if the situation grows even more ominous.

Haig called on his colleagues to view the situation in Poland in terms of its "genuine historical importance," and even tried to shame them into action: "Western inaction at this time will not be forgotten by those who assess the character of our nations and our individual qualities as statesmen in the years to come."¹⁰⁷ A day later, Reagan followed Haig's message with a personal letter of his own to Mitterand, Thatcher, and Schmidt, giving his "personal assessment of the situation." He called Poland a "watershed in the political history of mankind—a challenge to tyranny from within." Echoing earlier

¹⁰⁶ Cable from USMission NATO to Secstate, "Poland: NAC Discussion on Allied Public Posture," dated December 19, 1981, NSA, Flashpoints Originals, Box 1.

¹⁰⁷ Cable from Secstate to Amembassy Paris, London, and Bonn, "Message for Cheysson, Carrington, and Genscher from the Secretary," dated December 19, 1981, NSA, Soviet Flashpoints Originals, Box 2.

communications, Reagan pleaded, "There are measures we can take now to help prevent both further repression and Soviet intervention. These measures must be addressed to the Soviet Union as well as to the Polish regime."¹⁰⁸ This letter reflected the president's deep anti-Communist convictions and his belief that the world had been presented with a historical opportunity to confront the Soviets, and it showed where Washington was heading: toward political and economic sanctions against both Poland and the Soviet Union.

To work out the details for an Allied response, Eagleburger was dispatched to Europe. In Rome he met with the Pope at the Vatican to share intelligence and to brief the Church on American policy. Because the Pope was a public figure closely tied to Poland, the White House knew that John Paul's public pronouncements could put added public pressure on the Europeans. Therefore, it was essential to keep the Pope well informed on American policy to influence the Vatican to make statements that would support America's strong response against both Poland and the Soviet Union. Eagleburger also met with Italian foreign minister Emilio Colombo, where the Americans found basic agreement with their policies; Italian trade unions had raised a public outcry about the treatment of Solidarność, pushing Italian public opinion toward the American position.¹⁰⁹ The Italians and the Americans saw eye-to-eye so well that the U.S. wanted to bring the Italians into the quad discussions on Poland.¹¹⁰

From Rome, Eagleburger flew to Bonn on December 21 where he met with

¹⁰⁸ Cable from Secstate to Amembassy Paris, London, and Bonn, "Message for Mitterand, Thatcher, and Schmidt from the President," dated December 20, 1981, NSA, Soviet Flashpoints Originals, Box 2.

¹⁰⁹ Michael Getler, "U.S. Seeks European Support for Moves Directed at Soviet Union," *Washington Post* (Dec. 22, 1981): A12.

¹¹⁰ No declassified record of Eagleburger's meeting with the Pope or Colombo exists. For the American attitude on bringing the Italians into the quad, see footnote 112.

Genscher for an hour and a half. The West German foreign minister was "not as reluctant as expected," and the two found considerable agreement on the need to use economic measures against Poland.¹¹¹ In return Eagleburger shared Reagan and Haig's very confidential belief "that General Jaruzelski just might succeed in suppressing Solidarity and convincing the Soviets that he has rolled back reform." Eagleburger provided the usual litany of evidence proving Soviet involvement in Poland, and Genscher conceded that political actions against the Soviets were necessary, particularly a presidential letter to Brezhnev.¹¹² Eagleburger's analysis of the conversation was, however, that the Americans would have to "play hell getting him [Genscher] to accept more than political moves [against the Soviets] immediately." Eagleburger also succeeded in getting Genscher to agree that the United States would be allowed to put all issues on the table at the next meeting of the quad.¹¹³ From Bonn, Eagleburger flew to Paris and London to coordinate with more like-minded allies, before returning to Washington.

At a December 23 meeting of the NAC, American efforts to turn European opinion began to show growing consensus with American positions. First the British called for action against the Poles and Soviets at the upcoming CSCE meeting in Madrid. The British also reported that the European Community (EC-10) had agreed to suspend shipments of beef to Poland until it could be guaranteed that the food was delivered to its intended recipients. The Danes approved stronger COCOM restrictions. Of all of the Europeans, the Italians took the hardest line, supporting Haig's earlier letter and flatly stated that they would have trouble continuing their current economic relationship with

¹¹¹ Cable from Amembassy Brussels to Secstate, "My Meeting with Genscher," dated December 21, 1981, NSA, Soviet Flashpoints Originals, Box 1.

¹¹² Cable from Amembassy Brussels to Secstate, "Eagleburger-Genscher Meeting on Poland, December 21," dated December 22, 1981, NSA Soviet Flashpoints Originals, Box 4.

¹¹³ Cable from Amembassy Brussels to Secstate, "My Meeting with Genscher," dated December 21, 1981.

Poland. The West Germans, however, remained the key stumbling block. They argued against calling a special ministerial-level NAC meeting to discuss Poland. They also rejected economic measures and opposed using CSCE as a forum to present Western disgust regarding Poland.¹¹⁴ Following continued efforts to take advantage of European public opinion and to lobby European representatives directly, the United States did finally succeed in getting a ministerial-level NAC meeting scheduled for January.¹¹⁵

The Poles also began to lobby their friends in the West. As Foreign Minister Czyrek articulated, "The position of Western Europe is positive for us: they are not joining the American economic sanctions."¹¹⁶ To maintain this advantage, the PZPR sent Central Committee member and Deputy Prime Minister Mieczysław Rakowski to Bonn on December 30 to meet with Genscher. The two talked frankly about the situation in Poland, the Church's evolving role, and the possibility of a return to dialogue. Genscher explained that December 13 was a "shock" for the Germans, but this shock was not enough to cause the West Germans to take a harder stance against the Poles. To assure Rakowski, Genscher said that he did not "want to appear to be judging" the Poles, and near the end of the conversation, he told his Polish colleague, "We must continue a dialogue, we will do our best to help Poland."¹¹⁷ So, at the end of 1981 Americans still had their work cut out for them to get complete Allied support for sanctions against

¹¹⁴ See Cable from Secstate info to Amembassy Tokyo, "(U) Poland: NAC Discussion December 23," dated December 30, 1981; and Cable from Secstate info to Amembassy Tokyo, "Poland: December 23 NAC Consultations," dated December 30, 1981; both in NSA, Soviet Flashpoints Originals, Box 4.

¹¹⁵ The ministerial-level meeting was agreed to at a December 30 meeting of the NAC. For American efforts to influence European public opinion, see: Memo from Alexander Haig to the President, "Influencing European Attitudes on Poland," dated December 26, 1981, in Byrne, Machcewicz, and Ostermann, eds, *Poland 1980-1982*. For direct lobbying efforts see: Cable from Secstate to EC Collective, "Secretary's December 28 Luncheon Meeting with EC-10 Ambassadors in Washington," dated December 30, 1981, NSA, Soviet Flashpoints Originals, Box 4.

¹¹⁶ "Protocol No. 16 of PUWP CC Politburo Meeting, December 19, 1981," in *Documentary History*, 482-495; quoted at 483.

¹¹⁷ For Rakowski's account of the meeting and quoted comments, see his published diaries, *Dzienniki polityczne 1981-1983* (Warsaw: ISKRY, 2004), 151-152.

Poland.

While Genscher was meeting with Rakowski, Schmidt was already inside the United States, vacationing in Florida before meetings with Haig and Reagan on January 4 and 5. Haig explained the weight of the situation to the president as follows: "Given the FRG's political, economic, and military weight we need Germany almost as much as they need us, particularly on an issue such as Poland," adding, "dealing with Schmidt is difficult and frustrating. . . . On Poland, Schmidt is moving toward our position . . . and your meeting provides a good chance to bring him further along."¹¹⁸ Following Reagan's meeting with Schmidt on January 5 the two statesmen made a joint statement emphasizing that they "agreed on their analysis of the Polish situation" and worked very hard to show strong coordination and consensus between the allies. For the first time, Schmidt agreed with the president on "the responsibility of the Soviet Union for developments in Poland," but there was no consensus on specific punitive steps against either the Soviet Union or Poland.¹¹⁹ The next day, the press correctly interpreted this weak statement as a failure to move the FRG closer to the American position.¹²⁰

The depth of the disagreement between the United States and West Germany was more apparent when Haig and Schmidt met privately on January 6. Implicitly criticizing Reagan's earlier letters and statements Schmidt suggested that "the West needed to be

¹¹⁸ Memorandum from Alexander M. Haig to the President, "Visit of Helmut Schmidt, Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany, January 5, 1982," dated December 31, 1981, NSA, Soviet Flashpoints, Box 27, December 1981. See also Haig's memo after meeting with Schmidt: Memorandum from Alexander M. Haig to the President, "Your Meeting with Chancellor Schmidt," dated January 5, 1982, NSA, Soviet Flashpoints, Box 27, January 1982.

¹¹⁹ "Joint Statement Following a Meeting With Chancellor Helmut Schmidt of the Federal Republic of Germany January 5, 1982," *Public Papers* (1982), available on the Reagan Library's website: www.reagan.utexas.edu.

¹²⁰ See for example, Reginald Dale, "Reagan demands 'tangible' allied moves on Poland," *Financial Times* (Jan. 6, 1982): A1; as well as Don Oberdorfer, "Haig Silent on Future Sanctions," *Washington Post* (Jan. 7, 1982): A1.

realistic regarding the possibilities for change in Eastern Europe." Instead of entertaining the option of sanctions, Schmidt took the opposite approach and suggested that the West offer "massive foreign assistance under the conditions normally established for developing countries." Tensions grew to the point where the chancellor exclaimed that he would "not be blackmailed" by un-attributed threats of American troops pulling out of Germany, after which the conversation spiraled into a wide-ranging argument about the merits of détente and Ostpolitik with Schmidt arguing that the West needed to accept the "fact that changing the consequences of [World War II] and Yalta could very well involve a war in Europe."¹²¹ For the West Germans, Reagan's call to push for change in Eastern Europe and the American sanctions to punish the CPSU and the PZPR for their actions were provocative moves that could threaten stability in Europe. So, while West Germany made a few small concessions to the Reagan administration in public, in private the two remained deeply divided.

Having run into this wall, the secretary of state went back to work on drafting an Allied declaration to be presented at the special session of the NAC, scheduled for January 11. In a memo written prior to Schmidt's visit, State hoped that the NAC meeting would allow Washington "to pry loose some Allied sanctions against Poland and the Soviets . . . [and] to create a common overall policy for the longer haul The outcome we want is not a rhetorical declaration but a calm and sober agreed policy."¹²² After his last meeting with Schmidt, however, Haig approved a severely scaled-back version of a proposed Allied declaration on Poland. The first draft called for curtailing high-level

¹²¹ Memorandum of Conversation, "Secretary Haig's Breakfast Meeting with FRG Chancellor Schmidt," dated January 6, 1982, NSA, Soviet Flashpoints, Box 27, January 1982.

¹²² Action Memorandum from Lawrence Eagleburger to the Secretary, "Memorandum for the President on Poland, and Next Steps with the Allies," dated January 4, 1982, NSA, Soviet Flashpoints, Box 27, January 1982.

diplomatic visits with Poland and the USSR and listed specific economic sanctions (including redirecting commodity assistance to humanitarian assistance and suspending the "issuance of licenses on high technology *and* energy equipment"). The approved second draft, however, did not refer to specific steps but instead pushed for language which was supportive of Washington's position and which only committed the Allies to "do nothing to weaken the effects of" American sanctions.¹²³ At an NSC about the upcoming meeting, both Cap Weinberg and the president vocally disagreed with taking a more malleable line with the Allies.¹²⁴

When Haig returned to Brussels on January 10 for the special NAC session, he pursued the scaled-back package on sanctions, calling only for strong statements (not specific actions) and pushing for a statement about not interfering with individual ally's sanctions.¹²⁵ In the final NAC communiqué issued on January 11, NATO publicly condemned martial law, deplored Soviet pressure on the Poles, mentioned the "significance of the measures already announced by President Reagan," and pledged "not to undermine the effect of each other's measures." On the all important issue of sanctions, the Allies did take a few significant steps, they: suspended new credits to Poland, delayed consideration of rescheduling Poland's debt, and insured that humanitarian aid sent to Poland would reach the people. The statement, however, made no specific commitments to impose sanctions on the Soviet Union, only an agreement to consult and consider political and economic sanctions against the PZPR and the CPSU "in accordance with

¹²³ For the initial text, see: Action Memorandum from H. Allen Holmes to the Secretary, "The Alliance Declaration on Poland," dated January 5, 1982, published in *Poland 1980-1982*. For the approved text, see Action Memorandum from H. Allen Holmes to the Secretary, "Revised NATO Ministerial Declaration," dated January 6, 1982, NSA, Soviet Flashpoints, Box 27, January 1982.

¹²⁴ Pipes, *Vixi*, 177.

¹²⁵ Actual American records of the January 10-12 NAC have not been declassified. These statements are made based on the briefing materials and contingency plans created for Haig's trip. Those records can be found in: NSA, Soviet Flashpoints, Box 27, January 1982.

[each Allies'] own situation and laws."¹²⁶ When Haig left Brussels, he left on a positive note, saying, "I consider today's meeting to be a solid success for the alliance. ... We sought a common near-and-long-term strategy to help the Polish people, and today the alliance produced one."¹²⁷ No matter how he spun it, however, the communiqué was only a qualified success for the Americans. Suspending new credits, delaying debt rescheduling, and insuring aid went directly to the Polish people all had important long-term effects, but the actions taken by NATO lacked the immediate punch that more immediate economic sanctions would have delivered. In the thirty days following the declaration of martial law, the American government had succeeded in creating consensus in Washington about a punitive response to events in Poland, but this political will could not be exported to Europe.

The View from Warsaw

For General Jaruzelski and other members of the PZPR leadership, the political path pursued by the Reagan administration in the first thirty days after the declaration of martial law was not a primary concern. For the first few weeks after December 13, WRON—the Military Council for National Salvation—became the primary government body for coordinating martial law and met continuously. The measures undertaken as part of military rule were both expansive and draconian, with tens of thousands of MSW, milicja (police), and Army troops involved. Martial law restrictions consisted of imposing a nighttime curfew, restricting freedom of movement, banning all public meetings, closing all border crossings and ports of exit, limiting bank withdrawals,

¹²⁶ For the full text of the January 11 NAC Ministerial Communique, see the NATO website at: <http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c820111a.htm>.

¹²⁷ James Reston, "Haig's Verbal Success," *New York Times* (Jan. 12, 1982): A23.

introducing legal reforms including summary jurisdiction and expanding military courts, as well as suspending all secondary school and university classes.

Around 6,000 Solidarność activists were imprisoned in twenty-four interment centers. Most high-level Solidarność leaders were captured on their way to hotels in Gdańsk following a National Coordinating Commission meeting there. Wałęsa was apprehended the first night as well, and was flown to Warsaw against his will for talks with the PZPR leadership. A few central leaders, including Władysław Fransyniuk, Bodgan Lis, and Zbigniew Bujak managed to evade capture and immediately went "underground," carefully returning to their home districts to plan strike actions. These strike actions had little long-term effect. The military government successfully broke most occupation strikes with force, and with the exception of the Wujek mines, without a major loss of life. The last major strike ended by December 28.¹²⁸ By almost all accounts, martial law was executed "to perfection" and was successful in controlling the upper echelons of Solidarność.¹²⁹

At that point, the leadership's main concern became invigorating the party *aktiv* throughout the government bureaucracy. Solidarność's calls for pluralism and self-government prior to December 1981 had threatened the leaderships control by decentralizing power within the party. Party members had implemented "horizontal structures" for decision making (rather than vertical, top-down structures) in the party. Workers in the MSW had even taken steps to create a trade union.¹³⁰ Democratic centralism had been threatened, and Jaruzelski desperately needed to regain a strict measure of control over how the party functioned in order to have any chance of

¹²⁸ *Documentary History*, 514.

¹²⁹ *Ibid.*, 32.

¹³⁰ See Paczkowski, *Spring*, 420.

reforming the economy to a point where Poland could function well on its own.¹³¹

In terms of international relations, the Polish leadership turned first to its main ally. Jaruzelski's decision to declare martial law came as a great relief to Moscow. On December 13, Brezhnev called Jaruzelski to congratulate him and expressed "his warm feelings towards [Poland] and stated that we have effectively engaged the fight against the counterrevolution. They were difficult decisions, but appropriate ones." According to Jaruzelski his public announcement "met with high acclaim" in Moscow.¹³² Jaruzelski had finally taken the tough actions against Solidarność that the Soviets had been calling for since August 1980.

In relations with their Warsaw Pact allies, messages soon moved beyond congratulations; the Poles were desperately interested in increased economic aid as a reward for stabilizing the situation. Jaruzelski personally asked Brezhnev about the possibility of increasing aid during their December 13 conversation. That same day the Kremlin sent out a telegram to leaders in Czechoslovakia, Hungary, East Germany, Cuba, Mongolia, Vietnam, and Laos asking them to consider sending economic and political support to Poland.¹³³ The Hungarians acted most quickly by sending an official delegation to Warsaw on December 27-29 to discuss the Hungarian experience of rebuilding after the 1956 revolution.¹³⁴ By January 14, 1982, the Kremlin had also agreed

¹³¹ For a discussion of the spread of pluralism within the party, see *Documentary History*, 12-13. For a representative discussion of Jaruzelski's desire to reform the party following the imposition of martial law, see "Protocol No. 16 of PUWP CC Politburo Meeting, December 19, 1981," in *ibid.*, 482-495.

¹³² "Protocol No. 19 of PUWP CC Politburo Meeting, December 13, 1981," in *ibid.*, 461-472; quoted at 468.

¹³³ "Extract from Protocol No. 40 from CPSU CC Politburo Meeting, December 13, 1981," in *ibid.*, 473-474.

¹³⁴ For the Hungarian view of these meetings, see, "Hungarian Report to HSWP CC Politburo on Hungarian Delegation's Talks with Wojciech Jaruzelski, December 30, 1981," in *ibid.*, 499-503.

to increase grain, oil, gas, and benzene shipments to Poland.¹³⁵

Despite Soviet attempts to increase economic aid, the PZPR felt the sting of American sanctions almost immediately, specifically the suspension of consideration of \$740 million in agricultural aid, including an emergency appropriation of \$100 million which had already been approved at lower levels. The agricultural aid—mainly in the form of corn and grain—was earmarked to be used as feed for the Polish poultry industry—an important source of protein in a country where most ham was sold for export. As Jaruzelski proclaimed at a Politburo meeting on December 13, "The issue of buying corn in the USA is very important, the production of poultry will depend on that."¹³⁶ When word reached Warsaw on December 14 that Reagan had decided to suspend this aid, the Politburo became concerned about how a lack of grain would affect an already strained food situation. Five days later Central Committee member Marian Woźniak emphasized this point, arguing that, "The biggest problem is acquiring wheat and fodder outside the framework of the USA's embargo."¹³⁷ From the perspective of well-informed outsiders, the Pole's problems went well beyond the issue of chicken feed and grain. As a Hungarian delegation reported back to Budapest, "The present poor condition of the national economy is a major burden To make matters worse, the USA had just affected an economic blockade, thus badly affecting the economy which had developed a cooperative dependence on the economies of the capitalist countries over the past ten years."¹³⁸

¹³⁵ "Transcript of CPSU CC Politburo Meeting, January 14, 1981," in *ibid.*, 504-507.

¹³⁶ "Protocol No. 19 of PUWP CC Politburo Meeting, December 13, 1981," in *ibid.*, 461-472; quoted at 470.

¹³⁷ "Protocol No. 16 of PUWP CC Politburo Meeting, December 19, 1981," in *ibid.*, 482-495; quoted at 483.

¹³⁸ "Hungarian Report to HSWP CC Politburo on Hungarian Delegation's Talks with Wojciech Jaruzelski, December 30, 1981," in *ibid.*, 499-503; quoted at 501-502.

From an American perspective then, sanctions had an almost immediate positive impact. Reagan and his administration had wanted to punish Warsaw for imposing martial law. While it is unclear how much of an immediate effect suspending new credits, ending fishing rights, and blocking LOT flights to the U.S. had, the decision to suspend consideration of \$740 million in agricultural aid worried the Polish leadership. Moreover the lack of feed eventually led to a large-scale slaughter of poultry when feed reserves dried up, causing long-term damage to the poultry industry by reducing the overall number of reproducing chickens.¹³⁹ In addition, the Poles were forced to turn toward the East for greater economic aid. Because subsidies for Eastern European purchases of oil and gas were already draining money from the Soviet economy, expanded Polish needs and increased aid from the Soviet Union fit perfectly with the Reagan administration's desire to punish the Soviets as well as the Poles. Moreover, by causing the Poles to draw more resources and capital out of the Soviet Union, economic sanctions against Poland fit well within the neo-conservative plans to wage economic war against the Soviet Union to weaken the system from within.¹⁴⁰

Surprise and Distrust

American economic sanctions also had a secondary, much less positive set of effects: sanctions caused a real break in trust between Washington and Warsaw. To understand this break it is essential to examine expectations on both sides of the Atlantic prior to December 13, 1981. From the Polish perspective, Jaruzelski believed that he had

¹³⁹ Author's interview with Zbigniew Karcz, July 8, 2004. Karcz was the director of the international department of the Ministry of Finance from 1976-1987.

¹⁴⁰ For a full discussion of the neo-conservative plans to wage economic war against the Soviet Union, see Schweizer's *Victory*.

chosen the lesser of two evils, and that Western Europe and the United States would prefer this option over further instability or an invasion by the Soviets. Jaruzelski gauged the West Europeans correctly, particularly the West Germans who were pivotal in blocking a united stance on sanctions against Poland. He did not read the Americans correctly, however.

From information gained well after the events in question, it appears that the principal miscommunication between the Poles and the Americans came just a few days before the imposition of martial law, when Deputy Premier Madej met with Vice President Bush. From statements made by General Jaruzelski in 1997, it is clear that he interpreted the vice president's statements of sympathy and his offers as economic support as a signal that the United States would accept martial law, if at least grudgingly. As he has stated, "And that for me it was an unusually important signal; that the United States knew about [plans for martial law], and they knew about it from sources, not only from Ryszard Kukliński . . . but also from CIA materials, and from the American embassy in Poland, that the process [of moving toward martial law] was going on."¹⁴¹ The significance of a lack of a strong warning was magnified by the Reagan administration's ambiguous statements and American businessmen's calls for stability in the months prior to December 1981. Based on these patterns, General Jaruzelski sincerely believed that the United States would not take a hard stance against this middle path. As he recalled at Jachranka:

I admit, whenever I have such a rotten idea [*robaczywe myśli*], that the Americans would have deliberately liked us to go into a trance in advance of that coming event, which we had to bring to an end sooner, or later [there would be a] greater explosion, a greater tragedy, in connection to the coming intervention, to which we would become embroiled with the Soviet

¹⁴¹ *Wejda nie Wejda*, 283.

Union. . . . For a long time, I believed that. Later I corrected that idea. I am attentive, clearly the Americans realistically, wisely, wanted to [keep this from happening], and for Poland, and to save stability in Europe, the Americans would recognize that [the imposition of martial law] was a lesser evil.¹⁴²

In retrospect it becomes clear that part of Jaruzelski's decision-making process prior to declaring martial law included an attempt to weigh the American reaction to military rule.¹⁴³ The Polish government expected the Americans to begrudgingly accept martial law and, presumably, maintain longstanding relations.

This expectation was also reflected in contemporaneous analysis by the MSZ. A week after the declaration of martial law and four days after Scanlan had met with Spasowski to explain that the U.S. was ending consideration of further aid to Poland, *but* two days before Reagan announced economic sanctions, the MSZ American department wrote a memo which asked, "Does the U.S. government have a considered, united policy toward Poland?" The general conclusion was that "it is possible to state that so long as the Polish crisis does not threaten territorial agreements within Europe and does not shift power as a result of a Soviet intervention, the Polish Problem will not occupy a high place in the list of the United States' priorities in their anti-Soviet politics." More generally the information note recommended continuing to follow the same "peaceful, patient line" they had been taking. The memo outlined the steps desired by the Reagan administration toward national reconciliation; however, economic sanctions were not

¹⁴² Ibid, 283-284.

¹⁴³ In *Wejda nie Wejda*, the issue of Jaruzelski's expectations following the Madej meeting took center stage for a while, with the general commenting on the Reagan administration's inability to send him even a private letter to dissuade him from introducing martial law. The clear question that arises from this discussion and which Prof. James Hershberg asked at the conference was, would the general not have declared martial law if the Americans had clearly signaled that they would take very strong, punitive stance on the use of martial law? Unfortunately, Jaruzelski did not respond directly to that questions. This is, however, an interesting counterfactual that deserves further exploration. For discussion of this issue, see *Wejda nie Wejda*, 282-283 and 324-326.

even mentioned as a possibility. Rather, the memo substantiated Jaruzelski's view of martial law as the lesser of two evils and painted the solution as a middle-ground between increased instability and Soviet intervention. MSZ analysts believed that the United States and the West would accept martial law, albeit reluctantly. The working assumption was that if Poland continued to control the internal situation, the West would continue to offer at least modest economic support. Based on this analysis, the MSZ was even hopeful that relations with the West could soon return to a pre-August 1980 state.¹⁴⁴

As soon as the Reagan administration began to make moves in response to the declaration of martial law, the PZPR leadership realized that this would not be the case. As Foreign Minister Czyrek noted on December 19, "The USA has launched an offensive in the name of the Polish experiment. . . The USA is pressuring other governments including the USSR. They want to sustain [Solidarność]."¹⁴⁵ This break with Polish expectations, in turn, led to an emotional response from the Poles. American actions did not make sense to the PZPR, and Jaruzelski responded angrily. This anger is constantly revisited and evident in subsequent relations between Polish and American officials during the 1980s (see chapters 2 and 3 especially). Even sixteen years after the decision to impose sanctions, the general was still fuming about what he saw as the hypocrisy of the Reagan administration's decision to impose sanctions based on human rights abuses in Poland. Again, at the Jachranka conference, Jaruzelski spoke about how the economic sanctions hurt the common Polish people. He openly questioned why the Reagan administration had such a friendly relationship with the Romanians who had had de facto

¹⁴⁴ "Notatka Informacyjna Obecne Stanowisko USA wobec Polski" [Information Note on the Present Position of the USA regarding Poland], dated December 21, 1981, MSZ, 49/84, W-1, Dep III (1981), AP 22-1-81/B.

¹⁴⁵ "Protocol No. 16 of PUWP CC Politburo Meeting, December 19, 1981," in *Documentary History*, 482-495; quoted at 483.

martial law for twenty years. He asked the same question about the decision to support Augusto Pinochet in Chile. He openly condemned the American position of support to regimes in Saudi Arabia, Mobutu Sese Seco's Zaire, Pakistan, Greece, and Turkey, where human rights abuses were well documented.¹⁴⁶ It is almost as if economic sanctions were a personal affront to him.

In Washington, the decision to introduce martial law also exposed intense feelings. As Pipes recalls about the December 21 NSC meeting at which the White House began to compose a specific list of economic sanctions against Poland:

Real rage dominated after the declaration of martial law. Reagan wanted to apply extremely sharp means. The president erupted. It was a fantastic meeting, because the president delivered a great, emotional speech, the temperament of which reminded [Pipes] of the Quarantine Speech by Roosevelt in 1937. "This is a turning point. . ." [Reagan contended], "If the Allies don't go with us, we will go it alone, if that becomes necessary."¹⁴⁷

This rage and emotion grew in part from the fact that the declaration of martial law had truly come as a surprise to many people in the Reagan administration. They had been caught off guard. Moreover, the decision to impose martial law played upon Reagan's personal feelings about the evil nature of Communism. The president decided at that moment to take a stand, seeing himself like Roosevelt standing up to fascism. This was not a logical or rational response; it was driven by Reagan's fury and emotion at the moment.

Of course, anger is often hard to quantify, and it is certainly hard to recreate how this anger directly influenced events on the ground. Here it is useful to turn toward social scientists for some help, particularly discussions of trust. According to one definition, "in

¹⁴⁶ Ibid, 314. Jaruzelski had a similarly heated response to my question to him about American sanctions, which I posed to him at a meeting at Warsaw University in winter 2004.

¹⁴⁷ Ibid, 223.

its more instrumental form, trust is viewed as the expectation that specific others will reciprocate trusting behavior. In other words, people think they know what others will do, so they can adjust their level of cooperative behavior and precaution taking."¹⁴⁸ More specific to the case at hand, trust violations are defined as "unmet expectations concerning another's behavior, or when that person does not act consistent with one's values."¹⁴⁹ Feelings of anger or bitterness as well as feeling "confused" or "stunned" are often associated with the initial "hot cognitions" after trust has been broken and distrust has been created.¹⁵⁰

This framework fits well with relations between Washington and Warsaw surrounding the declaration of martial law. Both Reagan and Jaruzelski's anger came from a perception that the other side had not lived up to their expectations, and broken their trust. For Reagan, he expected that the PZPR would continue to try to negotiate with Solidarność, and not take any drastic steps. When the Reagan administration was considering sending \$740 million in agricultural aid to Poland just before the declaration of martial law, this decision was based on the trust that the Reagan White House began to have for their counterparts in Warsaw. It was a fragile trust, but it was trust. Similarly, after hearing words of sympathy from Vice President Bush, General Jaruzelski expected that the United States' reaction to the declaration of martial law would be sympathetic. By declaring martial law, General Jaruzelski broke the trust Reagan had placed in him; by imposing economic sanctions, Ronald Reagan had broken the trust General Jaruzelski had placed in him.

¹⁴⁸ Tom R. Tyler and Roderick M. Kramer, "Whither Trust," in their edited volume *Trust in Organizations* (Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1996): 1-15, quoted at 12.

¹⁴⁹ Robert J. Bies and Thomas M. Tripp, "Beyond Distrust: 'Getting Even' and the Need for Revenge," in *Trust in Organizations*, 246-260; quoted at 248.

¹⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 254.

In the first thirty days after General Jaruzelski's declaration of martial law, the American government reacted emotionally to take the unilateral move to impose economic and political sanctions against both Poland and the Soviet Union. Washington also pushed to impose these sanctions in a multilateral forum, with only limited results. For Poland and its allies, the main issue in the first month was not sanctions from the outside but efforts to control their internal situation. While American economic sanctions did have a nearly immediate sting, their effects were also emotional. In understanding Polish-American relations from December 1981 onwards, it is essential to recognize the significant emotional break that both sides felt. For Reagan, Poland was not just any old issue; it was a personal issue to him and segments of his administration. It was also a personal issue for Jaruzelski, who was equally enraged by American actions. These expressions of anger and shock indicated of a breakdown in trust between the two countries, or more precisely the creation of distrust between the White House and Belweder Palace. This distrust, in turn, created an environment ripe for emotional and angry reactions. The history of the next five years in Polish-American governmental relations, can in fact, be seen as a series of attempts to both create trust between the two sides and alternately to sabotage that trust, time and time again.

Chapter 2

"We are a card in their game":

American Policy toward Poland Takes Shape

January to September 1982

In the initial month after the declaration of martial law, the Reagan administration imposed sanctions on Poland and attempted to sell this approach to Western Europe.¹ Economic sanctions, however, were not so much a framework for future policy as a punishment. Once sanctions were imposed, the question remained: what next? Beginning in 1982 the Reagan administration and the foreign policy community worked toward agreement on a long-term strategy to achieve America's three goals: end martial law, free political internees, and see negotiations restarted between the government, the Church, and Solidarność. Within the White House, discussions about how to proceed broke down into disagreements between hardliners (led by Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger and centered in the Pentagon) and more moderate voices (centered in the Department of State), who wanted to engage with the Polish government by combining punishments and rewards. From January through September 1982, these two opposing camps vied for the upper hand, each achieving successes and suffering setbacks. Without clear direction from President Reagan, whose outrage had been central in pushing through sanctions, policy toward Poland became bogged down in the national security bureaucracy.

¹ This quote in the chapter title is from General Wojciech Jaruzelski from an excerpt from the transcript of a May 25, 1982, PZPR Central Committee Meeting, AAN, KC PZPR, V/174, 507.

With more difficult decisions and less centralization in policy making, a number of individual but intertwined policy initiatives took shape. The administration experimented with the options of economic incentives paired with sanctions, simultaneously arguing whether to base policy toward Eastern Europe on the existing framework of differentiation or to move in a new direction. The administration also spearheaded a global propaganda campaign against the PZPR and its Soviet comrades. Congress increasingly became involved in Polish policy, using budgetary oversight to join the conversation on how best to enforce economic sanctions. Outside government, humanitarian organizations entered the equation adding a counterweight to sanctions. Trade unions and other non-governmental groups also responded to martial law, providing substantial Western support to Solidarność, which was regrouping as an underground organization. General Jaruzelski's government reacted to American policy not by giving in, but by pushing back, maintaining a strong hold over the country, and strengthening partnership with the East.

In the midst of these new initiatives American policy toward Poland began to show real signs of strain by the beginning of the summer of 1982. By then policy debates were entwined in confrontation with West European allies over sanctions against the Soviet Union, particularly restrictions on financial credits and technology to build a natural gas pipeline. Bilateral relations with the PZPR also hit a new low. After a personnel change in the executive branch, however, a subtle shift occurred in the balance of forces within the administration and U.S.-Polish relations began to improve. Relations with the Allies were patched and bilateral relations with Poland were reformulated to accept a more gradual approach to promoting change.

Carrots vs. Sticks

From the beginning of the sanctions debate, diplomats in the Department of State voiced misgivings about the efficacy of economic sanctions and pushed for an alternative strategy. On December 22, 1981, EUR Acting Director H. Allen Holmes proposed an "additional bold move for the NSC": to call for a summit of the big five NATO leaders to "focus world attention on the moral and historic significance" of recent events and to announce a "joint Marshall Plan for Poland." Holmes did not go into details, but argued that a major incentives plan for Poland would be "premised on a process of reconciliation moving forward" and that "it would put the Soviets on the defensive and give a positive dimension to our carrots and sticks policy."² The summit with European leaders did not take place, but Reagan did approve the use of carrots as well as sticks in U.S. policy. In his speech on December 23, 1981 (in which he announced economic sanctions against Poland), the president referred to the reversibility of sanctions: "If the Polish Government will honor the commitments it has made to human rights in documents like the Gdańsk agreement, we in America will gladly do our share to help the shattered Polish economy, just as we helped the countries of Europe after both World Wars."³ While Reagan did not mention a new Marshall Plan explicitly, he implied it and hinted at the possibility of rewards as well as punishments for the PZPR.

Writing on December 26 and 27, Ambassador Meehan sent two analytical cables

² Memorandum from H. Allen Holmes to the Secretary, "Poland—Additional Bold Move for NSC," dated December 22, 1981, in Malcolm Byrne, Paweł Machcewicz, and Christian Ostermann, eds., *Poland 1980–1982: Internal Crisis, International Dimensions, A Compendium of Declassified Documents and Chronology of Events* (Washington, D.C.: The National Security Archive, 1997).

³ "Address to the Nation about Christmas and the Situation in Poland, December 23, 1981," *Public Papers of the President of the United States* (1981), available on the Reagan Library's website: www.reagan.utexas.edu.

expanding on the use of incentives. Interpreting America's main goal in post-December 13 Poland to "be, as previously, to maximize Russian disadvantages" and to "widen gaps between [Warsaw] and Moscow," Meehan argued that "we should not dismiss the possibility yet that [Jaruzelski] can be induced to make good on his commitment to return the country to renewal." Meehan saw three general possibilities in Poland's future: 1) the general makes good on his promise to return to a process of reconciliation and renewal, 2) he does not keep his promises and imposes increasingly repressive measures, or 3) he fails and is replaced by a hard-line Polish Communist or a full scale Soviet intervention and occupation. In Meehan's analysis, each scenario would "in varying degrees, severely weaken the Russian position," so the United States was in a win-win situation. However, when taking into account the "promotion of [the Polish peoples'] rights and liberties," the first option was most preferable. Moreover, Meehan had not given up on Jaruzelski:

[Jaruzelski] is, I am sure, wholly committed to the Russian connection on the large strategic-political issues ultimately involving Germany. But he is a Pole, and Polish nationalism runs deep. Jaruzelski gave me the impression . . . of being committed to a process of change in Polish political, economic, and social life. I would not entirely dismiss his claim that he acted on December 13 to prevent a drift to civil war, and the inference that he saw himself acting in Polish national interests, since civil war would inevitably mean foreign intervention.

The question then became how to move Jaruzelski back toward reconciliation. As Meehan explained:

I . . . believe we should hold out some carrot to him if he shows signs of relaxing the grip on the country in ways that we consider important. We have given him the stick, which he deserves, but if it is only the stick, he may not have much choice. How much carrot, and how it is dangled, is a matter for discussion, but I think we should not dismiss the option, however great our sense of outrage.⁴

⁴ Cable from Amembassy Warsaw to SecState, "Polish Situation: U.S. Policy," dated December 26, 1981, NSA, Soviet Flashpoints, Box 26, December 26-29, 1981.

On December 27, Meehan wrote a second cable defining the kind of carrot he had in mind. His proposed that Reagan send a second presidential letter to Jaruzelski. "The operative part of the suggested message would be that just as we were responsive to our concern over negative actions on the part of the Polish government . . . we would be responsive to clear evidence of a return to the renewal course." To sweeten this deal, "we could also indicate a willingness to restore either fishing or landing rights if Jaruzelski takes concrete steps toward reform and renewal." Meehan realized that it would be difficult to manage the Polish situation in a carrot-and-stick framework, but he believed that the United States held some tasty carrots, particularly the ability to reschedule debt.⁵

Meehan's proposal went a step further. Echoing Holmes' earlier memo, he advocated a more radical approach:

There is a much bigger, dramatic framework possible than the one I have suggested. It has the feel of classical Post-WW2 U.S. world leadership about it—but it would cost money. In other words, not small carrots; great big carrots. It would be an offer from the President to Jaruzelski to support a broad-based Western economic recovery program for Poland provided certain clear political and economic criteria were met. The offer could be surrounded by all sorts of other conditionality, notably an eastern contribution, but it would be an offer all the same.

With these suggestions, Meehan was arguing for a more pragmatic approach to Warsaw.

Meehan's ruminations on carrots also showed up in meetings with MSZ representatives. Meeting with Józef Wiejacz, director of Department III, on December 28, Meehan referenced the reversibility of American steps and emphasized that Washington was "impatiently waiting" to see what the PZPR did in the new year, hinting

⁵ Cable from Amembassy Warsaw to Secstate, "Polish Situation: U.S. Policy," dated December 27, 1981, NSA, Soviet Flashpoints, Box 26, December 26-29, 1981.

at the possibility of rewards.⁶ On December 30, Dan Howard, the embassy officer in charge of scientific, educational, and technical exchanges, took a more straightforward approach. He mentioned to an unnamed Polish source that Reagan imposed economic sanctions without consulting the embassy and that Meehan was advocating both carrots and sticks. Howard specifically stated that if the Poles took steps to continue reform and restore individual freedoms, Washington could respond with economic help, "on the scale of the 'Marshall plan.'"⁷ The State Department codified incentives in January 1982 in guidelines for short-term policy that included a call to "be ready swiftly to offer a carrot if any genuine step toward reconciliation is taken, but a carrot that is proportional to the step, leaving the rest of our sanctions intact."⁸

In terms of an economic package on the scale of a new Marshall plan, Reagan never proposed the possibility directly to Jaruzelski. However, the administration did act upon the idea. In the first two weeks of January 1982, the president's lead negotiator at the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty talks in Geneva, Ambassador Paul Nitze, spoke with his Soviet counterpart, Yuli Kvitsinskii about a large-scale economic recovery package for Poland. At the second of two meetings, Nitze read from an official statement:

I am instructed today to call special attention to the proposal made by President Reagan in his remarks of December 23. "If the Polish government will honor the commitments it has made to basic human rights in documents like the Gdańsk Agreement, we in America will gladly do

⁶ "Notatka Informacyjna z rozmowy z Ambasadorem USA F. Meehan'em w dn. 28.xii.81 (część ogólnopolityczna)" [Information Note from the Conversation with U.S. Amb. F. Meehan on 28.12.81 (general-political section)], MSZ, 30/85, W-2, Dep III (1982), AP 22-1-82/A. In Wiejacz's analysis, Meehan was trying to relativize (*zrelatywizowanie*) the political impact of economic sanctions. Wiejacz speculated that this change in position was caused by Eagleburger's meetings with West European allies.

⁷ "Notatka z rozmowy z przedstawicielem Ambassady USA w Warszawie p. Howardem w dniu 30.xii.1981r" [Note from the Conversation with U.S. Embassy Officer in Warsaw Mr. Howard on 30.12.1981], MSZ, 30/85, W-2, Dep III (1982), AP 22-1-82/A. The origin of this document remains unclear. According to a cover note, it was created outside of the MSZ and sent to the American department on December 31, 1981.

⁸ Memorandum, "Poland - The Next Thirty Days," dated January 8, 1982, in *Poland 1980-1982*.

our share to help the shattered Polish economy, just as we helped the countries of Europe after both world wars." This proposal is a serious one. In the proper setting it could become a large-scale and significant effort which could make a constructive contribution to Poland's economic and social renewal. But its realization depends upon the establishment of a process of national reconciliation in Poland: the lifting of martial law; release of detainees, and resumption of the dialogue among all elements of Polish society. As President Reagan has emphasized, this is the sole path to long-term stability in Poland and therefore in Europe as a whole.

Speaking from notes Kvitvinskii rejected the proposal because the decision to introduce martial law was an internal Polish decision, saying: "No one was in a position to prescribe to the Polish state how to order its affairs." The possibility of a U.S.-Soviet agreement on Poland appears to have gone no further.⁹

While the Soviets had not taken the bait, State continued to support the possibility of a substantial incentives package for Poland. On March 10, Holmes prepared an action memo for Haig to start an the interagency planning process to craft a public push for a large incentives package. Holmes acknowledged that a proposal like this would meet resistance in the both the White House and Congress; however, he believed that "we would be wrong not to exploit the public relations windfall which would be ours were we to come forward now with a major assistance proposal." Deputy Secretary of State Walter Stoessel returned the memo for revision, writing in the margins, "Haig has always favored the carrot. The question is, What are its econ[omic] and pol[itical] components? Before *any* interagency work is started I want a memo for the Secretary that lays out a

⁹ Cable from USMission Geneva to Secstate, "(S) U.S. Statement on Poland," dated January 12, 1982, NSA, Soviet Flashpoints Originals, Box 1. I have not been able to locate any materials in Polish sources to show that the Soviets raised the American demarche on a joint economic package with the PZPR. Nitze's cable mentions that Kvitvinskii spoke from notes at their second meeting; therefore, it is safe to presume that Kvitvinskii mentioned the first meeting with Nitze to his superiors in Moscow. Given the state of declassification in Moscow, I have not attempted to trace any of these conversations in Soviet archives. This tangent, like many others in this dissertation, offers ample reason for more follow-up. In addition, this overture provides another small example of Reagan sending quiet signals to the Soviets to spark superpower cooperation. As with his handwritten letters to Soviet leaders, this demarche shows that Reagan was not as rabidly anti-Communist as his public pronouncements.

detailed proposal on what EUR think the carrot would look like."¹⁰ Two weeks later, a detailed incentives memo made its way to Haig's desk, laying out a package which would include lifting sanctions and approving new credits if Jaruzelski took the three steps demanded by the West. Haig approved raising incentives at the NSC Polish Interagency Group and also approved State to begin work on a speech for the president to announce an incentive program.¹¹

The possibility of a major incentives program ended at the interagency level, without any presidential speech. However, the importance of this aborted policy should not be overlooked. While Reagan and his neo-conservative allies in the NSC were focusing on how to punish Poland and the USSR, the State Department and the embassy in Warsaw looked beyond punitive actions to restore some kind of working relationship with the Polish government. State even engaged directly with the Soviets to foster a breakthrough. Haig had been in favor of incentives from the beginning, but in the president's emotional fever following December 13, members of the NSC who pushed for tough measures played into the president's hard-line instincts and won out in the early stages of the policy-making process.

Agreement within State to offer carrots to Warsaw should not be confused with a finalized policy. The administration remained conflicted on how to push for change in Eastern Europe. On February 2, 1982, the NSC asked the Department of State to review Presidential Directive 21, the standing national security document on policy toward Eastern Europe which had been signed by President Carter in September 1977. After

¹⁰ Action Memo from H. Allen Holmes to the Secretary, "Poland: Incentives as a Means of Obtaining our Objectives," dated March 10, 1982, in *Poland 1980-1982*.

¹¹ Action Memorandum from John D. Scanlan to the Secretary, "Poland - An Incentives Package," dated March 25, 1982, NSA, Soviet Flashpoints, Box 27, March 1982.

completing the review, the head of State's European bureau, Lawrence Eagleburger, recommended that State lead an interagency group to bring the Reagan administration's guidelines "in line with the current situation in Eastern Europe," i.e. changes in Poland.

The interagency group met occasionally during March and April and focused on one central issue: whether to continue the past doctrine of differentiation or to move to a policy of non-differentiation. Differentiation had been official policy since the mid-1960s, when President Lyndon Johnson made "bridge building" a priority.¹² As it was defined in the spring of 1982, differentiation meant "that the U.S. should . . . encourage[e] diversity [between the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe] through active political and economic policies tailored to individual countries." In particular differentiation was meant to: "encourage liberalizing tendencies in the region," "increase economic dependence of Eastern European countries on the West," "expose the region to demands for better human rights performance," "increase antagonism between Moscow and some of the East European states," and "weaken the Warsaw Pact as a unified military institution."¹³ The main weapons to achieve these ends were economic: agreements for government loans, favorable trade arrangements, special technology transfer exceptions, and concessionary sales agreements to provide needed aid.¹⁴

¹² For an overview of American policy toward Eastern Europe during the 1970s see: Raymond Garthoff, *Detente and Confrontation: American-Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan*, rev. ed. (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1994), esp. 549-555. For information on Johnson's policies see *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968*, vol. 17 Eastern Europe, particularly document 15, "National Security Action Memorandum No. 352/1, Bridge Building," dated July 8, 1966 (accessed via the www.state.gov/www/about_state/history/).

¹³ "U.S. Policy Toward Eastern Europe," attached to Memorandum from Hugh Simon to John Davis, "U.S. Policy Toward Eastern Europe: HA Changes," dated April 22, 1982, NSA, Soviet Flashpoints, Box 27, April-June 1982.

¹⁴ Presidential Directive 21 had pursued differentiation, and President Carter's national security advisor, Zbigniew Brzezinski, pursued a vigorous differentiation policy toward Poland prior to and during the Polish Crisis. See Patrick Vaughn, "Beyond Benign Neglect: Zbigniew Brzezinski and the Polish Crisis of 1980," *Polish Review* 44, no. 1 (1999): 3-28. It should be noted that the Reagan administration's policies towards Poland were largely in line with positions taken by the Carter administration. Given Brzezinski's

Reagan's decision on December 8, 1981—overturned after December 13—to reward Jaruzelski for his leniency toward the Solidarność trade union by providing \$740 million in American feed grain reflected his government's application of differentiation.

As its name implies, non-differentiation advocated the opposite approach to Eastern Europe. The purpose of non-differentiation was to "call on the [U.S. government] and its allies to minimize political and economic contacts with the region . . . [to] weaken the USSR." Under non-differentiation the Soviet Union would be weakened by: "increasing strains within the [Warsaw] Pact and forcing diversion of resources away from military use," "helping to stem the flow of Western technology to the USSR," and "weakening the appeal of communism" by causing it to loose its allure in the West by forcing a "deterioration in the quality of life [in Eastern Europe] and harsher police regimes."¹⁵ Sanctions against both Poland and the Soviet Union fit within the non-differentiation framework.

The disagreement over differentiation and non-differentiation, and over the proper use of carrots in addition to sticks, had a clear lineage with the neo-conservative critique of American foreign policy. Officials like NSC staffer Richard Pipes, Defense Secretary Weinberger, and U.N. Representative Jeanne Kirkpatrick believed that differentiation—as practiced by Presidents Johnson, Nixon, and Carter—weakened national security. Because differentiation advocated continued economic exchanges with the Communist world, it allowed the East to rely on the West for support, artificially propping up East

advocacy of a confrontational line with the Soviet Union and his lead role on Polish policy, as well as Carter's increasing mistrust of the Soviet Union following the invasion of Afghanistan, it is unlikely that America's Poland policy under a (hypothetical) second Carter term would have looked much different from Reagan's policies. If anything, Brzezinski might have been more sensitive to intelligence coming from Colonel Kuklinski and the NSC certainly would not have been without a national security advisor in December 1981.

¹⁵ "U.S. Policy Toward Eastern Europe."

European economies and extending the life of communism. By accepting the Soviet bloc as partners rather than adversaries, differentiation also gave tacit moral credibility to Communism. For neo-conservatives, differentiation was a remnant of détente that needed to be discarded.

The Reagan administration had won the 1980 election, in part, by advocating a new relationship with the Communist world based on a stronger America willing and able to stand up to Soviet aggression. This meant waging economic war to weaken Warsaw Pact capabilities and to undermine Communist regimes throughout the world.¹⁶ The plans for waging economic warfare were not fully articulated in the first months of 1982. (NSDD 75, which laid out this invigorated U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union, was being drafted by Pipes and others, but it would not be signed by the president until December 1982.)¹⁷ Nonetheless, the debate over economic incentives for Poland and the larger debate over differentiation took place while neo-conservatives were working to articulate, defend, and implement a new policy to confront Communist power around the globe. State's positions were in conflict with hardliners in other parts of the bureaucracy. Raymond Garthoff breaks these two opposing camps into "pragmatists" and "'ideological' Cold Warriors." As he explains: "The pragmatists wanted to control trade but also to use it by linkage as a carrot to gain Soviet concessions. . . [The neo-conservatives] wanted to

¹⁶ For the most complete retelling of the work and beliefs behind the neo-conservatives' efforts to wage economic war against the Soviet Union, see Peter Schweizer, *Victory* (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 1994). Schweizer had excellent access to many members of Reagan's administration and is clearly sympathetic to the neo-conservative voices from that period. This sympathy makes his book an excellent source for understanding what the neo-conservatives (Reagan included) believed and what they *thought* they were accomplishing. His lack of objectivity, however, often leads Schweizer to overstate the effects of these policies or gloss over details and accounts which provide alternative explanations for the gradual collapse of the Soviet system over the course of the 1980s.

¹⁷ For Pipes' account of the drafting process of NSDD 75, see *Vixi*, 188-202.

wage economic warfare to strain the Soviet economy and polity."¹⁸ For the diplomats advocating incentives for Poland, their ability to implement a dynamic carrots-and-sticks approach was hampered by this larger debate between ideological and pragmatic voices on how to relate to Eastern Europe in general.

Debt Repayment

Concurrent with the differentiation debate, the executive and legislative branches of the U.S. government quarreled over how to exploit Poland's debt to Western lenders. By December 1981, Poland had accrued roughly \$26 billion in debt to the West. Of this, \$3.15 billion in loans (14 percent) came from the United States of which \$1.3 billion was in non-guaranteed loans from private banks. The remainder of the American portion came from the U.S. government: \$1.6 billion in direct credits and guarantees by the Credit Commodity Corporation (CCC), \$244 million in Export-Import Bank loans, and \$6 million in AID loans.¹⁹ In April 1981, the United States and other Western governments, who conducted negotiations through an ad-hoc group of governmental lenders known as the Paris Club, agreed to reschedule 90 percent of Poland's debt for 1981, deferring repayment for four years until 1986. To deal with their debt to private Western bankers the PZPR signed an agreement on December 4, 1981, to reschedule \$2.4 billion in debt principal. As part of this agreement with the London Club, the ad hoc and unofficial group that negotiated agreements for private bankers, the Polish government agreed to pay \$500 million in interest by the end of 1981.

When martial law was declared neither of these agreements had been paid off in

¹⁸ Raymond Garthoff, *The Great Transition* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1994), 45.

¹⁹ For this breakdown of Poland's debt, see "Fact Sheet on Poland's Debt" published as part of Senate Appropriations Committee, *Polish Debt Crisis*, 97th Cong., 2nd Session, 1982, 18-19.

full. Polish diplomats concerned about bankers' reactions met with private bank representatives on December 14, telling them that Poland was still planning to pay the full amount of their back interest payments by December 28.²⁰ Polish Finance Minister Marian Krzak also met with government representatives from the Paris Club to clarify martial law economic policy: Poland intended to maintain "normal economic relations with Western partners" and hoped to get a \$350 million bridging loan from Western governments to cover a shortfall in export proceeds and the withdrawal of short term deposits. They needed this bridging loan to pay the balance due to the London and Paris Clubs.²¹ When Western governments chose not to offer bridging loans and the Soviet Union refused to bail Poland out, it was clear that Poland would not be able to make its payments. Now American politicians had to decide whether to declare Poland in default.

The Reagan administration understood that control over debt repayment and rescheduling offered the United States its strongest point of leverage against the PZPR. According to calculations by the State Department's Economic and Business Affairs Bureau and the European and Soviet Affairs Bureau, even with the economy in shambles Polish exports could pay for all necessary Western imports. But, in the coming year the Warsaw government did not have enough hard currency to cover their payments. To keep their economy afloat the Poles needed \$5.6 billion in public and private debt rescheduling and \$3.8 billion in new export and agricultural credits from the West. Thus, Western economic leverage after December 13 came from "continuing trade relationships; debt

²⁰ Information Memorandum from Robert Hormats to the Secretary, "Actions taken in response to your calls from Brussels on Polish Economic Assistance," dated December 14, 1981, NSA, Soviet Flashpoints Originals, Box 3.

²¹ Cable from Secstate to Amembassy Vienna, "Finance Minister of Debt Service and Emergency Measures," dated December 24, 1981, NSA, Soviet Flashpoints, Box 26, December 23-25, 1981. This request is further evidence of Poles' expectations of a conciliatory Western policy following the declaration of martial law.

service relief, both public and private; and access to new credits, both public and private." This leverage, however, would be weakened if the Poles declared a unilateral moratorium on Western debt repayment, by decreasing the need for hard currency. Therefore, "Western economic levers [were] most effective if the Poles [attempted] to service their external hard currency debt." This meant that it was in the U.S. government's best interests for public and private American bankers *not* to declare Poland in default.²²

Not everyone, however, agreed with this assessment. More ideological members of the cabinet, particularly Weinberger and Kirkpatrick, believed that the United States should push the Polish economy toward complete collapse, and declare Poland in default. If the government declared Poland in default, private bankers could do the same, after which the private banks could attempt to seize Polish assets through court action.²³

The initial focus of this debate was whether to recall Poland's debts on government loans rescheduled in April 1981. As part of the rescheduling agreement the Western creditors included a so-called "Tank Clause" which allowed them to rescind the rescheduling agreement under exceptional circumstances—understood to mean either Soviet military intervention or Polish use of force against its own people. If the Tank Clause was exercised, debt servicing became due and payable immediately. Invoking the clause would cause private banks to declare Poland in default as well. According to an interagency report, the effects of such an action

would be for Poles to stop payments to official or private entities declaring default. If the default were widespread, it would precipitate total cessation of interest payments to the West. There would be no effect on Poland's

²² Action Memorandum from Robert Hormats and Lawrence Eagleburger to the Secretary, "Western Economic Leverage on Poland and Secure Phone Call to Regan," dated December 17, 1981, NSA, Soviet Flashpoints, Box 26, December 1-22, 1981.

²³ Dan Morgan and Robert Kaiser, "Group of Aides Sought Tougher Stand on Poland," *Washington Post* (Jan. 15, 1982): A1.

ability to borrow, since it cannot borrow now. Polish trade, however, would be hampered in the short run.

The same report concluded that not exercising the clause would keep pressure on the Soviets and Poles to continue to make some payments, that invoking the clause could lead to widespread budget and financial difficulties in Western Europe (particularly the solvency of West German lenders), and that refusing to participate in rescheduling Poland's debts coming due in 1982 would be a much more effective step to limit Polish access to Western credits. The State Department and Haig were particularly concerned about the negative effects that a unilateral American government decision which hurt European bankers would have on allied cohesion at a point when relations were already strained. Advocates for declaring default (represented by Defense) acquiesced to State's arguments in the final report, but inserted language not to invoke the Tank Clause "at the present time."²⁴

On January 31, the conclusions of this debate became public when the Reagan administration announced its decision not to declare Poland in default and to pay \$71 million to U.S. banks to cover past due payments on CCC guaranteed loans. In return American banks agreed to not call for Poland to repay its loans in full, ending the default debate. The White House made clear that this was only a temporary arrangement until Warsaw could pay their debts again. But, as the *Washington Post* reported this initial payment led to a much larger commitment: "For fiscal 1982, the total exposure on guaranteed loans comes to \$308 million, and in the next two fiscal years, the total owed

²⁴ "Report on the Working Group on the Implications of Invoking the Exceptional Circumstances Clause of the 1981 Polish Official Debt Rescheduling Agreement," dated January 20, 1982, NSA, Soviet Flashpoints, Box 27, January 1982.

to the banks and guaranteed by the CCC comes to \$613 million."²⁵ To cover this expenditure, the White House attached a provision to increase the CCC's borrowing authority to \$5 billion to a spending bill for unemployment benefits, agricultural loans, and heating assistance for the poor.²⁶

In a domestic atmosphere obsessed with deficit spending, this was a difficult message to swallow. Soon after the administration's announcement, conservative commentators spoke out against the idea. On February 3, the *Wall Street Journal* editorial page condemned the decision. The editors argued that Washington was "slipping into tacit collaboration with martial law by making it easier for the Soviet bloc to finance repression."²⁷ Public uncertainty about the decision increased after it became clear that Washington's decision protected West German bankers who had made the most loans to Poland, and therefore had the most liability if they were declared in default. The decision to bail out Warsaw appeared to contradict the president's earlier commitment to no longer conduct business-as-usual.²⁸

With high public interest and a clear budgetary stake in the decision, Congress stepped into the discussion. Congressional interest in Poland had been high since the declaration of martial law: Republican Senators Larry Pressler and Charles Percy from the Foreign Relations Committee traveled to Poland on January 15, 1982; a number of committees held hearings; and Congressional Research Service issued several reports.²⁹

²⁵ Dan Morgan, "U.S. tells its Banks Some Polish Debt will be Paid," *Washington Post* (Feb. 2, 1982): A11.

²⁶ Margot Hornblower, "Congress Approves \$7.4 Billion for Aid," *Washington Post* (Feb. 11, 1982): A17.

²⁷ "Congresses Choice on Poland," *Wall Street Journal* (Feb. 3, 1982): 24.

²⁸ Reporting on this topic is too wide to include all references, but for a representative, if mild, sample see: Leslie Gelb, "Reprieve on Polish Debt," *New York Times* (Feb. 3, 1982): A1, and Paul Lewis, "Role of the Western Banks in Poland's Debt Crisis," *New York Times* (Feb. 3, 1982): A10.

²⁹ For the Poles' version of Pressler and Percy's visit see: MSZ, 30/85, W-1, D III (1982), 220-1-82.

Congressional Research Service issued *Martial Law in Poland* on January 6 and *Polish Crisis* on January 9, both available through Lexis-Nexis Congressional Research Digital Collection.

Prior to early February, however, Congress's role was mainly advisory. With an appropriations issue on the table, legislators could now have a direct effect. On February 8, New York Democratic senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan introduced an amendment to the appropriations legislation, requiring the president to report to Congress when CCC funds were used to pay for Polish loans. He also convened hearings of the Senate Appropriations Committee (together with Republican Senator Robert Kasten of Wisconsin) calling Undersecretary for Defense Policy Fred Ikle and Assistant Secretary of State for Economic and Business Affairs Robert Hormats to Capital Hill. Facing tough criticism from Moynihan that the "United States and its allies have not found a way to apply meaningful pressure on either the military junta in Warsaw or its masters in Moscow," the State and Defense representatives put forth a united front despite earlier disagreements. Ikle emphasized that the agreement to pay Poland's debt was only temporary and could be reversed easily. Because Washington was dealing with "the chronic failure of the Communist economic system," Ikle argued that the president could take time to pursue a "prudent policy." Hormats noted that the United States had already stopped the flow of new credits and delayed consideration of new rescheduling talks. He also restated internal arguments "that our officially declaring Poland in default might be used by the Polish government as an excuse to relieve itself of its obligations to make repayments. In addition, [declaring Poland in default] would be a sanction that would be hard to reverse if the Polish situation improved."³⁰ These arguments did little to calm either Moynihan or Kasten. In the wider Senate debate, however, the executive branch's arguments prevailed and Moynihan's amendment was defeated.

Nonetheless, Moynihan continued to use hearings to voice opinions critical of the

³⁰ *Polish Debt Crisis*; Moynihan quoted at 50, Ikle at 7, and Hormats at 40.

Reagan administration's policy. On March 16, Tom Gleason of the International Longshoreman's Association and Tom Kahn, assistant to AFL-CIO president Lane Kirkland, expressed labor's point of view: the AFL-CIO was "disappointed by the mild sanctions . . . announced against Poland." Labor was especially critical of the moral ambiguity bankers displayed by willingly loaning money to Communist regimes.³¹ In more detailed comments made outside of Senate hearings, Kirkland elaborated on this criticism:

In effect, President Reagan told the Soviets to disregard his tough talk. He announced that the United States would not use the most potent economic weapon at our disposal in defense of Solidarity. . . . The AFL-CIO does not believe that American foreign policy should be made by the bankers—or the giant grain companies. We believe the people ought to have something to say about how their government responds to the suppression of freedom in Poland.³²

Another voice at the hearings, former ambassador to Poland Richard T. Davies, went as far as to say, "The Reagan administration appears to be long on threats and short on the kind of actions which are essential ingredients of leadership."³³ The Appropriations Committee did not present any voices supporting a softer position; all of the testimony argued in favor of declaring Poland in default.

Congressional interest in Poland's debt crisis also led to a House of Representatives fact-finding mission. From March 4-7, seven congressmen from the

³¹ The AFL-CIO was consistently critical of Reagan's policies for being too soft, calling for much stronger economic sanctions than those which were imposed. On December 28, 1981, Tom Kahn called for the U.S. government to: call in the balance of Polish debt, refuse to extend further credits to either Poland, the Soviet Union, or Eastern Europe; halt all grain shipments to the Soviet Union; suspend export licenses for the Siberian pipeline; restrict technology transfers; recall American delegates to the CSCE meetings in Madrid and arms talks in Geneva; publish satellite photos of detention camps in Poland; and beef up American radio broadcasts. "Statement by Tom Kahn to the Congressional Committee on Security and Cooperation in Europe," dated December 28, 1981, GMMA, Information Department, CIO, AFL-CIO Press Releases, 1937-1995, Box 47, 47/6.

³² "AFL-CIO Press Release, February 4, 1982 [re Kirkland statement on Reagan Administrations policy on Polish debt]," date February 4, 1982, GMMA, Information Department, CIO, AFL-CIO Press Releases, 1937-1995, box 48, 48/3.

³³ *Polish Debt Crisis*, 176; Kahn quote is from 163.

House Foreign Affairs, Budget, and Appropriations committees, led by Wisconsin Democratic representative David Obey, traveled through Poland meeting with embassy, government, Solidarność, and church officials. For the Polish government this was an important trip to show American lawmakers that economic sanctions were making it *more* difficult for Poland to move "beyond the crisis," increasing the likelihood that martial law would be prolonged.³⁴ The trip also allowed PZPR leaders to argue that sovereign Polish decisions would not be determined by outside pressure: issues like when to end martial law, when to release Solidarność internees (particularly Lech Wałęsa), and when to resume talks with the Church and society would be determined based on internal dynamics and developments.³⁵

On the issue of default, the congressmen returned convinced that the president made the correct choice. They also came back with a more positive outlook for Poland's internal development. All were impressed by how the Polish public was handling the hardships of martial law, and all were struck by Poles' optimism. The congressmen also became aware of "how difficult it is for an American President or any American administration to really have a direct and significant affect on events over there." More broadly, the Congressmen believed that developments were taking on a more "evolutionary" progression. Changes and reforms were not going to take place quickly, so it was "awfully important for [the U.S. government] to try to figure out the right mix of

³⁴ "Pilna Notatka" [Urgent Note], dated March 1, 1982, MSZ, MSZ, 30/85, W-1, Dep III (1982), AP 220-2-82.

³⁵ For the Polish government's reporting on Obey's trip, see "Notatka Informacyjna o wizycia grupy członków Izby Reprezententów Kongresu Stanów Zjednoczonych Ameryki" [Information Note about a Visit by a Group from the United States House of Representatives], dated March 11, 1982, MSZ, 30/85, W-1, Dep III (1982), AP 220-2-82.

both carrot and stick in order to affect events as best we can."³⁶

In the first three months of 1982, the White House agreed on a policy to leverage Poland's \$26 billion international debt: for the mean time, they decided to pay the balance on Polish loans to keep Poland from being declared in default. The State Department won this debate; however, this was considered a temporary policy that could be revoked at any point. More generally, by broadening discussions from 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue to include voices from the legislative branch, the dynamics of decision making began to change. More people and more voices were forcing themselves into the discussion on America's Poland policy.

Propaganda Wars

With an eye toward the global Cold War, Washington began looking at ways beyond sanctions to punish the Poles and particularly the Soviets. On December 19, Haig approved some geopolitical options to pursue, including: "working with CIA and DOD to develop a program of direct U.S. arms aid to Afghan rebel forces"; discussing "with CIA other covert action opportunities in Central America, Ethiopia, and elsewhere"; working "with ICA [the International Communications Agency] and BIB [Bureau for International Broadcasting] to increase our broadcast efforts targeted against the USSR . . ."; and

³⁶ Quotes taken from Obey's comments on the McNeil/Lehrer Report, "Congressmen Laud Spirit of the Polish People," dated Wednesday, March 10, 1982, retrieved from AFL-CIO, International Affairs Department Files, Inactive Records, "Solidarnosc 1982 #2 File." For the report given directly to Reagan, see, Action Memorandum from Richard Pipes to William Clark, "Congressional Delegation's Report on Trip to Poland," dated March 17, 1982, Ronald Reagan Presidential Library (hereafter referred to as RRPL), Paula Dobriansky Files, Box 90892, Poland Memoranda 1981-1983 [February-April 1982]. See also: House Committee on the Budget, *The United States and Poland*, 97th cong., 2nd session, April 1982; and Memorandum from John Davis to Allen Holmes, "Poland After Five Years," dated March 16, 1982, NSA, Soviet Flashpoints, Box 27, March 1982.

developing "a plan for strategic consultation with [China]."³⁷ While these strategic efforts reflected the Reagan administration's penchant for attacking Soviet interests worldwide, only Haig's approval of further action on international broadcasting directly affected events within Poland. It also signaled an upturn in the propaganda war between the United States and Poland.

The United States was handed its first victory in the post-December 13 propaganda war against the PZPR when Polish Ambassador to the United States Romuald Spasowski called Deputy Assistant Secretary Jack Scanlan to ask for political asylum. Scanlan honored the request, and by the evening of December 20, Spasowski was in front of news cameras. In his speech Spasowski condemned the Jaruzelski government for declaring martial law and for placing so many professors and workers into prisons. Referring to the PZPR's "brutality and inhumanity," the ambassador explained that he had defected in solidarity with Wałęsa. Shadowing Reagan's moralistic rhetoric, Spasowski concluded, "There is only one morality in the human family, the morality of people who live according to the principles of truth and justice. . . . It is this morality which shall prevail."³⁸ Two days later, Reagan met with Spasowski and his wife, expressing his gratitude and providing a tear-filled photo opportunity for the press corps.³⁹ As Reagan later recalled, "It was an emotional meeting for all of us and left me with more disgust than ever for the evil men in the Kremlin who believed they had the

³⁷ Action Memorandum from Richard Burt to the Secretary, "Poland: Current U.S. Geopolitical Options," dated December 19, 1981, in *Poland 1980-1982*.

³⁸ For Spasowski's comments see, "Transcripts of the Statement made by the Polish Envoy on his Resignation," *New York Times* (Dec. 21, 1981): A17. A few days after Spasowski's speech, Polish ambassador to Japan, Józef Rurarz and his wife defected as well. For a general account of Spasowski's experience see his autobiography, *A Liberation of One* (San Diego: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1986).

³⁹ Memorandum for Mr. James W. Nance, "President Reagan's Meeting with Ambassador Spasowski," dated December 21, 1981, in *Poland 1980-1982*.

right to hold an entire nation in captivity."⁴⁰ In Spasowski the White House found a distinguished Polish spokesman to sound the anti-Communist trumpet

On the same day Reagan met with Spasowski, ICA Advisory Board members discussed further means for America to condemn events in Poland. One member, Allen Weinstein, executive director of *The Washington Quarterly*, went so far as to say, "the U.S. needs to undertake 'ruthless politics of symbolism and moral gestures.'" Overall the group—including ICA director Charles Wick, career Foreign Service officer Len Baldyga, Assistant to the President David Gergen, and *Commentary* Editor Norman Podhoretz—proposed thirty-three options to pursue. Among them, a single theme emerged: "to keep the media pot boiling" and to "create a great moral wave" against the abuses in Poland.⁴¹

Ultimately, this media blitz took the form of a day to "Let Poland be Poland." Reagan first referenced this initiative on January 5, and by January 8, American diplomats began to pressure their European, Japanese, and Australian allies to take part in what was then called, "Light a Candle for the People of Poland" (reflecting language from the president's Christmas speech). Embassy staff were requested to urge foreign leaders to videotape statements "in support of the Polish people," to be collected and combined with footage of events in Poland and images of international protests against the declaration of martial law.⁴²

In the end, ICA Director Charles Wick spent between \$350,000 and \$450,000 of privately donated money to produce a ninety-minute program which included statements,

⁴⁰ Ronald Reagan, *An American Life* (New York: Pocket Books, 1990), 303.

⁴¹ Memorandum of meeting, "U.S. Response to Polish Crisis," dated December 22, 1981, NSA, Soviet Flashpoints, Box 26, December 1-22, 1981.

⁴² Cable from SecState to All NATO Capitals, "Poland," dated January 8, 1982, NSA, Soviet Flashpoints Originals, Box 3.

from Reagan, Margaret Thatcher, Orson Welles, and Frank Sinatra, among others. According to State's analysis, "with reruns and new runs we anticipate that 50 countries and 300 million people will have seen 30 minutes or more. This is an historic high for any [U.S. government] information effort."⁴³ Analysis from outside the government, however, was not so rosy. A number of PBS stations declined to air the special. In Western Europe, most stations aired only thirty minutes of the program or simply showed highlights on the nightly news. The press also chided Washington for exploiting Polish suffering for obvious propaganda: *Time* magazine called the international response to the program "mixed" and suggested that a star-studded television spectacular might be an "inappropriate response to military repression;" the *New York Times* ran an article focusing on the international criticism that the program sparked; and the BBC declared the program a "complete failure."⁴⁴

These two smaller projects were not the most important propaganda consequence of the declaration of martial law; rather, December 13 served as a catalyst for long-term changes in America's public diplomacy infrastructure. As a former broadcaster, Reagan believed in the power of radio and spoke about America's "neglected ability of communications" in the 1980 campaign.⁴⁵ Events in Poland galvanized bureaucratic support for international broadcasting efforts. Writing to Haig on December 30, 1981, Eagleburger pushed for action "to step up our radio broadcasting to Poland, the rest of

⁴³ Information Memorandum from Lawrence Eagleburger to the Secretary, "Poland Solidarity Day—Net Assessment," dated February 3, 1982, in *Poland 1980-1982*.

⁴⁴ "Better to let Poland Be?," *Time Magazine* (Feb. 8, 1982); Reuters, "TV Program on Poland is Criticized by Many," *New York Times* (Feb. 2, 1982): A8; and "Let Poland be Poland": 'Complete Failure' of US TV Programme," *Summary of BBC World Broadcasts* (Feb. 2, 1982).

⁴⁵ For quote from Reagan's 1979 speech, see Kiron Skinner, Annelise Anderson, and Martin Anderson, ed., *Reagan in his Own Hand* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2001), 128. For a broader discussion of Reagan's views on the role of international broadcasting see Schweizer, *Reagan's War*, 191-199.

East Europe, and the USSR."⁴⁶ Haig agreed and co-signed a memo to Reagan with Wick and Frank Shakespeare, BIB chairman, arguing that the Polish crisis underlined the importance of radio broadcasting which had been neglected during the era of détente.⁴⁷

This initiative reached full consensus on June 7, when Haig sent a draft NSDD on international broadcasting to the Oval Office under the title, "Response to Martial Law: Modernization of our International Radios." Reagan approved the draft on July 15 as NSDD 45. The decision directive prioritized improvement in programming and technical abilities in international broadcasting with the same budgetary and resource allocations "as in the case of other programs deemed vital to the national security." The NSDD called for the Voice of America (VOA) and Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) to "undertake a major, long-term program of modernization and expansion." Particular emphasis was placed on overcoming Soviet jamming, which had increased after December 13.⁴⁸

On June 19, Reagan went public with this reinvigorated policy on international broadcasting in a speech at a signing ceremony for Captive Nations Week. The president focused on Poland as the impetus for his plan by mentioning a letter Solidarność leaders had sent about the "power of ideas and the effectiveness of broadcasting as their carrier." Reagan then called for "a relatively modest expenditure" to rebuild and modernize

⁴⁶ Action Memorandum from Lawrence Eagleburger to the Secretary, "Response to the Polish Crisis: Radio Broadcasting," dated December 30, 1981, NSA, Soviet Flashpoints, Box 26, December 30-31, 1982.

⁴⁷ Memorandum for the President from Alexander Haig, Frank Shakespeare, and Charles Wick, "Response to the Polish Crisis: Radio Broadcasting," dated January 5, 1982, NSA, Soviet Flashpoints, Box 27, January 1982.

⁴⁸ Action memorandum from Richard Burt and Mark Palmer to Secretary Haig, "Response to Polish Martial Law: Modernization of our International Radios," with attachments, dated June 7, 1982, NSA, Soviet Flashpoints, Box 27, April-June 1982. For the final version of NSDD 45, "United States International Broadcasting," dated July 15, 1982 see the National Archives and Records Administration's Archival Records Collection (ARC) on-line at: www.archives.gov/research/arc/. Interestingly, a paragraph on the uses of Armed Forces Radio and Television Service is excised from the declassified NSDD, but is included in the draft version.

RFE/RL and VOA. He concluded the speech with trademark rhetorical flare: "The love of liberty, the fire of freedom burns on in Poland just as it burns on among all the peoples of the captive nations. To the leaders of Solidarity, to the people of Poland, to all those who are denied freedom, we send a message today: Your cause is not lost."⁴⁹

Events in Poland provided a similar impetus for Congress to pass an official budgetary request for increased funds for the BIB (which controlled the RFE/RL budget). For fiscal year 1983 the administration asked for an increase of \$13.2 million, an increase of almost 15 percent. Wick and his deputies in RFE/RL, Jim Buckley and Ben Wattenberg, testified to Congress that Soviet actions in Poland and Afghanistan were the main reasons for the needed modernization. Supplementary materials in the Congressional record also argued that RFE/RL needed immediate funds because Soviet jamming efforts had increased "measurably in recent years in the wake of turmoil in Poland."⁵⁰ The administration's push worked. In addition to the FY 1983 supplement, RFE/RL received \$21.3 million specifically for facility modernization and enhanced programming in 1983, as well as another increase in the annual appropriation.⁵¹

The Reagan administration came into office with a desire to intensify propaganda against the Communists bloc. This was an uncontroversial viewpoint, shared by ideological Cold Warriors and pragmatists. Events in Poland and the declaration of martial law, however, invigorated the White House's predisposition. Martial law was the catalyst behind NSDD 45 and allowed Reagan to move beyond ideas to concretely increase funding for RFE/RL. Without martial law, the executive branch may well have

⁴⁹ "Remarks on Signing the Captive Nations Proclamation, July 19, 1982," *Public Papers* (1982), available via the Reagan Library website (www.reagan.utexas.edu).

⁵⁰ Senate Foreign Relations Committee, *BIB Supplemental Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1983*, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 1982.

⁵¹ Michael Nelson, *War of the Black Heavens* (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1997), 173.

pursued these policies, but the president's urgency and public arguments would have taken a very different form. More centrally, in the months following December 1981, Poland's shadow began to stretch further and further throughout Washington, affecting how, when, and why policies were chosen and acted upon.⁵²

Humanitarian Aid

Martial law also pushed Reagan to engage with non-governmental organizations, looking for outside partners to help solve central problems in Poland policy. One such problem was making sure that sanctions did not provoke a humanitarian crisis in Poland. Reagan wanted to insure that sanctions penalized the regime, not common people. Humanitarian and charitable groups in coordination with the U.S. government had, in fact, spearheaded a food program for Poland since 1981. In March 1981, Pope John Paul II called on Catholics to send food to Poland, where shortages and rationing were becoming facts of everyday life. Cardinal John Krol, Archbishop of Philadelphia, met with Spasowski on March 24 to discuss American aid. CARE, Catholic Relief Services (CRS), and Project HOPE (a group specializing in medical aid and equipment) also heeded the Pope's request. The PZPR responded by signing Politburo decision 26/81 which opened the way for Western charitable groups by promising "to deliver such gifts from overseas benefactor intended for the specific agencies." The Polish American Congress (PAC), the national organizational and lobbying group for Polish-American

⁵² For a further example of Poland effecting a Reagan administration policy, see the discussion of Reagan's speech to the British Parliament in June 1982 and the creation of the National Endowment for Democracy in chapter 3.

fraternal organizations and charities, also began a drive called a "Tribute to Poland."⁵³ By the end of July, PAC had raised a total of \$576,188.42, out of which they disbursed: \$37,740.00 for 3,000 food packages; \$15,000 for 35,708 lbs of food (infant milk foods, vegetable oil, rice, and semolina); \$70,000 to Project Hope (10,000 units of insulin, 41 cases of Sporidicin, 129,000 soap bars, and 720 medical books); and \$100,000 for CARE food packages (rice, flour, non-fat dry milk, oil, tinned beef, sugar, brown lentils, and split peas).⁵⁴

CRS also moved to send aid. In May Reverend Terrance J. Mulkerin, CRS's coordinator for disaster and relief services, traveled to Poland to make contacts. By the end of August, CRS was "finalizing an agreement with the U.S. Department of Agriculture to purchase at favorable prices dairy products—milk, cheese, butter—for shipment to Poland."⁵⁵ Following Father Mulkerin's second trip to Poland with CRS member Robert Quinlan in September to meet with Cardinal Glemp, American embassy officials, and Polish officials from the Ministry of Health, CRS finalized the outline for a "Family Feeding Program" to distribute just under \$15 million in AID wheat flour, rice, and vegetable oil. The aid sailed to Gdańsk on vessels paid for by the Catholic Church and the Polish government. From there it was handed over to the Charitable Commission of the Polish Episcopate (*Komisja Charytatywna Episkopatu Polski* or KCEP) who

⁵³ This early information on food efforts to Poland is compiled from sources in the CRS Archives, Catholic Relief Services Archive (hereafter referred to as CRS), EURMENA XVII-C, Box 4, Poland Correspondence 1970-1986, 1981 Poland Food Aid.

⁵⁴ Letter from PAC President Aloysius Mazewski to Members of the Board, dated July 31, 1981, CRS, EURMENA XVII-C, Box 4, Poland Correspondence 1970-1986, 1981 Poland Food Aid.

⁵⁵ Letter from Edwin Broderick to Most Reverend Albert Abramowicz, dated August 21, 1981, CRS, EURMENA XVII-C, Box 4, Poland Correspondence 1970-1986, "1981 Poland Food Aid." Food aid from AID generally came from resources provided as part of the Food for Peace program. Food for Peace, or Title II of Public Law 480 allowed the U.S. government to provide food aid to be distributed by private voluntary organizations (PVOs) when humanitarian need existed. P.L. 480 was signed by President Dwight Eisenhower in 1954 and was dubbed "Food for Peace" by President John F. Kennedy. The U.S. government also supported food aid in humanitarian cases by allowing PVOs to purchase food at concessionary prices through the CCC.

distributed the food to each of Poland's twenty-seven Catholic diocese. Aid was distributed at the parish level by local priests to the elderly and "families with young children who would find it physically difficult to wait on lines or economically difficult to purchase food."⁵⁶ In an almost completely homogenous Catholic society where parish priests either saw everyone in church or at least knew everyone, this dispersal program provided complete coverage. By December 10, 1981, CRS had "responded to urgent requests initiated by the Polish-American community and the Church in Poland by shipping 16,921,128 lbs. of food valued at a total of \$10,181,512.89."⁵⁷

In the wake of martial law, organizations like CRS were unsure of how their humanitarian efforts would be affected. To make matters worse, the winter of 1981-1982 was turning harsh, particularly in the Plock area about seventy-five miles northwest of Warsaw which experienced devastating floods after ice dams formed on the Wisla (Vistula) River. Voluntary organizations, however, responded decisively to the public outcry and Poland's humanitarian needs. By mid-January 1982, CRS and CARE had raised \$3.7 million in cash and \$1.5 million in private donations. CARE planned to send about 28,000 tons of dairy products valued at \$29 million in 1982, in addition to about 20,000 food packages (22.2 lbs. each) to individuals in February 1982 alone. In January 1982, CRS shipped about one million pounds of food and clothing to Poland every two weeks. CRS also purchased truck tires, truck batteries, and spare parts to service the government-owned trucks which delivered materials around the country.⁵⁸ Smaller

⁵⁶ Memorandum, "Poland Operational Plan Coverage Outline," dated October 16, 1981, CRS, EURMENA, XVII-C, Box 4, Poland Correspondence 1970-1986, "1981 Poland Gen."

⁵⁷ Letter from CRS Director of Operations Jean J. Chenard to Russel Stover Candy Company, dated December 10, 1981, CRS, EURMENA, XVII-C, Box 4, Poland Correspondence 1970-1986, "1981 Poland Gen."

⁵⁸ Letter from Robert Charlebois to Janet Turner, dated January 5, 1982, CRS, EURMENA Program Correspondence Box 11, 1982 Poland: PL-IE-002 Spare parts for Trucks: Tires and Accumulators.

organizations like the protestant Church World Services and Lutheran World Relief, shipped blankets, quilts, clothing, and hygienic items like water purification tablets and soap.⁵⁹ As the *Christian Science Monitor* reported just before New Year's Day, 1982: "[Humanitarian aid officials] agree that as Poland's difficulties have increased, so has the generosity of contributors. Since the crackdown, says an official of the Boston bank which handles contributions to the Polish Relief Fund, 'the response has just been outstanding.'"⁶⁰

The U.S. government's humanitarian response to martial law, however, was not as clear cut. From the beginning Reagan had been adamant that the U.S. government needed to continue humanitarian aid shipments,⁶¹ but it was unclear of how this would be balanced against sanctions. In a first move, the Americans announced on December 14 that consideration of \$740 million in long-term agricultural aid through direct U.S. government subsidies from the CCC to the Polish government would be suspended, including \$100 million in grain sales aimed at saving Poland's struggling poultry industry which had already been approved.⁶² However, \$30 million of indirect Food for Peace aid already promised to CRS and CARE continued to flow.

Immediately after this announcement, Washington searched for a way to walk the line between punishing Poland's government and supporting its people. On December 15, Senate Foreign Relations Committee staffers contacted Father Mulkerin to talk about reprogramming the \$100 million in suspended direct CCC aid into Title II aid that could

⁵⁹ For a laundry list of assistance sent to Poland in January 1982, see "Emergency in Poland Operations Report #2, January 14, 1982," CRS, EURMENA, Program Correspondence Box 11, 1982 Poland: Agreement/Operational Plan & Relate (Bi-Lingual).

⁶⁰ Rushworth Kidder, "US helping hand extends to Poles," *Christian Science Monitor* (Dec. 31, 1981): 14.

⁶¹ Alexander Haig, *Caveat* (New York: MacMillan Publishing Company, 1984), 250.

⁶² For a further discussion of this move as it relates to economic sanctions, see chapter 1.

be distributed privately.⁶³ Members of the European and Economic Bureaus of State also contemplated replacing the suspended poultry feed with \$100 million in indirect humanitarian aid. A December 31, 1981, draft memorandum took a cynical line and argued for the political rather than humanitarian improvements this gesture could make: "This would demonstrate both domestically and internationally that our brief is not against the Polish people, but instead against the present repressive measures of the Polish regime, and against those who support and contribute to such measures."⁶⁴ The final memorandum to the president proposing increased aid, however, made clear that legally the U.S. government could not simply replace the \$100 million in suspended CCC credits with an equivalent amount in Title II funds: any increase in humanitarian aid required a supplemental appropriation, not just a reprogramming for pre-approved funds. New funds could not be appropriated until Congress reconvened on January 25.⁶⁵

As the discussion moved to the White House, a final decision became embroiled in concerns about extracting political concessions from the PZPR. On January 14, Philip Johnston, executive director of CARE, briefed State department officials on his recent trip to Poland and presented a letter from Jaruzelski requesting \$100 million worth of feed grain to be overseen and monitored by CARE. To receive this large of an assistance package, Johnston was told that the PZPR would have to agree to two conditions: lifting martial law and releasing political prisoners.⁶⁶ When Johnston met with Walter Stoessel

⁶³ Memo from Father Mulkerin to File, dated December 15, 1981, EURMENA XVII-C, Box 4, Poland Correspondence 1970-1986, 1981 Poland Gen.

⁶⁴ Memo from Ernest Johnston and Lawrence Eagleberger to the Secretary, "Memo to the President Requesting Increased Humanitarian Assistance to the Polish People," dated December 31, 1981, NSA, Soviet Flashpoints Originals, Box 1.

⁶⁵ Memorandum from Alexander Haig to the President, "Humanitarian Aid for Poland and the Kirkland Proposal," dated January 7, 1982, with attachment, NSA, Soviet Flashpoints, Box 27, January 1982.

⁶⁶ Memorandum for William Clark, "General Jaruzelski's Request for Humanitarian Assistance (Feed Grain for Poultry)," dated January 16, 1982, NSA, Soviet Flashpoints, Box 27, January 1982.

on February 26, CARE's executive director learned that the proposal for feed grain had been rejected. A secondary request for \$60 million to help support small private farmers in Poland was also rejected.⁶⁷ Ambassador Meehan spoke with officials in Warsaw about Johnston's proposals, but the Poles were not willing to lift martial law or release detainees to gain access to feed grain. As Holmes summarized, "we remain at square one."⁶⁸

Catholic Relief Services simultaneously worked to increase its government-sponsored programs, with little progress. On January 8, CRS sent a "Generic Grant Proposal" to Department of State with requests for \$3.5 million in the form of food, diapers and formula for children, and spare parts and fertilizer for farmers.⁶⁹ When Father Mulkerin returned from another trip to Poland to attend a meeting of the Task Force on Poland in Washington, D.C., on March 9, he inquired about requests for increased Food for Peace aid and CCC help; he left the meeting with "very negative vibes. . . . It [seemed] obvious to us that there [was] no urgent desire to approve either of the two programs . . . : in fact, a number of exquisitely bureaucratic reasons why the two programs should not be approved were presented. . . . Unless high level intervention is forthcoming the final

⁶⁷ Philip Johnston made a second trip to Poland from February 15-23 to meet with Polish government officials about the possibility of starting a program for individual, private Polish farmers. For Polish records related to this trip, see: Notatka [Note re Meetings with Care officials], dated February 17, 1982, and Notatka o wyniku rozmów przedstawicieli organizacji CARE oraz Ministerstwa Rolnictwa i Gospodarki Żywnościowej [Note about results of a conversation with officers from CARE and the Ministry of Agriculture and Food Economics], dated March 4, 1982, both in MSZ, 30/85, W-3, Dep III (1982), AP 39-4-82.

⁶⁸ Briefing Memorandum from H. Allen Holmes to the Deputy Secretary, "Your Meeting with Mr. Philip Johnston, Executive Director of Care, February 26, 10:00 a.m.," dated February 26, 1982, NSA, Soviet Flashpoints, Box 27, February 13-29. For the Polish version of Meehan's meeting with Vice Premier Ozdowski and Jan Kinast on January 19, when Ambassador Meehan placed political conditions on the extension of CCC credits, see Notatka [Note from January 19 of Vice Premier Ozdowski request of U.S. Ambassador to Poland Francis Meehan], dated January 20, 1982, MSZ, 30/85, W-3, Dep III (1982), AP 39-4-82.

⁶⁹ See proposal in CRS, EURMENA, Program Correspondence Box 11, Poland 1981-1983.

answer will be negative."⁷⁰

While the White House dragged its feet on humanitarian aid to Poland, CRS struggled forward. Father Mulkerin visited Poland again from April 22 to May 24 to meet with KCEP colleagues, other Western aid organizations, Polish government officials, and American embassy staff. Mulkerin reported back that in the first quarter of 1982 KCEP had successfully handed out huge amounts of CRS aid: 4,277,000 packages of butter, 1,134,000 packages of cheese, 1,383,750 packages of dried milk, 754,000 rations of wheat flour, 1,152,300 rations of rice, and 1,648,500 rations of vegetable oil. However, this was still not enough: KCEP asked that CRS increase programs for infants, providing hard-to-find items like diapers, cotton shirts, rubber pants, layettes, bottles, and nipples. Father Robert L. Charlebois, another CRS executive, traveled to Warsaw to work with Mulkerin, and together they wrote another grant proposal to the U.S. government to provide materials for children and infants, as well as a "Emergency Program to the Plock region" for families and farmers who had been hit by the January flood.⁷¹

When Father Mulkerin returned to CRS headquarters in New York at the end of May, the bureaucratic process in Washington had finally reached a conclusion.

According to a draft written by an interagency group studying humanitarian aid, the

⁷⁰ Memo from Bishop Broderick to Anthony Foddai, "Poland," dated March 24, 1982, CRS, EURMENA, XVII-C, Box 4, Poland Correspondence 1970-1986, 1981 Poland Gen. An interagency group on Poland met to discuss humanitarian aid to Poland and other issues on March 25, 1982. For a snapshot of how the bureaucracy was moving on humanitarian aid, see: Information Memorandum from Allen Holmes to Lawrence Eagleberger, "March 23 Interagency Group Meeting on Poland," dated March 26, 1982, NSA, Soviet Flashpoints, Box 27, March 1982. From January 7 to February 24, Father Mulkerin traveled to Poland to survey the situation and determine Poland's post-December 13 needs. For his report, see: Report, "Overview of CRS Program in Poland," dated March 4, 1982, CRS, EURMENA, Program Correspondence Box 11, Poland 1981-1983.

⁷¹ For an account of Mulkerin's April to May trip, see "Overview of the CRS Program in Poland," undated, CRS, EURMENA, Program Correspondence, Box 11, Poland 1981-1983. For specifics on the emergency program for Plock, see Interoffice Memorandum from Father Mulkerin to Oscar, undated, CRS, EURMENA, Program Correspondence, Box 11, Poland 1981-1983. Both are attached to an Interoffice Memorandum, "6/10/82 Meeting on Poland," dated June 10, 1982, CRS, EURMENA, Program Correspondence, Box 11, Poland 1981-1983.

decision to provide increased aid was political, not humanitarian. People were not starving, nor were they on the brink of starvation: "Despite the gloomy economic situation and outlook . . . Poland's situation is not so poor that it would meet the normal criteria for granting of [Title II food] aid." But, as the report argued, humanitarian aid offered certain political advantages:

Our assistance is widely visible in Poland, undermining regime propaganda and providing material evidence of Western support for Solidarity and the Church. Our continued assistance would help refute European criticism of sanctions and the view that Poland is a screen for a U.S. policy of confrontation with the Soviets. Our assistance also undermines Soviet propaganda portraying themselves as the only true friends of Polish workers.⁷²

These political arguments found support within the White House. On May 28, the *Wall Street Journal* reported that the president had authorized \$60 million in aid, targeted toward needy children, the elderly, and handicapped people. Of this, \$23.7 million was marked to be spent for the rest of FY 1982 and \$37.5 million in the first quarter of FY 1983.⁷³ According to AID, CRS and CARE would receive enough Title II assistance for Poland to maintain the programs' current levels through the end of December 1982 "with the understanding that the program[s] . . . would be continued through the balance of FY 1983 at a total not to exceed \$40.0 million." The president also approved \$5 million for

⁷² See Confidential Memorandum, "Draft Decision Memo on Options for Humanitarian Assistance to Poland," dated May 12, 1982, NSA, Soviet Flashpoints, Box 27, April-June 1982. Following the workers uprising in East Germany in 1953 the U.S. government implemented a humanitarian aid program with similar political goals, providing individual aid packages to East Germans able to travel to distribution points in West Berlin. For further information on this program see Christian Ostermann, *Uprising in East Germany, 1953: The Cold War, the German Question, and the First Major Upheaval behind the Iron Curtain* (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2001).

⁷³ *Wall Street Journal* (May 28, 1982). For CRS's view, see Memorandum from Oscar Ratti to Father Charlebois, "CRS Program in Poland," dated May 28, 1982, CRS, EURMENA, Program Correspondence, Box 11, Poland 1981-1983.

Project HOPE.⁷⁴ CRS's proposals for an emergency program for Plock and increased medical aid to children had not been accepted (Project HOPE, presumably would include programs for children, however). CARE's proposal to provide aid to private farmers had also been rejected.

Six months after the declaration of martial law, private humanitarian organizations were utilizing U.S. government funds to alleviate humanitarian needs in Poland. The final program was not as large as the \$100 million agricultural aid package that had been agreed to before martial law, but neither had Poland been completely cut out. Meat, protein, and luxury goods remained scarce, but the country had enough vegetables and grain to feed its population. American governmental aid combined with private donations and other Western European aid helped ease hardship in Poland, but the picture remained bleak. As Mulkerin reported following a third trip to Poland from July 21 to August 22:

The harvest was not so good in 1982 as it was in 1981. The grain harvest was a little better but still represented a shortfall of more than one million tons based on normal production figures. The sugar beet crop, which is a cash crop, and the potato crop, which provides a staple food, were not so good this year as they were last year. There is some distress slaughtering of animals taking place because of the lack of feed grains. The broiler [chicken] industry, with its 200,000 tons of chicken, no longer exists. Food prices have doubled and, in some instances, tripled since February. The target groups we serve continued to be in need. The food supply situation has deteriorated. . .⁷⁵

CRS representatives were disappointed at the level of U.S. government support. They saw a larger need than they were able to serve. However, the White House was successfully walking the tightrope, balancing punishing the Polish government against

⁷⁴ Letter from W. Antoinette Ford to Bishop John Broderick, dated June 28, 1982, CRS, EURMENA, Program Correspondence, Box 11, 1982 Poland: Agreement/Operational Plan & Relate (Bi-Lingual).

⁷⁵ Report to File, "Overview of the CRS Program in Poland," undated, CRS, EURMENA, Program Correspondence, Box 11, Poland 1981-1983.

supporting its people. Washington ensured that the public was not in danger of starving, but no attempt was made to flood the country with new aid to fulfill all needs. Funding was appropriated for humanitarian purposes because both the public and the administration felt strongly that the Polish people should not be abandoned. The United States rewarded Poland for her steps toward greater pluralism before the introduction of martial law; now was no time to revoke that commitment to the Polish people. However, as is clear from declassified documents, humanitarian aid to Poland was primarily political. Officials supported continued funding to CARE, CRS, and Project HOPE because it played well in the Western press, counteracted Polish propaganda, and showed that economic sanctions were not meant to punish the Polish people but were aimed at the Polish government and their supporters in Moscow.

The Growth of Conspiracy

As humanitarian organizations were reporting, life under martial law was difficult for the Polish public. Price increases were quickly approved following the introduction of martial law, causing food prices to rise an average of 241 percent, and fuel and energy costs to rise by 171 percent. All of this lowered Poles' real incomes by 32 percent in 1982.⁷⁶ Rationing, empty shelves, and long lines became a fact of Polish life until well after martial law was lifted.⁷⁷

As average Poles began to acclimatize to their new reality, Solidarność began to

⁷⁶ Andrzej Paczkowski, *The Spring Will be Ours* (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2003), 476.

⁷⁷ For a full accounting of the PZPR's predictions for food production in 1982, see: Wnioski z aktualnej sytuacji w skupie produktów rolnych i prognoza do staw żywca, zboża i mleka [Findings on the Current Situation in Purchase of Agricultural Products and the Prognosis for Livestock, Grain, and Milk], dated March 1982, AAN, KC PZPR, V/173, 214-225.

rebuild. Strikes started immediately after the declaration of martial law were crushed by the security services, Milicja, and ZOMO. Operations to capture Solidarność leaders and clashes between strikers and the authorities had been violent and often brutal, but they had not broken the back of either Solidarność or the larger opposition movement. One of the most widespread signs of resistance was the explosion of anti-government graffiti after December 13 with slogans like, "The winter is yours but the spring will be ours," and "CDN" (the Polish acronym for "to be continued"). Large numbers of people also took to more subtle forms of protest like placing lighted candles in windows on the 13th of every month and taking long strolls outside during evening newscasts on state-sponsored television.⁷⁸

As another widespread form of protest, activists printed and distributed illegal flyers, pamphlets, and weeklies (or *niezależny* [independent] press). Protest flyers and pamphlets popped up immediately, often printed in shops where workers first held occupation strikes. After these strikes were broken, opposition activists created new (or revitalized existing) underground presses to produce huge numbers of weekly newsheets and journals. The most famous of the *niezależny* weeklies included *Z dnia na dzień* [From Day to Day] out of Wrocław, *Observator Wielkopolski* [Wielkopolska Observer] from Poznań, *Biuletyn Małopolski* [Małopolska Bulletin] from Kraków, *Głos Wolnego Hutnika* [Voice of the Free Steel Worker] from Nowa Huta, and *Wola* [Will], *Tygodnik Wojenny* [Wartime Weekly], and *Tygodnik Mazowsze* [Mazowsze Weekly] from Warsaw. *Tygodnik Mazowsze* became the most widely produced and circulated publication and played an important role as the major publisher of pronouncements and

⁷⁸ Paczkowski, *Spring*, 455.

commentaries from the Solidarność underground structures.⁷⁹

Entire underground printing "houses" functioned under martial law. The most well known and important houses were CDN, NOWa (*Niezależna Oficyna Wydawnicza*, or Official Independent Publishing House), and Krag. CDN was a new creation. Krag had operated since 1977, and NOWa was the most significant independent publisher prior to December 13. Both houses had established connections to the West: NOWa signed a publishing agreement with members of the Polish émigré publication, *Kultura*, run by Jerzy Giedroyc in Paris, and Krag had a similar agreement with ANEKS publishers run by Eugeniusz Smolar in London. In the first months of 1982, each of these underground houses began producing books; NOWa published Karl Jaspers' *Problem winy* [The Problem of Guilt] in January 1982. Each also produced their own independent weeklies. All three houses played a role in publishing *Tygodnik Mazowsze*, although NOWa was the first to do so and the primary printer. Krag published *Wola, Kos-a* [Committee for Social Resistance], and *Tu Teraz* [Here Now], while CDN published *Wiadomości Dnia* [News of the Day] and *CDN-Głos Wolnego Robotnika* [Free Worker's Voice].⁸⁰ These major printing houses and other much smaller printing shops spread illegal, independent, underground periodicals spread throughout the country, becoming a complete social phenomena. According to one estimate, "during the course of 1982 at least eight hundred illegal periodicals appeared."⁸¹

⁷⁹ Ibid., 458.

⁸⁰ For a full exploration of these publishing houses' roots and their creation, see Pawel Sowinski, "Siła wolnego słowa - Nowa, Krąg, CDN (1982-1989)," in *Solidarność Podziemna 1981-1989*, edited by Andrzej Friszke (Warsaw: Instytut Studiów Politycznych PAN, 2006), 637-665, esp. 637-642.

⁸¹ Paczkowski, *Spring*, 458. The Polish government estimated that 850 separate underground titles were produced in 1982; see "Formy, Metody, i Treści Oddziaływania Nielegalnej Propagandy na Świadomość Społeczną" [Forms, Methods, and Contents of Various Illegal Propaganda in the Social Consciousness], by Marek Zielinski, dated November 1986, Hoover Institution Archives (hereafter referred to as Hoover), Poland, Służba Bezpieczeństwa Department III, Box 6, 6/1. The most complete collection of these

As independent publishing grew, Solidarność's central organs reorganized and reconstructed themselves. On the night of December 12, 1981, government forces captured around 6,000 Solidarność activists, including most national leaders who were meeting in Gdańsk, a shattering blow to the trade union's national organization. On a local level, however, regional strike committees remained strong and were able to organize occupation strikes. Also, despite government efforts, a handful of well-known Solidarność leaders evaded capture and lived an "underground" existence, relying on friends and co-conspirators to hide from the authorities. Five of the most important, nationally known Solidarność leaders who eluded capture were Bogdan Lis and Bogdan Boruszewicz from Gdańsk, Władysław Frasyniuk from Wrocław, Władysław Hardek from Kraków, and Zbigniew Bujak from Warsaw.

In their new underground life, each of these leaders worked to recreate a national structure of Solidarność. In the first days after December 13, Wrocław and the surrounding region of Dolny Śląsk was able to maintain the strongest regional organization, so Frasyniuk took the first step to approach other regional leaders. Through his close confidant, Barbara Labuda, Frasyniuk sent messages to Hardek and Bujak about coordinating a national strike to force the government to release internees, end martial law, and push for the re-emergence of Solidarność.⁸² This, however, led to the first of what became innumerable disagreements over tactics. Bujak disagreed with Frasyniuk's emphasis on a large strike and sent a letter back to Frasyniuk and to Lis, arguing that the

underground publications can be found at the KARTA archives in Warsaw. They have over 3,000 independent periodicals in their collection with nearly 5,000 censored books and brochures published both in Poland and smuggled in from abroad. For a full listing of these materials, see: Agnieszka Iwaszkiewicz, ed., *Archiwum Opozycji*, vol. 1 (Warsaw: Ośrodek Karta, 2006).

⁸² This position of waging an open confrontation with the authorities was later most eloquently argued by Jacek Kuron. Kuron was a founder of the Workers Defense Committee (KOR) in 1976, one of the most important predecessors to Solidarność. Kuron was also one of the most influential advisers to Solidarność, but he was still interned in January 1982.

opposition should create a decentralized, informal opposition structure. This structure would focus on supporting internees and their families, distributing independent press, collecting and exchanging information, and developing a means to affect public opinion. In Bujak's formulation, this would gradually create a nationwide movement based on passive resistance and civil disobedience. While Frasyński was calling for a quick, large-scale retaliation, Bujak was advocating a "long march" toward reform.⁸³ As Andrzej Friszke summarizes:

The dispute about the form of the underground organization was at the same time a dispute about its goals. From the perspective of preparing for a general strike, it was essential to build a cohesive organization with strong support in industrial plants, which respected the rules of subordination and were capable of creating uniform actions in given territories. From the "long march" perspective, such an organization was not necessary. It was sufficient to create loose contacts between autonomous groups of activists. From that perspective, centralizing the organization was even undesirable, because the introduction of a security service agent could cause the exposure of not only one cell, but the entire structure.⁸⁴

In February and March *Solidarność* leaders corresponded regarding tactics, a slow process given that letters could only be sent through trusted couriers. The underground activists also discussed how the organization would work in coordination with a "national" organization that had been founded by striking workers in Gdańsk.⁸⁵ In early April 1982, Frasyński and Bujak exchanged a flurry of letters, in which Frasyński argued

⁸³ Victor Kulerski, a longstanding opposition activist, is generally credited with creating the formulation of the "long march."

⁸⁴ Andrzej Friszke, "Tymczasowa Komisja Koordynacyjna NSZZ 'Solidarność' (1982-1987)," in his *Solidarność Podziemna*, 17-182, quoted at 21.

⁸⁵ On December 13, 1981 a new "national" organization was declared in Gdańsk. Two strike leaders at the Lenin Shipyards decided to create the All-Poland Resistance Committee (*Ogólnopolski Komitet Oporu*, or OKO) to replace *Solidarność*'s previous central organ, the National Strike Committee. A conversation ensued between the leaders in Gdańsk, Wrocław, Kraków, and Warsaw on what to name the new group and whether a different more representative group should succeed the National Strike Committee. This issue was resolved when the two main leaders of OKO were captured and acquiesced to form a different organization.

that any new organization's name should reflect their "temporary" situation, until the trade union could be resurrected. He also wrote that the organizations did not have to provide specifics about their goals; people already knew what Solidarność stood for. On the issue of tactics, Bujak argued that the new body need not be the source for finding the answers to every problem. On April 20 Bujak, Hardek, Lis, and Frasyniuk met secretly in a villa in the Żoliborz neighborhood of Warsaw to create a new national body: the Interim Coordinating Commission (*Tymczasowa Komisja Koordynacyjna*, or TKK).⁸⁶ The TKK's first announcement, published in *Tygodnik Mazowsze*, provided few details other than that the committee had been set up to coordinate actions among their four regions to fight for an end to martial law, a release of internees and prisoners, and the return of citizen's rights. The announcement also declared that the group was a temporary structure, until the Solidarność trade union could be resurrected, with Lech Wałęsa at its head.

In interviews published in *Tygodnik Mazowsze*, Bujak, Frasyniuk, Hardek, and Lis expanded on their thoughts for creating the TKK. Frasyniuk and Hardek called for a strong organization that could bring together the disparate opposition groups to help coordinate their actions, proving the people's continuing power to the authorities. Both Lis and Bujak underlined the need for society and the government to negotiate, for the country to move toward a normalized relationship between the state and the people, and for the government to take steps which would allow Poland to acquire new money and

⁸⁶ For an account of the meeting and analysis of the events that led to this creation from which this summary is taken, see Friszke, "Tymczasowa Komisja Koordynacyjna," 17-27. For an English source on this early period of Solidarność, see Maciej Lopiński, Marcin Moskit, and Maruiz Wilk, *Konspira*, trans. by Jane Cave (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990).

new credits from the West in order to get Poland's economy moving again.⁸⁷

To show the movement's continued strength, Solidarność activists and supporters took to the streets shortly after the founding of the TKK. On May 1, the Socialist holiday for workers, thousands of activists in most of Poland's major cities gathered to counter-demonstrate against official rallies. May Day demonstrations were large in Solidarność's traditional strongholds in Gdańsk, Wrocław, and Kraków, but the largest single crowd of about 30,000 appeared in front of the Old Town Castle in Warsaw, to chant slogans, hear speeches, and sing national hymns. The authorities appeared caught off guard by these counter demonstrations and most proceeded peacefully.⁸⁸ When 10,000 demonstrators appeared in Warsaw's Old Town two days later on May 3, the anniversary of the signing of Poland's first constitution in 1791, riot police came out in force, dispersing the crowds with water cannons, tear gas, and truncheons. Similar incidents took place throughout the country with clashes lasting into the night.⁸⁹ The unrest continued on May 13, when the TKK implemented a fifteen-minute nationwide strike. Again the regime reacted forcefully, firing at least 1,100 workers and taking administrative actions against others. As the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency concluded:

The anti-regime protests from 1 to 13 May clearly exhibited the depth of feeling among Poles against martial law and the degree to which opposition, particularly Solidarity, could still guide the dissent of large numbers of workers and citizens. The outpouring of feeling on 1 May, the bloody confrontations on 3 May, and the widespread strikes on 13 May were all remarkable shows of force against a regime committed to suppress such activities.⁹⁰

⁸⁷ *Tygodnik Mazowsze*, nr. 11 (April 28, 1982): 1-2, KARTA, Archiwum Opozycji.

⁸⁸ For a report on the May 1 events, see: John Darnton, "30,000 Poles defy Army in Warsaw in May Day March," *New York Times* (May 2, 1982): A1.

⁸⁹ For a report on the May 3 events, see John Darnton, "Polish Protesters Clash with Police in Several Cities," *New York Times* (May 4, 1982): A1.

⁹⁰ Defense Intelligence Agency Intelligence Appraisal, "Poland: Situation After Six Months of Martial Law," dated June 23, 1982, NSA, Soviet Flashpoints, Box 27, April-June 1982, 5.

The future of Solidarność, however, remained uncertain. Despite public support for the opposition, Wałęsa and other influential Solidarność leaders were still interned.

Western Support for Conspiracy

With a revitalized opposition movement, groups of émigré Poles, Solidarność activists trapped outside of Poland, and sympathetic groups from the West began to take steps to send covert aid to Solidarność's emerging leadership structures. The most well-known American group supporting Solidarność was the AFL-CIO. Even before events in the Lenin Shipyards in 1980, Lane Kirkland "had long been convinced that ordinary working people, and not diplomats, would bring about Communism's demise"; moreover, two movements that Kirkland felt passionately about—anti-communism and free trade unionism—converged in Solidarność.⁹¹ On August 20, 1980, before the Gdańsk agreements were even signed, the AFL-CIO executive council released a press statement exclaiming their support for the striking workers, criticizing any repressive measures taken against the workers in advance.⁹² Less than a week after the Gdańsk agreements were signed, Kirkland and the AFL-CIO General Board backed their words with actions and announced the creation of the Polish Workers Aid Fund (PWAFF) which was given an initial donation of \$25,000.⁹³ By November 1981, the PWAFF had raised nearly \$250,000 from private donations, t-shirt sales, individual union donations, and shop floor collections.⁹⁴

⁹¹ Arch Puddington, *Lane Kirkland* (Hoboken, N.J.: John Wiley and Sons, 2005), 163.

⁹² "Statement by the AFL-CIO Executive Council on Strikes in Poland," dated August 20, 1980, GMMA, Information Department, AFL-CIO Press Releases 1980, Box 45, 45/2.

⁹³ "Statement on the Polish Workers Aid Fund," dated September 4, 1980, GMMA, Information Department, AFL-CIO Press Releases 1980, Box 45, 45/3.

⁹⁴ The AFL-CIO Secretary-Treasurer kept immaculate records on donations to the PWAFF from November 1980 through the end of 1981. Most of the individual donations are less than \$20, with larger donations

To determine how to spend these funds, the AFL-CIO turned to Solidarność for guidance. The first report about Solidarność's needs came to the AFL-CIO from an International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) representative, Charles Kassman, who traveled to Warsaw and Gdańsk from September 9-15, 1980. Wałęsa had heard about Kirkland's \$25,000 pledge and was "skeptical of large financial contributions at the time being." As Kassman reported, "It is obvious that the AFL-CIO's gift of \$25,000 has created problems for the Committee. They will probably have difficulties in explaining to the authorities what the money will be used for and that it is not proof of a conspiracy between Gdańsk and the USA. The sum has not yet been accepted." Wałęsa did, however, ask for donations of "practical" support in the form of office equipment, specifically duplicating machines, writing paper, and carbon paper.⁹⁵ AFL-CIO representatives from the A. Philip Randolph Education Fund confirmed these requests when they met with Wałęsa in late Spring 1981. Wałęsa was quoted as saying, "financial aid can be a delicate matter, because it could be regarded that we are financed by somebody." However, "there was general agreement that what [was] most needed [were] . . . items not purchaseable in Poland, such as printing presses, cameras, mimeographs machines."⁹⁶ AFL-CIO funds distributed prior to December 13, 1981, were used precisely as Wałęsa requested: for the mundane matters of office and printing supplies.⁹⁷

from individual unions up to \$10,000. For donation information see: AFL-CIO International Affairs Department Files, Inactive Records, "After Nov. 24 PWAFF [Polish Workers Aid Fund]" and "Letters of Contribution from Individuals to the AFL-CIO Polish Workers Aid Fund, 1981."

⁹⁵ "Report to the ICFTU on visits to Warschau and Gdańsk, 15/9-18/9/1980," undated, AFL-CIO, International Affairs Department, Inactive Records, "Wałęsa, Lech."

⁹⁶ "A. Phillip Randolph Education Fund, Report to AFL-CIO President Lane Kirkland on: Poland and the American Labor Movement," circa May 1981, AFL-CIO Kirkland Presidential Files, Inactive Records, "Polish Workers Strike and Fund." Bayard Rustin, Charles Bloomstein, and Adrian Karatnycky took the trip.

⁹⁷ As the second Polish Workers Aid Fund Update reported, "The AFL-CIO Polish Workers Aid Fund has supplied typewriters, both electric and manual, duplicating machines, office supplies and small appliances,

After the declaration of martial law, Kirkland remained staunchly committed to Solidarność. First, he unequivocally condemned the imposition of martial law, blaming both the Polish government and the Soviet Union. AFL-CIO statements also supported robust sanctions against both countries. Finally, Kirkland proclaimed that his organization would do whatever it could to help. As before, the AFL-CIO deferred to Solidarność for guidance:

The AFL-CIO pledges its full support to our Polish brothers and sisters. We do not presume to recommend what Solidarność should or should not do. These are decisions that only the Polish workers can make for themselves. Whatever the decisions of these courageous people, we shall do what we can to assist them. . . . Poland's working men and women are struggling against tremendous odds to build and maintain an effective trade union. Their battle is ours. We shall not let them down.⁹⁸

In the week after December 13, the AFL-CIO also spoke with members of the Reagan administration to look for common interests. On December 15, State Department officials met with AFL-CIO Secretary Treasurer Tom Donohue, Executive Assistant to the President Ken Young, and Special Assistant for International Affairs Dale Good. After a briefing on what the administration knew about events, the government officials asked if there was a chance that Polish government officials searching Solidarność offices might find "any written communications . . . which could be an embarrassment to either [AFL-CIO or Solidarność] and which could provide fuel for Polish government

and in a larger outlay of funds, a small bus-like vehicle which is now in regular use by Solidarity"; quoted from "Update #2," AFL-CIO, International Affairs Department, Unprocessed records, "Update #2." The largest single donation on record from the PWWF was sent to ICFTU President Jan Vanderveken, who utilized the money to purchase and send Solidarność a new off-set printing plant; see: Letter from J. Vanderveken to Lane Kirkland, dated August 20, 1981, AFL-CIO, International Department Files, unprocessed records, "Letters of Contribution from Individuals to the AFL-CIO Polish Workers Aid Fund, 1981 (Box 2)." According to internal accounting a total of \$152,000 was spent on office supplies and material for Solidarność prior to December 13; see: "Note to Editors," dated June 14, 1982, GMMA, AFL-CIO, Information Department, AFL-CIO Press Releases 1937-1995, Box 49, 49/2.

⁹⁸ AFL-CIO Press Release, dated December 14, 1981, GMMA, AFL-CIO, Information Department, AFL-CIO Press Releases 1937-1995, Box 47, 47/2.

propaganda." Donohue assured them that everything would be "straightforward" and that there had been nothing of a "covert" nature.⁹⁹ Three days later Reagan met with Kirkland (who had been in Paris for a meeting of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development). As Kirkland recalled, the president greeted him by joking, "Well, at least we have something we can agree on." Kirkland responded, however, by calling for a sharp American reaction to martial law, including tough economic sanctions and declaring Poland in default. Kirkland also mentioned that the union was looking into sending support through existing channels. "We'll use whatever resources we can," he added, "but whatever [additional] resources could be provided [by the government] would be [helpful]."¹⁰⁰

Meetings between Kirkland and government officials—Haig and Vice President Bush attended the AFL-CIO's February 1982 Executive Council Meeting, for example—continued over the next few months. At these meetings, the administration attempted to coordinate policy with the union to help push both domestic and European public opinion to accept sanctions on Poland and the USSR.¹⁰¹ Even after Reagan's December 23

⁹⁹ Cable from SecState to Amembassy Warsaw, "Department Briefing for AFL-CIO Executive Staff," dated December 16, 1981, NSA, Soviet Flashpoints Originals, Box 1. Concern about the provocative nature of AFL-CIO support to Solidarność was long-standing. Carter's Secretary of State Edmund Muskie consistently pressured Kirkland not to send aid (see Puddington, *Kirkland*, 168-169). This pattern continued in the Reagan administration; see Briefing Memorandum from H. Allen Holmes to the Secretary, "Your February 10 Meeting with Lane Kirkland: Poland," dated February 9, 1981, NSA, Soviet Flashpoints Originals, Box 4.

¹⁰⁰ For Kirkland's recollections, see "An Interview with Lane Kirkland," conducted for the Labor Diplomacy Oral History Project by John F. Shea and Don R. Krienzle (November 13, 1996), 20 (copy available at the GMMA library). Based on a close reading, Kirkland may have been compounding events in his memory, and he may not have actually asked the President to declare Poland in default. This was verifiably a position taken by the AFL-CIO only later in December. Kirkland's commitment to tough sanctions, however, was unwavering. In Puddington's version of the meeting it takes place on December 15 (*Lane Kirkland*, 174), however, State Department documents place the meeting on December 18. For Reagan's briefing materials, see: Memorandum for Mr. James W. Nance, "Poland - President's Meeting with Lane Kirkland," dated December 17, 1981, NSA, Soviet Flashpoints, Box 26, December 1-22, 1981.

¹⁰¹ Puddington, *Kirkland*, 174-175. See also: Briefing Memorandum from H. Allen Holmes to the Secretary, "Your Meeting in Chicago with Lane Kirkland, AFL-CIO," dated January 29, 1982, NSA, Soviet Flashpoints, Box 27, January 1982.

announcement of sanctions, however, Kirkland and his deputies used these meetings to push for even tougher economic and political sanctions.

Another group joined the AFL-CIO in their fight to protect free trade unions in Poland: the Committee in Support of Solidarity (CSS). CSS was founded in New York City on December 14 "to gather information and to report on the situation in Poland in order to inform the American public, the U.S. government, and international bodies about the scope of repression against Polish society and the extent of Solidarity's resistance to the communist regime."¹⁰² As a less public goal, the CSS was also formed for "maintaining contact with Solidarity in Poland."¹⁰³ The group drew members from sympathetic Americans like Eric Chenoweth; Solidarność leaders stranded in the United States, like Mirosław Chojecki and later Wacek Adamczak, member of Solidarity's National Commission, and Mirosław Dominczyk, the chairman of the Kielce Region and a member of the National Commission; as well as émigré Poles who had been active in the democratic opposition in the 1970s, like Irena Lasota, Jakub Karpinski, and Piotr Naimski. The committee was well connected to American Polonia (émigré writers Stanisław Baranczak [Harvard] and Czesław Miłosz [Berkeley] as well as philosopher Leszek Kolakowski [University of Chicago], all signed CSS's first press release). CSS was also very well connected to the American trade union movement. CSS Executive Director Chenoweth had been employed by the Polish Workers Task Force of the League for Industrial Democracy, where CSS had its first offices. In addition, Tom Kahn, AFL-CIO international affairs department director, and Arch Puddington, director of the

¹⁰² "Annual Report, Committee in Support of Solidarity, 1983," Private collection of the Committee in Support of Solidarity (hereafter referred to as CSS), Administrative Files, "CSS Annual Reports 1983-1986."

¹⁰³ Memo from Tom Kahn to Tom Donahue, "Committee in Support of Solidarity," dated June 8, 1982, AFL-CIO, Unprocessed Records, "Committee in Support of Solidarity."

League for Industrial Democracy, sat on the CSS's board. By January 1982, Kahn and Kirkland had agreed to take a direct stake in CSS by paying their Telex bills.¹⁰⁴ Kahn made the AFL-CIO's first direct payment to support CSS's more conspiratorial activities when he authorized the union to pay \$575 to purchase a round trip ticket for Chojecki to travel to Brussels on January 7.¹⁰⁵

Chojecki traveled to Brussels to meet with Solidarność activists who had been stranded in the West. A group of about thirty met in Zurich on December 19 and then in Brussels on January 8-9 to decide how to proceed. Following this second meeting, Magda Wojcik, former assistant head of the international department of Solidarność, sent a letter to international unions asking for assistance to set up Solidarność information offices outside of Poland. As she explained in a separate letter to Kahn, it had "been agreed that no 'Solidarity in Exile' is formed but that in every country where there are members of our Union they all should come together and work jointly in an 'Information Office of Solidarność.'... [These information offices] are in no way a leadership body."¹⁰⁶ As of December 22, 1981, Krzystyna Ruchniewicz had created one such group in Brussels. Sławomir Czarlewski and Seweryn Blumstzajn also started a Solidarnosc Coordinating Committee in Paris and had raised 8 million francs (about \$1 million) from French trade unions.¹⁰⁷

Following this initial decision to create separate information offices, word

¹⁰⁴ Ibid. Tom Kahn's first payment to CSS for Telex bills was \$513 for expenses incurred through March 20, 1982. Memo from Kahn to Tom Donohue, dated April 1, 1982, AFL-CIO, Unprocessed Records, "Committee in Support of Solidarity."

¹⁰⁵ Note from Tom Kahn to William Collins, dated January 6, 1982, AFL-CIO, Unprocessed records, "Committee in Support of Solidarity."

¹⁰⁶ The original call for support came in a letter from Magda Wojcik to Lane Kirkland dated January 18, 1982. For this letter and the letter from Magda Wojcik to Tom Kahn, dated January 18, 1982, see AFL-CIO, unprocessed records, "Wojcik, Magda."

¹⁰⁷ Friszke, "Tymczasowa Komisja," 62-63.

reached Solidarność activists in the West that the TKK wanted to take the opposite approach and create a central office for coordinating Solidarność's foreign contacts. On July 1, 1982, Lis sent a letter calling for activists to create this office in Brussels under the leadership of Jerzy Milewski, a member of the National Commission who had political organizing experience. This decision was controversial because it undermined the activities of some of the offices that had already been started (particularly the Paris office). Solidarność activists ultimately accepted the decision, however, because it was "justified from a political point of view as well as the necessity for arranging a central structure authorized to maintain contacts with central unions and procure funds from them for the union's underground activity."¹⁰⁸

In a July 18 press release, Solidarność members meeting in Oslo announced that they had agreed to create a central Solidarność office abroad headed by Milewski. "By these means, until the restitution of freedom for the Union in Poland, a unified structure for action abroad by ISTU 'Solidarność' has been formed, with an explicit mandate from the authorities of Solidarność in Poland." The Brussels office's main tasks were "coordination of effective and wide support for the Union in Poland, 2) cooperation with trade unions and their international organizations, and 3) coordination of activities intended to inform the public about the actual conditions faced by ISTU 'Solidarność' in Poland." Office staff included Bohdan Cywinski (ideological and political matters), Krystyna Ruchniewicz (finances), Milewski (director and contact with trade unions), Chojecki (coordination of aid to Solidarność in Poland), Sławomir Czarlewski

¹⁰⁸ For an explanation of the creation of the body, see *ibid.*, 60-63; quoted at 63.

(coordination of aid to Solidarność in Poland), and Blumsztajn (information).¹⁰⁹ The Solidarność Coordinating Office Abroad opened its doors on July 29, 1982, in Brussels, with a branch office in Paris.

On August 1, Milewski sent his first communication to Kirkland, outlining the new office's role and requesting support from his brothers in international trade unions. Generally, the trade union's tactics for moving toward a peaceful solution to the "socioeconomic crisis" in Poland were to "show restraint in its demands and willingness to reach a compromise with the authorities" while simultaneously "demonstrate[ing] to the authorities the strength of Solidarność . . . [by] preparing various actions and short strikes." To help "build a strong organization structure for the trade union" the coordinating office was made responsible "for the rapid delivery of large amounts of printing and radio equipment, as well as funds, to all parts of Poland." Milewski asked the AFL-CIO to help pay for the coordinating bureau's expected annual operating fee of \$175,000 and to help provide part of the \$800,000 needed to purchase the necessary "material and equipment (photographic, broadcasting, communications, printing, etc.)." For security reasons, Milewski could not be more specific about the equipment requests.¹¹⁰

Although the AFL-CIO was supportive of Solidarność's new office, the union

¹⁰⁹ Solidarity International Press Release, dated July 18, 1982, AFL-CIO, unprocessed records, "Solidarność 1982 #2."

¹¹⁰ Letter from Jerzy Milewski to Lane Kirkland, dated August 1, 1982, AFL-CIO, International Affairs Department Files, Inactive Records, "Milewski, Jerzy." I was unable to locate any records in the AFL-CIO files showing that Kirkland or Kahn sent the requested funds. According to Idesbald Gooderis, a Belgian scholar who works on European trade unions' support for Solidarność, European unions and international labor organizations in Brussels provided the coordinating office's initial budget. I am deeply indebted to Gooderis for filling in the missing European pieces in my own research. Significant aid from the AFL-CIO to the coordinating office did not materialize until late in 1983 after the creation of the National Endowment for Democracy (see chapter 3). Likely reasons for the lack of a response include: the controversy surrounding the creation of a centralized Brussels office, general misgivings about Milewski within Western opposition groups, and dwindling funds in the PWAf.

created its own channels to run aid to Poland overseen by CSS co-director Irena Lasota. Initially Lasota sent material to her friends and contacts in the opposition in parcels disguised as care packages. They included censored books and small amounts of cash (in American dollars) hidden in common objects. Because there were so many care packages being sent to Poland by well-meaning Americans, Lasota assumed that the government could not possibly search all incoming mail, ensuring that a fair amount of support made it to their intended destinations. Disguising contraband remained an essential part of the task. To help aid independent publishers, in particular, Lasota purchased containers of Hershey's syrup, emptied the contents, cleaned them, and refilled them with printing ink, thereby concealing the contents.¹¹¹

Lasota and the CSS also sent specific communications and electronic equipment needed by the opposition. The details of the operation remain unclear, but on June 18, 1982, Lasota sent receipts and a note to Kahn, asking to be reimbursed for \$489.43. The receipts, from Radio Shack and another electronics store, were for one 14-812 audio recorder, two adapter cassette recorders, two accessory tapes, and \$250 in transistors from Alpine Radio and Television Corp. The attached handwritten note read:

Dear Tom

Enclosed you will find receipts for the transistors, tape-recorders and other "accessories" I already sent to Poland. People from Poland asked for them—I should send much more than that but people are not too willing to take. But they take.

Can I go up to 1? 2? 3? thousand dollars?

[. . .]

Best Regards, [signed Irena]

P.S. The check (for \$489.63) can be written either to me personally or to the Committee. Whatever is more convenient.¹¹²

¹¹¹ Author's interview with Irena Lasota, June 19, 2007.

¹¹² For this note and the receipts see: AFL-CIO, International Affairs Department Files, Inactive Records, "Committee in Support of Solidarity."

Seven months into martial law, the AFL-CIO had established lines of communication through CSS to send materials requested by the democratic opposition in Poland. These first steps were small but important. The American conspiracy to support Solidarność had begun in earnest.

Developments in the Polish Communist Party

For Jaruzelski and his colleagues, their main concern during the first nine months of 1982 was not what was happening outside of Poland, but rather what was happening within its borders. In early January, the general centralized power in a directorate of seven PZPR members including himself, Minister of Internal Affairs Czesław Kiszczak, Deputy Defense Minister Florian Siwicki, Deputy Prime Minister Mieczysław Rakowski, and three central committee members. In Politburo meetings during the first three months of 1982, the leadership focused almost exclusively on reforming the economy and purging and strengthening the party. To reinvigorate the Party *aktiv* they spent significant time drafting a paper, "O co walczymy, dokąd zmierzamy" [About what we are struggling for, where we are heading].¹¹³ Economic reforms included: "a considerable broadening of enterprise autonomy, the abolition of intermediate management units, a greater role for market mechanisms, the abolition of restrictions on the private sector in small-scale industry, and an end to the underprivileged status of private agriculture vis-à-vis cooperatives and the state farms."¹¹⁴ Political reforms created a Patriotic Movement of National Rebirth (PRON) to take over for the Front of National Unity in an attempt to reinvigorate government structures and increase the party's popular legitimacy by

¹¹³ For one Politburo conversation on this paper, see the records for Protocol 23 of the February 6, 1982 in AAN, Mikrofilm 2998, KC PZPR Syg. 1829, 220-228.

¹¹⁴ Paczkowski, *Spring*, 475.

creating "the appearance of a ruling coalition."¹¹⁵

Although efforts to transform Polish society were the government's main focus following the declaration of martial law, they were not very effective. As Andrzej Paczkowski explains, although Jaruzelski and other leaders were constantly claiming to be reforming, "the techniques of government were completely identical to the old methods." The political and economic reforms introduced reworked old ideas and rehashed failed attempts. No bold steps were actually taken, creating a system of "change without change."¹¹⁶

International affairs were considerably less important during 1982 than internal improvements, but the PZPR did engage with the outside world. In addition to the visit from Hungarian communists mentioned in chapter one, Jaruzelski and members of his inner circle traveled to their socialist brothers to request increased economic support. Jaruzelski's first trip out of Poland after December was to Moscow on March 1-2. On the first day he spoke with Brezhnev and high-level leaders for one-and-a-half hours about the internal situation and the steps taken since introducing martial law. The bilateral portions of the meeting focused on: "manifestations of full understanding" to show Soviet approval Jaruzelski's decisions, questions of economic help, and proclamations about "opening a new era in the development of close relations and cooperation between our parties and nations after the difficult period triggered by the Polish crisis." Jaruzelski also proposed specific economic requests for the Soviets: to give long-term credits worth \$1 billion, to provide one million tons of crude oil, to send 250,000 tons of grain in the

¹¹⁵ Ibid., 470. In Poland, a few parties including the ZSL and SD had been allowed to continue to exist alongside the Polish United Workers Party. These parties existed in the Sejm but never acted with any autonomy from the dictates of the PZPR.

¹¹⁶ Ibid., 470 and 465. For a fuller explanation of this phenomena of change without change, see *Spring*, 465-477.

second quarter of 1982, to make Soviet raw materials available to Polish industries, and to consider building a gas pipeline to the West through Poland.¹¹⁷

During the same trip, lower-level Polish and Soviet officials negotiated a general outline for developing Poland's economy over the next few years. These officials agreed to focus on projects to exploit Poland's industrial potential, to create tighter connections with Soviet industry, and to "make Poland's economy independent from the capitalist countries."¹¹⁸ When the PZPR International Department produced a final report on cooperation, the meetings' outcome became clear: "Strengthening and expanding Polish-Soviet economic and scientific-technical cooperation should have primary [*zapewniony*] priority in the foreign activity of our economic organs and scientific institutions."¹¹⁹

As his second trip, Jaruzelski visited Budapest on April 21. This afforded him the opportunity to hear again that imposing martial law was the right decision. Hungarian Party leader Janos Kadar also briefed the Poles on Hungary's internal situation: its economy, its problems with the Church, and its foreign debt. Kadar also explained Hungary's decentralized economic model and entertained Jaruzelski's calls for greater bilateral economic cooperation. No specific agreements were signed, but general possibilities of increased coal shipments from Poland and long-term cooperation to produce buses were discussed. Jaruzelski made clear to Kadar that he saw Hungary as an

¹¹⁷ Pilna Notatka z wizyty w Moskwie Delegacji Partyjno-Państwowej z I Sekretarzem KC PZPR, Prezesem Rady Ministrów tow. Wojciechem Jaruzelskim, w dniach 1-2 marca 1982 r. [Urgent Note from the Visit to Moscow by the Party-Government with First Secretary of the PZPR Central Committee, Head of the Council of Ministers Wojciech Jaruzelski from 1 to 2 March 1982], dated March 5, 1982, AAN, KC PZPR, V/172, 555-561; quoted at 556 and 560.

¹¹⁸ Podstawowe Problemy Współpracy Gospodarczej Między PRL i ZSRR oraz Pomocy Radzieckiej dla Polski [Basic Problems of Economic Cooperation between the PRL and USSR as well as Soviet Help for Poland], dated March 1982, AAN, KC PZPR, V/172, 562-566; quoted at 562.

¹¹⁹ Programowe założenia Umocnienia i Rozwoju stosunków Polskiej z ZSRR [Program Assumptions for Strengthening and the Development of Polish-USSR Relations], dated April 27, 1982, AAN, KC PZPR, V/174, 32-51; quoted at 50.

example to be emulated. While Hungary's economic system was flawed, its mix of decentralization and private initiative offered the best working example of a successful socialist economy in central Europe. Beyond economics, the Poles wanted to understand the Hungarian's "exit from the 1956 crisis, especially in areas like winning back society, the press, the intelligentsia, and youths' trust."¹²⁰

Other PZPR officials traveled throughout the Socialist bloc. From March 24-26, Politburo member M. Woźniak and directors from the PZPR foreign and economics departments visited Yugoslavia, looking for economic help (corn, truck batteries, and nickel in this case).¹²¹ Politburo member and Minister of Foreign Affairs Józef Czyrek made short trips to visit Erich Honeker in East Berlin and Gustav Husak in Prague on March 29 and April 4. Again, the fraternal leaders praised their Polish guests, and the allies planned for intensified economic cooperation.¹²²

These trips showed a clear change in Poland's foreign policy. Simply put, Poland turned inward toward the Socialist world in the aftermath of December 13. The PZPR took no initiatives to engage with the West. Rather than pressing on with previous policies and seeking to undercut American sanctions by working with sympathetic Western economies like West Germany, the PZPR decided to reorient their economy toward the East; this was their chosen path to recovery. According to one Politburo report: "The key issue for resuscitating our economy, in most of its industries, is the intensification of production for export. . . . Cooperation with the USSR and other

¹²⁰ For the report on Jaruzelski's visit to Hungary, see: Notatka Informacyjna z przebiegu wizyty delegacji partyjno-państwowej PRL w Budapeszcie w dniu 21 kwietnia 1982 r. [Information Note from the proceedings of the visit of the PRL Party-National delegation in Budapest on 21 April 1982], dated April 23, 1982, AAN, KC PZPR, V/173, 719-730; quoted at 729.

¹²¹ See Sprawozdanie z pobytu delegacji KC PZPR w Jugosławii (24-26.iii.1982 r) [Report from the Trip by a PZPR Central Committee Delegation to Yugoslavia (24-26.3.1983)], dated March 27, 1982, AAN, KC PZPR, V/173, 250-263.

¹²² See Czyrek's comments on his trip to East Berlin in AAN, PZPR KC, V/173, 199-201.

socialist countries has essential significance." The report also mentioned improving economic relations with non-aligned, developing nations. Hopes for improved trade with the West, however, were placed at a minimum. The Poles believed that their policies prior to December 1981 had led to an "irrational" situation where they relied extensively on capitalist goods and technology; the time had come to orient their economy back toward the Socialist world. Economic relations with the Soviet Union and the Soviet bloc were given the highest priority. This new policy advocated strengthening commitments and coordination through COMECON.¹²³

For some in Washington this was the desired response from Warsaw. NSC staffer Richard Pipes, Assistant Secretary of Defense Richard Perle, Defense Secretary Weinberger, and DCI Bill Casey had backed economic sanctions as part of their global strategy to wage economic warfare against Moscow. From their perspectives, sanctions were designed to punish Jaruzelski *and* to force Poland to draw more resources from the Soviet bloc. In this sense, sanctions against Poland succeeded: Jaruzelski turned toward the East for economic help, draining resources that could otherwise be used for military expenditures.

In another sense, however, economic sanctions had a very negative effect. By pulling away from reliance on economic help from the West, Jaruzelski further limited Western leverage. Politically and especially militarily the United States had little influence. Prior to December 1981, all meaningful connections were based on trade and economics; therefore, America's strongest pressure points in Poland had been to offer

¹²³ See excerpts on foreign trade in Referat Biura Politycznego KC PZPR na VIII Plenum KC [PZPR Central Committee Politburo Report for the 8th Central Committee Plenum], dated March 13, 1982, AAN, KC PZPR, V/173, 553-556; quoted at 553. This report also called for circumventing sanctions by attaining needed imports from the West through secret arrangements with other Socialist countries.

credits, aid, and favorable terms on either new loans or rescheduled debt. By rejecting trade with the West, Jaruzelski weakened American influence. As the CIA put it, "Sanctions will tend to make Warsaw more dependent on Moscow and its CEMA partners. Jaruzelski is thus faced with the choice of presiding over a deeper and more permanent integration of the Polish economy into that of the Soviet Union or undertaking the political measures necessary for the lifting of sanctions."¹²⁴ Jaruzelski and his colleagues in the Politburo opted for the first option. They decided they could get what they needed from the East and purposefully isolated themselves from the West. Sanctions effectively punished Poland; the country's economic condition clearly showed that. But, this came at a cost to longstanding economic links that could be manipulated to push for reform in Poland.

The Poles also isolated themselves politically by taking a provocative line against the United States. After sanctions were announced, the PZPR did whatever it could to punish the United States on the ground in Warsaw, Poznań, and Kraków. In meeting after meeting with American officials in Warsaw, representatives from the MSZ deliberately antagonized American representatives adding to the existing tension, rather than seeking to ameliorate it. For example, numerous MSZ officials complained about American statements regarding Poland's internal situation, specifically comments made by Haig in a speech in Brussels on January 12. Jan Kinast from the MSZ also complained about a RFE broadcasts which quoted from opposition leaflets. The PZPR considered both the speech and the broadcast to be illegal interventions into sovereign affairs, and made sure

¹²⁴ Special National Intelligence Estimate, "Poland's Prospects over the Next 12 to 18 Months," dated March 25, 1982, in *Poland 1980-1982*.

the Americans knew how upset they were about it.¹²⁵

When DCM Herbert Wilgis met with MSZ Department III Vice Director Stanisław Pawliszewski, the American lodged formal complaints against Polish infringements against American diplomats: only one of six telephones in the American consulate in Kraków were working and the American consul in Poznań was constantly harassed. Every time the consul, his wife, or his child stepped out of their house a milicja officer stationed nearby ordered them to leave the sidewalk and go home. In response, Kinast simply replied that the lack of telephones was a problem for everyone during martial law and that everyone, including the consul in Poznań needed to obey the curfew.¹²⁶ These types of meetings were typical for the first five months after martial law, showing the hostility diplomats on both sides felt toward each other. No effort was made to improve the substance or the tone of bilateral relations.

Hostility toward the United States permeated policy making to the highest levels of Poland's leadership. Jaruzelski, himself, was one of the strongest critics of U.S. policy. He consistently complained that RFE broadcasts recklessly promoted instability and that sanctions were illegitimate international policies that infringed upon Poland's sovereign right to make its own decisions. The break in trust caused by Reagan's reaction to martial law (see chapter 1) did not heal quickly. Jaruzelski also resented that Poland was being used by the United States as a lightning rod in the global Cold War. As he explained to the Politburo, "We are a card in their game which they want to carry on." He believed

¹²⁵ Notatka Informacyjna [Information Note from the 20th of this month for a conversation with U.S. Ambassador Francis Meehan], MSZ, 30/85, W-2, Dep III (1982), AP 22-1-82/A.

¹²⁶ Notatka Informacyjna z rozmowy Tow. St. Pawliszewskiego, wicedyrektor Departmentu III z radcą-ministrem Ambassady USA w Warszawie H.E. Wilgis'em [Information Note from St. Pawliszewski's, vice director of Department III, conversation with DCM of the U.S. Embassy in Warsaw, H. E. Wilgis], dated February 25, 1982, MSZ, 30/85, W-2, Dep III (1982), AP 22-1-82/A..

that Reagan was using martial law as an pretext to pursue bellicose policies against the Soviets and the rest of the Socialist bloc. However, he thought that the American moves were backfiring. In particular he noted Japan and Europe's desire to trade with the Soviet Union, and the growth of anti-Americanism in Europe.¹²⁷ Like MSZ officials berating and harassing American diplomats, Jaruzelski showed no signs of giving in to American pressure; he was prepared to play out the "game" the Americans began when they declared sanctions.

By mid-May 1982, the level of hostility between the two governments increased to the point of a full diplomatic standoff. On May 10, two American embassy officers, John Zerolis and Daniel Howard, were declared *persona non grata* (PNG) and asked to leave the country within four days. The two had been apprehended by the Polish security services while meeting with a recently released opposition scientist. The PZPR considered this an infringement on sovereignty and detained the Americans, regardless and in violation of the Americans' diplomatic status. In retaliation, Lawrence Eagleberger met with the charge d'affairs at the Polish embassy in Washington, Zdzisław Ludwiczak, to inform him that the Polish government's actions were "so transparent as to be beneath contempt." Eagleberger declared Andrzej Koroscik and Mariusz Wozniak of the Polish embassy *persona non grata* and requested that they leave the United States. Because their main science and technology officer (Howard) was leaving Poland, the Americans severed all scientific and technology exchanges.¹²⁸ This PNG crisis epitomized the larger

¹²⁷ Excerpt from the transcript of a May 25, 1982, PZPR Central Committee Meeting, AAN, KC PZPR, V/174, 506-509; quoted at 507.

¹²⁸ Cable from Secstate to Amembassy Warsaw, "Official Informal No. 56," dated May 13, 1982, NSA, Soviet Flashpoints Originals, Box 1. For MSZ materials on the incident see the folder, "Wydalenie z USA Pracowników Ambasady PRL w Waszyngtonie" [Expulsion from the U.S. of PRL Embassy Staff in Washington], MSZ, 30/85, W-2, Dep III (1982), AP 35-6-82.

problems in bilateral relations in the first six months after the declaration of martial law: the two sides were unable to find any common ground and were taking deliberately provocative moves by expelling one-another's embassy staff.

Foggy Bottom considered the plunge in relations important enough to request a meeting between Meehan and Jaruzelski.¹²⁹ The general declined the request, but the foreign minister saw Meehan on May 24. Washington instructed Meehan to call the meeting because "bilateral relations with Poland are at a critical point" and recent Polish actions were a "riddle" to the Americans. As Meehan explained:

The future of our relations depends to a great degree on the actions of the Polish government. If they become provocative—and we warn that the last actions were provocative—we are prepared to respond. As Eagleburger said, if the Polish side desires to completely eliminate relations we are prepared to accommodate you. We have one hope, that we manage to avert such a decline. . . . This means not only the broad political framework of relations, but also what Eagleburger said—about matters concerning everyday relations.

The U.S. government wanted to see "a true and frank dialogue with Solidarity and the Church, lifting martial law, and freeing internees," emphasizing that for the United States to respond favorably Jaruzelski needed to make more than just "cosmetic" reforms.

The foreign minister did not respond in a conciliatory manner. Instead he asked Meehan only slightly rhetorically, "Who is responsible for the worsening of relations: the Polish government or someone else?" Czyrek then launched into the usual line of condemning RFE broadcasts and criticizing American sanctions which had cut Polish exports to America to 57% of their 1981 levels and had cut American imports to 6.5% compared to a year earlier. Czyrek even declared: "Little substance of relations remains,

¹²⁹ For details of the meeting between American Embassy officer Vought and Pawliszewski on May 21 during which the American asked for the meeting, see Notatka Informacyjna [Information Note], dated May 22, 1982, MSZ, 49/86, W-1, Dep III (1983), AP 10-1-83.

because already we are out of everything." He defended martial law as a "protective umbrella for conducting reforms, which had always provided an occasion for turmoil in Poland." Czyrek summarized ongoing communications between the party and the Church, but rejected dialogue with Solidarność:

There is no possibility of an agreement based on a return to the situation before December, nor before August 1980. In accordance with that, there is not a possibility of agreement with such a Solidarność or such line of Solidarność which existed before December 1981. If such a possibility existed we would not have introduced martial law.

Czyrek returned to the issue of American sanctions, saying, "You have achieved the political isolation of Poland, you continue economic restrictions incorporating coal, ham, in scientific cooperation. This will not continue without effect. The effects are easy for you, but in Polish policy they have caused definitive consequences: seeking new partners, other relations, etc."¹³⁰

Both sides ended the conversation on May 24 with platitudes hoping for improved relations. The overall substance of the conversation, however, made the prospect of improved relations unlikely. America's economic and political sanctions against Poland had taken their toll on the Polish state. In response, Jaruzelski and his advisors had retaliated against the Americans, not by giving into American pressure, but by aggressively pursuing a policy to make life difficult for American diplomats in Poland. The Poles were taking what few steps they could to limit contacts with America. After six months of martial law, American sanctions and the Polish reaction had forced bilateral relations to a stalemate, with few prospects for improvement.

¹³⁰ For the Polish stenogram from the May 24 meeting between Czyrek and Meehan, see: Rozmowa Ambassadora F. J. Meehan'a z Ministerem J. Czyrkeim w dniu 24 maja 1982 r. [Conversation of Ambassador F. J. Meehan with Minister J. Czyrek on 24 May 1982], MSZ, 30/85, W-2, Dep III (1982), AP 22-1-82.

NSDDs, Credits, Pipelines, and "Small Steps"

By the end of May the president and his NSC had more pressing issues than re-evaluating deteriorating Polish-American relations. On March 19, Argentine forces landed on South Georgia Island, part of the United Kingdom's possessions in the South Atlantic, provoking a crisis in the Falkland Islands. Trouble was also brewing in the Middle East. Israel had come under attack from internal bombings and rocket attacks from southern Lebanon. In June, the Israeli army clashed with PLO, Lebanese, and Syrian forces. The White House was also facing massive anti-nuclear protests, including a June 12 march in New York City which mobilized 500,000 protestors calling for a nuclear "freeze." Declassified materials from NSC meetings show that START negotiations and the Falkland crisis were the main topics of concern.¹³¹

When the NSC did address American policy vis-à-vis Poland, it continued to push for strong sanctions by America's West European allies on the USSR, rather than policy directed specifically toward Poland. The United States had partially succeeded at enforcing sanctions against the Poles at the January 11 NAC meeting (see chapter 1), but hard-line members of the administration wanted to push Allied agreements to include measures aimed at the Soviets themselves. The East-West issue that received the most attention from January 1982 through that fall was not Poland but the construction of a natural gas pipeline from Siberia to Western Europe.¹³²

¹³¹ For an excised list of NSC meetings and brief topics, see: <http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/resource/findaid/nsexmeet.htm>.

¹³² Plans for the over-3,000 mile Siberian pipeline project came out of Europe's energy fears following the oil crises of the 1970s. Negotiations began in 1979 and the deal to create the pipeline was announced by Helmut Schmidt on a state visit to Moscow in July 1980. The pipeline would run from Siberia, through the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia to West Germany. For a full explanation of the genesis of the program see chapters two and three in Anthony Blinken's *Ally vs. Ally* (New York: Praeger, 1987).

Although the gas pipeline had been a concern before December 1981, blocking construction of the Siberian gas pipeline was quickly linked to events in Poland. On December 27, 1981, Haig cabled American diplomats in West European capitals, referring to "the shift in Italian attitudes toward Siberian pipeline as a result of Polish crisis [which] raises potentially very significant opportunity." Haig continued, "We would be most interested in any indication . . . posts can pick up that development similar to that reported by [U.S.] Ambassador Rabb [in Rome] may be underway in your countries."¹³³ Haig's initial optimism, however, met with a sober assessment from Ambassador Arthur Burns in Bonn. He reported: "We agree that U.S. pressure at this time on the pipeline issue would, in Germany at least, be counterproductive and interpreted as an U.S. attempt to use the Polish crisis to implement policies vis-à-vis the Soviets which were not accepted earlier."¹³⁴ Nonetheless, when the president announced sanctions against Moscow on December 29 he included the decision to suspend "licenses . . . for export to the Soviet Union for an expanded list of oil and gas equipment."¹³⁵

In both Washington and Western European capitals, it was unclear exactly how this sanction would affect the pipeline project. For hard-line members of the cabinet, "sanctions were targeted on oil and gas technologies because these were needed by Moscow to keep the weakening economy upright", part of the larger strategy to weaken the Soviet economy. Supporters were reluctant to give up the tactic, even in the face of robust Allied criticism throughout January and February. In mid-February, the president

¹³³ Cable from Secstate to Amembassy Bonn, Paris, the Hague, and Brussels, "The Polish Crisis and the Siberian Gas Pipeline," dated December 27, 1981, NSA, Soviet Flashpoints Originals, Box 1.

¹³⁴ Cable from Amembassy Bonn to Secstate, "The Polish Crisis and the Siberian Pipeline," dated December 28, 1981, NSA, Soviet Flashpoints Originals, Box 1.

¹³⁵ "Statement on U.S. measures taken against the Soviet Union Concerning its Involvement in Poland," December 29, 1981, *Public Papers of the President* (1981), available via the Reagan Library website (www.reagan.utexas.edu).

decided to send former Senator and Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance James Buckley on a mission to Europe to fight for sanctions against the Kremlin and explain Washington's reasons for blocking the pipeline.

During the build-up to Buckley's trip, pipeline sanctions became a contentious issue within the White House, once again pitting State against Defense. Defense pushed to halt the pipeline's construction by denying essential American technology (specifically rotors manufactured by GE to transport gas through the pipeline). State recommended dropping any hope of halting construction: it feared that blocking technology would cause a full break in Allied relations already strained by disagreements over Poland. As a compromise, State recommended that Buckley use uncertainty about how Reagan would eventually rule on pipeline sanctions "to obtain other concessions from the allies in more general areas of East-West trade," namely to restrict new loans and credit agreements with the Soviets.¹³⁶ In a report prepared for the NSC, State's argument to focus on financial credits rather than on pipeline sanctions was the consensus opinion.¹³⁷ When the NSC discussed the Buckley mission on February 26, disagreements remained: Haig called for pipeline equipment to be exempt from the sanctions. Weinberger, who was the only voice in opposition, advocated keeping pipeline sanctions and applying them retroactively and extraterritorially, meaning that neither American corporations nor their subsidiaries would be allowed to sell technology for the pipeline.¹³⁸ Choosing to keep the issue open, Reagan backed State's negotiating position but held off on a final decision

¹³⁶ Blinken, *Ally*, 11.

¹³⁷ Action Memorandum from Robert Hormats to the Secretary, "Terms of Reference for the Mission to Europe on Sanctions vis-à-vis the Soviet Union," dated February 20, 1982, and Memorandum from Paul Bremer, "Small Group Meeting on the Proposed Buckley Mission to Europe, February 24, 1982," dated February 26, 1982 both in NSA, Soviet Flashpoints, Box 27, February 13-29, 1982.

¹³⁸ Pipes, *Vixi*, 178.

until after Buckley's trip.

Buckley traveled to Bonn, Paris, London, Rome, and Brussels from March 15 to 19 with a high-level team from Defense, Commerce, and NSC. As agreed, Buckley asked that the West work more closely to limit and restrict new loans and financial credits to the Soviet Union. Buckley's mission did not get any concessions from the Europeans to limit Soviet access to Western cash. As Pipes summarized, "He met everywhere with failure: all the Europeans opposed our stand."¹³⁹ Despite this setback, Buckley and George Shultz, the president of Bechtel Corporation who had been recruited to discuss East-West trade issues, traveled repeatedly to Europe in April and May to negotiate on restricting credits to the Soviet Union in return for dropping the pipeline sanctions.¹⁴⁰ Neither found success.

Reagan then traveled to Europe June 2-11 for meetings in European capitals and the G-7 summit at Versailles, with the issues of credits and pipeline sanctions unresolved. Reagan personally advocated tougher credit restrictions against the Soviets, but like Buckley and Shultz, the president returned "thoroughly disappointed and angry with the lack of any decisive moves by the allies on credit restrictions." A week later, the President's anger turned into a decision. On June 18 at a hastily called NSC meeting which did not include Haig, Reagan "ruled from the bench," agreeing with advice from Weinberger, Casey, and Clark to apply American sanctions against oil and gas technology exports to the Soviet Union retroactively and enforce them extraterritorially. The president felt that not taking this step would make the United States look "flabby" in

¹³⁹ *ibid.*

¹⁴⁰ Blinken, *Ally*, 100-101. Blinken's book provides the most in depth study of the pipeline crisis. For his retelling of the crisis as it unfolded in the Winter, Spring, and Summer of 1982, see chapter 6 in particular.

the face of continued repression in Poland.¹⁴¹

The response to the decision was sharp in both Washington and Western Europe.

In Europe, the president's announcement

met with vehement protest The EEC issued a statement decrying "the state of extreme political and economic tension with Washington." Bonn pronounced itself "dismayed" at the sanctions and called them "a contradiction to what was agreed and discussed at the economic summit." EEC trade negotiator Sir Roy Denman said, "Our trade relations with the United States are the worst I have seen since the end of the war." The normally conservative *Financial Times* of London wrote that "the components of the Western Alliance are coming apart."¹⁴²

Even Reagan's close collaborator Margaret Thatcher denounced the sanctions in legalistic terms: "It is wrong for one powerful nation" to try to prevent the fulfillment of "existing contracts that do not, in any event, fall under its jurisdiction."¹⁴³ In Washington, Haig was so upset that the decision was made in his absence, that he submitted a letter of resignation. Rather than ignoring the letter as he had done in previous instances, Reagan accepted. Haig announced he was stepping down as secretary on June 25, and he was replaced almost immediately by George Shultz, who was officially sworn in as secretary of state on July 16.

When Shultz stepped into office his initial concern was violence in Lebanon; however, he also took steps to shift American policy on the pipeline issue and sanctions in general. In August the French government forced French companies working on the pipeline to honor their agreements with Moscow. To enforce sanctions the U.S. government would have to directly confront Paris, evidence of just how fractured U.S.-West European relations were. Sanctions meant to punish the Soviet Union were now

¹⁴¹ Pipes, *Vixi*, 178-183.

¹⁴² Blinken, *Ally*, 104.

¹⁴³ *Ibid.*, 105.

taking a harsher toll on the Western alliance than the Soviet bloc. In the face of this reaction "even Cap Weinberger agreed that [the United States] should engage the Europeans in working out the problems."¹⁴⁴ After meetings in Europe and Washington, Shultz forged a new agreement in which the Europeans agreed to "security-minded principles" to determine economic exchanges, specifically: to refrain from any new natural gas agreements with the USSR, to enhance restrictions on technology exports through COCOM, and to harmonize export credit policies. This was not as strong as the commitment Reagan wanted earlier, but it did repair the fissure in Allied relations. At the end of November, Reagan codified this new framework in NSDD 66, "East-West Relations and Poland-Related Sanctions."¹⁴⁵

Changing personnel also directly affected American policy toward Poland. First and foremost, Shultz was not Haig. In the months leading up to the June 18 decision, Haig was enmeshed in increasingly acidic arguments with Clark and Weinberger.¹⁴⁶ His volatile personality and his territoriality about foreign affairs bothered the president; in Reagan's own words, "[Haig] had a toughness and aggressiveness about protecting his status and turf that caused problems within the administration."¹⁴⁷ By mid-June Reagan was convinced that Haig was "no longer a member of the team," and, by one account, the president orchestrated the June 18 decision to provoke his resignation.¹⁴⁸ With personal relations so low, the messenger must have hurt the State Department's messages. In contrast, "Reagan thought Shultz's calm, professional manner a refreshing contrast to

¹⁴⁴ George Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1993), 138.

¹⁴⁵ A copy of NSDD 66, dated November 29, 1982, can be located via www.archives.gov/research/arc/.

¹⁴⁶ According to Pipes, Haig also made the inexcusable mistake of offending Nancy Reagan while at Versailles. See *Vixi*, 182.

¹⁴⁷ Reagan, *An American Life*, 254-256, 271, 360-362; quoted at 271.

¹⁴⁸ Lou Cannon, *President Reagan* (New York: Public Affairs, 2000), 169.

Haig's excitability," and the president hand picked Shultz to be secretary of state before announcing Haig's resignation.¹⁴⁹ Reagan and Shultz quickly created a strong working relationship. As Shultz recalled, Reagan "increasingly took his side of the issue."¹⁵⁰ Pragmatic and moderate voices within State now had an amicable and respected spokesman to argue against the hard-line ideologues.

Shultz also brought a new approach to sanctions. As a trained economist, he "was skeptical of the effectiveness of sanctions, especially when applied unilaterally." He argued that sanctions were "a wasting asset. . . the longer the sanctions last, the less they mean." In the face of these arguments, Weinberger finally came around to the idea of dropping the sanctions on pipeline technology, opening the way for a final resolution.¹⁵¹

The State Department's ascendancy and Shultz's new perspective on sanctions influenced Polish matters even before Shultz officially took office. On July 9, the *New York Times* reported that "President Reagan [was] searching for ways to ease economic sanctions against Poland." To ease tension and generate a new accord with the Allies, one official said, the White House was looking for "some signal on the part of the Soviet and Polish authorities that some kind of movement is beginning and will be advanced in Poland."¹⁵² Since the end of May, State officials had been reporting that while they were getting mixed signals from Warsaw, a faction within the highest levels of the PZPR, including Rakowski, was "actively advocating reconciliation as the only means of achieving economic recovery and the modification of NATO sanctions."¹⁵³ Jaruzelski

¹⁴⁹ Ibid., 170-171; quoted in fn.

¹⁵⁰ For Shultz's take on this issue, see *Turmoil*, 135-145; quoted at 140.

¹⁵¹ Ibid., 137, 138.

¹⁵² Leslie Gelb, "Reagan is Seeking ways to Moderate Poland Sanctions," *New York Times* (July 9, 1982):

A1.

¹⁵³ See Information Memorandum from H. Allen Holmes to the Secretary, "Poland: Effectiveness of Economic Sanctions," dated May 28, 1982, and Information Memorandum from Thomas Niles to the

took a step towards national reconciliation when he announced on July 21 that 1,227 internees would be released and hinted that martial law could be suspended by the end of the year. Assistant Secretary Scanlan had also had a cordial meeting with Ludwiczak on August 25 to discuss moves in Congress to defer Poland's debt.¹⁵⁴

In this more optimistic atmosphere with signs of change in Poland, the White House undertook a general discussion of national security policy toward Eastern Europe. On September 2, Reagan signed NSDD 54, "United States Policy toward Eastern Europe." This time the president supported the more pragmatic position advocated by the Department of State. Rather than accepting non-differentiation to seek decreased economic and political contacts with nations behind the Iron Curtain, Reagan decided to endorse differentiation "to encourage diversity through political and economic policies tailored to individual countries." Unlike President Johnson, Nixon, and Carter's variety, in this version "implementation will differ in that we will proceed more cautiously and with a clearer sense of our limitations, including budgetary ones." However, the goals of differentiation remained the same: to encourage liberalizing trends, to further human and civil rights, to re-enforce the pro-Western orientation of their peoples, to lessen economic and political dependence on the Soviet Union, and to encourage private markets and free trade unions. Finally, differentiation was calibrated to discriminate between countries in terms of their "relative independence from the Soviet Union in the conduct of foreign policy" and "greater internal liberalization as manifested in a willingness to observe

Secretary, "Polish Sanctions," dated June 17, 1982, both in NSA, Soviet Flashpoints, Box 27, April-June 1982.

¹⁵⁴Notaka Informacyjna z rozmowy z Asistentem Sekretarzem Scanlan'em w dniu 25.vii [Information Note from a conversation with Assistant Secretary Scanlan on 25.7], dated September, 13, 1982 MSZ, 30/85, W-2, Dep III (1982), AP 22-1-82. In an attached memo to the information note, Wiejacz mentions that Scanlan's comments on sanctions and relations were "considerably softer" than the administration or the embassy, but is unsure of his sincerity. This is the first direct confirmation of the July 9 *New York Times* article that Washington was interested in improving relations.

internationally recognized human rights and to pursue a degree of pluralism and decentralization, including a more market-oriented economy."¹⁵⁵

The decision to endorse differentiation was a de facto rejection of more ideological voices. The White House concluded that its long-term strategy was to re-engage with Eastern Europe to pull it away from the Soviet Union, rather than to isolate Eastern Europe to draw resources from the Soviets. Before Haig's exit, differentiation had bureaucratic momentum because it was standing policy, but non-differentiation remained a real possibility. NSDD 45 ended this possibility. As Raymond Garthoff has noted, Secretary Shultz began a review of U.S.-Soviet relations at the end of 1982 and early 1983 to "move slowly but deliberately to build a constructive relationship [with the Soviets]; in [the secretary's] own later words, to try to turn the relationship 'away from confrontation toward real problem solving."¹⁵⁶ NSDD 54 was an earlier sign on a much lower-profile issue that under Shultz's guidance Washington was reorienting relations with the Socialist bloc to return to a more pragmatic foundation.

The change in American policy was first confirmed to the Poles less than ten days after the signing of NSDD 54. On September 11, Ambassador Meehan met with the new Minister of Foreign Affairs Stefan Olszowski to discuss bilateral relations.¹⁵⁷ Unlike his meeting with Czyrek four months earlier, Meehan took a less confrontational line. After some polite chat, including mentioning McDonald's interest to buy Polish potatoes for their French fries, Meehan transmitted a message from the administration about its "uneasiness" with relations. He went on to say that the U.S. government had noted "with

¹⁵⁵ A copy of NSDD 54, dated September 2, 1982, can be located at www.archives.gov/arc/.

¹⁵⁶ Garthoff, *Great Transition*, 102.

¹⁵⁷ Olszowski replaced Czyrek as minister of foreign affairs in July 1982. Czyrek remained in charge of relations with the Socialist world in the Politburo.

importance" Jaruzelski's July 21 announcement, but that it was waiting to see what the general did next to move toward meeting the three conditions set down by the U.S. and its allies for normalizing relations. In response, Olszowski explained that Polish moves had been made for internal reasons and that "we are not molding ourselves to the West's dictates." He then made a proposal for improving relations: "it is necessary to consider the possibility of taking even small steps, which could lead in the direction of improved Polish-American relations." Meehan responded that this possible approach would be difficult both politically and economically, and that it would "clearly be different from the situation in the 1970s."¹⁵⁸

Less than two weeks later, Meehan met with Wiejacz to inquire about the "small steps" framework. In response Wiejacz proposed a number of areas where the Poles wanted to see improvements, including airlines, fishing quotas, scientific-technical cooperation, returning Poland's representative in Washington to the level of ambassador, increasing safety for Polish diplomatic posts, and streamlining visa procedures for diplomats and embassy workers.¹⁵⁹ Meehan "expressed satisfaction" with the possibility of exchanging opinions and reviewing concrete matters within the purview of bilateral

¹⁵⁸ Pilna Notatka z rozmowy z Ambasadorem USA w Warszawie F.J. Meehan'em w dniu 11 wrzesien 1982 r. [Urgent Note from a conversation with U.S. Ambassador in Warsaw, F. J. Meehan on 11 September 1982], MSZ, 30/85, W-2, Dep III (1982), AP 22-1-82. Unlike most other MSZ documents, the report on Olszowski's meeting with Meehan was sent to the highest level of the leadership, including Jaruzelski, Rakowski, Kinast, and Czyrek. Meehan requested the meeting with Olszowski on August 31, and an overview of U.S.-Polish relations was prepared for Olszowski prior to the meeting, see: Notatka w sprawie prośby Ambasadora USA Francis J. Meehan'a o przyjęcie przez Towarzysza Ministra S. Olszowskiego [Note regarding the request by U.S. Ambassador Francis J. Meehan to meet with Comrade Minister S. Olszowski], MSZ, 48/86, W-1, Dep III (1983), AP 10-1-83. After this meeting, Meehan met once with Wiejacz during which small steps were mentioned, but not discussed. Wiejacz did write that Meehan "presented a more elastic stand than in previous conversations." See Notatka Informacyjna z rozmowy z Ambasadorem USA w Warszawie Meehan'em w dniu 16 wrzesien 1982 r [Information Note from a conversation with U.S. Ambassador in Warsaw on 16 September 1982], MSZ, 30/85, W-2, Dep III (1982), AP 22-1-82.

¹⁵⁹ After Spasowski defected, Zbigniew Ludwiczak was left as the head of the embassy at the level of charge d'affaires. Regarding security for diplomatic posts, the Polish consulates in Chicago and New York had been vandalized and were regular sites for protests.

relations. He explained the American viewpoint on the need to consider small steps in order to prevent future deterioration in relations. Finally, he asserted that topics and assessments for further discussion should be raised with him to pass on to Washington.¹⁶⁰

With this informal agreement the framework of U.S.-Polish relations began to shift. While the details remained unclear, the "small steps" framework meant that sanctions might be lifted individually (rather than as a block) to reward the PZPR for taking partial steps toward the West's demands. Specifically, the Poles were looking for a positive response for the release of internees that had been announced on July 21. They were attempting to embrace a more give-and-take relationship: when the PZPR took steps toward internal liberalization or reconciliation with the Polish people and its representatives, they wanted to be rewarded. The hope was that carrots could now be traded for incremental moves taken within Poland. Implicitly sticks remained an option.

From the Polish record (American cables from meeting have not been declassified) it appears that the Poles initiated the "small steps" framework. The option was only raised after the White House signaled through the *New York Times* that they were looking for a way to reduce tension.¹⁶¹ Meehan also made clear that the United States sought to respond positively to Jaruzelski's moves in July. More importantly, "small steps" fit Meehan's previous opinions about incentives. This new framework also fit well within the recently accepted and re-codified doctrine of differentiation. While the mechanisms for implementing "small steps" proved difficult to finalize—for five months

¹⁶⁰ Pilna Notatka z rozmowy z Ambasadorem USA F. Meehanem w dn. 24.ix.br. [Urgent Note from a conversation with U.S. Ambassador F. Meehan on 24.9], MSZ, 30/85, W-2, Dep III (1982), AP 22-1-82. Meehan was scheduled to return to Washington for consultations in early November.

¹⁶¹ The July 9 *New York Times* article which mentioned that the Reagan administration was looking for a signal of change in Poland or the Soviet Union was in the records of Department III at the MSZ, see: MSZ, 30/85, W-2, Dep III (1982), AP 22-1-82/A.

the Reagan administration continued to define sanctions as an all-or-nothing proposal, and it took much longer before bilateral relations significantly improved—the "small steps" approach would become the a cornerstone of U.S.-Polish relations.

* * *

In the nine months from January to September 1982, the shadow of Polish policy expanded into a wider array of concerns beyond martial law and sanctions. American diplomats in Warsaw and Washington tried to move policy onto a new footing that included carrots as well sticks, with some even suggesting a Marshall Plan for Poland. Events in Poland gave public credibility and added urgency to requests for new funding for Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty and Voice of America. Poland became a center of the debate over international financial agreements and aid procedures. In the NSC hardliners used Poland to fight for tougher sanctions against the Soviets.

Over the course of the pipeline sanctions debate, however, the cause of Poland was obscured. The gas pipelines issue moved the Reagan administration's focus away from Poland *qua* Poland. Poland was only important in terms of how it was used to secure global goals. As Haig recalled, "The Polish crisis provided a convenient pretext for dealing with the pipeline, which had long nettled [neo-conservatives] strategic sensibilities."¹⁶² Policy discussions about how to engage Poland and Eastern Europe were pushed to the background. With Poles cutting economic ties with the West and strengthening their connections with the East, American leverage in Poland decreased. Still angry about sanctions the Poles pursued a provocative and antagonistic policy that caused relations to spiral downward, finally leading to a PNG crisis.

As the White House distanced itself from daily policy in Poland and bilateral

¹⁶² Haig, *Caveat*, 252.

relations worsened, all the major storylines surfaced which would dominate Polish-American relations over the next five years. Congress took a direct role in determining policy. Propaganda moved onto the front lines of confrontation. Solidarność reorganized itself in the underground, proving through street demonstrations and independent publications that it had survived to fight again. In response, an international web of conspirators lead by labor and Polish émigré organizations surfaced to support the opposition with money and material. American humanitarian organizations solidified their role as well, delivering millions of dollars of aid through the KCEP and local Catholic parishes. Finally, under Shultz's guidance the White House agreed to a softer approach toward Eastern Europe, resuming the policy of differentiation. In response to signals from the White House the PZPR made its own new policy initiative and suggested basing relations on "small steps."

Front page headlines about martial law and Poland began to fade after the fall of 1982. The White House's interest also began to wane as Shultz and the rest of the cabinet turned to focus on the Soviet Union *without* links to Poland. Poland occasionally reappeared on the front page, was the subject of an NSC decision, and appeared in a presidential speech, but it moved progressively to the background. In the background, Poland would not spark the same ideological arguments that had motivated American decisions during 1982, freeing relations to evolve incrementally. In the first three quarters of 1982, in effect, the situation in Poland stabilized, with all the major issues and players materializing. Over the next three years Poland's transformation and American policy did not follow a straight trajectory; both turned and twisted as time progressed. But with the framework of small steps on the table, Washington and Warsaw now had a new tool to

move gradually towards improvement.

Chapter 3

"Bilateral relations were about as cold as you can imagine":

Diplomatic Stalemate

1982-1985

When John Davis arrived in Warsaw as the Chargé d'affaires *ad interim* in September 1983, he was the third in a string of chargés since Ambassador Meehan exited earlier in the year. Davis thought that this would be a temporary position; he only had a six month mandate from the Department of State. The working assumption was that during those six months, he and his superiors in Washington would be able to improve bilateral relations with the Polish government enough to allow an exchange of full ambassadors. That assumption proved incorrect. With meeting after meeting leading to dead end after dead end, both sides stubbornly refused to give ground. Following one particularly tense meeting with MSZ officials Davis returned to the embassy and made light of the stalemate in his casual, low key manner: "Well it looks like I am going to have to buy another shirt."¹ His six month mandate lasted over six years.

Davis's experience was neither unique nor particularly noteworthy in the long series of contentious meetings that characterized bilateral relations in the mid-1980s. Although the PZPR proposed a framework of "small steps" to improve relations in September 1982, it took over six months before Washington began working with similar

¹ Davis, as quoted by Ambassador Christopher Hill, who was second economics officer in Warsaw from June 1983 to July 1985. Author's interview with Hill, May 12, 2004.

assumptions. Afterwards, the PZPR remained frustrated about American policy, making improvements difficult to secure. Beginning in November 1982 Jaruzelski did take steps toward liberalization, but internal dynamics meant that these changes did not follow a predictable trajectory. In response Washington lifted some sanctions and, in a few cases, imposed new ones. Both sides met with successes and failures, but a significant breakthrough in relations remained elusive.

Beyond the scope of government-to-government relations, humanitarian organizations continued their work, with Congress playing a central role. Legislators approved appropriations to support a second pillar of independent society: individual farmers. They also passed legislation to provide direct payments to improve Poland's healthcare infrastructure. Capitol Hill also worked together with the White House to give non-governmental organizations a new powerful source of funding—the National Endowment for Democracy—buttressing continued efforts by the international web keeping Solidarność alive. Under the direction of DCI William Casey, the CIA added their support as well. In Warsaw, the American embassy took steps to independently support the opposition, creating close personal relationships with Solidarność activists increasingly living above ground. Despite these positive trends beneath the surface, at the beginning of 1985 Polish-American relations found themselves in yet another diplomatic crisis, showing just how little relations had progressed.

Internal Dynamics of Change

In the wake of a partial amnesty on July 21, 1982, advocates within Solidarność for a strong, centralized underground society were skeptical that they could reach a

compromise with the government. To show their continuing strength, the TKK called for street demonstrations on August 31, the second anniversary of the signing of the Gdańsk agreements.² For activists, like Jacek Kuron, the demonstrations were meant to show the government that the people had not been intimidated and to push the authorities into direct negotiations.³

On August 31, large crowds gathered and clashed with milicja, ZOMO, and police. According to the MSW, demonstrations occurred in sixty-six cities and involved about 118,000 people. Marchers hurled rocks, paving stones, and even Molotov cocktails at the authorities a stark contrast to peaceful demonstrations the previous May. Jaruzelski and Minister of Internal Affairs Czesław Kiszczak were prepared, and riot police and security forces used deadly force to control the situation. Two people in Lubin and two people in Gdańsk died after government forces fired into crowds. Despite the turnout elsewhere, demonstrations in Warsaw proved to be much smaller than the organizers hoped, drawing only about 15,000 people compared to the 50,000 to 100,000 that opposition leaders had been expecting.⁴ With international attention focused on Warsaw, this smaller-than-expected turnout and the authorities' ability to "quash antigovernment demonstrations" with "comparative ease" led the international press to conclude that "the suspended Solidarity trade union [had failed] to devise an effective strategy for combating martial law."⁵

² For the announcements calling for strikes on August 31, see *Tygodnik Mazowsze*, no. 22 (July 28, 1982) and no. 24 (August 18, 1982), both in KARTA, Archiwum Opozycji.

³ For an explanation of Kuron's standpoint on strikes see Andrzej Paczkowski, *The Spring Will be Ours* (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2003), 459. For a retelling of the discussions within the TKK before the demonstrations, see Andrzej Friszke, "Tymczasowa Komisja Koordynacyjna NSZZ 'Solidarność' (1982-1987)," in his *Solidarność Podziemna 1981-1989* (Warsaw: Instytut Studiów Politycznych PAN, 2006), 28-36.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 36-37.

⁵ Michael Dobbs, "Solidarity Lacks Effective Strategy in Combating Martial Law," *Washington Post* (Sept.

The PZPR leadership also interpreted the August 31 events as a victory. Although crowds were substantial, few workers took part; most demonstrators were either youth or members of the intelligentsia. In the authorities' eyes, this was a sign of Solidarność's decreasing popularity with workers, the opposition's former stronghold. The MSW also arrested almost 5,000 of the most militant oppositionists, and there were no major disruptions in production. The demonstrations had not been the decisive show of power that TKK leaders planned. The American intelligence community came to similar conclusions, "The demonstrations probably did nothing to shake Jaruzelski's conviction that time is on his side and that he can eventually wear down Solidarity's will to resist."⁶ As Jaruzelski put it, "Solidarność extremists performed their funeral march."⁷

This perceived victory emboldened the PZPR to pursue further tough policies against Solidarność. After a Politburo meeting on September 2, six leading members of KOR—Jacek Kuron, Adam Michnik, Jan Latynski, Henryk Wujec, Mirosław Chojecki, and Jan Josef Lipski—were charged with treason, singling them out as traitors for attempting to overthrow the government.⁸ In addition, officials discussed officially dissolving Solidarność. Jerzy Wiatr, the head of the party's institute for Marxism-Leninism, publicly hinted that new government-sanctioned unions would be created.⁹ Days later the official Polish government paper, *Rzeczpospolita*, reported that the

2, 1982): A16.

⁶ Special National Intelligence Estimate (SNIE 12.6-82), "Poland's Prospects over the Next 12 to 18 Months," dated September 1, 1982, NSA, Soviet Flashpoints, Box 28, July-September 1982.

⁷ Mieczysław Rakowski, *Dzienniki polityczne 1981-1983* (Warsaw: Wydawnictwo ISKRY, 2004), 333-334.

⁸ Kuron, Michnik, Latynski, and Wujec were already interned; Chojecki and Lipski, who were living in Paris and London, were charged in absentia.

⁹ Krzysztof Bobinski, "Compromise Hint on Creation of New Polish Trade Unions," *Financial Times* (Sept. 13, 1982), A18.

government was considering declaring Solidarność illegal.¹⁰ On September 23 and 28, the Politburo met to discuss the issue, with some fearing that Solidarność would react with massive strikes and demonstrations, possibly crippling the country. The PZPR also consulted with the Church. On October 2, Bishop Bronisław Dąbrowski, Cardinal Glemp's main negotiator, assured the Communist leadership that the Church would not have a comment on the matter.¹¹

Following a final Politburo meeting on October 5 and a meeting between Politburo member Stanisław Ciosek and Lech Wałęsa (who remained in prison) to try to gauge his reaction, the Politburo passed the legislation onto the Sejm. The Sejm rubber stamped the legislation on October 8, creating a new system of trade unions and declaring Solidarność illegal. The Politburo anxiously waited to see workers' reactions, but there were no major protests or violent clashes.¹² The PZPR had won another tenuous victory against the opposition.

The reaction from the United States, was swift, clear, and tough. On October 9, President Reagan declared the new law for independent trade unions a "sham" and announced that he was suspending Poland's most favored nation (MFN) trade status, increasing duties and taxes on all Polish imports. The president made clear that the U.S. was "prepared to take further steps as a result of this further repression" and reiterated his earlier offers of economic assistance if the PZPR moved to end repression.¹³ From the

¹⁰ Michael Dobbs, "Polish Press Floats Idea of Final Solidarity Ban," *Washington Post* (Sept. 23, 1982): A34.

¹¹ Rakowski, *Dzienniki 1981-1983*, 356.

¹² For Mięczysław Rakowski's account of this period, from which most of the information in my account is taken, see his *Dzienniki 1981-1983*, 339-370.

¹³ "Radio Address to the Nation on Solidarity and United States Relations with Poland, October 9, 1982," *Public Papers of the President* (1982), available on the Reagan Library's website: www.reagan.utexas.edu. The NSC held a meeting on September 30, presumably to discuss rumors of a move against the union and possible American responses. The transcript remains classified, but according to withdrawal sheets it will

American perspective, suspending MFN was not economically important but would "have great symbolic and political significance . . . particularly to the Poles who attach great importance to the MFN."¹⁴

Unlike the presidential announcement imposing sanctions in December 1981, this punitive step came as no surprise to Warsaw. On October 6, two days before the Sejm's announcement, Davis, then head of the East European department in the Department of State European Bureau, with Jan Kinast, director of MSZ Department III, and warned him that any move against Solidarność would have very negative effects, an obvious reference to rumors circulating about the new union law.¹⁵ As Jaruzelski remarked to Rakowski after Reagan's pronouncement, "It was, after all, known with [Reagan] and so it goes; onto [Foreign Minister] Olszowski where he will remain alone on the battlefield."¹⁶ The decision to outlaw Solidarność was a rebuke of one of America's requirements for improved relations—reopening negotiations with the trade union—taken in spite of clear warnings.

Simultaneously, however, the PZPR leadership took actions in line with Western

eventually be located in RRPL, Paula Dobriansky Files, Box 90892, Poland Memoranda 1981-1983, [October-December 1982]. Shortly after the president's announcement, the Department of State concluded that they could not count on Congress to pass a new law, so the executive branch utilized a provision in the GATT treaty with Poland to suspend MFN. On October 27, Reagan signed Presidential Proclamation 4991, officially suspending Poland's MFN status. On the internal dynamics of the decision, see: Action Memorandum from Richard McCormack, Davis Robinson, and Richard Burt to Mr. Wallis, "Implementation of the Decision to Suspend MFN Treatment for Poland," dated October 15, 1982; Cable from Secstate to Amembassy Warsaw, "Consultation with Polish Charge on Suspension of Poland's MFN Status," dated October 23, 1982; Action Memorandum from Powell Moore to Under Secretary Eagleburger, "Congressional Telephone Calls on Polish MFN," dated October 25, 1982; and Cable from Secstate to USMission NATO, "Suspension of Poland's Most-Favored-Nation Status," dated October 27, 1982, all found in NSA, Soviet Flashpoints, Box 28, October-December 1982.

¹⁴ Cable from Lawrence Eagleburger to Secretary Shultz, "Impact of U.S. Suspension of MFN on Tariff Treatment for Poland," dated October 9, 1982, NSA, Soviet Flashpoints, Box 28, October-December 1982.

¹⁵ Notatka Informacyjna z rozmowy z John'em Davis'em w dniu 6.x.1982 r. [Information Note from a conversation with John Davis on 6.10.1982], dated October 6, 1982, MSZ, 30/85, W-2, Dep III (1982), AP 22-1-82.

¹⁶ Rakowski, *Dzienniki 1981-1983*, 365.

requests. First, the PZPR pursued closer contacts with the Catholic Church. Earlier in 1982 Glemp and Jaruzelski exchanged letters on the possibility of Pope John Paul II visiting Poland, but in July the general postponed the visit.¹⁷ Nonetheless channels remained open, and on September 30, the episcopate proposed a meeting among Glemp, Jaruzelski, and Wałęsa to move towards national reconciliation again. Glemp also called for Wałęsa to be freed from internment as a sign of good will.¹⁸ Jaruzelski and his advisors did not reject this possibility out of hand, instead they used Wałęsa to gain leverage with the church. As Jaruzelski explained to Rakowski: "We will free Wałęsa, but we must get something in exchange for him from the Church."¹⁹

Jaruzelski and Glemp met on November 8. At that time, the PZPR leadership was concerned about possibly debilitating strikes on November 10, which the TKK called for to mark the first anniversary of the signing of Solidarność's constitution.²⁰ Party officials also worried about anti-government demonstrations on November 11, a traditional holiday marking the creation of a free Poland at the conclusion of World War I. The PZPR wanted the Church to use its influence to insure that calm prevailed. Glemp's pronouncements had helped keep calm in the first weeks of martial law, and the Party hoped that the Church could have the same effect again.

At the meeting, the two sides agreed to a loose *quid pro quo*. Jaruzelski dangled a papal visit and freeing Wałęsa. In response Glemp was sympathetic toward the general's position and openly criticized RFE and Western sanctions. Overall Jaruzelski categorized

¹⁷ For the text of Glemp's letter and a discussion of Jaruzelski's response see records for the June 29, 1982, Politburo meeting in: AAN, Sygn. 1833, Mikr. 3002, 1-16.

¹⁸ September 30 marked the first anniversary since Wałęsa, Glemp, and Jaruzelski had met, in a last ditch effort.

¹⁹ Rakowski, *Dzienniki 1981-1983*, 362.

²⁰ Opposition leadership had also been calling for workers to boycott the new government-sanctioned trade unions. For the general strike announcements see the front pages of *Tygodnik Mazowsze*, nr. 30 (Oct. 20, 1982) and nr. 31 (Oct. 27, 1982) both in KARTA, Archiwum Opozycji.

the meeting as "constructive and useful."²¹ Immediately afterwards the two sides announced that the Pope would visit Poland in June 1983. The Church and government together voiced "concern for the preservation and strengthening of peace, order and honest work in society."²² In Western media and within Poland the November 8 meeting was correctly viewed as an attempt by the Church and the state to dissolve tension between the people and the government. As one Western journalist concluded, the agreement on a papal visit was "an apparent attempt to defuse protest strikes and demonstrations."²³ This cooperative strategy worked. No major strikes materialized on November 10, and street demonstrations on November 11 remained small and non-violent.

This new Church-government dialogue also took a more surprising turn. On the November 11 evening news, readers announced that Wałęsa would be released from Arłamow prison. Three days earlier, Kiszczak had met with Wałęsa and agreed to his release. The former leader of Solidarność returned to Gdańsk a few days later, welcomed home by a group of about 1,500 people. When the Politburo met on November 18 to review the decision to free Wałęsa, Jaruzelski explained that it was a "suitable moment" to release him "to become a regular citizen." He continued, "Wałęsa at home, that is a difficult problem for [him]. Wałęsa cannot go into the underground. The legend of a steadfast and interned Wałęsa has been disgraced. Freeing [him] was a definite surprise for capitalist countries. It is peaceful in Gdańsk. There were not many welcomers."

²¹ Ibid, 400.

²² For quotes of the announcement, see Krzysztof Bobinski, "Jaruzelski agrees to June for Pope's visit," *Financial Times* (Nov. 9, 1982): A3.

²³ For quote see Michael Dobbs, "Poland Sets date for Pope's Visit," *Washington Post* (Nov. 9, 1982): A1. For more analytical coverage, see Eric Bourne, "Polish Regime, Church try to Defuse Tensions," *Christian Science Monitor* (Nov. 10, 1982): 1, and John Kifner, "For Poland's Church a new Relationship with the State," *New York Times* (Nov. 14, 1982): D3.

Kiszczak supported these views: "without [Bronisław] Geremek and other advisors, he is an illiterate politician."²⁴ In the wake of poorly organized strikes and demonstrations throughout the second half of 1982, the PZPR leadership decided that a free Wałęsa did not pose a significant threat. Releasing Wałęsa also reflected the growing spirit of cooperation between the PZPR and the Church.

The PZPR Politburo took a further bold step towards liberalization at their November 18 meeting: they agreed to suspend martial law. The possibility had been on the table since July and by the middle of November. The question of how to proceed was posed as a choice between three options: 1) lifting martial law, 2) suspending martial law, and 3) continuing martial law. Both WRON and Jaruzelski opted for the second option. Suspending martial law showed the Party's strength and confidence in their improving situation. On the other hand, if problems with food delivery or the Pope's visit led to an emergency situation, martial law could be re-imposed easily without a new law from the Sejm. The Politburo accepted WRON's suggestion and the discussion turned toward implementing the decision: would there be another amnesty, who would write the draft legislation to suspend, and when would the Sejm pass it?

Comments from Politburo members help illustrate the major motivation for ending martial law. There was no talk of foreign pressure or American sanctions. Instead, suspending martial law allowed the government to focus on pressing economic measures. If Poland wanted to extricate itself from its crisis, the economy had to be improved. Martial law was too burdensome to continue to carry. For instance, restrictions on

²⁴ Protokół nr. 56 z posiedzenia Biura Politycznego KC PZPR w dniu 18.xi.1982 [Protocol no. 56 from minutes of the PZPR CC Politburo on 18.11.1982], dated November 18, 1982, AAN, KC PZPR, V/182, 217-252; quoted at 227 and 230. For information on the letter sent from Wałęsa to Jaruzelski, see Michael Dobbs, "Poland said it will Free Lech Wałęsa, Union Leader sent Conciliatory Letter to Gen. Jaruzelski," *Washington Post* (Nov. 12, 1982): A1.

movement and communication were slowing growth in the economic sphere. As Jaruzelski summarized, suspending martial law was "only one step toward normalization. It is very important [now] to focus on economic measures."²⁵

The PZPR's decisions to schedule a papal visit, release Wałęsa, and suspend martial law were all steps towards liberalization that the West had been demanding for a year. From the outside it might appear as if Warsaw was acquiescing to the West's demands. From the inside, the decision-making process was driven by domestic factors, particularly the leadership's belief that they needed the church as a partner to get society functioning again. As the decision to outlaw Solidarność showed, the PZPR did not feel the need to acquiesce to Solidarność; to the PZPR the union was a nuisance that was gradually losing its influence. The Church however, remained a central player which was needed to regain public trust. Announcing a papal visit and releasing Wałęsa were moves to promote trust. Suspending martial law was a necessity for improving the economy. All were internal concerns.

The West

Jaruzelski in particular did not view his moves toward liberalization as a concession to the West. Rather, he saw an opportunity to make headway against sanctions. From the general's perspective the PZPR needed to take advantage of Wałęsa's release and the suspension of martial law to move against the United States. "We must be on the offensive. Create a movement admonishing . . . Reagan on the Polish issue."²⁶

Jaruzelski's push to seize the initiative was indicative of how he saw relations

²⁵ Protokół nr. 56, 246.

²⁶ Ibid, 247-248.

with the West and the United States, in particular. From the beginning of martial law, Jaruzelski pursued a policy that consistently sought to increase confrontation, rather than limit tensions. With few points of leverage against the United States, Jaruzelski often turned to propaganda to diminish Washington's influence within Poland as well as beyond its borders. In the first days of martial law, the Poles and the Soviets increased jamming RFE and VOA in an attempt to overcome some of the United States' advantage in this arena. As early as June 1982 the Politburo worked to coordinate international propaganda activities better and to move from a "defensive reaction to events" toward a more "offensive" stance.²⁷ In line with this plan, the Politburo pursued commentaries and interviews in the Western press to "show the hypocrisy of Reagan's policies, using meaningful examples from the U.S. (i.e., relations with striking traffic controllers. . .)." ²⁸

In the wake of Reagan's decision to suspend MFN, the Politburo also decided to take "concrete actions" against Washington.²⁹ On November 23, the PZPR placed further restrictions on scientific and cultural exchanges, visas for American journalists, as well as visas for American citizens in general.³⁰ On December 3, Jaruzelski publicized his intentions in a spirited speech to miners in southern Poland. He attacked Washington as the "main inspirer of anti-Polish actions," and derided Reagan for being "blinded by an anti-Polish obsession." He defended his decision to impose martial law, and announced

²⁷ Report, "Kierunki propagandy PRL na zagranicę w warunkach polityki Zachodu zmierzającej do izolacji politycznej i blokady ekonomicznej Polski oraz prowadzonej prezeń wojny psychologicznej przeciwko naszemu krajowi" [Direction of foreign PRL propaganda under Western political conditions of Poland's political isolation and economic blockade, as well as referring to the psychological war again our country], dated June 24, 1982, AAN, KC PZPR, XI/308, 291-295; quoted at 294.

²⁸ For the text of this Politburo decision, see: AAN, BP PZPR, Mikr. 3005, Sygn. 1836, 279. In August 1981 Reagan fired 13,000 members of the Professional Air Traffic Controllers Organization three days after they walked off their jobs. Jaruzelski believed this to be inconsistent with Reagan's pro-trade union statements.

²⁹ For these decisions taken at the November 23, 1982, Politburo meeting, see AAN, PZPR BP, Mikr 3012, Sygn 1843.

³⁰ For these decisions taken at the November 23, 1982, Politburo meeting, see AAN, PZPR BP, Mikr 3012, Sygn 1843.

that his government would take steps to decrease cooperation between the two countries "if the current aggressive campaign continues In particular, all Polish institutions and missions will break off contacts with the United States Information Agency. . . . Our cultural and scientific participation in the world can be successfully realized with other countries to mutual advantage." Finally the general hinted that his government would take steps to limit "contacts between Polish citizens and American missions and agencies." The speech's message was clear: Poland would not be intimidated into acting according to other countries' wishes.³¹

Despite Jaruzelski's tough talk, the PZPR made a subtle sign that it was still open to improved relations. On December 8, a Polish diplomat in Moscow informally invited the Americans to respond to the "small steps" framework, suggesting that "the United States . . . might consider 'suspending' one or more of the sanctions now in effect against Poland as a signal of its willingness eventually to lift sanctions if and when more progress is achieved."³² In reply to this and Jaruzelski's speech, the president publicly reiterated America's willingness to rescind sanctions and approve economic incentives, slightly refining the three earlier requirements for such a move. Steps would now be contingent upon: "the end of martial law, the release of political prisoners, and the beginning of dialogue with truly representative forces of the Polish nation, such as the

³¹ John Kifner, "Poland's Leader, in Bitter Speech, Threatens to Restrict ties to U.S.," *New York Times* (Dec. 4, 1982), A7. Jaruzelski's focus on the United States as the cause of Poland's problem was repeated in private in a speech he gave to the Political Coordinating Commission of the Warsaw Pact, which met in Prague on January 4, 1983. See Przemówienie Przewodniczącego delegacji polskiej na posiedzeniu Doradczego Komitetu Politycznego Układu Warszawskiego i Sekretarza KC PZPR, prezesa Rady Ministrów, gen. armii Wojciecha Jaruzelskiego, wygłoszone w Pradze, 4 stycznia 1983 r [Address by the head of the Polish Delegation to the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Pact, First Secretary of the PZPR Central Committee, chairman of the Council of Ministers general Wojciech Jaruzelski, delivered in Prague, 4 January 1983], AAN, KC PZPR, V/189, 8-17. The general blamed the Reagan administration for the poor state of international relations and appeared to be arguing for his own credentials as a staunch opponent to Reagan's policies.

³² Cable from Amembassy Moscow to Secstate, "Polish, Soviet Signals on How U.S. Should respond to Martial Law Suspension," dated December 8, 1982, NSA, Soviet Flashpoints Originals, Box 1.

church and the freely formed trade unions." (Solidarność was not explicitly mentioned.) However, Reagan also made clear that, "[The United States was] not interested in token or meaningless acts that do nothing to fundamentally change the situation in Poland today—or to replace one form of repression with another."³³

On December 11, Meehan and his political officer Mark Ramee met with Jozef Wiejacz to discuss Jaruzelski and Reagan's speeches. First, Meehan reiterated his government's position: the president hoped that there could be a positive bilateral relationship, and the United States was prepared to return to normal relations "especially to providing economic help," if proper conditions were created. Wiejacz's responded brusquely: he did "not see any positive signs" in bilateral relations. Moreover, he threatened that "if the American administration's anti-Polish policies continue, every move in General Jaruzelski's speech will be brought to life in a very short time. . . . We can live without the U.S.A."³⁴ Again, the MSZ was standing tough, making clear that they were going to do everything in their power to limit government-to-government relations if Washington did not stop interfering in sovereign matters or continued to pursue an anti-Polish line in international circles.

As scheduled, Jaruzelski announced on December 12 that martial law would be suspended by the end of the year.³⁵ The Sejm signed legislation to suspend martial law on

³³ "Remarks on Signing the Human Rights Day and Day of Prayer for Poland Proclamations," December 10, 1982, *Public Papers of the President* (1982), available on the Reagan Library's website: www.reagan.utexas.edu.

³⁴ Pilna Notatka z rozmowy z Ambasadorem USA F. Meehan w dniu 11 bm [Urgent Note from a conversation with U.S. Ambassador R. Meehan on the 11th of this month], dated December 11, 1982, MSZ, 30/85, W-2, Dep III (1982), AP 22-1-82. As with other important "urgent notes" this one was sent to Jaruzelski, Czyrek, Kiszczak, and Olszowski, as well as other Politburo members and MSZ staff. Deputy Secretary of State Mark Palmer met with Ludwiczak in Washington a few days earlier to deliver a similar message.

³⁵ For a translation of some of the general's speech, see, "Excerpts from the Speech by the Polish Leader," *New York Times* (Dec. 13, 1982): A9.

December 31 and to release a significant number of internees. High-level detainees, including Wałęsa's advisor Bronisław Geremek and former Solidarność spokesman Janusz Onyszkiewicz as well as Tadeusz Mazowiecki and Andrzej Czumawere, were released just before Christmas. This amnesty did not, however, include seven "radical" activists who were charged with crimes against the state: Andrzej Gwiazda, Seweryn Jaworskiego, Marian Jurczyk, Karol Modzelewski, Grzegorz Palka, Andrzej Rozpłochowski, and Jan Rulewski. Nor did it include the four KOR activists who were charged with treason. Władzław Frasiński and Piotr Bednarz, members of the TKK from Dolny Śląsk who were captured in October and November, were also denied amnesty. Finally, activists who had been arrested and charged with crimes following demonstrations throughout the summer and fall of 1982 were also excluded. According to the Polish Helsinki Watch Committee, "courts and misdemeanor courts passed more than 30,000 prison sentences in political cases," none of which were affected by the December 1982 amnesty.³⁶

The Americans reacted coolly. While in Rome on a tour through Europe, Secretary Shultz commented, "I think that the general answer is that we are looking closely at what has been said, but in a preliminary way, what we have seen so far are some words but nothing of substance has actually been done. . . . We do not see that there is anything that substantial as to cause us to think a major change has taken place."³⁷ On New Year's Eve, a State Department spokesman stated that lifting martial law alone might not lead to significant changes in the sanctions regime. Washington needed to see

³⁶ Polish Helsinki Watch Committee, *Poland Under Martial Law* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Helsinki Watch Committee, 1983), 322.

³⁷ "Secretary Visits Europe: Attends North Atlantic Council," *Department of State Bulletin*, 83, 2071 (Feb. 1983): 24.

"meaningful liberalization moves," not just cosmetic changes.³⁸ As late as February 1983, the secretary of state remained skeptical of Polish intentions, "Some [developments] seem to be a step forward and some seem to be a step backward, so I think it is a rather ambiguous question as to whether or not there has been any genuine movement [toward liberalization]."³⁹

Judging from this back and forth at the end of 1982, American diplomats had not yet accepted the small steps framework. Reagan and Meehan's comments remained basically unchanged since events a year earlier: for the Poles to see sanctions lifted, all three conditions of liberalization needed to be met. In his conversations, Meehan did not offer to respond to Jaruzelski's tentative moves by lifting individual sanctions as the Poles had suggested in September. For the Americans, sanctions remained an all-or-nothing proposition. As Davis saw it the White House believed that "all sanctions should be kept on . . . indefinitely . . . until the regime collapsed somehow—gave up."⁴⁰

More importantly Washington viewed Jaruzelski's moves as nothing new. Martial law was only being suspended, not lifted. Wałęsa and other important activists had been released, but they were still harassed. Other noteworthy prisoners remained in jail. Finally, while the Communists restarted meaningful negotiations with the Church, they had not reopened negotiations with Solidarność or other free trade union representatives. American demands for lifting sanctions had not been met.

In response to American refusals to lighten sanctions, the Poles began making good on Jaruzelski's threats. To heat up the propaganda war, Polish authorities started a crackdown on Western journalists. First a BBC journalist was arrested and expelled on

³⁸ Department of State comment recorded in MSZ, 30/85, W-2, D-III (1982), AP 22-1-82A.

³⁹ "Secretary en route to Beijing," *Department of State Bulletin*, 83, 2072 (March 1983): 49.

⁴⁰ Author's Interview with Ambassador John Davis, November 23, 1999.

December 31. Then in January the Polish government revoked employment papers for Poles working with foreign press organizations. On January 11, UPI station chief Ruth Gruber was arrested for suspicion of crimes against the nation, specifically for accepting two cans of film sent from Gdańsk. As a result she lost her accreditation and was expelled.⁴¹ The American embassy took Gruber's arrest seriously, particularly because she was held overnight and was denied access to U.S. embassy officials. On January 12 and 13, American diplomats lodged complaints with the MSZ about Gruber's treatment.⁴²

Even more disconcerting for American diplomats, Polish authorities attacked the inner workings of the American embassy. On January 12, DCM Herbert Wilgis met with Kinast to complain about the treatment of Poles working at the embassy and consulates. According to Wilgis, constant police requests to see identification and general harassment had been a part of life since the declaration of martial law, but in the past few days workers were threatened with arrest if they did not receive a new permit from the government employment office. Some Poles had already resigned their positions at the embassy. As Wilgis explained, Washington's "patience has limits." Kinast responded by blaming the Americans for deteriorating relations, specifically mentioning that Washington had not responded to the informal "small steps" framework that Poland had proposed the previous fall.⁴³

⁴¹The film delivery was widely viewed in Western papers as a government sponsored trap to frame Gruber. For press coverage on the Gruber case, see: Bradley Graham, "U.S. Reporter In Warsaw Held By Polish Police," *Washington Post* (Jan. 12, 1983): A20; Graham, "Poland to Expel UPI Reporter Held Overnight," *Washington Post* (Jan. 13, 1983): A1; "To suppress Solidarity, Poland cracks down on Western press," *Christian Science Monitor* (Jan. 14, 1983): 6; and "Poland vs. Press," *Christian Science Monitor* (Jan. 17, 1983): 24.

⁴²Notatka Informacyjna [Information Note about meeting with H.E. Wilgis], dated January 13, 1983, and Pilna Notatka z rozmowy z Ambasadorem USA F. Meehan w dniu 13.I.1983 [Urgent Note from a conversation with U.S. Ambassador F. Meehan on 13.I.1983], dated January 14, 1983, both in MSZ, 48/86, W-1, Dep III (1983), AP 22-1-83.

⁴³Notatka Informacyjna, dated January 13, 1983.

The next day Meehan met with Wiejacz to stress the seriousness of the situation. He added complaints about police being stationed outside of the American embassy when they screened American movies ("Yankee Doodle" and "Coal Miner's Daughter" were two examples), in an obvious attempt to intimidate Poles from attending. Meehan also explained that the United States would take steps to limit the numbers of Poles working in economic offices in New York and Washington if the Poles working for the U.S. embassy did not receive the necessary paperwork. Wiejacz remained resolute. He explained that it was a sovereign Polish decision to decide who worked where. He also objected to continuing inflammatory broadcasts on RFE and VOA, as well as Washington's acceptance of groups in the United States working to support Solidarność. As Wiejacz recorded: "The Polish side has shown patience for a long time in the face of sanctions, restrictions, and pressure against our country from the United States. I explained that if the U.S. continues actions against us, we will be forced to respond with future steps."⁴⁴

In the midst of this tense situation, Kinast travelled to Washington for consultations with the Polish embassy during the first week of February. While there he met with Undersecretary Eagleburger and Deputy Assistant Secretary Mark Palmer.⁴⁵ After Kinast's return little changed. The two sides exchanged views at a high level, but no one took any new moves. Rather, when Meehan and Wiejacz met in Warsaw to discuss the meeting on February 9, the two disagreed over the basic issue of whether the Americans owed the Poles some kind of response to questions posed by Kinast. The two

⁴⁴ Pilna Notatka z rozmowy z Ambasadorem USA F. Meehan w dniu 13.I.1983, dated January 14, 1983.

⁴⁵ Pilna Notatka z rozmowy z Ambasadorem USA F. Meehanem, w dniu 28 stycznia 1983 r [Urgent Note from a conversation with U.S. Ambassador Francis Meehan on 28 January 1983], dated January 28, 1983, MSZ, 48/86, W-1, Dep III (1983), AP 22-2-83.

also argued over whether internal developments in Poland should have an effect on bilateral relations: the Americans based their policies on this assumption, the Poles rejected the linkage as an infringement on their sovereignty. They also disagreed over who should take the first steps toward improving relations. As of February both countries saw themselves taking concurrent or simultaneous (*równoległy*) steps to move forward, rather than some kind of negotiated give-and-take.⁴⁶

An additional problem also surfaced in bilateral relations: Meehan was stepping down as ambassador. Because Ambassador Spasowski had not been replaced, neither country would have full representation in the other's capital. At his farewell meeting, Meehan expressed concern that Washington's choice to replace him, John Scanlan, had not yet received agrément from Warsaw, a "normal step" and a "formal procedure" that the State Department believed should be taken without political significance.⁴⁷ Moreover, Meehan warned that if the Poles made agrément contingent on America's response to questions posed by Kinast, a solution would "become considerably more difficult and evolve into a serious problem between both nations."⁴⁸ When Meehan left Warsaw on February 11, the MSZ continued to balk at granting Scanlan agrément, leaving the Americans without full ambassadorial representation.

With Meehan back in the United States, Herbert Wilgis took over at the embassy as chargé d'affaires *ad interim*. Through the rest of the winter and spring of 1983

⁴⁶ Pilna Notatka z wizyty pożegnalnej Ambasadora USA F. Meehana w dniu 9 Lutego br. [Urgent Note from the final visit by U.S. Ambassador F. Meehan on 9 February], dated February 11, 1983, MSZ, 48/86, W-1, Dep III (1983), AP 10-1-83. This note was sent to Jaruzelski, Olszowski, and Czyrek among others. The American records from Kinast's trip to Washington, D.C., in early February 1983 have not been declassified. No full reports were contained in the MSZ files reviewed either, most likely because these reports would have been sent as a cipher-gram (*szyfrogram*) from the Polish embassy. I was not granted access to szyfrogram files under my agreement with the MSZ archives.

⁴⁷ Agrément is a standard diplomatic procedure in which the host country gives legal approval for a candidate to be appointed ambassador.

⁴⁸ Pilna Notatka z wizyty pożegnalnej Ambasadora USA F. Meehana, dated February 11, 1983.

relations continued to limp forward with neither side taking decisive steps to improve the situation. Most of Wilgis's meetings in Warsaw involved responding to complaints from the MSZ about RFE and VOA broadcasts which the Poles considered an intrusion into sovereign affairs. Wilgis consistently responded that VOA was a government agency, but that RFE operated independently so the U.S. government could not be held responsible for its content. Wilgis also consistently invoked the Helsinki Agreement Final Act which guaranteed the free distribution of information and news across borders. The Poles categorically rejected these arguments as often as Wilgis made them.⁴⁹

Moreover, the Polish government took bolder steps to impede what they considered to be American propaganda. On April 27, Kinast announced that his government would be closing down the American Library.⁵⁰ The library, which was part of the embassy in Warsaw, provided Poles with access to Western periodicals and books, as well as the occasional movie. Milicja officers regularly harassed and intimidated Polish citizens trying to gain access to the library, limiting the numbers who would take part in events. To explain their decision, the MSZ argued that by providing access to materials—for example, the periodical *Problems in Communism* and Western publications on *Solidarność*—the library was interfering in internal Polish matters. The MSZ also directly connected the decision to close the library with "aggressive propaganda" from RFE and VOA. In response Wilgis said that he considered actions impeding the library's work to be violations of consular agreements between the two countries. The embassy would continue to keep the library open despite MSZ orders.

⁴⁹ For one such conversation between Meehan and the MSZ, see: Notatka Informacyjna [Information Note re meeting between Wilgis and Kinast re American Propaganda], dated April 27, 1983, MSZ, 48/86, W-2, Dep III (1983), AP 53-3-83. As with many meetings about RFE broadcasts, this one was sent to Jaruzelski and other top members of the Politburo and WRON.

⁵⁰ Ibid.

When confronted, Wilgis explained that the library remained open because he had not received instructions from Washington to close it.⁵¹

In the first five months of 1983, Polish-American relations continued to spiral downward. The PZPR's campaign to combat American propaganda deserves most of the blame for this trend. Moves to expel American journalists, to harass embassy staff, to limit American representation in Warsaw, and to limit activities within the embassy were all attempts to go on the offensive against Washington. The Poles tried to use a high-level delegation to Washington to spark a new dialogue, but met with little success. Rather than responding to reverse pressure from the Poles by relinquishing sanctions, the two sides were deadlocked over who would make the first move toward normalizing relations. By acting tough in response to America's continued sanctions, Jaruzelski did little to change American attitudes; however, it was a sign of the PZPR's determination to remain resolute in the face of American pressure.

Changing Attitudes in Washington

Despite confrontation on the ground in Warsaw, Washington did make some movement in the first half of 1983 to change policy toward Poland. This change was precipitated by the growing acceptance of Jaruzelski's regime. As the Defense Intelligence Agency reported, "Authorities have effectively and decisively broken Solidarity as an organization and have firmly established their ability to maintain order." Focusing on "the lack of worker response" to TKK calls for strikes in November, the DIA held out

⁵¹ Although the Poles announced the closing of the library on February 27, mentioned in *ibid.*, a longer conversation on the issue took place on May 3. The quotes are taken from this later meeting. See *Pilna Notatka z rozmowy z Charge d'Affaires a.i. Stanów Zjednoczonych Ameryki H. E. Wilgis'em w dniu 3 maja 1983 r.* [Urgent Note from a conversation with U.S. charge d'affaires a.i. H. E. Wilgis on 3 May 1984], dated May 4, 1983, MSZ, 48/86, W-1, Dep III (1983), AP 10-2-83.

little hope that Solidarność, as an organization, could provoke any major changes in the Communist party's direction. However, the report also concluded that Jaruzelski had done little "to address essential economic and social issues which are at the root of Polish unrest."⁵² It looked less likely that Solidarność would be able to bring quick change to Poland; therefore, transformation was taking on a more evolutionary character rooted in continuing social and economic problems.

By January 1983, the National Security Council had also agreed to a new approach for confronting and engaging the Soviet Union. NSC staffer Richard Pipes began drafting the document early in 1982, but the process only gained bureaucratic momentum after Shultz came into office. Thus, NSDD 75, "U.S. Relations with the USSR," bore marks of both the neo-conservative's ideological approach and Shultz's more pragmatic strategy. While the document sheds little light on relations with Poland, NSDD 75 does provide insight into Washington's evolving negotiating stance vis-à-vis the Soviet bloc. First, the administration would only enter into negotiations "consistent with the principle of strict reciprocity." Moreover, dialogue would continue to "address the full range of U.S. concerns about . . . internal behavior and human rights violation." Most importantly,

The U.S. will . . . try to create incentives (positive and negative) for the new leadership to adopt policies less detrimental to U.S. interests. The U.S. will remain ready for improved U.S.-Soviet relations if the Soviet Union makes significant changes in policies of concern to it; the burden for any further deterioration in relations must fall squarely on Moscow. The U.S. *must not yield to "take the first step."* [author's emphasis]⁵³

This policy was consistent with Reagan's longstanding criticism of détente, and was on a

⁵² Defense Intelligence Agency Intelligence Appraisal, "Poland: One Year after Martial Law," dated December 29, 1982, NSA, Soviet Flashpoints, Box 28, "October-December 1982"; quoted at 1, 3, and 1.

⁵³ NSDD 75, "U.S. Relations with the USSR," dated January 17, 1983, quoted at 1, 5, and 7. For a copy of the document see NARA's ARC system (www.archives.gov/research/arc/).

belief that negotiations with the Communist world had to be based on concessions by the other side. More critically, the Socialist bloc had to make concessions *first*, before the United States would make concessions of their own.

In January 1983, Washington was also being forced to deal with the enduring problem of Polish debt.⁵⁴ In December 1981, the United States decided to block any further debt negotiations between the Paris Club and Warsaw, so the Polish government had not signed any new rescheduling agreements with Western government lenders. In the mean time the U.S. government continued to pay the interest on government loans, in line with the decision not to declare Poland in default. A year after the decision to not declare Poland in default, the issue of Poland's debt arose again on the agenda for a meeting of the Senior Inter-departmental Group on International Economic Policy (SIG-IEP). Some other creditor nations—the United Kingdom and several "neutrals," including Switzerland—were expressing "their doubts about the appropriateness of delaying a Polish rescheduling."⁵⁵ Under pressure from the Allies, Washington was re-evaluating the payment issue.

The first few months of 1983 also saw more general movement on the Reagan administration's Poland policy. On January 4, the NSC staff member responsible for economic and political matters in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, Paula Dobriansky, drafted a memo to National Security Advisor William Clark on "next steps"

⁵⁴ In November 1982, Polish officials had successfully negotiated with private Western banks in the London Club to reschedule debt payments from 1982 for four years, with the Polish government only responsible for paying \$500 million in interest and principal payments for 1982. "Banks Ease Polish Interest Payments," *New York Times* (Sept. 15, 1982): D1. The issue of payments to government lenders remained open.

⁵⁵ Memorandum from David Pickford, "Senior Interdepartmental Group on International Economic Policy (SIG-IEP)" with attachments, dated January 10, 1983, RRPL, Executive Secretary NSC, National Security Decision Directives, Box 91286, NSDD 66 [4 of 5].

for Poland.⁵⁶ Two weeks after sending the first memo Dobriansky inquired about a meeting on Poland. Over the course of February and March members of the White House and Department of State began to draft proposals and the agenda for a National Security Planning Group meeting to discuss policy toward Poland, held on April 8. A little over a month later the NSC approved and on May 13 Reagan signed a strategy paper titled, "Next Steps on Poland."⁵⁷

The National Security Strategy Paper remains classified, making it difficult to explain the exact policy prescribed. However, a related memo mentioned that the administration had agreed on an incremental methodology in Poland, advocating a "step-by-step approach." The strategy paper also outlined a series of steps to take in response to PZPR moves. On the top of this list was an offer to provide for debt rescheduling.⁵⁸ As Davis, still in Washington in Spring 1983, has explained:

Our position was that we had to put down sanctions to achieve certain objectives, enumerated objectives: the release of all the political prisoners, the resumption of the dialogue, and the lifting of martial law. . . . The trick was to bring the regime along to a point where they would grant these concessions and hopefully grant—given the fact that the huge majority of

⁵⁶ With Pipes back at Harvard, Dobriansky was now the main staffer in charge of Poland. Pipes had been one of the most ideological voices on the NSC staff pushing a very hard line against Jaruzelski and his colleagues. Because Dobriansky was one of Pipes's protégés she shared some of his views, but it is doubtful that as a younger staff member she would have been able to put up as strong of an argument against Shultz's more pragmatic tendencies. Pipe's exit is one possible reason for the gradual shift in Polish policy in early 1983. Dobriansky has refused my requests for an interview, so I have been unable to confirm the nuances of her approach to Poland.

⁵⁷ The memoranda mentioned in this paragraph remain classified. The information here is gleaned from withdrawal sheets from Paula Dobriansky's files at the Reagan Library, which were processed as a result of the author's FOIA request. These documents and others in the collection are awaiting clearance from the George W. Bush administration to be declassified. See the withdrawal sheets for January to May 1983 in RRPL, Paula Dobriansky Files, Box 90892, Poland Memoranda 1981-1983. It is safe to assume that this long process to draft a new Polish policy was caused in part by an emphasis on other matters. In March 1983, the president announced his plans for the Strategic Defense Initiative and gave the "Evil Empire" speech about relations with the Soviet Union.

⁵⁸ Memorandum for the Vice President, Secretary of State, Secretary of the Treasury, Secretary of Defense, Director of Central Intelligence, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, "Poland: Next Steps," dated May 13, 1983, RRPL, Executive Secretariat NSC, Box 91286, National Security Decision Directive, NSDD 66 [5 of 5].

the Polish people were adamantly opposed to the Polish government as it was then constituted—it would result [in] greater freedom of press, greater freedom of information, and eventually freedom of representation and elections. You would get a different regime. You would get a democratic regime in Poland.⁵⁹

For some particularly hopeful diplomats like Davis, the ultimate goal was regime change.

For others the goal was more practical; in the words of a junior State official, "The idea was to figure out a way that [the Poles] could start crawling out of their hole."⁶⁰

By adopting the step-by-step framework, the United States embraced a new relationship with the Poles. Similar to the PZPR's proposal for small steps, step-by-step endorsed the use of sanctions as bargaining chips to be lifted as rewards for concessions by the PZPR, concessions which moved Poland toward the ultimate goals of ending martial law, releasing all political prisoners, and restarting negotiations with representatives of the people. The sticks announced at the end of 1981 and added to in the last quarter of 1982, therefore, became individual carrots which could be used to reward the PZPR by being lifted. Also, sanctions were no longer an "all-or-nothing" proposal. Individual sanctions could be lifted in return for specific moves in Warsaw that moved towards but did not necessarily fulfill America's three demands.

Small Steps in Warsaw

While the White House engaged in an internal review of Polish policy, relations on the ground in Poland deteriorated (as explained above); nonetheless, the Polish government continued to take steps to normalize their domestic situation. The most outward sign of this liberalization was the PZPR's actions to follow through on their

⁵⁹ Author's interview with Davis, November 23, 1999.

⁶⁰ Author's interview with Hill.

agreement to host a papal visit, motivated by a desire to improve relations with the Catholic Church. At a meeting on February 15, the PZPR Politburo concluded that the "gradual movement towards normalized relations between the nation and the church" should be a primary goal. The Politburo even hoped to elevate diplomatic relations with the Vatican to envoy and nuncio "in the face of the growing role of the Vatican in international politics, particularly European [politics]."⁶¹ This statement pointed to a secondary goal of hosting a papal visit: Poland hoped to "shape a proper picture of Poland in the world." From beginning of 1983 onward, the PZPR focused on the Papal visit as a chance to change outside perceptions: "In relation to the Pope's planned visit it will be important to prevent negative internal aspects while simultaneously developing external aspects which contribute to overcoming the Poland's isolation in the West."⁶² So, good relations with the Vatican were not only good within Poland, but for the country's image and relations abroad.

A papal visit came with some risks. From the outset, the PZPR was concerned about how the visit would affect the opposition. The Pope's visit in 1979 was accepted as one of the catalysts for creating *Solidarność*, and the PZPR wanted to make sure they did not make the same mistakes again. Aware of PZPR fears, the Pope made his trip seem as innocuous as possible. Two of the Pope's advisors explained that the chief motivations for the trip were the themes "dialogue and understanding" and "peace, détente, and disarmament."⁶³ When the PZPR sent Mirosław Ikonowicz to meet with Father Stanisław Dziwisz at the Vatican in April the PZPR's emissary was assured that the visit would be

⁶¹ Report, "Wytyczne Polityki Wyznaniowej" [Guidelines for Vatican Policies], dated February 4, 1983, AAN, KC PZPR, V/191, 11-16; quoted at 11 and 15.

⁶² Węzłowe Zadania Polityki Zagranicznej PRL w 1983 r. [Objectives for PRL foreign policy in 1983], dated c. January 1983, AAN, KC PZPR, V/190, 8-27; quoted at 8 and 17.

⁶³ For Rakowski's retelling and reactions to this interview, see his *Dzienniki 1981-1983*, 460.

"beneficial for everyone" and that this trip was planned "because we are all Poles and we are working for the sake of the country."⁶⁴ Not all of the Pope's plans for his visit sat easily with the Polish Communists, however. In early April the Vatican made it known that the Pope wanted to meet with Wałęsa and his family.⁶⁵ The Pope and Glemp also pressured the PZPR both privately and publicly to declare an amnesty before the Pope's arrival,⁶⁶ but the PZPR gave no indications of acquiescing to either request. When Glemp confronted Jaruzelski about an amnesty, the general replied: "That is out of the question. . . [but] the visit may speed up the process."⁶⁷ The PZPR was taking a wait-and-see perspective.

As the Pope's visit approached, the opposition flexed its muscles. Since January, Wałęsa had been involved in a public disagreement over whether he could return to his old job at the Lenin Shipyards, bringing unwanted international attention. Wałęsa also took the bold step of meeting with the TKK on April 9-11, planning with them for the Pope's visit.⁶⁸ In the first half of April opposition activists made preparations for annual street demonstrations on May 1 and 3.⁶⁹ Wałęsa held a press conference at his home with Western news agencies on April 20, calling for Poles to participate in the May protests.⁷⁰ With Wałęsa's endorsement the May 1 and 3 demonstrations brought nearly 40,000 protesters to the streets in twenty cities. Warsaw remained quiet, but 20,000 protesters

⁶⁴ Untitled report [re Ikonowicz's visit to the Vatican], dated April 1983, AAN, XIA/1417, Korespondencja z członkami BP i Sekretarzami KC PZPR, 1983, [Correspondence with members of the Politburo and Secretariat of the PZPR Central Committee, 1983], 1-15.

⁶⁵ Rakowski, *Dzienniki 1981-1983*, 511.

⁶⁶ John Kifner, "Free Prisoners, Pope asks Poland," *New York Times* (April 30, 1983): A4.

⁶⁷ Rakowski, *Dzienniki 1981-1983*, 494.

⁶⁸ KARTA, Archiwum Opozycji, *Tygodnik Mazowsze* nr. 47 (April 14, 1983), 1. For a further discussion see Friszke, "Tymczasowa Komisja Koordynacyjna," 58-59.

⁶⁹ KARTA, Archiwum Opozycji, *Tygodnik Mazowsze* nr. 48 (April 21, 1983), 1. For other articles on the upcoming Papal visit and planned demonstrations on May 1 and May 3, see *Tygodnik Mazowsze* beginning with number 42 on March 3, 1983.

⁷⁰ John Kifner, "Wałęsa Comments on May 1 Protests," *New York Times* (April 21, 1983): A12.

clashed with police in Gdańsk.⁷¹ Wałęsa claimed victory, but members of Politburo saw it as a much less decisive matter; as Rakowski concluded in his diary: "It would have been better if there were not demonstrations, but that was simply impossible. What are the lessons of the demonstrations? Only one: one should patiently record the event and remember that [progress] takes time, time, and more time."⁷²

The importance of the Papal visit for internal developments was not in question within PZPR circles. As Jaruzelski summed up: "The Pope's visit is the last chance to reanimate [Solidarność]."⁷³ Moreover, less than a month before the Pope's visit the PZPR was still unsure of how the Pope would act vis-à-vis the opposition. As one report from the Information Department of the PZPR Central Committee noted, "[The church's role] will be positive, if it is in the interests of Poland, for the visit to confirm the advancing process of stabilization. It is not certain that the church will be at the same cooperative point in the elimination of accents which could constitute support for the opposition (for example meeting with Wałęsa)."⁷⁴ In the weeks leading up to the Pope's arrival, the Vatican dropped calls for an amnesty, but continued to request a meeting with Wałęsa. In meetings with church officials, Jaruzelski remained steadfast in his responses, even contemplating arresting Wałęsa to ensure that a meeting did not take place.

When the Pope arrived on June 16, nerves were running high throughout the country.⁷⁵ On his first morning, the Pope met with Jaruzelski for a private conversation at

⁷¹ Eric Bourne, "Poland: Parades, but no Holiday Spirit," *Christian Science Monitor* (May 2, 1983): 15; and John Kifner, "Solidarity Rallies turn into Clashes with Police," *New York Times* (May 2, 1983): A1.

⁷² Rakowski, *Dzienniki 1981-1983*, 520. For a full discussion in the Politburo on the demonstrations see records from the May 4, 1983, Politburo meeting in AAN, KC PZPR, V/197.

⁷³ *Ibid.*, 525.

⁷⁴ Report on the internal situation, Wydział Informacyjna KC PZPR, dated May 23, 1983, AAN, KC PZPR, V/198, 207-221; quoted at 217.

⁷⁵ Over the course of the visit, both private sources and public accounts make constant notes about Jaruzelski's nervousness. See Rakowski's entries for June 17 through 23, *Dzienniki 1981-1983*, 561-568.

Belvedere Palace. Over the course of the next seven days, the Pope appeared in front of crowds in Warsaw, Gdańsk, Katowice, Częstochowa, and Kraków, often numbering over one million. His homilies and addresses touched on wide-ranging topics including Polish history, human and civic rights, national sovereignty, freedom, and creating national reconciliation through trust. The political implications of his words could not be overlooked, however, particularly after the Pope publicly reprimanded Jaruzelski following their first meeting. Everywhere he went the Pope was greeted with chants for Wałęsa, Solidarność banners, and fingers held in a "V," a common Solidarność symbol.⁷⁶ As Andrzej Friszke summarizes, "The Pope's pilgrimage was the first moment since December 13 that Solidarność could demonstrate their presence without the threat of drastic repression—with flags, banners, cheers, peacefully displayed before and after the Papal masses."⁷⁷ The Pope also had two unexpected meetings: a second private meeting with Jaruzelski during which the general acquiesced to requests to meet with Wałęsa as a "private citizen" and a private meeting with Lech Wałęsa and his family on the Pope's final day in Kraków.⁷⁸

Small Rewards from Washington

With the Pope's visit successfully completed, Washington publicly signaled that

⁷⁶ The Pope's visit was widely covered in the American press, for some representative articles, see: Bradley Graham, "Pope Greets Poland as Land That 'Suffers Anew,'" *Washington Post* (June 17, 1983): A1; Michael Dobbs, "'Solidarity Will Be Reborn—But Inside Us'; Poles Hope for a Revival of Unity," *Washington Post* (June 17, 1983): A25; Dobbs, "Pope's Chief Theme Is Polish History," *Washington Post* (June 18, 1983): A16; John Kifner, "Angry Chants and 'V' Signs fill Warsaw," *New York Times* (June 18, 1983): A1; Kifner, "Pope Hails the 'Solidarity' of Poles and Gets a Tumultuous Ovation," *New York Times* (June 19, 1983): A1; Kifner, "Misjudgment by Warsaw," *New York Times* (June 20, 1983): A1; and Bradley Graham, "Pope Issues Appeal to Poles For Accord Based on Trust," *Washington Post* (June 22, 1983): A1.

⁷⁷ Friszke, "Tymczasowa Komisja Koordynacyjna," 76.

⁷⁸ Rakowski, *Dzienniki 1981-1983*, 565.

the United States was looking to reward Jaruzelski for his good behavior. On the Pope's last day in Poland, Reagan addressed a gathering of Polish Americans in Chicago, saying, "I urge the Polish authorities to translate the restraint they showed during the Papal visit into willingness to move toward reconciliation rather than confrontation with the Polish people." In a signal of the new step-by-step approach he also stated: "If the Polish Government takes meaningful, liberalizing measures, we are prepared to take equally significant and concrete steps of our own."⁷⁹ The same day, a number of Democratic Congressmen including Clement Zablocki of New York, Dan Rostenkowski of Illinois, Lee Hamilton of Indiana, and Dante Fascell of Florida wrote a letter to the president arguing that the release of Wałęsa and the papal visit deserved "some reciprocal action," possibly including "the restoration of Polish landing rights at U.S. airports, extension of fishing rights in the U.S. waters, return of MFN, and public and private support to improve and expand Poland's private sector."⁸⁰ Former National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski joined the chorus, calling for Reagan to unilaterally return fishing rights.⁸¹

Amid rumors that Jaruzelski was planning to lift martial law and announce an amnesty for political prisoners in mid-July, the Washington news cycle reported on serious moves within the administration that led to new conversations with the Poles. Following a meeting between the president and Cardinal John Krol of Philadelphia (a Polish American who accompanied the Pope on his trip), unnamed "officials

⁷⁹ "Remarks to Polish Americans in Chicago, Illinois, June 23, 1983," *Public Paper of the President* (1983), available on the Reagan Library's website: www.reagan.utexas.edu.

⁸⁰ A copy of the letter is located in MSZ, D-III, 49/86, w-1 (1983), AP 22-1-83, "Stanowisko USA wobec Zawieszenia i Zniesienia Stanu Wojennego w Polsce od 23.xii.1983 do 31.xii.1983r." [U.S. Position regarding Suspending and Lifting Martial Law in Poland from 23.11.1983 to 31.12.1983].

⁸¹ Michael Gertler, "Brzezinski, West Berlin Mayor Urge Quick U.S. Nođ to Poland," *Washington Post* (June 16, 1983): A21.

acknowledged there have been discussions within the administration about whether the United States should make a good-will gesture, such as lifting the sanctions against Polish fishing in American waters."⁸² On June 28, the president substantiated these rumors, saying: "And if they [restored free unions], I think that we would review what we were doing and turn back from some of those things [sanctions imposed]."⁸³ The *New York Times* then published a leaked list of actions under discussion, including: restarting debt negotiations with the Paris Club, ending the ban on fishing rights, reinstating permission for LOT flights, lifting travel restrictions on Polish diplomats, granting new agricultural credits, and restoring MFN status.⁸⁴ Finally, on July 7 Under-Secretary Eagleburger met with Ludwiczak in Washington to inform the Polish government that the U.S. was officially considering restarting debt negotiations through the Paris Club and lifting restrictions on fishing rights in American waters if liberalization continued and if a substantial number of political prisoners received amnesty.⁸⁵

In line with the United States' general outline for negotiating with the Communist bloc, the offer of lifting sanctions came with strings attached. As NSDD 75 advocated sanctions would not be lifted without first receiving concessions. Any steps toward liberalization would need to be verifiable and significant. As unnamed officials put it, the

⁸² Lou Cannon, "U.S. Links Lifting of Sanctions to Poles' Intent to Lift Martial Law," *Washington Post* (June 28, 1983): A6.

⁸³ "President's News Conference, June 28, 1983," *Public Papers of the President* (1983), available on the Reagan Library's website: www.reagan.utexas.edu.

⁸⁴ Bernard Gwertzman, "President Terms Unions Key to Aid to Poles," *New York Times* (June 29, 1983): A1. Although it is unclear without full access to files in the Reagan library, this is most likely the progression of sanctions to be lifted according to the May 13 NSPG.

⁸⁵ Most details of this meeting come from Gwertzman, "U.S. takes a Step to Prompt Poles to Free Prisoners," *New York Times* (July 13, 1983): A1. The specific date of the meeting, July 7, and the general outlines of the information are confirmed in files from the MSZ, see: MSZ, 48/86, W-1, Dep III (1983), AP 22-1-83, "Stosunki Bilateralny PRL-USA" [Bilateral PRL-U.S. Relations]; see in particular the account in "Ocena polityki USA wobec Polski. Wnioski. Program działania" [Assessment of U.S. policies regarding Poland: Conclusions: Action Program], dated October 17, 1983, 5. Presumably a full report on the Ludwiczak-Eagleburger meeting is contained in the MSZ's szyfrogram files.

White House wanted "to see true movement and not a façade" and "meaningful, substantial and not merely cosmetic" changes.⁸⁶ The United States decided to wait and see just what steps the Poles were willing to take, and only then respond.

Jaruzelski's announcement to the Sejm that martial law would be repealed at midnight on July 21 and most political prisoners would soon be released did little to change the actual situation on the ground. The law repealing martial law included provisions which made it easier for the PZPR to impose a new "state of emergency" (rather than a state of "military rule"); the law also made many of the extraordinary powers invoked under martial law part of the government's permanent powers, greatly reducing citizens' and activists' rights. The amnesty was also substantially limited: people with sentences less than three years were released and longer sentences were cut in half, but about sixty of the most well known and influential opposition members, including eleven KOR and Solidarność activists charged with crimes against the state, remained in prison.

Because of these caveats, Washington's response was also limited. As the president explained, "We're going to go by deeds, not words. . . . What we want to be on guard for is having a cosmetic change in which they replace martial law and replace it with equally onerous regulations."⁸⁷ When Eagleberger met with Ludwiczak again on July 27, he made clear that the extent to which sanctions would be lifted was still being discussed and depended on freeing "the majority of political prisoners" and "the resurgence [*powstanie*] of free trade unions is especially critical for full normalization of

⁸⁶ Bernard Gwertzman, "President Terms free Unions key to Aid to Poles," *New York Times* (June 29, 1983): A1.

⁸⁷ As quoted in Graham, "Warsaw Abolishes Martial Law; Amnesty Decreed; New Rules Limit Dissident Activities," *Washington Post* (July 22, 1983): A1. See also Kifner, "Poland Says it Lifts Martial Law; Curbs now put into Law," *New York Times* (July 22, 1983): A1.

mutual relations."⁸⁸ The White House did, however, act on its offer to allow debt negotiations. At a Paris Club meeting on July 29, the United States "agreed 'in principle' to participate in debt rescheduling. [They] made it clear, however, that [U.S.] participation [would] be dependent on the release by Polish authorities of the 'vast majority' of political prisoners."⁸⁹ Beyond consideration of the internal Polish situation, the American decision was driven by European concerns. As the *Washington Post* reported, "most Western European governments opposed continued suspension of negotiations since they were being required to keep up the high interest payments on the guaranteed credits to private institutions."⁹⁰ In private discussions the Europeans made it clear that if the United States did not go along with debt rescheduling talks, they were "prepared to move on their own."⁹¹ Debt negotiations eventually resumed in working groups which included meetings in Warsaw in October; however, a final agreement remained elusive.⁹²

PZPR Stands Strong

Despite the United States acceptance of the small steps framework and their signals to reward Poland for liberalization, relations between the two countries remained tense. When Democratic Senator Christopher Dodd from Connecticut led a trip to Poland from August 8 to 10, he received the usual barrage of criticisms: sanctions were hurting the Polish people; American policy infringed on Polish sovereignty; aggressive American

⁸⁸ "Ocena polityki USA wobec Polski. Wnioski. Program działania," 5.

⁸⁹ Briefing Memorandum, "Western Policy Towards Poland," dated August 10, 1983, NSA, End of the Cold War, Box 1, September 6-9, 1983: Shultz's Trip to Madrid.

⁹⁰ Dobbs, "U.S. Takes Step To Resume Talks On Polish Debt," *Washington Post* (July 30, 1983): A1.

⁹¹ "Western Policy Towards Poland," dated August 10, 1983.

⁹² Notatka w rozmów z grupa robocza "Klubu Paryskiego" w Warszawie [Note of conversation with a working group from the Paris Club, in Warsaw], MSZ, 48/86, W-1, Dep III (1983), AP 23-5-83.

propaganda went too far; Solidarność was the main cause of economic problems. Dodd however was allowed to visit Wałęsa in Gdańsk and remained cordial with his PZPR hosts.⁹³ In contrast, when a delegation led by Democratic Congressman Clarence Long from Maryland met with Jaruzelski on August 17, the atmosphere was not nearly as cordial. Jaruzelski presented a windy explanation blaming the United States for the horrible state of bilateral relations—"the worst it had been since the beginning of the Cold War." Long became so fed up with the general's explanations that he interrupted Jaruzelski to say that he had to go to the bathroom. When the parties returned they clashed again, and Long asked Jaruzelski to get to the point.⁹⁴ America's small move to lessen sanctions did not cause a comparable shift in the Polish government's approach to the United States. In both meetings Jaruzelski simply restated harsh criticisms of American policy, choosing to disregard the opportunity to pursue continued improvements.

Bilateral relations also suffered setbacks surrounding the KAL 007 crisis. Following the downing of a civilian Korean airliner on the night of September 1, the Americans posted a transcript of U.N. Representative Jeanne Kirkpatrick's confrontation with the Soviet's U.N. representative in a display case outside the embassy. The Poles took this as a deeply provocative act, repeatedly calling in American officials to complain

⁹³ "Notatka Informacyjna z pobytu w Polsce senatora amerykańskiego Christophera Dodd'a w dniach 8-10 sierpnia br." [Information Note from the visit in Poland by American Senator Christopher Dodd from 8-10 August], dated August 11, 1983, MSZ, 48/86, W-1, Dep III (1983), AP 220-4-83.

⁹⁴ For a summary of Long's visit, see Notatka Informacyjna z pobytu grupy członków Izby Reprezentantów Kongresu USA z Kongresmanem Clarence D. Long'iem w Polsce w dniu 17.08.83 r. [Information Note from the visit of a group from the U.S. House of Representatives with Congressman D. Long to Poland on 17.8.1983], dated August 22, 1983, MSZ, 48/86, W-1, Dep III (1983), AP 220-6-83. For a full transcript of the meeting with Jaruzelski, see Zapis z rozmowy Towarzysza Premiera Gen. W. Jaruzelskiego z grupą kongresmenów amerykańskich w dn. 17.viii.1983 r. [Transcript from Comrade Premier General W. Jaruzelski's conversation with a group of American congressmen on 17.8.1983], dated August 17, 1983, AAN, KC PZPR, V/203, 200-228, esp. 211 and 218.

about this "brutal" form of propaganda.⁹⁵ The Americans also tied Polish actions in the U.N. to bilateral relations, releasing a statement on September 15 that read: "We have been closely following developments in Poland since the formal lifting of Martial law. Unfortunately, the continuing ambiguity of the situation in Poland, especially in so far as the number of political [prisoners or detainees] is concerned, as well as the Korean airline tragedy have led us to defer a decision on next steps in our relations with Poland."⁹⁶

When Davis arrived in Warsaw as the new charge d'affaires *ad interim* in mid-September, he was confronted by this spike in animosity.⁹⁷ Davis's first meeting with Kinast was spent clarifying the American announcement deferring the decision to lift sanctions.⁹⁸ When the director of the State Department's East European Office Richard Coombs visited Warsaw a month later and met with MSZ officials, Davis explained that the United States would take a step on sanctions in the near future. Coombs further elucidated that the two sides needed to maintain a "dialogue on a working level" and that Washington's policy would now be based on a series of "small steps" (using the Polish formation) "founded on taking gradual actions . . . not 'unrealistic' moves."⁹⁹ On October 28, Eagleberger met with Ludwiczak to discuss these next steps, which Davis reiterated

⁹⁵ Author's interview with Hill. See also, Notatka Informacyjna, dated September 9, 1983, MSZ, 48/86, W-2, Dep III (1983), AP 53-3-83.

⁹⁶ This is the text of a Department of State announcement, found in English in MSZ, 48/86, W-1, Dep III (1983), AP 22-1-83.

⁹⁷ Davis replaced Hugh Hamilton, who had replaced Herbert Wilgis as charge d'affaires at the end of August 1983. Wilgis's final meeting with the MSZ took place on August 23, 1983, see Notatka Informacyjna z wizyty pożegnalnej charge d'affaires USA H. Wilgis w dniu 23 sierpnia 1983 r. [Information note from the final visit by U.S. charge d'affaires H. Wilgis on 23 August 1983], MSZ, 48/86, W-1, Dep III (1983), AP 10-2-83. Following Davis's arrival, Hamilton remained at the embassy as DCM.

⁹⁸ Pilna Notatka z rozmowy z charge d'affaires USA, Johnem Davis'em [Urgent Note from a conversation with charge d'affaires John Davis], dated September 17, 1983, MSZ, 48/86, W-1, Dep III (1983), AP 22-1-83.

⁹⁹ Notatka Informacyjna z rozmowy z dyrektorem Biura d/s Europy Wschodniej w Departamencie Stanu Richardem Combs'em, w dniu 14.10.br. [Information Note from a conversation with the director of the East European Bureau of the Department of State, Richard Coombs, on 14.10], dated October 19, 1983, MSZ, 48/86, W-1, Dep III (1983), AP 220-10-83.

A return to normal relations between the Polish People's Republic and the United States of America is contingent upon the lifting of economic and financial restrictions and upon the termination of the other unfriendly actions against Poland. Failing that, the further deterioration of relations may become inevitable.

The note concluded by specifically suggesting that ending objections to Poland's membership in the IMF could lead to real improvements.¹⁰³

Thus, in November 1983, the Poles rejected American overtures to help improve bilateral relations. The small steps allowing Poland to begin new negotiations with the Paris Club and to regain fishing quotas proved too small. Instead of seeing these moves as steps toward normalization, the Polish government snubbed the American actions. More importantly they placed American actions at the center of any hopes to improve relations. The MSZ's overriding opinion of improvements in bilateral relations was—"that it is not about what we are up to—the USA must leave behind such a destructive approach and take up more significant steps."¹⁰⁴ The Poles had decided that the Americans needed to flinch first for relations to move forward.

Expanding Government Support for Solidarność

With few prospects for improved relations with the Polish government, Davis turned toward the other half of the equation: relations with Solidarność. He and his wife Helen had been stationed in Warsaw in the 1960s and 1970s when he served as an economics officer, so shortly after arriving the Davises decided to host a party for their

¹⁰³ Unofficial Translation of November 3, 1983, PRL Government Note [in English], dated November 3, 1983, MSZ, 48/86, W-1, Dep III (1983), AP 22-1-83/B.

¹⁰⁴ Zapis ze spotkania tow. Z. Ludwiczak Charge d'Affaires a.i. PRL w Waszyngtonie z kierownictwem Departamentu III i pracownikami Zespołu Ameryki Północnej Departamentu III - w dniu 19.09.1983 r. [Transcript of meeting with PRL charge d'affaires a.i. to the U.S. Z. Ludwiczak and the staff of the North American Group of Department III, on 19.09.1983], dated September 19, 1983, MSZ, 48/86, W-1, Dep III (1983), AP 23-3-83.

old friends. They invited about one hundred and twenty people to the ambassador's residence, mainly journalists, artists, economists, film directors, and academics. On the night of the party, however, around two hundred people showed up including some Solidarność leaders who had been released from jail. A number of unexpected guests explained that they had just assumed that they were supposed to receive invitations. As Davis explains, "A lot of the [guests] without invitations [were] saying that 'they' stole our invitation."¹⁰⁵

After this success, the Davises began hosting informal receptions at their residence once or twice a month. Usually John would get a recent American movie from the Army circuit to show, and his wife and staff would cook a large batch of beef burgundy, lasagna, or stroganoff to feed everyone. Formal written invitations were never issued nor were phones used; Helen would simply issue verbal invites to her friends at literary gathering-spots like Czytelnik or at church groups, telling those present to pass the invitation on to others. Anywhere between thirty to fifty people would come for dinner and a movie, providing the Davises a regular chance to see old friends and make new acquaintances. With a few exceptions, Helen and John's friends were either Solidarność members or sympathizers. As John recalls, their old friends "started bringing their Solidarity friends and made sure we got to know them socially as well as politically. By '84-'85 we were having, every week or ten days, we'd have most of the leadership of Solidarity over that

¹⁰⁵ Author's interview with Davis, November 23, 1999. Written records or recordings were not made of these parties, so no specific archival documentation is available. However, information gathered during conversations from these gatherings did regularly appear in the cable traffic back-and-forth with Washington.

was out of jail. Then as people would come out of jail we would add them to the mix."¹⁰⁶

So, in addition to cultural figures like film director Andrzej Wajda and poet Julia Hartwig, well known Solidarność members like Geremek and Onyszkiewicz soon joined the gatherings.¹⁰⁷

From all accounts these parties were more social than political. Only a select few staff members from the embassy—deputy chief of mission, political officers, and other ranking members—would be invited to join; junior members were kept out of the loop.¹⁰⁸ As Helen Davis describes it, she inadvertently created a "salon" in Warsaw: "I had a very sort of carpe diem approach to the whole posting. I decided that since [John] was not an ambassador . . . I didn't have to be ambassadorial. I didn't have to be elegant. I could meet as many people as possible in the shortest time possible . . . so I started having dinner two or three times a month."¹⁰⁹ These meetings were not formal gatherings with an agenda or speeches but social gatherings with groups of Poles sitting at tables of eight to ten with, perhaps, an embassy officer assigned to each table.¹¹⁰ Politics was not the focus of these gatherings, but the subject did come up. For opposition activists these dinners became a place to discuss their situation openly. As Geremek remembers:

John Davis tried to give a very personal touch to these meetings. They weren't political meetings with reports, but a dinner, sometimes in the garden, sometimes in his residence, friendly dinners. During these dinners we had the opportunity to discuss, among us, in his presence, among us to discuss the situation, to discuss what can be done, what we have to do and also to present some projects and programs. John Davis had the—how to

¹⁰⁶ Ibid.

¹⁰⁷ Author's interview with Bronisław Geremek, July 26, 2006.

¹⁰⁸ Author's interview with Hill.

¹⁰⁹ Conference proceedings from "Communism's Negotiated Collapse: The Polish Round Table Talks of 1989, Ten Years Later," held at the University of Michigan, April 7-10, 1999 (available online at www.umich.edu/~iinet/PolishRoundTable/frame.html); quoted from the morning session April 8.

¹¹⁰ Author's interview with Cameron Munter, June 11, 2004. Munter was a consular officer and then economics officer in Warsaw in 1986-1988.

say this—the fact to be a distant witness of it and not a participant, political partner in these discussions.¹¹¹

So, as relations with the Polish government were floundering, John and Helen Davis were getting to know Solidarność leaders, gaining their trust, and strengthening relations.

The Central Intelligence Agency also took steps to improve the support network for Poland's democratic opposition. As explained in chapter one, the declaration of martial law caught the CIA off guard, and they were not as prepared as the AFL-CIO to begin funneling support to Solidarność. According to Robert Gates, deputy director for intelligence at CIA in 1982, DCI Casey felt "that Lane Kirkland and his AFL-CIO were doing a 'first-rate' job in Poland helping Solidarity—better, he thought, than CIA could do. Indeed, Casey was worried that if CIA got involved, we might 'screw it up.'"¹¹²

Reservations aside, the CIA did pursue a covert policy to support Solidarność. Rather than taking the usual step of issuing a covert action finding, the president and his advisor Clark informally gave Casey the authority to run the operation as he saw fit. Reportedly, Casey's plan had four foci: provide money, provide advanced communications equipment for leaders to connect within the country, offer training to Solidarność members in using the equipment, and share intelligence.¹¹³ Of these operations the most substantial were efforts to send money to Solidarność. These operations were headquartered in the Frankfurt CIA station, rather than the embassy in Warsaw. From this center, "Casey constructed a web of international financial institutions. The money trail was constantly shifting to avoid detection," with Western businessmen and corporations knowingly and

¹¹¹ Author's interview with Geremek.

¹¹² Robert M. Gates, *From the Shadows* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996), 237.

¹¹³ Schweizer, *Victory*, 75.

unknowingly being used to funnel money.¹¹⁴ Although Casey initiated the covert plan in Spring 1982 and had some early success coordinating with Israeli intelligence to run fifteen radio transmitters through a supply line from Sweden to northern Poland, his financial web did not start running until the end of that year. The exact amounts of these funds and the channels they were funneled through remain unclear (money is relatively easy to smuggle in compared to printing presses or containers of ink), but most accounts agree that the CIA successfully sent around \$2 million a year, which translated to about \$10 million over the life of the program.¹¹⁵

The funding operation's complex web was not only instituted to maintain secrecy from the Polish government, but to obscure the money's source from opposition activists themselves. As Gates recalls:

I was always told that CIA had no direct link with Solidarity and that, in fact, the union did not know in specific terms what, if anything, it was getting from CIA. Our people thought that deniability was important for Solidarity, and so we worked through third parties or other intermediaries in Western Europe.¹¹⁶

At the embassy in Warsaw, Davis took this a step further. He "insisted that the CIA, at least the CIA in the embassy, stay away from [Solidarność]. 'I don't want to be introduced to anybody from Solidarity,' [Davis] said, 'who turns out to be talking to one

¹¹⁴ Ibid, 76.

¹¹⁵ The \$10 million figure comes from Andrzej Paczkowski's, "Playground of the Superpowers, Poland 1980-1989," in Olav Njolstad, ed., *The Last Decade of the Cold War* (London: Frank Cass, 2004), 385. According to Schweizer the CIA funneled about \$2 million a year from 1983 to 1989. In addition, Schweizer and Gates' accounts of the events do not line up as to the timing of the beginning of the financial operation. Schweizer believes they began in early 1982, but Gates writes that they did not get rolling until the end of 1982. Given Gates's access to classified material and the specificity of the dates he cites, I am inclined to believe his account over Schweizer's, although it is credible that Casey began planning for the support operation in early 1982. See Gates, *Shadows*, 237-238 and Schweizer, *Victory*, 76-77. It is unlikely that the specifics of this program will ever be declassified given Freedom of Information Act restrictions on "means and methods" in intelligence work; however, the Hoover Institution has received the personal papers of William Casey. Given that Casey headed the operation himself, I hope to find additional information in this collection once it is opened. The collection may be opened sometime in 2008, once final approval is secured from the Casey family.

¹¹⁶ Gates, *Shadows*, 237.

of you guys." The reasoning behind Davis's position was quite simple: "The one thing I was afraid of was that the Solidarity leadership would get pinned as foreign agents. That was the danger. . . . I did not want the Polish government to be able to say or prove that, 'Here is, you know, Geremek, talking to a CIA agent. These people are not true Poles; they are acting as agents of the United States.' That's what I did not want."¹¹⁷

From the beginning of his posting in Warsaw, Davis understood that the United States needed to walk a fine line between displaying support for Solidarność and pursuing formal ties that could be used by the Polish government to question the movement's patriotism or legitimacy. Holding private gatherings at his home, rather than meetings at the embassy, added a layer of deniability for Solidarność. The gatherings were social, not political; they were personal, not professional. Also by basing connections with Solidarność leaders on personal relations, Davis added to the security for opposition leaders. As one of Davis's officers recalls, "Solidarity contacts were handled in Davis's back pocket . . . because [of] the dangers for these people for contacts with Americans. . . . No one would accuse Davis of being a CIA agent, when some of us [lower-level officers] might have been accused."¹¹⁸ There was never any doubt within the Polish government that the CIA and the embassy were working to support the opposition, but American policy—particularly policy pursued by Davis—was subtle, restricted, and discrete enough to make it difficult to tar Solidarność as part of some kind of American-led conspiracy.

Beyond Warsaw and Washington, the U.S. government also increased support to

¹¹⁷ Author's interview with Davis, November 23, 1999.

¹¹⁸ Author's interview with Hill.

Solidarność via RFE headquarters in Munich. From the very beginning of martial law, RFE was a major point of confrontation between the United States and Poland. As mentioned throughout previous chapters, MSZ officials frequently requested meetings with American embassy officers to lodge complaints about broadcasts, which the Poles labeled as infringements on internal Polish matters. As a former propaganda officer in the Army, Jaruzelski understood the importance of information and took a personal interest in RFE broadcasts, particularly any reports that either questioned his patriotism or his Polish-ness.¹¹⁹ The conflict over RFE also regularly spilled out into public debate with numerous articles attacking RFE published in the government-sponsored press.¹²⁰ During and after martial law the Polish government and their Soviet partners devoted significant time and effort to blocking RFE broadcasts into Poland. According to scientific research and RFE surveys of émigrés and refugees, the jamming effectively weakened RFE's signal from 46% in 1981 to 24% in 1984, but listenership in western Poland hovered consistently around 66% over the same period.¹²¹

Given the particularities of RFE's charter, policy guidance was provided by

¹¹⁹ Usually Jaruzelski did not receive information notes on MSZ meetings; however in reviewing the Department III files a pattern emerged in which the general received information on meetings devoted to complaints about RFE broadcasts. This pattern applied particularly to MSZ complaints about RFE broadcasts that specifically mention Jaruzelski. For two examples, see: Notatka dot. złożenia protestu w sprawie RWE i Głosu Ameryki [Note regarding notice of protest in the matter of RFE and Voice of America], dated August 20, 1982, MSZ, 30/85, W-3, Dep III (1982), AP 53-2-82; and Notatka Informacyjna z rozmowy z Charge d'Affaires a.i. USA - Johnem Davisem w dniu 22.xii.1983 [Information Note from a conversation with U.S. charge d'affaires a.i. John Davis on 22.12.1983], dated December 22, 1983, MSZ, 48/86, W-2, Dep III (1983), AP 53-3-83.

¹²⁰ For a selection of these articles mostly from the 1980s, see Alina Grabowska, *PRL atakuje Radio "Wolna Europa"* (Wrocław: Towarzystwo Przyjaciół Ossolineum, 2002).

¹²¹ See Report, "Impact of Jamming on the Reception of RFE/RL Programs," dated August 1984, Hoover, RFE/RL, Corporate Records, 380, Engineering - Jamming 1978-1987; and Report, "Audience and Opinion Research/East European Area," c. 1987, Hoover, RFE/RL, Corporate Records, 420, 420.4. According to the second report, VOA had a listenership in the mid-40 percent range during the same period, while only about 25% of Poles regularly listened to the BBC. According to other opinions, RFE listenership was closer to a quarter of the Polish population, see Paczkowski, *Spring*, 484. The discrepancy may be due to the RFE's own survey being focused on western Poland, where the signal would have been stronger.

officials in Washington, but daily content was shaped by the individual language services located in Munich. More than any other official, therefore, the decisions about what to broadcast were made by the Polish Service Director Zdzisław Najder, an internationally recognized expert on Joseph Conrad and a *Solidarność* collaborator who was teaching at Oxford University in December 1981. Najder assumed the director's position in March 1982 upon the recommendation of former director and NSC consultant Jan Nowak-Jezioranski.

Radio Free Europe had broadcast news about opposition activities in Poland since before the Gdańsk Agreements, but under Najder's energetic and sometimes controversial leadership RFE support intensified. More than any other role, RFE's Polish service was successful by broadcasting messages from the opposition back into Poland, acting as a kind of mouthpiece for the movement. Specifically Najder used his "wide network of contacts among the opposition within and outside Poland and used his contacts to acquire inside information."¹²² These contacts included connections with long-standing émigré activists like Jerzy Giedroyc, editor of the émigré journal *Kultura* in Paris, and close contacts with activists in the underground in Poland, including Zbigniew Bujak.¹²³ As independent publishing houses printed more and more underground literature, Najder and his office began to receive copies and broadcast portions back into Poland, even translating the information and broadcasting it on other language services to the rest of the Soviet bloc.¹²⁴ Najder also received shipments of microfilmed documents smuggled

¹²² Arch Puddington, *Broadcasting Freedom: The Cold War Triumph of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty* (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2000), 270.

¹²³ There are a series of letters between Najder and Giedroyc from 1982-1984 in Najder's private papers, as well as a letter from Bujak, dated April 23, 1986, in Hoover, Zdzisław Najder Files, Box 3.

¹²⁴ George Urban, *Radio Free Europe and the Pursuit of Democracy* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1997), 124.

out of Poland through, among others, a contact named Jerzy Łojek in Paris. The microfilm images included Solidarność proclamations and internal decisions, as well as Polish government materials documenting policies against the movement.¹²⁵ Unlike underground literature, these internal Solidarność and government documents were not read over the air, but were used to inform and enrich evidence for editorials and commentaries.

Najder and his colleagues also conspired with the opposition to exchange more than just information; it appears that he and his office were involved in providing material support to the opposition. Najder received one note from the end of 1983 which reads, "June 27 I got the SONY TC-D5 M tape recorder, together with the instruments." The sender then asked for more recording equipment including, microphones, micro-cassettes, tape recorders, batteries, and a mixer.¹²⁶ Najder also received a note from two men in Lublin who sent a wish list (with prices in British pounds) for three microcomputers, diskettes, a converter, a hard drive, and a printer.¹²⁷ There is no evidence to suggest that Najder took steps to purchase these materials himself and send them into Poland, but he was at least tangentially involved in the web of activists working in the West to send material support back into Poland.

Second, monthly financial records from the Polish service record "Confidential Payments" from the "Outside Consultation" budget to various recipients. From this information it seems likely that Najder was using RFE funds to pay for materials that

¹²⁵ Najder's papers at the Hoover Institution Archives include an impressive amount of correspondence between Wojtech and Olek, two pseudonyms. From other correspondence it appears that Olek was J.L., likely Jerzy Łojek who lived in Paris and who regularly corresponded with Najder. It is unclear who his contact in Poland was. Najder's files include a collection of the Solidarność and government documents, a few examples of samizdat, and at least one example of the smuggled microfilm. See Hoover, Zdzisław Najder Files, Box 10, [Unlabelled].

¹²⁶ Hoover, Zdzisław Najder Files, Box 10, [Unlabelled].

¹²⁷ Hoover, Zdzisław Najder Files, Box 5, Scripts.

were later sent into Poland. RFE records also contain numerous references of payments made to "freelancers" who were also important members of the Solidarność support network, including Irena Lasota, Seweryn Blumsztajn, and Jerzy Milewski. Again there is no specific use listed for the funds, but RFE money was making its way into opposition activists' hands, either to pay for information they had smuggled out or material they were smuggling back in.¹²⁸

Beyond these dalliances into material support, RFE's efforts were most effective at providing information to Poles about what was really happening within their own country, counteracting the barrage of misinformation in government-sponsored press. According to one study, "the circulation of one *zamizdat* rose from a maximum of eighty thousand when distributed on paper to many millions when transmitted by radio."¹²⁹ RFE broadcasts were also utilized to spread calls for strikes and demonstrations providing specific instructions such as where and when protesters should meet, an activity the Polish communists found particularly inflammatory.¹³⁰ Najder was so despised by the PZPR that he was tried in a Polish court and sentenced to death in absentia in March 1983. In August 1984 PZPR spokesman Jerzy Urban even went as far as to state, "If you would close . . . Radio Free Europe, the underground would completely cease to exist."¹³¹

As Wałęsa summarized from the other side,

¹²⁸ For examples of these kinds of payments, see Hoover Institution, RFE/RL, Broadcast Records, Blue Box 3, Operations Summary 1986, January-Dec. The RFE/RL collection contains dozens of these monthly Operation Summary reports. While at the Hoover Institution in November 2007, I was not able to review them all. Accounting for all of this RFE money, while painstaking, would make for an interesting further project.

¹²⁹ Jacques Semelin, "Communication et Résistance: Les Radios occidentales comme vecteur d'ouverture a l'est" (Paris: Reseaux no. 53, CNET, June 1992), 9-24, as summarized by Michael Nelson in his *War of the Black Heavens* (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1997), 160.

¹³⁰ Pilna Notatka z rozmowy z charge d'Affaires USA w Warszawie John'em Davis'em w dniu 18 kwietnia 1984 r. [Urgent Note from a conversation with U.S. charge d'affaires a.i. John Davis on 18 April 1984], dated April 23, 1984, MSZ, 59/86, W-8, Dep III (1984), AP 53-5-8.

¹³¹ Nelson, *Black Heavens*, 158.

When a democratic opposition emerged in Poland, the Polish Section of Radio Free Europe accompanied us every step of the way. . . . It was our radio. But not only a radio station. Presenting works that were "on the red censorship list," it was our ministry of culture. Exposing absurd economic policies, it was our ministry of economics. Reacting to events promptly and pertinently, but above all, truthfully, it was our ministry of information.¹³²

As with Urban, Wałęsa's accolades should be taken with a grain of salt; nonetheless the RFE played an important role relaying information from the underground activists back to a wider Polish audience than could be reached through printed material alone.

Non-governmental Organizations Plod Steadily Along

As RFE, the CIA, and the American embassy strengthened their support for Solidarność, non-governmental groups including the AFL-CIO and CSS expanded upon their earlier successes. First and foremost this included material support to Solidarity through CSS funded by the AFL-CIO. In November 1982, the director of the PWAF and head of the International Affairs Department in Washington, Tom Kahn, signed off on paying Lasota \$661.04 in accordance with their "agreement . . . to reimburse them for limited shipments of items to Poland."¹³³ The funds were allocated from the PWAF, and included reimbursement for "2 short wave radios (receivers), 2 tape recorders (one mini), and assorted equipment . . . [which are] already in Poland." With the note, Lasota attached receipts from two electronics stores in Manhattan as well as her plans for future requests: "I am buying 3 transmitters and assorted equipment in Europe. I shall send you

¹³² Message to the Polish Section, RFE, May 3, 1992, BIB 1993 annual report, 5, RFE/RL, as quoted in *ibid.*, 160.

¹³³ Memo from Tom Kahn to Tom Donahue, dated November 5, 1982, AFL-CIO, International Affairs Department Files, Inactive Records, "Committee in Support of Solidarity."

the bills."¹³⁴ On November 21, Lasota sent another handwritten note to Kahn asking for reimbursement for \$2,575.28, for equipment bought outside Chicago including three two-way radios model GMT-24-OHE (\$650.00 each), two ASP-775 mobile antennas (\$49.50 each), and two ASP 636 base station antennas (\$135 each).¹³⁵ From Lasota's notes it is unclear just how these radios and electronic materials made their way into Poland, but they were presumably used to allow better communication between underground leaders or to help broadcast Radio Solidarność, a clandestine radio station which sporadically provided short informational bulletins.

In 1983, Lasota and CSS's efforts to provide material to Solidarność intensified. In March 1983, Lasota sent a Polish "internal passport" to Kahn and asked him to duplicate it for her as soon as possible. The request was filled on March 29, suggesting that the AFL-CIO was forging Polish government documents.¹³⁶ Five months later, Lasota sent her largest invoice to date, requesting \$5,410 for equipment bought in France with Piotr Naimski, adding, "I hope you do not find [the sum] outrageous. From what we know it is already in Poland. It is being used to 'promote democracy in the world,' right?"¹³⁷ While the original bills are not attached, a cover memo written to AFL-CIO Treasurer Tom Donohue identifies the purchased goods as "printing and recording

¹³⁴ Handwritten note from Irena Lasota to Tom [Kahn], dated November 2, 1982, AFL-CIO, International Affairs Department, Inactive Records, "Committee in Support of Solidarity."

¹³⁵ Handwritten note with attachments from Irena Lasota to Tom Kahn, dated November 21, 1982, AFL-CIO, International Affairs Department, Inactive Records, "Committee in Support of Solidarity."

¹³⁶ "Internal Passports" were documents needed by Polish citizens to travel within Poland. Again it is unclear who the passport was for, if it was Lasota herself or her collaborators in Poland. However, from the exchange of notes it does appear that the AFL-CIO was forging Polish government documents to help members of the underground move about the country. See handwritten note from Irena Lasota to Tom [Kahn], dated c. March 1983, and Telephone message to Tom Kahn from E, dated March 29, 1983, both in AFL-CIO, International Affairs Department, Inactive Records, "Committee in Support of Solidarity." When I asked Lasota about this in the interview she confirmed that they received copies of the internal passport, but could not remember if they were ever used within Poland. This may have been a selective memory loss to protect those who received the passports. Author's interview with Lasota, June 19, 2007.

¹³⁷ Note from Irena Lasota to Tom Kahn, dated August 8, 1983, AFL-CIO, International Affairs Department, Inactive Records, "Committee in Support of Solidarity."

equipment."¹³⁸ Shortly after this check was cut, Kahn sent a note to Lasota giving credence to her concerns, explaining: "Since the fund from which this check is drawn is limited, we will need to consult in advance before any additional funds can be committed."¹³⁹ From AFL-CIO records it appears that Kahn did not pay for any further deliveries to Poland with Polish Workers Aid funds until almost a year later in July 1985 when Kahn requested a check for \$482.72 for a Grundig Yacht Boy 700 Radio (receiver) and "electrical units" bought in London, as well as two round trip tickets for Lasota to travel from London to Paris and back in May and June 1985.¹⁴⁰ Shortly after this final reimbursement, Kahn transferred control of the Poland operation over to Adrian Karatnycky, a Ukrainian-American who ran the program for the remainder of the decade.

While Lasota concentrated her efforts on sending material and monetary support, her CSS co-director Eric Chenoweth headed a campaign to raise public awareness of the human rights situation in Poland. In 1982 Chenoweth had an operating budget of \$84,500, supported mostly by a \$50,000 grant from Smith Richardson and about \$15,000 from the Rockefeller Brothers. In 1983, CSS's operating budget dropped to just under \$55,000, donated primarily by the AFL-CIO and other individual unions as well as a grant from the John M. Olin Foundation. Expenditures for 1984 grew to just over \$95,000, with \$50,000 from the Free Trade Union Institute (an AFL-CIO subsidiary), \$25,000 from the Olin Foundation, and \$20,000 directly from the AFL-CIO, among others. According to internal records, each year the majority of these funds went to pay

¹³⁸ Note from Tom Kahn to Tom Donohue van, dated August 17, 1983, AFL-CIO, International Affairs Department, Inactive Records, "Committee in Support of Solidarity."

¹³⁹ Letter from Tom Kahn to Irena Lasota, dated August 22, 1984, AFL-CIO, International Affairs Department, Inactive Records, "Committee in Support of Solidarity."

¹⁴⁰ Memorandum from Tom Kahn to William Collins, dated July 8, 1985, with attached letter and receipts from Eric Chenoweth, dated July 1, 1985, AFL-CIO, International Affairs Department, Inactive Files, "Committee in Support of Solidarity."

salaries, rent, duplication fees, and to purchase the necessary office equipment, most notably photocopiers.¹⁴¹

In terms of products, the funds primarily supported the publication of a monthly periodical simply titled, *Reports*. *Reports* translated and published the most interesting and relevant articles taken from the underground press, as well as news about which activists had been released and who had been arrested. It reached a circulation of about eight-hundred copies in 1984, including academics, Congressmen, government officials, and concerned citizens.¹⁴² Beginning in 1984, CSS also began to maintain an archive of the underground publications they received.

CSS also focused their efforts on publicizing human rights abuses. They regularly produced special reports, one in late 1982, one just after the amnesty declaration in June 1983, and one in August 1984. Working closely with the Polish Helsinki Committee, an underground human rights organization in Poland, CSS also maintained a list of political prisoners including addresses for their families so that they could be sent aid packages. In 1984, CSS translated and published the Polish Helsinki Committee's report, *1984 Violations of Human Rights in Poland*, which detailed suspicious deaths, the use of torture, legal abuses, and changes in Polish law that legalized infringements on basic

¹⁴¹ For information on 1982 financial records, see CSS Records, CSS: Fundraising (Budget, income) 1982. For financial information on 1983, see letter from Eric Chenoweth to Ms. E. Tischer (IRS) with attachments, dated February 17, 1985, CSS, CSS: Corporate Records, U.S. Corporation Co. For 1984 reports see Financial Report January-December 1984, in the same file. As of September 2006, CSS records were located at the offices of Eric Chenoweth and Irena Lasota's current endeavor, the Institute for Democracy in Eastern Europe (IDEE), located in the Mt. Pleasant Neighborhood of Washington, D.C. From existing letters it is difficult to say how much of the annual budget went to direct support to Poland and what portion went to administrative costs. However, Lasota has kept numerous files beyond those in the official CSS files. During my interview she mentioned that she is working on organizing the files so that they can be maintained and archived. I plan to coordinate with Lasota to ensure that these files become publicly available.

¹⁴² The Indiana University Herman B. Wells Library has a full run of the CSS *Reports*.

human rights.¹⁴³

Armed with this information, CSS kept abuses in Poland in the public mindset. They sent speakers around the country to college campuses and community groups. Chenoweth and others including former Solidarność National Commission member Wacław Adamczyk, wrote editorials and articles which appeared in the *New York Times*, *Wall Street Journal*, and *Times of London*. Lasota regularly provided articles for Polish-language newspapers in the United States, particularly *Nowy Dziennik* out of New York City. CSS translated articles by Adam Michnik which appeared in the *New York Review of Books*. Together with their patrons in the AFL-CIO, CSS members also lobbied Congress. One of their largest successes was holding a press conference in March 1983 to expose the use of military penal camps to repress Solidarność activists.¹⁴⁴ Finally, Chenoweth and Lasota wrote letters to Shultz, Reagan, Clark, and Dobriansky consistently advocating a tough stance on sanctions against the PZPR.¹⁴⁵

The National Endowment for Democracy

In 1984 the AFL-CIO, CSS, and other non-governmental organizations found a new partner in Washington to work with to assist the Polish underground: a quango, or quasi-governmental organization, created to promote democracy around the world.

During his European trip in June 1982 to meet the G-7 at Versailles, the Reagan gave a well-received speech to the British Parliament on "promoting democracy and peace."

¹⁴³ Polish Helsinki Watch Committee, *1984 Violations of Human Rights in Poland* (London: Libra Books, 1985). The information about CSS activities in 1983 and 1984 in this section is culled from annual reports from 1983 and 1984-1985, located in CSS, CSS: Annual Reports 1983-1986.

¹⁴⁴ From Tom Kahn's records, it appears that the AFL-CIO generally reimbursed CSS for trips to Washington to pursue this and other lobbying activities in Washington.

¹⁴⁵ For letters to government officials see blue marked folder and "Correspondence/Let Sanct," both located in the CSS records.

Specifically invoking the situation in Poland, Reagan called on the free nations of the world to stand strong against the growth of "refined instruments of repression":

If the rest of this century is to witness the gradual growth of freedom and democratic ideals, we must take action to assist the campaign for democracy The objective I propose is quite simple to state: to foster the infrastructure of democracy—the system of a free press, unions, political parties, universities—which allows people to choose their own way, to develop their own culture, to reconcile their own differences through peaceful means. . . . For the sake of peace and justice, let us move toward a world in which all people are at last free to determine their own destiny.¹⁴⁶

This call to action sparked two parallel policy initiatives: one within the administration and one led by the American Political Foundation (APF), an NGO created in 1979 "to encourage international non-governmental bipartisan political exchanges between American political activists and their counterparts in Europe and elsewhere."¹⁴⁷

Within the administration, Reagan's speech led to "a cabinet level-meeting [which] took place August 3, 1982 to discuss a government organization structure for a public diplomacy program,"¹⁴⁸ which eventually spawned NSDD 77, "Management of Public Diplomacy Relative to National Security," signed on January 14, 1983.

Specifically this decision directive called for the creation of an International Information Committee that would be responsible for:

aid, training and organizational support for foreign governments and private groups to encourage the growth of democratic political institutions and practices. This will require close collaboration with other foreign policy efforts . . . as well as a close relationship with those sectors of the American society—labor, business, universities, philanthropy, political parties, press—that are or could be more engaged in parallel efforts

¹⁴⁶ "Address to Members of the British Parliament, June 8, 1982," *Public Papers of the President* (1982), available on the Reagan Library's website: www.reagan.utexas.edu.

¹⁴⁷ Joel M. Woldman, "The National Endowment for Democracy," *Congressional Research Service Brief*, — September 3, 1985, 3; located in NSA, National Endowment For Democracy Collection (hereafter NED), 2, "Duplicates."

¹⁴⁸ *Ibid.*

overseas. This group will undertake to build up the U.S. government capability to promote democracy.¹⁴⁹

In line with NSDD 77, the administration requested \$65 million for "Project Democracy" as part of their Fiscal Year (FY) 1984-1985 budget request.¹⁵⁰

Working concurrently with the government process, the APF proposed a study to understand better how the United States could improve its infrastructure for supporting democracy abroad.¹⁵¹ After gathering a powerhouse of Washington insiders—the Republican and Democratic parties' national chairmen, the vice-chairman of RFE, current and former NSC staff members, Democratic politicians Dante Fascell and Christopher Dodd, the vice president of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, and Lane Kirkland—for their board of directors, the APF received a \$400,000 grant from AID to complete a study with three goals: 1) to survey past and present private sector programs in the United States and abroad to promote democracy, 2) to compose recommendations for future actions to promote democracy by U.S. political parties, labor movement, and business; and 3) to propose practical recommendations for a private sector entity to coordinate these programs.¹⁵²

In the midst of APF's study, the administration's budget request for Project Democracy came under intense criticism from Capitol Hill. In particular, members of the House Foreign Affairs Committee Subcommittee on International Operations were

¹⁴⁹ NSDD 77, "Management of Public Diplomacy Relative to National Security," dated January 14, 1983, available online through the NARA's ARC system (www.archives.gov/research/arc/).

¹⁵⁰ "Current Policy No. 456: Project Democracy," February 23, 1983 (Washington, D.C.: Department of State, 1983), 2-3; located at NSA, NED, Box 2, "GAO Reports."

¹⁵¹ APF kept the White House well informed of their progress and potential suggestions. Memorandum for William P. Clark from Walter Raymond, "American Political Foundation Study," dated September 29, 1982, PPRL, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Records, OA 85, Project Democracy [1].

¹⁵² APF Report, "The Democracy Program: A Brief Introduction," dated January 1983, NSA, NED, 2, "NED General."

concerned that any money appropriated would support existing programs, throwing new money into tired solutions. Congress was also troubled that Project Democracy might only be used to promote the Reagan administration's particular political and ideological policies abroad. Finally, committee members were concerned that if funds were used evenhandedly—including in friendly or allied countries like Chile, South Korea, and the Philippines (who were run by less-than-fully democratic governments)—this could create conflicts of interest.¹⁵³

As controversy swirled, APF completed an interim report with its own specific recommendations.¹⁵⁴ Leaders from APF, including Kirkland, presented their conclusions to the Congressional subcommittee hearings on April 19, 1983, and proposed starting a non-governmental, private sector organization called the National Endowment for Democracy (NED). NED would have a fifteen member, bi-partisan board of directors to guide the institution, and would be responsible for dispersing Congressional funds through grants to individual programs meant to promote democracy. NED would not run democracy promotion programs; they would receive money from Congress and pass grants on to other institutions. In addition, APF recommended the creation of four sister institutions: the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (run by the Democratic party), the National Republican Institute for International Affairs (run by the Republican party), Center for International Private Enterprise (run by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce), and the Free Trade Union Institute (an existing organization run by the

¹⁵³ U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on International Operations, *Authorizing Appropriations for Fiscal Years 1984-1985 for the Department of State, the U.S. Information Agency, the Board for International Broadcasting, the Inter-American Foundation, the Asia Foundation, to Establish the National Endowment for Democracy*, 98th Cong., 1st sess., 1984, esp. comments by Representatives Fascell and Kastmeyer on 123 and 128.

¹⁵⁴ American Political Foundation Democracy Program Report, "The Commitment to Democracy: A Bi-Partisan Approach," dated April 18, 1983, on file at the NED Headquarters Library, Washington, D.C.

AFL-CIO). These four organizations would receive some funding from NED and would be responsible for overseeing programs meant to promote democracy.¹⁵⁵

As the Subcommittee on International Operations (chaired by APF board member Fascell) saw it, the NED provided a better mechanism to promote democracy than Project Democracy. By creating a private sector grant-giving organization, the NED solved the conflict-of-interest problems: the U.S. government appropriated the money to NED, but it did not decide where the money went. Therefore, the government could not be blamed for how the money was used. Second, because NED funds would go to institutions run by the two main political parties, business, and labor, Congressional money would only promote the executive branch's priorities. The APF's approach also had the explicit support of the White House, creating a perfect political storm.¹⁵⁶ On November 22, 1983, President Reagan signed the FY 84-85 appropriations bill into law, granting \$31.3 million to the National Endowment for Democracy.

With NED funded, CSS and other organizations requested support for ongoing and new programs. In April 1984, CSS proposed a grant for \$274,500 to fund a new East European Democracy Project, which had three goals: 1) to coordinate the distribution of financial and material assistance (printing equipment, ink and stencils, and recording equipment) to the underground free trade unions, independent underground publishing houses, and independent movements for education; 2) to publish Polish authors whose work is banned within Poland, other East European dissidents, and general works on democratic societies and Western democratic systems and make these materials available

¹⁵⁵ For testimony to Congress summarizing the APF report, see "Authorizing Appropriations for Fiscal Years 1984-1985," 881-883.

¹⁵⁶ Letter from William Clark to William E. Brock, dated March 14, 1983, included as an appendix to "The Commitment to Democracy: A Bi-Partisan Approach."

within Poland; and 3) to translate Solidarność proclamations and statements into other East European languages (particularly Czech) to spread Solidarność's ideas.¹⁵⁷ In September 1984, CSS wrote a second grant proposal directly to the AFL-CIO's Free Trade Union Institute, requesting \$65,000 to support independent publishing specifically within Poland, focused on sending new printing equipment to independent publishing houses like CDN and NOWA, providing material aid to writers working in Poland, and translating more Western books into Polish.¹⁵⁸ The East European Democracy Project received a grant of \$91,825 from NED for FY 1984 to support independent publishing in Poland and to translate books and materials about Solidarność into Czech, Russian, and Ukrainian for eventual distribution in those countries.¹⁵⁹ The NED also approved two other smaller grants for Poland-related activities: \$6,000 to the International Freedom to Publish Committee to help support the publication of *Zeszyty Literackie* (Literary Notebooks) a Paris-based publication which provided an outlet for writers working within Poland, as well as \$90,000 to the Polish Institute of Arts and Sciences in America (PIASA) "to provide assistance [food, medicine, and other support] to Polish political prisoners and to assist in maintaining independent cultural, educational, and scholarly activities in Poland."¹⁶⁰

The AFL-CIO's Free Trade Union Institute (FTUI), which had nearly become defunct for lack of funding in 1983, also gained funding for its activities in Poland. For

¹⁵⁷ Proposal to the National Endowment for Democracy Submitted by the Committee in Support of Solidarity, dated April 10, 1984, AFL-CIO, International Affairs Department, Inactive Records, "Committee in Support of Solidarity."

¹⁵⁸ Proposal to the Free Trade Union Institute, AFL-CIO, Submitted by the Committee in Support of Solidarity, dated September 20, 1984, AFL-CIO, International Affairs Department, Inactive Records, "Committee in Support of Solidarity."

¹⁵⁹ See Annual Report 1984-1985, undated, CSS, CSS: Annual Reports 1983-1986 and Total Budget January-December 1985, undated, CSS, CSS: Corporate Records, U.S. Corporation Co.

¹⁶⁰ Report, National Endowment for Democracy Fiscal Year 1984 Grants Awarded, dated c. October 1984, PPRL, Walter Raymond Files, OA91068, NED 1984-1985 [12 of 14]

FY 1984 FTUI received \$11 million from NED. The majority went to administrative costs, Asia programs, and Latin American programs. Just over \$500,000 was provided for European projects aimed at "assistance to a series of research, cultural, and intellectual organizations promoting democratic values, and assisting unions in totalitarian countries. These organizations [were] located in Paris, London, and Brussels and assist union rights efforts throughout Western Europe, Soviet Union, and Poland." Although records are sketchy, given that other areas were included in this broad sum, the contribution from the FTUI to Solidarność, through Jerzy Milewski's Coordinating Office Abroad in Brussels was likely between \$200,000 and \$300,000.¹⁶¹ In total this meant that NED provided between \$387,000 and \$487,000 in FY 1984 for Poland-related activities.

For FY 1985, the total level of NED grants for Poland increased, and was administered through different groups. The FTUI grants and money for CSS programs were combined into one appropriation of \$540,000, designated for CSS to continue its translations and publication activities, to "support individual Polish exiles in Europe," and to provide for the Coordinating Office's activities. As before \$6,000 was given to publish one issue of *Zeszyty Literackie*, this time administered by the Aurora Foundation. Freedom House, a human rights group in New York, received \$10,000 to support the Committee for Independent Culture, which ran flying universities and underground cultural activities in Poland. The Aurora Foundation also received \$50,000 to assist the work of the Polish Legal Defense Fund, a human rights group that worked with dissidents

¹⁶¹ Andrzej Friszke estimates that the AFL-CIO provided \$200,000 per year to the Coordinating Office in 1983 and 1984. In 1985 and 1986 he estimates that they received \$300,000 ("Tymczasowa Komisja Koordynacyjna," 133). This figure is roughly confirmed in Carl Gershman's testimony for 1987 appropriations for NED which set the level of funds going through FTUI to Solidarność in 1986 at \$304,163, and as Gershman laments in his testimony funding levels from NED had remained stagnant. See "National Endowment for Democracy Regional Listing of Approved Programs in FY 1986," in House Committee on Appropriations, *Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary and Related Agency Appropriations for 1987, part 5*, 99th Cong., 2nd sess., 1986, 498.

in and out of jail. So for FY 1985, NED set aside just under \$600,000 for the democratic opposition in Poland.¹⁶²

The NED gave a much needed infusion of money to American groups working to support Solidarność. As Tom Kahn's note to Irena Lasota made clear, the PWAF was drying up. With money from the U.S. Congress filtered through NED to CSS's Democracy in Eastern Europe Project, Lasota and her colleagues likely doubled their resources. By creating a separate project, the CSS insured that the money would go to supporting the opposition in Poland directly, rather than having funds also go into producing the committee's publications. With a new source of money, other groups like the PIASA also got into the game, increasing not only the total sum of money for Poland but also the contacts and routes needed to provide support.¹⁶³

Humanitarian Efforts Press On

From the end of 1982 through 1985, charitable and humanitarian efforts run by American groups hit a new peak, with Congress adding to the effort. Charitable aid in the form of frozen turkey, rice, oil, milk, cheese, flour, and used clothing continued to form the brunt of American aid with Catholic Relief Services running the largest program. CRS oversaw nearly weekly shipments of aid to Gdańsk on freighters from New York, Wilmington, Baltimore, Charleston, Jacksonville, New Orleans, Galveston, and

¹⁶² For a report on NED's FY 1985 expenditures, see *Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary and Related Agency Appropriations for 1987*, 485-486. In FY 1985, NED had its Congressional appropriations slashed. The \$18.5 million that was given for the program came from a fund designated for salaries. In FY 1986, Congressional funding for NED funding was reinstated but were over \$1 million less due to budgetary constraints.

¹⁶³ I have not attempted to determine other Western government's support to Solidarność. I am however, unaware of any group with resources as large as NED in Western Europe. This provides another area for future research.

Houston.¹⁶⁴ According to Polish government records, between 1981 and 1985 CRS was responsible for 266 thousand tons of aid worth \$188 million.¹⁶⁵ Once in Gdańsk the aid was trucked to distribution centers run by KCEP, who oversaw its distribution to needy families throughout twenty-seven diocese.¹⁶⁶ PACCF sent additional humanitarian support: 701 tons in 1982, 1,384 tons in 1983, 706 tons in 1984, and 842 tons in 1985.¹⁶⁷ CARE and Project HOPE also continued their work, with CARE providing 120 thousand tons of aid worth \$60 million and Project HOPE sending 1 thousand tons of medical equipment worth \$23 million.¹⁶⁸ In total between 1981 and 1985, American humanitarian aid sent through non-governmental organizations totaled 402 thousand tons worth \$362 million.¹⁶⁹

Based on the success of their relationship with American charitable groups the Catholic Church attempted to intensify cooperation and create a new fund for Polish farmers. Unlike other countries in the Soviet bloc, three quarters of Poland's farmland remained in individual, private farmers' hands. Moreover, 80% of the country's food came from private farmers. On September 14, 1982, Cardinal Glemp sent a letter to

¹⁶⁴ Report, "Shipments to Poland as of May 5, 1983, dated May 5, 1983, CRS, EURMENA, Program Correspondence Box 11, "1983 Poland: Shipping Reports."

¹⁶⁵ W nawiązaniu do ustaleń telefonicznych z Tow. V-dyrektorem Pawliszewskim podajemy informacje nt. dostaw humanitarnych z USA w latach 1981-85 [In reference to the telephone arrangements with Com. Vice-director Pawliszewski sending information about humanitarian shipments from the U.S. from 1981 to 1985], dated October 24, 1985, MSZ, 2/89, W-8, Dep III (1985), AP 39-2-85. As this is a government report from the Ministry of Health and Social Welfare it is possible that the figures are being underreported. However, the figures do match closely with CRS and KCEP sources, so the figures should be generally reliable.

¹⁶⁶ For information on KCEP, see Gabriela Kreihs, *Dobro Ukryte w Archiwach* (Cieszyn, Poland: Cieszyńska Drukarnia Wydawnicza, 2004). Overall Kreihs' volume is an excellent summary of the Catholic Church's charitable efforts from 1981-1990. The second section, 59-90, on foreign aid sent through KCEP is particularly helpful in understanding how American aid was distributed. According to Polish government documents KCEP distributed over 530 thousand tons of aid from 1981 to 1985, so the CRS contribution amounted to about half of the final distributed amount. The other aid KCEP distributed came primarily from Western Europe, especially West Germany.

¹⁶⁷ Kreihs, *Dobro Ukryte*, 69.

¹⁶⁸ See note 165.

¹⁶⁹ *Ibid.*

Jaruzelski proposing the creation of a Church-run foundation "using material help from abroad [the West] for the sake of overcoming the deep crisis and softening the effects of economic sanctions."¹⁷⁰ When Cardinal Krol returned to the United States following his trip to Poland with the Pope, he spoke with Reagan about starting a private fund to develop agriculture and reported to Polish officials that the president showed "significant interest" in the idea.¹⁷¹ In April 1984, the Sejm passed a law allowing autonomous, private foundations opening the way for the Church to create the agricultural fund.

The Poles followed this advance by sending Church representatives to request money for a pilot program. Father Aloyszy Orszulik and Professor Andrzej Stelmachowski, both members of the organizing committee for the agricultural fund, were sent to lobby in both Western Europe and North America during June and July 1984. While in Washington, they met with Assistant Secretary of State Edward Derwinski; Deputy Secretary of Agriculture Richard Lyng; new National Security Advisor Robert McFarlane and Dobriansky,¹⁷² and with members of the House and Senate Committees on Foreign Relations. Outside of government, the Polish emissaries spoke with AFL-CIO president Kirkland, John Rockefeller of the Rockefeller Brothers Foundation, Cardinal Krol, and Zbigniew Brzezinski.

¹⁷⁰ List od Prymasa Glempa do Wojciecha Jaruzelskiego [Letter from Glemp to Wojciech Jaruzelski], MSZ, 42/92, W-5, Dep III (1988), AP 54-0-88. For the MSZ Department III's early opinions on a agricultural fund, see Opinia dla Towarzysza gen. armii Wojciecha Jaruzelskiego - Prezesa Rady Ministrów dotycząca propozycji Prymasa Polski udzielenia pomocy zagranicznej na rzecz polskiego rolnictwa [Opinion for Com Gen. Wojciech Jaruzelski, Chairman of the Council of Ministers, regarding the proposition by the Primate of Poland to accept foreign help for Polish agriculture], dated c. September 1982, and Stanowisko MSZ w sprawie propozycji Prymasa Polski udzielenia pomocy zagranicznej na rzecz polskiego rolnictwa [MSZ position on the matter of the Primate of Poland's proposition to accept foreign aid for Polish agriculture], dated September 24, 1982, both in MSZ, 42/92, W-5, Dep III (1988), AP 54-0-88.

¹⁷¹ Szyfrogram Nr. 621/III from New York, dated July 14, 1983, MSZ, 42/92, W-5, Dep III (1988), AP 54-0-88.

¹⁷² Robert McFarlane replaced William Clark as national security advisor in October 1983.

Although Stelmachowski and Orszulik were not government representatives per se, the American reaction to their presentations was, nonetheless, tempered by ongoing conflicts in bilateral relations; money for the agricultural fund was treated as part of the step-by-step process, not a separate issue. American government officials emphasized the treatment of political prisoners and the internal situation in their decision making about whether to provide funds. Also, the trip gave policy makers a chance to meet with Polish representatives when exchanges were at a minimum. Stelmachowski and Orszulik's meeting with McFarlane and Dobriansky was only scheduled to be ten minutes, but lasted over an hour, during which McFarlane asked about the state of affairs in Poland and reported on the White House's position on membership into the IMF. In reporting back to the MSZ, the agriculture fund representatives emphasized "that their conversations play[ed] an important role in actions on matters of lifting the U.S. government's restrictions."¹⁷³

The trip was also a success for the agricultural program. The Polish delegation received pledges for \$28 million to provide training, modern machinery, and fertilizer to private farmers. The U.S. government pledged \$10 million, with an additional \$3 million from the American Catholic Church and \$1 million from the Canadian Catholic Church. The European Union, who the Poles met with in Bonn, pledged a comparable amount. On August 17, 1984, Reagan gave his public support to the measure.¹⁷⁴ A month later the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations approved the appropriations. As the program was

¹⁷³ Pilna Notatka z rozmowy w dniu 20.7. br. z prof. A. Stelmachowskim i prof. W. Trzeciakowskim na temat ich rozmów w Europie Zachodniej, USA i Kanadzie w sprawie funduszy dla kościelnej Fundacji [Urgent note from a conversation on 20.7 with Prof. A. Stelmachowski and Prof. W. Trzeciakowski regarding their conversations in Western Europe, U.S., and Canada on the matter of funds for the Church foundation], dated July 23, 1984, MSZ, 42/92, W-5, Dep III (1988), AP 54-0-88; quoted at 5.

¹⁷⁴ "Remarks at a White House Luncheon Marking the 40th Anniversary of the Warsaw Uprising, August 17, 1984," *Public Papers of the President* (1984), available on the Reagan Library's website: www.reagan.utexas.edu.

devised, foreign money would be given directly to the Church agricultural foundation which would purchase farm machinery, fertilizer, etc., in the West. They would then sell the equipment at reduced prices to farmers for zlotys, with the proceeds going to pay for administrative expenses and social projects in rural areas.¹⁷⁵ Both measures were meant to bring needed money and equipment to less-developed provinces and alleviate food shortages.

In addition to the agricultural fund, Congress took independent steps to increase humanitarian aid flowing to Poland. Fascell and forty-six other representatives from the 98th congress co-sponsored legislation (H.R. 4835) to appropriate funds to construct the Clement Zablocki Memorial Outpatient Facility at the American Children's Hospital in Kraków. Zablocki was a Polish-American congressman from Milwaukee who chaired the Foreign Relations Committee for seven years before his death in December 1983; he had also been instrumental in the original legislation that helped to build the children's hospital. Fascell's legislation allowed excess zlotys held by the U.S. government to be used to construct the new hospital wing and appropriated \$10 million additional dollars to furnish the wing, provide needed medical equipment, and purchase necessary medical supplies. The bill was approved by Congress in June 1984.

Although bilateral political relations remained at a near standstill between 1982 and 1985, relations based on humanitarian concerns did not suffer the same fate. The Polish people continued to need Western help. CRS, the Polish American Congress Charitable Foundation, CARE, and Project HOPE continued to send massive amounts of

¹⁷⁵ Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, *Agricultural Activities in Poland*, 98th Cong., 2d. sess, 1984, S.hrg.98-108. Although Western funds were raised for a pilot version of the Church Agricultural Fund, the fund never came into existence. Ultimately the government blocked the creation of the independent, Church-run foundation. For a full explanation of the problems beset by the fund, see: Sławomir Siwek, *Fundacja Rolniczej* (Warsaw: Air Link, 2001).

needed food, clothing, and medical supplies, with American aid accounting for at least half of the entire sum of foreign aid sent to Poland between 1981 and 1985. Beginning in 1984, Congress also directly involved itself by pledging \$10 million to help Polish farmers and millions more to build and furnish a wing of the Kraków children's hospital. These humanitarian agreements and the tacit or explicit cooperation they required between Americans and Poles were not just tangential notes. These agreements and the political will they involved were among the few bright spots in Polish-American relations in the mid-1980s and allowed both sides to continue to talk and work together, no matter how bad political relations got. As with the internal situation, the Catholic Church played an essential role in enabling these contacts.

Sanctions and Domestic Politics

Reagan's announcement at the end of 1983 that his administration was considering allowing Polish ships to fish in American waters and supported debt rescheduling negotiations at the Paris Club reinvigorated the political debate about how to proceed, both in the United States and in Poland. In an October 26, 1983, letter to the president, Kirkland pressured the White House to maintain sanctions, explaining that the AFL-CIO would consider any move to relax sanctions "as profoundly misguided and unwarranted. To return to business as usual would put the blessings of the United States on continued repression in Poland . . . [only encouraging] the hardliners in Warsaw and Moscow."¹⁷⁶ The CSS joined the AFL-CIO, arguing that many Poles remained in favor of

¹⁷⁶ Letter from Lane Kirkland to the President, dated October 26, 1983, RRPL, Paula Dobriansky Files, Box 90892, Poland Memoranda 1981-1983 [November 1983]; a second copy is located in AFL-CIO, International Affairs Department Files, Inactive Records, "Walesa on Sanctions."

sanctions.¹⁷⁷ On the other side of the debate, PAC lobbied the administration to lessen sanctions for pragmatic reasons. PAC President Al Mazewski understood that repression continued, but he argued "to break the impasse in the U.S.-Polish relations and to signal our good will to offer assistance, we suggest that the U.S. should at this time express its agreement to the resumption of negotiations . . . for the rescheduling of Polish debt and lift the U.S. fish rights embargo."¹⁷⁸ Both sides of the debate felt that they were arguing for the best interests of the Polish people; Kirkland and the CSS specifically invoked Solidarność positions to argue that sanctions should not be withdrawn.

Within Poland, the underground was also struggling with exactly how to respond to American sanctions. Solidarność leaders knew it was difficult to balance the negative effects of sanctions on Polish peoples' lives with the positive pressure the sanctions put on the PZPR. As TKK member Zbigniew Bujak put it just after the initial announcement of sanctions:

One must first answer the question of whether or not these sanctions are genuinely—as the television here suggests—a blow against society, and thus whether the things we would have received from the West would have been used to ameliorate the material and food situation. Here there is not the slightest doubt as to the answer. Only an insignificant part of the aid would have been put to this use.¹⁷⁹

By the end of the first year of martial law, however, the opposition's position had grown more sophisticated: American sanctions were only symbolically important. On one hand, sanctions provided a symbol for the Jaruzelski government to use in propaganda to blame Reagan for the country's problems. On the other hand, lifting sanctions would not

¹⁷⁷ Letter from Irena Lasota and Eric Chenoweth to Secretary George Shultz, dated November 23, 1983, CSS, [blue labeled folder].

¹⁷⁸ Mailgram from Alojz Mazewski to the President of the United States, dated October 21, 1983, RRPL, Paula Dobriansky Files, Box 90892, Poland Memoranda 1981-1983 [November 1983].

¹⁷⁹ Interview with Bujak, *Tygodnik Mazowsze* no. 2 (February 11, 1982) in KARTA, Archiwum Opozycji. A translated version of this article can be found in AFL-CIO, Lane Kirkland Presidential Files, Inactive Records, Poland 1986-1990.

really change anything because what the government truly needed was new Western credits. In the opposition's eyes sanctions were not the cause of economic hardship; they were just a symbol to show American disapproval of the PZPR and American support for Solidarność.¹⁸⁰ In the face of constant propaganda during 1983 the opposition's position evolved further, culminating in Wałęsa giving a press conference in December to call for the end of sanctions. As Jerzy Milewski, explained in private correspondence:

Official propaganda in Poland has begun to exploit the fact of the existence of these sanctions by flaunting them as the major cause for a successive increase in the price of food and other basic goods, scheduled to take effect on 1 January 1984. It also accused Solidarność of supporting the sanctions and attacked the trade union for acting against the best interests of the society. Therefore the leadership of NSZZ Solidarność decided that, for the good of the trade union, it would be better to appeal for the withdrawal of the economic sanctions before the beginning of next year.¹⁸¹

Solidarność had not changed its opinions about the relative importance of economic sanctions versus new credits, but supporting sanctions had become too politically expensive.

Two other sources added to Wałęsa's call for sanctions to be lifted. First, in an address to the Polish community in Rome, the Pope expressed "his hope and wish that the economic and commercial sanctions against Poland be lifted in the near future."¹⁸² In addition, 1984 was an election year, and the White House showed signs of thinking more politically: Faith Whittlesey, assistant to the president for public liaison, pushed the NSC

¹⁸⁰ Kassandra (Jacek Kolobinski), "W Zamydlonych Oczach Zachodu" [In the soapy eyes of the West], *Tygodnik Mazowsze* no. 37, (December 16, 1982), 4, in KARTA, Archiwum Opozycji.

¹⁸¹ Telex Message from Jerzy Milewski to Lane Kirkland, dated December 6, 1983, AFL-CIO, Lane Kirkland Presidential Files, inactive records, "Wałęsa on Sanctions." Wałęsa also took the time to write a personal letter to Kirkland explaining that he did not mean to cause any friction with the AFL-CIO's earlier position, Letter from Lech Wałęsa to Lane Kirkland, dated January 28, 1984, AFL-CIO International Affairs Department Files, Inactive Records, "Committee in Support of Solidarity."

¹⁸² Cable from Amembassy Rome to Secstate, dated December 30, 1983, RRPL, Paula Dobriansky Files, Box 90892, Poland Memoranda 1984-1985 [January 1984]. This position was consistent with the Pope's earlier statements and with comments by the Catholic Church in Poland.

to make more favorable advances towards Mazewski, the "recognized leader of most Poles in the U.S." and the president of an organization "that has been very helpful in getting the president's message out to the eight million Polish Americans."¹⁸³ Under this combination of pressures—most importantly Wałęsa's new public posture—the White House hastily took another step to ease sanctions, announcing on January 19, 1984, that Poland would be given a fishing quota for 1984 and that LOT airlines would be allowed eighty-eight charter flights to American airports.¹⁸⁴ Two more sanctions were dropped, this time in response to domestic pressures and revised thinking within Solidarność.

An Attempt at Quiet Diplomacy

While voices in the White House and the Solidarność underground were changing their public positions on sanctions, John Davis continued to use the step-by-step framework to improve the situation in Warsaw. Rather than engaging in a debate through the MSZ, Davis conducted new negotiations in a much quieter manner through a confidential emissary from the Polish government, Adam Schaff. Schaff was a Warsaw University professor and Party intellectual who served as a Central Committee member in the 1960s and was best known for his attempts to create a "humanistic" Marxism. He was purged from the party in the late 1960s but eventually regained favor. In the early 1980s,

¹⁸³ Handwritten note from Faith Whittelsey to Bud McFarlane with attachments, dated February 23, 1984, RRPL, Paula Dobriansky Files, Box 90892, Poland Memoranda 1984-1985 [February 27-18, 1984].

¹⁸⁴ John Goshko, "Reagan Eases Polish Sanctions After Appeal From Wałęsa," *Washington Post* (Jan. 20, 1984): A16. This announcement confirmed fishing quotas that had been mentioned earlier in the year, meaning that the administration had dropped any restrictions on quotas based on how political prisoners were treated. The announcement on airline communications did not allow for LOT to maintain regularly scheduled flights, only eighty-eight chartered flights. The decision, however, was made so quickly that it led to a rift with the Civilian Aeronautics Board (CAB) who felt that they had not been properly briefed prior to the announcement. See Memo from Richard Levine to Robert Kimmit, Attached Dan McKinnon letter, dated February 26, 1984, RRPL, Paula Dobriansky Files, Box 90892, Poland Memoranda 1984-1985 [February 27-28, 1984].

he was deeply opposed to Solidarność and even suggested that Jaruzelski deserved a Nobel Peace Prize.¹⁸⁵ Schaff also served as an unofficial emissary in July 1983, when he met privately with the Pope.¹⁸⁶ Building off this prior role, Schaff approached Davis to talk "on behalf of Poland's highest authorities" beginning around New Year's 1984, and the two brokered a deal "that the Polish government would be prepared to release the eleven prominent Solidarity leaders and KOR activists who are awaiting trial, if the U.S. would further ease some of its sanctions against Poland."¹⁸⁷ On February 16, Reagan signed off on the deal and instructed Davis to agree to lift two sanctions—to restore regularly scheduled LOT flights and to reopen the Marie Skłodowska Curie Foundation funds for joint scientific exchanges—if the Poles released the eleven opposition members.¹⁸⁸ In addition, the U.S. government would "consider sending an ambassador to Warsaw to engage in a high-level dialogue to review the state of our bilateral relations."¹⁸⁹

¹⁸⁵ See Norman Davies, *God's Playground*, vol. 2 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985), 551-553; and Paczkowski, *Spring Will be Ours*, 298.

¹⁸⁶ Rakowski, *Dzienniki 1981-1983*, 289, 337.

¹⁸⁷ Memorandum from Paula Dobriansky to Robert McFarlane, "Poland: Response to Unofficial Emissary Schaff," dated February 9, 1984, PPRL, NSC, European and Soviet Affairs Directorate, Box 91186, Vatican.

¹⁸⁸ These eleven political prisoners included four activists linked to KOR (Jacek Kuron, Adam Michnik, Henryk Wujec, and Zbigniew Romaszewski) and seven activists linked to Solidarność (Andrzej Gwiazda, Seweryn Jaworski, Marian Jurczyk, Karol Modzielewski, Grzegorz Palce, Andrzej Rozpłochowski, and Jan Rulewski). In Polish documents the group is often just referred to as "the eleven."

¹⁸⁹ Memorandum from Robert McFarlane to the President, "Poland: Response to Unofficial Emissary Schaff," dated February 16, 1984, PPRL, NSC, European and Soviet Affairs Directorate, Box 91186, Vatican.

Schaff's inquiry led to a series of meetings with Davis at which the two looked for some kind of breakthrough in relations. Lawrence Eagleberger even traveled for secret meetings with Davis and Schaff at the American embassy in Vienna on March 30-31, 1984, to discuss the possibility of lifting all American sanctions. In Vienna, Eagleberger presented a "non-paper" outlining moves the Poles would have to take to see all sanctions lifted. Schaff looked over the paper but could not comply with the requirements. In Schaff's view these negotiations with Davis and Eagleberger offered a real opportunity to redefine Polish-American relations (see his *Notatki Kłopotnika* [Warsaw: Polska Oficyna Wydawnicza BGW, 1995], 123-127). In my phone interview with Davis on April 27, 2007, I confirmed the details of these meetings in Vienna; however, Davis was not convinced that the negotiations offered an opportunity for a true breakthrough. Given the continued animosity and lack of trust between the two sides, as well as the slow

The administration's reasoning for accepting the offer combined a number of influences. First, the decision was in line with the step-by-step policy. Second, the sanctions they were offering to lift were not very substantial: the White House still maintained control over Poland's MFN status, IMF membership, and new credits. Third, "domestically a lifting of these two sanctions would be supported by Polish-Americans" (meaning Mazewski and the PAC).¹⁹⁰ Finally, the president was affected by the Pope's public calls to relieve suffering. On February 22, Reagan wrote a letter to the Pope advising him of his decision to deal with Schaff, specifically mentioning that he had drawn upon the Pope's advice in making the decision.¹⁹¹

For the Polish side, Schaff's offer was part of a muddled process within the PZPR to decide exactly what to do with the eleven high profile activists still in prison. The Church had consistently called for their release and on January 5, Jaruzelski met with Glemp to talk over what to do with them.¹⁹² By the end of January, Politburo members were beginning to see the possibility of a trial as a losing proposition. After meeting with Kiszczak on January 20, Rakowski wrote in his journal: "The trial against the KOR members and the seven from Solidarność is a necessary evil. After what kind of shit is it necessary? Certainly not lucky. Politically the trial will be groundless. There will be sentences and then what? For half a year we will lose points, the entire West will have screamed, and we will not profit at all."¹⁹³ On February 10, the PZPR Politburo met to discuss their options. Although that day was dominated by the death of Soviet Secretary

pace of change in American policy, I remain doubtful that this episode was any kind of missed opportunity to transform Polish-American relations.

¹⁹⁰ "Poland: Response to Unofficial Emissary Schaff," dated February 16, 1984.

¹⁹¹ Letter from Ronald Reagan to the Pope, dated February 22, 1984, PPRL, NSC, European and Soviet Affairs Directorate, Box 91186, Vatican.

¹⁹² Rakowski, *Dzienniki polityczne 1984-1986* (Warsaw: ISKRY, 2005), 12.

¹⁹³ *Ibid.*, 18.

General Yuri Andropov, a the MSW offered three possible paths: 1) to hold a trial which would only incur greater resistance from the West and the Church, 2) to declare an amnesty as was favored by the Church, or 3) to "begin a trial process of both groups and discontinue them on the basis of a planned amnesty on the 40th Anniversary of the PRL," which would have the same advantages as declaring an amnesty in relations with the Church.¹⁹⁴ As a compromise, the third option afforded the best way out of a tough situation. As the NSC noted, "Polish authorities appear already to be inclined to release the eleven prisoners as they feel that putting them on trial would only serve to embarrass the government. Even Professor Schaff asserted that 'Poland was desperately anxious to solve the prisoner problem and was aware of its delicacy.'"¹⁹⁵ The PZPR was looking for a way to release the prisoners at least partially because of pressure from the Church and the West, so while accepting the inevitable Schaff was trying to take advantage of the release by linking the move with weakened sanctions.

The Polish response to the deal, however, was neither quick nor clear. Over the next few months the PZPR continued to struggle with how best to handle the eleven. The government offered the dissidents amnesty if they agreed to leave the country (a deal brokered by U.N. Secretary General Perez du Cuellar). They offered amnesty if the defendants agreed to refrain from political activity for a period of time. In both cases the dissidents refused the offers.¹⁹⁶ Kiszczak was also involved in negotiations with Glomp

¹⁹⁴ Koncepcje polityczno-prawne zakończenia postępowań karnych przeciwko członkom kierownictwa anypaństwowego związku pn. "KSS-KOR" i ekstremistycznym działaczom b. "Solidarności" [Politico-legal conceptualization for ending the criminal proceedings against leaders of the anti-State group KSS-KOR and Solidarnosc extremists], dated c. Februry 1, 1984, AAN, KC PZPR, V/219, 228-239; quoted at 234.

¹⁹⁵ "Poland: Response to Unofficial Emissary Schaff," dated February 16, 1984.

¹⁹⁶ For information on the U.N. secretary general's visit to Poland in February, see Notatka Informacyjna z oficjalnej wizyty w Polsce Sekretarza Generalnego ONZ, Javiera Pereza de Cuellara [Information Note from the official visit to Poland of U.N. Secretary General Javier Perez de Cuellar], dated Februry

and Dąbrowski who pressured the government time and again to release them on behalf of the Church. After a tense spring during which students held demonstrations across the country to insure that crucifixes remained in classrooms, Solidarność ran a campaign calling for Poles to boycott government elections, and the usual street demonstrations occurred on May 1 and May 3, the PZPR stuck with the original plan and directed General Kiszczak to "continue negotiations in accordance with the plan that had been put forward."¹⁹⁷ As part of implementing the plan Kiszczak conducted talks with local party officials to try to convince this group, who were often more hard line than leaders in Warsaw of the soundness of releasing the eleven.

In the mean time, the PZPR took two public steps that seemed to contradict the deal that Davis had brokered with Schaff. On June 12 the PZPR announced that the four KOR leaders in the group of eleven would head to trial in one month.¹⁹⁸ Second, amid conflicting rumors that an amnesty was both forthcoming and that hard-line members of the government were attempting to block the amnesty,¹⁹⁹ Schaff was expelled from the Communist party "for publishing 'politically harmful' articles . . . [and for] conduct 'incompatible with his party membership.'"²⁰⁰ Publicly there was no mention of his role in negotiations with Davis about a deal to free the eleven. Nonetheless, Schaff's removal raised questions about the deal.

24,1984, AAN, KC PZPR, V/221, 206-212. Michnik and other KOR dissidents had routinely been given the option of emigrating from Poland to secure their release, beginning in 1982. Each time, however, he and his colleagues rejected the offers. For Michnik's reactions to these offers, see his pronouncements, "Why you are not emigrating . . ." and "A Letter to General Kiszczak," both of which appeared originally in the underground press and have been translated by Maya Latynski in *Letters from Prison and other Essays* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987).

¹⁹⁷ Decision #2, Protocół 115 for PZPR Politburo Meeting May 2, 1984, AAN, KC PZPR, Mikr. 3054, Sygn. 1885, 31.

¹⁹⁸ Michael Kaufman, "Trial date is Set for 4 Solidarity Advisors," *New York Times* (June 13, 1984): A3.

¹⁹⁹ Christopher Bobinski, "Most of Poland's Political Prisoners Likely to be Freed," *Financial Times* (June 15, 1984): A3, and "Hardliners Force Delay in Polish Amnesty," *Financial Times* (July 12, 1984): A2.

²⁰⁰ "Poland expels Marxist Scholar," *Globe and Mail* [Canada] (June 29, 1984).

After a few shaky months, the Poles and Americans stuck to their agreement from February. The trial of the KOR members began on July 13 as planned but was suspended on July 19 before the first witness was given a chance to testify. Then on July 21, the fortieth anniversary of the founding of Communist Poland, the Sejm ratified an amnesty declaration that promised to free all political prisoners except those charged with a few specific crimes. In addition to over 650 political prisoners, 35,000 inmates who had been imprisoned on minor crimes related to demonstrations were also released. Members of the underground organizations and independent presses were also offered amnesty if they turned themselves in.²⁰¹ Most importantly, Kuron, Michnik, Gwiazda, Wujec, Romaszewski, and the other members of the eleven were all set free. In addition, Władysław Frasyniuk and Józef Pinior were also released. Only Bogdan Lis, a member of the TKK, and Piotr Mierzewski who had been with Lis in early June when they were captured, remained in prison on charges of treason. Two weeks after the amnesty, White House spokesman Larry Speakes announced that "in accordance with his step-by-step approach for dealing with the Polish situation" the president had decided to drop two sanctions: to allow LOT to return to regularly scheduled flights and to permit full scientific and technical exchanges. Both sides had now kept up their respective ends of the deal. Further, the president offered to back the "reactivation of Poland's application for membership in the International Monetary Fund," if the amnesty proved to be complete and reasonable (meaning that activists were not quickly re-arrested).²⁰²

Through the end of 1984, Davis worked to parlay this new carrot (IMF

²⁰¹ Bradley Graham, "Poles Declare Amnesty for Political Prisoners," *Washington Post* (July 22, 1984): A1.

²⁰² Statement by Principal Deputy Press Secretary Speakes on United States Sanctions Against Poland, August 3, 1984," *Public Papers of the President* (1984), available on the Reagan Library's website: www.reagan.utexas.edu.

membership) into further advantage for the United States.²⁰³ On October 20, Davis approached Kinast with a second offer to trade sanctions for political prisoners. Armacost made a simultaneous offer to Ludwiczak in Washington. As Davis made clear, "The USA wants to start the procedure for Poland to join the IMF," but they were concerned about twenty-two people who fell under the amnesty but remained in prison. As Davis explained, the United States had announced to the IMF board that they were willing to drop restrictions on Poland's membership, but only if the amnesty was "complete and reasonable." But, "the administration [could not] accept in good measure that the amnesty is 'full and reasonable' so long as Lis and Mierzewski find themselves in prison."²⁰⁴

Consistent with earlier decisions this offer was in response to more than just events in Poland. As with the decision to begin Paris Club negotiations, Europeans were pressuring Americans to make a change: "a majority of West European governments [felt] that Poland [had] a perfect right to join the IMF . . . , that it [was] in the general Western interest to have Poland in a Western-oriented institution, and that all Western creditors would gain from any IMF supervision of the bankrupt Polish economy."²⁰⁵

Voices in the Polish-American community, including Jan Nowak and the PAC, were also pushing Reagan to allow Polish membership.²⁰⁶ Finally, as with the previous deal, the Americans were not risking too much because dropping veto power over IMF membership did not mean that Poland would necessarily gain the loans they desired.

²⁰³ Poland signed the original treaty to create the IMF and was making final preparing for membership in 1980 and 1981. IMF officials visited Warsaw to observe their progress just prior to the declaration of martial law.

²⁰⁴ Notatka Informacyjna z rozmowy w dniu 20 października 1984 r. z Charge d'Affaires a.i. Ambasady USA J. Davis'em [Information Note from the conversation on 20 October 1984 with U.S. embassy charge d'affaires J. Davis], dated October 20, 1984, MSZ, 59/86, W-5, Dep III (1984), AP 22-1-84/A.

²⁰⁵ Bobinski, "General Jaruzelski Takes a Calculated Gamble," *Financial Times* (July 24, 1984): A14.

²⁰⁶ Charlotte Saikowski, "US may ease up on Warsaw to avoid gain by hard-liners," *Christian Science Monitor* (Dec. 13, 1984): A3.

Poland would still need to make tough economic decisions to qualify for money. Davis was "selling a horse that we didn't own. . . . The feeling was that if you looked at Poland on its own merits, it would have troubles. In short, I don't think we gave away a lot . .

"²⁰⁷

The second sanctions-for-prisoners deal was also a success. On December 8, both Lis and Mierzewski were released. Less than a week later, unnamed Treasury officials quietly confirmed that the United States had dropped its veto against Poland's IMF membership, making no specific mention of the deal for opposition activists.²⁰⁸ There was no presidential statement on the issue. In reporting the news to the Pope, however, the NSC made the decision's parameters clear: "in response to Poland's implementation of the July 1984 amnesty (in particular the release of Bogdan Lis and Piotr Mierzewski), we withdrew our objection to Poland's membership application in the IMF."²⁰⁹ The step-by-step policy had dropped another sanction in return for the release of Solidarność leaders.

Dis-agrément

Despite both sides holding up their respective ends on bargains for political prisoners, the bilateral relationship on all other levels remained frigid in 1984. On March 16, Davis and the assistant director of State's office for Eastern Europe, Dale Herspring, met with Kinast in Warsaw to make a pitch for continuing the "step-by-step" and "small steps" policies. Herspring robustly criticized the Poles' request for the United States to drop all sanctions for relations to improve, as advocated in the November 1983

²⁰⁷ Interview with Hill.

²⁰⁸ Clyde Farnsworth, "U.S. Said to Drop its Bar to Poland in Monetary Fund," *New York Times* (Dec. 15, 1984): A1.

²⁰⁹ Memo from Robert McFarlane to Tyrus Cobb, "Your Meeting with the Pope," dated January 8, 1985, RRPL, Tyrus Cobb Files, OA 90901; The Vatican-1985 (1 of 2).

government note. To Herspring the "note [felt] like a 'slap in the face' and as if [the Poles were] waiting for the American side to capitulate." He added that this approach would only "lead to future impasses and worsening mutual relations." Rather than interpreting this as an attempt to restart the small steps process, Kinast reported to the Politburo, including Jaruzelski and Foreign Minister Olszowski, that

the American side is attempting to shift responsibility for a lack of improvements or the eventual worsening of bilateral relations onto [the PZPR]. This indicates that the Reagan administration does not intend to undertake calculated decisions to improve Polish-American relations in the period leading up to the presidential elections.²¹⁰

Under this impression, the MSZ responded negatively to similar overtures from Dobriansky when she visited Warsaw in June. She told the MSZ that Washington was taking an "elastic" approach and hoped to move forward on agreements regarding the Church agricultural fund and agrément for Jack Scanlan. The MSZ again responded by invoking the arguments in the November note.²¹¹

Even after Reagan announced that he was dropping sanctions following the July amnesty, the Poles staunchly defended their hard-line approach. On August 16, Davis was presented another eight-page government note nearly identical to the November 1983 missive. The note criticized the American actions as "still far away from actual needs both in terms of the damages inflicted against Poland and its people, as well as in terms of the requirements for normalization of mutual relations." Reagan's move was too little, too late. The PZPR could "see a positive element" in it, but normalizing Polish-

²¹⁰ Notatka Informacyjna z rozmowy z Dale Herspring'em, wicedyrektorem biura d/s Europy Wschodniej w Departamencie Stanu w dniu 16 bm [Information Note from a conversation with Dale Herspring, vice-director of the Department of State East European Bureau on the 16th of this month], dated March 23, 1984, MSZ, 59/86, W-6, Dep III (1984), AP 220-1-84.

²¹¹ Notatka Informacyjna z rozmowy w dniu 15 bm. z Paula Dobriansky, pracownicą w Narodowej Radzie Bezpieczeństwa w Białym Domu [Information Note from a conversation on the 15th of this month with Paula Dobriansky, staff member of the National Security Council in the White House], dated June 20, 1984, MSZ, 59/86, W-6, Dep III (1984), AP 220-1-84.

American relations still depended upon the United States "relinquishing the policies of interference in [Poland's] internal affairs, including the propaganda oppression, a return to normal terms of trade, economic and financial cooperation, to equitable cooperation in all areas as well as taking measures designed to make good on the losses caused by the policies of restrictions."²¹² If the November 1983 note was a first slap in the face, this was the second.

Bilateral relations in the fall of 1984 were further slowed by tragic internal developments. On October 30 a staunchly pro-Solidarność priest, Father Jerzy Popiełuszko, was found murdered. Popiełuszko, who was frequently criticized by the government for his support for the opposition, was kidnapped by members of the Polish security services on October 19 and then beaten to death. In the face of massive public outcry (200,000 mourners attended his funeral and Solidarność called for strikes in his honor) and pressure from the Catholic Church, the PZPR investigated the crimes and took the unprecedented step of bringing three SB officers to trial on murder charges. The White House only released a statement that America shared "the grief of the Polish people at the news of the tragic death" and called for those responsible to be brought to justice.²¹³ The tragedy was not used to make any grand statements or as an excuse to impose new sanctions—actions that certainly would have looked heavy handed. Instead, the murder and ensuing trial were taken as another sign that they were "dealing with a

²¹² Unofficial Translation of the Position of the PRL regarding the announcement by the authorities of the USA of their readiness to lift some restrictions, dated August 16, 1984, MSZ, 35/90, W-4, Dep III (1987), AP 223-1-87. For a record of Davis's meeting when he received this note see, Notatka Informacyjna z przekazania Charge d'affaires a.i. USA J. Davis'owi Stanowisko Rządu PRL w sprawie zapowiedzi władz USA gotowości zniesienia niektórych restrykcji [Information Note from presentation of U.S. charge d'affaires J. Davis on the PRL position on the matter of a response to the U.S. to lifting no restrictions], dated August 17, 1984, MSZ, 35/90, W-4, Dep III (1987), AP 223-1-87. Public statements by Urban after the July amnesty contained similar arguments.

²¹³ "Statement on the Death of Father Jerzy Popiełuszko of Poland, October 31, 1984," *Public Papers of the President*, available on the Reagan Library's website: www.reagan.utexas.edu.

criminal regime . . . that . . . had absolutely no legitimacy."²¹⁴

Even in the face of international criticism and intense concern from the United States, the PZPR continued to follow the same line against Washington, leading to another diplomatic crisis. On December 14, Davis told Kinast that the embassy would be making an official request for agrément to appoint John Scanlan ambassador in the next few days. Armacost made the same announcement to Ludwiczak in Washington. The White House had first made its intentions known to appoint Scanlan in November 1982 and had continued to raise the issue intermittently over the previous two years. Each time the Americans raised the possibility of exchanging ambassadors the Poles did not respond, allowing the issue to linger. On December 17, Kinast explained to Davis that the Polish government did not consider allowing Poland to enter the IMF as sufficient enough to "justify the exchange of ambassadors." Instead Kinast suggested the appointment of a special envoy from Washington to discuss the entirety of Polish-American relations, a position he had advocated originally in Washington in February 1983. In response, Davis made clear that his earlier proposal "was not the object of an auction."²¹⁵

On December 19, the Americans forced the Poles' hand. That day Davis delivered an official note requesting written agreement from the Polish People's Republic to appointment Scanlan as ambassador. With the note came an oral ultimatum:

²¹⁴ Interview with Hill.

²¹⁵ The information on this episode is culled from informal notes and brief records in MSZ, 2/89, W-6, Dep III (1985), AP 10-5-85. The quotes come from a handwritten chronology in those files. Full records of the meetings mentioned do not exist in these files. Because of the rapidity of the exchanges in question, it is likely that written records were only prepared as szyfograms, meaning that they would have been highly classified. This also explains why they were not in the files I was able to view.

Should there be no response within thirty days, we will have to draw our own conclusions. We would then have no choice but to establish relations at the Chargé level for the foreseeable future.

If it occurs, then as Under Secretary Armacost told Mr. Ludwiczak on December 14, it will be a long time before there will be an American Ambassador in Warsaw or a high-level discussion of the type Deputy Foreign Minister Kinast suggested.²¹⁶

In fact, according to the May 1983 decision which inaugurated the step-by-step policy, Reagan specifically did not want to appoint a special emissary. The president specifically decided that he wanted all negotiations to go through traditional diplomatic contacts.²¹⁷ Davis met again with Kinast after Christmas to reiterate his earlier statements and to make clear that the embassy "did not turn down . . . the idea of a dialogue at a high level, but they consider[ed] the accreditation of a USA ambassador the completion of the first step."²¹⁸

Ambassador Davis did not hear back from the MSZ until after the New Year, when he was called to talk with MSZ Director of Department III Juliusz Biały. Rather than talk about Scanlan, Biały delivered a "sharp protest" against a program broadcast earlier in January on RFE which included a mock speech by Adolph Hitler, insinuating comparisons between Jaruzelski and Hitler and between the PZPR and the Nazi party.²¹⁹ Davis explained to Biały that RFE broadcasts did not reflect U.S. government opinions and were not subject to government control. He went even met with Biały again six days

²¹⁶ Letter from John Davis to Stefan Olszowski with attached note, dated December 19, 1984, MSZ, 2/89, W-6, Dep III (1985), AP 10-5-85. The decision to announce an ultimatum was made in Washington without consultations with Davis. Author's interview with Davis, April 27, 2007.

²¹⁷ Handwritten note on White House stationary from John [Poindexter] to Judge [Clark], dated May 6, 1983, and Memo from Bud McFarlane to Paula Dobriansky, Dated May 7, 1983, both in RRPL, Paula Dobriansky Files, 90892, Poland Memoranda 1981-1983 [May 1-12, 1983].

²¹⁸ See footnote 215.

²¹⁹ Pilna Notatka z rozmowy z J. Davis'em, charge d'affaires a.i. USA w Warszawie w dniu 10 bm. [Urgent Note from a conversation with J. Davis, U.S. charge d'affaires a.i. in Warsaw, on the 10th of this month], dated January 11, 1985, MSZ, 2/89, W-8, Dep III (1985), AP 53-5-85. This urgent note was sent to a number of Politburo members including Jaruzelski.

later to make an extended presentation on the intricacies of RFE's relationship with the U.S. government and to disavow the broadcast.²²⁰ Davis's presentation fell on deaf ears. On January 17, Kinast met with Davis again to officially reject the ultimatum regarding Scanlan "or any ultimatum pertaining to relations between Poland and the United States of America." Kinast also stated that "the present request for agrément is of a character and form which preclude any possibility for the Polish side of ever taking it into consideration."²²¹ Two weeks later Davis declared the request for agrément null and void, and added: "With regard to the Polish proposal for special talks, our view is that existing diplomatic channels should be used to discuss legitimate bilateral issues."²²² Shortly thereafter, Davis returned to Washington for consultations.

The PZPR's rejection of agrément has been blamed simply on the RFE broadcast in early January which clearly hit a nerve at the highest levels of the Polish government. This view overlooks Poland's long-term policy in which they had rejected exchanging ambassadors for over two years. Meeting after meeting and confrontation after confrontation the MSZ did their best to stand up to and reject American pressure. They consistently invoked the tough language of their November 1983 and August 1984 government notes which outlined the concessions they expected from the Americans before they could return to normalized bilateral relations. In addition scholars minimize the importance of the PZPR's decision to reject Scanlan. For the Polish government it was an important point. As Colonel Wiesław Gornicki, Jaruzelski's aide and close personal

²²⁰ Notatka Informacyjna z rozmowy w dniu 16 stycznia 1985 r. z charge d'affaires a.i. USA [Information Note from a conversation on 16 January 1985 with the U.S. charge d'affaires], dated January 18, 1985, MSZ, 2/89, W-8, Dep III (1985), AP 53-5-85.

²²¹ Notatka dla Towarzysza Min. J. Kinast [Note for Comrade Minister J. Kinast], with attachment, c. January 17, 1985, MSZ, 2/89, W-6, Dep III (1985), AP 10-5-85.

²²² See note 215.

advisor, wrote in an internal memo, "Agrément for Scanlan is one of the effective instruments of pressure in our hands."²²³ Rather than some kind of emotional response to an RFE broadcast, the PZPR's decision to deny Scanlan the necessary approval to be the next ambassador was symptomatic of the PZPR's policy to remain resolute in the face of American pressure.

While reminiscing at a conference in 1999 about his time in Warsaw, John Davis spoke about the step-by-step process, saying, "Some of our friends in Solidarność will be surprised, when one day documents are released on this, that their exits from prison were in exchange for restoring landing rights to LOT in Chicago or for the right for Poland to fish in waters off Alaska."²²⁴ Now that some of those documents have emerged they bear out Davis's statement: prisoners-for-sanctions exchanges were a high point for the Reagan administration's policy toward Poland. These negotiations were also a real highlight of Davis's first few years in Warsaw. As he describes the experience:

I wound up going into the foreign office, I would always find myself starting with the thing about the Helsinki Final Act because that gave me the right to intervene on human rights, since they were fellow signatories. Then we would get into trying to get Michnik [. . .] or Lis or whoever it was out of the pokey.

[. . .] I would always ask for everybody [in prison]. But then they would wind up giving two or three and I would give them a little bit of something in recognition, to encourage them to go on. Of course the trick was not to be put in a position where they would keep re-arresting people so they could get more [chuckle] concessions to let them out. We never paid twice for the same guy. [Laugh].²²⁵

From the American perspective this is how the process worked, and it clearly succeeded.

²²³ Report, dated February 1, 1984, MSZ, 59/86, W-5, Dep III (1984), AP 22-1-84.

²²⁴ Andrzej Paczkowski, ed., *Polka 1986-1989: koniec systemu* vol. 2 (Warsaw: Instytut Studiów Politycznych PAN, 2002), 267.

²²⁵ Interview with Davis, November 23, 1999.

Adam Michnik, Jacek Kuron, Jan Latynski, Henryk Wujec, Andrzej Gwiazda, Seweryn Jaworskiego, Marian Jurczyk, Karol Modzelewski, Grzegorz Palka, Andrzej Rozpłochowski, Jan Rulewski, Piotr Mierzewski, and Bogdan Lis all owed their freedom at the end of 1984, in part, to Davis's diplomatic efforts.

Taking into account Polish documents, however, the extent of the American victory is not so clear. Political prisoners were also released because of changing risk calculations. Kiszczak argued before Wałęsa's release that Solidarność's former leader was not a threat as a private citizen. Jaruzelski felt similarly about the amnesty in 1984. As he explained to the Politburo: "The amnesty was addressed to society and not to the opposition; this circle which they are concentrating on leaving prison is, nevertheless, minute; the opposition is strengthened by the exit to freedom of these Solidarność activists, but their base has decreased; . . . the opposition has a program to fight against us, but they don't have a positive action program."²²⁶ The PZPR did not fear the opposition as much as they had in December 1981, primarily because they believed the opposition was losing its relevance to the people and influence with workers.

These revised calculations played directly into Davis's negotiations. Before Davis and Schaff agreed to a framework for releasing the eleven, the Politburo had already decided that a trial would be politically risky and that it was in the government's best interest to release the prisoners. As regards Lis, Jaruzelski "confided in" Rakowski on August 23 "that he [had] taken a decision about freeing Lis and his companion. This way the entire problem of political prisoners will go away."²²⁷ This was two months before Davis officially offered a deal for Lis. Given these details of chronology, it becomes

²²⁶ Rakowski *Dzienniki 1984-1986*, 113.

²²⁷ *Ibid.*, 119.

clearer that American proposals did not directly provoke the decisions to release political prisoners. Nonetheless Davis's offers to lift sanctions certainly helped to push the Politburo in that direction by counterbalancing the sting of having another opposition member out on the street.²²⁸ American policy was very helpful but not essential in freeing political prisoners.

The centrality of America's step-by-step policy for the PZPR's small moves toward liberalization is further diminished when looking beyond the specific issue of political prisoners to include the entire picture of bilateral relations. When Poland first proposed the small steps framework in November 1982 and then sent Kinast to meet with officials in Washington in February 1983, American policy was still based on keeping *all* sanctions in effect indefinitely. When the Reagan administration finally switched course in May 1983 and began lifting sanctions the following fall, the PZPR made it clear with their official government note that the Americans were doing too little, too late. The Poles stonewalled the Americans on improving bilateral relations with the hope that America would acquiesce to Warsaw's demands and drop all their sanctions.

It is difficult to pinpoint the source of Poland's resolve not to give in to American pressure. Here, however, it seems helpful to look back to the beginning of the crisis, and the deep sense of anger and distrust that American sanctions originally provoked (see chapter 1). The disgust did not fade after 1982. It comes across in Jaruzelski's tirade to Congressman Long in the summer of 1983. The basic outline of this argument resurfaced

²²⁸ Within this framework it is possible to view Polish moves as attempts to use prisoners as points of leverage against the Americans. The historical record shows that the PZPR decided to use Wałęsa's release to get concessions from the Catholic Church. Jaruzelski and his colleagues may have viewed other prisoners in a similar way. Deals with the Americans were only finalized after the Politburo had decided to release the prisoners, so it is consistent to view negotiations linking sanctions to prisoner releases as a means for Poland to gain some relief. The full extent of this conclusion is only tentative and deserves further research, however.

in the Polish government's November 1983 and August 1984 notes. Time did not lessen the sense of betrayal. Instead the Reagan administration's reluctance to drop significant sanctions after martial law was finally lifted pushed the PZPR further toward confrontation. Anger and distrust between the two sides continued to create problems in Polish-American relations.

For some, Poland's diplomatic protests against American pressure appear a case of, "thou dost protest too much." But the Poles backed their protests with policy meant to use every point of leverage they had to force the Americans to accept the Communist regime's legitimacy. Polish security services harassed members of the Western press. They harassed Poles who worked at the American embassy as well as American diplomats. The PZPR tried to shut down the American library attached to the embassy. Time and time again, the MSZ called American diplomats into the ministry to complain strenuously about VOA and RFE broadcasts. When the American government requested agrément to post a new ambassador in Warsaw, the MSZ rejected the deal outright rather than give in to American pressure, despite the possibility that accepting Scanlan could lead to improved relations. At every possible turn the Polish government did what they could to sour the bilateral relationship until the other side blinked.

Unfortunately for the Polish government, its actions had little real leverage against the Americans and did nothing to change attitudes in the White House. As Christopher Hill remembers:

No one [in Washington] was really looking to improve relations. There was only one person looking to improve relations and that was the guy whose name had been put forward for ambassador [The White House was] very clear—remember this was the height of the Reagan era—they made it very clear that they were not interested in improving relations with a regime who had just declared war on its own people. . . . Nothing the

[Polish] government ever did was considered significant. . . . The leadership in Washington . . . made it very clear to the Poles that ultimately *we don't care*. If they want to take the relationship down to zero, we are happy to take it down to zero. It's up to them. The purpose of such a line, which seems such a brutally hard line, is to make it clear to the regime that they need us more than we need them.²²⁹

In retrospect, bilateral relations remained stalled from 1982 to 1985 because neither side was truly interested in improving relations. With the exception of deals to free political prisoners, government-to-government relations at the beginning of 1985 were as bad as they had been at the end of 1982, and improvements were nowhere to be seen. As Davis recalls, when he returned to Washington for consultations in 1985, "[I was] disappointed. It looked like a long hard slog. At that point it looked hopeless."²³⁰ Both sides had made clear what they expected to improve relations, but neither side was willing to take those steps.

And yet during this diplomatic stalemate, Jaruzelski and his Politburo moved to normalize the situation in Poland: Wałęsa was freed, martial law was suspended and then lifted, the Pope made a pilgrimage, and the Sejm passed annual amnesties for political prisoners. More than any other player, the Catholic Church produced the pressure that resulted in these changes. The Catholic Church saw itself as an intermediary between the people and the government and sought to ameliorate the situation on the ground. This included directly lobbying the government for all the changes listed above. The Church did not always get exactly what it wanted, but it did succeed in getting important concessions. In return, the PZPR found a partner.²³¹ The PZPR relied on the Church to

²²⁹ Interview with Hill, emphasis in the original.

²³⁰ Interview with Davis, April 27, 2007.

²³¹ The term "partner" is not meant to insinuate that the Church's loyalties lay anywhere other than with the Polish people. Unlike the relationship with the United States, however, the PZPR's relationship with the Church entailed open negotiations with both sides making concessions. In recent months revelations about

restrain popular opinion and keep the masses from revolting. The Communists also increasingly relied on the Catholic Church, particularly the Pope and the Vatican, to improve Poland's image abroad and exert pressure on the West to end sanctions. In terms of U.S. policy, this strategy found success; the Pope's personal contacts with Reagan were integral to the president's decisions to drop sanctions.

This second point leads into another source of pressure on the communists: Western economic sanctions and restrictions on credits. References to Western pressure are common in documents, and there is no doubt that by 1984 economic sanctions were taking a toll on the Polish economy. By the PZPR's own calculations Western imports dropped from \$6.233 billion in 1981 to \$4.317 billion in 1983. Because of restrictions on loans and credits they had to pay cash for these goods. In 1981 the government spent \$1.313 billion in cash for imports compared to \$3.752 billion in 1983. Together that meant the Polish government was paying 286% more in 1983 for 34% less in imported goods.²³² In a country that suffered from shortages of consumer and technological goods even in the best of times this decrease was acutely painful.

While the PZPR leadership publicly blamed the United States for sanctions and economic troubles, West European nations, Canada, and Japan had also imposed restrictions. The United States was not the only culprit or cause of Poland's problems. For this reason, it is important to note that references to the "West" were not synonymous with references to the United States. As internal economic and political trends continued

parish priests and church officials working as informants to the security services, however, has muddied the clarity of the church's role as intermediary.

²³² The figures in this section come from information in a document prepared by the International Department of the Ministry of Finance, dated March 15, 1984, Notatka w sprawie oceny skutków restrykcji zastosowanych przez kraje zachodnie wobec Polski w sferze stosunków finansowo-kredytowych [Note concerning the assessment of the effects of the restrictions imposed by the Western countries against Poland in the financial-kredit sphere], attached to Notatka Informacyjna [Information Note], dated April 26, 1984, MSZ, 14/89, W-3, Dep III (1986), AP 223-2-86.

to work against the PZPR over the next few years, this economic pressure intensified, highlighting the importance of European policies in Poland's transformation. In addition, American humanitarian aid and support to Solidarność—that continued and, in some cases, increased between 1982 and 1985—would begin to bear fruit. Under ever increasing pressure and in a changing international setting, the Polish government neared an important turning point in 1986.

Chapter 4

"A Circle of Mistakes":

International Pressures, Domestic Response,

January 1985 to September 1986

On Friday, September 19, 1986, Jacek Kuron held a private gathering in his apartment in the Żoliborz neighborhood of Warsaw to mark the tenth anniversary of the founding of KOR. At the time KOR was outlawed as was its progeny Solidarność, with leaders of both groups in and out of prison for the five years since martial law was declared. But this was not a somber gathering. The activists were celebrating a new victory over the Communist authorities: a complete amnesty for all political prisoners. The amnesty included well known recidivist activists Adam Michnik, Bogdan Lis, and Władzław Frasyński. Zbigniew Bujak, who had managed to evade capture longer than any other high level Solidarność leader, joined his old friends not as a fugitive but as a free man who had just received amnesty from the government that worked so hard to harass and capture him. So, this was a night to meet with old friends, sharing stories and drinks. While Michnik explained to a journalist that he had promised himself "that he would not start drinking until nine" but was already "drunk with happiness," Kuron

summed up the joyous mood, embracing Bujak and exclaiming, "There has never been a gathering like this, never!"¹

This was also a joyous occasion for the Americans who made human rights and political prisoners a focal point of their demands to the Polish government. Unlike the decisions to release specific prisoners in 1984, however, the 1986 amnesty had more than one foreign parent. In the year prior to the complete amnesty bilateral Polish-American relations remained in a poor state, further limiting American influence on the PZPR and relegating the United States into the background of the decision-making process in Communist party circles. The PZPR's decision to release all remaining political prisoners was more of a response to long-standing economic concerns and the shifting input of two other international actors: the Soviet Union and Western Europe. As domestic problems clashed with concerns about foreign affairs, the PZPR ultimately chose to give into those foreign pressures, leading the country in a new direction.

Frozen Relations

In the first half of 1985, bilateral relations between Washington and Warsaw dissolved even further. First, the small improvements gained from negotiated releases for political prisoners were partially erased. On February 13, Adam Michnik, Bogdan Lis, and Władysław Frasyniuk were arrested in Gdańsk while trying to meet with TKK members; the three were eventually received jail terms ranging from two-and-one-half to

¹ The quotes and story are taken from Michael Kaufman, "A Rousing Polish Party Celebrates an Amnesty," *New York Times* (Sept. 21, 1986): A16. An earlier and much less developed version of the argument in this chapter was published in my contribution, "Rumblings in Eastern Europe: Western Pressure on Poland's Moves toward Democratic Transformation," in Frédéric Bozo, Marie-Pierre Rey, N. Piers Ludlow, and Leopoldo Nuti, eds., *Europe and the End of the Cold War* (Oxford: Routledge, forthcoming 2008). I am indebted to the editors for their helpful comments in revising the earlier version.

three-and-one-half years. Andrzej Gwiazda was arrested in February and landed in jail for two months. Jacek Kuron and Seweryn Jaworski were arrested and sentenced to two months in jail for participating in annual May 1 demonstrations in Warsaw. When U.S. embassy staff raised the issue of recent political incarcerations under the aegis of the Helsinki Final Agreement, the Polish diplomats responded by dismissing the report as "morally duplicitous, politically harmful, and legally groundless."² Despite Davis's successful efforts to free democracy activists in 1984, in 1985 the PZPR took no steps to ease their policy to harass high-profile members of the opposition.

Second, the MSZ torpedoed relations with American diplomats yet again, precipitating two *persona non grata* crises. In February, Defense Attaché Fred Myer and his wife were arrested for photographing military installations in Warsaw and detained without communication for six hours. During this time, Mrs. Myer was forced to undress and "perform demeaning physical exercises." After being released both were asked to leave the country within 48 hours. In response, the Polish defense attaché in Washington, Zygmunt Szymanski, was required to exit the United States.³ A second PNG crisis erupted in May when William Harding, the first secretary in Warsaw, and David Hopper, consul in Kraków, were detained and declared *persona non grata* after observing and participating in May 1st demonstrations in Nowa Huta, a Stalinist era, working-class district built outside of Kraków. In response four Polish diplomats including Bogusław

² Notatka Informacyjna z rozmowy z charge d'Affaires a.i. USA w Warszawie, David'em Swartz'em w dniu 19 lutego 1985 r. w sprawie raportu Departamentu Stanu dotyczącego przestrzegania praw człowieka w poszczególnych państwach w 1984 r. [Information Note from a conversation with U.S. charge d'affaires David Swartz on 19 February 1985, concerning the Department of State's report on Human Rights abuses in 1984], dated February 20, 1985, MSZ, 2/89, W-6, Dep III (1985), AP 22-1-85/A.

³ For information on the Myer affair, see MSZ, 2/89, W-8, Dep III (1985), AP 35-6-85. Quoted material on the specifics of how the Myers were treated is from a Pilna Notatka from a February 22 meeting between David Swartz and a Polish diplomat Zych, located in these files. According to some of the records, Reagan was personally upset by reports about the treatment the Myers received.

Maciborski (second secretary at the embassy), Romuald Derylo (consul), Józef Kaminski (consul), and Stanisław Zawadzki (vice counsel in Chicago) were all forced to leave.⁴ With the Americans happy to let relations fall to nothing and the Poles unwilling to change unless Washington dropped all remaining sanctions, relations moved towards zero. With Davis back in Washington for consultations for the first few months of the year and little political desire for improvements even after he returned, bilateral relations during 1985 continued on the same well worn path and remained chilly.

Economics

While some in the Polish government might take comfort in driving Polish-American relations into the ground between 1982 and 1985, the Polish government had been unsuccessful at fighting a primary root of Poland's problems: economic decline. From the beginning of the Polish Crisis, economic factors had deeply affected events. According to a study by the Planning Commission of the Council of Ministries, national production dropped 6% in 1980 and then 12.1% in 1981, which, although influenced by other factors, was "fundamentally caused by strikes." Martial law was declared in part to gain control of impending economic collapse. With greater control the government "returned discipline to the economy," "militarized a number of the industries most important for the economy," and "gave rise to conditions facilitating the launch of implementations of economic reforms as well as reforms in retail prices." This, however,

⁴ For information on the Hopper/Harwood affair, see MSZ, 2/89, W-8, Dep III (1985), AP 35-8-85.

was not enough. As a retrospective report, written just before martial law was lifted stated, "With certainty, martial law did not dissolve all of the problems."⁵

As explained in chapter 2, the PZPR's first response to Western sanctions was to turn to its neighbors behind the Iron Curtain. Within the first seven months of martial law, PZPR officials traveled to Moscow, Budapest, Prague, Berlin, Sarajevo, and Bucharest seeking economic support and suggestions for reforms. In a continuation of this policy, Jaruzelski took the extra ordinary step of writing personal letters in November 1982 to his fellow heads of Communist parties, Leonid Brezhnev, Erich Honeker, Todor Zhivkov, Gustav Husak, Janos Kadar, and Nicolai Ceausescu, explaining the progress made under martial law and taking time to blame Poland's economic problems on harsh policies pursued by the capitalists. He also suggested specific economic aid packages that each country could send.⁶ Concurrently, the PZPR strengthened ties with the Socialist bloc through COMECON (Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, also CMEA), meeting with member states in Moscow in February and April 1983 to closely coordinate each country's national economic plans to increase output.⁷

This strategy to invigorate the economy with support from allies, however, was not particularly successful. Although Jaruzelski did receive increased aid from the

⁵ Informacja o skutkach gospodarczych wywołanych restrykcjami wprowadzonymi przez państwo zachodnie przeciwko Polsce [Information about the effectives of economic sanctions imposed by Western nations against Poland], dated June 9, 1983, AAN, KC PZPR, V/203, 11-30; quoted at 11, 13-14.

⁶ The letter to Brezhnev is dated October 30 and the rest are dated November 3, 1982. Each of the letters starts out similarly, but includes specific requests for aid tailored to each country. All letters are signed by Jaruzelski and are located in AAN, KC PZPR, XIA/1394, 3-30.

⁷ Informacja o spotkaniu konsultacyjnym Sekretarzy Komitetów Centralnym oraz Stałych Przedstawicieli krajów członkowskich RWPG w sprawie przygotowań do narady gospodarczej na najwyższym szczeblu [Information about the consultative meetings of the Secretaries of Central Committees as well as standing chairmen from member nations of COMECON on the matter of preparations for economic consultations at the highest level], dated March 30, 1983, AAN, KC PZPR, V/197, 249-253.

Warsaw Pact, particularly the Soviet Union,⁸ growth continued to lag through the end of 1982. The economic picture remained bleak with national production income, consumption, and imports all showing decreases, even compared to dismal numbers from 1981. Moreover, through the end of 1982, all major economic indicators gathered by the government showed losses between 10% and 33% when compared to numbers from 1978 (see chart).

Polish Economic Development Indicators 1978-1983
(% change in relations to the previous year)⁹

	1978	1980	1981	1982	1983 plan	1978 1982= 100
national production income	3.0	-6.0	-12.1	-7.5	2.6	74.3
consumption	1.7	2.1	0.0	-13.5	1.6	87.5
gross investment	2.1	-12.3	-22.7	-19.0	1.6	50.5
industrial production	4.9	0.0	-10.5	-4.7*	3.7-4.0	89.2
import	1.5	-1.9	-16.9	-15.6	11.1	67.9
export	5.7	-4.2	-19.0	9.4	14.1	90.7

Since economic support from allies alone was not enough to rebuild the economy, the PZPR found itself in a hard position, caught between East and West. With investment down 50% from 1978, Poland needed to increase resources available for industrial production. But, as the foreign trade section of the National Social-Economic Plan for 1983-1985 made clear, "Poland cannot count on a firm increase in trade sales with these

⁸ Informacja dotycząca odpowiedzi Sekretarza Generalnego KPZR i Sekretarzy Partii krajów socjalistycznych na propozycje zawarte w listach I Sekretarza KC PZPR Gen. armii Wojciecha Jaruzelskiego (przekazanych do ZSRR 30 października i do pięciu krajach socjalistycznych w listopadzie 1982) [Information to date on responses from the secretary general of the CPSU and the party secretaries from socialist countries on proposals from letters by First Secretary of the PZPR Central Committee Gen. Wojciech Jaruzelski (sent to the USSR on 30 October and to the five socialist countries in November 1982)], dated February 7, 1983, AAN, KC PZPR, V/191, 189-192.

⁹ Informacja o skutkach gospodarczych wywołanych restrykcjami wprowadzonymi przez państwo zachodnie przeciwko Polsce, 13.

countries," referring to the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact members.¹⁰ Increased revenues would not come from increased sales to the East.

Poland's economy was also burdened with huge debts to the West. In the government's view, the "fundamental" cause of economic decline was "high debt and its servicing. . . . In 1984 and 1985 we will not be able to draw any new credits to import commodities. Nevertheless, the level of our debt will continue to increase incrementally."¹¹ Because loans, even rescheduled loans, incurred interest payments, debt continued to grow. However, Poland could not just turn to the West for increased investment and imports to help reinvigorate the economy either, because as the same report concluded: the United States had suspended MFN, Poland would "not be able to attain any transactions credits," and a recession in the West had increased protectionism.¹² Further, with Western sanctions on new credits and restrictions on trade, imports from the West had to be paid for in cash gained through other exports. Simplifying, Poland needed to increase exports to countries outside of the Warsaw Pact to improve their economic situation, but they were only able to do that if they could get new credits. With Western economic sanctions in place, new credits were not a possibility.¹³

¹⁰ [Handel Zagraniczny Sekcja] Narodowy Plan-Społeczno-Gospodarczy Na Lata 1983-1985: Podstawowe Uwarunkowania Rozwoju i Założenia Polityki Społeczno-Gospodarczej Na Lata 1983-1985 [(International Trade Section] of the National Social-Economic Plan for 1983-1985: Basic Conditions for Development and Assumptions for Socio-Economic Policies for 1983-1985], dated March 1, 1983, AAN, KC PZPR, V/191, 365-370; quoted at page 365.

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² Ibid., 368.

¹³ As explained in chapter 1, at the January 11, 1982, NAC meeting, all NATO members agreed to delay debt renegotiations and suspend new credits. Debt renegotiations began in 1983, but the suspension of new credits remained in place. This political decision by the West Europeans was buttressed by the fact that very few European businesses were interested in pursuing new opportunities in Poland. Combined with public support for Solidarność in Europe, there was little will in Europe to provide new credits. As Tim Simmins, an economics officer at the British embassy in Warsaw from 1985 to 1988, explained economic relations had begun to sour well before martial law. British companies "had been burned quite badly" when

The fundamental points of this conundrum were obvious to economists beyond Party circles. Solidarność activists and advisors had argued about a cycle of economic problems since the beginning of martial law. In the first months of 1982, Bujak emphasized the centrality of economic concerns: without a working economy there was little possibility to normalize the domestic situation.¹⁴ For the TKK, the economy was a key to moving towards normalization. Opposition economists also understood the necessity of increasing foreign trade and the relationship between economic growth and foreign credits. In an article from March 1982 in *Tygodnik Mazowsze* one author argued:

The key problem is the situation in foreign trade. Today there is a kind of circle of mistakes. It is not possible to create products for export because we cannot import parts, raw materials, and goods from the West. It is not possible to import more, because there is a lack of foreign currency from exports.¹⁵

Solidarność also criticized the government's ability to address Poland's economic problems. From the very beginning of the crisis, opposition critics argued that the party's economic reforms would never be enough. One article on the government's reform program was simply titled, "To same błędy" [The Same Mistakes].¹⁶ Another commentator bluntly wrote, "The authorities' economic activities are inconsequential and chaotic."¹⁷ Following from their belief in the link between foreign trade and growth and their negative views of government reform programs, the opposition argued that the only

the Gierek regime's loans became due, so "disenchantment was really quite strong in the U.K. and that's had an effect as far as to this day. In some parts of British industry you take great care looking at an economy in this part of the world." Author's interview with Simmins, July 9, 2004. Krzysztof Bobinski, the Warsaw reporter for the *Financial Times* during the 1980s provided a similar assessment of Western business interests in Poland in the mid-1980s. Author's interview with Bobinski, May 13, 2004.

¹⁴ KARTA, Archiwum Opozycji, "Zmusić władze to Porozumienia" [Twisting the authorities' arm for understanding], *Tygodnik Mazowsze* nr. 11 (April 28, 1982), 2.

¹⁵ KARTA, Archiwum Opozycji, "Perspektywa Marozmu," *Tygodnik Mazowsze* nr. 8 (March 31, 1982): 1.

¹⁶ KARTA, Archiwum Opozycji, "To same błędy" [The same mistakes], *Tygodnik Mazowsze* nr. 17 (June 19, 1982): 2.

¹⁷ KARTA, Archiwum Opozycji, "Porozumienie a gospodarka" [Understanding and the economy], *Tygodnik Mazowsze* nr. 20 (30.vi.1982), 2.

exit from economic crisis was to seek new Western credits. As one analysis plainly wrote, "the economic situation will deteriorate without Western credits."¹⁸ For Solidarność new credits were the key economic issue. Of course, in order to get these credits the opposition knew that the PZPR would have to acquiesce to Western political demands and negotiate with Solidarność or other opposition groups. So as long as the West maintained their link between new credits and political reform, Solidarność had a strong economic argument in its favor.

As the last chapter showed, however, Jaruzelski and his colleagues were not willing to acquiesce to American political demands. Instead, in Spring 1983, the Poles turned toward their working partner, the Church, to reverse international public opinion and to create political pressure to lessen and lift sanctions. During preparations for the Pope's pilgrimage, while the PZPR and the Vatican were still negotiating the parameters for the visit, President Henryk Jablonski wrote a letter proposing that the Pope do what he could to help ease his homeland's economic crisis:

We share the hope with your Holiness that the visit of the head of the Roman Catholic Church will contribute to improvements of the common good in every area of spiritual, moral, social, and economic life. It could be undoubtedly important to ease the economic difficulties of Poland and her citizens, if the Pope's universally recognized authority could possibly take a stance on economic sanctions applied to our nation by the American administration and some governments of Western Europe. It would be a significant act, gratefully accepted by every patriotic, thoughtful Pole. Broad world opinion could then be eased, that the sanctions policy is not related to the observance of sovereign human and national rights, and conversely, [sanctions are] an expression of a vile intervention in our internal affairs.¹⁹

¹⁸ KARTA, Archiwum Opozycji. "Uwagi o kompromisie" [Be ware compromise], *Tygodnik Mazowsze* nr. 18 (June 16, 1982), 1.

¹⁹ Letter from Henryk Jablonski to Pope John Paul II, dated May 2, 1983, attached to the proceedings for the PZPR Politburo meeting on May 4, 1983, AAN, KC PZPR, Mikr. 3022, Sygn. 1853, 30-34.

From the initial announcement on sanctions Cardinal Glemp and the local Polish church had taken a critical stance against sanctions. In 1982, the Vatican had acquiesced to the political importance of sanctions. By allowing the Pope to visit the PZPR was not only hoping a papal pilgrimage would give the government greater domestic political legitimacy; the Communists also wished the Pope would become a stronger critic of Western sanctions. The PZPR's strategy did bear some fruit, if not immediately. For example, the Pope's conversations with President Reagan, as well as the Church's public stance against sanctions, gave the president a meaningful reason to drop selected sanctions in 1983 and 1984.²⁰

Pressure from Moscow

The extent and pace of programs for economic and political rebirth were not only influenced by the circle of economic mistakes aggravated by Western policy; pressure from the Soviet Union also loomed over internal decisions. From August 1980 onward, Brezhnev consistently advocated a conservative line toward the pace of change, pressing Jaruzelski to control the situation and to implement martial law, with the shadow of military intervention under the auspices of the "Brezhnev Doctrine" remaining in the

²⁰ See chapter 3 on this issue. More generally the Reagan administration considered the Pope an essential voice regarding Poland. They took precautionary steps to keep the Pope well informed about all decisions that related to Poland throughout the 1980s. As Politi and Bernstein mention in their book *His Holiness* (New York: Doubleday, 1996) on page 269, DCI Casey or his deputies traveled to the Vatican fifteen times from 1980-1986 to speak with the Pope. Whenever Reagan met with the Pope the two spoke about Poland, as well. See RRPL, European and Soviet Affairs Dir, NSC, Box 91186, Vatican; RRPL, Executive Secretariat, NSC, Head of State File, Container 41, The Vatican; and RRPL, Peter Sommer Files, Box 90587, Vatican 1983-1984 and Box 90901, Vatican 1985 1986.

This issue regarding the Pope's influence on Reagan adds an interesting spin to the Pope's visit in 1983. From the PZPR's perspective the papal visit was a way to take the offensive against sanctions. They were trying to subvert that pressure by gaining the Pope as a vocal critic of Western policies. Glemp and the Polish Catholic Church had consistently called for sanctions to be lifted, adding Papal prestige to this call was a logical next step. Of course the end result of both Western pressure to allow the Pope to visit and the Polish policy to bring the Pope to Poland to then advocate against sanctions was the same.

background as a point of leverage. This pressure did not wane after Jaruzelski declared martial law. As the Polish leader was reminded when he visited Moscow in March 1982, "The Soviets think highly of their friendship with Poland, that in neighborly Poland they see an inseparable link in the socialist community, a very important part of stabilization in Europe."²¹ References to "stability" and "an inseparable link" invoked concepts of fraternal assistance in defense of Communism, a basic principle of the Brezhnev Doctrine. In his own remarks, Brezhnev added that martial law could not last forever, but neither should it be lifted prematurely "to give up your precautions."²² Under Brezhnev the Kremlin supported martial law and did not want it lifted before the situation had stabilized. Brezhnev died before martial law was even suspended and before Jaruzelski took his first step toward internal normalization by freeing Wałęsa, so it is unclear just how the Soviet leader would have reacted.²³ Regardless, while alive the Brezhnev leadership advocated a strictly cautionary approach to change in Poland.

In the wake of Brezhnev's death in November 1982, new general secretary Yuri Andropov pursued a more flexible relationship with Warsaw. After returning from a trip to Moscow a month after Brezhnev's death, Jaruzelski informed Rakowski that he "had a friendly conversation with Andropov" and, as a result, had seen a change in East German and Czech attitudes towards internal developments. All three nations (which had

²¹ Pilna Notatka z wizyty w Moskwie Delegacji Partyjno-Państwowej z I Sekretarzem KC PZPR, Prezesem Rady Ministrów tow. Wojciechem Jaruzelskim, w dniach 1-2 marca 1982 r. [Urgent Note from the Visit to Moscow by the Party-Government with First Secretary of the PZPR Central Committee, Head of the Council of Ministers Wojciech Jaruzelski from 1 to 2 March 1982], dated March 5, 1982, AAN, KC PZPR, V/172, 555-561; quoted at 559.

²² Wystąpienie tow. L. Breżniewa w Czasie Rozmów Plenarnych w dniu 1 marca 1982 r. [Address by Com. L. Brezhnev during the Plenary Conversations on 1 March 1982], dated March 6, 1982, AAN, KC PZPR, V/172, 567-575; quoted at 572.

²³ Wałęsa was released four days after Brezhnev's death. Announcements of Wałęsa's impending release came so shortly after the Soviet leader's death that this is at the least an interesting coincidence. Although I have found no information confirming a direct link, it is possible that Jaruzelski was taking advantage of uncertainty in Moscow following Brezhnev's death to release the former head of Solidarność.

advocated taking harsh steps to control the situation during the 1980-1981 period) were showing increased sympathy for Poland's plight, giving Jaruzelski more room to maneuver politically.²⁴ Rakowski confirmed this view of Andropov with Hungarian diplomats who told him, "Andropov is a remarkable person and, in turn, we should not be afraid of a courageous realization of our own concepts of socialism."²⁵

Andropov also acted upon his words. When Józef Czyrek, Central Committee member in charge of relations with the Soviet bloc, traveled to Moscow in March 1983 he received approval for the PZPR's attempts to improve relations with the Polish church, a relationship which Brezhnev had been reluctant to allow.²⁶ Just after the Papal pilgrimage the top PZPR leadership traveled to Moscow for an unexpected Warsaw Pact meeting to talk over American moves to place short-range missiles in Western Europe, providing Jaruzelski a chance to meet with Andropov personally.²⁷ Consistent with his earlier statements, Andropov "fully understood" the PZPR's decisions to allow the Pope's visit. Consequently, at least one PZPR Politburo member saw Andropov as "a person who sees the necessity of reform and change."²⁸ During Andropov's tenure, pressure from the Soviet bloc decreased, and Poland was allowed to follow the path it chose towards

²⁴ Rakowski, *Dzienniki 1981-1983*, 443.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, 487.

²⁶ Notatka w dniach 16-17.03.1983 przebywała w Moskwie z roboczą wizytą delegacja Komitetu Centralnego PZPR, której przewodniczył czł. BP sekretarz KC - Józef Czyrek [Note from 16-17.3.1983 working visit in Moscow by a PZPR Central Committee delegation, lead by Poliburo Secretary Jozef Czyrek], dated March 18, 1983, AAN, KC PZPR, V/193, 155-161.

²⁷ For the report on the meeting of the Warsaw Pact leaders on June 28, see Notatka Informacyjna o spotkaniu przedstawicieli państw Układu Warszawskiego w Moskwie 28 czerwca 1983 r. [Information Note about a meeting of representatives of the Warsaw Pact in Moscow 28 June 1983], dated June 29, 1983, AAN, KC PZPR, V/201, 36-44.

²⁸ Rakowski, *Dzienniki 1981-1983*, 575.

national reconciliation. As Rakowski put it, the reformist wing in the PZPR felt as if they had a partner in Moscow, "a person who understood Poland's specificity."²⁹

When Konstantin Chernenko assumed the general secretary position following Andropov's death in February 1984, Jaruzelski and others expected Polish-Soviet relations to remain on their new course. Jaruzelski reported back to Warsaw during Andropov's funeral that, "[The Soviet leadership] are realists. They know, that the one direction which we represent, has a chance to be favorable for socialist results."³⁰

Contrary to expectation that Warsaw would continue to receive the leeway in their efforts to reform that they had under Andropov, Chernenko pursued a much more controlling and conservative line in relations. When Jaruzelski met face to face with him in May 1984, Chernenko lectured his guest on the best path for reform. This included calls for "future actions to strengthen the leading role of the PZPR in the nation and in society."

Specifically, the general secretary called for the PZPR to:

eradicate the roots of anti-socialist elements, liquidate soil for enemy activities, restrict church interference in political life, affirm the decisive influence of Marxism-Leninism in society, liquidate decentralization [*wielosektorowości*] in the national economy, move rural areas toward the path to socialism, and pay off Western debts burdening the Polish economy.³¹

²⁹ Ibid., 620. From the Polish record it is difficult to fully evaluate how far Andropov was willing to allow East European governments to pursue reform. As Garthoff argues, Andropov still required ideological coordination and conformity within the Socialist bloc. He did, however, allow a fair amount of economic reform. See Garthoff, *Great Transition*, 564. In the case of Poland, this demand for ideological conformity can be seen in May and June 1983, when a small crisis in relations broke out when the Polish periodical *Polityka* published an article that was severely criticized in the Russian periodical *Nowy Czas*. Also, the references to Andropov's view on change refer to his flexibility to allow reforms within the Communist system, not some predisposition to allow for political liberalization. Andropov certainly did not want to see the PZPR give up any of its power to the opposition; Andropov was not Gorbachev.

³⁰ Rakowski, *Dzienniki 1984-1986*, 32.

³¹ Notatka Informacyjna z wizyty w ZSRR tow. W. Jaruzelskiego w dniach 4 i 5 maja 1984 r. [Information Note from the visit to the USSR of com. W. Jaruzelski on 4 and 5 May 1984], dated May 8, 1984, AAN, KC PZPR, V/228, 63-78; quoted at 69. The restriction on "decentralization" in the economy was a particularly important point, because it placed real limits on the kind of economic restructuring that could be implemented. Warsaw had been experimenting with allowing small, independent firms, often referred to as "Polonia" firms, which worked outside of the centrally planned economy to try to increase productivity.

Using phrases couched in ideological meanings ("leading role of the party" for example), Chernenko harkened back to the earlier relationship with Brezhnev. Like Brezhnev, he advocated stronger steps against the opposition and the Church, with a heavy reliance on ideological doctrine and much less room for Poland's "specificity." Second, Chernenko was lecturing the Poles on what policies they should implement. Andropov was much more willing to speak with Jaruzelski about their problems, and then following coordination, support the policies the Poles chose. With Chernenko's rise to party head Warsaw was under demanding scrutiny from Moscow once again.

The Soviet Union's watchful presence in Poland formed a complimentary book end to Western economic sanctions. The Polish government's range of options to remove itself from crisis was considerably restricted from both east and west, both politically and economically. In December 1981, Jaruzelski proved that he was willing (if reluctant) to do as he was told when the Kremlin demanded something of him. It would have been inconsistent for him to defy the Soviet Union to push harder for internal political reforms. Moreover, as ineffective as increased deliveries from the Soviet Union and the Socialist bloc were in rebuilding the Polish economy, Warsaw could not risk provoking another economic or political crisis with their Socialist neighbors. With little room to maneuver, the Poles were forced to look elsewhere to solve their economic problems.

Subverting Sanctions

Following the Pope's visit, the PZPR began to concentrate again on the issue of Western, particularly American sanctions. In July 1983 officials from the Ministry of

With a prohibition on decentralization, these small attempts at economic reform would have to be restricted, rather than explored further.

Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Finance, the Central Committee Economics Department, and the Central Committee Foreign Department met to analyze and evaluate Western sanctions. According to their own computations, sanctions and restrictions had cost the PZPR between \$8 and \$11 billion from 1981 to 1983. More importantly, Polish officials understood that in order to get Poland out of economic crisis, they needed to gain access to new long-term development credits from Western countries agreed to at preferential interest rates.³² To get these new credits without acquiescing to Western demands, the only other path open to the PZPR was to weaken and undercut the sanctions regime.

Poland's first policies to undermine Western sanctions to get access to new credits came in a familiar package: propaganda. In July 1983, the PZPR Central Committee Department of the Press, Radio, and Television outlined their campaign for domestic propaganda to show the economic effects of American and western sanctions and to blame these sanctions for Poland's economic problems and Poles' suffering.³³ The next month, the Council of Ministers supplied a twelve-point action program assigning tasks to the MSZ and the Ministry of Foreign Trade, among others, to counteract American sanctions. Steps included creating a legal team to study the basis of the sanctions, making stronger arguments against sanctions in international forums like the International Labor Organization and the United Nations, raising the issue of Poland's lost MFN status within GATT, and emphasizing to Paris Club members the sanctions' negative effects on

³² Informacja o skutkach gospodarczych wywołanych restrykcjami wprowadzonymi przez państwa zachodnie przeciwko Polsce i Straty z tytułu wprowadzenia, przeciwko Polsce, restrykcji przez państwa zachodnie [Information about the economic effects of restrictions imposed by Western nations against Poland and losses caused by the imposition, against Poland, of restrictions by the West], MSZ, 35/90, W-4, Dep III (1987), AP 223-1-87.

³³ Program kampanii informacyjno-propagandowej na temat skutków społecznych i ekonomicznych zachodnich sankcji gospodarczych wobec Polski [Information-propaganda campaign on the social and economic effects of Western economic sanctions against Poland], dated July 28, 1983, AAN, KC PZPR, V/202, 379-382.

Poland's ability to repay loans.³⁴ At a September Politburo meeting, the PZPR added to these initiatives by deciding to publish a white book of public and private diplomatic documents by Americans, substantiating Polish arguments that Americans actions during the 1980-1981 crisis and their subsequent sanctions were an illegal intervention into sovereign Polish affairs.³⁵ The government also formed a committee in mid-September to coordinate actions between all of the ministries involved, focusing particular attention on coordinating relations with Paris Club members to improve chances of securing preferable debt rescheduling agreements.³⁶ Finally at the end of September, Jablonski traveled to New York for the 38th Annual opening session of the United Nations to argue against sanctions and to reverse the PZPR's political isolation in international organizations.³⁷

As with earlier moves to counteract sanctions, these propaganda efforts partially succeeded. In terms of domestic Polish opinion, the PZPR successfully demonized American sanctions enough to cause Lech Wałęsa to make public statements in December 1983 asking the United States to lift them. As Wałęsa explained to Lane Kirkland in a private letter:

³⁴ Program działań zmierzających do zapewnienia podstaw dla dochodzenia roszczeń z tytułu strat poczynionych w polskiej gospodarce - w wyniku zastosowania restrykcji przez państwo zachodnie [Action program aiming for assurance bases for investigating claims with the title system of losses in the Polish economy - in effects caused by Western nations' restrictions], dated August 16, 1983, AAN, KC PZPR, V/203, 8-10.

³⁵ For documents on the decision to publish the White Book, see records for the Politburo meeting on September 2, 1983, in AAN, KC PZPR, Mikr. 3029, Sygn 1860, 263. The White Book was put together by the Polish Institute for International Affairs and the Institute for Research on the Social Problems of Capitalism, in 1984 as: Hanna Trentkowska, ed., *Polityka Stanów Zjednoczonych Ameryki wobec Polski w Świetle Faktów i Dokumentów (1980-1983)* (Bydgoszcz, Poland: Zakłady Graficzne RSW, 1984).

³⁶ Pilna Notatka założenia koncepcja oraz program prac zespołu do spraw kompleksowej koordynacji działań w związku z zastosowanymi wobec polski restrykcjami i tzw. sankcjami przez Państwa Zachodnie [Urgent note of assumption concept as well as a work program of the group coordinating the mater of complex actions in relation to implementation of Polish restrictions and so-called sanctions by Western Nations], dated September 20, 1983, MSZ, 14/89, W-3, Dep III (1986), AP 223-2-86.

³⁷ Notatka z pobytu w Nowym Jorku w dniach 25 września - 1 października 1983 r. [Note from the trip to New York from 25 September to 1 October], dated October 3, 1983, AAN, KC PZPR, V/206, 130-135.

The sanctions were being blamed for all of Poland's difficulties and the economic crisis by the authorities who realized that I could take a position on this issue which they considered to be unfavorable. My statement supporting the lifting of sanctions undercut this argument. As the authorities were initiating a vast propaganda campaign against me, I could not postpone my statements any longer.³⁸

President Reagan's decision to allow fishing rights and LOT charter flights was directly influenced by Wałęsa's public shift (see chapter 3). Moreover, international propaganda efforts seem to have influenced the Polish-American community, whose representatives in the PAC sought to reduce suffering in Poland. In 1984, PAC president Al Mazewski successfully advocated reducing sanctions (see chapter 3).

While public propaganda did increase pressure to lift sanctions, major restrictions on trade and new Western credits remained in effect. A year after the Pope's visit no signs of increased foreign investment had surfaced. With only limited success to have comparatively minor sanctions lifted, the PZPR reevaluated the issue of Western economic sanctions. In June 1984 the embassy in Washington provided a full report on how American trade restrictions, particularly on high-tech items, worked. In July 1984, MSZ Department III prepared an analysis of NATO attitudes towards East-West trade and recommended improving economic relations with Western nations not part of NATO, as well as with smaller and medium-sized nations within NATO. The report also recommended "to support Western circles interested in maintaining East-West trade" and "to continue favoring private business entities in our economic relations with capitalist countries."³⁹ In late September the Economics Department and MSZ Department III held

³⁸ Letter from Lech Wałęsa to Lane Kirkland, dated January 28, 1984, AFL-CIO International Affairs Department Files, Inactive Records, "Committee in Support of Solidarity."

³⁹ Notatka Informacyjna, Kierunki polityki państw NATO w dziedzinie współpracy gospodarczej Wschód-Zachód [Information Note: Political direction of NATO countries in the area of East-West economic cooperation], dated July 6, 1984, MSZ, 59/86, W-7, Dep III (1984), AP 2413-13-84.

a short conference on American policy toward COMECON, focused particularly on Washington's actions in response to other East European countries' attempts to gain MFN status and IMF membership.⁴⁰ Through the end of 1984, however, these new studies did little to change Poland's policy against sanctions.

Re-engaging with the West

In 1985, the PZPR moved beyond its focus on propaganda and strengthened ties with the Soviet bloc toward a policy of cooperation with the capitalist world. The emphasis of foreign relations remained the Socialist bloc, but in a shift from earlier policy the MSZ was specifically charged with seeking closer relations with the West. A yearly report, "Vital Foreign Policy Tasks for the PRL for 1985," recognized that difficulties and tensions would continue to exist in relations with the West in general and that "the process of normalization in our relations with the USA will be long and difficult." Nonetheless, the MSZ prioritized "activities with the goal of finally ending Western policies of political isolation against Poland, for example a path for developing higher-level official contacts particularly with Western Europe."⁴¹ Regarding economic matters, the MSZ's game plan remained focused on new financial credits by "expanding economic relations, above all financial-credit [relations], the gauge of which will be negotiations regarding refinancing debt, the negotiation process for Poland's entry into the IMF and World Bank, as well as eliminating discriminatory and protectionist barriers

⁴⁰ Notatka Informacyjna [Information Note], dated October 5, 1984, MSZ, 59/86, W-7, Dep III (1984), AP 2413-13-84.

⁴¹ Węzłowe Zadania Polityki Zagranicznej PRL w 1985 roku [Vital Foreign Policy Tasks for Poland in 1985], dated January 1985, AAN, KC PZPR, V/256, 18-55; quoted from 44 and 19 respectively.

against Polish exports."⁴² The MSZ also refined its targets in the West: "in the process of gradually normalizing relations with Western nations, it is essential to intensify activities with the goal of reorienting economic coordination on small matters and the policies of less confrontational partners. This process should not be run through the behest of trade enterprises with the large capitalist states (the USA, West Germany), but through dynamic enterprises with smaller nations."⁴³ For 1985, the Politburo instructed the MSZ to increase Western contacts, not by focusing on the United States but by pursuing a closer orientation with the "smaller" nations of Western Europe.

In the year that followed, Jaruzelski's Poland met their goal of breaking political isolation, even with larger states like West Germany. On March 6, 1985, West German foreign minister Hans Dietrich Genscher made an unofficial visit to Warsaw, hoping to lay a foundation for normalized relations which could lead to a later official visit. No major policy initiatives were produced in Jaruzelski and Foreign Minister Stefan Olszowski's meetings with Genscher, but the Poles did consider the trip important because it "could be used in favor of their arguments for normalizing relations with Western nations," and "confirmed [Poland's] preparedness in creating constructive relations with [West Germany] and the realism in policies from Bonn."⁴⁴ Steps to normalize relations with Germany continued during Chernenko's funeral a week later,

⁴² *ibid.*, 39.

⁴³ *ibid.*, 51.

⁴⁴ Notatka Informacyjna o wizycie ministra Spraw Zagranicznych RFN Hansa-Dietricha Genschera w Polsce w dniu 6 marca 1985 r. [Information Note about the visit by FRG Minister of Foreign Affairs Hans-Dietrich Genscher on 6 March 1985], dated c. March 7, 1985, AAN, KC PZPR, Mikr. 3083, Sygn. 1914, 471-496.

where Jaruzelski met briefly with Chancellor Helmut Kohl. Again, no agreements were signed, but both sides expressed hopes that relations would continue to improve.⁴⁵

While in Moscow for the funeral, Jaruzelski spoke with other Western leaders as well. He thanked U.N. Secretary General Perez de Cuellar for his work on the Polish issue in the United Nations. The general also invited Italian president Alessandro Pertini to visit Warsaw, building on an earlier visit by Jablonski to commemorate the fortieth anniversary of the Battle of Monte Cassino.⁴⁶ Jaruzelski also met with President Mauno Koivisto of Finland.⁴⁷

Visits to Warsaw by various Western representatives followed through spring and into summer 1985. West German minister of economics Martin Bangemann traveled to Warsaw to find "common efforts" to make "visible" improvements in economic relations. For his part, Jaruzelski spoke broadly about the need for détente within Europe and his desires to see a return to German realpolitik in relations with Poland and the Soviet Union. He also spoke specifically about his concerns with financial-credit relations, asking that Poland be able to receive new credits before paying off their old debts.⁴⁸ A few weeks later British foreign minister Geoffrey Howe made an official visit to talk with Jaruzelski and Olszowski about increasing trade, including a British agreement to fulfill

⁴⁵ Notatka ze spotkań delegacji polskiej przebywającej w Moskwie w dniach 12 i 13 marca br. na uroczystościach pogrzebowych K. Czernenki, [Note on the Polish delegation's meetings in Moscow on 12 and 13 March during the funeral for K. Chernenko], dated March 1985, AAN, KC PZPR, Mikr. 3084, Sygn. 1915, 80-85.

⁴⁶ The Battle of Monte Cassino was a strategically important Allied victory against the Germans, which allowed for the final assault on Rome. Fighting with the British, Polish troops under the command of Lt. Gen. Władysław Anders played an important role in the final victory.

⁴⁷ For information on these brief meetings, see Notatka ze spotkań delegacji polskiej przebywającej w Moskwie w dniach 12 i 13 marca br. na uroczystościach pogrzebowych K. Czernenki.

⁴⁸ Notatka Informacyjna: Zapis z rozmowy Prezesa Rady Ministrów, gen. armii W. Jaruzelskiego z Federalnym Ministrem Gospodarki RFN, Przewodniczącym FDP, M. Bangemannem w dniu 22 marca 1985 r. [Information Note: Transcript of the conversation between the chairman of the Council of Ministers, Gen. Wojciech Jaruzelski, and the FRG federal minister of economics, leader of the FDP, M. Bangemann on 22 March 1985], dated April 1, 1985, AAN, KC PZPR, Mikr. 3086, Sygn. 1917, 146-153.

investment promises that were signed prior to December 1981.⁴⁹ The British placed more emphasis on political developments than the Germans, by inquiring about the well being of opposition figures who had been re-arrested. This inquiry led the MSZ to conclude that Poland would still have to struggle to normalize relations with NATO countries. Nevertheless, the PZPR considered the British meeting an "important step in normalizing relations."⁵⁰

In May and June, the PZPR continued their streak of contacts with the West. Italian prime minister Bettino Craxi came to Warsaw on May 28. As with the Germans, the Italians showed interest in improved economic relations, increasing exports to and imports from Poland. Craxi also responded positively to the possibility of a new agreement to modernize Fiat 126 production facilities which had originally been built in the 1970s.⁵¹ As with Howe, the Italians voiced concern about ongoing trials against opposition members, explaining that internal events in Poland affected popular opinion in Italy which in turn affected possibilities for economic exchanges, debt relief, and new investment.⁵² Next, Japanese foreign minister Shintaro Abe visited Poland (only the second visit by a Japanese foreign minister in the history of bilateral contacts) looking to

⁴⁹ During the 1970s, the British tractor company Massie Ferguson had invested in Poland, as had a PVC company and a cement and construction company, but all of them had suffered losses since then. According to Tim Simmins, these companies were looking to fulfill their contractual agreements and get out. Shell Oil and Imperial Chemical were interested in making new investments in Poland in the mid-1980s, however. Author's interview with Simmins.

⁵⁰ Pilna Notatka o wizycie ministra spraw zagranicznych Wielkiej Brytanii, Geoffrey'a Howe w Polsce (11-13 kwietnia 1985 r.) [Urgent Note about the visit of the minister of foreign affairs of Great Britain, Geoffrey Howe, to Poland (11-13 April 1985)], dated April 17, 1985, AAN, KC PZPR, Mikr. 3088, Sygn 1920, 334-374.

⁵¹ In July, Fiat signed a \$50 million deal to modernize their plant in Poland. The Fiat 126 is the classic "Polski Fiat" or "Małuch" that still can be seen on Poland's streets, and maintains a cultural cache similar to the East German Trabant. See Christopher Bobinski, "Fiat signs \$50m deal to modernise car plant in Poland," *Financial Times* (July 12, 1985): A5.

⁵² Zapis z rozmowy Prezesa Rady Ministrów gen. W. Jaruzelskiego z Premierem Włoch B. Craxim w dniu 28 maja 1985 [Transcript from the conversation of the chairman of the Council of Ministers Gen. W. Jaruzelski with the Prime Minister of Italy B. Craxi on 28 May 1985], dated June 4, 1985, AAN, KC PZPR, V/266, 329-339.

normalize relations and improve economic ties. The Japanese voiced support for Poland's proposals to reschedule debt in the Paris Club and membership in the IMF. No economic agreements were signed, but the two sides did move ahead with possible agreements on cultural and scientific-technical exchanges, with the Poles showing particular interest in exchanges to improve industrial capacity and modernize their production process.⁵³

As the fall approached, General Jaruzelski turned his attention to another important meeting: a trip to New York for the fortieth opening session of the United Nations General Assembly. Although his visit drew large public demonstrations supported by the PAC and the AFL-CIO,⁵⁴ he did meet with Peres De Cuellar, the president of Brazil (Poland's most important trading partner in Latin America), King Hussein of Jordan, Spanish prime minister Felipe Gonzalez, new Soviet foreign minister Eduard Shevardnadze, Genscher, and Italian foreign minister Giulio Andreotti. As an after report summarized, these bilateral meetings were further evidence "of the preparedness of our partners to normalize and expand the extent of relations." Moreover, Jaruzelski's appearance at the General Assembly gave him a rare opportunity to present his view on Polish events on an international stage. While in New York, Jaruzelski also gave interviews to American media outlets, a rare chance to speak directly to the American people.⁵⁵

⁵³ Notatka Informacyjna o wizycie oficjalnej w Polsce ministra spraw zagranicznych Japonii, Shintaro Abe, odbytej w dniach 10-11 czerwca 1985 r., [Information Note on the official visit to Poland of the Japanese minister of foreign affairs, Shintaro Abe, on 10-11 June 1985], dated June 18, 1985, AAN, KC PZPR, V/267, 198-218.

⁵⁴ The PZPR was concerned about these planned protests, and the MSZ called in DCM Swartz to complain about them before the general's arrival. The MSZ asked the Americans to block the protests, which Swartz refused to do. See record of the meeting between Swartz and Bialy on September 17, 1985 in MSZ, 2/89, W-6, Dep III (1985), AP 22-6-85.

⁵⁵ For the quoted after report, see: Sprawozdania z pobyt delegacji PRL pod przewodnictwem Prezesa Rady Ministrów, Tow. W. Jaruzelskiego na 40-tej jubileuszowej Sesji Zgromadzenia Ogólnego ONZ w Nowym Jorku (24-28 września 1985 r.) [Report from the Polish delegation under the leadership of the Chairman of

Jaruzelski's successes, however, did not extend to Polish-American relations. Prior to the general's arrival at the U.N., Reagan announced that neither he nor any members of his administration would meet with Jaruzelski, to protest increased arrests of opposition members.⁵⁶ Nonetheless, the U.S. government found a way to get its message across to Jaruzelski directly. Jaruzelski met privately with three well connected Americans, John Rockefeller, Zbigniew Brzezinski, and John Whitehead of the Council on Foreign Relations. The meeting was scheduled to talk about the Rockefeller Foundation and the Rockefeller Brothers Foundation's efforts to fund the Church's agriculture fund. Prior to his meeting Rockefeller received a series of talking points from National Security Advisor Robert W. "Bud" McFarlane, laying out the White House's perspective on political elements in U.S.-Polish relations. The talking points made clear that Washington was "deeply troubled . . . by developments in Poland . . . [and saw them] as a reversal of favorable trends in 1984." The administration had adopted "the view that the amnesty of 1984 was a kind of trick, in that, once the U.S. responded favorably to the amnesty, the arrests resumed and many of the amnestied individuals [were] again in jail."⁵⁷ When the subject of Polish-American relations came up in a private luncheon, Rockefeller responded to Jaruzelski by referencing some of the talking points. Brzezinski and Whitehead also "succinctly and candidly" rebutted the general's statements blaming Poland's economic hardships and the poor state of relations on

the Council of Ministers, W. Jaruzelski, to the 40th Anniversary of the Opening Session of the U.N. in New York (24-28 September 1985)], dated October 2, 1985, AAN, KC PZPR, V/278, 85-123; quoted at 87. For information on Jaruzelski's preparations and expectations including a full set of briefing papers, see: MSZ, 2/89, W-6, Dep III (1985), AP 22-6-85. For one interview transcript, see "Excerpts from Jaruzelski Interview," *New York Times* (Sept. 29, 1985): A16.

⁵⁶ Bernard Gwertzman, "U.S., Protesting Arrests, Bars meeting with Pole," *New York Times* (Sept. 8, 1985): A8.

⁵⁷ Unsigned Letter from Robert McFarlane to David Rockefeller with attached talking points for meeting, c. September 4, 1985, RRPL, Paula Dobriansky Files, Box 90892, Poland Memoranda 1984-1985 [September 1-23, 1985].

American policies. Whitehead attributed economic problems to internal "misgovernment," and Brzezinski protested the idea that relations with Poland were directly linked to relations with the Soviet Union; for Brzezinski, "it was simply not true that Poland was a pawn in the East-West debate."⁵⁸ So, even though no official contacts with administration officials took place, the White House found a quiet way to have its voice heard showing that bilateral relations remained in the gutter.

Jaruzelski followed the New York meetings with a trip to Paris, where he met with French president Francois Mitterand. This was the general's first visit to a Western capital since the declaration of martial law, and Mitterand came under intense political criticism for accepting Jaruzelski.⁵⁹ Again, the meeting gave Jaruzelski an opportunity to explain the internal situation in Poland and blame the United States for problems. Jaruzelski even criticized France's response to the declaration of martial law. For his part, Mitterand placed the spotlight on more positive issues, specifically progress with the Church agricultural fund and the possibility of increased economic cooperation. Mitterand wanted "to emphasize, that [he was] ready for action toward improvement in the situation," mentioning new deals to reschedule debt after which Poland might be able to gain financial credits again. Mitterand also mentioned that he was examining the issue of allowing short-term loans to Poland. Jaruzelski responded very positively to these possibilities and ended the meeting by explaining the steps he had taken to normalize the internal situation.⁶⁰

⁵⁸ Memo from William Dietel to David Rockefeller, "September 25 Luncheon Meeting with General Wojciech Jaruzelski," dated October 2, 1985, RRPL, Paula Dobriansky Files, Box 90892, Poland Memoranda 1984-1985 [September 1-23, 1985].

⁵⁹ Judith Miller, "Mitterand meets with Jaruzelski," *New York Times* (Dec. 4, 1985): A1.

⁶⁰ Notatka z rozmowy Przewodniczącego Rady Państwa PRL tow. gen. armii Wojciecha Jaruzelskiego z Prezydentem Francji Francois Mitterand. Paryż, 1985.12.04 [Note from the conversation of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the PRL, com. Gen. Wojciech Jaruzelski with the president of France,

Jaruzelski's encounter with Mitterand in December 1985 was a noteworthy cap to a year of important progress in foreign relations. Even though Jaruzelski was asked to enter the Palace Elysee through the back door—ostensibly for security reasons—he was nonetheless directly meeting major Western leaders again. After five years of political isolation and trips only within the Socialist bloc, Jaruzelski re-entered the world stage and was negotiating directly with West European politicians. The Poles could now make their case against sanctions, directly to the leaders behind those sanctions. Reagan continued to block high-level political contacts throughout 1985, but Jaruzelski and his comrades held high level contacts with leading officials from the big four (France, Britain, Germany, and Italy) who had been central in the White House's strategy to implement sanctions in early 1982. These meetings were both symbolically and politically significant.

More central to Poland's internal crisis, these improved political contacts advanced economic relationships. In each meeting with the West Europeans, the Polish government received assurances that each country backed Poland's membership in the IMF, an important step toward gaining new credits. Each Western representative also expressed willingness to increase economic cooperation. Japan and Italy went as far as signing specific economic exchanges and improvements, adding promises of modernized equipment and technology. Finally, increased political will for a dialogue led to a final agreement to reschedule Poland's debt to governmental lenders. After two years of negotiations which began after Washington dropped restrictions, the Paris Club announced on July 15 that it had agreed to reschedule \$12 billion in debts owed from

Francois Mitterand. Paris, 1985.12.04], dated December 9, 1985, AAN, KC PZPR, V/286, 251-262; quoted at 259.

1982 to 1984.⁶¹ In November, Polish representatives signed a further agreement rescheduling \$1.37 billion in debt that had come due in 1985. As the *Financial Times* reported, "Thus, for the first time in four years Poland will now in theory be without unrescheduled arrears on its official debt to its major western government creditors."⁶² So, Poland's new international political position led to an improved economic picture as well.

Throughout this period of transition in European relations, the PZPR became aware of more opportunities to drive a wedge between Western Europe and the United States. Tensions within NATO over technology transfer and related trade issues were publicly visible in 1982 over the Siberian gas pipeline crisis (see chapter 2), and relations had never completely healed. In the middle of 1985, the Polish Ministry of Foreign Trade (*Ministerstwo Handel Zagranicznych* or MHZ) noted American and European disagreements about rules governing technology transfer through COCOM, referring specifically to West European statements that there were a growing number of coincidences in which technology-transfer rulings had been used to increase the "competitiveness of American firms in relation to non-American firms." The report also noted that the European Economic Community viewed the American policy as a "critical hazard for West European industries."⁶³ Similarly, the Polish embassy in Washington sent a report back to Warsaw titled "Discrepancies between the U.S. and Western Europe concerning East-West economic relations" that outlined major West German,

⁶¹ Bobinski, "New chapter opens in Poland's debt saga," *Financial Times* (July 17, 1985): A2.

⁶² David Buchan, "West Signs Rescheduling Accord with Poles," *Financial Times* (Nov. 11, 1985): A2.

⁶³ "Pilna Notatka [Urgent Note from the Ministry of Foreign Trade]," dated May 15, 1985, MSZ, Dep III (1985), 2/89, W-7, AP 2413-15-85.

French, and British disputes with the Reagan administration over trade with the communist world. The report concluded:

The main Western European countries' current difficult economic situation will lead to the development of economic calculations and aspirations to deepen economic relations with all socialist countries. Also, in the long term, the development of economic relations with socialist nations will play a vital role in hardening Western Europe's standpoint in East-West relations, through, for example, strengthening their resistance to political pressure from the USA.⁶⁴

Polish awareness of this rift added further evidence of Poland's growing opportunities to improve relations with Western Europe despite America's tough policy.

Taking into account all of these issues, the MSZ provided a very optimistic view of Poland's new political and economic position at the end of 1985. In their year-end review of international relations for 1985, the MSZ stated, "We brought about significant progress in the process of normalizing relations with developed capitalist nations. The results gained were quantitatively and qualitatively much greater than those during 1982-1984."⁶⁵ The report noted the progress made to break out of NATO-imposed isolation, particularly with Italy, France, and most importantly West Germany. In terms of relations with the United States, the MSZ concluded that "there remains an impasse."⁶⁶ In a report on the "Vital Tasks for Poland's Foreign Policy in 1986," the MSZ emphasized that in the second half of the 1980s "Polish foreign policy will be more active and less defensive than it was during the first half of the 1980s," stressing that to improve Poland's place in the international environment the MSZ needed to "cultivate political, economic, and

⁶⁴ "Informacja Nr. 1-2/1986. Rozbieżności USA - Europa Zachodnia w sprawie stosunków gospodarczych W-Z" [Information no. 1-2/1986: Discrepancies between the U.S. and Western Europe concerning East-West economic relations], dated February 6, 1986, MSZ, Dep III (1986), 14/89, W-4, AP 2413-19-86.

⁶⁵ "Bilans Polityki Zagranicznej PRL w 1985 r." [Balance Sheet for Foreign Policy in 1985], c. December 31, 1985, AAN, KC PZPR, V/294, 32-53; quoted at 40.

⁶⁶ *ibid.*, 42.

cultural-scientific relations with capitalist nations (particularly Western Europe)"; to improve financial and credit relations; to continue to reschedule debt; and to gain access to new money.⁶⁷ After four years of economic and political isolation, the PZPR was now seeing concrete improvements with Western Europe.

Changes in the East

The PZPR also had high hopes for Poland's future because of events in Moscow, namely Mikhail Gorbachev's selection in March 1985 to replace Chernenko as general secretary. Upon hearing the news, Rakowski noted Gorbachev's youth and referred to him as "a true revolutionary cadre."⁶⁸ When Gorbachev traveled to Warsaw for a meeting of Warsaw Pact leaders, he gave subtle signs of his new approach to relations with the bloc. According to Polish records Gorbachev stated that in discussing relations within the Socialist bloc "it is necessary in this matter to speak openly, bringing up different viewpoints and working out claims, preventing stratification." While still emphasizing the shared nature of class interests, he also referred to each country's own social, economic, and political histories, acknowledging the specificity of each country. Gorbachev even stated that "every fraternal party alone determines its policies and is responsible for them to their own nation."⁶⁹ Following a private meeting with the general secretary, Jaruzelski reported that Gorbachev was very interested in Poland's development and agreed with the PZPR's approach toward the Church. Gorbachev also

⁶⁷ "Węzłowe Zadania Polityki Zagranicznej PRL w 1986 r." [Vital PRL Foreign Policy Tasks in 1986], dated January 13, 1986, AAN, KC PZPR, V/294, 9-31; quoted at 10, 11, and 27.

⁶⁸ Rakowski, *Dzienniki 1984-1986*, 131.

⁶⁹ Notatka Informacyjna o Spotkaniu przywódców partii i państw-stron Układu Warszawskiego w Warszawie (26.04.1985 r.) [Information Note about the meeting of party and national leaders of the Warsaw Pact in Warsaw (26.4.1985)], dated April 29, 1985, AAN, KC PZPR, V/264, 11-20; quoted at 12.

reported that the Soviet Union was also seeking greater cooperation with Western Europe.⁷⁰

At the end of 1985, Poland's new foreign minister Marian Orzechowski traveled to Moscow and confirmed the new Soviet approach toward relations with Poland. Unlike meetings with Chernenko or Brezhnev in which the Soviets dictated policy, Shevardnadze and Politburo Member Nicolai Ryzhkov did not lecture Orzechowski about Poland's internal problems. They simply mentioned that they were "content" with Poland's progress and that the country was "on the proper path." As Orzechowski concluded in the after report, "During conversations one thought was affirmed: that Polish-Russian relations, after a period of constraints in many fields during 1980-1982, are currently growing dynamically and have entered a new working and elastic form of cooperation at every level."⁷¹ Gorbachev was not yet fully enunciating his "New Thinking" on Eastern Europe but this young and dynamic leader was showing a much more flexible relationship with Eastern Europe, more akin to Andropov's approach than to Chernenko's style.

Gorbachev and Jaruzelski were also forging a close personal relationship based on a shared vision of reform. In a personal letter to Jaruzelski from September 1985, Gorbachev assured Jaruzelski about his decision to allow Genscher's visit and wrote that his "Polish friends made a completely valid judgment."⁷² In a show of support for Polish policies Gorbachev had Jaruzelski speak first at the Warsaw Pact Political-Consultative

⁷⁰ Rakowski, *Dzienniki 1984-1986*, 258.

⁷¹ Notatka informacyjna z oficjalnej wizyty przyjaźni w ZSRR Zastępcy Członka Biuro Politycznego KC PZPR, Ministra Spraw Zagranicznych PRL, Marian Orzechowskiego (Moskwa 5-6 grudnia 1985 r.) [Information Note from the official friendly visit to the USSR of Assistant Member of the Politburo of the PZPR Central Committee, minister of foreign relations of the PRL, Marian Orzechowski (Moscow 5-6 December 1985)], dated December 9, 1985, AAN, KC PZPR, V/286, 263-272; quoted at 272.

⁷² Attachment to a letter from Mikhail Gorbachev to Wojciech Jaruzelski, dated September 12, 1985, AAN, KC PZPR, XIA/1412, 15-18; quoted at 18. Translated from Russian by Bora Kim.

Council meeting in Sofia.⁷³ This close relationship between the two Communist leaders went public in June 1986, when Gorbachev visited Warsaw during the PZPR's Tenth Party Congress, lending the Soviet Union's praise and his own personal support to the economic and political reforms Jaruzelski announced there. As Gorbachev's chief foreign policy aide, Anatoly Chernyaev, summarizes: "[Gorbachev] became friends with Jaruzelski. It was not just a personal bond, but an emotional and political bond to establish truly fraternal relations with Poland and with the Polish people."⁷⁴

Gorbachev's rise to power was also important for changing the PZPR's analysis of geo-political concerns. Since the declaration of American sanctions, Jaruzelski complained that Poland was treated like a "pawn" in the game between the superpowers. From Warsaw's perspective Poland suffered the most relative to the other socialist countries during the first half of the 1980s "as an object and instrument of the West's confrontational policies."⁷⁵ Throughout 1985, Jaruzelski's complained to Western leaders about unfair American policies based on Poland's position within the Soviet sphere of influence, part of his stump speech about the injustices suffered under American sanctions.

Following logically from this argument, Warsaw believed that with Soviet-American tensions declining, Washington would be more willing to improve relations with Poland. If American relations improved with the Soviet Union, Washington would not be prone to punishing Warsaw to get at Moscow. Thus, the PZPR closely tracked—

⁷³ Notatka Informacyjna dot. narady Doradczego Komitetu Politycznego państw-stron Układu Warszawskiego w Sofii (22-23 października br.) [Information Note regarding a meeting of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Pact in Sofia (22-23 October of this year), dated October 24, 1985, AAN, KC PZPR, V/281, 264-273.

⁷⁴ Anatoly Chernyaev, *My Six Years with Gorbachev*, trans. and ed. by Robert English and Elizabeth Tucker (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2000), 62.

⁷⁵ "Prognoza Rozwoju Sytuacji Międzynarodowej w 1986 r." [Prognosis for the Development of the International Situation in 1986], dated January 1986, AAN, KC PZPR, V/294, 54-71; quoted at 71.

and were regularly briefed on—the development of Gorbachev's policy toward the United States.⁷⁶ In an impromptu meeting of Warsaw Pact leaders in Prague in late November 1985, Gorbachev reported on the outcome from his first summit with Reagan in Geneva:

Concluding, M. Gorbachev stated that the most difficult and most important [steps] are still ahead of us. One should not overestimate or underestimate the Geneva meeting. We do not suppose that détente has already returned in Soviet-American relations or in the world, but Geneva was an important step in the proper direction. . . . There were certain positive achievements, opening up some new possibilities.

Given this generally positive review, Orzechowski concluded that "the results of the Geneva summit have been persuasive that it is the appropriate moment for a review of the current state of Polish-American relations and for considering our behavior towards the USA, in response to the present requirements and possibilities."⁷⁷ Superpower tensions were finally decreasing, enough to review how this would effect Polish-American relations.

⁷⁶ See Notatka Informacyjna dot. stosunków między ZSRR a USA (na podstawie konsultacji grupy uczestników kursu kadry kierowniczej MSZ z dyrektorem Departamentu d/s USA MID A Bessmertnych oraz wykładu dla uczestników kursu z-cy dyrektora Departamentu d/s USA) [Information Note re relations between the U.S. and USSR (following consultations between cadres from the MSZ directorship with the director of the U.S. Department A. Bessmertnii as well as lectures from the director of the U.S. department)], dated April 24, 1985, MSZ, 2/89, W-7, Dep III (1985), AP 2413-5-85; Charge d'Affaires Ambasady ZSRR tow. W. Swirin przekazał w KC PZPR następującą o cenę rezultatów Spotkania Helsińskiego ministrów spraw zagranicznych i informację o treści rozmowy E. Szewardnadze z sekretarzem Stanu USA G. Shultzem [USSR charge d'affaires W. Swirin passed to the Central Committee of the PZPR information about the results of the Helsinki meeting of ministers of foreign affairs and information about conversations between E. Shevardnadze and the Secretary of State G. Shultz], dated August 8, 1985, MSZ, 2/89, W-7, Dep III (1985), AP 2413-5-85 and AAN, KC PZPR, XIA/1420, 293-301; Notatka Informacyjna dot. narady Doradczego Komitetu Politycznego państw-stron Układu Warszawskiego w Sofii (22-23 października br); Notatka na temat stanu stosunków między ZSRR a USA w okresie prezydentury R. Reagana [Note about the state of relations between the USSR and the U.S. during the presidency of R. Reagan], dated November 14, 1985, MSZ, 42/92, W-3, Dep III (1988), Og 22-2-85/88; and Notatka Ambasador ZSRR w Polsce - Tow. A. Aksjonow przekazał członkowi BP, Sekretarzowi KC PZPR - Tow. Józefowi Czyrkowi następującą informację [Note passed by the USSR Ambassador in Poland, com. A. Aksjonov, to Politburo member, and secretary of the PZPR Central Committee, Jozef Czyrek], dated November 18, 1985, AAN, KC PZPR, XIA/1420, 306-307. Many of these briefings focused on early arms control negotiations.

⁷⁷ Notatka Informacyjna o spotkaniu generalnych i pierwszych sekretarzy partii oraz ministrów spraw zagranicznych państwu UW w Pradze 21 Listopada 1985 r. [Information Note about the meeting of general and first secretaries as well as ministers of foreign affairs from the WP nations in Prague, 21 November 1985], dated November 23, 1985, AAN, KC PZPR, V/285, 7-14; quoted at 11 and 14.

For Jaruzelski and the leadership in Warsaw, Gorbachev's rise to the general secretary's chair opened up new possibilities. First of all, Gorbachev took a much less intrusive and controlling view over internal developments within Poland, so the Poles would have a freer hand to act as they saw fit. Second, Gorbachev and Jaruzelski developed a personal relationship based on a shared sense of direction for reforming their countries, boosting Polish confidence that they could act as they saw fit both domestically and internationally. Finally, Gorbachev pursued a much more conciliatory line with the United States, holding the first summit meeting with an American president in almost seven years. With tension decreasing between the superpowers, Jaruzelski believed that the United States would be more amenable to pursuing normalized relations with the socialist bloc.

Economics and Politics Collide

Despite all the improvements in Poland's international situation in 1985, the country's domestic economy still looked bleak. Debt was fully rescheduled but it had not been forgiven. Some money had been freed up, but Warsaw still needed to repay loans, just over a longer period of time. More importantly the economic inefficiencies, broken machinery, antiquated processes, and unmotivated workforce that hindered Poland's economic output continued to be a burden. Price increases and efforts to strengthen coordination through COMECON improved economic output slightly: industrial production increased 6.4% in the third quarter of 1985, more than a similar period the year before and more than the Central Yearly Plan expected; production of apartments

and homes increased 2.4% from the year before; and the government continued to provide food stuffs at a rate higher than planned.⁷⁸

But not everything was looking up economically at the end of 1985. In the all important area of foreign trade, in the first nine months of 1985 exports to capitalist countries were down 2.4% from the previous year. Imports had only increased 9.6% from the year before, attaining 73% of the level desired by the economic plans.⁷⁹ More importantly strong inflationary increases appeared in 1985. As one Polish report concluded:

Economic results from the third quarter indicate a significant threat to the money-market balance and reflect an intensification of inflationary payments pressures in comparison to 1983-1984. . . . It is necessary to predict that in 1985 the national money reserves grew between 580 and 610 billion zlotys, therefore about 270 to 300 billion zlotys above the guidelines in the Central Yearly Plan for 1985. The extent of this [increase shows] that there will be an inflationary gap in the current year.⁸⁰

Therefore, even when government figures were showing modest growth, these numbers did not take into account growing inflationary pressures, further evidence of just how weak the Polish economy truly was.⁸¹ In turn this economic instability was directly linked to the possibility of social instability. As Paczkowski writes, "The fundamental issue

⁷⁸ Ważniejsze Problemy sytuacji Gospodarczej w 1985 roku (stan bieżący i wnioski) [Important problems in the economic situation in 1985 (recent conditions and conclusions), dated October 23, 1985, AAN, KC PZPR, V/281, 200-207.

⁷⁹ Handel Zagraniczny [Foreign Trade], attached to Ważniejsze Problemy sytuacji Gospodarczej w 1985 roku (stan bieżący i wnioski), dated October 23, 1985, AAN, KC PZPR, V/281, 213-214.

⁸⁰ Sytuacja Piężno-Rynkowo [Money-market situation], attached to Ważniejsze Problemy sytuacji Gospodarczej w 1985 roku (stan bieżący i wnioski), dated October 23, 1985, AAN, KC PZPR, V/281, 208-212; quoted at 209-211.

⁸¹ The PZPR's economic numbers (as with other Communist parties calculations) were prone to manipulation, often covering up the true situation in the economy. So, even the modest gains these documents cite are suspect. It is also incredibly hard to get a real sense of just how bad the Polish economy was performing. As former American economics officer Christopher Hill remembers, "What was hard was figuring out what was really going on. You couldn't do it from newspapers; you couldn't do it from statistics." (author's interview with Hill, May 12, 2004). This section is not meant to be an in depth review of Poland's problems; rather it is just an attempt to show the depth and nature of Poland's continuing economic crisis.

gradually tipping the balance in the direction of far-reaching reform was the impasse in the economy, which threatened at any moment to erupt in social unrest whose impact would be all the greater in that it would be channeled by underground Solidarity organizations."⁸²

In response to the continuing economic crisis, the PZPR Politburo spent a significant portion of its time preparing plans to reform the economy. In December 1985 the PZPR held its Twenty-Second Central Committee Plenum, focusing almost exclusively on economic issues to prepare for the "Drugi Etap" [Second Stage] of reform, which was announced six months later at the PZPR's Tenth Party Congress from June 29 to July 3, 1986. The economic sections of the Drugi Etap attempted to invigorate the economy by introducing measures which would allow for greater individual control in markets. This was an effort to transfer Hungary's successful "goulash Communism" to the Polish model, and included some timid moves to introduce market forces. Most foreign and opposition economists, however, saw little possibility that these minor changes would do much to improve the situation. As an economics officer from the U.S. embassy recalls, "We were convinced that the people who were trying to run [the reforms] were sincere in trying to come up with economic plans that would make them another Hungary, [but] I don't remember anyone saying they got any kind of traction at all."⁸³ As before, new reforms would lead to little real change.

The build-up to the Drugi Etap was, however, significant economically because it reflected an important shift in the PZPR's reasoning: the PZPR began to embrace Solidarność's long-standing argument about the necessity of increasing exports through

⁸² Paczkowski, *Spring*, 484.

⁸³ Author's interview with Cameron Munter, June 11, 2004. Munter was a consular officer and then economics officer at the U.S. embassy in Warsaw from June 1986 to July 1988.

foreign investment. For the MSZ, this meant that their proposed goals for 1986 emphasized the need to attain new money from the West.⁸⁴ Within other sections of the bureaucracy, preparations for changes to Poland's economic system led to a joint project to analyze how other socialist countries, particularly Hungary, Yugoslavia, Romania, and Bulgaria, had structured their foreign investment system and how they attracted that investment.⁸⁵ This was followed by a memo by the PZPR Economics Department laying out how to revise Polish law to increase possibilities for foreign investment through so-called "cooperative enterprises."⁸⁶ The purpose of the new legislation was to

create conditions conducive to enlivening the Polish economy with the goal of increasing its export possibilities. With a lack of medium-term foreign payments as well as the insignificant possibilities of obtaining investment credits in the next few years, cooperative enterprises may constitute a change to nourish the slowed investment process, and also for the fundamental development of, above all, a pro-export production field. This has particular significance given the signed "Paris agreement" with regard to paying Poland's debt.⁸⁷

In implementing the Drugi Etap, the PZPR showed that it was coming to grips with its need to seek greater and greater economic assistance from the West in order to climb out of its economic problems.

The Drugi Etap also embraced political reforms. One major reform replaced the Patriotic Movement for National Rebirth (PRON) which had been formed in 1982 and had never produced results. A new Consultative Council was proposed as "a body that was to advise the chairman of the Council of State, a post held by General Jaruzelski

⁸⁴ Węzłowe Zadania Polityki Zagranicznej PRL w 1986 r. [Vital PRL Foreign Policy Tasks for 1986], dated January 1986, AAN, KC PZPR, V/294.

⁸⁵ Informacja o wspólnych przedsięwzięciach z udziałem kapitału obcego w krajach socjalistycznych [Information about cooperative ventures utilizing foreign capital in socialist countries], dated November 14, 1985, AAN, KC PZPR, V/292, 91-96.

⁸⁶ Wydział Ekonomiczny Opinia dot.: projektu ustawy o spółkach z udziałem kapitału zagranicznego [Economic Department: Opinion about the legislation project for companies utilizing international capital], dated December 30, 1985, AAN, KC PZPR, V/292, 109-111.

⁸⁷ "Uzasadnienie" [Justification], dated c. January 1986, AAN, KC PZPR, V/292, 112-118; quoted at 112.

since November 1985."⁸⁸ This new organ was meant to "put forward proposals and cooperative proposals on all matters in order to increase normalization in social-political life in the country as well as to deepen national reconciliation."⁸⁹ Moreover, it was meant to attract members of the Catholic intelligentsia and the opposition to work in conjunction with the government and add their support and credibility to government policies. The opposition, however, viewed the council as an attempt to co-opt Solidarność into accepting government reforms.⁹⁰ In the eyes of the U.S. embassy observers, "reality on the ground [was] not as frozen as it [looked] . . . in Washington."⁹¹ While the political reform was cautious it was still an attempt at genuine reform.

The PZPR's new economic reasoning and plans soon collided with political pressures from outside Poland. Simultaneously with the build-up to the Tenth Party Congress, the PZPR considered a new amnesty for political prisoners. Jaruselski made allusions to the possibility as early as his September 1985 United Nations trip. With this possibility in the air, American and Western diplomats began to lobby the Polish government. In November 1985, the American deputy chief of mission in Warsaw, David Swartz, met with Bogumił Sujka, a member of the PZPR's International Department, to discuss the plight of rearrested political prisoners, during which he stated that the United States was looking for an "encouraging gesture" from the Poles to begin to move relations ahead again.⁹² When Dennis Ortblad, the State Department's Poland Desk Officer, traveled to Warsaw a month later in December 1985, he also emphasized the

⁸⁸ Paczkowski, *Spring*, 486.

⁸⁹ Notatka w sprawie Społeczno Rada Konsultacyjnej przy Radzie Państwa y 16 października 1986 r [Note regarding the matter of the Social Consultative Council of the People's Government 16 October 1986], in *Polska 1986 1989*. vol, 3, 21, as quoted in Antoni Dudek, *Reglamentowana Rewolucja* (Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Arcana, 2004), 76-77.

⁹⁰ Paczkowski, *Spring*, 486.

⁹¹ Author's Interview with Davis, April 27, 2007.

⁹² Notatka [Note], dated c. November 5, 1985, AAN, KC PZPR, XIA/1420, 323-325; quoted at 324.

importance of freeing political prisoners, and noted that the Poles should not wait for a "dramatic gesture" from the Americans. Instead *Ortblad* hoped that the two sides could return to a negotiating pattern based on small steps.⁹³ The Americans then sent former ambassador to Poland and former Deputy Assistant Secretary *Walter Stoessel* on an "unofficial visit" to Warsaw in March 1986 to show America's commitment to the step-by-step framework and to try to spark productive talks between the two sides. *Stoessel* also focused on political prisoners.⁹⁴ The Poles interpreted his visit positively but believed that Washington was still waiting for the PZPR to take the first move. When MSZ Department III member *Juliusz Biały* visited Washington during the second week in June, 1986, neither side looked any closer to making a move. As *Stoessel* told *Biały*, both *Shultz* and *Reagan* were reluctant to take the first move because ever since activists had been rearrested the Americans "did not want to be tricked again."⁹⁵ Although Washington continued to press Warsaw on political prisoners, in the first half of 1986, neither the United States nor Poland looked like they were willing to take steps to break the logjam.

⁹³ *Pilna Notatka [Urgent Note]*, dated December 5, 1985, MSZ, 2/89, W-6, Dep III (1985), AP 220-1-85.

⁹⁴ Author's interview with *Davis*, April 27, 2007.

⁹⁵ *Notatka z rozmów podczas pobytu w USA [Note re conversations during the stay in the U.S.]*, dated July 28, 1986, MSZ, 14/89, W-3, Dep III (1986), AP 220-1-86. Unfortunately I have not been able to find any direct records of *Stoessel's* visit to Poland in March 1986. The trip is mentioned tangentially a number of times in both American and Polish records, however. From other tangential records it is also clear that in meetings with *Stoessel* the Poles made some kind of offer to which they expected an answer from the Americans. *Biały* was at least partially frustrated by his trip because he received no answer to the earlier proposal. Interestingly there is a flurry of activity in *Paula Dobriansky's* Poland files from the NSC for the months following *Stoessel's* visit, but few meaningful records have been released (See withdrawal sheets from RRPL, *Paula Dobriansky Files*, Box 90893, Poland Memoranda 1986-1987 [folders 7 and 8]). It would fit the pattern if the PZPR tried to broker some kind of deal over the upcoming amnesty by linking it with a promise to suspend sanctions. This was how the *Schaff* negotiations had worked. If this was the case it is likely that the *Reagan* administration entertained the idea but was not willing to commit to it because they feared that activists would simply be rearrested, as had happened after 1984. When I asked *Davis* about *Stoessel's* trip he said that it was "a nostalgic trip" for *Stoessel*. He "talked to everybody" but there were "no major changes. . . Nothing immediately came of it." Author's interview with *Davis*, April 27, 2007.

Against this backdrop, in June 1986 Jaruzelski announced plans for a new amnesty on the first day of the Tenth PZPR Party Congress. Around three hundred political prisoners were then in jail, many of whom had been rearrested in the months after the July 1984 amnesty.⁹⁶ The initial amnesty announcement suggested "that clemency would not extend to repeat offenders" or "well known activists."⁹⁷ Jaruzelski clarified exceptions policies to amnesty in a rare press conference following the congress. Political prisoners would be dealt with on a case-by-case basis; this would not be a complete amnesty. As Jaruzelski said, "We shall not give up the possibility to preserve peace in Poland—and anything that might disturb this peace will not be embraced. . . . It wouldn't be logical as we open a new chapter to take steps in releasing prisoners that might get in the way of our progress."⁹⁸ Under these conditions, well known recidivists like Michnik, Lis, and Frasyński had little chance of being set free. Another important name on the list of those unlikely to be released was Zbigniew Bujak, who had been caught at the end of May after living underground for over five years and serving as a member of the TKK since its formation in early 1982.⁹⁹ The amnesty law was passed by the Sejm on July 17 and started to be implemented on July 24. Initial releases included no surprises.

⁹⁶ A significant number of activists had also been arrested in the weeks prior to the Party congress, an attempt to limit opposition statements and activities during the event and over the course of Gorbachev's visit. For an in depth review of human rights violations after the 1984 amnesty, see the Committee in Support of Solidarity's Report, "Human Rights Violations in the Polish People's Republic (January 1984–January 1985)," available at Indiana University's Herman B. Wells Library.

⁹⁷ Michael Kaufmann, "Jaruzelski Offers Hope of Amnesty for Political Foes," *New York Times* (June 30, 1986): A1.

⁹⁸ Jackson Diehl, "Jaruzelski Says Amnesty To Be Sharply Limited; No Plans to Upgrade Ties to U.S., Church," *Washington Post* (July 5, 1986): A18.

⁹⁹ The United States showed particular interest in Bujak's case shortly after his arrest. See Notatka Informacyjna z rozmowy z charge d'affaires a.i. USA D. Swartz'em w dniu 6 czerwca br. [Information Note from the conversation with U.S. charge d'affaires a.i., D. Swartz on 6 June], dated June 8, 1986, MSZ, 14/89, W-3, Dep III (1986), AP 22-1-86/A.

In response the Church, Western Europe, and the United States rallied to pressure the PZPR to release of all remaining political prisoners. Glemp and the Church called for prisoners to be released during negotiations over the formation of a Consultative Council.¹⁰⁰ U.S. DCM Swartz met with the head of the American section of the Polish Institute for International Affairs (PISM), and told him that that Washington "might abolish the embargo on credits for Poland" if the PZPR released Bujak, a message that was relayed to Jaruzelski and the Politburo.¹⁰¹ For the Europeans, Italian president Pertini and Foreign minister Craxi publicly linked the possibility of a visit by Jaruzelski to the release of prisoners. This linkage not only jeopardized bilateral relations with Italy, but put into question Jaruzelski's possible trip to the Vatican. Behind the scenes, on July 30, 1986, the British ambassador presented a demarche from the European Economic Community's (EEC) twelve members stating that relations with Western Europe would only continue to improve if the PZPR released Bujak and his co-conspirators. If these steps were not taken, the EEC representative assured the PZPR that Western Europe would halt all improvements in relations with Poland.¹⁰²

These combined pressures soon began to show effects. On July 31, Wałęsa's advisor Bogdan Lis was released. Then on August 7, the government announced that they were recommending to the Polish courts that Michnik be released; he was freed on

¹⁰⁰ Diehl, "Poland Releases Solidarity Activist Lis," *Washington Post* (Aug. 1, 1986): A17. As Paczkowski notes in *Spring, 486*, "The formation of the Consultative Council . . . would have been impossible without the release of political prisoners."

¹⁰¹ Quoted in Paczkowski, "Playground of the Superpowers," 388. For the original document, see Notatka z rozmowy z radcą Ambasady USA w Warszawie Davidem Schwartzem [Note from conversation with U.S. embassy counselor in Warsaw David Swartz], dated July 10, 1986, AAN, KC PZPR, XIA/1422, 292-293, and Institute of Political Studies Polish Academy of Sciences, Miedzyszyn Collections (hereafter referred to as ISPPAN, KM), M/15/9.

¹⁰² Notatka w sprawie implikacji naszej sytuacji wewnętrznej dla stosunków Polski z państwami Europy Zachodniej [Note concerning the implications of our internal situation for Polish relations with the nations of Western Europe], dated August 6, 1986, AAN, KC PZPR, V/314, 85-92. I plan to make a freedom of information request to the British Foreign Office for information on this meeting.

August 11. References to international pressure also began to surface in the PZPR's internal decisions. On August 6, the PZPR wrote a report "Concerning the Implications of our Internal Situation for Relations with Western Europe." The report was discussed in an August 12 Politburo meeting and stated, "the exclusion from the amnesty of the most active members of the opposition" would "have an unfavorable impact upon our potential to conduct an active and effective policy towards Western Europe." This included expected problems with scheduling upcoming bilateral meetings with Italy, France, and Great Britain, as well as multi-lateral political contacts through the CSCE in Vienna.

Regarding economic consequences, if the PZPR kept the activists in prison

the meaning of that element will grow as a condition complicating Poland's payment situation and [will create] increasing difficulties in the evolution of a deadline for financial obligations to Western nations. . . . Poland's international position in the economic and payment matters may succumb to later weaknesses."¹⁰³

Simply, keeping political prisoners in jail threatened Poland's economic recovery.

When the Politburo met on September 9 to consider the possibility of extending the amnesty, the documentation prepared for the meeting illuminated the combination of domestic and international elements that were at the center of the decision. As with earlier amnesty decisions, the Communists emphasized that an amnesty would improve the government's domestic position: freeing all of the remaining political prisoners "will show our strength and will [to create] social understanding, enlisting and neutralizing those social groups which are still undecided, lost, expectant." The amnesty was also a chance to show the government's "will and consistency" in building societal understanding as well as future normalization. In terms of relations with the Church, the decision "will benefit from the possibility of increasing activities limiting non-religious

¹⁰³ *ibid.*, 88; also quoted in Paczkowski, "Playground of the Superpowers," 389.

activity of some priests, as well as persuading the church to support the realization of [solutions to] social problems."¹⁰⁴

In contrast to earlier amnesty decisions, however, international considerations were at the forefront of arguments in favor of freeing political prisoners. Here it is worthwhile to quote at length:

The improvement of relations between the two superpowers which has emerged in the last few months has brought a significant increase in activity in the East-West dialogue. This has caused a certain re-evaluation in the Western campaign against socialist nations. This has [also] significantly increased the quantity of economic and political visits of a high level, [and led to] contracts and agreements being concluded.

This has not included Poland. The West applied tactics against our country which made progress in normalizing relations within Poland dependent on assessments of the development of our [internal] situation, taking advantage of all convenient pretexts for the sake of justifying their restrictions policy.

One of the Western nations' publicly presented criteria for assessing the internal situation in Poland is the matter of political prisoners.

Not embracing the [amnesty law] as part of a frontal action against the opposition and the judicial process will provide an opportunity [for the West] to malign the good name of Poland, to continue restrictions, and to slow the development of economic and political relations. On the other hand, embracing the law will permit us to develop actions in international policies, which should bring improvements on a great many levels and will be fruitful with positive results for the country.

Or as the paper put it more succinctly in the first bullet point in favor of extending the amnesty, "It will result in progress in the stabilization of socio-economic life, in the acceptance of ventures by national authorities, and in significantly decreasing the threat

¹⁰⁴ Propozycje w sprawie rozszerzenia zakresu stosowania ustawy z dnia 17 lipca 1986 r. o szczególnym postępowaniu wobec sprawców niektórych przestępstw [Proposition concerning expanding the law from 17 July 1986 about procedures against criminals], dated September 9, 1986, AAN, KC PZPR, V/316; also published in Antoni Dudek and Andrzej Friszke, ed., *Polska 1986-1989: koniec systemu* vol. 3 (Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Trio, 2002), 13-19.; quoted at 14.

of interference by hostile powers in the internal situation of the nation."¹⁰⁵ Western pressure was working.

Taking into account all of these benefits, the PZPR extended the amnesty to include *all* political prisoners. The MSZ met with foreign diplomats over the next few days to explain the decision and made the decision public on September 11. By September 15, 1986, Bujak, Frasyniuk, and all other remaining political prisoners were released.¹⁰⁶ Western political and economic pressure had successfully forced Jaruzelski's government to pardon all of the members of Poland's democratic opposition. Bujak and his co-conspirators could now walk the streets of Warsaw and meet openly at friends' apartments.

* * *

This amnesty proved to be the last one that the PZPR ever had to approve. Unlike previous releases, political activists were not quickly rearrested and convicted of crimes against the state. In retrospect, September 1986 was a watershed event. In retrospect, most scholars agree that the 1986 amnesty was the final departure point for the democratic revolution of 1989.¹⁰⁷ As Andrzej Paczkowski has argued, the key period for understanding the transformation of the PZPR's attitudes towards Poland's internal opposition movement was the decade preceding the 1986 amnesty: "One could thus say that the fundamental part of the struggle between the opposition and the communists,

¹⁰⁵ Ibid., 14-15.

¹⁰⁶ Diehl, "Poland Declares Amnesty, Political Prisoners to be Released," *Washington Post* (Sept. 12, 1986): A1; and Bobinski, "Warsaw Decides to Free Remaining Prisoners," *Financial Times* (Sept. 12, 1986): A2.

¹⁰⁷ For example, see Dudek, *Reglamentowana Rewolucja*, 73-79; and Andrzej Garlicki, *Karuzela* (Warsaw: Czytelnik, 2003), 5, 24-32.

who enjoyed a monopoly [on] power, was waged in a period from [1977] . . . to the events of September 1986, which inaugurated a negotiated transformation of Poland into a democratic country."¹⁰⁸ This was the beginning of a new era in Poland's internal development. However, it was not the end either. As Wałęsa said at the time, "It is a step in the right direction. . . . A second step must still be fulfilled, a step must be taken in the direction of pluralism."¹⁰⁹

The amnesty decision provides strong evidence of how international concerns viewed through the country's internal economic crisis affected Poland's internal transformation. Threats of continuing Western sanctions and Western pressure successfully pushed the PZPR to free all its remaining political prisoners, because if sanctions remained in place the PZPR knew that they would never extricate themselves from their economic crisis. Without access to transcripts from the Politburo meeting at which the PZPR accepted a full amnesty, it is difficult to draw concrete conclusions beyond a shadow of a doubt about the exact mixture of international concerns that pushed the decisions. But by placing the decision within the international context of 1986 it is clear that the most important international actors were the Soviet Union, Western Europe, and the United States, in that order.

First and foremost, Gorbachev's rise to power inaugurated a new era of permissiveness and reform within the socialist bloc. At the Twenty-Seventh CPSU Party Congress in February and March 1986, Gorbachev had unveiled his new policies of *perestroika* (transformation) and *uskorenia* (acceleration). It was still unclear if

¹⁰⁸ Andrzej Paczkowski, "From Amnesty to Amnesty: the Authorities and the Opposition in Poland, 1976-1986," paper presented at a conference, "From Helsinki to Gorbachev, 1975-1985," Artimino, Italy, April 2006.

¹⁰⁹ As quoted in Jerzy Holzer and Krzysztof Leski, *Solidarność w podziemiu* (Łódź: Wydawnictwo Łódzkie, 1990), 115.

Gorbachev's words were just words or if they would lead to meaningful changes in the Soviet Union's behaviors; nevertheless, the PZPR closely watched and analyzed Gorbachev's steps for signs of how it could effect Poland. More importantly, by joining Jaruzelski at the Tenth Party Congress and giving his stamp of approval to the Drugi Etap Gorbachev was, at least, acquiescing and, at best, fully supporting the PZPR to include the opposition more in government efforts to normalize the situation in Poland. Neither Brezhnev, Chernenko, nor Andropov had ever been this permissive. Expanding the amnesty was, therefore, an extension of policies that Jaruzelski knew Gorbachev and his Moscow comrades had approved. The geo-political realities of Poland's position behind the Iron Curtain made it obvious that far reaching reforms in Poland could not advance without Soviet acquiescence or support.

In terms of influences from outside the Soviet Bloc, Western pressure pushed the PZPR to free the last remaining political prisoners. The documentation conclusively shows this. By early 1986, the PZPR had concluded that they could not rebuild and strengthen their economy without new Western investment and possibly new Western credits. In order to access Western money the PZPR acquiesced to political demands which the West been making since January 1982 for the release of political prisoners. The trickier point of interpretation comes when determining what exactly the PZPR meant in their document by "West" and "Western." Were they referring to the United States or Europe? In his work Paczkowski focuses on the July 9 meeting with Swarz as the catalyst for change. In effect Paczkowski argues that the hope of gaining new credits

from the United States was enough to push the PZPR to release the remaining political prisoners.¹¹⁰

However, taking a longer view of Polish-American relations casts some doubts on the centrality of American actions. First of all, documentary evidence on direct American influence is weak. A record of the conversation between Swartz and Patusiak was sent to the PZPR Central Committee Foreign Department and to Jaruzelski, but was not included in materials prepared for any Politburo meeting. Only the document on West Europe, particularly mentioning the July 30 EEC demarche, made it to the full Politburo. Moreover, the documentary record does not mention any PZPR attempt to follow up on Swartz's original offer or even to clarify that offer. In a July 28 meeting between Swarz and Bogumił Sujka (a member of the MSZ American department), neither side mentioned any pending deal for Bujak or anyone else's release.¹¹¹ When the head of the State Department's East European Department, Martin Wenick, met with MSZ officials in Warsaw on August 18 the subject did not come up in any specific terms either, with the MSZ concluding that there were "absolutely no" new moves being taken by the United States. The Poles assumed that any response to the amnesty would only come after it was completed, when Washington could confirm that people were not simply being rearrested.¹¹² Polish files also do not contain any mention of an attempt to confirm Swarz's offer through diplomatic contacts in Washington. More importantly, the head of

¹¹⁰ For Paczkowski's argument, see Paczkowski, "Playground of the Superpowers," 388. Paczkowski's argument is generally accepted in the Polish historiography. For example, Antoni Dudek and Andrzej Friszke both footnote Paczkowski on this issue.

¹¹¹ Notatka z rozmowy z Radcą-Ministrem Ambassady USA p. Swarz'em [Note from the conversation with Minister-counsellor of the U.S. embassy Mr. Swartz], dated July 28, 1986, AAN, KC PZPR, XIA/1422, 280-282. This note was sent to all Politburo members.

¹¹² Notatka z rozmowy z dyrektorem Departamentu Europy Wschodniej Departamentu Stanu USA Martinem A. Wenickiem w dniu 18 sierpnia br. [Note from a conversation with the director of the East European Department of the Department of State, Martin A. Wenick, on 18 August], dated August 18, 1986, MSZ, 14/89, W-3, Dep III (1986), AP 220-1-86.

the American embassy, John Davis, was not contacted to confirm any kind of deal. The absence of other evidence about Swarz's offer is conspicuous and raises doubts about how seriously the offer was taken.

Most telling, however, was the long-term trend in the U.S.-Polish relationship: relations with the United States had hardly improved since the declaration of martial law. If anything, relations in 1985 and early 1986 were worse than contacts during a relative warm period in bilateral relations in 1983 and 1984. In 1986, Poland and the United States remained in a stalemate with each side waiting for the other to take a significant step. As the MSZ noted in its annual review in 1986 there was little hope for any improvement in relations with the United States. After nearly five years of bad relations there was also little trust in bilateral relations. In Washington, policy-makers continued to feel "tricked" by earlier deals to release political prisoners, only to see them rounded up and jailed again. On the Polish side, the PZPR was consistently angered by Washington's track record of only begrudgingly offering small incentives for steps toward liberalization as part of the "step-by-step" policy. The Poles had even rejected the entire step-by-step or small steps framework in 1984. Official Polish policy was to wait for the United States to lift all remaining sanctions before responding. Finally the MSZ had spent the previous years refusing to give in to American pressure. Given that background, it is highly unlikely that a comment made by a mid-level diplomat could have caused such a drastic policy reversal.

The more likely source of pressure which pushed the PZPR to expand the amnesty was from Western Europe. Throughout 1985 and into 1986 Poland made real gains in relations with West Europeans. It had broken the political blockade and had

begun to see some much needed economic rewards. At the beginning of 1986, the PZPR was hopeful that political gains would lead to improved economic relations. That optimism about future progress was reflected in an annual prognosis for foreign relations prepared early in 1986, which noted:

There remains an interlocking reflexivity between the internal situation and foreign affairs. In contrast to the last few years, the expected improvement of the international climate in Europe would offer more favorable external conditions for the sake of improving the internal situation in Poland; that is, accelerating the process of overcoming the effects of the social-economic crisis and deepening socialist democracy.

There had been no such improvement in either political or economic relations with the United States. When PZPR documents refer to a "re-evaluation in the Western campaign against socialist nations" and increases in "the quantity of economic and political visits of a high level as [led to] contacts and agreements being concluded," the PZPR was definitely referring to the countries of Western Europe.¹¹³ As the PZPR was plainly and painfully aware, Washington had not re-evaluated its relationship with Poland; France, Italy, West Germany, and (to a lesser extent) Great Britain had. The same goes for high level visits; only West European nations had taken or received these kinds of visits.

Second, in 1986 the PZPR had begun to accept West European links between economic improvements and human rights. This connection was explicitly made in the MSZ's prognosis for foreign relations in 1986:

The central criteria for the credibility of Poland in the international arena remains the state of the internal situation and the national economy. In this sense, more active and effective activity by Poland in 1986 will be possible under the conditions which follow further progress in stabilizing the internal situation and developing the country's economy.¹¹⁴

¹¹³ Progniza Rozwoju Sytuacji Międzynarodowej w 1986 r., 71.

¹¹⁴ *ibid.* This paragraph directly proceeded the large quote from the previous paragraph.

The United States might have been the loudest voice on human rights, but the MSZ was well aware of the importance Western Europe placed on Poland's internal development and liberalization. As Tim Simmins, a British embassy official in 1986, recalls:

Margaret Thatcher felt very strongly . . . that martial law was not an internal affair of a sovereign country that could be coped with in the way we had coped with previous crack-downs within the Soviet bloc before. Something bigger and more important had happened in 1981, and throughout the 1980s under her government, the British government position towards the PRL was that much tougher.¹¹⁵

Records from Foreign Minister Howe's visit in 1985 confirm this viewpoint. Italy and France engaged in similar conversations, verifying West European attempts to influence decisions about political prisoners. Human rights was not only an American concern. And, whereas the PZPR had consistently rejected any attempt by Washington to link restrictions to internal developments as an infringement upon sovereignty, the MSZ was willing to accept the "reflexivity" in relations to the West Europeans. The British-led EEC demarche on July 30 placed the link between the internal situation and foreign affairs front and center.

Finally, in 1986 the Poles had something to lose in relations with the West Europeans. The European threat—to halt improvements in relations if all political prisoners were not released—would have meant a return to the political and economic isolation of early 1982. Four years of hard won progress in relations with Western Europe would have been lost. The same was not true in Polish-American relations: even if the PZPR accepted Swarzewski's statements as a legitimate deal, it only offered the hope of improved relations. As the Poles knew full well from previous experience, the United States held very tightly to their restrictions and sanctions. In the case of Western Europe,

¹¹⁵ Author's interview with Simmins.

however, the PZPR had been given a concrete and easily enforceable ultimatum: release all prisoners or return to political and economic isolation.

Both the United States and Western Europe were putting pressure on Poland in 1986. Undoubtedly an offer of new American credits would have been enticing to a government looking to increase foreign investment. However, given the fact that Swartz's comments do not appear in the Politburo records and references to European moves do, it seems likely that Europe played the key role in this decision. Poland also had a lot more to lose if relations with the Europeans turned sour. After five years of bad blood there were few incentives for the Poles to believe Swartz's offer or to hope that their actions could somehow sway Washington's opinions and transform Reagan's policies towards the Poles.

Even though the United States was not directly responsible for the PZPR's policy redirection in 1986, the amnesty was still a success for American foreign policy. The United States had led the drive to impose Western sanctions in the first place in December 1981 and January 1982. The American belief (shared by the internal Polish opposition) that economic sanctions and restrictions would force the Communist government to change its policies was correct. The need for foreign currency was a fundamental weakness and vulnerability in the Polish economy, exacerbated by Western sanctions. A need to redress this investment problem led the Polish government to accept foreign intervention on matters of human rights and political prisoners. However, if West Europeans had not begun to drop political and especially economic sanctions in 1985, the West would have not had as much leverage in 1986. Because of Western European involvement, Poland had much more to lose if the amnesty was only partial. From a close

reading of the September 9 Politburo meeting it becomes clear that these European concerns were at the forefront of PZPR decision making. The amnesty of 1986 was more of an Allied triumph than a purely American one.¹¹⁶

With this Allied victory, the PZPR took a second significant step toward fulfilling Western demands to lift economic sanctions (martial law had been lifted and all political prisoners had been released). In terms of Polish-American relations, however, contacts and trust remained strained. But with this second demand met, not only had Poland's internal situation been transformed, so had relations with the United States.

¹¹⁶ My insistence that this was an allied victory rather than a primarily American obviously leads to a separate question, How central was the United States in getting the Europeans to accept and maintain economic sanctions for the first half of the 1980s? As I explain in chapter 1, the United States was the driving force behind declaring NATO-wide sanctions in 1982. However, it is also clear that the limited sanctions that were ultimately accepted were a much shorter list than what the Americans wanted. This outcome and available documentation leads me to believe that the sanctions that the other Allies accepted had the support of France, Italy, and Great Britain, and at least begrudging support from West Germany. As the 1980s progressed, given Margaret Thatcher, Helmut Kohl, and Francois Mitterand's anti-communist records, it is doubtful that they would have quickly lifted the most meaningful sanctions on new credits even without American pressure to maintain them. Nonetheless, further study of America's actions to keep sanctions robust, particularly through international organizations like the IMF and COCOM, is necessary. I have begun the process of obtaining information from the IMF and World Bank archives to see their records on the issue. I have also recently learned from Dr. Jacquelyn McGlade of Penn State, Shenango Campus, that a complete set of COCOM records is available at the French Foreign Ministry. Once one receives access to the ministry, I have been told, the records are completely open to researchers without excisions or restrictions. The French Foreign Ministry also holds records for the Paris Club.

Chapter 5

"Very good and getting better":

Reengagement and Reinforcement,

September 1986 to February 1988

On January 28, 1987, Deputy Secretary of State John Whitehead's plane landed on the tarmac at Okęcie Airport as an "authoritative" member of the Reagan administration, the highest level American visitor since 1981. Whitehead traveled to Warsaw to meet with leaders from all of the major players in Poland including Jaruzelski, Glemp, and Wałęsa. When he stepped off the plane, however, he was greeted by Jan Kinast who told him that Wałęsa would be unable to travel to Warsaw to meet because he had already taken all of his vacation days from his electrician's job at the Gdańsk shipyards. Whitehead was surprised and upset that the PZPR blocked his meeting at this late point. In the spur of the moment, he decided to take a gamble: Whitehead said that if Wałęsa could not come to him, he would fly to Gdańsk instead of meeting with Jaruzelski. By the time the deputy secretary made it to his hotel room, the government had reversed their position, and told Whitehead that Kinast had been misunderstood. Wałęsa would be in Warsaw as scheduled.¹

Following the complete amnesty in September 1986, the United States followed a cautious policy to reengage with the Polish government. Over a series of high-level

¹ Whitehead, *Life in Leadership* (New York: Basic Books, 2005), 163-165. I have heard numerous versions of this story from American diplomats, a story that ranks high in the lore of U.S.-Polish relations.

meetings and negotiations, culminating in Vice President Bush's visit in September 1987, Washington moved methodically to lift all remaining sanctions and then normalize economic and political relations. By Whitehead's second visit to Poland in January 1988, bilateral relations had experienced nearly eighteen months of improvement and trust was returning. Over this same period, the United States did not neglect the opposition in order to improve government-to-government relations. Congress, NGOs, and the NED took increasingly bold moves to ensure that American money to Solidarność increased, as the opposition played an ever greater role in public life. In post-amnesty Poland, American humanitarian aid decreased, but the long-term effects showed how aid policy amplified American soft power, with positive results. Overall, the period from September 1986 to February 1988 was remarkably cordial compared to the previous five years, with bilateral relations taking a new direction and long-term policies to support the opposition bearing fruit.

Calls for a Change

Keeping with previous policy, the White House's responded guardedly to PZPR statements in September 1986 that the amnesty would apply to *all* political prisoners. On September 12, White House Spokesman Larry Speakes presented a cautious front, "We hope that this is a genuine and complete amnesty. . . . We will be monitoring the release closely to see that the government of Poland keeps its commitments." The State Department spoke in equally restrained terms restating the administration's longstanding position, "If the Polish government takes meaningful liberalizing measures, we are

prepared to take equally significant and concrete steps of our own."² In private Assistant Secretary of State Rozanne Ridgway told Ludwiczak that they were pleased but were waiting to see how the amnesty was implemented and how it affected dialogue with in Poland.³ In a further sign of prudence, Shultz did not meet with Foreign Minister Orzechowski during the Forty-first Opening Session of the U.N. General Assembly.⁴ As one unnamed official made clear, the policy reflected "'a certain wait-and-see quality to U.S. policy' as Washington gauges whether the Warsaw government is 'fully serious and will fully maintain the spirit of the amnesty by not rearresting any of the freed political prisoners.'"⁵ In Warsaw, the MSZ regarded the American response as "very qualified [*bardzo powściągliwa*]."⁶

While the administration discussed options, public voices pressured the White

² As quoted in David Ottoway, "U.S. Hails Announcement Of Poland's Amnesty Plan," *Washington Post* (Sept. 13, 1986): A19.

³ Pilna Notatka w sprawie reakcji amerykańskich na decyzję rządu polskiego o zwolnieniu wszystkich osób skazanych oraz aresztowanych za przestępstwa przeciwko państwu i porządkowi publicznemu [Urgent Note regarding the American reaction to the Polish government's decision about freeing all convicted and arrested people for offenses against the nation and the public order], dated October 1, 1986, MSZ, 14/89, W-3, Dep III (1986), AP 22-1-86/A.

⁴ Congressman Dante Fascell told Ludwiczak in mid-August that he would speak with Schultz about arranging a meeting with Orzechowski in New York, apparently peaking Polish hopes (Notatka dotycząca ewentualnego spotkania Ministra Spraw Zagranicznych M. Orzechowskiego z Sekretarzem Stanu USA G. Shultzem podczas 41 Sesji Zgromadzenia Ogólnego ONZ w N. Jorku [Note regarding the eventual meeting of Minister of Foreign Relations M. Orzechowski with Secretary of State G. Shultz during the 41st openings session of the U.N.], dated c. August 1986, MSZ, 14/89, W-3, Dep III [1986], AP 22-8-86). The Poles went as far as writing talking points for the possible meeting (Tezy do rozmowy Towarzysza Ministra M. Orzechowskiego z Sekretarzem Stanu USA, G. Shultz'em w czasie pobytu w Nowym Jorku na 41-szej Sesji ZO NZ [Theses for Comrade Minister M. Orzechowski's conversation with U.S. Secretary of State G. Shultz during the trip to New York for the 41st Session of the U.N.], dated September 16, 1986, MSZ, 14/89, W-3, Dep III (1986), AP 22-8-86). The meeting does not appear to have taken place. The Polish record for Orzechowski's visit to New York does not include any mention on a meeting (Notatka o udziale delegacji polskiej w pracach 41 sesji Zgromadzenia Ogólnego NZ w okresie 16 września - 3 października 1986 r. [Note about the activities of the Polish delegation during the 41st Opening Session of the U.N. from 16 September to 3 October], dated October 8, 1986, AAN, KC PZPR, V/319, 260-270), and *New York Times* reported that no meetings were planned ("U.S. Considers Lifting Sanctions on Warsaw," [Sept. 27, 1986]: A1). During this opening session Schultz negotiated intensely with Soviet foreign minister Shevardnadze to dispel the Danilov Affair and make arrangements for the Reykjavik Summit.

⁵ As quoted in George Moffet III, "Administration urged to lift remaining sanctions on Poland," *Christian Science Monitor* (Oct. 1, 1986): 5.

⁶ Pilna Notatka w sprawie reakcji amerykańskich.

House to drop all remaining sanctions. The most robust calls came from Capitol Hill. Even before all political prisoners were freed, thirty-three Congressmen from both political parties led by Democratic Representative Bill Lipinski from a Chicago district sent a letter to the president calling for an end to sanctions.⁷ Democratic Representatives Steven Solarz (who had just returned from a trip to Poland) and Dante Fascell, along with Republican congressman Frank Murkowski, held a widely reported press conference on September 26 calling for the United States to

move quickly to lift the last remaining sanctions—the denial of most favored nation status and the prohibition of government guaranteed credits—that were imposed upon Poland . . . [because] a failure to respond positively to Warsaw's initiative would forfeit our best chance of exerting influence on the course of events in Poland.⁸

The Polish American Congress joined voices with Capitol Hill. As of June 27, the PAC National Board of Directors resolved that, if all political prisoners were released, sanctions should be lifted. They also advocated a "more flexible position in regard to guaranteed bank credits."⁹ In line with this policy Jan Nowak-Jezioranski, national director for PAC, wrote an editorial criticizing the administration for lifting sanctions against the Soviet Union but maintaining them against Poland. He argued that U.S. policy "appears to have lost its way" and was "losing the very leverage our sanctions were meant to provide, at a time when it could be used in a most positive way."¹⁰ A week later Nowak and PAC President Mazewski joined Rep. Solarz's press conference, and continued to press for a change in course. In Nowak's words, "If [the Polish leadership's]

⁷ The letter appears in Polish files in MSZ, 14/89, W-3, Dep III (1986), AP 22-1-86/A.

⁸ As quoted in "U.S. Considers Lifting Sanctions on Warsaw," A1. See also David Ottaway, "U.S. Weighs Lifting Sanctions Against Poland," *Washington Post* (Sept. 27, 1986): A24.

⁹ Polish American Congress Resolution, dated June 27, 1986, RRPL, Paula Dobriansky Files, Box 90893, Poland Memoranda 1986-1987 (6).

¹⁰ Jan Nowak, "Poland and US sanctions: a time for reappraisal," *Christian Science Monitor* (Sept. 16, 1986): 14.

hopes do not materialize, there is a likelihood of retrogression. . . . [A] carrot offered by the U.S. can help the opposition more than maintaining sanctions."¹¹

Voices from the Catholic Church also continued to call for an end to sanctions. In Warsaw and the Vatican, Glemp and John Paul II had long called for sanctions to be lifted. During a visit to the United States in September 1985, Glemp was unequivocal in his position, calling sanctions "unjust toward the Polish nation," adding that "the rupture of economic and scientific collaboration is of great damage to the Polish people."¹² In early October 1986, Archbishop John Krol of Philadelphia added his weight to the issue, writing a letter to the president about his recent trip to Poland and passing on a *Philadelphia Inquirer* editorial calling for sanctions to be dropped. Krol noted that "the greatest majority of Poles would appreciate the lifting of sanctions, and, hopefully, the Polish government would be encouraged in its efforts."¹³ The message from Congress, PAC, and Cardinal Krol was clear: sanctions had lost their usefulness, maintaining them any longer would do more harm than good.

The most important voices, however, did not come from the United States; they came from within Poland. On September 22, Wałęsa wrote a letter to Reagan appealing for him to lift all remaining sanctions.

It is not our fault that Poland's economic situation, and along with it our society's conditions of life and health, are continuously getting worse. The specter of catastrophe is rising before us, a catastrophe which could threaten the physical existence of our people and its identity.

It is because of this concern I write to you, Mr. President, with an appeal that the government of the United States take into consideration actions which would contribute to the betterment of Polish societal situation and eliminate the economic sanctions which are still in force

¹¹ As quoted in "Administration urged to lift remaining sanctions on Poland," 5.

¹² As quoted in Marjorie Hyer, "Glemp Ends Seven-Day Visit," *Washington Post* (Sept. 16, 1985): A30.

¹³ Letter from Archbishop Krol to President Reagan with attachment, dated October 9, 1986, RRPL, Paula Dobriansky Files, Box 90893, Poland Memorandum 1986-1987 (3).

against Poland. Please understand our desire to avoid anything which deepens our country's isolation from the Western world, with whom we are joined by ties of culture and moral values.¹⁴

On October 10, Wałęsa followed this private message with a public appeal published in the Catholic weekly *Tygodnik Powszechny* and signed by himself and a group of his advisors. The appeal called for the abolition of all remaining economic sanctions and to restore scientific, cultural, and personal exchanges with America and the West.¹⁵

Vienna

As public pressure grew, policy wheels began to spin. First Davis was brought back to Washington, then Schultz called a meeting of his top aides to discuss actions vis-à-vis Poland on Saturday, September 27,¹⁶ "debating whether to complete the normalization process by dropping the last of several sanctions." The State Department then sent its analysis to the White House for final review on how to proceed.¹⁷ Despite this flurry of activity, the policy process progressed slowly. In fall 1986, Poland was a secondary concern in foreign relations. Shultz and the White House's main focus remained Gorbachev and the Soviet Union, particularly the upcoming Reykjavik Summit. As Deputy Assistant Secretary Tom Simons recalls, "Poland was not a front burner issue. . . . The policy toward Poland was really subsidiary to policy toward the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union, you have thousands of people worry about it every day. Poland, you have fewer people worry about it every day and other people worrying about it

¹⁴ Letter from Lech Wałęsa to President Reagan, dated September 22, 1986, RRPL, Paula Dobriansky Files, Box 90893, Poland Memoranda 1986-1987 (4).

¹⁵ Antoni Dudek argues that this move may have been an attempt to signal to the government that *Solidarność* was serious about negotiating. See his *Reglamentowana Rewolucja* (Kraków: Arcana Historii, 2004), 77. The appeal was published in *Tygodnik Powszechny* on October 10 and then in *Tygodnik Mazowsze* nr 185 (October 22, 1986): 1-2; available at KARTA.

¹⁶ "U.S. Considers Lifting Sanctions on Warsaw," A1.

¹⁷ "Administration urged to lift remaining sanctions on Poland," 5.

intermittently." Moreover, Washington's hopes for change in Poland were reserved.

According to Simons:

No one thought that Solidarity was going to overthrow Communism in Poland . . . because as you say [the government] have the guns, they have the ideology, they have the backing. But that does not mean you do not support Solidarity, especially in the Reagan administration. You have a strong ideological commitment to support Solidarity from martial law. . . . It was something you did because it was right, because it fit in the overall matrix of keeping pressure on the Communist system, the Soviet Union and its ancillary regimes in Eastern Europe, and enhancing liberty. So, there were three reasons to do it, but you did not put a lot of eggs into that basket. You did not put a lot of effort, a lot of energy, a lot of resources into it.¹⁸

Even with significant changes occurring on the ground in Warsaw, Poland remained a secondary priority.

In addition, the idea of rewarding Jaruzelski remained controversial. As Schultz recalls, "My effort to encourage change in Eastern Europe was actively opposed by many on the NSC staff, in the CIA, and in the Defense Department—people who believed that we should shun all 'evil empire' leaders and avoid visits to them that would 'enhance their credibility.'"¹⁹ Debate within the Reagan administration apparently fit within earlier patterns: some within the NSC and Defense took a more ideological view and blocked moves toward gradual normalization with the Polish government. Within State, opposition came from Dick Solomon and Nelson Ledsky on the Policy Planning Staff, and from within the department's Counselor's office, a group that even called themselves the "three ravens," for their opposition to the general direction in State. The Treasury Department added its weight in favor of maintaining sanctions.²⁰ For Simons these

¹⁸ Author's interview with Tom Simons, July 7, 2007. Tom Simons was deputy assistant secretary of state from mid-1986 until June 1989.

¹⁹ George Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1993), 873.

²⁰ Author's email correspondence with Simons, May 22, 2007.

arguments fell into three basic strains:

They thought the regime had a very narrow margin for maneuver, so you were unlikely to get very much in return for whatever it was you were doing. They were afraid of a slippery slope . . . you take one brick out of the edifice of sanctions and the whole thing is going to collapse on you. And third, they were genuinely attached to Solidarity, to defending Solidarity and not making the kinds of concessions that would make it harder for Solidarity to maintain itself. Because we knew the regime's purpose was to get around Solidarity.²¹

Finally, all parties were concerned that the Polish government would renege on its amnesty agreement and re-arrest Solidarność leaders as they had done after the 1984 releases.²²

However, voices like Davis and Simons had a new advocate. In April 1985, Shultz replaced Kenneth Dam with a new Deputy Secretary of State, John Whitehead, a businessman from the New York area. Whitehead was brought in to be Shultz's "partner" at State (not his deputy), to run the department while the secretary was away. After a year in office, Whitehead began looking for an area in which to specialize and chose Eastern Europe. Shultz, who felt he had neglected Eastern Europe, readily agreed to the project.²³ For Shultz, "Small steps that accumulate could wind up being a big step, even if it seemed to be taking place at any one moment. Work with small steps would be a promising and reasonable shift on our part. . . John took on this assignment with enthusiasm and flair." Whitehead also brought a fresh perspective; during one meeting, he asked, "I know I'm still learning this business, but could you tell me why we can talk

²¹ Interview with Simons.

²² U.S. government documents on this decision remain classified. For general references to concerns about arrests following an amnesty, see chapter 4. This concern was also openly referred to in press accounts. See "U.S. Considers Lifting Sanctions on Warsaw," A1, and "Administration urged to lift remaining sanctions on Poland," 5.

²³ Whitehead, *Life in Leadership*, 147, 155-159.

to Gorbachev, but can't talk to Jaruzelski?"²⁴

For those working underneath him, Whitehead gave Eastern European policy a new focus that it had previously lacked. He was a "champion on the seventh floor who [gave] us the kind of consistent policy focus that you need to get anything."²⁵ Finally, Whitehead showed a real affinity toward Wałęsa and Solidarność. He believed in Solidarność's intrinsic value, filling his office with Solidarność memorabilia including a banner with the Solidarność slogan: *Gdy niemożliwe, stało się możliwe* [When impossible, became possible.]²⁶ Finally, when the Iran-Contra scandal broke in November 1986 pulling the White House and Shultz with it, Whitehead remained to run relations with Eastern Europe.

While internal American accounts from fall 1986 remain classified, American actions prove that at least State embraced a pragmatic approach to dropping sanctions.²⁷ The first signs of change came to the PZPR in a letter from former Polish Ambassador to the United Nations, Ryszard Frelek. In the letter Frelek described his meetings with Simons, Davis, and Wenick, all of whom supported "a gradual normalization of relations with Poland through the resumption of political dialogue." Moreover, the Americans were willing to reinstate MFN, allow renewed scientific-technical cooperation, and end sanctions on Export-Import Bank credits, in a step-by-step process that would be outlined

²⁴ Shultz, *Turmoil*, 694.

²⁵ Interview with Simons.

²⁶ Author's interview with Dan Fried, October 6, 2006. Dan Fried was the desk officer in Poland from 1987 to 1989.

²⁷ It is unclear what role the White House and NSC played in policy during this initial phase after the September amnesty. It is possible that State took these moves independently, while the president, NSC, and his advisers dealt with Iran Contra. The first moves taken fit within the step-by-step policy, which would mean that State did not need White House approval. This would also explain why a final decision on sanctions was delayed until February 1987.

when Davis returned to Warsaw.²⁸ When Davis returned he met with Politburo member Jozef Czyrek on October 30, proposing a bilateral meeting during upcoming CSCE meetings in Vienna. While Schultz and Orzechowski would be at the CSCE meeting, the Americans did not want a high-profile meeting. Davis did not divulge any American expectations, but he made clear that attitudes in Washington were changing.²⁹

Both sides arrived in Vienna and met on November 6. The American delegation was led by Ridgway and included Simons, Davis, Wenick, and Dobriansky. The Poles were led by Kinast and included Biały and Vice Director of Department III Ryszard Krystosik. The Americans explained that they understood each country had its own national interests, and that the meeting's purpose was to find "common interests" that they could agree and act upon. The American delegation also presented a "calendar for a return to dialogue" (also referred to as a "work plan"), which set forth steps towards normalized relations, including visits and exchanges. The highest priority visits were a parliamentary visit to Washington, a trip by Czyrek to the United States, and a visit to Warsaw by an "authoritative" member of the Reagan administration who could speak for the White House. Other steps included a new treaty on scientific-technical cooperation, efforts to confront international terrorism, American participation in the Poznań

²⁸ Notatka w uzupełnieniu do informacji przekazywanych przez tow. Ludwiczaka, pragnę wstępnie poinformować o wnioskach z moich [Ryszard Frelek] spotkań w Waszyngtonie a przede wszystkim z przedstawicielami Departamentu Stanu oraz Kongresu [Note with the endorsement of information from com. Ludwiczak, informing about conclusions from my (Richard Frelek) meeting in Washington and above all with leaders in the Department of State as well as Congress], c. October 29, 1986, AAN, KC PZPR, XIA/1422, 300-302; quoted at 300. Frelek was a professor at Warsaw University, then head of the Central Committee Foreign Department in the 1970s, and rose to be Poland's ambassador to the U.N. from 1980-1981. In 1986 he worked in New York for the Institute for East-West Security Studies. He traveled to Washington mainly to research the upcoming Reykjavik Summit, but talked with State Department officials and congressman about U.S.-Polish relations as well.

²⁹ Notatka z rozmowy członka Biura Politycznego, sekretarza KC PZPR Józefa Czyrka z charge d'Affaires Stanów Zjednoczonych Johnem Davisem w dniu 30 bm. [Note from Politburo member and PZPR Central Committee secretary Jozef Czyrek's conversation of with United States charge d'affaires John Davis on the 30th of this month], dated October 30, 1986, ISPPAN, KM, M/15/19.

International Trade Fair, American support for Poland's IMF membership, and a "generally positive" attitude toward Polish matters in the Paris Club.³⁰ Surprisingly after five years of strained relations, both sides agreed to these prescribed steps with little negotiation.

Polish representatives and American negotiators, of course, did not agree upon everything. In response to Ridgway's comments emphasizing human rights and the need for Poland to engage in a dialogue with "'important parts' of society," Kinast explained that the "Solidarność chapter [of Polish history] had come to an end." There would not be a return to the situation before December 1981, but nor would there be a return to the period before August 1980. Kinast also protested American support to "anti-socialist" forces, particularly through the propaganda activities of RFE and VOA, clarifying that propaganda and continued support for Solidarność would affect normalization. As with previous disagreements he emphasized Poland's sovereignty: "the process of national reconciliation will be run on the basis of our own Polish script."³¹

Second, the Poles disagreed about the timing for dropping sanctions. Kinast wanted sanctions lifted as the first move, but Ridgway explained that sanctions would only be dropped at the end of a preliminary "transitional period" meant "to demonstrate to the leadership from both sides that achieving improved relations is possible." As the

³⁰ Notatka Informacyjna ze spotkania z Asystentem Sekretarza Stanu USA d/s Europy i Kanady Rozanne Ridgway, w dniu 6 listopada br., w Wiedniu [Information Note from a meeting with Assistant Secretary of State for Europe and Canada Rozanne Ridgway on 6 November in Vienna], dated November 11, 1986, AAN, KC PZPR, V/322, 147-157; quoted at 148-150. Quotes are from this document. Other interesting documents on the meeting include: Instrukcja do rozmów z R. Ridgway, Asystent Sekretarz Stanu USA, w dniu 6 listopad 1986 r. w Wiedniu [Instructions for the conversation with R. Ridgway, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State, on November 6 in Vienna], dated October 31, 1986; Untitled [Handwritten Question and Answer Note about the Meeting Between Kinast and Ridgway] dated c. November 1986; Untitled [List re Kinast-Ridgway meeting], dated c. November 1986; Untitled, [Handwritten Notes re Kinast-Ridgway Mtg, 6.xi.1986 in Vienna], dated November 6, 1986; and Odpowiedź na ew. pytanie w sprawie rozmów polsko-amerykańskich [Answers to eventual questions about Polish-American conversations], dated November 10, 1986; all located in MSZ, 14/89, W-3, Dep III (1986), AP 22-9-86.

³¹ Ibid., 152-153.

Americans explained:

In the Department of State there is a cautious attitude toward matters of relations with Poland. This sense of caution results from what happened in Poland in 1984. Then "you and we, alike, made a decision." But later "the amnesty turned out to be a funeral." Many people drew the conclusion that "Poland was not operating under a sense of good will." Today a cautious attitude still persists. This will not stop [the Americans], however, from taking leading steps to a "renewed beginning of dialogue," with the goal of progress in mutual relations.³²

So, in deference to previous experience the Americans decided to keep sanctions in place until both sides could foster a sense of trust.

Although the meeting between Kinast and Ridgway went mostly unnoticed in the media,³³ it represented an important turning point in Polish-American relations.

Differences and arguments persisted, but the two sides now had a roadmap of clear steps to rebuild trust and move towards normalization. However, this was not a true negotiation between two countries; rather, Ridgway prescribed how events would progress, laying out specific steps for both sides to take. The Americans were pleased that a complete amnesty had been declared, but the specter of earlier short-lived amnesties still loomed.

For relations to progress, the Poles had to follow the series of steps dictated by the United States.³⁴

³² Ibid., 148. Material within quotes within the block quote denote that this is directly from Ridgway and is not a paraphrase. These quotes are confirmed in the Handwritten notes of the meeting, referenced in footnote 30. Ridgway's reference to "you and we, alike, made a decision" is clearly a reference to the deal brokered through Schaff in early 1984. It might also be a reference to Schaff's failed attempts to broker a larger-scale agreement between the two sides.

³³ Media coverage focused almost exclusively on Shultz's meetings with Shevardnadze to discuss arms control options following the Reykjavik summit.

³⁴ It is interesting to note the differences in perceptions surrounding this meeting. In Polish records, the Vienna meeting was seen as a turning point in relations. The Politburo was included on any information notes which dealt with the Vienna meeting, as well as developments in line with the "work plan." In interviews with Davis and Simons, however, both had trouble recalling details from the session. Simons even considered the meeting a distraction from ongoing negotiations with the Soviets. The American viewpoint is most likely a factor of low expectations within bilateral relations at that point. Nothing that was said by Kinast struck the Americans as particularly new. Davis and Simons's comments may also



Through the Transitional Period

With a new road map, the Polish negotiating team returned to Warsaw. On November 21, Kinast met with Davis to accept the American framework for moving forward. The two spoke about plans for Simons' December visit to Warsaw, as well as a Czyrek's visit to Washington in early 1987. Davis also clarified that Whitehead would be the "authoritative" Reagan administration official sent to Warsaw in 1987. Kinast expressed satisfaction with the American propositions. He even added a few other possible steps to add to the work plan: a "round-table" discussion on Polish-American relations involving the participation of PISM and the council on Foreign Relations, a new plenary session of the Polish-American Economic Council, and an effort to increase bilateral cooperation for problem-solving in the Paris Club and IMF.

The conversation was not particularly notable for what was said, but rather, for what went unsaid. Compared to the contentious meetings between Davis and Kinast which were the hallmark of bilateral relations in past years, the tenor of this meeting was downright cheery. There was no major disagreement. Neither side found reason to accuse the other of any insidious deed. No one stonewalled the other. Instead, Kinast and Davis found themselves in the unusual position of sharing opinions in a professional, pleasant manner. As Kinast summed up, "The conversation proceeded in a good atmosphere. J. Davis was obviously pleased with the presentation of our position."³⁵ Both sides had

reflect their discomfort to talk about events which remain classified in American records. From the historical perspective, however, this meeting does appear to be a noteworthy point of change.

³⁵ Notatka Informacyjna z rozmowy dniu 21 listopada br. z charge d'affaires a.i. USA J.R. Davis'em [Information Note on a conversation on November 21 with U.S. charge d'affaires a.i., J. R. Davis], dated November 23, 1986, MSZ, 14/89, W-3, Dep III (1986), AP 22-9-86. This information note was sent to all members of the PZPR Poliburo.

taken a perceptibly new approach based more on cooperation than confrontation. The new approach was confirmed by another cordial meeting between Ludwiczak and Simons on November 25.³⁶

To keep moving forward, Simons traveled to Warsaw on a "familiarization visit" from December 1 to 5, his first visit to Poland since being named deputy assistant secretary. He met with the Minister of Finance B. Samojslik and Undersecretary of State in the Ministry of Foreign Trade J. Kaczurba to discuss economic issues, specifically American participation in the Poznań International Trade Fair and further work on a new scientific-technical cooperation treaty. In conversations about the IMF and Paris Club, Simons emphasized that an "automatic improvement in that field is not possible," as if to keep Polish expectations low.³⁷ In his meeting with Kinast, Simons covered these same economic issues as well as political concerns. The two reported on progress being made in the "work plan," with Simons stressing that moves toward national reconciliation and human rights would continue to determine the pace of improvement. Kinast rejected this linkage, but nonetheless briefed Simons on internal developments, particularly the Consultative Councils and the *Ogólnopolskie Porozumienie Związków Zawodowych's* (OPZZ or All-Polish Trade Unions Agreement) recent national conference.³⁸ The two also talked about the sequence for upcoming meetings, with Simons suggesting that

³⁶ Cable from SecState to Emembassy Warsaw, "U.S.-Polish Dialogue: November 25 Discussion with Polish Charge," dated December 2, 1986, NSA, End of the Cold War Collection, scanned incoming FOIA documents.

³⁷ Notatka Informacyjna dot. pobytu w Warszawie Thomasa W. Simons'a, Zastępcy Asystenta Stanu USA d/s Europejskich [Information note about the visit to Warsaw of Thomas W. Simons, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Europe], dated December 10, 1986, MSZ, 14/89, W-3, Dep III (1986), AP 220-9-86.

³⁸ The OPZZ was founded in 1984 as a government-sponsored trade union.

Czyrek move his visit to February to better accommodate Congressional schedules.³⁹

Simon's visit with Czyrek, however, showed that old tensions remained. During their December 4 meeting, Czyrek accused Simons of intending to pursue improved relations at only a "slowed down" pace. Czyrek also defended the 1984 amnesty and subsequent events which "stemmed exclusively from domestic considerations If a mistake was made in 1984 it was that the time was not yet ripe for an amnesty." Finally Czyrek launched into an extended speech outlining Poland's "raison d'etre," which included the usual historical references to experiences since World War II with complaints that "the U.S. intends merely to use Poland against the Soviet Union." Czyrek also argued that sanctions only harmed ordinary Poles. In response:

Simons thanked Czyrek for his long presentation. He recalled . . . that [the American government hopes] that not every high-level exchange begin with full explanations of what are in essence questions of principle. They can make it more difficult to work on practical issues to mutual benefit. Secretary Shultz . . . will not react positively to that kind of lengthy statement that has just been presented. Rather it would be useful to focus on concrete areas Further the view of U.S. motivations vis-à-vis Poland, as just presented, is simply wrong. . . . As far as the U.S. is concerned, if the Polish authorities see a U.S. policy of fighting to the last Pole as the current greatest danger to Poland, Poland is as safe as if it were in the womb of the mother of God.⁴⁰

Simons' terse response relayed the message that old arguments would carry little weight in the new situation, and reflected earlier American attitudes that if Poland wanted to drive relations to zero they should feel free to do so.

Fortunately, Simons' visit did not conclude this brusquely. On Simons' last day,

³⁹ Cable from Amembassy Warsaw to SecState, "Meeting Between DAS Simons and Polish Vice Minister Kinast," dated December 4, 1986, NSA, End of the Cold War Collection, scanned incoming FOIA documents.

⁴⁰ Cable from Amembassy Warsaw to SecState, "Deputy Assistant Secretary Simons' Meeting with PZPR Politburo Member Jozef Czyrek," dated December 5, 1986, NSA, End of the Cold War Collection, scanned files.

Foreign Minister Orzechowski focused conversation on the working plan (or the "decatalogue" as the Poles referred to it, because with Polish additions the plan had ten steps): "As realists' . . . the Polish government believes that the program proposed at Vienna and subsequently agreed to should be realized quickly, thereby bringing positive elements to the bilateral relationship." Orzechowski also presented a reserved version of Polish hopes for the future: "The Polish government . . . has no illusions about the nature of U.S. interests towards the East. . . . Bilateral relations cannot be as they were in the 1970s . . . but real progress is possible, based on building an infrastructure of economic and cultural relations." As Simons responded, "The dialogue . . . should be based on realism and candor. The 'decatalogue' . . . is not a maximum but a minimum program."⁴¹

Following his Warsaw visit, Simons drafted a memo advocating next moves. He wrote the memo in a guest house in Belgrade, Yugoslavia, owned by the embassy there and sent it to Whitehead, who then sent it on to Shultz. The memo presented "the first strong recommendation of lifting sanctions and the reasons why." Above all else, Simons argued for the need to respond to the final amnesty from September "to maintain our credibility with the Jaruzelski regime." In Simons' argument, "Our response to the final amnesty of September should be as we promised, the lifting of the sanctions." Armed with this memo, Shultz and Whitehead then got approval from the White House for the "game plan" of moving to lift sanctions.⁴²

⁴¹ Cable from Amembassy Warsaw to SecState, "DAS Simons' Courtesy call on Polish Foreign Minister Orzechowski," December 9, 1986, NSA, End of the Cold War Collection, scanned incoming FOIA documents.

⁴² Interview with Simons. Simons refers to this as the "key memo." While I have requested it through FOIA, it has not been declassified. Without a record of Shultz and Whitehead's meetings with the president, it is unclear how important the memo truly was; nonetheless, Simons recommended continuing to move toward lifting sanctions. There is also some confusion as to when the memo was written. In my original interview and in Simon's article ("American Policy and the Polish Road to 1989," *Polish Review* vol. 44, no. 4 [1999]: 401-405), he recalls that the memo was written in November. Following further

In the weeks following Simons' visit developments remained on track despite a few complications. On December 8, Ludwiczak met separately with Ridgway and Armacost to be updated on American thinking. Both State Department officials assured Ludwiczak that relations remained "on track," with Ridgway "reaffirming that the U.S. [was] ready to move forward." Ridgway was concerned, however, with Polish preparations for planned visits by Senator Edward Kennedy and AFL-CIO President Kirkland; both parties were waiting for visas. Ludwiczak responded that the PZPR had concerns about Kirkland's potential visit, but said that "he would support Kirkland's trip . . . if it were necessary step for removing sanctions" and if Kirkland agreed to meet with the head of the OPZZ, Alfred Miodowicz.⁴³ Neither Kennedy nor Kirkland were granted visas, but when Ludwiczak returned from Warsaw after the holidays he reasserted the PZPR's continued intentions "'to stay the course' in pursuing . . . U.S.-Polish dialogue."⁴⁴

The two sides also ran into obstacles with scheduling Whitehead's visit to Warsaw. Orzechowski would be in Iran and Jaruzelski had planned a long-awaited skiing vacation. Ultimately, the Department of State acquiesced to the Poles restrictions, switching the order of Whitehead's East European swing making Warsaw the first stop

correspondence it is clear that this memo was written before Whitehead's trip to Warsaw in January 1987, but after Whitehead's first trip to Eastern Europe. This makes early December, after Simons' Warsaw visit, the most likely point.

While in Warsaw, Simons met with Solidarność representatives, although no records of this facet of his trip have been declassified. Wałęsa did not make the trip down from Gdańsk, but Simons probably met with Geremek, Onyszkiewicz, Mazowiecki, and Wielowieyski at the residence, with perhaps Michnik and Bujak involved. These Solidarność advisors would have reiterated the opposition's public calls for lifting sanctions.

⁴³ Cable from SecState to Amembassy Warsaw, "U.S.-Polish Relations: Polish Charge Calls on Armacost and Ridgway," dated December 11, 1986, NSA, End of the Cold War Collection, scanned incoming FOIA documents. Neither Kennedy nor Kirkland were allowed to visit in 1986. For Polish information on preparations for Kennedy's visit (which took place in May 1987), see: MSZ, 35/90, W-5, Dep III (1987), AP 220-6-87. Kirkland did not meet with Wałęsa until a visit to Paris in 1989. For Polish deliberations on his visit, see the record from a December 9, 1986, meeting with Davis in the Kennedy folder above.

⁴⁴ Cable from SecState to Amembassy Warsaw, "GOP Charge describes plan for U.S.-Polish High Level Visits," dated January 21, 1987, NSA, End of the Cold War Collection, scanned incoming FOIA documents.

instead of Sofia.⁴⁵ While none of these political concerns were particularly significant, they are notable because American and Polish actions showed mutual flexibility and the necessary political will to construct a new relationship.

As a final decision neared and Whitehead prepared to make a trip to Poland, political pressures for and against sanctions continued to swirl in Washington. A few weeks before the trip, Mazewski and Nowak met with Whitehead to say that PAC continued to support lifting sanctions despite concerns that political prisoners could be rearrested.⁴⁶ On the other side of the issue, the AFL-CIO's Adrian Karatnycky met with Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights Richard Schifter on January 23 and learned that Whitehead was "sympathetic" to lifting sanctions. In the days preceding his departure, Kirkland scheduled a meeting to lobby the deputy secretary to keep sanctions, maintaining the AFL-CIO's longstanding position against easing pressure on the Jaruzelski regime.⁴⁷

Whitehead in Warsaw

⁴⁵ See Cable from Amembassy Warsaw to SecState, "Visit of Secretary Whitehead," dated January 21, 1987, and Cable from Amembassy Warsaw to SecState, "Tentative Schedule for visit of Deputy Secretary Whitehead to Poland," dated January 26, 1987, both in NSA, End of the Cold War Collection, scanned incoming FOIA documents.

⁴⁶ Cable from SecState to Amembassy Warsaw, "Official-Informal 2," dated January 7, 1987, NSA, End of the Cold War Collection, scanned incoming FOIA documents.

⁴⁷ Memorandum from Adrian Karatnycky to Lane Kirkland, "Deputy Secretary Whitehead's Mission to Poland," dated January 23, 1987, AFL-CIO International Affairs Department Files, Inactive Records, "Poland - AK." The AFL-CIO remained steadfast in support of sanctions until the very end. Only on February 16, 1987, two days before the final decision was announced did the trade unionists drop their support for sanctions. Even then the decision was made "in deference to Solidarność." See "AFL-CIO Executive Council Statement on Poland, February 16, 1987, Bal Harbour, Fla." in GMMA, Minutes of Meetings of the Executive Council 1987, vol. 32. Apparently, when Simons ran into Kirkland at a private function in New York a few days before the final decision Kirkland was "mad as hell" (Author's correspondence with Simons). As Simons' recalls, "Steve Forbes in their office in New York had . . . an exhibit of Fabrege eggs and I met Lane Kirkland just before we did the deed in February 1987. He was angry, he was angry at me, he was angry at everyone. They were still objecting at that point. . . . They were dug in until the last minute, and for honorable reasons. We didn't moralize these things" (Interview with Simons).

The "transitional period" concluded when Whitehead traveled to Poland at the end of January 1987. Warsaw was his first stop before heading to Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia with an entourage including Simons, Dobriansky, and Wenick. In Warsaw he met first with Orzechowski, during which the foreign minister went to great lengths to explain steps taken in regards to human rights (political prisoners and new unions) and national reconciliation (the Consultative Council, in particular). The Poles also showed interest in further cultural exchanges through the U.S. Information Agency, as well as greater government coordination on international terrorism and narcotics trafficking.⁴⁸ The next day, January 30, Whitehead met with Prime Minister Zbigniew Messner to talk about human rights again, but also delving into economic matters especially desires for outside investment. As Messner explained, "Only Poland can solve its [foreign debt problem], but the only way for Poland to do so is for Poland to increase exports, and this will require new credits for modernization." He also went to great lengths to explain the economic reform efforts and price revisions his government had undertaken, indirectly confirming the central role of economic concerns in decision making.⁴⁹

On his final day, Whitehead met with Jarzuelki for nearly three hours. Once again, the deputy secretary stressed human rights. But in a shift from earlier policy, he did not emphasize the Helsinki Final Act or other treaty obligations. Instead, Whitehouse took a much simpler approach:

⁴⁸ Cable from Amembassy Warsaw to SecState,, "Deputy Secretary Whitehead's Meeting with Polish Foreign Minister Orzechowski, Thursday, January 29, 1987, NSA, End of the Cold War Collection, scanned incoming FOIA documents. See also Tezy do Rozmów z J. Whitehead'em, Zastępcą Sekretarza Stanu USA [Theses for Conversaton with J. Whithead, U.S. Deputy Secretary of State], dated January 26, 1987, MSZ, 35/90, W-5, Dep III (1987), AP 220-2-87.

⁴⁹ Cable from Amembassy Warsaw to Secstate, "Deputy Secretary Whitehead's Meeting with Prime Minister Messner, Friday, January 30, 1987," dated January 31, 1987, NSA, End of the Cold War Collection, scanned incoming FOIA documents.

I told them that they have a sovereign right to resist interference in their internal affairs. But I also said that we . . . have a sovereign right to choose our friends, and that one of the criteria we use to make that choice is where a country stands in its willingness to give its citizens the basic human freedoms we value.⁵⁰

Whitehouse was not chastising Jaruzelski for his actions. His approach treated Jaruzelski more as an equal and gave him the choice of how to run his government. As Simons recalls Whitehead argued "if you don't want to deal with the United States, you don't have to. . . . But if you do want to deal with the United States this is the kind of country we are, these are the kinds of things we want. [It's] up to you. . . . It was friendly. It was not an ultimatum, but it was firm."⁵¹

Jaruzelski responded positively to this line of reasoning, and refrained from the kind of tirade he had given Congressman Long and subsequent visitors when human rights were raised.⁵² Jaruzelski, however, upheld his convictions. He defended the decision to declare martial law, chastised the America for sanctions, and condemned America's tradition of treating Poland like a "pawn" in the struggle between the superpowers. Jaruzelski also laid out four points where he saw room for Washington to make improvements. First he emphasized the importance of maintaining the Potsdam agreements which set Europe's borders. Second, he complained that Poland was "the object of a massive propaganda campaign" which needed to end. Third, he rejected American support for "anti-national and destructive" groups and made clear that "there will not be an agreement with extremists." Finally he based further improvements in

⁵⁰ Briefing Memo, "Statement to the North Atlantic Council, Brussels, Belgium," dated February 6, 1987, NSA, End of the Cold War Collection, scanned incoming FOIA documents.

⁵¹ Interview with Simons. Whitehead was presenting a new variant of the "you need us more than we need you" approach that had been part of American strategy since 1984 (see chapter 3).

⁵² Whitehead, *Life in Leadership*, 170. Simons confirmed this in my interview with him.

relations on lifting all remaining sanctions.⁵³

While Jaruzelski remained resolute in his convictions, he also showed some new flexibility. He downplayed the importance of ideological confrontation, saying that Coca Cola had been "a symbol of evil, imperialism. But that thinking was left behind thirty years ago. We drink Coke, but I don't overestimate its taste value." He also said that he was open to some amount of pluralism. In Jaruzelski's words, "We are sympathetic toward democracy. We are not afraid of a 'constructive' opposition." He rejected Solidarność as "generals without an army," but he did talk frankly about ongoing moves towards national reconciliation. He also emphasized efforts to create trade union pluralism through the OPZZ. Finally, Jaruzelski spoke openly about Poland's massive debt problem and its sincere desire to repay the West.⁵⁴

Jaruzelski also personally opened up to Whitehead, providing insight into his sense of betrayal following the application of sanctions. As the transcript of the Jaruzleski-Whitehead meeting reads:

The USA, Wojciech Jaruzelski said, is looking for a formula of how to untie the knot of relations with Poland "without losing face." That is important for a superpower, and we will do our best to get you out. But we also "have face," we have our dignity. If someone has face and money, if they lose face, they still have money. We do not have money. We only have face. We can not and we do not want to lose it. Dignity has tremendous importance for us. We did not give it up at that time, when we experienced our dramatic difficulty. Therefore it is necessary to seek a

⁵³ The American cable for this conversation has not been declassified. The quotes are taken from the extensive Polish record of the meeting which reads like a stenographic account, Notatka Informacyjna przesyłam zapis rozmowy przewodniczącego Rady Państwa Tow. Wojciech Jaruzelskiego z Zastępą Sekretarza Stanu USA Johnem C. Whiteheadem, w dniu 31 Stycznia 1987 roku [Information Note including a transcript of the chair of the National Council com. Wojciech Jaruzelski's conversation with U.S. Deputy Secretary of State John C. Whitehead on 31 January 1987], dated February 17, 1987, MSZ, 35/90, W-5, Dep III (1987), AP 220-2-87. A slightly different second copy is available in ISPPAN, KM, M/16/3.

⁵⁴ Ibid.

proper solution.⁵⁵

Jaruzelski maintained his opposition to American sanctions, but pursued a more honest conversation between the two sides. He showed a willingness to move beyond old grudges to work with Whitehead to create a more "natural" or normalized relationship. Whitehead saw himself doing the same thing. The governments were now indulging in a true dialogue, with both sides listening and responding.

Meeting Jaruzelski was not the most notable part of Whitehead's trip to Warsaw; the most important event was dinner with Wałęsa at the Davises' residence. As with other gatherings, the dinner was not meant to be an official meeting with the Americans advising the opposition. This was a chance for Whitehead to hear privately and directly from Wałęsa (not through advisors or intermediaries in Brussels) about what the U.S. government should do on their behalf.⁵⁶ Over the course of dinner Wałęsa argued that there was a need for compromise in Poland to "pass smoothly through the current phase." He also spoke about Solidarność's forthcoming economic plan and his own hopes that U.S. relations with the PZPR would improve to give the Americans greater influence to move the government "in a desirable direction."

Finally, Wałęsa and his advisors made clear to the visitors that Solidarność "supported the lifting of the remaining American economic sanctions. . . . The time had come for a new approach." Solidarność also clarified that they wanted the sanction lifted "in such a way that manifests the United States' continued support for Solidarity and

⁵⁵ Ibid. Whitehead refers to this part of the conversation in his memoirs as well (*Life in Leadership*, 170-171); however, the two accounts do not agree on precisely what Jaruzelski said. Only the tenor of the conversation is the same. It is clear from other factual errors in the autobiography that Whitehead was not working from specific documents, but rather his memory. Therefore, I have chosen to quote from the Polish record, rather than Whitehead's memoirs.

⁵⁶ In addition to Wałęsa, Michnik, Kuron, Geremek, Onyszkiewicz, Andrzej Wielowiejski, Tadeusz Mazowiecki, Klemens Szaniawski, and Witold Trzeciakowski were invited to the dinner.

concern for the human rights situation." The opposition did not want a return to the easy loans of the 1970s. Instead, "a new way needed to be found to use economic means to achieve Solidarity's political goal of the democratization of public life in Poland."⁵⁷ To make his point crystal clear, Wałęsa handed Whitehead an aide-memoir requesting that all remaining sanctions—including reinstating MFN and ending prohibitions on guaranteed loan credits—be dropped immediately. As for future investment, new credits should "depend on the realization of economic reform and the democratization of public life. . . . Each step on the road of democratizing public life in Poland should be answered by concrete activities in the area of economic aid."⁵⁸

When Whitehead left Poland he was optimistic about the future. As he told the NAC after visiting Prague and Sofia, "I have become convinced that there are some opportunities [in Eastern Europe] for the West. I think we should be alert to every chance to influence these countries when and where we can. . . . I am convinced that the potential for change is large in the area and that the situation in these countries in relation to the Soviet Union is not hopeless."⁵⁹ Whitehead also saw Jaruzelski as a possible partner; he felt Jaruzelski had provided "a reaffirmation that the degree of freedom that had been granted would not be rolled back." Most importantly, Whitehead had gotten "to hear it face to face [that Wałęsa wanted sanctions dropped]. That was what was important. [Whitehead] could then go back to Washington and say, 'I talked to Lech Wałęsa, he said. . . .'"⁶⁰

⁵⁷ "Deputy Secretary Whitehead's Dinner Meeting with Lech Wałęsa."

⁵⁸ Cable from Amembassy Warsaw to SecState, "Text of Solidarity Aide-Memoir Presented by Lech Wałęsa to Deputy Secretary Whitehead," dated January 30, 1987, NSA, End of the Cold War Collection, scanned incoming FOIA documents.

⁵⁹ "Statement to the North Atlantic Council, Brussels, Belgium."

⁶⁰ Interview with Simons.

A week after Whitehead's return, the White House officially signed off on lifting all remaining sanctions against Poland. Wałęsa's personal note and Whitehead's new trust in Jaruzelski trumped any remaining arguments for maintaining them. As the presidential message sent to all NATO capitals on February 14 said, this decision had the blessing of the representatives of the Polish people, "Both Lech Wałęsa and Cardinal Glemp told us that they feel the time is right to lift the remaining U.S. economic sanctions." As Wałęsa also requested, Reagan made his support of Solidarność crystal clear: "Our support for Solidarity's goals is unabated. We will monitor the progress of dialogue between the government and the people of Poland to ensure that our policy remains responsive to continued movement toward genuine national reconciliation."⁶¹ The decision became public on February 19, 1987, in a presidential announcement, lifting all remaining sanctions most notably on MFN and CCC credits. Continuing his longstanding rhetoric, Reagan closed the statement:

Today is a first step, a big step. Our relations with Poland can only develop in ways that encourage genuine progress toward national reconciliation in that country. We will be steady. We will be committed. The flame that burns in the hearts of the Polish people, a flame represented by the candles we lit in 1981, that flame of justice and liberty will never be extinguished.⁶²

Thus, U.S.-Polish relations moved into a new era, one no longer dominated by sanctions, but by the real possibility of improved economic, political, and cultural ties. The step-by-step framework remained in place, but the Reagan administration only had new carrots to use, the old sticks were removed from the equation.

⁶¹ Cable from SecState to All NATO capitals, "Presidential Message on the Lifting of U.S. Economic Sanctions Against Poland," dated February 14, 1987, NSA, End of the Cold War Collection, scanned incoming FOIA documents.

⁶² "Statement on Lifting of Economic Sanctions Against Poland, February 19, 1987," *Public Papers of the President* (1987), available on the Reagan Library's website: www.reagan.utexas.edu. For details see also, Memo from Frank Carlucci, "Ceremony Lifting Economic Sanctions," dated February 19, 1987, RRPL, Paula Dobriansky Files, Box 90893, Poland Memoranda 1986-1987 (1).

Transitions in the Opposition

For *Solidarność*, the months following the final amnesty of September 1986 were also a transitional period. With political dissidents free, *Solidarność* faced a choice about what to do with the structures that had headed the underground opposition for nearly five years. On September 29, 1986, fifteen of *Solidarność*'s most important leaders including Wałęsa, Geremek, Mazowiecki, Lis, Bujak, and Michnik met at St. Bridgette Church in Gdańsk to discuss the movement's future. Following this meeting, Wałęsa announced in *Tygodnik Mazowsze* that a new Temporary Council of NSZZ *Solidarność* (*Tymczasowa Rada NSZZ "Solidarność"* or TR) had been inaugurated to function in the post-amnesty atmosphere and to demonstrate *Solidarność*'s "preparedness to take a step on the road to dialogue and understanding" with the government.⁶³ The TR was meant to operate above ground, but at the same time oppositionists decided to keep most of their underground operations secret. So, while the TR leadership began to play a more public role, the operational activities (printing newsletters, smuggling money and material into Poland, and distributing this money and publications) remained underground. By the end of 1986, there were two levels within the opposition: the public face of *Solidarność* including leading advisors and intellectuals (mainly in Warsaw and Gdańsk), and the activists involved in more direct oppositional activities and aware of operational details.⁶⁴

While this new public face of *Solidarność* showed that the opposition was

⁶³ For the buildup to this meeting and an analysis of it, see Friszke, "Tymczasowa Komisja Koordynacyjna," 159-166; quoted at 166.

⁶⁴ Author's interview with Konstanty Gebert, August 3, 2006. Gebert was active in the underground as an editor and publisher of independent publications, including *KOS-a*. Only a few members of the leadership, therefore, knew details about money and material coming in from the West. This separation clearly gave added protection to the political leaders. It also gave increased security to operational activists; it was easy to track Wałęsa or Geremek, but lower-level officials were harder to follow, keeping their roles secret.

regrouping, the movement did not command the same power it had during the 1980-1981 period. Part of Jaruzelski's original decision to allow a complete amnesty grew out of Solidarność's declining stature. By fall 1986, the PZPR no longer felt as threatened by the opposition. In their analysis of power dynamics, the government placed particular significance on the fact that over 75% of Poles voted in elections for the Sejm at the end of 1985, despite the fact that the opposition called for a boycott. In January 1986, the MSW Analytic Group concluded that at the end of 1985 there were 350 illegal groups and structures, mostly surrounding Warsaw, Wrocław, Gdańsk, Kraków, and Łódź, totaling around 100,000 people involved at any level in the opposition, or between 5% and 7% of the population. By May 1986, the MSW believed that the number of opposition groups and structures had dropped to 316, a decrease of 11%. When Bujak was arrested, the MSW reported that the "position of the TKK in the underground had been ruined." Further the preceding years had seen the growth of a new ecological and pacifist opposition movement, Wolność i Pokój (WiP or Freedom and Peace). To the MSW this demonstrated Solidarność's weakened position. From this analysis, the PZPR believed that Solidarność was weak enough to coopt the opposition structures into working with the government through groups like the Consultative Council.⁶⁵

In the days directly preceding the final amnesty announcement and in the months that followed, the MSW further demonstrated that they maintained strict control over the situation, regardless of the release of political prisoners. As Bujak was about to be released, members of the security services held "some 3,000 'exposing talks' with people suspected of participating in clandestine opposition activity. . . . Many were pressed to

⁶⁵ This summary of Solidarność's weakening position, is taken from Dudek, *Reglamentowana Rewolucja*, 57-73; quoted at 68.

give police written statements promising not to break the law in the future."⁶⁶ No one was actually arrested, but in a move meant to intimidate, the security service showed that they knew who was involved in underground activities. Then on November 29, 1986, the security services intercepted a massive shipment that was being smuggled by the Coordinating Office in Brussels through Sweden. According to documentation from Milewski the seizure was worth \$141,209 and included 12 offset printing machines, 58 duplicating machines, 20 faxes, 20 scanners, 40,000 stencils, over 4 tons of printers ink, 8 computers, 16 printers, 4 radio transmitters, 6,500 books, and various electronic parts and supplies.⁶⁷ In addition, the security services began fining people found with independent publications and seizing cars used by the underground, making life more financially risky for opposition activists.⁶⁸ Even though Solidarność's political leaders were now operating above ground and it appeared that Jaruzelski would no longer be placing them in jail, the eventual outcome of the struggle between the government and the democratic opposition remained unclear.

The Embassy and the Opposition

Few elements within the U.S. government, however, questioned the necessity of supporting Solidarność. Whether or not American policy makers and foreign service officers believed that the Polish opposition would eventually triumph, the American government remained firmly loyal to Solidarność and its leaders. In Warsaw this support included expanding an already impressive information gathering apparatus to stay aware

⁶⁶ Diehl, "Poland Declares Amnesty," A1.

⁶⁷ Statement of Incurred Costs due to the Seizure of a Consignment on 29.xi.1986, undated, AFL-CIO International Affairs Department Files, Inactive Records, "Poland - AK."

⁶⁸ Bobinski, "Polish Underground Press Suffers Fines And Confiscations," *Financial Times* (Dec. 24, 1986): A2.

of opposition activities and needs in the post-amnesty atmosphere. This included a wide network of contacts run through all levels of the embassy. Shortly after coming to Warsaw in June 1986 as vice consul, Cameron Munter was assigned to keep track of and maintain contacts with different opposition members including Henryk Wujec and his wife, Ryszard Pusz, and Bogdan Lis. In the case of Wujec, who lived in Warsaw, Munter was contacted about once a month and arranged to meet at a café or other public location near the embassy. In their meetings Wujec shared information about what was going on within the opposition, news of any difficulties they were having with the government, reactions to ongoing events, views about the mood within the opposition, etc. In the case of Pusz, Munter exchanged more procedural information including who had been questioned by the security services and who had been beaten up. Pusz would also pass on information, sometimes handing Munter "grubby pieces of paper" that he would pass on to his superiors.⁶⁹

In a similar relationship, when Lis travelled down to Warsaw from Gdańsk he occasionally stood on street outside of the consular section in line with Poles applying for visas. Once inside the consular section, Munter took Lis into a back room where the two exchanged reports, news, and any other messages which Munter then up the chain of command. As Munter saw it, he was a "message relay," never making pronouncements on policy, but simply gathering information from his opposition contacts and sending it on to officers in the political section, including Davis and Political Counsel David Pozorski.⁷⁰

⁶⁹ Author's interview with Cameron Munter, May 5, 2006. Munter was a foreign service officer serving on rotation, working first as vice-consul and then as economics officer, from June 1986 through July 1988.

⁷⁰ Ibid. From the limited number of interviews I conducted, it remains unclear just how many staff members were involved in this kind of activity, or when this kind of work began. Embassy staff may well

Embassy officials were also placed in charge of contacts with other members of society colluding with the opposition. Primarily, this meant meeting with clergy, with whom the embassy consistently maintained close relations through the entirety of the 1980s. Davis maintained personal contacts with Church leaders like Cardinal Glemp and Father Bronisław Dembowski (who headed the Primate's Committee on Assistance to Prisoners), as well as some active dissident priests like Cardinal Franciszek Marcharski and Father Tadeusz Gocłowski.⁷¹ During her assignment in Warsaw from 1986 to 1988, Political officer Marilyn Wyatt was assigned to lead contacts with the Church and she found herself in charge of contacts with a group of female activists and wives of opposition leaders who met at St. Anne's church in Warsaw's Old Town. Wyatt attended weekly meetings to gather information about opposition activities, again learning who had been brought in for questioning, who was being harassed by the authorities, etc.⁷² Finally, whenever embassy officials traveled outside of Warsaw, they made sure to meet with the local parish priest to hear their views on local developments and the general mood of the country.

Information gathering was the major work of the day, because in Poland this work was greatly hampered by government censorship and misinformation. Reliable information on the economy, government reforms, or the opposition, simply was not available, so diplomats had to work very hard to determine just what was happening. For the embassy, "what was hard was figuring out what was really going on. You couldn't do

have been engaged in these types of activities, from 1982 onward. From the interview, it is clear that other staff members were given similar information-gathering assignments. However, no other people I have interviewed have offered up this kind of information.

⁷¹ Interview with Davis, November 23, 1999.

⁷² Author's interview with Marilyn Wyatt, July 8, 2004.

it from newspapers; you couldn't do it from statistics."⁷³ Thus diplomats had to talk to as many people as they could. This included exchanging information with other diplomats, particularly the British, Australian, Swedish, and French embassies, who were in step with America's outlook. Generally there was a camaraderie with all Western diplomats who lived under the same travails of daily life in Warsaw, and suffered from the same lack of information. The information web also included contacts with academics and Western journalists, as well as simple chance encounters on the street.⁷⁴ As Munter recalls, one of his weekly events was spending Friday afternoon at the Marine bar in the U.S. embassy, followed by burgers and fries at the Eagle Club to exchange information with whoever was there.⁷⁵ Armed with this information, the embassy could more accurately report the opposition's progress or shifts in government policy, providing the kind of analysis which aided the opposition by keeping policy-makers in Washington well informed.

In certain cases American diplomats went beyond efforts at information gathering in their contacts with the opposition. Specifically, Munter stepped outside of his role as a "message relay" and was involved in the opposition's operational activities. On a few occasions, he drove to the outskirts of Warsaw to a pre-arranged location. There unnamed activists loaded his car with new copies of underground literature. The activists took the precautionary step of realigning the headlights on his car, so that it would not be obvious that his car was carrying a heavy load. He drove back to Warsaw, usually into the working-class district of Praga on the east side of the Wisła River, and dropped the

⁷³ Interview with Hill.

⁷⁴ Hill used this term in his interview and relayed a story of hiring someone to plant some roses in his garden. It turned out the person he hired was a former Solidarność member, the first opposition member Hill met.

⁷⁵ Interview with Munter.

literature in an agreed to location like a dumpster. The materials were then picked up by other opposition members in charge of distribution. Other lower-level members of the embassy staff were also involved in these kinds of drops. As Munter explained, he was never expressly directed by his superiors to take part in these activities, but he felt that it was an unspoken part of his role as a lower-level member of the staff to get involved in the "dirtier" aspects of supporting the opposition. By not discussing his efforts with his superiors, Munter knew that he could be dismissed as a "rogue element" if he was ever caught, thereby insulating Davis and the embassy from political fallout from his activities.⁷⁶

As all of these informational and operational contacts intensified, John and Helen Davis continued to host regular events at their residence, including increasingly frequent Congressional visits. In the three years since the Davises had relocated to Warsaw, only one Congressional delegation had visited. In contrast, from August 1986 to August 1987, seven "codels" came to Poland, in addition to the visits by Simons and Whitehead.⁷⁷ This included: two visits led by Solarz in September 1986 and August 1987; a visit to Kraków led by Fascell, a mission headed by Republican Pennsylvania Senator Arlen Specter, and a trip headed by Democratic Georgia Senator Sam Nunn and Republican Virginia Senator

⁷⁶ Ibid. With the security services actively seizing opposition cars in the second half of 1986, it is logical that they would turn to sympathetic diplomats and foreigners to undertake these kinds of activities. Munter's account is included here, not as a definitive accounting of all of the embassy's activities, but rather as an example of the kind of coordinated operational activities that the embassy was involved in. In future interviews I hope to clarify the extent of these activities, both chronologically and in terms of the number of staff involved.

⁷⁷ The one Congressional delegation to travel to Warsaw (from August 6-8, 1985) was led by Democratic Congressman Neal Smith. Three Democratic and four Republican congressmen from the House Budget Committee met with ministerial level government officials, but did not meet with any of the party leadership. The trip's main purpose was to review embassy procedures as part of a study to revise funding requests by the State Department. See Notatka Informacyjna dotycząca pobytu grupy członków Reprezentantów Kongresu USA [Information note regarding the visit of a group of U.S. congressmen], dated August 10, 1985, MSZ, 2/89, W-6, Dep III (1985), AP 220-5-85. Democratic Congressman David Bonior from Michigan planned to visit Poland in May 1984; however there are no records in the MSZ to confirm his visit. See MSZ, 59/86, W-6, (1984), AP 220-1-84.

John Warner, all in April 1987; a rescheduled visit by Kennedy in May 1987; and a parliamentary exchange led by Democratic Illinois Congressman Dan Rostenkowski in June 1987.⁷⁸ Zbigniew Brzezinski also visited Poland from May 16-21, 1987, delivering a series of lectures around the country.⁷⁹

With each visit, the American embassy set up two sets of meetings. They scheduled both "official" meetings with government and party officials and "unofficial" contacts comprised of meetings with Church officials and opposition leaders. While Church officials had offices, the embassy arranged meetings with opposition figures as dinners and receptions at the ambassador's residence, an extension of Helen Davis's continuing salons (see chapter 3). The residence became a second, informal pillar of American policy, reflecting the dual tracks of relations: government-to-government and government-to-opposition. As Davis recalls, from 1986 on

we got a lot of Congressmen coming and an increasing number of U.S. visitors. And each time we would have those we would go through the routine of having a dinner for the government officials to meet them—the foreign minister to meet them. . . . Then the next night we would have a dinner for all the Solidarity leaders and some Church people, so [the American guests] would meet both sides. And well, we kept this up until it got to be a regular routine to the point where there was always a big party going on at our place with all of the rebels.⁸⁰

As with Whitehead's visit in January 1987, invitees for the Congressional visits included

⁷⁸ For Solarz's first visit see: MSZ, 14/89, W-3, Dep III (1986), AP 220-10-86; for his second visit see: MSZ, 35/90, W-5, Dep III (1987), AP 220-13-87; on the Specter, Nunn, and Warner visits see: MSZ, 35/90, W-5, Dep III (1987), AP 220-8-87; on Fascell's visit see: MSZ, 35/90, W-6, Dep III (1987), AP 54-10-87; on Kennedy's visit see: MSZ, 35/90, W-5, Dep III (1987), AP 220-6-87; and for the Rostenkowski visit see: MSZ, 35/90, W-4, Dep III (1987), AP 23-5-87. New York Mayor Ed Koch also visited in January (MSZ, 35/90, W-5, Dep III [1987], AP 220-4-87), and Eunice Kennedy Shriver visited in March 1987 as part of a Special Olympics delegation (MSZ, 35/90, W-5, Dep III [1987], AP 53-2-87).

⁷⁹ There are no MSZ files for this visit, presumably because it was made as a private citizen. It is safe to assume that there are MSW files for it, however. For reporting on the visit see *Tygodnik Mazowsze* nr. 213 (May 27, 1987): 1, 4; available at KARTA. As a Polish-American famous for defending Solidarność as Carter's national security adviser, Brzezinski drew a crowd from outside Warsaw including underground leaders from Gdańsk and Wrocław.

⁸⁰ Interview with Davis, November 23, 1999.

a regular group of Warsaw intellectuals and opposition figures: Michnik, Kuron, Geremek, Onyszkiewicz, Wielowiejski, and Mazowiecki. Bujak was also a regular attendee, as was Frasnyniuk when he could travel from Wrocław. As for Wałęsa, Lis, and Gwiazda they "would come down for dinners . . . from Gdańsk, but of course it was less easy for them to make that trip. It was a long trip to come. They only usually came down for the big time visitors."⁸¹

For the Congressmen, these opposition dinners gave them a chance to hear another perspective on life in Poland. As with the salons, this was an opportunity for the Americans to hear how the U.S. government could help the democratic opposition, not to advise the opposition on tactics or strategies. Mirroring comments from cables about Whitehead's visit as a chance "to listen, to learn, and to explain,"⁸² Kennedy stated, he was there on a "mission to listen, to learn and to do what we can . . ."⁸³ Conversely, this was an important chance for Solidarność leaders to have their voices heard. As Geremek explained:

The purpose was to explain the Polish situation. We had the feeling that the information given in such a direct way, in a personal way, had a different importance, could touch American political leaders, members of the Congress. I remember also some debate, discussions with Steve Solarz concerning the Yalta agreement. A very violent debate with myself, with Adam Michnik, in which we had this friendly framework of this debate, but it was in a sense an argument with the official American interpretation of the Yalta agreement, assuring to the East Central European countries free elections. We had to explain to our friend, what does it mean Yalta for us. Yalta, that was the imposition of the Soviet regime, the slavery. That was the end of our political independence. Such intellectual framework of this discussion was extremely important. It wasn't only a discussion of short-term problems.

⁸¹ Ibid.

⁸² Memorandum, "Condensed Version of NATO Talking Points," undated, NSA, End of the Cold War Collection, scanned incoming FOIA documents.

⁸³ Michael Kaufman, "Kennedy Sees Officials in Poland and Honors Opposition Leaders," *New York Times* (May 23, 1987): A2.

We never had the impression of being given lessons of what to do or of [intentions] to impose a kind of political leadership. I think that probably we wouldn't accept it. But even on the American side I couldn't observe such a will. It was a very partnership relationship. Sometimes what we had to accept from the American side was an interpretation of the international scene which concerned American-Russian, American-Soviet relations, the place of China [. . .], but never a kind of political leadership imposed to us. [. . .]

I even had the feeling that sometimes we are more asked by American partners to give *our* impressions, *our* judgments on the Soviet Union for instance or on what we want to do inside an oppressive system, inside the totalitarian regime. How do we see the possibility of action? So, it was behind *us* the experience of ten million people. In the trade union, the experience of 500 days of freedom in which we played a political role. I would think that I liked this attitude of respect, admiration and friendship, without the teacher's attitude or even leader's, effective leadership attitude.⁸⁴

The visits also gave Americans a chance to meet with modern-day heroes.

Whitehead wanted to meet with Wałęsa because he "admired him deeply"⁸⁵ and "very was moved . . . to be with him."⁸⁶ As the reporting cable stated, "Mr. Whitehead began the conversation by telling Wałęsa how honored he was to have the opportunity to meet him. Wałęsa is a famous man in American because people in the United States admire his courageous defense of his convictions."⁸⁷ In Kennedy's case, the purpose of his trip was to honor Father Popieluszko, Bujak, and Michnik who had received the Robert F. Kennedy Human Rights Award in absentia in November 1986. During a meeting with Bujak and Michnik at the residence, he "praised them for 'speaking truth to power.'"⁸⁸ At a mass held at the Stanislaw Kostka Church by the side of Popieluszko's grave, he equated the loss of John Kennedy and Robert Kennedy with the loss of Father

⁸⁴ Interview with Geremek. The interview was conducted in English.

⁸⁵ Whitehead, *Life in Leadership*, 166.

⁸⁶ Cable from Secstate to Amembassy Sofia, "Deputy Secretary Whitehead's Dinner Meeting with Lech Wałęsa, Friday, January 30, 1987," dated February 11, 1987, NSA, End of the Cold War Collection, scanned incoming FOIA documents.

⁸⁷ "Deputy Secretary Whitehead's Dinner Meeting with Lech Wałęsa, Friday, January 30, 1987."

⁸⁸ Adam Clymer, *Edward M. Kennedy* (New York: William Morrow and Company, Inc., 1999), 413.

Popieluszko.⁸⁹ When he met with Wałęsa and attended a special mass at St. Bridgette's in Gdańsk, the senator invoked his older brother's legacy again, declaring "Jestem Polakiem [I am a Pole]" and commending Solidarność for "fighting 'against tyranny, repression, and for human rights.'" ⁹⁰ As Jane Fonda and her then husband, SDS founder Tom Hayden, put it during their Spring 1987 visit, "We are here in order to express support for Solidarność."⁹¹ For American celebrities and politicians alike Wałęsa and his colleagues were well known symbols of the fight against authoritarian oppression, and so Americans traveled to see them for the honor of meeting with these Polish martyrs.⁹²

For Solidarność leaders, these meetings also had symbolic significance to *their* home audience. The independent press like *Tygodnik Mazowsze* reported when famous Americans met with opposition leaders, giving Whitehead, Brzezinski, Kennedy, and Fonda and Hayden front page articles. Visits were an opportunity to counteract years of government publications belittling Solidarność's relevance by showing that well known outsiders continued to support Poland's democratic opposition.⁹³ By meeting with high-level American officials, Solidarność showed that they remained an important force in the world.

This symbolic importance became overtly political during Whitehead's visit. One of the meeting participants, Onyszkiewicz, wrote an article for the independent press

⁸⁹ Michael Kaufman, "Kennedy Sees Officials in Poland and Honors Opposition Officials," *Washington Post* (May 23, 1987): A2.

⁹⁰ Clymer, *Kennedy*, 414.

⁹¹ "Jane Fonda i Tom Hayden Dla 'TM'" [Jane Fonda and Tom Hayden for TM] *Tygodnik Mazowsze* nr. 201 (March 4, 1987): 1, available at KARTA, Archiwum Opozycji.

⁹² For American elected officials like Solarz, Fascell, and Kennedy these meetings also had obvious political advantages. For all it brought there name into the press, with important photo opportunities with a Noble Laureate. For Solarz, who came from a heavily Polish district in Brooklyn, his trip was a way to gain political points in his home districts.

⁹³ For Kennedy and Brzezinski, see *Tygodnik Mazowsze* nr. 213 (May 4, 1987): 1; for Whitehead see *Tygodnik Mazowsze* nr. 197 (February 4, 1987): 1, 2; for Fonda and Hayden see *Tygodnik Mazowsze* nr. 201 (March 4, 1987), all available in KARTA, Archiwum Opozycji.

giving a detailed account of the meeting. His report included news that Whitehead threatened not to meet with Jaruzelski if he could not meet with Wałęsa. He also reported that Whitehead began the meeting by "expressing complete support and sympathy, which the USA feels for Wałęsa and the entirety of Solidarność." Onyszkiewicz also clarified that Washington had not yet made a final decision about lifting sanctions: the Americans were waiting to hear Wałęsa's opinion before acting. As Onyszkiewicz summarized, this meeting was important for more than just what was said:

Visiting Western politicians' conversations with Solidarność or opposition representatives happen already as a normal thing; never, however, has this led to a meeting "at the highest levels," i.e. Wałęsa. Whitehead's visit may become an important step in forcing the authorities to acknowledge the *defacto* pluralism manifesting itself in independent organizations and social and political groups.⁹⁴

Visits by Western politicians and celebrities, therefore, were important to the opposition for more than just making their case directly to the outside world. By arranging to meet with Wałęsa, Whitehead showed that he placed Wałęsa on the same plane as Jaruzelski.

The PZPR also took note of these meetings, writing in August 1987 that

the process of upgrading the opposition leaders as "trustworthy and legally elected representatives of society" is continuing (e.g. many recent invitations for Wałęsa to foreign events, contacts by western officials with the opposition leadership). The purpose of these measures is quite clearly the recreation of the opposition leadership elite.⁹⁵

⁹⁴ For the original see, "Spotkanie z Johnem Whiteheadem" [Meeting with John Whitehead], *Tygodnik Mazowsze* nr. 197 (February 4, 1987), quoted at 1 and 4; available in KARTA, Archiwum Opozycji. Onyszkiewicz's published the article under his pseudonym, Janusz Białołęcki. For the American embassy's translation see: Cable from Amembassy Warsaw to SecState, "Underground Weekly Details Deputy Secretary's Meeting with Solidarity Leaders," dated February 17, 1987, NSA, End of the Cold War Collection, scanned incoming FOIA documents.

Prior to Bush's 1987 visit, independent journalists made a similar argument, writing: "The intensity of contacts by the vice president with Solidarność activists proves the acceptance of Solidarność as an important political power"; quoted from "Po wyzycie George'a Bush: Aktywna Polityka" [After the George Bush's Visit: Active Policy], *Tygodnik Mazowsze* nr. 221 (September 30, 1987): 1, available at KARTA, Archiwum Opozycji.

⁹⁵ Report, "A Synthesis of the Internal Situation and the West's Activity," dated August 28, 1987, published in Paweł Machcewicz, "Poland 1986-1989: From 'Cooptation' to 'Negotiated Revolution' New Documents," *Cold War International History Project Bulletin* issue 12/13 (Fall/Winter 2001), 100.

As Andrzej Paczkowski summarizes, "The increasingly numerous discussions that foreign visitors and Western diplomatic personnel had with Wałęsa's advisors and Solidarity activists enhanced the public perception of the union as an opposition force."⁹⁶

In the two years after Jaruzelski announced that there would be a final political amnesty the American embassy's support for the opposition blossomed. Salons continued, information coordination flourished, and an undetermined number of embassy officers even participated in the opposition's illegal operations. More importantly the embassy and the residence became a central means for Solidarność to make their opinions known to American leaders, through direct conversations not just interviews granted to foreign journalists. This gave the Poles a chance to explain their own views on their shifting political fortunes. For the Americans this was an opportunity to meet with Polish heroes. For the Polish opposition the meetings also gave the movement greater visibility and greater legitimacy, even within Poland. No less than Jaruzelski acknowledged the centrality of the American embassy's support to Solidarność's continued strength (albeit in a statement meant to minimize Solidarność's importance), saying that Solidarność was "just a group of people that Davis always invites over for dinner, while my wife and I eat alone on the other side of the street."⁹⁷

Congress and Solidarność

Concurrent with frequent visits to Poland, Congress took an active role in

⁹⁶ Andrzej Paczkowski, *Spring will be Ours* (College Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2003), 488.

⁹⁷ This quote is often cited by American officials; however, I have never been able to find the original source. For an example of Davis quoting it, see: Andrzej Paczkowski, ed., *Polska 1986-1989: koniec systemu*, vol. 2 (Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Trio and Instytut Studiów Politycznych Polskiej Akademii Nauk, 2002), 238. Jaruzelski lived in the same neighborhood as the ambassador's residence.

discussions and appropriations to shift Polish-American relations in step with the administration's new policies. Members of Congress first offered recommendations for reconnecting with Poland in March 1987 in a report by the Congressional Research Service, commissioned by Indiana Democratic Congressman Lee Hamilton of the House Foreign Affairs Committee. Written following a research trip to Warsaw, the report, "Poland's Renewal and U.S. Options," "outlined the prospects for a possible reengagement of the United States and the international financial community in an effort to provide for the recovery of the Polish economy." Delineating the choice between three possibilities, the report rejected the disengagement policy symbolized by the use of sanctions since December 1981 because with improved Polish relations with Western Europe and Japan the "effectiveness of a U.S. disengagement stance had been reduced." It also rejected the "uncritical preference" policy most typified by the easy loan agreements of the 1970s which offered money regardless of trends within the country.

Instead, the report advocated a third policy: "reengagement in a process of reciprocal improvement" or "conditional reengagement." This called for rewarding Poland when it took steps towards fulfilling specific criteria: creating a dialogue between the government and society, sustaining the release of political prisoners, restructuring the economy based on "efficiency criteria," reforming the economy to include market forces, or pursuing an export strategy to enhance the prospects for Polish debt repayment. Because Western European countries (and Japan) were already normalizing economic relations, the only way the United States could assure that internal political changes were required for new economic support and credits was for Washington to be involved in the process. The report also highlighted that the United States could use organizations like

the IMF and World Bank to insure that Poland made hard economic choices to improve Poland's economic engine and help improve the people's standard of living.⁹⁸

Some members of Congress also supported policy changes more directly. On April 30 Republican Representative Jack Kemp (from a heavily Polish-American district in Buffalo, New York) submitted Joint Resolution 263 requesting \$1 million in support for Solidarność.⁹⁹ Liberal Democratic Representative Morris Udall of Arizona supported the resolution, adding "The brave members of the Solidarity movement deserve our encouragement and our messages of support. More than just that, they deserve concrete assistance . . . to continue their just struggle for basic human rights."¹⁰⁰ On May 1, the Senate Appropriation's Committee backed the recommendation that \$1 million be provided to Solidarność in FY 1987 "through assistance channels which have been used in the past to provide assistance to Solidarity."¹⁰¹ Although the appropriation was criticized by some as a non-emergency appropriation during a period of high deficits, Solidarność was appropriated the money immediately.¹⁰²

Congressional support did not end there. In July Kennedy, joined by colleagues including Joseph Biden, Carl Levin, Barbara Mikulski, and Jesse Helms, submitted the "American Aid to Poland Act of 1987." The appropriated \$1 million for bilateral scientific and technology projects, extended the availability of \$10 million for private Polish farmers (originally appropriated for the Church Agricultural Fund) through the end of FY 1989, donated 8,000 metric tons of agricultural surplus to humanitarian

⁹⁸ "Poland's Renewal and U.S. Options: A Policy Reconnaissance," Report Prepared for the Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East of the Committee of Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives by the Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress. 100th Cong. 1st Session; quoted at iii, x, vii.

⁹⁹ J.H. Res 263, 100th Cong., 1st sess., *Congressional Record*, 133 (April 30, 1987): H2998.

¹⁰⁰ Extension of Remarks, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., *Congressional Record* 133 (May 4, 1987): E1703.

¹⁰¹ Senate Committee on Appropriations, *Supplemental Appropriations Bill 1987*, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., Senate Report 100-48 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1987), 46.

¹⁰² For a sample of criticism, see: *Congressional Record* 133 (June 2, 1987): S7420.

organizations working in Poland, provided \$2 million in medical supplies and hospital equipment for both FY 1988 and FY 1989 through voluntary and charitable organizations, freed up the use of Polish currency held by the U.S. government for use by private and public charitable organizations in FY 1988 and FY 1989, and created a joint Polish-American commission based at the embassy in Warsaw to determine how these Polish funds should be utilized. Finally, Kennedy's act appropriated funds directly to Solidarność by earmarking "no less than \$1 million" to be sent to Solidarność in both FY 1988 and FY 1989, a clause that Sen. Helms insisted upon.¹⁰³

With more money came concerns about how exactly the money would be sent to Solidarność. As recently as October 1986, the TKK had specifically asked that aid "be given openly and without political or organizational conditions attached."¹⁰⁴ Until 1987 all U.S. government funds for Solidarność had gone through the NED, to the AFL-CIO's Free Trade Union Institute, and finally to the Brussels Coordinating Office, allowing Solidarność leaders to claim that they only accepted funds from fellow unionists. At the end of October 1986, however, Jerzy Milewski made a direct appeal through the Senate

¹⁰³ For the original aid to Poland act see: *Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act*; Kennedy (and Others) Amendment no. 580, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., *Congressional Record* 133 (July 15, 1987): S10087. The information about Helms' involvement comes from a Memorandum from Adrian Karatnycky to Tom Melia, "Second (and third) million dollars for Solidarność," dated July 16, 1987, AFL-CIO International Affairs Department Files, Inactive Records, "Poland - AK." According to another memo from Tom Melia to Eugenia Kemble (the head of the AFL-CIO's Free Trade Union Institute), "NSZZ Solidarność on Capitol Hill - recapitulation," dated May 28, 1987, "the goals of these right-wingers [including Helms] seem to be (a) to compel the State Department to be involved in a highly visible manner in providing some material assistance to Solidarity, mainly in order to embarrass Shultz & Whitehead, whom they believe are insufficiently anti-Communist. . ."

The Act did not survive in its original form, but all of its provisions were funded by the government. The provisions for the science and technology agreement and allocations of surplus agricultural commodities were included in the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988. The money for Solidarność was placed into section 530 of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1988. The time extension for funds for the Church Agricultural Fund, \$1,500,000 worth of Polish currency freed for humanitarian projects, and \$500,000 worth of Polish currency appropriated to the Institute of Jewish Culture and History at Jagiellonian University in Kraków, were all part of section 613 of the International Security and Development Act of 1987.

¹⁰⁴ Guidelines Concerning Financial Aid from Abroad for NSZZ "Solidarność" signed by the TKK, dated October 4, 1986, AFL-CIO International Affairs Department Files, Inactive Records, "Poland - AK."

Committee on Appropriations for funds which "may include but not be limited to, additional NED funding from its discretionary funds, yet untapped (and yet undiscovered) other sources, or direct allocation in the Congressional budget."¹⁰⁵

Milewski also sent a letter to Kemp outlining the Coordinating Office's \$1,360,000 budget needs were for 1988.¹⁰⁶ On Capitol Hill, conservative congressmen including Helms and Republican Senator Steven Symms of Idaho were happy to accept a direct congressional role, a move the AFL-CIO interpreted as an attempt to undermine their position as Solidarność's main supporter and benefactor. The AFL-CIO, in turn, began lobbying to make sure they would maintain their position.¹⁰⁷

As confusion swirled among various pro-Solidarność groups, Wałęsa stepped in to provide clarity. He sent a letter to Congress which "expressed gratitude for the decision" to provide funds, but which also explained that they would use the million dollars "for a Solidarity social fund." As Wałęsa explained to Kirkland in private correspondence:

We accept the subsidy because we know that it [comes] from the best feeling and the best intentions. . . . The whole affair attracted a lot of publicity that makes the situation rather embarrassing for our union. We claim all the time that we accept assistance from the fraternal trade unions, from movements and social institutions which are ready in [a] manner to support the struggle of Polish trade unions for the right to exist. The independence of our movement is one of the main [facets] of our philosophy. Using a subsidy coming from the American state, for organizational needs of our union, would be in contradiction with this principle. We must take into account, that not only in the official propaganda, but also among the organizations and institutions, the

¹⁰⁵ Letter published in Senate Committee on Appropriations, *Commerce, Justice, State, the Judiciary, and Related Appropriations, FY88, Part 1*, 100th Cong., 1st sess., 1987, 729-730.

¹⁰⁶ Additional Statements; U.S. Assistance to NSZZ Solidarność, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., *Congressional Record* 133 (Oct. 23, 1987): S15068.

¹⁰⁷ Memorandum from Tom Melia to Eugenia Kemble, "NSZZ Solidarność on Capitol Hill - recapitulaton," dated May 28, 1987, AFL-CIO International Affairs Department Files, Inactive Records, "Poland - AK."

accusation could be raised, that "Solidarity" is an alien interest.¹⁰⁸

Congress accepted Wałęsa's wishes, and the \$1 million allocated for FY 1987 went through NED to the humanitarian group, International Rescue Committee, to buy three ambulances and fund Solidarność-run medical clinics.¹⁰⁹

As with the decision to drop economic sanctions half a year earlier, Wałęsa's word was final in policy-making circles. In both cases the U.S. government acquiesced to the desires of the man who had come to symbolize the Polish opposition. Equally as important, Wałęsa's gesture, decided in coordination with his advisors, demonstrated the movement's independence. Even faced with the temptation of \$1 million (more than double the Coordinating Office's budget for 1986), the opposition believed that it was more important to maintain their patriotic purity, rather than publicly accept money so closely associated with a foreign power. Of course, Poland very much needed the money, so Solidarność created a social fund. Once the public spotlight was off of the Congressional appropriations, the yearly subsidies of \$1 million for FY 1988 and FY 1989 made their way through NED to the Brussels office via the FTUI, evidence of how the movement's emphasis on its independence was tempered by realism.¹¹⁰

NED, NGOs, and the Opposition

Regardless of the opposition's decision to reject directly appropriated Congressional funds in 1987 for political activities, Solidarność and other groups

¹⁰⁸ Letter from Lech Wałęsa to Lane Kirkland, dated August 11, 1987, AFL-CIO, International Affairs Department Files, Inactive Records, "Poland - AK."

¹⁰⁹ House Committee on Appropriations, *Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Appropriations for 1989, part 5*, 100th Cong., 2nd sess., 1988, 714.

¹¹⁰ See NED President Carl Gershman's comments in House Committee on Appropriations, *Department of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agency Appropriations FY91, part 1*, 101 Cong., 2nd sess., 1990, 1000.

accepted large "subsidies" to continue their work in the underground, which was increasingly being institutionalized into a kind of second society. The largest single source for American support to Poland following the 1986 amnesty remained the NED. In FY 1986, NED money for Poland's democratic opposition increased once again, totaling \$934,763—up from \$606,000 in FY 1985. Of this sum, roughly one-third (\$304,163) was dedicated to direct support through FTUI to Solidarność's Coordinating Office and publication efforts by CSS. The CSS's Institute for Democracy in Eastern Europe (IDEE) was given \$123,200 to "support the activities of independent publishing houses, independent publications, and self-education and human rights groups in Poland." The Aurora Foundation, a human rights organization, received \$92,400 to assist the Polish Legal Defense Fund and to publish four issues of the Paris-based *Zeszyty Literackie*. NED provided Freedom House, a New-York based human rights watch group, with \$127,200 to support three journals produced outside of Poland which publicized Poland's struggle (*ANEKS Quarterly* in London, *The Uncensored Poland News* from London, and various publications by the Independent Polish Agency [IPA] in Lund, Sweden), as well as one journal focused on the Soviet Union, *Contradictions in the USSR*. The Polish Institute of Arts and Sciences in America (PIASA), a Polish-American philanthropic and academic foundation, administered another grant: \$25,000 to publish three books in Polish on the development of democracy in Poland. Finally, the PACCF received \$263,000 to oversee a hodge-podge of programs, including: providing material support to political prisoners and their families (\$90,000); supporting the Committee for Independent Education, Culture, and Science (OKN, in the Polish acronym for Oświaty, Kultura, Nauk [Education, Culture, Science] at \$100,000); to underwrite the Polish

Helsinki Watch Committee (\$5,000); and to support the work of a new movement to create and archive video productions from Poland's recent past (\$50,000), as well as a few related smaller projects.¹¹¹

In FY 1987, funding increased again, growing to nearly \$2 million, with \$920,750 from the NED with an additional \$1 million provided by Congress for the Solidarność Social Fund. In the established pattern, the FTUI received the lion's share: \$451,000 "for assistance to the Polish independent trade union movement, its Western representatives, and to organizations documenting its activities" (which presumably included CSS). Next in line the PACCF was placed in charge of distributing \$295,000 for assistance to political prisoners and their families (\$90,000), to support OKN (\$100,000), to aid the Polish Helsinki Watch (\$10,000), to subsidize the independent video movement (\$50,000), to continue to support *Zeszyty Literackie* (\$20,000), and to fund POLCUL (\$15,000)—an Australian organization that gave annual awards to "individuals in Poland in recognition of their defense of human rights and independent culture." IDEE, run by Irena Lasota, again received money (\$116,000) to smuggle material and monetary assistance to a consortium of independent publishing houses. A new American group known as the Solidarity Endowment also received \$42,000 to support the independent press through the IPA. Freedom House was given control over a grant of \$55,000 to support ANEKS and the *Uncensored Poland News*.¹¹²

To oversee the process of distributing Congressional funding, the NED

¹¹¹ For a public discussion of these funds see House Committee on Appropriations, *Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary and Related Agency Appropriations for 1987, part 5*, 99th Cong., 2nd sess., 1986, 498-499. The numbers presented here are taken from the NED's Annual Report for 1986, located in loose Polish American Congress (PAC) files. For a full account see Appendix 1.

¹¹² For a public account see Senate Committee on Appropriations, *Commerce, Justice, State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations, FY88, part 1*, 733. The numbers presented here are taken from the NED's Annual Report for 1987, located in loose PAC files. For a full account see Appendix 1.

implemented a structured, bureaucratic system for applying and reporting back about how moneys were being spent.¹¹³ Each year the grantee organizations (Free Trade Union Institute, PACCF, Aurora Foundation, Freedom House, etc.) prepared proposals, signed grant agreements, provided quarterly expense reports showing that funds were being dispersed, and produced end of the year reports giving at least a rough outline of how funds were utilized. These grantee organizations, however, did not work directly with the opposition. The grantee organizations simply functioned as middlemen who passed money to organizations working in Western Europe, Scandinavia, and the United States, taking a small fee for administrative costs. The smaller, second-tier recipient groups in New York, Paris, London, and Lund, Sweden, actually ran the programs to support the Polish opposition. So, in each case, money from the NED went through a number of hands before it reached people actually part of the opposition movement within Poland.

A close reading of the paper trail created by these layers of bureaucracy demonstrates American priorities, as well as the evolving nature of the democratic opposition movement itself.¹¹⁴ First, from 1984 to 1988 NED funds for Poland fell into three categories: humanitarian support to political prisoners and activists, payments to publishers and advocacy groups working in the West, and money and material sent to aid

¹¹³ These stricter rules and oversight were implemented following the growing pains associated with creating a new institution, Congressional attempts to slash funding for NED in 1985, and then intense Congressional oversight after controversies over the use of funds to influence elections in France. In addition to the controversy over activities in France, Capitol Hill was also concerned about NED's board, which oversaw the way grants were dispersed and who were prominent members of the four core grantee organizations (AFL-CIO's Free Trade Union Institute, U.S. Chamber of Commerce's Center for International Private Enterprise, National Democratic Institute for International Affairs, and the National Republican Institute for International Affairs), creating the appearance of nepotism. For a full discussion of congressional concerns, see House Committee on Foreign Affairs, *Oversight of the National Endowment for Democracy*, 99th Cong., 2nd sess., 1986.

¹¹⁴ The information about specific programs which follows is mainly culled from the files of the PAC which contained the most complete set of NED records I was able to locate. Following legislation in 1986, the NED is required to comply with the rules of the Freedom of Information Act. I plan to file FOIA requests to NED and its core grantees for more information on programs dealing with Poland.

opposition groups working within the country. In terms of humanitarian support this included \$90,000 per year administered through PIASA and then the PACCF. As with PACCF's longstanding efforts, the purpose of this program was to ship food, clothes, and medicine purchased in the West into Poland via the offices of KCEP; however, as the grant application made clear, "This is not a charitable project but based purely on political considerations. It is a means to provide a kind of insurance to activists in the independent movement against the risk of arrest, imprisonment, or the loss of a job." Therefore, humanitarian shipments included cash sent to offset the fines, loss of employment, and property confiscations that the government favored to punish political activists after the 1986 amnesty.¹¹⁵ Similarly, NED provided resources to the Polish Legal Defense Fund to subsidize the cost of defending activists. Also in this category, POLCUL, founded by Jerzy Boniecki (a wealthy Polish-Australian industrialist), awarded \$500 cash prizes to independent publishers, human rights activists, academics, poets, writers, journalists, and actors who were judged to have made important contributions to the opposition. These awards also counteracted the harassment and fines they to which activists were subjected.¹¹⁶

The second major focus for grants—support to publishers working in the West—can be divided further into two sub-priorities: materials published for distribution in the

¹¹⁵ Letter from Al Mazewski to Carl Gershman, dated January 2, 1986, PAC, Books 4, "NED Grant #86-181-E-047-50 Polish Video Film." The money was sent through a bank account in Paris held by Coordination Pologne, and administered in Paris by Father Eugeniusz Plater. According to reports over 60% of the sums were used to purchase medicine. For the continuing need for humanitarian aid after the 1986 amnesty, see Letter from Jan Nowak to Carl Gershman, dated January 9, 1987, PAC, Books 4, "NED Grant #86-181-E-047-25."

¹¹⁶ Letter from J. Boniecki (POLCUL) to Myra Lenard re Report on the Distribution of the Grant, dated July 25, 1987, PAC, Books 4, "Grant # 87-181-E-047-17.1 POLCUL." According to the grant report a family of five could live on \$500 for about six months, which was sent into Poland by "selected and fully trusted people traveling to Poland." The judges for the awards were a who's who of the émigré community and included Polcul President and editor of *Kultura*, Jerzy Giedroyc; Solidarity activist Mirosław Chojecki; poet and Harvard Professor Stanisław Baranczak; Jan Nowak-Jezioranski; head of ANEKS publishing, Eugeniusz Smolar, and J. Swiecicki.

West and materials published to be smuggled back into Poland. Groups like CSS in New York and the Information Centre for Polish Affairs in London, which published the *Uncensored Poland News Bulletin* fortnightly, as well as the Polish Helsinki Watch, focused on providing news to the public and governments outside of Poland about human rights abuses and the internal political situation, often archiving and translating articles from the underground press.¹¹⁷ On the other side, the management of *Zeszyty Literackie*, ANEKS, PIASA, and IPA worked to produce works in Polish and smuggle them into Poland. Issues of *Zeszyty Literackie* were produced in miniature to aid the smuggling process and IPA regularly produced microfilm of *Kultura* and *Zeszyty Historyczny* (Historical Notebooks) which were produced in Paris, so that underground presses in Poland could reproduce them domestically. Each of these publications from the West presented a forum for Polish intellectuals to reach a wider audience, while simultaneously allowing émigrés to take part in a dialogue with the internal opposition.¹¹⁸

The third and largest priority for NED projects were grants dedicated to activists working within Poland, which can be divided into three sub-priorities. The jewel of this program was support through FTUI which provided roughly two-thirds of the Solidarność Coordinating Office Abroad's yearly budget.¹¹⁹ The Coordinating Office represented Solidarność at the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions and

¹¹⁷ On CSS see chapter 3. On the Information Center for Polish Affairs, see: Final Program Report (1 April 1987 - 31 March 1988) from Jan Radomski to Freedom House, dated April 14, 1988, PAC, NED 89/90, "Uncensored Poland News Bulletin 89-29." On the Helsinki Watch see: Report of Activities of the Polish Helsinki Committee Between January 1, 1986 and April 30, 1987, undated, PAC, Books 4, "Grant #87-181-E-047-17.1 Helsinki Watch - Poland."

¹¹⁸ Timothy Snyder convincingly demonstrates that émigré publications, particularly Jerzy Giedroyc's *Kultura*, deeply affected the consensus within Poland on accepting Poland's post-war borders with Lithuania and Ukraine. See *The Reconstruction of Nations* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2003), esp. 222-231.

¹¹⁹ I have been unable to access Coordinating Office files. This estimate of two-thirds comes following conversations with Idesbald Gooderis, a scholar at the University of Leuven in Belgium, who hosted a conference on West European union's support to Solidarność and completed extensive research on the topic himself. I am indebted to Idesbald for filling me in on this vast "other side" of the issue.

oversaw major operations to support the union's activities within Poland by sending cash, printing equipment, and communications equipment to trade union representatives. According to a budget provided by Jerzy Milewski for 1987, 10% of the Coordinating Office's budget went to humanitarian support for activists, 15% funded the national leadership, 15% was divided by Solidarność's regional structures, 25% was spent on purchasing equipment abroad for shipment to Poland (categories for printing equipment, spare parts, printing materials, communications equipment, computer equipment, and "other" are listed), 15% was earmarked for the Brussels office, 10% was given to independent organizations not associated with Solidarność, and 10% was given to independent presses and publishing houses not associated with the union.¹²⁰ So, through the FTUI and Solidarność's Brussels office, American money was dispersed mainly to union structures for their daily work of organizing, supporting those who could not work, and publishing independent news and reports.

In addition to supporting Solidarność structures, the NED also granted over \$100,000 a year to support a second pillar of opposition activity: independent publishing houses. From 1986, Lasota and IDEE were placed in charge of these funds. As with her earlier work with the AFL-CIO and CSS, Lasota used these funds to purchase printing equipment, spare parts, supplies, and computer equipment needed to sustain the independent presses that had flourished since the declaration of martial law (see chapter

¹²⁰ The NSZZ Solidarność Budget for Aid from Abroad in 1987, attached to Letter from Lane Kirkland to Lech Wałęsa, dated August 6, 1987, AFL-CIO International Affairs Department Files, Inactive Records, "Poland - AK." For the operating budget for 1988, which took into account \$1 million in additional funds allocated by Congress, Solidarność changed priorities, more than doubling allocations for equipment and increasing funds for the Brussels office, while decreasing funds for humanitarian uses. It is not clear how these percentages were actually implemented. The budgets are clearly a wish list, allocating \$1 million dollars in 1987, when funding levels were probably closer to half that amount. Therefore, the percentages are provided to give a general sense of priorities until more definitive records are located or become available.

2). Based in Paris with her husband Jakub Karpinski, Lasota worked primarily with a consortium of publishers formed in 1985 called the Independent Publishers Foundation, which included CDN, Nowa, and Krag. While printing equipment and replacement parts were still needed in the second half of the 1980s, the consortium's biggest problems involved gathering money to support their operations, a problem which Lasota alleviated with NED funds sent primarily by couriers traveling back and forth from Western Europe.¹²¹ Funds provided to IPA were also used to provide printing operations with money and equipment. Finally, Mirosław Dominczyk was employed directly by Adrian Karatnycky at the AFL-CIO in a program named, "Project Coleslaw" to provide another avenue of support to independent publishers¹²²

The third pillar of opposition grants focused on programs to support educational, cultural, and scientific activities that were neglected, criminalized, or censored by the state, often referred to as "independent culture." NED provided \$100,000 per year from 1986 to 1989 to OKN which was represented in the West by the philosopher, Oxford professor, and longtime émigré activist Leszek Kołakowski and Jan Piotr Lasota (a Polish physicist and brother of Irena Lasota who took care of most of the day-to-day work from Paris). OKN was actually an umbrella group for three separate organizations each with a different focus: the Independent Education Group (*Zespół Oświaty Niezależny*), the

¹²¹ For information on the beginnings of the foundation, *Fundusz Wydawnictw Niezależnych* (FWN), in Polish; see Pawel Sowiński, "Siła wolnego słowa - Nowa, Krag, CDN (1982-1989) in Friszke, ed., *Solidarność Podziemna 1981-1989*, 662-663. Other information on IDEE's activities is based on my interview with Irena Lasota, June 20, 2007.

¹²² "Project Coleslaw" received about \$100,000 a year from 1986 to 1989. Presumably this money came out of the NED funds provided to the FTUI for *Solidarność*. Memorandum from Adrian Karatnycky to Tom Kahn, "Eastern Europe and the USSR," dated November 28, 1989, AFL-CIO, International Affairs Department, inactive records, "Adrian Chron 1989." For further information on the project see Arch Puddington, "Surviving the Underground: How American Unions Helps Solidarity Win," *American Educator* (Summer 2005), accessed online at www.aft.org/pubs-reports/american_educator/issues/summer2005/puddington.htm. It should be noted that as the Polish opposition and NED have always maintained, no American funds were used for equipment that were designed to be used for violent purposes. All the support was, as is often mentioned, "non-lethal."

Independent Culture Committee (*Komitet Kultury Niezależny*), and the Social Committee for Science (*Spoleczny Komitet Nauki*). Each group published their own weeklies like *Tu Teraz*, as well as hard to find or illegal academic books and textbooks, including titles such as Kołakowski's *Communism as a Cultural Formation*, a translation of Max Weber's *Politics as a Profession and a Vocation*, and George Orwell's *1984*.

More central to its mission OKN provided "scholarships" to students, academics, and artists to pursue work that was not funded by the state. Scholarships went to students who were expelled for political reasons or to those who were preparing research, for example, on martial law or Polish-Jewish relations surrounding World War II—subjects which would not have been open to students pursuing degrees in universities. Similar support was provided to academics, particularly those working in the sociology, history, literature, philosophy, and economics fields which were highly affected by political indoctrination. Money also funded youth programs and the well known "Flying Universities": lectures and intellectual gatherings which met secretly in private apartments or churches to teach subjects that were censored in public. For artists, money was provided to produce plays and theater events, to hold music performances, to run literary contests, and to sponsor art exhibits (over forty in 1987 involving more than one-hundred artists). The committees also supported libraries and archives that collected and lent censored literature, as well as projects for recording oral histories from the preceding few years. The committees prided themselves on ensuring that these cultural, educational, and scientific activities were supported throughout Poland, not just in the Solidarność

strongholds of Warsaw and Gdańsk.¹²³

As an offshoot of these cultural and artistic activities, NED supplied money to produce and distribute video productions, beginning in 1986. The Video Association or ZWID (*Zespół Wideo*), was also based in Paris and administered by the director Agnieszka Holland (and later Seweryn Blumsztajn).¹²⁴ The program funded new films produced in Poland and sent censored films available only in the West. These videos were viewed in small private groups, known as "Flying Home Cinemas." As many as half-a-million Poles already owned video-cassette players, so the main expenses for the program were purchasing clean video cassettes and buying film and video recording and editing equipment to be used by the underground. Both of these commodities could be bought legally in Poland, so NED funds were mainly smuggled into Poland as cash to be used within the country. Videos produced in Poland included recordings of independent theater productions, popular lecture series from the Flying University, interviews with underground leaders, coverage of special events like the Papal pilgrimage, and documentaries on recent events. Films sent into Poland included banned versions of Holland's films, Andrzej Wajda's films *Man of Marble* and *Man of Iron*, and documentary films on martial law and the state of the opposition movement, created by a Polish émigré group in Paris, Video-Kontakt.¹²⁵

¹²³ The information about OKN is compiled from three annual reports from 1986, 1987, and 1988. See the files located in PAC, Books 4, "Grant # 86-181-E-047-25.0 OKNO" and "Grant #87-181-E-047-17.1 OKNO," as well as PAC, NED 89/90, "OKNO 1988."

¹²⁴ Agnieszka Holland later became one of Poland's most famous directors who has collaborated with Andrzej Wajda and Krzysztof Kieślowski. She emigrated to France just before martial law was imposed. Her more well known films include *Kobieta Samotna* (A Lonely Woman), *Europa, Europa*, and *Angry Harvest*.

¹²⁵ The information in this paragraph is culled from various reports from Agnieszka Holland in PAC, Books 4, "NED Grant #86-181-E-047-50 Polish Video Film." For a fuller list of titles smuggled into Poland and more detailed information on the activities of the Video Association, see the report by the PZPR's Governing Body for Propaganda and Agitation: *Nagrania Video i Magnetowidowe oraz Telewizja*

Even this cursory review of the American funders' priorities illustrates how diverse and extensive Poland's opposition movement had become by the second half of the 1980s. The democratic opposition was much more than just free trade unionists or the political activists symbolized by KOR and Solidarność. The opposition included high school teachers, students, clergy, intellectuals, academics, scientists, workers, professors, and artists of all kinds, not to mention those who participated in "independent" life by coming to exhibitions and theatrical performances or by sitting in a friend's living room to watch a documentary on Father Jerzy Popiełuszko. From a practical standpoint, Solidarność remained the most important priority for American politicians and NED, but the endowment did well to support a wide variety of activities. This included giving money to a broad section of underground publishers who were not necessarily linked with Solidarność and who even criticized the American government.¹²⁶

Moreover, American money supported a huge network of artistic, educational, and cultural activities that did not necessarily have a specifically political purpose. In the early 1980s the political opposition led by Bujak, Lis, Frasiński, Kuron, Michnik, and others made the decision to pursue a decentralized system of opposition. By the second half of the 1980s this vision had grown into a mature, institutionalized movement which

Satelitarna w Działalności Propagandowej Przeciwnika Politycznego [Video and Cassette Tape Recordings as well as Satellite Television in the the Political Opposition's Propaganda Activities], dated May 1986, Hoover Institution Archive, Służba Bezpieczeństwa, Box 6, 6:13.

¹²⁶ The most famous example of critical pieces in the underground press was an article in the independent monthly *KOS* (by Konstanty Gebert) which condemned the American invasion of Granada (Author's interview with Gebert). This was not, however, the only example. Columnists in even mainstream publications like *Tygodnik Mazowsze* regularly commented on the political situation in Chile, drawing parallels between their own situation and that of free trade unionists under Pinochet, both tacitly and directly criticizing American support for the military government. American policy toward Central and Latin America was a common target of criticism. For example, the poster collection at the KARTA foundation includes one piece of work which shows a cartoon version of a bear using the hammer and sickle to break the word Solidarność in half, while Mickey Mouse stabs the Statue of Liberty into South America, drawing blood. KARTA's collection of visual materials, including this poster, can be viewed online at: <http://www.karta.org.pl/fotokolekcje/plakaty2/index.htm>.

operated within an entire second society living in opposition to the government system. As Timothy Garton Ash wrote at the time, "intellectual and cultural life is emancipated from the would-be-totalitarian ideological control of the Party to a degree unthinkable anywhere else in the Soviet bloc" with Poles acting "as if [they] live in a free country." Through the creation of the independent structures of the opposition— independent presses, independent unions, and, most broadly, independent cultural, educational, and scientific groups—the dissident minority became a dissident majority in Poland.¹²⁷

NED reports also show a second important fact about the opposition: it was almost purely Polish. The money came from America, but once NED funds were dispersed through the grantee organizations to its final sub-grantee destination, the money was in Polish hands. All the operations that NED funded were run by Polish émigrés living in the West, who then sent money and materiel to their homeland. Whether it was Jerzy Milewski in Brussels; Jozef Lebenbaum in Lund; Agnieszka Holland, Jerzy Giedroyc, Seweryn Blumsztajn, or Jan Lasota in Paris; Eugeniusz Smolar in London; or Irena Lasota in New York, all of the players who oversaw the actual operations to send support to Poland were Poles.

This separation between the source of money and the way that Poles spent it was perhaps most apparent in the accounting practices of the final grantee organizations. In the case of support to the Coordinating Office, humanitarian aid, and or funds for publishing houses in Western Europe—groups that worked and functioned completely in the West before sending finished products into Poland—they could provide regular lists

¹²⁷ For the classic account of the widespread nature of opposition life in Poland, see Garton Ash's essay, "Uses of Adversity" in his book *Uses of Adversity* (New York: Vintage Books, 1990), 105-199; quoted at 113 and 116. The essay was written in June 1985. See also Michael Kaufman's chapter, "Underground Civilization," in his book *Mad Dreams, Saving Graces* (New York: Random House, 1989).

of exactly how American money was spent and be held accountable. But for groups like OKN, ZWID, or IDEE which smuggled cash into Poland, activists could not provide details on how the money made its way into Poland or give a full account of how it was used once it arrived. As Jan Lasota explained to Myra Lenard, the head of PAC's Washington office:

I would like to clear one matter. I am sending dollars to Poland, not zlotys. Sending zlotys from the West is impossible and, forgive my expression, it would make no sense. . . . Also, I cannot supply you with the names of the universities and organizations which are assisted by [OKN]. They are underground institutions, and they are illegal according to communist law. I do not have that kind of information, because just passing such information it would endanger my colleagues. Please note that when [OKN] is helping some 'official organizations' as for example theaters, the information is supersecret since those institutions could face closing up.¹²⁸

In order to keep opposition activities safe, operational information was compartmentalized and only given to people who truly needed to know. The Americans were dealing with underground, illegal institutions which had to rely on disguised postal packages and unnamed couriers to carry money and material into Poland.¹²⁹ Keeping exact financial records, receipts, lists of contacts, or written records of any kind could jeopardize the safety of those working for the opposition if the records fell into the hands of the security services. When these kind of these records were kept they were not reproduced in the yearly reports for fear that operational information would be

¹²⁸ Letter from J.P. Lasota to Myra Lenard dated February 15, 1987, PAC, Books 4, "Grant # 86-181-E-047-25.0 OKNO."

¹²⁹ On the issue of couriers, it is very difficult to reconstruct how these webs functioned. From most accounts it was a surprisingly informal process. Couriers included Poles who were allowed to travel to the West and given a password to use in meeting with émigrés living abroad (if the two parties were not already familiar). The opposition also passed money and material through shipments overseen by the KCEP, as well as sympathetic Westerners who could be trusted. As one example, Prof. Jane Curry was given a disassembled computer prior to a planned trip to Warsaw, and given instructions on a church location to leave the parts in once within Poland. Curry smuggled the computer equipment into Poland in her children's luggage (Author's interview with Jane Curry, November 30, 2006). In the case of IDEE, Irena Lasota relied mainly on trusted friends and colleagues she had known since working in the early Polish opposition in the 1970s. Shipments of money were usually small enough (about \$500) to make any losses due to confiscation relatively painless (Interview with Lasota).

compromised.¹³⁰

To provide a loose mechanism for accountability, however, the Polish opposition provided receipts of a kind to their Western donors by communicating through the underground press. Independent publications included a small thank-you section which listed nondescript names and amounts to acknowledge donations. In the case of large deliveries of money from the West, the underground press used codenames to acknowledge that American funds had made it to their intended destinations. For the Video association the code in *Tygodnik Mazowsze* was "Zebra dz. Wackowi."¹³¹ For OKN the code for money from PACCF was "Gebroch" with "bullion" serving as the name for the independent councils. Shipments received from IPA were acknowledged in the weekly *Solidarność Walcząca*. The specific amounts of money and aid received were also in code. As Jan Lasota explained, "Smaller amounts of foreign currency are sometimes acknowledged with the name of the currency. . . In principle [*Tygodnik Mazowsze*] is trying not to state the name of the currency and amounts of funds which are coming regularly."¹³² These small notes in the underground press were then passed to patrons in the West as confirmation that money was reaching the opposition.¹³³

¹³⁰ Irena Lasota kept extensive records of who she sent money with, the final destination organization, and the code word that would be printed in the independent press to confirm receipt. I have seen one of these ledgers and am currently in correspondence with Lasota to help her organize and archive her other records and correspondence.

¹³¹ Letter from Agnieszka Holland to Ms. Lenard, dated January 27, 1987, PAC, Books 4, "NED Grant #86-181-E-047-50 Polish Video Film."

¹³² Letter from J.P. Lasota to Myra Lenard, dated February 15, 1987.

¹³³ Gebert confirmed this procedure (Author's interview with Gebert). It should also be noted that while the funder and the final grantees did eventually come to an understanding regarding methods to properly report how American money was being spent, the issue of providing accounting for dissident activities was a significant source of tension. Agnieszka Holland summed up this frustration best in a letter to Myra Lenard (see note 131 for source): "First of all I have to clear the situation to you: I have no qualifications to be an accountant or bookkeeper and so far the situation does not give me that opportunity to account for monies spent. I am a film director, lucky enough to be quite busy. . . . I had agreed to represent VIDEO in Poland because: I knew people directing that movement, I trusted them, and wanted to help them. . . . I am only a middleman: I accept money from Brussels and pass it on to Poland through authorized individuals by a

This system was based on a deep sense of trust between the Polish activists and their American patrons. Officials from NED did visit their grantees in Western Europe to check in and ask questions, but overall the NED was at the mercy of the groups operating smuggling routes into Poland. As Myra Lenard explained to NED in an annual report:

Although we have experienced a few anxieties, from our sub-grantees, attributed to the complexity of the reporting system we now realize that the "network" works. For all practical purposes we are reconciled with the fact that more detailed information, especially from Poland, is perhaps unreasonable because of security considerations. Understandably, after the ease with which the Polish security forces were able to round up and contain key leaders of Solidarity, many individuals are reluctant to submit great details of their operation.¹³⁴

Over time, the NED and its final grantees learned to trust one another, accepting the limitations of what could be disclosed and what needed to be left unsaid.

Together with the overwhelming Polish-ness of the Western structures which supported the opposition, this trust-based system provides further evidence of how little operational control Americans actually had over how funds made their way into Poland or how they were spent. Washington completely relied upon the opposition itself to report truthfully what was being bought in Poland, further evidence of the democratic movement's extensive independence. While this independence led to some anxieties, policy makers in Washington understood and accepted it. Independence was an integral part of the relationship between the NED and the movements they supported. The endowment understood that it was not in the business of telling democracy activists how to do their job; rather, the NED was funded to respond when admirable movements and

prearranged password. Those people, in most cases, inform me whether they are taking the money to Poland or will do the buying here. . . . Truly speaking I, also, was not aware of the necessity of keeping books. Had I known that I would never have agreed to be in charge of the program and in the near future I will find someone to take my place, someone less busy and better oriented."

¹³⁴ Final Narrative Report from Myra Lenard to NED, dated July 29, 1987, PAC, Books 4, NED Grant #86-181-E-047-25."

workable ideas surfaced. As NED President Carl Gershman explained to Congress:

The second principle that characterizes Endowment grantmaking policy is responsiveness. The Endowment does not seek to fashion solutions to problems in far off countries, or to impose programs developed in the U.S. on foreign democratic groups, but rather to respond to their initiatives and requests for assistance. . . . The Endowment's approach is to encourage the indigenous democratic groups to define their needs and set forth their priorities and goals.¹³⁵

For the NED their control over the process came from selecting programs and choosing who to trust. Once NED funds were allocated and sent there were few mechanisms to influence how it was actually delivered to Poland or how it was utilized once it arrived. Operational decisions were left in the hands of Poles, either in Western Europe or within Poland. But, as NED grant administrator Yale Richmond simply commented after a visit to Paris in late 1986, "Our grants . . . appear to be in very good hands."¹³⁶

In the wake of the final political amnesty in 1986, the NED and American NGO's remained focused on keeping money flowing to the opposition movement, with over three times the amount of funds available in 1987 as in 1985. While activists did not have to worry about long jail sentences any longer, they were still susceptible to harassment and punishment through fines and confiscations. Thus, as diplomatic relations between the Polish and American governments warmed, the second line of American policy—American financial support to Solidarność and other opposition groups—grew stronger, verifying where American loyalties and hopes for the future lay: with the democratic opposition movement.

¹³⁵ "Prepared Statement of Carl Gershman," in Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, *Foreign Relations Authorization Act: Hearings*, 100th Cong., 1st Session, 1987, 395-396. For the scope of this dissertation it is difficult to ascertain whether "responsiveness" was implemented equally in other NED programs in Latin America, Africa, or Asia; however, from the record on Poland Gershman's words were more than just hypothetical guidelines.

¹³⁶ NED Trip Report, Polish Video, OKNO, and POLCUL. Agnieszka Holland and Piotr Lasota, Paris, dated October 20, 1986, PAC, Books 3, "NED Grant #86-181-E-047-25."

The Fruits of Humanitarian Aid

As government-to-government relations normalized and American financial support for the opposition movement increased, American humanitarian assistance programs began to reap rewards from their longstanding policies. By the end of 1986, the Polish economy was not supplying all of the consumer goods and commodities needed by the Polish people, but by no means were living conditions as bleak as the first years of martial law. Even according to opposition figures, by 1984 the consumption of bread, vegetables and vegetable products, fish, and eggs had returned to 1980 levels, although meat consumption remained at 83% of 1980 levels.¹³⁷ Despite government mandated price increases, real wages increased roughly 2% per year from 1983 to 1986. Over the same period of time the country's net material product per capita increased about 4% per year.¹³⁸ In addition Poland had a thriving black market, based in dollars, supplementing the domestic market with much needed consumer goods.

These general improvements in the economy and opportunities to purchase goods outside of the legal market, however, meant only that Poland's humanitarian needs had decreased, not disappeared. In 1986, the KCEP distributed 19,775 tons of humanitarian aid, compared to 180,000 tons in 1982. This decrease was similar among all humanitarian groups working in Poland.¹³⁹ So, American aid distributed through NGOs like CRS continued to flow into Poland, but at much lower level than the first years after martial

¹³⁷ *Polska 5 lat po Sierpniu* (London: Aneks, 1986), 186

¹³⁸ World Economy Research Institute, *Poland International Economic Report 1990/91* (Warsaw: Warsaw School of Economics, 1991), 199, 205

¹³⁹ Informacja o Zagranicznych Dostawach Humanitarnych w Latach 1982 - I Kwartał 1987 [Information about Foreign Aid from 1982 to the first quarter of 1987], dated July 31, 1987, MSZ, 35/90, W-6, Dep III (1987), AP 39-4-87.

law. Also, by 1986 the focus of the aid flowing to Poland changed from fulfilling basic food needs to prioritizing medical shipments and donations of clothing. For example, in FY 1986, the PACCF sent \$16,560,463 in aid to Poland, of which \$12,150,395 (73%) was medical supplies and \$3,080,913 (19%) was clothing and shoes.¹⁴⁰

These levels of aid in 1986 also reflect one-time initiatives by American charitable organizations to respond to the Chernobyl disaster. On April 29, the Polish government was the first Soviet bloc nation to publicly acknowledge and respond to reports about the nuclear accident at the Chernobyl nuclear reactor located 700 miles east of Warsaw in Ukraine. Polish radio and television announced that high-levels of radioactivity had been recorded in the northeastern portions of the country around the city of Białystok, and the PZPR announced precautions including banning the sale of all milk from grass-fed cows in the region, warning the public to wash fresh vegetables thoroughly, testing airborne radioactivity regularly, and providing iodine tablets to infants, children, and pregnant women in the affected area.¹⁴¹ The Polish church then made an appeal for Western aid including milk and iodine tablets for children and infants.

America's charitable instincts came to the fore once again. The day after the government announcement, Davis met with Kinast to inquire about the situation and to

¹⁴⁰ PACCF Relief for Poland Report, November 1, 1985 to June 30, 1986, dated June 27, 1986, and PACCF Relief for Poland, July 1 to October 31, 1986, dated November 21, 1986, both in PAC, Books 9, "PACCF Registration as a Private Voluntary Organization with AID."

¹⁴¹ Michael Kaufman, "Nuclear Disaster: Spreading Cloud and an Aid Appeal," *New York Times* (Apr. 30, 1986): A10, and Eric Bourne, "Cloud hangs over East-bloc nuclear plans," *Christian Science Monitor* (May 2, 1986): 12. It is noteworthy that Jaruzelski approved this announcement before Gorbachev spoke publicly about the disaster, showing the relative openness of the Polish system. As one Western source was quoted as saying in Bourne's article, "The [Jaruzelski] government reacted as a government should, and this correct handling of the problem and the candor will do more for its credit than a dozen PRON declarations." The PZPR was obviously vindicated in its choice for action when Gorbachev spoke publicly about the disaster two weeks later on May 14.

offer American medical and humanitarian aid.¹⁴² A week after the disaster, CRS announced they had purchased \$100,000 of milk in Western Europe and were transporting it to be distributed by the Catholic church.¹⁴³ The PACCF also responded quickly, shipping thirty tons of dried milk from London, airlifting 25,000 doses of iodine, and sending tens of thousands of dollars worth of donated baby formula, children's vitamins, and baby juices. The local PAC chapter in Buffalo, New York, even held a spontaneous telethon and raised \$75,000 for Polish children.¹⁴⁴ Working together, CRS and PACCF also airlifted 100 tons of dried milk, provided by a Senate resolution from surplus reserves.¹⁴⁵ In the scope of the decade, these actions were not an anomaly, but simply a short-lived peak in the constant stream of American aid to Poland.

By the end of 1986, a growing body of anecdotal evidence was surfacing to show that this aid was not going unnoticed by the Polish people. Public voices included Polish church officials who worked with Americans. During Glemp's visit to the United States in September 1985, he specifically visited CRS's offices in New York to offer his "warmest thanks for the work done for the benefit of [his] countrymen in Poland." When the head of the KCEP, Bishop Czesław Domin, made a follow-up trip to meet with American donors in June 1986 he presented CRS with a Medal of Gratitude, and described "prayers and masses offered to God for the donors." Domin also wrote of his "high esteem and prayerful gratitude" for all the work CRS had done with its "great

¹⁴² Notatka Informacyjna [Information Note], dated May 2, 1986, MSZ, 14/89, W-3, Dep III (1986), AP 22-1-86/B.

¹⁴³ Speech by Bishop Czesław Domin in New York, dated June 27, 1986, CRS, EURMENA, XVII-C, Box 4, Poland Correspondence 1970-1986, "Charity Commission of the Polish Episcopate '86."

¹⁴⁴ On PACCF activities surrounding the crisis, see PACCF Relief for Poland Report, November 1, 1985 to June 30, 1986.

¹⁴⁵ Senate Resolution 394 was sponsored by Sen. Paul Simon and supported by Sen. Jesse Helms among others, on May 5. See *Congressional Record* (May 5, 1986); 99th Cong., 2nd Sess., S 5305. Jaruzelski famously responded to the shipment of powdered milk by donating sleeping bags to the homeless in New York City.

material importance but also enormous spiritual value."¹⁴⁶ The Bishop of Kraków thanked the PAC for their shipments of milk, writing, "We thank you! Your kindness and generosity move us deeply, because we are aware that ultimately all men have their own problems, and despite of this the people of the United States willingly hurry to send help where that help is needed."¹⁴⁷ Father Bronisław Dąbrowski from the Primate's Charitable-Social Committee wrote, "We thank you from the bottom of our hearts for the generous gift. . . . We are truly moved by such effective remembrance of our wards. Your help has not only a material significance for us, but also a spiritual [*moralny*] one. It is proof of the solidarity of people of good will that are always eager to provide help for those who are in need."¹⁴⁸

Messages did not come only from officials in the church, but also came from people who received the aid, giving a full sense of the gifts' significance. Even a simple shipment of used clothes was meaningful. As a local priest wrote:

We liked the clothes very much. At present they are fashionable in our country. Both young people and the old were very pleased. And those rather fat were satisfied. Clothes are very expensive and all these people can't afford to buy them. Pensions and salaries are very low. Four brides were dressed in these white Californian dresses. They were all very happy! We pray for God's bless for all of you and may the Good Lord keep you all in his loving care at work and in your life.¹⁴⁹

Moreover these gifts clearly took on a symbolic as well as practical meaning. Like the church leaders, recipients wrote about the gifts' spiritual (*moralny* or *duchowo*)

¹⁴⁶ Speech by Bishop Czesław Domin in New York, dated June 27, 1986.

¹⁴⁷ Excerpts from thank you letters received, attached to PACCF Relief for Poland Report, November 1, 1985 to June 30, 1986.

¹⁴⁸ Excerpts from thank you letters received, attached to Relief for Poland Report, November 1, 1986 to May 31, 1987, dated June 12, 1987, PAC, Books 9, "PACCF Registration as a Private Voluntary Organization with AID."

¹⁴⁹ Thank You Letter from Father Edward Dajczak, dated June 9, 1986, CRS, EURMENA XVII-C, Box 114, General Correspondence 1987-1995, "Poland: General Correspondence 1985-1986." The original is in English.

importance. Writers frequently referred to a sense of no longer being alone in their struggle. As one explained: "I thank you very, very much for this—not only for the contents in your good things, but above all for the awareness that somewhere far away someone thinks about us and wants to help us."¹⁵⁰ As a former political prisoner put it, "Whoever remembers us [reminds us] that we are not alone, gives us strength and stimulates us in our future work."¹⁵¹ Or as another recipient wrote:

The best part for me is that shortly after finishing my thirteen-month stay in [prison], I discover here an unfamiliar person from the other end of the earth, and what's more he impartially gives me articles in short supply in our country. . . . Even the smallest impulse of support for the desires and ideas for which I lost my freedom reminded me of the correctness of what I do and fills me with hope for the future.¹⁵²

American aid was providing moral support, reminding Poles that they were not alone and that their struggles and hardships were not being forgotten.

More generally, these handwritten thank you notes represent the sincere closeness Poles felt with the Americans who sent aid packages. In their notes, Poles included stories about their family and their children. They included pictures as well, often of events like christenings. They sent Christmas cards with warm words and "heartfelt" [*serdeczny*] thanks. Many notes also included their own symbolic gesture: Christmas Eve wafers. These wafers are traditionally shared among family members and close friends, with each member breaking off a bit of wafer before offering good wishes for the coming year. While the cards, pictures, and wafers were not a grand gesture, they are important

¹⁵⁰ Unsigned Thank You Letter from Warsaw, dated September 26, 1986, Hoover, Assistance Committee for the Democratic Opposition in Poland, Box 3. The Assistance Committee for the Democratic Opposition in Poland was a small, presumably grass roots organization that sent care packages with hard to get items (coffee, toothpaste, cooking oil, etc.) to recently released prisoners and their families. Box 3 in this collection is an amazing collection of thank you notes from many of the recipients.

¹⁵¹ Thank You Letter from Marek Łukarz, dated September 3, 1986, Hoover, Assistance Committee for the Democratic Opposition in Poland, Box 3.

¹⁵² Thank You Letter from Bogdan Guśc, dated October 11, 1986, Hoover, Assistance Committee for the Democratic Opposition in Poland, Box 3.

indicators of the emotional response American aid evoked. These were all gestures Poles would traditionally share with friends and family members, so by sending these notes to an unknown person the recipients were demonstrating the close ties the American charitable gestures evoked. As a young seminarian from Lublin explained in a letter to CRS, humanitarian aid was a "unifier of people in distant lands."¹⁵³

When the U.S. government made the final decision to support humanitarian projects in Poland in May 1982 (see chapter 2), they did so for political reasons: "Our assistance is widely visible in Poland, undermining regime propaganda and providing material evidence of Western support for Solidarity and the Church."¹⁵⁴ Despite years of being bombarded by PZPR statements that American sanctions caused their country's economic problems, the Polish people remained unconvinced. Whether it was large shipments of rice, gallons of cooking oil, blocks of surplus yellow American cheese, or sacks of flour sent by the American government or tubes of tooth paste, cans of coffee, candy, a new dress, and soap sent directly by American NGO's, the message received by the Polish people was the same: you are not alone, you are not forgotten, you are not suffering unnoticed. In turn these gifts provided moral support and instilled hope that circumstances would improve. While Jaruzelski was looking to find a scapegoat for Poland's problems to relieve pressure on his own government, American aid served as evidence that sanctions and U.S. policies were not intended to hurt the Polish people. In addition, humanitarian aid served to strengthen old bonds and create new ones between

¹⁵³ Thank You Letter from Polish Seminarian, dated September 24, 1987, CRS, EURMENA XVII-C, Box 114, General Correspondence 1987-1995, "Poland: General Correspondence 1985-1986." Numerous cards with Christmas wafers can be found in Hoover, Assistance Committee for the Democratic Opposition in Poland, Box 3.

¹⁵⁴ Confidential Memorandum, "Draft Decision Memo on Options for Humanitarian Assistance to Poland," dated May 12, 1982, NSA, Soviet Flashpoints, Box 27, April-June 1982.

the Polish and American peoples when the Polish government sought to sow discord. After more than five years of humanitarian projects, both large and small, these heartfelt letters provided evidence that the American strategy was successful at maintaining and strengthening America's position in Poland.

Toward Normalization in Bilateral Relations

In the days following Reagan's February 1987 announcement dropping all remaining American sanctions, Washington and Warsaw found themselves on new footing, no longer arguing over economic sticks but negotiating over carrots and new agreements. In the first months, both sides followed the working plan agreed to in Vienna. Jozef Czyrek visited Washington, New York, Philadelphia, and Chicago from March 2 to 11, meeting with government officials, congressmen, businessmen, public leaders, and U.N. leaders. Czyrek's most important meetings included a short March 4 meeting with Vice President Bush, and then meetings with Ridgway, Whitehead, Shultz, Secretary of Commerce Malcolm Baldrige, and Secretary of the Treasury James Baker all on March 10—the highest level meetings for a Polish official since 1981. Czyrek pursued a friendly tone but persistently pushed to accelerate improvements in economic relations. His top priority was assurances that lifting sanctions would have practical as well as political significance. Specifically, Czyrek hoped for new Export-Import Bank credits, access to American technology, new CCC credits, increased opportunities for joint ventures, American support for IMF and World Bank membership, and a positive influence on discussions to reschedule Polish debt through the Paris Club. To support his calls for improved economic opportunities, Czyrek emphasized internal developments

towards "socialist pluralism," particularly the new robust role of government-sanctioned trade unions, the powers of the Consultative Council, the creation of a new government ombudsmen to monitor human rights standards, and the presence of large number of former Solidarność members within these organizations and other local and regional government structures. In terms of diplomatic relations, Czyrek announced to Shultz that Poland was now prepared to provide agrément for the next ambassador to Poland in hopes that Washington would reciprocate.¹⁵⁵

In the face of Czyrek's enthusiasm for improved relations, the Americans presented a much more reserved vision of the future. Shultz agreed with Czyrek's call to return to full diplomatic relations; however, the Americans again emphasized that further improvements in economic relations would be based on tangible improvements in human rights and steps towards national reconciliation. Washington also stressed that there would be no major influx of new credits or economic aid; economic decisions would focus on practical improvements in Poland's creditworthiness. Moreover, any new joint ventures would be based on the decision of individual companies, not the U.S. government. From the American side, reengagement was meant to be gradual process. As explained in briefing material:

Our task is to cool off exaggerated Polish expectations and to put in place a realistic framework for the next phase in our relationship. We need to make clear our intention to continue our step-by-step approach leading to a gradual expansion of our bilateral relations. The Poles must understand that we will continue to relate progress to [the government of Poland's]

¹⁵⁵ For the Polish record on these meetings see Tezy do Rozmów tow. J. Czyrka z Sekretarzem Stanu USA - G. Shultzem [Theses for com. J. Czyrek's conversation with U.S. Secretary of State G. Shultz] (dated February 26, 1987), Tezy do Rozmowy z Sekretarzem Handlu USA Malcolm Baldrige w dniu 10 marca 1987 r., godz. 9.30 w gmachu Departamentu Handlu [Theses for conversation with U.S. Secretary of Commerce Malcolm Baldrige on 10 March 1987, at 9:30 a.m. in the Commerce Department] (dated March 9, 1987), Tezy do rozmowy z Sekretarzem Skarbu USA James'em A. Baker'em III w dniu 10 marca 1987 roku [Theses for conversation with U.S. Secretary of the Treasury James A. Baker on 10 March 1987] (dated March 5, 1987), all located in MSZ, 35/90, W-5, Dep III (1987), AP 220-7-87.

performance on human rights and national reconciliation.

To head off the [government of Poland from] dwelling on U.S. economic aid, we will need to make clear to Czyrek: 1) we foresee continuing our cautious, step-by-step approach; 2) solutions to Poland's economic problems will be found in Warsaw, not in Washington; 3) Western financial ties with Poland must be based on sound commercial and financial criteria.¹⁵⁶

In American eyes, Poland had not earned a clean slate, and the Department of State made it clear that relations, economic or otherwise, would not return to the free-flowing days before the Polish Crisis.

Following Czyrek's visit, the two sides negotiated in a number of lower-level forums meant to improve exchanges and coordination. In late February a Polish delegation traveled to Washington to discuss re-starting an agreement on scientific exchanges through the Marie Curie-Sklodowskiej Foundation. An American delegation reciprocated with a visit to Warsaw in June.¹⁵⁷ The main concern was not the agreement itself, but the need to find funding to support it. Kennedy solved this problem in July when he included \$1 million for scientific exchanges in his "American Aid to Poland Act of 1987." Minister of Environmental Protection and Natural Resources Stefan Jarzebski

¹⁵⁶ Briefing Memorandum from Charles Thomas to the Acting Secretary, "Your Meeting with Polish Party Leader Jozef Czyrek on March 10 at 11:30 A.M.," dated March 6, 1987, NSA, End of the Cold War Collection, scanned incoming FOIA documents. For other American records on Czyrek's visit, see Cable from Secstate to Amembassy Warsaw, "Secretary's Meeting with Polish Politburo Member Czyrek," dated March 12, 1987; Cable from Secstate to Amembassy Warsaw, "GOP Suggestions for Bilateral Consultations," dated March 27, 1987; Briefing Memorandum from Rozanne Ridgway to the Secretary, "Your meeting with Polish Politburo Member Jozef Czyrek on March 10 at 3:30 PM," dated March 9, 1987; Cable from Secstate to Amembassy Warsaw, "Deputy Secretary's Meeting with Polish Leader Czyrek," dated March 12, 1987; Cable from Secstate to Amembassy Warsaw, "Roundtable Discussion on Polish Issues," dated March 13, 1987; Memorandum for the Record, "Poland: Whitehead Luncheon for Czyrek March 10," dated March 10, 1987; Information Memorandum from Rozanne Ridgway to the Acting Secretary, "Poland: Czyrek Foreshadows Prisoner Releases to Vice President," dated March 4, 1987; and Cable from USDOC to Amembassy Warsaw, "Czyrek Delegation's Meeting with Commerce Secretary Baldrige," dated March 14, 1987; all in NSA, End of the Cold War Collection, scanned incoming FOIA documents.

¹⁵⁷ For Polish records on these trips see MSZ, 35/90, W-6, Dep III (1987), AP 54-1-87, as well as, Notatka Informacyjna z rozmowy z charge d'affaires a.i. USA J. Davis'em [Information Note from a conversation with U.S. charge d'affaires a.i. J. Davis], dated February 19, 1987, MSZ, 35/90, W-4, Dep III (1987), AP 23-7-87.

followed this success with a trip to Washington in September to sign a cooperation agreement with the EPA.¹⁵⁸

The two sides also took steps to revive pre-existing economic contacts and open new ones. At the end of May the Georgetown University Law Center hosted a conference sponsored by the Polish Chamber of Commerce and the International Law Institute, to discuss the role of joint ventures in East-West trade. Guests included Americans from the Overseas Public Investment Corporation, the U.S. Trade Representative's office, and the Commerce Department.¹⁵⁹ On June 11-12, the Polish-U.S. Economic Council—a group organized by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce to promote American businesses meeting with Polish officials—held their Seventh Plenary Session in Poznań. Two days later the Commerce Department sponsored exhibition space for American businesses at the Poznań International Trade Convention, the first American exhibition in five years.¹⁶⁰

In a step not outlined in the Vienna working plan, Washington and Warsaw also began to work towards a new agreement on the contentious issue of propaganda. Shortly after the September amnesty, Rakowski had suggested to Jaruzelski to revise information and propaganda policies, "which were no longer capable of convincingly representing the authorities' points of view on important political achievements."¹⁶¹ In bilateral relations, this re-evaluation of priorities led the U.S. and Poland to agree to new understanding on USIA activities. This was a staunch reversal from Polish policy in the early 1980s which

¹⁵⁸ "Washington Talk: Briefing," *Washington Post* (Sept. 8, 1987): A20.

¹⁵⁹ For Polish records on this meeting held from May 26-30, 1987, see: MSZ, 35/90, W-6, Dep III (1987), AP 43-3-87.

¹⁶⁰ Susanne Lotarski, "Eastern Europe's Economic Plans May be Dimmed by Harsh Winter," *Business America* (Mar. 30, 1987).

¹⁶¹ Final chapter on jamming, Paweł Machcewicz, "*Monachijska menażria*". *Walka z Radiem Wolna Europa 1950-1989* (Warsaw: Instytut Pamięci Narodowej i Instytut Studiów Politycznych, forthcoming 2007). Machcewicz's chapter also includes a broader discussion of the PZPR's evolving views on RFE broadcasts in the second half of the 1980s.

focused on shutting down the American Library. On June 16, Dell Pendergrast, the assistant director of the European bureau at USIA, came to Warsaw to talk about starting new cultural and information exchanges. He also made two specific proposals: to begin distributing the USIA publication, *Ameryka*, from the embassy and to arrange a visit by the Cooperative Theater of America. For Biały, these proposals were not important in themselves, but showed that Washington was considering reducing its propaganda activities against Poland.¹⁶² A little over two months later, the USIA and the PZPR agreed to begin formal negotiations to strengthen information, educational, and cultural exchanges, opening new funding sources. The MSZ interpreted this as a very positive step because Washington had avoided addressing the issue of USIA exchanges since the Poles proposed them in Vienna.¹⁶³

Over the course of 1987, both sides worked to exchange ambassadors. Although Shultz responded positively to Czyrek when he proposed exchanging ambassador in February, Washington did not make an official response until April. On April 7, Davis met with MSZ officers to read an official statement that the United States "happily welcomed" the offer of agrément, but that the process of choosing an American

¹⁶² Pilna Notatka z rozmowy z Dell Pendergrast'em zastępcą Dyrektora Biura d/s Europy Agencji Informacyjnej Stanów Zjednoczonych [Urgent Note from a conversation with Dell Pendergrast, assistant director of the European Bureau of the United States Information Agency], dated June 16, 1987, MSZ, 35/90, W-6, Dep III (1987), AP 50-3-87.

¹⁶³ Pilna Notatka dotycząca propozycji odbycia konsultacji z przedstawicielami Agencji Informacyjnej Stanów Zjednoczonych (USIA) [Urgent Note regarding the proposition to begin consultations with leaders from the United States Information Agency], dated August 29, 1987, MSZ, 35/90, W-6, Dep III (1987), AP 50-3-87. Polish enthusiasm for new agreements continued through the end of the year with government agencies coordinating activities to make a proposal to expand cultural, educational, and scientific exchanges between the two countries. See: Notatka: w dniu 21 września br. w DPI odbyło się spotkanie z udziałem przedstawicieli DWKN, Dep III, i DPT poświęcone przygotowaniom do rozmów z USA w sprawie normalizacji współpracy w zakresie informacji, nauki, kultury i wymiany stypendialnej [Note: on 21 September in the DPI there was a meeting to discuss the matter of normalizing cooperation in information policies, scientific, culture, and educational stipends], dated September 23, 1987, MSZ, 35/90, W-6, Dep III (1987), AP 50-3-87.

ambassador could take a few months given the nature of the process.¹⁶⁴ The United States did not announce their choice for ambassador until September 21 when Swartz met with Bialy to name John Davis. The same day, Ludwiczak met with State Department officials to announce that Poland had chosen Jan Kinast to fill the position in Washington. The following day, Davis accepted Kinast; however, Washington wanted to wait to officially announce the decision during Bush's visit commencing just four days later.

Vice President Bush's visit to Poland, from September 26 to 29, marked a new symbolic high point in relations: Bush became the highest ranking American visitor to Poland since President Jimmy Carter's visit ten years earlier. From the initial announcement that Bush was including Warsaw among his stops in European capitals, American journalists questioned the visit's diplomatic importance: the vice president was accused of scheduling publicity opportunities before he officially announced his candidacy for the presidency at the end of September.¹⁶⁵ To the media, Bush was wearing two hats: one as statesmen sent to address the evolving Polish-American relationship and one as presidential candidate looking to improve his image on the campaign trail. Bush's decision to hire a camera crew to shoot campaign footage only added to public suspicions.¹⁶⁶ State Department members also worried privately about the trips' domestic

¹⁶⁴ Pilna Notatka [Urgent Note], dated April 8, 1987, MSZ, 35/90, W-4, Dep III (1987), AP 22-4-87.

¹⁶⁵ "Washington Talk: Briefing," *Washington Post* (Aug. 19, 1987): A20. The precise genesis of Bush's visit remains unclear. When he met with Czyrek in March, Bush mentioned his own opinion that Reagan should schedule a visit to Warsaw, but did not mention any of his own aspirations. According to Simons, the decision to take the trip was made in June or July (interview with Simons). The first mention of the trip in opened MSZ files appears in August in a memo about meetings with the vice president's advance team on August 24-26, 1987 (Notatka Informacyjna o przebiegu rozmów przygotowawczych do wizyty wiceprezydenta USA George'a Busha w Polsce [Information Note about the preparatory talks for the visit of Vice President Bush to Poland], dated August 27, 1987, MSZ, 35/90, W-5, Dep III [1987], AP 220-15-87). According to published accounts Brezinski, who the Reagan administration briefly considered for the ambassadorial position, brokered the deal for the Bush visit (David Hoffman, "Chanting Polish Crowds Provide Bush With Footage for '88 Campaign," *Washington Post* [Oct. 4, 1987]: A18).

¹⁶⁶ The two hats analogy is taken from David Hoffman, "Bush in Iowa Promotes Foreign Policy Credentials," *Washington Post* (Sept. 24, 1987): A17.

political focus. Simons "found [the trip] a distasteful prospect . . . because it was politically motivated. . . . The Bush trip germinated as a campaign trip. It was scheduled in order to get to Poland and meet publicly with Lech Wałęsa, and to get a picture with Lech Wałęsa before the deadline as a candidate."¹⁶⁷

In terms of his political impulses, the trip to Warsaw provided Bush with images of him as statesmen. He met privately with all three major groups: with Jaruzelski, Głomp, and Wałęsa. He participated in the obligatory visitor's activities: placing a wreath at a memorial to the Warsaw Uprising, inspecting a private farm outside of Warsaw, viewing the Royal Castle in Warsaw, touring a television factory, and visiting the Holocaust Memorial and extermination camp at Auschwitz-Birkenau. In a new element for foreign visitors, the vice president addressed the Polish people directly and uncensored over Polish television, taking advantage of the opportunity by mentioning Wałęsa by name, a rare occurrence on Polish television.

Bush's most important public appearance, however, occurred when he laid a wreath at the grave of Father Popieluszko at St. Stanisław Kostka Church on Monday morning, September 28. For his ride across Warsaw to the church, Bush was joined by Wałęsa.¹⁶⁸ When the two exited the limousine they were greeted by the visit's largest crowds. After laying a wreath and placing a Solidarność banner, the vice president and Wałęsa were whisked up to a balcony overlooking the crowds where they addressed the crowd over a microphone that had been placed there the night before. The leaders spoke over chants of, "Solidarity! Lech Walesa! Long live Bush! Long live Reagan!" The vice president joined the crowd by tentatively raising his fingers in the traditional Solidarność

¹⁶⁷ Interview with Simons.

¹⁶⁸ For Bush's recollections see George Bush and Brent Scowcroft, *A World Transformed* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1998), 117.

"V" for victory.¹⁶⁹ The next day Bush completed his stop in Poland and continued his European tour to Bonn.

While most contemporary accounts emphasized the political imagery of Bush's visit over its substance, the trip did have meaningful effects on American policy.¹⁷⁰ First, the two governments signed the new agreement on scientific-technical cooperation and officially announced that Davis and Kinast would be ambassadors. It was also widely reported that in his talks with Jaruzelski, Bush agreed to use American leverage in the Paris Club to get a favorable agreement to reschedule more of Poland's debt which had become due from 1985 to 1987. This was slightly different from the previous American policy which stated that Washington would no longer block these kinds of agreements. Poland signed a new agreement to reschedule \$8.5 billion in debt with the Paris Club in December.¹⁷¹

Importantly, the vice president also laid out a vision of when and how Polish-American relations could improve. Bush and Jaruzelski held face-to-face talks over two days, with both sides engaging in a frank, but cordial exchange. The tone of the meeting was much closer to Jaruzelski's talk with Whitehead in 1987 than his exchanges earlier in the 1980s; there were no attempts to lecture the American guests on their failures or

¹⁶⁹ "Chanting Polish Crowds Provide Bush With Footage for '88 Campaign." According to this article, the shared drive and the hidden microphone were planned and executed by Bush's campaign advisors. Also, as the article pointed out, "The scene . . . is regarded by Bush campaign strategists as a masterpiece of political theater for a candidate who is often regarded as bland and uninspiring." This kind of grand gesture was much more consistent with Wałęsa and Solidarność's sense of symbolism, images, and gestures. Clearly the operation was planned in coordination with Solidarność members. It remains unclear who provided the original impetus for the idea. According to Davis, these details were handled by the White House, not the embassy (Interview with Davis, November 23, 1999).

¹⁷⁰ For examples of press coverage emphasizing political theater over substance see: A.M. Rosenthal, "The Truths of Poland," *New York Times* (Sept. 29, 1987): A35; Christopher Bobinski, "Bush Visit Does Little To Improve Polish Ties," *Financial Times* (Sept. 30, 1987): A2; and "The World in Poland," *New York Times* (Oct. 4, 1987): D2.

¹⁷¹ The Paris Club agreement was signed on December 16, 1987 (www.clubdeparis.org/sections/pays/pologne/).

intrusions. Rather, the two talked openly, about arms control, economic reform, the state of human rights, Poland's subordinate position to the Soviet Union, debt to the Paris Club, and Poland's relationship with the IMF, Paris Club, and World Bank—a point Jaruzelski emphasized a number of times, focusing on Poland's need for new technology and new Western credits to increase their exports and salvage their economy. Bush responded positively to all of Jaruzelski's comments, but maintained the same realistic and cautious approach the State Department had been advocating since February 1987.

Bush did provide, however, a vision of the way forward. The vice president consistently argued that American policy was driven by the many millions of Polish-Americans living in the United States. In Bush's opinion:

it would be helpful for Poland . . . to introduce institutionalized pluralism, reform the electoral system to make it possible to present "independent opinions," reform the trade union law, and make it possible to register independent trade unions. Such a program by the Polish authorities would make it easier in meaningful ways for the American administration to deal with Polish matters in Congress. From the USA administration's side, the response would be simultaneous and positive. "Free elections and free trade unions, that is your concern, but the more Americans are able to identify themselves with your solutions [*rozwiqzaniami*] the more they will be able to help."¹⁷²

During the second day of talks, Bush made a similar point: if the PZPR allowed trade union pluralism, "it would make it easier for the administration to make a commitment."¹⁷³ For Bush this was only positive thinking. For the Poles of course, these were huge steps to take, and while they believed relations had entered a new stage they concluded that Bush showed the "greatest restraint in reference to the possibility of

¹⁷² Notatka Informacyjna o oficjalnej wizycie wiceprezydenta Stanów Zjednoczonych Ameryki G. Bush'a w Polsce [Information Note about the official visit of the Vice President of the United States, G. Bush, to Poland], dated c. September 29, 1987, AAN, KC PZPR, V/365, 168. The quote marks signal that this is a direct quote from Bush, otherwise the material is a summary of what he said.

¹⁷³ *Ibid*, 172.

gaining American credits."¹⁷⁴ The importance of this vision should not be overemphasized; nonetheless, Bush committed himself to provide help—presumably in the form of economic incentives and credits—if the PZPR took concrete steps to increase pluralism and democracy.¹⁷⁵

Over the next few months, relations remained on a positive trajectory. Following Bush's visit, Davis presented a new list of areas for improvement in bilateral relations, including: coordination against international terrorism and narcotics trafficking, increased youth exchanges, new agreements regarding propaganda activities, pushing agreements with the IMF forward, and increased economic and financial exchanges.¹⁷⁶ In mid-December, a Polish delegation traveled to Washington to discuss a new agreement over propaganda activities, with USIA and BIB.¹⁷⁷ Relations were now on such firmer ground that even after the Department of State accused the Polish military attaché in Washington of acquiring American technology improperly and asked for his removal, both sides remained calm and did not allow events to spiral down into another PNG crisis.¹⁷⁸ At the end of 1987, the PZPR Politburo also decided to allow Western visitors to meet with opposition officials, ending the possibility of a replay of Whitehead's first Warsaw visit.¹⁷⁹ When John Whitehead made a return visit to Warsaw from January 30 to February 3, 1988, only a year after his first visit, the MSZ considered bilateral relations

¹⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, 190.

¹⁷⁵ For further discussion of this point see chapter 6.

¹⁷⁶ United States - Polish Relation [in English], dated November 13, 1987, MSZ, 35/90, W-4, Dep III (1987), AP 22-1-87.

¹⁷⁷ Notatka Informacyjna z rozmów z przedstawicielami Agencji Informacyjnej Stanów Zjednoczonych (USIA) oraz Zarządu Międzynarodowej Radiofonii (BIB) w Waszyngtonie, w dniach 14-15 grudnia br. [Information note from conversations with officials at the U.S. Information Agency as well as the Bureau for International Broadcasting in Washington, on 14-15 December], dated December 23, 1987, MSZ, 35/90, W-6, Dep III (1987), AP 50-3-87.

¹⁷⁸ For information on the affair involving I. Goreczen, see MSZ, 42/92, W-9, Dep III (1988), AP 35-5-88.

¹⁷⁹ Notatka o dotychczasowych doświadczeniach modelu wizyt zachodnich polityków w Polsce [Note about future model for visits by Western politicians to Poland], dated October 27, 1987, AAN, KC PZPR, VII/85, 374-382.

"very good and getting better."¹⁸⁰

Following the Polish decision to pursue a complete political amnesty in the second half of 1986, Polish-American relations entered a new period of cordial coordination. Beginning with Ridgway's meeting with Kinast in Vienna and followed shortly afterwards by Simons' and then Whitehead's visits to Warsaw, the U.S. government moved to lift all remaining sanctions. In the year following Whitehead's first visit, the two sides repaired some of the damage done to bilateral relations over the years since the declaration of martial law: diplomatic representation returned to the level of ambassador; scientific-cultural exchanges started anew; mechanisms for small-scale economic exchanges and relations were revived; the United States agreed to support Poland's propositions for economic assistance and restructuring through the IMF, World Bank, and Paris Club; and the PZPR and the USIA worked together to decrease tensions in the propaganda wars. In many regards Poland's position was looking up.

Nonetheless, not all problems had been solved. While U.S.-Polish relations had been patched, they had not been repaired to the level prior to martial law. As American diplomats made clear, economic relations would not return to the 1970s model or even the relationship shared during the original Polish crisis. The United States had signed no new agreements to provide direct agricultural or economic aid, as they had during 1980 and 1981. Nor had the United States signed any agreements to begin offering Poland new credits to purchase technology, raw materials, and make investments that the Polish economy dearly needed. American companies would only embark on new joint ventures

¹⁸⁰ Notatka Informacyjna o oficjalnej wizycie zastępcy sekretarza stanu Stanów Zjednoczonych Ameryki J.C. Whitehead [Information Note about the official visit of the deputy secretary of state of the United States, J. C. Whitehead, dated February 8, 1988, MSZ, 42/92, W-6, Dep III (1988), AP 220-4-88.

if they decided that these were good investments; the U.S. government had no plans to subsidize joint ventures with cheap, government-backed loans. While American support for the PZPR's bids to the IMF and World Bank held out the possibility of future economic aid, Poland had to make painful and deep economic reforms before international aid began to flow. Moreover, as Bush made clear in his September 1987 visit, the PZPR would have to pursue deep political liberalization for the United States to open the flood gates of support.

Bilateral relations warmed from 1986 to 1988, but by no means had the Reagan administration returned to the era of *détente*. In line with the Reagan administration's longtime critiques, economic relations with Poland were now based on realistic economic calculations about returns on American investments. The new agreements penned during 1987 showed the very limited ways in which the American government was willing to get involved in the economies of Eastern Europe. On the other side of the issue, Congressional and executive branch funding priorities proved where American hopes for the future remained: with the opposition. In turn, the lack of a significant influx of Western aid meant that the Polish economy continued to struggle under the weight of a disintegrating infrastructure, weak exports, and huge international debt. While Washington engaging more with Warsaw, Americans remained exceedingly loyal to the opposition, increasing expenditures on their behalf. Under the dual pressures of gradual economic collapse and a resilient opposition, Polish workers once again rose up in anger against the government, returning the impetus for political change to the domestic sphere, setting the stage for the final act of Poland's transformation.

Chapter 6

"Volatility in Poland's continuing drama":

Solidarność's Final Victory,

February 1988 to September 1989

On July 4, 1989, John and Helen Davis hosted the annual Independence Day celebration at the ambassador's residence, with about 1,300 guests in attendance. As Davis reported, "This Fourth of July celebration . . . generated much more than the usual cocktail conversation." A month earlier, the democratic opposition won a landslide election victory, taking nearly all the spots open to them in semi-free elections that were part of the power-sharing agreement negotiated during the Round Table talks earlier that year. The topics of conversation in the Davises' backyard this year were not the food or the weather; instead the hot topics were if Jaruzelski would run for the newly created office of president and whether Solidarność would seek a larger coalition in the new Sejm and Senate to create their own government. As guests nibbled and sipped, Warsaw's new political elite from both the opposition and the PZPR chatted about Poland's future, creating a "surreal tone of the party, with lifelong enemies cordially congratulating each other on all sides." In symbols of Poland's new political reality, "Bronisław Geremek . . . walked arm-in-arm with Politburo member Jozef Czyrek," and PZPR Minister for Youth, "Aleksander Kwaśniewski sat under the trees with former prisoner Adam Michnik

making jokes and deals." As one guest exclaimed, "This was no party; this was history."¹

In February 1988, very few, if any, political analysts predicted that in little over a year, Solidarność activists would hold seats in the Polish parliament and be chatting cordially with their former jailors. In spring and summer 1988, however, Polish workers took events into their own hands, staging strikes which brought Poland to the edge of a precipice once again. Faced with immense popular discontent, the PZPR chose to engage directly with Solidarność, first secretly and then publicly in the Round Table negotiations. With domestic Polish events driving change, American diplomats did little other than report back to Washington and revel at the positive changes in the political landscape. After President George H.W. Bush was inaugurated in January, he spent the first months of 1989 reviewing existing foreign policy and then the United States responded with a cautious rewards package for the government and continuing aid for the opposition. As spring turned into summer, domestic Polish events moved rapidly, causing the American embassy to wonder if the pace of change was too quick. When Bush came to Warsaw in July 1989, he landed in the middle of a new political crisis and used his influence to inhibit the pace of change to maintain as much of the negotiated agreement as possible, a prudent policy also followed in private meetings with PZPR and opposition leaders by Davis and his deputies in Warsaw. In August, however, Solidarność took yet another political gamble—accelerating the pace of transformation even further—and created a Solidarność-led coalition government, the first elected non-Communist

¹ Cable from Amembassy Warsaw to SecState, "High Politics at Warsaw's Fourth of July Reception," dated July 5, 1989, NSA, End of the Cold War, Poland 1989 Cables. In 2000 and 2001 the Department of State declassified over 660 cables back and forth to the American embassy in Warsaw, in response to a FOIA request by National Security Archive director Tom Blanton. These cables cover January through September 1989, providing unparalleled insight into American policy toward Poland during this period. A Polish translation of the cable quoted above, and many of the other cables cited below, can be found in Gregory F. Domber, ed., *Ku zwycięstwu "Solidarności". Korespondencja Ambasady USA w Warszawie z Departamentem Stanu styczeń-wrzesień 1989* (Warsaw: Institute Studiów Politycznych, 2006), 307-311.

government in Eastern Europe since the end of World War II. Once again, the American government could only sit back and marvel at Solidarność's political cunning. Overall the final period from February 1988 to September 1989 was more noteworthy for internal Polish politics than American or international influences on the democratic transformation.

Tensions and Strikes

Despite advances in Poland's international position made from 1985 to 1987, none of these improvements led to a significant influx of economic aid. Poland's economic future remained bleak. Jaruzelski and the PZPR leadership also became increasingly concerned about instability in their domestic sphere, fearing that continued economic stagnation could flare up into a national crisis, on the scale of 1980 or worse. As a PZPR report from August 1987 summarized:

General anxiety is rising due to the prolonged economic crisis. An opinion is spreading that the economy instead of improving is getting worse. As a result there arises an ever greater dissonance between the so-called official optimism of the authorities ("after all it's better") and the feeling of society. . . . Social dissatisfaction is growing because of the cost of living. An opinion is spreading that the government has only one "prescription," i.e. price increases. Against this background the mood of dissatisfaction is strongest among the workers.

As the same report noted, all of the improvements in foreign policy and U.S.-Polish relations had little, or even a negative impact on public perceptions:

for the "average" citizen, foreign policy is something remote, without an effect on the domestic situation of the country and the standard of living of the society, and, what is worse—an impression is created that the authorities are concentrating their efforts on building an "external" image,

neglecting the basic questions of citizens' daily lives.²

As feared, these societal anxieties about the economy, price increases, and the lack of progress in PZPR policies came to a head in spring 1988.

In line with the PZPR's efforts to restructure the economy through the "second stage" of reform, the government announced price increases on February 1, 1988. The price of foodstuffs, cigarettes, and alcohol grew about 40 percent, the price of gasoline rose almost 60 percent, and the price of some consumer goods rose over 200 percent. These price increases were coupled with increases in wages, but Polish workers did not remain complacent for long. On April 22, 5,000 workers at the *Stalowa Wola* steel mill southeast of Warsaw held a protest rally calling for pay increases and great freedom for unions. Three days later, municipal workers in Bydgoszcz held wildcat strikes for twelve hours, crippling the city's public transportation. The strike ended quickly when local Party leaders agreed to raise wages from 83 zlotys to 135 zlotys per hour. However, after seeing the success in Bydgoszcz, 4,000 workers at the Lenin Steelworks in Nowa Huta, just outside of Kraków, went on strike beginning April 26. The steelworkers called for wage increases but also added a political dimension, demanding that workers who had been fired for connections to *Solidarność* be reinstated. Three days later, workers in *Stalowa Wola* followed through on threats and began their own strike, pushing the limits of tolerance further by demanding pay raises and the reinstatement of *Solidarność*. While strikes continued in Nowa Huta, workers in *Stalowa Wola* ended their strike after receiving a significant pay raise. But on Monday, May 2, workers in the Lenin Shipyards

² Report, "A Synthesis of the Internal Situation and the West's Activity," dated August 28, 1987, in Paweł Machcewicz, "Poland 1986-1989: From 'Cooptation' to 'Negotiated Revolution' New Documents," *Cold War International History Project Bulletin* issue 12/13 (Fall/Winter 2001): 98 and 99.

in Gdańsk declared a strike in solidarity with the Lenin Steelworks.³

The PZPR utilized tactics from their well-tested playbook to respond to strikes. At 2 a.m. on May 5, riot police stormed the gates of the Lenin Steelworks, beating, arresting, and carrying away protestors to break the strike.⁴ The next night ZOMO troops amassed outside of the Lenin Shipyard in Gdańsk, shining bright lights and beating their truncheons against police trucks as they marched toward the shipyard entrance, all in a show of force meant to intimidate workers.⁵ With Wałęsa inside the shipyards, government troops never stormed the gates; instead, the PZPR sent Minister of Internal Affairs Kiszczak and Władysław Siła-Nowicki, an opposition lawyer and member of the Consultative Council, to negotiate. Outside the walls of striking industries, the MSW and police also harassed Solidarność leaders in a well organized display of power: about twenty-five leaders including Bujak and Kuron were all detained. Solidarność spokesman, Janusz Onyszkiewicz was even briefly jailed for providing information to foreign journalists. The strikes concluded on May 10 with workers peacefully exiting the shipyards leaving their goals unmet, despite Wałęsa's efforts to motivate them.⁶ With this wave of strikes over, the PZPR appeared to have come out on top. For the party leadership, "It looked as though they were no longer in imminent danger, the strike wave would not be repeated any time soon, and the prestige of Wałęsa and Solidarity had

³ Information in this paragraph is based on reporting by John Tagliabue for *The New York Times*. In particular, see: "Polish Workers Strike and Win a Raise" (Apr. 26, 1988): A3; "Steel Strike Widens Polish Labor Unrest" (Apr. 27, 1988): A3; "Steel strikes Spreading in Poland; Talks with Official Unions Fail" (Apr. 30, 1988): A1; and "Thousands at Gdansk Shipyard Join Polish Strike" (May 3, 1988): A1.

⁴ John Tagliabue, "Security Forces Crush a walkout at Mill in Poland," *New York Times* (May 6, 1988): A1.

⁵ John Tagliabue, "Young and Wary Strikers Take Solace from Wałęsa," *New York Times* (May 7, 1988): A1.

⁶ Tagliabue, "Gdansk Workers Reject Polish Offer to End Strike," *New York Times* (May 10, 1988): A10; and "Gdańsk Workers end 9-day Strike; Key Demand Unmet," *New York Times* (May 11, 1988): A1.

suffered a serious blow."⁷

The United States also responded to events in established patterns. After Polish forces stormed the Lenin Shipyards, Whitehead publicly stated, "We have to condemn the violence, imprisonments, the beatings that are reported to be taking place." While sanctions were not under consideration, he explained that prior to the strikes Washington considered taking positive steps to help Poland's debt problem through the IMF, World Bank, and Paris Club, as well as discussing the possibility of allowing commercial bank loans and even direct government aid. As Whitehead added, "All of those things are now in jeopardy."⁸ Outside of government, in mid-June Jerzy Milewski turned to Solidarność's promoter in the United States, Lane Kirkland, requesting that he "speed up" transfer of the first \$250,000 quarterly payment to the Coordinating Office in Brussels and to "arrange for the prompt transfer" of a second quarterly installment "to cover urgent obligations. . . regarding victims of economic repression directed at striking workers and other persons."⁹ In addition, American diplomats in Warsaw found themselves under obvious and often intrusive surveillance in spring and summer 1988, with plain clothes and uniformed police keeping a close watch on the embassy. The increase in harassment and tension was palpable enough that it reminded American diplomats more of the days

⁷ Andrzej Paczkowski, *The Spring will be Ours* (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2003), 490

⁸ Philip Shenon, "U.S. Says Polish Crackdown Jeopardizes Help," *New York Times* (May 8, 1988): A13. Whitehead and Simons also delivered private appeals to Kinast in Washington. See, Notatka Informacyjna z rozmowy z ambasadorem USA w Warszawie J. Davis'em w dniu 12 Lipca br. [Information Note for a conversation with U.S. Ambassador in Warsaw J. Davis on July 12], dated July 13, 1988, MSZ, 42/92, W-6, Dep III (1988), AP 220-21-88. According to Simons, "the press guidance [. . .] was restraint because we recognized that both sides were in trouble. Solidarity was in trouble from radicalizing young workers. The regime was in trouble if it didn't deal with Solidarity. And we told the regime, I think we told both sides, that really they ought to try to keep a lid on this thing." (Author's interview with Tom Simons, July 7, 2000)

⁹ Letter from Jerzy Milewski to Lane Kirkland, dated June 6, 1988, AFL-CIO, International Affairs Department, unprocessed records, "FTUI." According to Milewski's computations, payments to workers would cost about \$117,000. Given the size of these transfers (\$500,000 in total) and the language used to describe them, these funds most likely came out of the \$1 million allocated by the Congress for 1988, rather than the yearly NED grant to Solidarność.

following martial law than of recent years.¹⁰

Although the PZPR's public posturing during these strikes looked similar to previous tactics, in private the Politburo took a new approach. Meeting on April 29 under the shadow of spreading strikes, the PZPR Central Committee Secretariat discussed the possibility of beginning conversations with members of Wałęsa's inner circle, predicated on an end to strikes.¹¹ On May 3, Central Committee members Jozef Czyrek and Stanisław Ciosek met with Solidarność advisor Andrzej Wielowieyski to relay these discussions to the opposition, which signaled a affirmative response by sending negotiators to both Gdańsk and Nowa Huta to disperse tensions.¹² Following the conclusion of strikes, however, the Politburo remained deadlocked about legalizing Solidarność and allowing trade union pluralism, the union's main precondition for negotiations. In particular, the head of the OPZZ, Alfred Miodowicz, staunchly argued against recognizing Solidarność because it would undermine the OPZZ's position.¹³

A month later, however, the movement toward negotiations continued. Ciosek spoke with the director of the Church's Press Bureau, Father Alojz Orszulik, mentioning that the Politburo was considering creating a second house of parliament, the Senate, and allowing opposition figures to run for seats in the Sejm. As Orszulik recorded, "Ciosek stated that political pluralism in Poland is necessary."¹⁴ Then in a June 14, article in the Party daily, *Trybuna Ludu*, PZPR spokesman Jerzy Urban raised the

¹⁰ Author's interviews with Cameron Munter, June 11, 2004, and Marilyn Wyatt, July 8, 2004.

¹¹ Antoni Dudek, *Reglamentowa Rewolucja* (Kraków: Arcana, 2004), 138-139. In February 1988, Geremek had signaled the opposition's willingness to negotiate with the government by publicly calling for the creation of an "anti-crisis pact."

¹² *Ibid.*, 141-142.

¹³ *Ibid.*, 142-147.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 147. On July 21, Ciosek mentioned the possibility to Catholic intellectual Andrzej Stelmachowski of creating a Christian political party that could obtain a 40 percent mandate in the Senate as well as appoint Wałęsa as the speaker.

possibility of a "round table" for negotiations involving a broad gamut of existing representatives, clearly alluding to Solidarność's participation.¹⁵ Thus, following the first wave of strikes in 1988 the PZPR was considering opening new negotiations with the opposition to increase political pluralism. The Politburo, however, remained divided over allowing pluralism in trade unions.

During this critical period, Gorbachev made a scheduled visit to Warsaw from July 11 to 16 for a meeting of the Political Coordinating Committee of the Warsaw Pact. Gorbachev met with the PZPR Politburo twice and in private with Jaruzelski twice. During the meeting attention focused on discussions about "blank spots" [*biały plamy*] in Polish history (the Katyn Massacre, the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, Poles deported to Siberia, etc.) which the two countries had been discussing over the past year; however, the private meetings gave the two leaders a chance to discuss ongoing internal changes in both countries. As the PZPR summary of this meeting reported, the "USSR fully supports the program of reform in Poland."¹⁶ Another summary went as far as to say that the USSR viewed Poland "as an innovative territory for democratic and social reform, with experiences which the USSR leadership would surely make use of in the process of perestroika."¹⁷ More importantly, Gorbachev's support for continuing reform "greatly weakened, even dissolved" arguments by hard-line Politburo members who wanted to

¹⁵ Ibid., 148.

¹⁶ Wstępna informacja o wizycie Sekretarza Generalnego KC KPZR M.S. Gorbaczowa w Polsce 11-16 lipca 1988 r. [Rough information about the visit of CPSU Central Committee Secretary General M. S. Gorbachev to Poland 11-16 July 1988], dated July 25, 1988, AAN, KC PZPR, V/418, 314-335; quoted at 332.

¹⁷ Tezy dot. wyników wizyty M. Gorbaczowa w Polsce na spotkanie Tow.Min. T. Olechowskiego z G. Shultzem [Theses regarding effects of M. Gorbachev's visit to Poland on Com. Min. T. Olechowski's visit with G. Shultz], dated August 1988, MSZ, 42/92, W-6, Dep III (1988), AP 220-21-88.

curb changes.¹⁸

The U.S. government also explained their views on Poland's internal developments directly to the Polish government. From July 25 to 29, Foreign Minister Tadeusz Olechowski visited Washington and New York to meet with congressman, American media, IMF representatives, American journalists, and members of the Reagan administration including Shultz, Whitehead, Wick, and Bush.¹⁹ Prior to the trip, the MSZ knew that these meetings were an important chance to: explain PZPR actions during the spring strikes; describe "the deepening democratization of political life, national reconciliation, as well as implanting economic reforms"; and seek concrete economic and financial-credit cooperation.²⁰ The message from the White House was clear: the United States was taking a "wait and see" approach and viewed internal developments as essential concerns for determining improvements in relations. Specifically, Shultz and Whitehead mentioned the need for trade union pluralism and "finding a place for Solidarność and Wałęsa." As carrots to make these hard choices easier, the Americans dangled the possibility of strong support in the IMF for restructuring loans, and even hinted at the possibility of allowing OPIC credits, involving American capital directly, and expanding cooperation between small industries. Olechowski's report back was optimistic about future improvements, pointing to a visit by Whitehead in October as the

¹⁸ See comments by Ciosek, in Andrzej Paczkowski, ed., *Polska 1986-1989: Koniec Systemu*, vol. 2 (Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Trio and Instytut Studiów Politycznych Polskiej Akademii Nauk, 2002), 33-34.

¹⁹ Olechowski replaced Marian Orzechowski as foreign minister on June 17, 1988.

²⁰ Pilna Notatka w sprawie oficjalnej wizyty ministra Spraw Zagranicznych w Stanach Zjednoczonych Ameryki, 25-29 bm. [Urgent Note regarding the official visit of the minister of foreign affairs to the United States of America, 25-29 of this month], dated July 6, 1988, MSZ, 42/92, W-6, Dep III (1988), AP 220-21-88. For American expectations on the meetings, especially Washington's focus on internal developments, see: Notatka Informacyjna z rozmowy z ambasadorem USA w Warszawie J. Davis'em w dniu 12 Lipca br. [Information Note from conversation with U.S. ambassador in Warsaw J. Davis on 12 July], dated July 13, 1988, MSZ, 42/92, W-6, Dep III (1988), AP 220-21-88.

next chance to intensify American economic support.²¹

As approaches to a possible path forward swirled around Warsaw, the country was hit with a second wave of strikes. On August 15, the evening shift at the July Manifesto Coal mine near Jastrzębie in southern Poland went on strike, calling for pay increases and for Solidarność to be reinstated. The following day, workers at the Morcinek Mine, also near Jarstrzębie, declared an occupation strike, as did workers at Poland's second-largest port, in the Baltic coast town of Szczecin. Within a week's time, the number of striking mines grew to ten, workers were occupying the Lenin Shipyards, portions of the Lenin Steelworks were under worker control, and numerous other small industries throughout the country were on strike. These events were particularly dangerous for the Party and government because coal was Poland's main export and a significant source for much needed foreign currency. Second, many of the striking workers were in their teens and twenties with only vague memories of the 1980 strikes, proving that another generation of Polish workers had been radicalized. Finally, each strike committee called for the reemergence of Solidarność, making these strikes more political than the previous round.²²

In the midst of these strikes, the Politburo met to discuss once again the issue of initiating talks with Wałęsa. As Dudek summarizes, "In the situation when the summer strikes were obviously stronger than the strikes in the spring, and Jaruzelski—despite being in charge of preparations—had not decided to introduce an exceptional state [*stan*

²¹ Notatka Informacyjna o wizycie ministra Spraw Zagranicznych w Stanach Zjednoczonych Ameryki (25-29 lipca 1988 r.) [Information Note about the visit of the minister of foreign affairs to the United States of America 25-29 July 1988], dated August 1, 1988, MSZ, 42/92, W-6, Dep III (1988), AP 220-21-88.

²² For reporting on these strikes, see John Tagliabue's articles in the *New York Times*: "Thousands Strike Major Coal Mine in Poland," (Aug. 17, 1988): A5; "Second Coal Mine Struck in Poland," (Aug. 18, 1988): A3; "Five More Coal Mines Join Strike," (Aug. 21, 1988): A1; "Gdańsk Shipyards to Join Strikers," (Aug. 22, 1988): A1; and "Poland Declares Emergency Rules to Quell Strikes," *New York Times* (Aug. 23, 1988): A1.

wyjatkowy], initiating a dialogue with moderate opposition appeared to be the optimal solution. 'It is a bold path, but it is the path forward,' he declared to the gathered members of the Politburo, adding simultaneously that 'tomorrow the situation will be worse.'²³ Disagreements over the best way forward, particularly on the issue of legalizing Solidarność, continued in the Politburo; nonetheless, contacts with the opposition—most notably between Czyrek and Andrzej Stelmachowski, chairman of the Catholic Intelligentsia Club in Warsaw—intensified. Then on August 26, Kiszczak announced on television that he would be willing to talk with "representatives from diverse social and workers' groups" about the possibility of forming a "round table," thrusting the concept of round table negotiations into the public eye once more.²⁴ The Politburo met again on August 28 to discuss the possibility of opening a round table with the opposition. This time they decided to treat the issue of legalizing Solidarność as a bargaining chip in negotiations with Wałęsa and his inner circle; putting off the decision on trade union pluralism.²⁵

On August 31, 1988, the eighth anniversary of the Gdańsk accords, Kiszczak met with Wałęsa in the presence of Ciosek and Bishop Jerzy Dąbrowski in Warsaw. Kiszczak invited Wałęsa to further talks, but made clear that a precondition for the beginning discussions about a possible round table agreement was the cessation of strikes. Kiszczak also spoke about the possibility of elections to the Sejm, the creation of a Senate, as well as a place for a constructive opposition in the political system. He glossed over the issue of trade union pluralism. In his response, Wałęsa made clear that trade union pluralism

²³ Dudek, *Reglamentowana Rewolucja*, 166. The term "exceptional state" is basically a euphemism for imposing martial law.

²⁴ Krzysztof Dubiński, *Magdalena: Transakcja epoki* (Warsaw: Sylwa, 1990), 4.

²⁵ Dudek, *Reglamentowana Rewolucja*, 172.

was central to discussions of political pluralism.²⁶ Wałęsa also took the "tremendous risk" of agreeing to end strikes without a full agreement to begin round table negotiations directly afterwards. He then set out about the country urging strikers to return to work.²⁷ By September 4, all major strikes had ended, clearing the way for negotiations between the opposition and the government.

Throughout these crucial developments in the summer of 1988, the U.S. embassy took a patient and passive approach. As Davis recalls:

We didn't get regularly briefed about [contacts between the opposition and the PZPR]. You could see the results, which we applauded. And the fact of the meeting [between Kiszczak and Wałęsa] was just fascinating, to put it mildly. It was clear that things were going in the right direction.

More importantly, in line with Davis's longstanding position to stay on the outside of internal political decisions, the embassy did not try to advise the opposition on tactics or how to negotiate.

We didn't try to tell Wałęsa how to play it. . . . These guys, all the leaders of Solidarity by this time were pretty experienced at negotiating and dealing with the government. They were getting experienced in a hurry. They knew what they wanted. And in broad outlines what they wanted looked good to us. We figured that they had to make the calls.²⁸

In Washington, the Department of State took a similar position. According to Tom Simons: "Solidarity really owned themselves. No, we weren't giving guidance to Solidarity. Our main thing was to tell the regime to talk to them and . . . the main thing we focused on was legalization."²⁹ The events that cleared the way for direct negotiations, therefore, were purely internal decisions, based on Polish developments and Polish

²⁶ *ibid.*

²⁷ The quote is taken from Geremek, as quoted in Flora Lewis, "Poland's Tired Dreams," *New York Times* (Sept. 4, 1988): D4.

²⁸ Author's interview with John Davis, November 23, 1999.

²⁹ Interview with Simons.

thinking.

That is not to say that international concerns did not have an effect on Polish thinking. Most importantly, Gorbachev's views aided reformers' arguments in the PZPR Politburo. As for the West, calculations about access to Western economic help were directly linked to the decision to begin talks with Wałęsa. As the leadership explained to central committee and secretariat members, "Talks and preparatory activities for the 'round table' allow us to gain political initiative and deprive our political adversary and the West of the argument that we don't want to talk, that the dialogue is being simulated and understanding is a façade." In terms of including Wałęsa in these talks, the PZPR leadership argued,

Wałęsa is being played out in the political game of the West toward Poland, he has gained a certain international prestige (a Nobel Prize, honoris causa doctorates, talks with politicians arriving to Poland). Thus undertaking talks with him is depriving the West an essential argument in its propaganda war with us.³⁰

Overall, domestic considerations and fears about strikes and instability forced Jaruzelski and his comrades toward the negotiating table. Pressure from the West, including American hints of future economic gains, added weight to arguments in favor of negotiations. Western pressure did not cause these changes, but Western policies and offers did make them more palatable.

Magdalenka and Beyond

In the weeks after Wałęsa's initial meeting with Kiszczak, the opposition and the

³⁰ "Teleprinter Message from the Political and Organizational Committee of the CC PZPR to Members and Associate Members of the Politburo and CC Secretaries, on 'The Question of Talks with the Opposition,'" dated September 2, 1988, in the documents briefing book prepared for the conference, "Poland 1986-1989: The End of the System," in Miedzeszyn-Warsaw, Poland, October 20-24, 1999. Copies are available through the National Security Archive.

government continued to talk, leading directly to closed-session meetings at a villa owned by the MSW just outside Warsaw in the town of Magdalenka. On one side of the table the government team was led by Kiszczak and Ciosek, and included representatives from the OPZZ. On the other side, Wałęsa and Stelmachowski led the opposition team, which included Frasnyniuk and Mazowiecki. The two sides agreed to discuss what the round table negotiations could look like and the scope of the decisions it could make. Unfortunately, the talks quickly stumbled. In his opening remarks Kiszczak alluded to the PZPR's main focus for negotiations:

The "round table" could take a stance and eventually correct the economic model, which should ensure that reforms are effectively realized, achieve economic equilibrium, and dissolve the debt issue. The economic reform program's success, through assuring equal chances and workloads to all forms of ownership, depends upon the degree of its comprehension and social acceptance.³¹

For the government, the key issue was the economy and finding a way to get opposition support to take the painful and necessary steps needed to get the economy working again.

In his opening remarks, Wałęsa pointed to a very different set of goals:

We should speak about the future. We have different views of the past, the last forty years and the last eight years, but we warn that the country needs to be saved. It is necessary to save the country from collapse. Removing the country from crisis is compatible with the desires of Solidarność. Solidarność's viewpoint is this: we want to talk about this and act in this direction. The August strikes arose from working people's anxiety about the future, anxiety caused because nothing is getting better. . . . For us the key question is a clear position on the question of union pluralism and the legalization of Solidarność. That was strike postulate number one.³²

The key issue for the opposition was not economic change, but increased political pluralism and the legalization of Solidarność. The government wanted to agree to a

³¹ "Spotkanie Robocze w Magdalence, 16 września 1988 r., godz. 15.15-19.00" [Working Meeting in Magdalenka, 16 September, 3:15-7:00 p.m.], in Dubiński, *Magdalenka*, 19.

³² *Ibid.*, 20.

coordinated economic solution to Poland's problems, and the opposition felt that the only way to achieve economic success was to increase pluralism.

Again and again over the next few hours, government negotiators raised the need to deal with economic problems. In response the opposition always agreed that solving economic problems was essential to moving the country forward, but they remained resolute that political changes needed to precede these economic changes. Without legalizing Solidarność, there would be no round table. So, after one meeting, the two sides found themselves at an impasse. Both sides gave positive public statements following the talks (even giving an October date for beginning the round table) and agreed to keep lines of communication open, but Solidarność remained steadfast about legalizing the union before the round table could begin.³³

In the midst of these historic meetings, Solidarność sent their spokesman to the United States to give their appraisal of ongoing events and negotiations. On Wednesday, September 7, Onyszkiewicz met with Reagan to talk about ongoing reforms, specifically mentioning proposals to create a freely elected second house of parliament, the Senate, while allowing the Sejm to remain under PZPR control.³⁴ Two weeks later, Onyszkiewicz presented the opposition's view on human rights in Poland to Congress. As in other public statements, Onyszkiewicz emphasized the importance of legalizing Solidarność as a starting point for negotiations. He also spoke authoritatively about the need to create new associations and institutions to strengthen political pluralism. He also explained that

³³ Jackson Diehl, "Solidarity Agrees to Join 'Round Table'; Warsaw Gives Banned Union No Assurances on Legalization," *Washington Post* (Sept. 17, 1988): A15.

³⁴ Stephen Rosenfeld, "The Promise of Poland," *New York Times* (Sept. 9, 1988): A25. I have not yet composed a FOIA for Onyszkiewicz's American trip; thus analysis of this event is based purely on publicly available sources. In terms of American policy, it is likely that Onyszkiewicz's visit motivated the new approach to the PZPR expressed by Whitehead in his October trip, discussed below.

Solidarność was not considering becoming a political party; rather, the opposition wanted to initiate political clubs and institutions for debate, discussion, and to represent the needs of different constituencies. He also described Solidarność's assumptions about the new Senate as a "political" or "chamber of labor" in which opposition voices could debate internal, domestic matters like economic reform, prisons, and social policies. Decisions about defense, security, and international affairs would be left to PZPR and allied parliamentarians in the Sejm.³⁵

Onyszkiewicz also touched on issues of international influence and Jaruzelski's views on reform. In Onyszkiewicz's analysis: "There is a feeling in Poland we can go forward with reforms, far reaching reforms" and the "main obstacle" is not the Soviet Union, but "very conservative forces inside the [Polish] power structure."³⁶ In terms of Western support during the period of reforms, he said simply, "Obviously it would be of great importance to have an additional cushion for this period of hardships in the form of some aid, economic aid."³⁷ Onyszkiewicz also argued that Jaruzelski remained undecided and cautious: "Jaruzelski is seen in Poland as a man of half measures. . . . Let's hope at this critical moment that General Jaruzelski will realize that he cannot sit any longer on the fence. He must jump. Let's hope he will jump on the right side."³⁸ For Solidarność, it was not clear which way Jaruzelski would go, toward reform or toward repression.

However, the image presented was that Jaruzelski was open to influence; he could be pushed to fall toward one side or the other. Presumably, Onyszkiewicz provided similar

³⁵ Onyszkiewicz's testimony is recorded in Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, *Implementation of the Helsinki Accords: The Current Situation in Poland*, 101 Cong., 2nd sess., 1988; quoted at 20, 21. He testified with Jan Nowak-Jezioranski and Father Eugene Koch, a Polish-American priest and head of the campus minister at Seton Hall University.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, 15.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, 18.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, 16.

advice in his private meetings with administration officials.³⁹

A few weeks after Onyszkiewicz's testimony, while new Prime Minister Mieczysław Rakowski was forming a new government and Solidarność and the PZPR continued to quarrel over legalization, Whitehead made his third scheduled trip to Warsaw, from October 12 to 14.⁴⁰ In part, Whitehead was in Poland to review progress in bilateral relations and to meet with both government and opposition figures to investigate recent developments. More centrally, he traveled to Warsaw to talk about new initiatives with the PZPR. In his meeting with Olechowski, Whitehead explained that it was time for a new approach to bilateral relations, saying, "step-by-step passed the test and it is necessary currently to elevate relations to a new level."⁴¹

In his conversation with Jaruzelski, Whitehead gave an idea of where Washington stood on Poland's current situation. According to the post-meeting report, "he has a positive position towards Poland. [The U.S.] wants to help. They abstained from a reaction to the strikes, and even supported the authorities. . . . [He wants] to speed up the pace of growth in Polish-U.S. relations. The U.S. is ready to moderately economically support progress in reforms, not only in the long term but in the short term as well."⁴² Of course, these offers had strings attached:

[Whitehead] expressed the conviction that without national understanding, it is impossible to improve the country's economic conditions. At this time

³⁹ Onyszkiewicz has refused numerous requests for an interview, usually due to his hectic travel schedule as a member of the European Parliament.

⁴⁰ Zbigniew Messner was removed as premier on September 19, and Rakowski was given the job of forming a new government on September 27. This move was widely seen as an attempt to shore up the reformist base in the Sejm. For discussion of this transition, see Andrzej Garlicki, *Karuzela* (Warsaw: Czytelnik, 2003), chapter 6.

⁴¹ Notatka Informacyjna dot. wizyty w Polsce zastępcy Sekretarza Stanu USA Johna Whiteheada (12-14 października 1988 r.) [Information Note regarding U.S. Deputy Secretary of State John Whitehead's visit to Poland (12-14 October 1988)], dated October 15, 1988, MSZ, 42/92, W-6, Dep III (1988), AP 220-25-88; quoted at 7.

⁴² *Ibid.*, 4.

he does not see it possible for Poland to gain financial help from abroad, because in his opinion Poland could not take advantage of it. He recognized that events like last May have a place leading to that understanding. The United States does not want to intervene. Conversely, we want to help. They will [help], if they are convinced about improvements.⁴³

The Americans were no longer talking about punishing the Poles if they stepped out of line. Nor were they talking about small steps. Rather, Whitehead spoke about concretely rewarding Poland, both now and later, if the PZPR negotiated directly with the opposition and accepted the round table framework.

In an uncharacteristic move, the American representative even spelled out what American help could look like, rather than just leaving the details vague. The list of possible moves (from easiest to most difficult) included: appropriating \$700,000 for scientific-technical cooperation in FY 1989; providing CCC credits for agricultural purchases (dependent on agreeing to a rescheduling agreement with the Paris Club); signing an agreement to create a charitable foundation to spend American funds in zlotys (which had been earned through agricultural sales since the 1950s); extending OPIC guarantees for investments (with Congressional approval); extending Ex-Im Bank credits (with congressional approval); moving Poland up the list for countries eligible for CCC credits; making available tax relief to Poland given to developing countries to help increase exports to the United States; providing direct American financial and economic aid; supporting Poland's programs in the IMF, World Bank, and Paris Club with America's "specific influence"; and further developing bilateral trade with the possibility of joint ventures.⁴⁴ In an uncharacteristic move, Whitehead showed Jaruzelski what he could expect if he followed the path of reform to its conclusion.

⁴³ Ibid., 9.

⁴⁴ Ibid., 9-10.

In addition to American pressure, Great Britain also prodded Jaruzelski toward reform. From November 2 to 4, Margaret Thatcher traveled to Poland, meeting government and opposition officials in both Warsaw and Gdańsk. Thatcher did not come bearing specific economic packages, but she did advocate continuing to negotiate with Solidarność and move towards political pluralism. Thatcher explained to Jaruzelski that the best system of government is the one that lets people choose for themselves and that the PZPR had to include Solidarność in any agreement because "they were the only opposition." More pointedly, Thatcher specifically referred to the need to legalize Solidarność. As the final MSZ report summarized, discussions with Thatcher were "difficult on account of her well-known anti-communism," but she left Poland "with the conviction that the Polish authorities are decidedly continuing the process of democratization in the country and introducing deep economic reforms."⁴⁵ Both the Americans and the British were making clear that the only path forward for Poland included Solidarność.

Over the last three months of 1988, the pace of negotiations between Solidarność and the PZPR lagged. The Magdalenka talks were disbanded. Early statements that round table discussions would start in October were quickly placed on hold when Solidarność stubbornly demanded that their union be legalized and the PZPR refused to take this step. (By that point a huge round table had actually been custom made and assembled in Jabłonna Palace outside Warsaw.) In other disheartening news Rakowski decided on October 29 to begin liquidating the Lenin Shipyard under the pretense that it was unprofitable and outdated. As the birthplace and stronghold of Solidarność, the

⁴⁵ Pilna Notatka z wizyty oficjalnej w Polsce premiera Wielkiej Brytanii Margaret Thatcher (2-4 listopada 1988 r.) [Urgent Note from the British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher's official visit to Poland (2-4 November 1988), dated November 6, 1988, AAN, KC PZPR, V/437, 212-244; quoted at 241.

opposition viewed the liquidation as a slap in the face. Urban announced Rakowski's call for negotiations just before making the liquidation decision public, a move Wałęsa considered a "contemptible act of political manipulation," further hindering possibilities for fruitful talks.⁴⁶

Against this backdrop, British and American actions come into focus as an unobvious attempt to push the PZPR to accept Solidarność as a negotiating partner. For the Americans the form of the offer was particularly noteworthy. Washington was proposing to move beyond the step-by-step framework, meaning that improvements in bilateral relations could move more quickly and more substantially. Most importantly, Whitehead provided a specific list of possible economic gains for Poland. Washington had long resisted offering substantial economic aid, and had only included vague offers for improved economic relations in the past. Whitehead's October offer was quantitatively and qualitatively different than earlier conversations. To support Solidarność's push for legalization and round table negotiations, the United States was dangling a large, well formed carrot in front of Jaruzelski, hoping that he would take the bait and fully embrace political pluralism. Extrapolating from Onyszkiewicz's analogy, the White House was trying to push Jaruzelski off the fence onto the right side.

For internal developments in Poland, the end of 1988 did include one high note. On November 30, Wałęsa debated Miodowicz on Polish television. The event was designed to allow a debate on trade union pluralism, but Wałęsa used the opportunity to defend Solidarność's entire platform. In the end, the PZPR had mistakenly given Wałęsa the chance to make his case for reform, both political and economic, in front of the entire

⁴⁶ Lech Wałęsa, *The Struggle and the Triumph*, trans. by Franklin Phillip (New York: Arcade Publishing, 1992).

Polish nation. Miodowicz was trounced, with Wałęsa and Solidarność the clear winner.

As Davis recalls:

Before the debate some of the Solidarity leaders were quite worried about whether Wałęsa would be able to hold his own against Miodowicz, who was a good talker and who was really self-confident. I told them in no uncertain terms that all Wałęsa had to do was show up at the studio. This was an opportunity for national exposure again, which everyone had been waiting for, and it wouldn't matter two hoots what he said. He would be instantly the winner, because he represented the views of a great majority of the population. That is exactly what happened. Nobody could quote you a single line from that debate today, but Wałęsa was just overwhelmingly declared the winner.⁴⁷

The debate also had wider political significance. As Andrzej Friszke summarizes, Wałęsa "shattered to dust years of propaganda attempting to present him as dependent [upon advisors], primitive, heading toward anarchy. That day, Solidarność returned to public life, pulling with it the attention and hopes of millions of Poles." Shortly thereafter, government public opinion polls showed 73 percent of the population favored legalizing Solidarność.⁴⁸

During December the opposition focused this new momentum to strengthen their plans for reform. Wałęsa was approved for a passport and traveled to Paris where he met with Soviet dissident Andrzej Sakhaov, Lane Kirkland, and French leaders including President Mitterand, solidifying the impression of Wałęsa as a world leader. On December 18, over one hundred opposition activists met as the newly formed Citizen's Committee, headed by Henryk Wujec, Geremek, and Mazowiecki. Their prescribed work was to prepare for negotiations with the government and to determine representatives for

⁴⁷ Interview with Davis, November 23, 1999. For some of the transcript of the debate see Wałęsa, *Struggle*, 169-171.

⁴⁸ Andrzej Friszke, *Polska: Losy Państwa i Narodu 1939-1989* (Warsaw: Wydawnictwo ISKRY, 2003), 448.

the round table negotiations.⁴⁹ Solidarność also took a new public line on legalization: they would agree to begin negotiations before the union was legalized, as long as legalization was a topic of discussion in these negotiations. With their reinvigorated public image, Solidarność set about preparing for the next step, even though that future remained unclear.

To the Round Table

On December 20-21, 1988, and January 16-17, 1989, the PZPR held its Tenth Party Plenum. The first half of the plenum was devoted to changes in the Party leadership. Ciosek and Kazimierz Cypryński, as well as Marian Stępien, were moved from Secretariat to Politburo. Leszek Miller and Zygmunt Czarzasty became Secretariat members. Jaruzelski also promoted some of his informal advisors, including Prof. Janusz Reykowski (who was a Party first secretary from Wrocław). As Dudek summarizes:

The December "cadre maneuver" indicated that Jaruzelski was continuing the process begun in June 1988 of removing conservatively oriented activists from the PZPR leadership . . . , filling [these spots] with voivodship committee secretaries as well as party intellectuals . . . [who] were involved with the scientific problems of solving social conflicts [and who] would play a central role in negotiations with the opposition in the coming months. Their selection confirmed that Jaruzelski had then already taken the decision about legalizing Solidarność, and intently needed able negotiators who would be able to sell concessions at the round table for the highest possible price.⁵⁰

Jaruzelski and other reformers in the Politburo were setting the stage to make their final push to legalize Solidarność.

⁴⁹ Paczkowski, *Spring*, 495.

⁵⁰ Dudek, *Reglamentowa Rewolucja*, 224-225. Dudek does an excellent job explaining all of these maneuvers by Jaruzelski, the details of which are too numerous to include in this dissertation. A record of these conversations is available in Stanisław Perszkowski, ed., *Tajne Dokumenty Biuro Politycznego i Sekretariatu KC PZPR. Ostatni rok władzy 1988-1989*, (London: Aneks, 1994).

The PZPR began discussions about legalization during the December meeting of the Tenth Plenum, but quickly postponed conversations until the second half in January. When the plenum reconvened, the PZPR leadership remained divided over legalizing Solidarność, with members of the nomenklatura and the OPZZ arguing heatedly to block the move. Jaruzelski successfully gained resolutions calling for Solidarność to be legalized.⁵¹ A number of voices in the leadership, however, remained adamant that these resolutions were forced on them and expressed their disagreement very vocally. In a Politburo meeting called during the plenum, Jaruzelski decided to ask for a vote of confidence. As he declared:

There were clear signals that the *aktiv* does not trust the leadership and that we are creating a dangerous crisis situation. Thus there is no other solution. Either the [Central Committee] members will put full trust in the present leadership, or this leadership will resign, and if such vote of confidence is given, then we have the right to demand the implementation of the adopted resolutions.⁵²

If the plenum voted against the vote of confidence, Jaruzelski, Rakowski, Kiszczak, and Minister of Defense Florian Siwicki would all step down from the Party leadership. When the vote was put to the full plenum, 32 of 178 Central Committee members voted against and 14 abstained. Jaruzelski and his fellow reformers remained in office and won the debate to legalize Solidarność, clearing the final hurdle for the Round Table negotiations to begin.

In the domestic context, this vote was seen as a sign of the deep fractures within the PZPR, suggesting "that Jaruzelski was far from exerting complete control over the

⁵¹ As part of his argument for beginning negotiations, Jaruzelski emphasized international economic considerations: "Without an agreement with the opposition. . . we cannot count on economic support from the West"; quoted from Dudek, *Reglamentowana Rewolucja*, 231.

⁵² "Minutes No. 107 from a meeting of the Politburo after the Conclusion of the discussion on January 17, 1989," dated January 17, 1989, part of the "Poland 1986-1989" briefing book. A Polish version is available in Perzkowski, *Tajne Dokumenty*.

situation. Such a state of affairs did not often occur in communist parties."⁵³ For American observers Jaruzelski's move was viewed in a much different light. Brent Scowcroft, Bush's National Security Advisor-designate, referred to the vote of confidence as "an extraordinary turn of events" leading him to believe that "Poland was most likely to take the lead toward liberalization."⁵⁴ Davis remained a bit less grand, "It was a very encouraging bit of news, that they had laid it on the line in favor of negotiating."⁵⁵

Jaruzelski did not have complete American trust yet, but the Americans took note of signs of his reformist leanings.⁵⁶ More importantly, as the Department of State informed the White House, "The Polish regime has finally acknowledged that Solidarity is a necessary factor for Poland's recovery and has tacitly committed itself to achieving some working understanding with the democratic opposition."⁵⁷

With consensus finally formed, the two sides prepared for the Round Table. On January 27, the party and the opposition sat down once again in private at Magdalenka to discuss the broad framework for negotiations, specifically the issues of legalizing Solidarność before elections, the scope of elections, and the division of seats at the Round Table. Solidarność also agreed not to provoke strikes during the negotiations.⁵⁸ The

⁵³ Paczkowski, *Spring*, 495.

⁵⁴ George Bush and Brent Scowcroft, *A World Transformed* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf), 37.

⁵⁵ Interview with Davis, November 23, 1999.

⁵⁶ As Davis admits in the interview the embassy was not immediately aware of Jaruzelski's role in calling for the vote of confidence to push for legalizing Solidarność. They only learned about it later through rumors. In contrast to these retrospective admonitions, the original cable reporting on the event (which was signed by DCM Daryl Johnson, meaning Davis was out of Warsaw), did not take a very positive view of Jaruzelski's role. For that cable see, Cable from Amembassy Warsaw to SecState, "PZPR Plenum Clears way for Round Table, Possible Eventual Relegalization of Solidarity," dated January 18, 1989, NSA, End of the Cold War, Poland 1989 Cables.

⁵⁷ Cable from SecState to Amembassy Warsaw, "Official-Informal 009," dated January 18, 1989, NSA, End of the Cold War, Poland 1989 Cables.

⁵⁸ "Spotkanie Robocze w Magdalence, 27 stycznia 1989 r., godz. 11:30-22.15" [Working Meeting in Magdalenka, 27 January 1989, 11:30 a.m. to 10:15 p.m.], in Dubiński, *Magdalenka*, 38-58.

Round Table negotiations finally began on February 6, in the great hall of Namiestnikowski Palace (now the presidential palace) in Warsaw. Plenary sessions included 56 delegates: 20 from the opposition (including 6 representing the Solidarność trade union), 6 from the OPZZ, 14 from the government coalition, 14 "independent persons of high standing" (5 chosen by the Citizen's Committee), and 2 representatives from the Church. To facilitate negotiations three main working groups were formed on: economic and social policy, political reforms, and trade union pluralism. There were also nine smaller working groups on: agriculture, mining, legal and court reforms, associations, territorial administration, youth, mass communications, science, education and technical training, health, and ecology. In total 452 representatives took part in the negotiations which lasted until April 5.

Over these eight weeks, tensions and apprehension about results remained high, with negotiators sitting in marathon sessions to create consensus. On ten different occasions, when agreement could not be reached at the Round Table, small groups of opposition and government representatives (often including Wałęsa and Kiszczak) met in Magdalenka to break the logjams, earning its reputation as a backroom for secret deals. Even on the last day of the Round Table, when all details had been ironed out, Miodowicz managed to bring some high drama to the closing ceremonies. At the last minute he raised an objection to the speaking order for representatives at the closing ceremonies, causing a three hour break in the live telecast of the event. A compromise was eventually worked out during the break, and the live broadcast resumed. At 10:10 p.m. on April 5, five hours after the ceremony began, Kiszczak and Wałęsa signed a statement

committing each side to the round table agreements.⁵⁹

The most important outcomes from the Round table were agreements on Poland's political transformation. First, a new 100-seat Senate was created as an upper house of parliament and was given veto power over all Sejm legislation. This veto, however, could be overturned by a two-thirds Sejm vote. All seats in the new Senate were open to opposition candidates in free elections. In another compromise semi-free elections would be held to the new Sejm, with 65 percent of seats reserved for PZPR and coalition candidates.⁶⁰ Only 35 percent of seats (161 in total) would be open to opposition candidates. Part of the 65 percent reserved for the PZPR was to consist of a "national list" of candidates, mainly well known party leaders, who would run unopposed and only need 50 percent of the vote to take office. In return for creating a new upper house of parliament, the opposition agreed to create a new, powerful office of the president based on the model of the French presidency, who would maintain control over the armed forces and be in charge of national security. As part of the compromise, Jaruzelski was agreed to as the only "serious candidate" for the new office and "was to be guarantor that further changes in the political system would be of an evolutionary nature."⁶¹ Elections were set for June 4, with a second round for all unresolved elections in which no candidate received more than 50 percent of the vote, set for June 18. In addition, the opposition was given

⁵⁹ For a discussion of this final interruption, see Garlicki, *Karuzela*, 301-303. The actual round table agreements were signed by the heads of the three main working groups.

⁶⁰ Since the creation of the People's Republic of Poland, the Communist government included a number of "coalition" parties as existed in other Socialist bloc countries. The coalition included the ZSL (*Zjednoczone Stowowictwo Ludowe* or United People's Party), SD (*Stronnictwo Demokratyczne* or Democratic Party), PAX (Christian Social Association), UchS (*Unia Chześcijańska-Spoleczna* or Christian-Social Union), and PZKS (*Polski Zwiśzek Katolicko-Spoleczny* or Polish Catholic-Social Union). As the lead party, the PZPR dominated all decision-making, giving no real power to the satellite parties.

⁶¹ Paczkowski, *Spring*, 500.

permission to start their own newspapers (a daily for the Citizen's Committee, a weekly *Solidarność* paper, and other publications for Rural *Solidarność* and the NZS) and was given access to state television to broadcast its own programs.⁶²

The opposition and the government now had a specific power-sharing agreement mapping out Poland's future. As Davis reported, "On the political side, the round-table agreement meets nearly all of Solidarity's most recent demands."⁶³ The importance of this development was not missed in Washington where it "was clear that the Round Table agreement, if fully implemented, was the beginning of the end of Communist rule in Poland."⁶⁴ From here on, the question was not whether Poland would change, but how much and how quickly.

Washington Responds

During the first four months of 1989, Davis's staff—including DCM Daryl Johnson, political officer Terry Snell and his deputy John Boris, and economics officer Paul Wackerbarth and his deputy Jack Spilsbury—provided articulate reporting and insightful analysis to keep Washington well informed on all of these developments.⁶⁵

Prior to February 6, the embassy reported on the PZPR plenum, changing PZPR attitudes

⁶² For an extremely detailed account of how the negotiators arrived at this political compromise, see chapter 5, "The Negotiations and their Outcomes" in Marjorie Castle, *Triggering Communism's Collapse: Perceptions and Power in Poland's Transition* (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2003). For a basic overview of political agreements, see: Amembassy Warsaw to SecState, "Outline of the Round Table's Political Agreement," dated April 24, 1989, NSA, End of the Cold War, Poland 1989 Cables.

⁶³ Cable from Amembassy Warsaw to SecState, "Round Table Agreement to be Signed," dated April 5, 1989, NSA, End of the Cold War, Poland 1989 Cables.

⁶⁴ Robert Hutchings, *American Diplomacy and the End of the Cold War: An Insider's Account of U.S. Policy in Europe, 1989-1992* (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1997), 9.

⁶⁵ Other diplomats at the embassy in 1989 included: agricultural officer John Harrison, defense attaché Colonel Glen Bailey, as well as Steve Dubrow and Alicé LeMaistre in the public affairs office.

and approaches, Solidarność preparations, and backroom deals to ensure the initiation of the round table. Once the Round Table began, the embassy briefed Washington daily on progress in each of the sub-groups, and occasionally sent cables highlighting important developments. Beyond the Round Table, the embassy reported on strikes and protests which flared up, as groups of workers and students showed their displeasure at being left out of the Round Table. Davis and his staff also regularly updated Foggy Bottom about behind-the-scenes efforts at Magdalenka to break through disagreements. These cables reflected the strong connections that Davis had cultivated with the opposition during his years holding salons in Warsaw, as well as his regular contacts with PZPR officials. The accuracy of the reports was also striking.

The embassy, however, received little guidance in response. This quiet period in the State Department was, in part, caused by the exchange of power occurring in Washington. The previous November, Vice President Bush had won the presidential election, and on January 20, 1989, he was sworn in as the forty-first president of the United States. As with any transition, a certain pause could be expected. It was amplified in this case, however, by a purposeful and decisive break made by the new administration. Although Bush had served closely under Reagan for the previous eight years, the transition from Reagan to Bush was not very fluid. As Director for European Affairs in the NSC Robert Hutchings recalls, Bush cleared out all of the Reagan officials from the NSC: "an entirely new team came in There was no such thing as a 'Reagan-Bush' foreign policy. Before 1989 there was Reagan; afterwards there was Bush."⁶⁶ The turnover in the State Department was not as severe (Simons and Ridgway remained in office during the transition); however, the key point man on Eastern Europe, Whitehead,

⁶⁶ Hutchings, *American Diplomacy*, 6.

stepped down the day Bush was inaugurated, to be replaced by Lawrence Eagleburger. Compared to earlier changes in American policy toward Poland, Hutchings retrospectively concluded that "the foreign policy shift under the Bush administration in 1989 was as stark in substance (though not in style or rhetoric) as the change from Carter to Reagan."⁶⁷

Bush also decided to put his own stamp on foreign policy by overseeing an extensive policy review of foreign relations. In part, this decision reflected a deep uncertainty within the new administration about Gorbachev's sincerity as a reformer, driven by the first secretary's bold public relations push which included a December 7, 1988, speech to the United Nations announcing the end of the Cold War and a unilateral reduction in the size of the Soviet armed forces of 500,000 men.⁶⁸ National Security Advisor Scowcroft "was skeptical of Gorbachev's motives and skeptical of his prospects. . . . He was attempting to kill us with kindness, rather than bluster."⁶⁹ For Bush, his first impression of Gorbachev was that he would "package the Soviet line for Western consumption much more effectively than any . . . of his predecessors."⁷⁰ Bush, Scowcroft, and new Secretary of State James Baker all worried that Gorbachev's words were only a tactic to gain the upper hand in the public relations war to define the superpower confrontation. They were all skeptical that Gorbachev's words would translate into concrete changes in concrete policy.⁷¹ This included skepticism about Gorbachev's "new

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, 27.

⁶⁸ For one account of Gorbachev's New York visit and announcement, see: Michael Dobbs, *Down with Big Brother: The Fall of the Soviet Empire* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1997), 215-216.

⁶⁹ Bush and Scowcroft, *World Transformed*, 13.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, 4.

⁷¹ For Bush and Scowcroft, see *World Transformed*, 4-15. For Baker, see his *The Politics of Diplomacy: Revolution, War, and Peace 1989-1992*, with Thomas M. Defrank (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1995), 69-70.

thinking" toward Eastern Europe.⁷² As with other policies from the 1980s, this perception was, in part, based on ideas about the failures of détente:

We had in an earlier period mistaken a twist in the road for a basic change in direction and I was determined that we should err on the side of prudence. . . . I believe that one should try to change the direction of the great Ship of State only with care, because changes once made are inordinately hard to reverse.⁷³

With equal parts skepticism and caution the Bush administration undertook a series of National Security Reviews (NSR), with the three most important focused on relations with the Soviet Union, relations with Eastern Europe, and relations with Western Europe. These reviews were initiated to give the new leadership team a chance to influence internal thinking within the bureaucracy. As Bush explained, "I wanted the key foreign policy players to know that I was going to involve myself in many of the details of defense, international trade, and foreign policies."⁷⁴ For the national security advisor, the reviews "would take time to complete, but we wanted quickly to put our own stamp on policy. . . . We needed this opportunity to determine what direction we wanted to take, rather than simply accepting what we had inherited."⁷⁵ NSR 4, "Comprehensive Review of U.S.-East European Relations," was signed on February 15, 1989, beginning the official review process more than a week after the Round Table had already begun.⁷⁶

In the interagency process which occurred through February and March, the main question for Eastern European policy was how and when to respond to liberalization.

Beyond negotiations in Poland, the Hungarian Communist party was making noteworthy

⁷² For an excellent account of Gorbachev's changing relationship with Eastern Europe and "new thinking," see: Jacques Levesque, *The Enigma of 1989: The USSR and the Liberation of Eastern Europe*, trans. Keith Martin (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997).

⁷³ Bush and Scowcroft, *World Transformed*, 12.

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, 17.

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, 37.

⁷⁶ The contents of the NSR have not been declassified, but the title and date have been declassified on the Bush Presidential Library website: bushlibrary.tamu.edu/research/paper.html.

progress to allow the creation of political parties other than the Communist party, showing that a range of possibilities for transformation existed in Eastern Europe. The Bush administration accepted the differentiation framework it had inherited from Reagan, but they quickly saw its limitations. With its focus on Communist states' efforts to distance themselves from the Soviet Union through foreign policy, differentiation meant that the dictatorship in Romania was treated more favorably than reformers in Poland. (Learning from Soviet invasions in Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968, Solidarność had always focused on domestic concerns in their demands, never seeking to question close relations with the Soviet Union or Poland's participation in the Warsaw Pact, so Poland remained securely in line with Soviet foreign policy throughout the 1980s.) With liberalizing trends accelerating in both Poland and Hungary, Washington policy makers decided to rewrite the differentiation formula to weigh political liberalization more heavily.⁷⁷

While most members of the administration were convinced of the need to rewrite the differentiation formula, policy makers were much more deeply divided over how to reward states for liberalization. In interagency meetings to discuss the issue, Simons represented State with Dennis Ross, the director of State's Policy Planning Staff. Robert Blackwill and Condoleezza Rice from the NSC staff attended, as well as representatives from CIA, Treasury, and Commerce. State and NSC came to the table arguing that political liberalization should be rewarded economically. The CIA representative—who Simons considered "just kind of an original Reaganaut who thought it was wrong for the United States to give concessions to commies, especially those guys who had done 1981"—argued against economic rewards because "even if the Round Table came to a

⁷⁷ Bush and Scowcroft, *World Transformed*, 38, 48.

successful conclusion, it would not basically change the structure of power in Poland." The CIA believed that these changes did not deserve economic rewards because even successful Round Table agreements would leave the PZPR in charge of the power ministries and leave the bureaucracy in place.⁷⁸ This argument was easily overridden. However, Treasury pushed an equally conservative view on economic rewards, arguing that Poland had not made the necessary economic changes—they had not restructured their economy or created possibilities for greater realization of market forces—to make economic aid meaningful. In their view, any attempt to pump economic aid into Poland would be ineffective and waste American money.⁷⁹

To overcome these disagreements, Simons retrieved records from Bush's trip to Warsaw in 1987 as vice president. As Simons recalls:

I went back [with Poland desk officer] Dan Fried. . . and fished out the record and the memcon of the vice president's meeting with Jaruzelski in September of 1987, in which he said that if you continue liberalization there will be economic benefit. We just spread it around this table of people who mainly didn't want to do this, and said, "This is what our president wants." I remember the CIA guy saying, "That's just a snippet from a memcon, I mean that's not a thing. . ." And the [NSC] supported me on that and said, "Hey, yeah this is what the White House, what the president wants."⁸⁰

The interagency report recommended limited economic awards for political liberalization.

In the midst of these preparations for NSR 4, a public controversy erupted over conceptualizing American policy toward Poland as a bargaining point in U.S.-Soviet relations. In December 1988, former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger approached the incoming Bush administration with an offer to serve as a backchannel to the Soviet

⁷⁸ Interview with Simons.

⁷⁹ Hutchings, *American Diplomacy*, 37.

⁸⁰ Interview with Simons.

Union.⁸¹ As a proposal for possible backchannel discussion, Kissinger suggested that he could work to cut a deal with the Soviet Union over Eastern Europe: if the Soviets agreed to cut troops and allow Eastern European countries to continue toward liberalization on their own path without threats of Soviet intrusion, the United States would agree to not exploit the situation in a way that undermined Soviet power or concerns there. Simons and Ridgway "hated the idea" with Simons asking, "Why buy what history is giving you for free?" Despite internal disagreement, in early January Kissinger was dispatched to inquire with Gorbachev and his advisors about the possibility of a backchannel.⁸² The proposal became public on March 28, in a *New York Times* article in which Baker said the idea was "worthy of consideration because it is a novel approach."⁸³ The article caused a minor furor over the possibility of accepting spheres of influence in Eastern Europe, both domestically and internationally.⁸⁴ In response the administration quickly distanced itself from the policy with Deputy National Security Adviser Robert Gates declaring, "I am not enthusiastic about that approach."⁸⁵

With this public outcry behind them and the interagency report prepared, Bush called a full meeting of the NSC to discuss Poland and the NSR on April 4. The main question on the table then, "was whether the U.S. should offer economic incentives to support political liberalization absent any significant move toward economic reform."

⁸¹ Bush and Scowcroft, *World Transformed*, 26.

⁸² For the fullest treatment of these conversations see Strobe Talbott and Michael Beschloss, *At the Highest Levels: The Inside Story of the End of the Cold War* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1993), 13-17, 19-20; quoted at 19.

⁸³ Thomas Friedman, "Baker, Outlining World View, Assesses Plan for Soviet Bloc," *New York Times* (Mar. 28, 1989): A1.

⁸⁴ Beschloss and Talbott, *Highest Levels*, 45-46.

⁸⁵ Sally Jacobsen, "U.S.-Soviet Talks on Eastern Europe Would Be Inappropriate," AP (Apr. 1, 1989). According to Hutchings the controversy was overblown, as the Kissinger proposal was "never on the agenda, nor ever given serious consideration by any senior administration official." See *American Diplomacy*, 36.

Treasury and Commerce were against economic incentives, continuing to argue that they would be wasted by inefficient economies. On the other side of the argument were NSC and State officials arguing "that a political opening would have to precede economic reform and that carefully conditioned U.S. assistance could facilitate first political, then economic reform."⁸⁶ Consistent with his earlier statements in Poland, the president (along with Baker) came out in favor of providing economic rewards for political liberalization. As Bush recalls, "Although the economic conditions in Eastern Europe were so bad that the usefulness of aid might be limited, we had to try. I directed that I wanted to see aid proposals."⁸⁷

By April 5, the Bush administration had settled on a policy approach toward Poland, but events there were already moving further. A day after this NSC meeting, the PZPR and the opposition signed the round table agreements in Warsaw. As part of the review process, the president planned to outline his new approaches to foreign policy in a series of commencement speeches. Given the pace of events in Poland, the NSC decided to schedule a speech on East European policy first, and began the process of deciding just what economic rewards to include.

Davis began the discussion on possible responses to the Round Table, nearly a month before its conclusion. As he wrote to Washington:

This can be the breakthrough we have been working to achieve for forty years and more, and its success or failure may well affect the future course of events not only in Eastern Europe but in the Soviet Union. . . . We should move partly together with other Western creditor nations to help insure its success. . . . Without a return to visible economic growth and greater Western engagement in Polish affairs, no agreement will capture the support and positive engagement of the bulk of the Polish population.

⁸⁶ Hutchings, *American Diplomacy*, 37-38.

⁸⁷ Bush and Scowcroft, *World Transformed*, 49.

In particular Davis recommended a massive debt relief program through the Paris Club which would roll over all of Poland's nearly \$38 billion in government debts. Creditors would then receive a proportion of Poland's export revenues (about 15 percent), which the Western governments would turn over into government credit guarantees to support Polish purchases of Western goods. This would both reduce the debt burden and open an opportunity to receive an infusion of Western technology and goods that Poland desperately needed. Davis also recommended further economic moves including: pushing for a standard IMF loan, accelerating consideration of a World Bank loan for export-oriented investment, extending OPIC coverage, planning a presidential visit, and bringing both Wałęsa and Rakowski to the United States. Other smaller, more immediate, recommendations included increasing cultural and educational exchanges and promoting debt for equity swaps by private American investors.⁸⁸ After working for years to transform Poland's political scene, Davis advocated a bold initiative to reward both the opposition and the government, and to ensure that the political transformation led to the economic improvements demanded by the Polish public.

The response from Washington was much more restrained than Davis's outline. Speaking on April 17 in Hamtramck, a heavily Polish-American enclave within Detroit, Bush outlined his approach to Eastern Europe in general, and Poland in particular. Most broadly, the president exclaimed his support for reform movements by asking rhetorically, "How can there be stability and security in Europe and the world as long as nations and peoples are denied the right to determine their own future, a right explicitly promised by agreements among the victorious powers at the end of World War II?"

⁸⁸ Cable from Amembassy Warsaw to SecState, "When the Round Table Ends: The U.S. Response," dated March 7, 1989, NSA, End of the Cold War, Poland 1989 Cables.

Alluding to the shift in differentiation, Bush explained, "First, there can be no progress without significant political and economic liberalization. And second, help from the West will come in concert with liberalization." Both statements attested to the new focus on economic and political liberalization as opposed to distance from Moscow in terms of foreign policy. Finally, Bush outlined the economic steps his administration was advocating vis-à-vis Poland: for Congress to provide Poland with access to the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP, which lowers tariff rates on certain imports to the United States), for Congress to open access to OPIC credits, to seek new debt repayment schedules in the Paris Club, to continue American support for Polish initiatives in the IMF, to promote greater private-sector initiatives, to encourage greater business and non-profit efforts to create debt-for-equity swaps, and to support "imaginative" training, education, and cultural exchanges.⁸⁹

In a separate meeting that same day, Ridgway and Fried spoke with Kinast in Washington. Ridgway clarified that the announced moves were "conditional." The main economic incentives announced by the president would only go through if Solidarność was finally given legal status, a move that was officially announced in a Polish court on April 17 between the time of Ridgway's meeting with Kinast and the president's speech early that afternoon.⁹⁰ The moves were also "based on the premise that the agreed reforms will be implemented and not reversed; that commitments will be met; and that disputes will be worked out fairly." Referring to private-sector initiatives, Ridgway stated that the United States "invited Poland to begin negotiations of a private business-to-

⁸⁹ For the text of the speech, see: Remarks to Citizens in Hamtramck, Michigan," dated April 17, 1989, *Public Papers of the President* (1989), available on the Bush Presidential Library's website: bushlibrary.tamu.edu/research/paper.html.

⁹⁰ On the final moves to legalize Solidarność see, Cable from Amembassy to SecState, "Solidarity, Legal Again," dated April 17, 1989, NSA, End of the Cold War, Poland 1989 Cables.

business agreement." In response, Kinast welcomed the moves as "an important step in bilateral relations."⁹¹ The Bush administration had taken their first tentative steps to reward the Polish government and the opposition for their historic steps towards political transformation.⁹²

Disappointment

Even before the initiatives were announced, Washington knew that their economic response paled in comparison to the historic changes occurring in Warsaw. As Scowcroft explained, "budgets were extremely tight everywhere, and the huge federal deficit cast a pall over any additional spending." As Bush admitted, "the long shopping list of incentives for reform laid out in the speech made embarrassingly obvious our lack of resources to provide real rewards for Eastern Europe. . . . Any serious observer would see that the response was not really enough to address the magnitude of the problem."⁹³

In the embassy, Davis was distraught:

I felt very disappointed. I was rather outspoken in some telegrams to Washington about the importance of doing a major reinforcement to what we perceived as a huge change in Eastern Europe. It was something we had tried to achieve for forty years and here it is and now we can't respond to it? That's unbelievable.⁹⁴

⁹¹ For the cable on the Ridgway-Kinast meeting, see: Cable from SecState to Amembassy Warsaw, "Demarche to Polish Ambassador on President's Speech on Poland," dated April 17, 1989; NSA, End of the Cold War, Poland 1989 Cables. It is interesting to note that the initiatives announced in Hamtramck were in line with the possibilities outlined by Whitehead the previous October, and, in some respects, more reserved than some of the actions that had been offered. This comparison between policy at the end of the Reagan administration and at the start of the Bush term provides further evidence for the common criticism that the national security reviews did little to spark new ideas within the bureaucracy and led to policies that were basically status quo. For Baker's criticism in which he refers to the reviews as "status quo plus," see: *Politics of Diplomacy*, 68.

⁹² These steps were codified as National Security Directive 9, "Actions to Respond to Polish Roundtable Agreement," signed by the president on May 8, 1989. For a copy see: bushlibrary.tamu.edu/research/nsd/NSD/NSD%2009/0001.pdf.

⁹³ Bush and Scowcroft, *World Transformed*, 48 and 51.

⁹⁴ Interview with Davis, November 23, 1999.

From the inside of the bureaucracy, Simons saw the speech, however, as an important victory to change the bureaucratic precedent, because it created an "agreement in principle" which would later expand into much greater sums as policy matured.⁹⁵

This bureaucratic victory, however, had little meaning to either the opposition or PZPR. The Poles expected a more robust American response. In November 1988, the MSZ greeted news of Bush's election as a positive sign, because of the new president's pragmatic nature compared to Reagan's more ideological drives, particularly his "more practical and calmer" approach to human rights issues. With Bush in office the MSZ assumed that relations would improve more smoothly.⁹⁶ In a March 2 meeting with American philanthropist David Rockefeller, Jaruzelski spent most of his time explaining the necessity of Western economic aid, even theorizing that if countries like Poland and Hungary who were taking the most reformist approach did not receive economic help, they might conclude that democratization "is not the optimal path." He explained that Poland was particularly looking for increased joint ventures to spur on their export economy and gain access to Western technology.⁹⁷ When Olechowski met with Baker for the first time during CSCE meetings in Vienna on March 5, the Polish foreign minister openly called for the two nations to move beyond "step-by-step" to a policy of "'extended steps' and more development of comprehensive bilateral cooperation." This included Olechowski accepting the nine economic steps outlined by Whitehead, with particular emphasis on new Ex-Im bank credits and greater economic cooperation through joint

⁹⁵ Interview with Simons.

⁹⁶ Pilna Notatka dot. implikacji wyboru G. Busha na prezydenta USA [Urgent Note regarding the implications of George Bush's election as U.S. president], dated November 15, 1989, ISPPAN, KM, M/17/25.

⁹⁷ Zapis z rozmowy przewodniczącego Rady Państwa gen. W. Jaruzelskiego z D. Rockefellerem w dniu 2 marca 1989 roku [Transcripts from the chairman of the National Council W. Jaruzelski's conversation with D. Rockefeller on 2 March 1989], dated March 8, 1989, MSZ, 2/94, W-8, Dep III (1989), AP 220-4-89.

ventures.⁹⁸ When Czyrek met with Deputy Assistant Secretary Eagleburger in Washington on May 16 he "stressed the need for a more rapid and less conditional Western economic support."⁹⁹ Although the Hamtramck speech created new openings for increased coordination through international organizations (IMF, Paris Club, and World Bank), the PZPR felt that it did little to produce direct American aid, clearly less than the Polish government wanted.¹⁰⁰

For the opposition, the concept of a substantial American economic response, on the "scale of a Marshall plan for Poland," had become like doctrine by the end of the 1980s. The idea of such a plan first appeared in the independent press during the initial months of martial law, near the time that Ambassador Meehan and other American diplomats were still pursuing the idea in Washington. In an article published on March 16, 1982, *Tygodnik Mazowsze* argued that Poland needed economic help from the West "on the scale of a Marshall Plan" to get their economy going again.¹⁰¹ Three months later the argument surfaced again, with an opposition economist arguing, "In general, the debt problem of our country is rather hopeless. An exit from the crisis is not guaranteed even

⁹⁸ Sugestie do Rozmowy Ministra Olechowskiego z Sekretary of State James A. Baker [Suggestions for Minister Olechowski's conversation with Secretary of State James A. Baker], dated March 1989, MSZ, 2/94, W-7, Dep III (1989), AP 22-6-89.

⁹⁹ Cable from SecState to Amembassy Warsaw, "Party Secretary Czyrek's call on the Deputy Secretary, May 16, 1989," dated May 17, 1989, NSA, End of the Cold War, Poland 1989 Cables.

¹⁰⁰ Pilna Notatka z rozmowy z Ambasadorem USA w Polsce J. Davis'em, dated April 17, 1989, MSZ, 2/94, W-7, Dep III (1989), AP 22-1-89.

¹⁰¹ "Historyczny Porownonia," *Tygodnik Mazowsze* nr. 6 (Mar. 13, 1982): 4; available at KARTA, Archiwum Opozycji. An interesting question remains about where this idea came from. Undoubtedly, part of the fascination with this issue comes from the general Polish fascination with the Yalta agreements, and the public perception that Poland was abandoned by the West during these negotiations. Poland had been cut off from Marshall Plan aid in the 1940s, so they deserved it now. The Poles were also, most likely, referring to this possibility because of Reagan's public statements in December 1981 and January 1982 which emphasized American willingness to provide aid to Poland, as it had to Europe following World War II. It is also possible that Meehan or his deputies discussed ongoing American consultations with opposition activists and journalists.

with additional large credits on the scale of a Marshall Plan."¹⁰² Three years later, *Tygodnik Mazowsze* published portions of an RFE broadcast about a meeting between head of the Coordinating Office in Brussels, Jerzy Milewski, and Reagan on October 21, 1985, which included references to possible economic aid: "Milewski again turned to the president for preparations for an economic assistance plan. Such a 'mini-Marshall Plan for Poland' could be realized after the return of democratic rights and after carrying out deep economic reforms."¹⁰³ Finally, in a review of American policy toward Poland, made shortly before Bush's 1987 visit to Poland, the concept appeared again. This time opposition journalists argued that: "what was needed [in U.S. policy toward Poland] was a bold political vision model, [like the one] which appeared after the end of the war and took the form of the Marshall Plan."¹⁰⁴

For Solidarność activists, references to a Marshall Plan for Poland had clear propaganda advantages. By linking democratic reforms to large-scale economic packages from the West, the opposition reinforced their own domestic political power: the economy could only be successfully reformed with massive aid from the West, but only negotiations with Solidarność could lead to large-scale Western economic support. These statements should not, however, be dismissed as merely propagandistic. Some opposition leaders believed that a massive economic aid plan would be enacted for Poland if they took the prerequisite steps. On December 4, 1988, the Solidarność Coordinating Office called for Polish activists and economists to come to a conference to prepare a

¹⁰² "Porozumienie a Gospodarka" [Understanding and the Economy], *Tygodnik Mazowsze* nr. 20 (June 30, 1982): 2; available at KARTA, Archiwum Opozycji.

¹⁰³ "Rozmowa Prezydenta Reagana z Przedstawicielem 'S'" [President Reagan's Conversation with a Official from 'S'], *Tygodnik Mazowsze* nr 143/144 (Oct. 24, 1985): 1; available at KARTA, Archiwum Opozycji.

¹⁰⁴ "Po wyzycie George'a Bush: Aktywna Polityka" [After George Bush's Visit: Active Policy], *Tygodnik Mazowsze* nr. 221 (Sept. 30, 1987): 1; available at KARTA, Archiwum Opozycji.

"Solidarność Economic Plan for Poland." The announcement specifically resurrected the idea of a "mini-Marshall Plan for Poland." It continued, "we do not know if such a plan is possible in general. We don't know what the proportion of these previously mentioned [ideas] were between real possibility and a propaganda code word." However, the coordinating office wanted to find out if "such a plan could come to existence as something greater than slogans."¹⁰⁵ When Wałęsa met with Mitterand in June 1989 he requested a \$10 billion aid program from France, evidence of the opposition's high expectations. For some segments of Solidarność, the possibility of large-scale economic aid packages in return for moves toward democratization was more than just a propaganda tool, it was something they believed they deserved.

Against this background the opposition's frustration and disappointment with Bush's plans becomes even clearer. While Solidarność activists did not chastise their American friends, they did consistently endorse calls for a larger economic aid program. On April 26, now Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, Paula Dobriansky, traveled with Davis to meet with Wałęsa in Gdańsk. As the reporting cable summarized, "Wałęsa emphasized the importance of an appropriate Western response to the reforms now being attempted in Poland. It was in the West's own self-interest to assist this goal; this opportunity should not be missed." As he explained, "Poland offered more favorable prospects for reform than any other country in the region. The 'necktie' of indebtedness, however, hampered these chances."¹⁰⁶ Wałęsa was too polite to openly criticize the Hamtramck gestures as "inappropriate," but that was

¹⁰⁵ Plan solidarności gospodarczej z Polską [A Solidarnosc Economic Plan for Poland], dated December 4, 1988, Hoover, Zdzisław Najder Files, Box 6, Facts and Views. I have been unable to locate any records showing the outcome of this conference.

¹⁰⁶ Amembassy Warsaw to SecState, "Wałęsa Emphasizes the Need for an Appropriate Western Response," dated April 28, 1989, NSA, End of the Cold War, Poland 1989 Cables.

certainly the underlying thrust of his comments.

When Kuron visited Washington on May 1 to meet with Simons, Dobriansky, and Fried, he reiterated the same point. Joined by PAC advisor Nowak-Jezioranski, Kuron

steered the discussion to U.S. economic support to Poland. He described a 'wise and just' scenario in which outside economic support for Poland would serve to open the road for development of private Polish capital. However, the West appeared to be holding back with economic support until Poland had achieved stability, yet stability required an influx of capital. This vicious circle frustrated Lech Wałęsa and Solidarity. . . . Kuron urged that the U.S. provide tangible economic support for Poland. . . . In short, Kuron stressed that the United States had to take a radical step in support of Poland.

In response, Simons "stressed that the U.S. had no ready answers. Poles on both sides tended to mythologize American resources and largess."¹⁰⁷ From the opposition's viewpoint, the United States was not doing enough to support the political changes taking place. Moreover, by not infusing the country with a large-scale economic aid, as the opposition had envisioned, the United States increased chances that Poland's domestic situation would spiral into chaos. Even in the face of these arguments, the Bush administration remained reluctant to pursue any bold gestures.

With Washington maintaining a guarded approach to economic support, Solidarność activists turned to their other benefactors in the NED for smaller-scale support. On April 1, Seweryn Blumsztajn, who headed a Solidarność office in Paris and who was responsible for NED grants to the independent video association ZWID, wrote to the president of NED, Carl Gershman, asking for a new grant. Blumstzajn explained that as part of the soon-to-be-signed Round Table Agreements, the opposition would be allowed to publish its own daily newspaper, and they "have solely the authorities'

¹⁰⁷ SecState to Amembassy Warsaw, "Department Meeting with Solidarity Adviser Jacek Kuron," dated June 3, 1989, NSA, End of the Cold War, Poland 1989 Cables.

promise that [the PZPR] would provide for the supply of paper and printing facilities." To assure publication, Blumsztajn was seeking outside support for what eventually became *Gazeta Wyborcza* [Election Gazette]. He did not request a precise amount, but was simply asking for help of any kind.¹⁰⁸ Two months later, he wrote a more specific request for support to provide equipment to the new newspaper. The most expensive items on the list included two photocopiers, computers, and large amounts of paper.¹⁰⁹ *Gazeta Wyborcza* eventually received \$30,000 for 1989 in direct support from NED, sent through the PACCF.¹¹⁰

When Geremek traveled to Washington at the end of May, he experienced a microcosm of frustration with the government and success with NGOs. When he met with Eagleburger and Simons on May 19, he called on the United States to take a "dramatic gesture . . . for psychological and political as well as material reasons." Specifically, he called for the United States to head an international coalition including West Europeans and Japan to provide aid to the Poles and Hungarians (a kind of multi-national Marshall Plan), which the administration was already discussing.¹¹¹ Geremek left the Department of State without any definite agreements for new economic aid to Poland. He did, however, stop off at the AFL-CIO to meet with Kirkland. Following this meeting, the AFL-CIO presented Geremek with a suitcase full of \$100,000 in cash for the ongoing

¹⁰⁸ Letter from Seweryn Blumsztajn to Carl Gershman, dated April 1, 1989, PAC, NED 89/90, "Video 89-52 Grant Agreements and Amendments."

¹⁰⁹ Letter from Seweryn Blumsztajn to Carl Gershman, dated June 9, 1989, PAC, NED, 89/90, "Video 89-52 Grant Agreements and Amendments."

¹¹⁰ The grant is included in the Annual Report for 1989, available at the NED Headquarters library. See also Appendix I.

¹¹¹ Cable from SecState to Amembassy Warsaw, "Acting Secretary Eagleburger's Meeting with Solidarity Leader Geremek," dated May 23, 1989, NSA, End of the Cold War, Poland 1989 Cables.

election campaign provided by the AFL-CIO and PAC.¹¹²

Rumors of a possible Western Marshall Plan for Poland persisted and resurfaced as late as June. As the embassy reported,

Solidarity sources have told us of the current rumors in Poland of a Western-financed 'Marshall Plan' of some ten billion dollars. Most of the stories' permeations contend that two Western governments—presumably the U.S. and Britain—have offered this huge sum in financial aid to both the opposition and the Polish government on the condition that Solidarity be given the presidency and the prime minister's job.

As the embassy also reported, "many well-connected and [opposition] activists" as well as "some in the regime leadership itself" believe the rumors.¹¹³ After a decade of hearing about the possibility of economic aid, even members of the PZPR leadership believed the propaganda.

In the months following the Hamtramck speech, both the Polish government and opposition openly discussed their disappointment at American economic moves. After years of working to create the national reconciliation the United States and the West had demanded since December 1981, both sides assumed that the economic response would be more significant. For their part, the Americans had their own economic constraints. More importantly, despite the fact that Davis's reporting kept Washington well informed of events and his analysis pushed for bold economic steps, the policy review process had not sparked any new or bold initiatives. Washington was torn between agencies who

¹¹² Arch Puddington, "Surviving the Underground: How American Unions Helps Solidarity Win," *American Educator* (Summer 2005). Presumably this money came from NED funds already allocated to the PAC and the AFL-CIO. I did not come across any records in either AFL-CIO or PAC files dealing with this transfer of money or programs to raise it. Moreover, it is unlikely that either of these two organizations could have raised this large of a sum of cash without NED assistance. For a full accounting of NED money for Poland in 1989, see Appendix 1. Geremek's decision to accept the cash also showed Solidarność's changing calculations regarding charges of foreign influence. Funding a quick election was clearly much more important than maintaining perceived distance with American labor and Polonia.

¹¹³ Cable from Amembassy Warsaw to SecState, "Tall Tales about U.S. Marshall Plan," dated June 20, 1989, NSA, End of the Cold War, Poland 1989 Cables.

feared that economic aid would only lead to new wastefulness in the Polish economy, and other groups who felt that Poland had gone through a substantive political change that needed to be rewarded regardless of how efficiently the money would be utilized. Under pressure from the White House's own economic belt tightening and this bureaucratic scuffle, the only initiatives taken were timid and under funded compared to the the task and opportunity at hand.

Elections and Concerns

Soon after signing the Round Table Agreements, Solidarność's main concern in Poland was not gaining Western economic support, but rather preparing for parliamentary elections. As the opposition regularly stated, it was a difficult task to run 260 candidates (100 in the Senate and 160 in the Sejm, totaling all seats open to the opposition) for national election given only six weeks and starting without an existing party structure. To organize and coordinate their campaign efforts, the opposition relied on the newly created Citizen's Committee. The first task for the campaign was to create a list of candidates and receive the necessary 780,000 signatures (3,000 per candidate) to register them by the mandated May 10 deadline.¹¹⁴ Under the auspices of the National Citizen's Committee, local committees were created and charged with nominating potential candidates. These local nominations moved through regional Citizen's Committee structures and were whittled down until they reached the national body where a final decision was made.¹¹⁵ Through this process the opposition tried to create a mix of local and national figures

¹¹⁴ Cable from Amembassy Warsaw to SecState, "Geremek Explains the Next Steps," dated April 7, 1989, NSA, End of the Cold War, Poland 1989 Cables.

¹¹⁵ Cable from Amembassy Warsaw to SecState, "Election '89 - Election Prospects," dated May 5, 1989, NSA, End of the Cold War, Poland 1989 Cables.

running on each regional ticket. For example, Onyszkiewicz, a longtime resident of Warsaw who was nationally known, ran in the southeastern town of Przemyśl where his wife had some family.¹¹⁶ In contrast, in Ostroleka in northeast Poland, the opposition ticket included Jozef Gutowski, a lifelong resident and sheep farmer who was also a longtime member of Rural Solidarność.¹¹⁷

The other early concern for the campaign was raising campaign funds. Wujec, the national coordinator for the Citizen's Committee, expected the entire national campaign would cost \$250,000, of which the committee had raised only \$30,000 by the end of April. In order to make up the shortfall, candidates and campaign staff began selling "bricks" (paper certificates) of various denominations which people could take as souvenirs of their donation. In a nod to Western campaigns, the opposition also sold Solidarność bumper stickers. In addition, opposition spokesmen left open the possibility of accepting money from labor and fraternal organizations, but Solidarność remained "reluctant to consider positively the idea of direct foreign government appropriations for Solidarity activists."¹¹⁸ Wałęsa also appealed for campaign funds directly from the Polish government.

Once the list of candidates for national office was settled on April 23 and officially registered on May 10, the candidates moved into a flurry of campaign activity. They created local election offices, held rallies, hosted speeches, handed out bumper stickers, plastered areas with campaign literature and candidate posters, and made use of

¹¹⁶ Cable from Amembassy Warsaw to SecState, "Campaign '89 - Solidarity Spokesman as a Parliamentary Candidate," dated April 28, 1989, NSA, End of the Cold War, Poland 1989 Cables.

¹¹⁷ Cable from Amembassy Warsaw to SecState, "Campaign '89 - Ostroleka," dated May 12, 1989, NSA, End of the Cold War, Poland 1989 Cables.

¹¹⁸ "Campaign '89 - Solidarity Spokesman as a Parliamentary Candidate." This statement is particularly interesting in light of Geremek's later reported acceptance of \$100,000 from the AFL-CIO and PAC. If the Citizen's Committee stuck to their original budget, this would mean that Americans funded 40 percent of the election campaign.

sound trucks. For a May 3 election event in Kraków, candidates led a march complete with brass band from the cathedral on Wawel Hill down to the nearby Old Town Square where they gave speeches to a crowd of about 5,000 people. During these rallies candidates focused on the details of voting, in order to educate what many activists considered a politically "ignorant" society who were only used to the non-competitive elections the PZPR had run for the last forty years. Specifically, opposition candidates taught people how to vote for opposition candidates and told them how to cross off the names of government candidates to force these candidates to take part in the second round of elections on June 18.¹¹⁹ Throughout the process the opposition received extensive support from the Catholic Church, with local priests making parish meeting halls and churches available for rallies. Some priests went further; as one cable reported, "Priests inform their congregations of the necessity of signing the petitions of Solidarity candidates and of voting for them in June."¹²⁰ Although he declined to run for office to "retain his authority as someone above the fray," Wałęsa took part by posing for pictures with all 260 candidates to be used in their campaign literature, as well as occasionally appearing for rallies and speeches.¹²¹

Throughout the campaign process, the opposition remained very cautious, nearly pessimistic, about their chances of a complete election victory. As Geremek said to reporters a week after signing the Round Table agreements, "We have no structures, little

¹¹⁹ Cable from Amembassy Warsaw to SecState, "Campaign '89 - Kickoff in Kraków with Brass Bands, Soundtrucks and Political Infighting," dated May 15, 1989, NSA, End of the Cold War, Poland 1989 Cables.

¹²⁰ "Campaign '89 - Ostroleka."

¹²¹ On Wałęsa's desire to stay out of politics, see Cable from Amembassy Warsaw to SecState, "Wałęsa to try to Remain 'Above Politics,'" dated April 14, 1989, NSA, End of the Cold War, Poland 1989 Cables. For an account of one of his campaign speeches, see Cable from Amembassy Warsaw to SecState, "Campaign 89 - Wałęsa leads Rural Solidarity Rally in Raclawice," dated May 19, 1989, NSA, End of the Cold War, Poland 1989 Cables. On posing for campaign posters, see Paczkowski, *Spring*, 504.

money and scant access to the mass media,"¹²² a contrast to PZPR bodies which were well organized and well funded. When Wałęsa met with American representatives on April 26 he emphasized that there were already fractures appearing in the opposition, stating, "We could lose."¹²³ While none of the Americans at the meeting agreed with Wałęsa, Kuron gave an equally reserved picture of the opposition's election chances when he traveled to Washington on May 1:

[Kuron] stated that the opposition faced a very tough fight in the June elections. It would likely win a majority but less than 60 percent of the Senate seats. This was due to the greater weight given to relatively conservative rural districts where Solidarity strength was sparse. Of the 35 percent of the Sejm seats open to free elections, the opposition likely would win about two thirds, for a total of 20-25 percent of the lower house. Generally, noted Kuron, the electorate would vote for personalities rather than for parties: only about 10 percent would automatically vote for the Solidarity candidate and only 2 percent for the party candidate. The party was examining the opposition candidate list to determine vulnerabilities and would chose for its own a list popular individuals tailored to specific races. As a result of this, and of the party deliberately lowering public expectations, it could emerge from the elections in reasonably good shape.¹²⁴

As opposition activists gained experience and confidence in their campaign skills, their predictions remained reserved, mainly because of continued public apathy about the political process. As the *Washington Post* reported, "As Poland's politicians conduct a frantic, fractious campaign . . . , the challenge of winning votes has been matched by that of convincing average Poles that the exercise of partial democracy is worthwhile."¹²⁵ Against this backdrop of public apathy, Solidarność resisted the temptation to predict a victory, reminding anyone who was listening that "so much is unknown."¹²⁶

¹²² Krzysztof Bobinski, "Poland's Free Vote," *Financial Times* (Apr. 23, 1989): A26.

¹²³ "Wałęsa Reiterates a Need for Appropriate Western Response."

¹²⁴ "Department meeting with Solidarity Advisor Jacek Kuron."

¹²⁵ Jackson Diehl, "Poles Skeptical Of Both Sides in Elections," *Washington Post* (May 28, 1989): A29.

¹²⁶ "Election '89 - Prospects."

From the very beginning of the election campaign, however, Davis's embassy took a much different view. Only two weeks after the Round Table concluded, Davis made his predictions clear:

The elections in June are, for the regime, an unpredictable danger and, for the opposition, an enormous opportunity. The authorities, having staked a great deal, are hoping for some modest success, but they are more likely to meet total defeat and great embarrassment. The party, despite its touted superior organization, is vastly disliked and nearly incapable of persuading an electorate through traditional campaign techniques, with which it has had no experience. . . . It is difficult to see how the party's core will be able to elect many—or any—candidates to the Senate. Apparently seeing the possible outcome in a different way, the regime may have committed the sin of many crumbling power elites in seriously underestimating the strength and depth of its opposition.

This optimism was based in part on activists working at "break neck speed" with "real enthusiasm," showing that their "ability to organize and overcome doubts could make the opposition formidable competitors."¹²⁷ By the middle of May, the opposition's leading position became even clearer to the embassy: "early nominations . . . allowed Solidarity to dominate the scene before official candidates were announced."¹²⁸ Two days before the first round of elections, the embassy provided an overview of the "one-sided campaign in which Solidarity has emerged as a genuine and capable party," and concluded that the opposition would "win a nearly-total" victory, with the government coalition winning only two or three Senate seats and the opposition winning all of its possible Sejm seats.¹²⁹

From the beginning of the campaign, Davis and his team took it as a matter of faith that Solidarność would win an overwhelming victory. The opposition's ability to run

¹²⁷ Cable from Amembassy Warsaw to SecState, "Election '89 - The Year of Solidarity," dated April 19, 1989, NSA, End of the Cold War, Poland 1989 Cables.

¹²⁸ Cable from Amembassy Warsaw to SecState, "Election '89 - Growing Confidence and Sharpening Antagonisms in Płock," dated May 19, 1989, NSA, End of the Cold War, Poland 1989 Cables.

¹²⁹ Cable from Amembassy Warsaw to SecState, "Election '89: Solidarity's Coming Victory: Big or Too Big?" dated June 2, 1989, NSA, End of the Cold War, Poland 1989 Cables.

an organized and focused (if not completely united) election campaign only reinforced the diplomats' predisposition. In a political climate where Solidarność activists like Geremek, Kuron, and Wałęsa shied away from claiming that they would win substantial gains, Davis and his team saw through their rhetoric to provide the White House and the Department of State with a nearly flawless analysis of the political situation on the eve of the elections. This prediction was even more striking given that no one else was predicting a landslide for Solidarność. Newspaper accounts from the week before the election either emphasized the Polish public's political apathy or foresaw only a modest victory for the opposition, gaining seventy-five Senate seats.¹³⁰

However, Davis's predictions of a Solidarność victory were not cause for unrestrained joy; complete victory brought new uncertainties to the political process. First, a one-sided victory threatened the election of prominent government officials and Round Table participants who were running unopposed as part of the PZPR's "national list." In order to be elected, these candidates needed to receive only 50 percent of the eligible vote; however, many opposition candidates had been instructing voters to cross out the entire list. Moreover, if these candidates did not receive the necessary votes in the June 4 round there were no provisions for including them in the second round of voting on June 18, meaning that the seats could remain unfilled. If they were unfilled, the

¹³⁰ See for example, Henry Kamm, "In Pro-Solidarity City Poland's Coming Vote Is Stirring Little Excitement," *New York Times* (June 1, 1989): A3, and Krzysztof Bobinski, "Why Solidarity Fears A Landslide At The Polls," *Financial Times* (June 3, 1989): A2. Davis's reporting on the election campaign is also important as it relates to the historiography of 1989. In *American Diplomacy* (page 59), Hutchings claims that "no one inside Poland or out had expected such a landslide," a common misperception in American and Polish accounts. Davis's June 2 and April 19 cables patently refute that claim, which is usually stated to defend the United States' lack of foresight and their weak response to events in Poland. It remains possible that American diplomats neglected the analysis of their own representative in Warsaw in favor of the bleaker picture they were receiving from Solidarność visitors to Washington, which fit better into the conventional wisdom. If so, this reinforces criticisms of the bureaucratic struggles in the Bush administration that tended to restrict creative and unconventional thinking.

opposition could win 38 percent of the Sejm seats, giving them power to block the two-thirds vote needed for the Sejm to veto legislation from the opposition-heavy Senate. This new power dynamic weakened Solidarność's position for two reasons. First, as Davis reported, "While the regime needs Solidarity, so, at present, does Solidarity need the regime; it does not want to be the government, saddled with more responsibility than authority." Second, taking this much control over the legislative process could threaten both hardliners and reformists in the PZPR: "Too hasty progress toward pluralism and democracy could turn to dust. . . if the regime feels an immediate mortal threat."¹³¹

Second, an overwhelming victory for Solidarność in the Sejm and Senate elections affected political calculations beyond the national list. Here, American concerns boiled down to worries about how a defeated PZPR would react, with the possibility of a hardliner revolt within the party leading to possibly catastrophic effects. As the embassy explained, "Total victory or something close to it. . . will threaten a sharp defensive reaction from the regime. The position of the leading party reformers would be endangered. Sharper, and even possibly military responses cannot be entirely ruled out."¹³² When backed against a wall in 1981 the party responded by declaring martial law; while this possibility was less likely in 1989 the American embassy did fear some kind of conservative backlash if Solidarność's victory was overwhelming.

When election returns began to be calculated on June 5, the outcome was clear: Solidarność had triumphed with a landslide victory. From early accounts it appeared that all opposition candidates for the Sejm would win and all "but a handful" of opposition

¹³¹ Cable from Amembassy Warsaw to SecState, "The National List - Looking Defeat in the Face," dated May 24, 1989, NSA, End of the Cold War, Poland 1989 Cables. It should be noted that Solidarność activists shared the embassy's concerns and in the final days of the campaign, Wałęsa personally tried to convince voters to vote for some of the names on the national list.

¹³² "Election '89: Solidarity's Coming Victory: Big or Too Big?"

candidates to the Senate had won in the first round. Their ultimate victory was assured in the run-off elections on June 18. In terms of government candidates, early reports suggested that none of them had won the necessary 50 percent of the vote and would be forced to compete in June 18 elections in which they only needed a plurality to win. In addition, all but two names on the national list had been rejected.¹³³ While the opposition leadership made sure to restrain their celebration, as the embassy reported, "gentle words and celebration can do little to disguise the threats and anxieties that the election results evoke." Moreover, with the rejection of the national list, the government coalition was now only guaranteed 263 seats in the combined legislature (called the National Assembly), giving them only a two seat majority over the opposition's 261-seats.¹³⁴

This small majority was further weakened by the rapidly dissolving government coalition. Two days after the first round of elections, Davis informed Washington that the opposition "quietly claims to have at least 10 perspective Peasant's Party (ZSL) deputies in its pockets. The glue that has held the ruling coalition together—the permanence and inevitability of PZPR rule—has been eliminated." With these defections, the opposition's majority was guaranteed in the National Assembly, and even a majority in the Sejm was becoming a possibility. Under these new circumstances, the embassy predicted that Jaruzelski's election to the presidency would become a matter for debate. To become president, Jaruzelski needed at least the tacit support of the opposition parliamentarians, a prospect that the embassy reported many opposition politicians would be reticent to take. As Davis concluded, all of these new questions and concerns highlighted the "future

¹³³ Cable from Amembassy Warsaw to SecState, "Election '89: First Solidarity Press Conference," dated June 6, 1989, NSA, End of the Cold War, Poland 1989 Cables.

¹³⁴ Cable from Amembassy Warsaw to SecState, "Election '89 - Solidarity's Victory Raises Questions," dated June 6, 1989, NSA, End of the Cold War, Poland 1989 Cables.

volatility in Poland's continuing drama."¹³⁵

Rather than solidifying the agreements reached during the Round Table, the June 4 election increased concern over Poland's political future. The issue of how to elect prominent reform-minded PZPR leaders who had been rejected as part of the national list remained open. In the new political environment, even Jaruzelski's election as president was up in the air. More importantly, tension in Warsaw remained high as both opposition leaders and American diplomats worried about a conservative reaction from hard-line members of the party, a possibility made all the more real by images from Beijing of Chinese tanks attacking democracy activists in Tiananmen Square on June 4. Half-way through 1989, Poland's future remained unclear despite gains from the Round Table and Solidarność's election victory.

A Presidential Crisis . . .

As concerns about Poland's political development swirled around Warsaw, bilateral U.S.-Polish relations continued to move forward. Most importantly, in a May 2 letter to Jaruzelski, Bush accepted a previous invitation from the general to visit Poland. In particular, the president's letter noted that "Poland has taken a step in the direction of freedom and democracy, a step that contributes to building the sort of Europe I and my country seek." While he argued that Poland's further development depended on continued internal economic and political reforms, Bush hinted at increased American backing, writing, "the successful negotiation of the round-table accords and subsequent formal registration of Solidarity has made it possible for Poland's friends to support a process of

¹³⁵ Ibid.

genuine reform and recovery."¹³⁶ While the MSZ expressed concerns over what Jaruzelski's official standing would be when the president arrived in Poland (it was unclear if he would be voted in as president by the time of a visit),¹³⁷ Jaruzelski sent an official response on May 11 welcoming Bush for the coming July.¹³⁸ For the PZPR this trip held some negative possibilities: "the visit will constitute a central element in the American policy to strengthen the U.S. position in Central Europe as well as within emerging active transformation in the socialist countries of Europe," allowing Washington to "unambiguously exhibit backing for the opposition." Nonetheless, the MSZ began preparations for the visit which they hoped would "open a new era in the development of dialogue on the highest level," bringing positive international, bilateral, and internal effects.¹³⁹

For policy-makers in Washington, the presidential trip gave them an opportunity to return to the issue of America's response to Poland's transformation. To push the Bush administration for further steps, the House Committee on Foreign Affairs held a session to discuss Poland on June 7. Specifically they were discussing a new bill, H.R. 2550, which created legislation to approve GSP and OPIC credits, as requested in the Hamtramck speech. The bill also appropriated \$1.5 million for scientific and technological exchanges in FY 1990 and \$1.56 million in FY 1991, \$2 million for both FY 1990 and FY 1991 for hospital equipment and medical supplies, and \$1 million for

¹³⁶ Letter from President George Bush to General Wojciech Jaruzelski (in English), dated May 2, 1989, MSZ 2/94, W-9, Dep III (1989), AP 220-9-89.

¹³⁷ Cable from Amembassy Warsaw to SecState, "Presidential Trip to Poland and Hungary," dated May 4, 1989, NSA, End of the Cold War, Poland 1989 Cables.

¹³⁸ Unofficial translation of a letter from General Jaruzelski to President Bush (in English), dated May 11, 1989, MSZ, 2/94, W-9, Dep III (1989), AP 220-9-89.

¹³⁹ Pilna Notatka w sprawie oficjalnej wizyty w Polsce prezydenta Stanów Zjednoczonych Ameryki, George'a H. Busha [Urgent Note regarding U.S. President George H. Bush's official visit to Poland], dated May 19, 1989, MSZ, 2/94, W-9, Dep III (1989), AP 220-9-89.

FY 1990 and FY 1991 "for unconditional support of democratic institutions and activities." In addition to these steps, Representative Stephen Solarz pushed for strong language to call for the president to appoint a taskforce to coordinate with American allies in Western Europe and Japan to offer "major assistance to [the Poles] in getting the economy on its feet."¹⁴⁰

While policy makers discussed Bush's upcoming trip in Washington, the opposition and the government coalition in Warsaw initiated a new compromise on the national list. On June 6 the government proposed a new election to be held during the second round elections, previously scheduled to allow run-off elections.¹⁴¹ On June 8 a select group of opposition and PZPR leaders met as part of the Coordinating Commission—a group similar to that which met at Magdalenka which was formed to deal with controversies and problems that occurred in implementing the Round Table agreements. There the two sides decided to accept the government's suggestion and allow seats left empty by the defeat of the national list to be reopened to coalition candidates in elections on June 18.¹⁴² However, in another surprise, the high-profile PZPR reformers who were on the original national list decided not to run again. As Davis recalled:

I went to see Czyrek after the election, and he told me that they were not going to run again; he and all the others who had not been elected, who had been crossed off. I said, "Well, why don't you run again. You're allowed to." "No, that would be too humiliating." So, they gave up on all those seats, in effect put non-entities up in the second round. All the Communist

¹⁴⁰ House Committee on Foreign Affairs, *Consideration of Miscellaneous Bills and Resolutions*, vol. 1, 101 Cong., 1st Session, 1989; quoted at 172. H.R. 2550 was eventually included in Public Law 101-179, "Support for East European Democracy, passed on November 28, 1989.

¹⁴¹ Cable from Amembassy Warsaw to SecState, "Possible New Election for a Contested National List," dated June 7, 1989, NSA, End of the Cold War, Poland 1989 Cables. In his cable reporting on this, Davis suggests this idea came from a casual conversation he had with Czyrek on June 5. Davis also asks that RFE and VOA broadcasts "avoid heaping scorn on this admittedly contrived expedient."

¹⁴² Cable for Amembassy Warsaw to SecState, "Round Table Coordination Committee Meets to Endorse National List Compromise," dated June 9, 1989, NSA, End of the Cold War, Poland 1989 Cables.

leadership declined to run. That was another amazing decision. . . . I never thought these guys would just say that it would be too humiliating to run again.¹⁴³

While this solved the problem of empty seats in the Sejm, the decision bothered the Americans because it weakened the new government, replacing respected reformers with "warm bodies, but . . . not the people most needed."¹⁴⁴

Despite the compromise to fill national list seats, the rapid dissolution of PZPR unity continued to cause alarm for the Americans. In particular, Peasant Party leader Mikołaj Kozakiewicz was becoming increasingly independent. As he described to embassy officials: "the ZSL would be loyal to the PZPR only when it served the ZSL's interests and the PZPR's agenda."¹⁴⁵ In the wake of the June 18 elections, these self-destructive trends in the PZPR gained strength, with party leaders openly talking about the party splitting in two, into hardliners and reformers.¹⁴⁶ So, not only were important reformers from the PZPR too humiliated to run for election, but their entire coalition was on the verge of breaking up.

More central to American concerns, dissolving loyalty within the government coalition meant that Jaruzelski's election as president was now in question. As opposition members explained to the embassy, "as many as forty or fifty" coalition parliamentarians refused to vote for Jaruzelski as president in order "to punish him for the party's electoral humiliation." Given the overwhelming Solidarność election victory, this meant that opposition politicians would have to vote for Jaruzelski in the National Assembly to put

¹⁴³ Interview with Davis, November 23, 1999.

¹⁴⁴ Cable from Amembassy Warsaw to SecState, "Election's Second Round only a Partial Solution to the National List Problem," dated June 13, 1989, NSA, End of the Cold War, Poland 1989 Cables.

¹⁴⁵ Cable from Amembassy Warsaw to SecState, "Peasant Party Loosening its Bonds with PZPR," dated June 15, 1989, NSA, End of the Cold War, Poland 1989 Cables.

¹⁴⁶ Cable from Amembassy Warsaw to SecState, "Election Results Pressure Party to Split Sooner than Anticipated," dated June 20, 1989, NSA, End of the Cold War, Poland 1989 Cables.

him into office. Many opposition activists had made campaign pledges specifically not to vote for Jaruzelski as president, but many also felt that making Jaruzelski president was an implicit part of the Round Table agreements. So, not voting for him would threaten the political arrangements between the government and the opposition, destabilizing the situation even further. As the embassy reported, "most Solidarity leaders are convinced that Jaruzelski must be elected if the country is to avoid civil war."¹⁴⁷

Faced with intense "hand wringing" by his friends in the opposition, Davis took an extraordinary step. Instead of remaining in his usual role on the outskirts of political discussions and decisions, the American ambassador interjected himself to advise Solidarność on tactics, suggesting to them a way to elect Jaruzelski without voting for him. As a June 23 cable records: "I had dinner last night with some leading Solidarity legislators, who had better remain nameless, and jotted down for them a few numbers on the back of an embassy notebook. I also reviewed for them an arcane Western political practice known as head-counting." Davis explained to his Solidarność friends that a large number of opposition legislators could be absent from the vote for president and there would still be a quorum. Under these circumstances, even with defections within the government coalition, Jaruzelski would have enough votes to gain a majority. "The Solidarity deputies and senators could then safely abstain."¹⁴⁸ In a historical anomaly, the American ambassador advised democratic activists how to elect a Communist president, the same president who less-than-ten-years earlier had been responsible for jailing, harassing, and beating these activists.

In the weeks leading up to Bush's arrival in Warsaw, the crisis surrounding

¹⁴⁷ Cable from Amembassy Warsaw to SecState, "How to Elect Jaruzelski without Voting for Him and Will he Run," dated June 23, 1989, NSA, End of the Cold War, Poland 1989 Cables.

¹⁴⁸ Ibid.

Jaruzelski's election worsened. The embassy received reports that Jaruzelski was not willing "to creep into the presidency with a few votes" and unsure whether he would even run for office.¹⁴⁹ Intensifying pressure on the Americans, Czyrek called in DCM Johnson to explain to him the rumors he had heard that the United States was supporting "extreme opposition positions" and that Washington was opposed to Jaruzelski's election as president.¹⁵⁰ On June 30, during a PZPR Plenum, Jaruzelski announced that he would not run for president, and nominated Kiszczak instead; although discussion on a final decision continued.¹⁵¹ In this extremely fluid situation, Solidarność was also positioning itself to make a move for more power, with a July 3 cable reporting that "although he mildly denies such intentions now, Geremek does admit that Solidarity has been offered the chance to form a government from its own resources."¹⁵² Later that day, the new editor of *Gazeta Wyborcza*, Adam Michnik, made these machinations public by publishing a front-page editorial proposing that in return for accepting a PZPR president, the opposition should be given the opportunity to elect the prime minister and create its own government.¹⁵³

On the eve of President Bush's trip, Poland was deep into a presidential crisis. As Davis made clear weeks before, "There have probably been few occasions when an American president has arrived for an official visit in a more fluid and fast-moving

¹⁴⁹ Cable from Amembassy Warsaw to SecState, "Crisis Develops over Election of Polish President," dated June 30, 1989, NSA, End of the Cold War, Poland 1989 Cables.

¹⁵⁰ Cable from Amembassy Warsaw to SecState, "Politburo Member warns that U.S. has been Dragged into War of Election of Jaruzelski as President," dated June 16, 1989, NSA, End of the Cold War, Poland 1989 Cables.

¹⁵¹ Cable from Amembassy Warsaw to SecState, "Poland's Political Crisis, Wałęsa's Views," dated July 1, 1989, NSA, End of the Cold War, Poland 1989 Cables.

¹⁵² Cable from Amembassy Warsaw to SecState, "Political Crisis Intensifies," dated July 3, 1989, NSA, End of the Cold War, Poland 1989 Cables.

¹⁵³ Cable from Amembassy Warsaw to SecState, "Michnik Proposes a Solidarity Government, Prints the Proposal in the Newspaper," dated July 3, 1989, NSA, End of the Cold War, Poland 1989 Cables.

political situation than the present one in Poland."¹⁵⁴ The key question remained, just what would the Bush administration do with this opportunity?

... and a Presidential Visit

Air Force One landed at Warsaw's military airport on the evening of Friday, June 9, where Bush and his entourage, including Baker, Scowcroft, and White House Chief of Staff John Sununu, were greeted by Jaruzelski and Wielowiejski. Otherwise the airport was empty, but as the president's motorcade drove through Warsaw—on a route announced in RFE and VOA broadcasts—he was greeted by thousands of Varsovians lining the streets, sometimes two and three deep.¹⁵⁵ On his first morning, Bush went to two wreath-laying ceremonies with his wife Barbara, and then alone to a private meeting with Jaruzelski. For lunch the Bushs' went to the Ambassador's residence where a mix of opposition and government officials—similar to the July 4 party, but smaller—met the president and exchanged toasts, including a toast by Jaruzelski who said, "I have lived perhaps 50 or 80 meters away from here for 16 years. . . and it is for the first time that I have come to this building and this residence. . . . I think . . . it is also a sign of the times."¹⁵⁶ That afternoon Bush gave his major policy speech to the National Assembly, and spent the evening at a state dinner hosted by Jaruzelski.

The next day Bush flew to Gdańsk. He first met with local church officials and then ate a "private" lunch in Wałęsa's personal home. That afternoon he gave a short speech at the Solidarity Workers' Monument (commemorating workers killed in strikes

¹⁵⁴ "How to Elect Jaruzelski without Voting for Him and Will he Run."

¹⁵⁵ Maureen Dowd, "Bush in Warsaw on Delicate Mission to Push Changes," *New York Times* (July 10, 1989): A1.

¹⁵⁶ Maureen Dowd, "For Bush, a Polish Welcome Without Fervor," *New York Times* (July 11, 1989): A1.

during 1970) at the gates of the Lenin Shipyard. From there he finished his tour by laying a wreath with Jaruzelski at Westerplatte, the sight of the beginning of World War II. From Gdańsk he continued on with his European tour in Budapest and then Paris.¹⁵⁷ Overall the public response to the visit was more reserved than Bush's 1987 trip. As one of his senior advisors summarized, "The President got a warm reception, an admiring one, but not a very intense or exuberant one."¹⁵⁸

While in Warsaw the White House pursued a two-tiered goal. Primarily U.S. officials wanted to convey "our approval and support of [the Poles'] progress on reform and [give] new weight to [the president's] theme of ending the division of Europe on Western democratic terms. . . . [The] visit will demonstrate our support for change in tangible ways that do not threaten the Soviet Union." This political goal was, however, tempered by secondary economic concerns. As Baker reported to Bush, "your objective is to support the democratic political reforms underway, while bringing the government and Solidarity to understand that the U.S. and Western economic support can be effective only if the Poles implement necessary economic reforms."¹⁵⁹ In particular, Baker was concerned about Solidarity's expectations of a large Western response, expectations which the president's trip was meant to temper.¹⁶⁰

Bush did, however, offer some modest new aid and investment in his speech to the National Assembly. In addition to the GSP and OPIC measures announced in Hamtramck, the United States and Poland had just signed new agreements to expand

¹⁵⁷ This outline of the presidential visit is compiled from State Department documents, "Schedule of the President and Mrs. Bush to Warsaw, Poland," and "Schedule of the President and Mrs. Bush for Gdańsk, Poland," both dated June 28, 1989, NSA, End of the Cold War, scanned incoming FOIA documents.

¹⁵⁸ Dowd, "For Bush, a Polish Welcome Without Fervor."

¹⁵⁹ Memo from James A. Baker to the President, "Your Visit to Europe, July 9-18, 1989," dated June 30, 1989, NSA, End of the Cold War, scanned incoming FOIA documents.

¹⁶⁰ Memo from James A. Baker to the President, "Your Visit to Poland, July 10-11, 1989," dated June 30, 1989, NSA, End of the Cold War, scanned incoming FOIA documents.

tourism and to exchange cultural centers. He also proposed new measures: an Energy Cooperation Initiative to bring scientists to the United States to talk about nuclear and clean coal technology, a business and economic agreement to enhance the legal foundation for American business investment, a housing privatization and development program to promote home ownership and increase the housing stock, and three environmental initiatives for the Kraków area to provide \$10 million to retrofit a coal-fired plant with clean-coal technology, \$1 million for air quality monitoring, and \$4 million to improve water quality and availability. In terms of debt repayment, Bush signed two bilateral agreements to reschedule Poland's debt to the United States for 1985 and 1987. The president also pledged to support "an early and generous rescheduling of Polish debt" within the larger Paris Club, to defer about \$5 billion in debt payments in total. The administration also pledged to encourage the approval of "two economically viable project loans . . . totaling \$325 million" through the World Bank. The most significant new unilateral initiative launched by the Americans, however, was a \$100 million "Polish-American Enterprise Fund" which would provide funds for private sector development, privatizing state firms, increased technical assistance and training programs, funding export projects, and encouraging joint ventures between private Polish and American investors.¹⁶¹

In retrospect, the most important effect of Bush's visit to Warsaw and Gdańsk was not these announcements dealing with economic relations; rather, the president directly affected the presidential crisis. When Bush and Jaruzelski met privately on June 10, the two engaged in an open discussion of bilateral relations, the international situation, and

¹⁶¹ Explanations of all of these initiatives are included in declassified briefing materials, c. July 1989, NSA, End of the Cold War, scanned incoming FOIA documents.

Poland's ongoing transformation. In terms of the presidential crisis, Bush recalls:

Jaruzelski opened his heart and asked me what role I thought he should now play. He told me of his reluctance to run for president and his desire to avoid a political tug-of-war that Poland didn't need I felt that Jaruzelski's experience was the best hope for a smooth transition in Poland.¹⁶²

The Polish record of the conversation does not mention Jaruzelski "opening up his heart," but does record Bush's supportive words for Jaruzelski as a force for reform. Bush made clear that he did not want to pursue "super rhetoric" which would be well received in the West, but would hamper the transformation in Poland. He also spoke highly of Jaruzelski, saying, "The personal position and popularity of General Jaruzelski in the United States had never been as high as it is right now," an opinion the president seconded in his later conversation with Rakowski. In Bush's meeting with Rakowski, the prime minister expressed his "satisfaction that the president had such a high opinion of General Jaruzelski." Rakowski also made clear that Jaruzelski still might run for president.¹⁶³

To help show his endorsement for Jaruzelski, Bush also publicly supported Jaruzelski in his comments and mannerisms. In pictures and television images, Bush's body language actually looked more at ease in his meetings with Jaruzelski than in his lunch with Wałęsa, where the Solidarność leader pushed Bush to increase economic support hoping for a \$10 billion Western aid package. Beyond the power of images, "Bush repeatedly, and also publicly, expressed esteem for the initiators of change, of which he considered the front of the line to be General Jaruzelski as well as the present political management." Moreover, both Bush and Baker "strongly and repeatedly

¹⁶² Bush and Scowcroft, *World Transformed*, 117.

¹⁶³ Notatka Informacyjna dot. wizyty oficjalnej prezydenta Stanów Zjednoczonych Ameryki George H. Bush (9-11 lipca 1989 r.) [Information Note regarding the official visit of the President of the United States of America, George H. Bush (9-11 July 1989)], dated July 18, 1989, MSZ, 2/94, W-9, Dep III (1989), AP 220-9-89.

emphasized that transformation should proceed in an evolutionary manner, and that it is not a goal of American policy to decide about [Poland's] direction."¹⁶⁴ These were not-so-subtle signs that the United States wanted Jaruzelski to remain in a position of power to continue to support slow progress as laid out by the Round Table agreements.

The president and his entourage never openly called for Jaruzelski to be named president, but they gave strong signals that Washington would support such a move. This was not, however, the only external pressure on Jaruzelski's position. Jaruzelski received backing from Gorbachev during a Warsaw Pact meeting in Bucharest on July 7-8, when the Soviet leader called for all members of the Warsaw Pact to continue on the path of "rebuilding, reform, and refining different aspects of the socialist system."¹⁶⁵ As Dudek summarizes, "Gorbachev was with certainty interested in the assumption of his Polish ally to the office of the president."¹⁶⁶ Soviet pronouncements almost certainly affected Jaruzelski's thinking. However, Bush also had a direct effect. As Rakowski recorded at the time: "After the Bush visit, during which at every occasion he spoke about the contributions of [Jaruzelski], Wojciech's efforts [*akcje*] greatly increased."¹⁶⁷

Shortly after Bush's visit, Jaruzelski renewed his efforts to run for president, and he met with various constituencies to lobby for their support. By July 14, Jaruzelski had already met with representatives from the smaller coalition parties and had received a declaration of support from the ZSL Party Plenum.¹⁶⁸ Then on July 17, Jaruzelski met with a full group of opposition members of the new Sejm and Senate and "declared that

¹⁶⁴ Ibid.

¹⁶⁵ Notatka Informacyjna o naradzie Doradczego Komitetu Politycznego państw-stron Układu Warszawskiego [Information Note of a meeting of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Pact], dated July 10, 1989, AAN, KC PZPR, V/490, 41-53; quoted at 46. Also in ISPPAN, KM, M/18/9.

¹⁶⁶ Dudek, *Reglamentowana Rewolucja*, 354.

¹⁶⁷ Mieczysław Rakowski, *Dzienniki polityczne 1987-1990* (Warsaw: Wydawnictwo ISKRY, 2005), 475.

¹⁶⁸ Cable from Amembassy Warsaw to SecState, "Jaruzelski to Face the Nation and then Run for President," dated July 17, 1989, NSA, End of the Cold War, Poland 1989 Cables.

he was prepared to discuss anything for as long as it would take." He answered numerous questions about the decision to introduce martial law, as well as both current and past policies and personal history. The meeting was, in effect, an attempt to "reveal the general as a reasonable and moderate man, rather than the imagined monster he had become for so many."¹⁶⁹ On July 19, the National Assembly met and voted to declare Jaruzelski president. Because of expected defections from the PZPR and its coalition parties, Solidarność parliamentarians were forced to manipulate the vote in Jaruzelski's favor. A lookout for the group monitored votes from an upper balcony using binoculars, and delegates were moved in and out of room to create the necessary quorum. A number of Solidarność politicians also abstained from voting and some even invalidated their votes when it became clear that their negative vote would tip the scales against Jaruzelski.¹⁷⁰ In a scene that looked very similar to a picture Davis described on the back of a matchbook, General Jaruzelski became President Jaruzelski by the smallest of margins, ending the presidential crisis.

In his memoirs, Bush describes the American role in Eastern Europe as that of a "responsible catalyst"; however, in July 1989 the United States was not a catalyst for accelerating change but pushed a cautious agenda to prop up the tottering Round Table agreements. Both Davis and the Bush delegation actively campaigned for Jaruzelski as president, in public and private, even providing a tactical roadmap on how to do the deed. Both of these moves grew out of the Bush administration's cautious policy toward Eastern Europe. Economically, this caution was grounded in a fear of deficit spending

¹⁶⁹ Cable from Amembassy Warsaw to SecState, "Jaruzelski meets with the Solidarity Caucus and now Will (#)," dated July 18, 1989, NSA, End of the Cold War, Poland 1989 Cables.

¹⁷⁰ Cable from Amembassy Warsaw to SecState, "Solidarity Describes how it Engineered the Election, Debates Whether to Form a Government," dated July 24, 1989, NSA, End of the Cold War, Poland 1989 cables.

and in the belief that economic change could be best implemented in Poland by promoting the private sector, not providing a massive economic aid package as liberal Democratic presidents had done after World War II. It would have been completely inconsistent for a Republican president who had worked with Ronald Reagan for eight years to drastically cut the size of the U.S. government and infuse the economy with more market forces, to then propose a massive government program to bail out a centralized economy.

Politically, Bush and his foreign policy team were afraid that strong involvement in Eastern Europe or rapid changes there could provoke a hard-line response from within the Communist system. In a sign of their distrust of Gorbachev, Washington was particularly afraid of provoking the Soviet Union. From the beginning of 1989, "the question was not whether revolutionary upheaval was coming, but whether it would lead to catastrophe or liberation, and the answer hinged on Soviet attitudes."¹⁷¹ In the case of Poland, by July "the velocity and unpredictability of the Polish transformation was making Bush uneasy."¹⁷² White House attitudes were clearly influenced by failures of American policy in 1953, 1956, 1968, and 1981 to protect revolutionaries once they overstepped the boundaries imposed by Communist authorities. The White House "wanted to facilitate further democratic change without inadvertently provoking a backlash. Another failed revolution could have set the clock back a decade in Eastern Europe and derailed Soviet reform."¹⁷³ Bush believed "we should support freedom and democracy, but we had to do so in a way that would not make us appear to be gloating over Gorbachev's political problems. . . . Hot rhetoric would needlessly antagonize the

¹⁷¹ Hutchings, *American Diplomacy*, 8.

¹⁷² Beschloss and Talbott, *Highest Level*, 87.

¹⁷³ Hutchings, *American Diplomacy*, 54.

militant elements within the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact."¹⁷⁴

So, instead of pushing for greater or quicker change, the Bush administration moved warily. Washington chose voices of moderation over fiery rhetoric and backed a Jaruzelski presidency as the best guarantor of continued evolutionary change.¹⁷⁵ They wanted the Round Table process to go forward and for change to continue, but at an evolutionary rather than revolutionary pace. Poland had already moved further than anyone had predicted at the start of 1989, and the Bush administration did not want to threaten that progress. So, they pursued a non-threatening policy and could then sit back and watch. As Scowcroft recalls, "We followed closely but quietly, we could accomplish more by saying less."¹⁷⁶ The White House "did not know how much change Gorbachev would allow . . . , and [Bush] saw the Eastern Europeans themselves would try to push matters as far as they could."¹⁷⁷

Search for a Western Response

As part of their cautious approach, the American government did, however, work to coordinate a larger Western response to events in Eastern Europe. During his Warsaw visit, Bush announced in his National Assembly speech that at the upcoming summit meeting of the Group of Seven Industrialized Nations (G7), scheduled for July 14-16 in Paris, the United States would seek a concerted action "to support economic reforms

¹⁷⁴ Bush and Scowcroft, *World Transformed*, 115.

¹⁷⁵ It should be noted that the decision to support Jaruzelski as president was in line with the more moderate voices, particularly Wałęsa, within Solidarność. The U.S. did not force this decision on the opposition. However, as an interesting counterfactual, more radical voices within Solidarność which were pushing for a quicker grab for power might have been able to parlay American support for such a move into action.

¹⁷⁶ Bush and Scowcroft, *World Transformed*, 135.

¹⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, 130.

based on political pluralism in Poland and Hungary."¹⁷⁸ As Hutchings explained, "Our view from the beginning was that the West Europeans should assume the principle financial assistance burden. . . . Beyond these lofty considerations was the more prosaic fact that we were unwilling to come up with significant U.S. financial assistance."¹⁷⁹

The effort to create this coordinated response began in April through NATO. At an April 13 NAC meeting on Poland, Simons presented a report on America's evolving policy toward Eastern Europe and Poland and called on the other member nations "to use prospects for increasing economic ties, where feasible and politically appropriate, as incentives for steps toward meaningful economic reform, which to be effective would have to be accompanied by political reform and greater practical respect for human rights."¹⁸⁰ Most member nations expressed agreement with Simons' presentation and steps being planned by Washington (as announced at Hamtramck); however, the United Kingdom, Canada, and Belgium "sounded cautious notes" and pushed for a "go slow" approach.¹⁸¹ As political events progressed in Poland, Washington kept a close eye on discussions within NATO countries about appropriate responses, but received few signs from their allies that they were pursuing policy initiatives more substantial than debt rescheduling.¹⁸²

¹⁷⁸ Briefing Memorandum, "Intensified Concerted Western Action for Poland and Hungary," c. July 1, 1989, NSA, End of the Cold War, scanned incoming FOIA documents. The G7 included the United States, United Kingdom, West Germany, France, Italy, Canada, and Japan.

¹⁷⁹ Hutchings, *American Diplomacy*, 69.

¹⁸⁰ Cable from USMission NATO to SecState, "Presentation by DAS Simons at April 13 NAC on Poland," dated April 14, 1989, NSA, End of the Cold War, Poland 1989 Cables.

¹⁸¹ Cable from USMission NATO to SecState, "NAC Discussion of Responses to Poland," dated April 14, 1989, NSA, End of the Cold War, Poland 1989 Cables.

¹⁸² For examples of this reporting see: Cable from Amembassy Rome to SecState, "Western Response to Polish Reforms - Continued Consultations," dated June 1, 1989; Cable from Amembassy Bonn to SecState, "Western Response to Polish Reforms - Consultations with the FRG," dated June 2, 1989; Cable from Amembassy Vienna to SecState, "Western Response to Polish Reforms - Austria," dated June 5, 1989; and Cable from Amembassy Tokyo to SecState, "Western Response to Polish Reforms - Continued Consultations Japan," dated June 5, 1989; all in NSA, End of the Cold War, Poland 1989 cables.

As the G7 approached this meeting became the obvious point to reinvigorate the Western response. However, even in this high-level meeting with Bush advocating a strong position, no major aid or investment projects were launched, and no new amounts of money were pledged. The G7 simply "welcomed the process of reform underway in Poland and Hungary," announced that they were "in favor of an early conclusion of negotiations between the IMF and Poland," and announced that they were "ready to support in the Paris Club the rescheduling of Polish debt expeditiously and in a flexible and forthcoming manner."¹⁸³ In response the IMF sent a study team to Poland in August, and the Paris Club called for meetings on Polish debt in September or October. As Hutchings later lamented, "the paucity of the U.S. assistance package weakened the symbolic effect we hoped to achieve . . . and set the wrong example for our G7 partners."¹⁸⁴ Because Washington had not led by example prior to July 1989 by taking bold economic initiatives, it was very difficult to go to their European allies plus Japan and expect them to take on large-scale burdens.

The most important step taken by the G7 was to call on the Commission of the European Communities to take the necessary initiatives to aid Poland and Hungary, with a particular emphasis on quickly needed food aid. International assistance and investment to Poland and Hungary now ran through the EEC. The EEC jumped into their new role, meeting a few times in July to get a handle on the economic concerns in Poland. The first complete meeting took place on August 1, with the EEC quickly agreeing to send

¹⁸³ "Declaration on East-West Relations," dated July 15, 1989, available via the University of Toronto G-8 Information Center website: <http://www.g8.utoronto.ca/summit/1989paris/east.html>.

¹⁸⁴ Hutchings, *American Diplomacy*, 63. For the meeting at which Deputy Assistant Secretary Curtis Kamman (who replaced Simons in June) explained the results of the G7 summit to Kinast, see: Cable from SecState to Amembassy Warsaw, "Briefing the Polish Ambassador on Results of the Paris Summit," dated July 25, 1989, NSA, End of the Cold War, Poland 1989 Cables.

200,000 tons of wheat, 100,000 tons of barley, and 10,000 tons of beef beginning September 1.¹⁸⁵ The EEC also quickly began negotiations to sign a counterpart fund agreement to use sales of the food aid to reinvest in the Polish economy, and to sign an agreement to lift quantitative restrictions on imports of industrial goods from Poland.¹⁸⁶ None of this amounted to a Marshall Plan for Poland, but in conjunction with Paris Club and IMF negotiations Poland was finally beginning to see a strong Western economic and aid response based in Western Europe rather than the United States.

"Your President, Our Prime Minister"

In Warsaw, while a small portion of the government focused on new agreements with Western Europe, the major political question yet to be answered after Jaruzelski's election was: who would form a government? The idea of an opposition government was already being publicly discussed following Michnik's July 3 editorial, "Your President, Our Prime Minister." During Bush's visit the idea was not much discussed, but a day after Jaruzelski's election as president Michnik and Kuron made a second plea to the opposition delegates to the Sejm to push for a Solidarność-led government. Kuron's drive was, in part, informed by reforms within the Soviet Union and the need to pre-empt the possibility of a social crisis in Poland, which would in turn imperil changes in the Soviet Union.¹⁸⁷ The new push was also influenced by changing power dynamics within the government coalition. As Andrzej Stelmachowski, a leader of the opposition's newly

¹⁸⁵ Cable from Amembassy Brussels to SecState, "EC Food Aid Program for Poland," dated August 10, 1989, NSA, End of the Cold War, Poland 1989 Cables.

¹⁸⁶ Cable from Amembassy Brussels to SecState, "EC-Poland Trade and Cooperation Agreement Signed," dated August 8, 1989, NSA, End of the Cold War, Poland 1989 Cables.

¹⁸⁷ Cable from Amembassy Warsaw to SecState, "Kuron Argues for a Solidarity Government," dated July 25, 1989, NSA, End of the Cold War, Poland 1989 Cables.

formed leadership body in the Senate, informed the American embassy: "the idea of a Solidarity government had been 'greatly strengthened' by the election of Jaruzelski because the election revealed that the so-called ruling coalition was a thing of the past." In particular, the opposition saw a "strong movement" in the ZSL and a weaker one in the SD to formally break with the PZPR.¹⁸⁸

The PZPR, however, had not given up hope to form their own government. Specifically, they hoped to create a "grand coalition" government led by the PZPR, including their coalition partners and some Solidarność politicians holding ministerial positions. On July 25, Wałęsa met with Jaruzelski to talk over the possibilities for forming a government, both a coalition government and a Solidarność government. Following the meeting, however, Wałęsa rejected the idea of Solidarność joining a grand coalition, and opted instead to create a Solidarność "shadow government" to prepare for "solutions which sooner or later will become unavoidable."¹⁸⁹ Jaruzelski also stuck to his convictions and, in his constitutional role as president, nominated Kiszczak as prime minister on July 31.¹⁹⁰ On August 2, Kiszczak managed to hold together his rapidly dissolving coalition and was elected prime minister and given the duty of forming a government.¹⁹¹

As Kiszczak worked to form a government, public concern over the country's future hit a new high. On August 1, the (still) PZPR-led government with Rakowski as prime minister implemented an earlier decision to introduce market pricing, "opening the

¹⁸⁸ "Solidarity Describes how it Engineered the Election, Debates Whether to Form Government."

¹⁸⁹ Cable from Amembassy Warsaw to SecState, "Solidarity Declines a Role in the Grand Coalition," dated July 27, 1989, NSA, End of the Cold War, Poland 1989 Cables.

¹⁹⁰ Cable from Amembassy Warsaw to SecState, "Interior Minister Kiszczak proposed as Prime Minister," dated August 1, 1989, NSA, End of the Cold War, Poland 1989 Cables.

¹⁹¹ Cable from Amembassy Warsaw to SecState, "Sejm Elects Kiszczak Prime Minister despite Defectors," dated August 2, 1989, End of the Cold War, Poland. 1989 Cables.

door to a rapid increase in inflation and giving rise to numerous outbursts of protest and the threat of a general strike."¹⁹² Strikes quickly spread across the country with workers in a number of factories, railway men, and transportation workers on strike to call for higher wages to offset the price increases.¹⁹³ In this tense social atmosphere, Solidarność did not acquiesce to calls to create a grand coalition. Instead Wałęsa and other advisors spoke publicly about forming their own government, stymieing Kiszczak's efforts to form a government. Wałęsa also quietly instructed Solidarność activists Lech and Jarosław Kaczyński to begin secret negotiations with the ZSL and SD about possibilities for a Solidarność-led coalition.¹⁹⁴

In this tense atmosphere, Kiszczak sought the counsel of the American government, and met with Davis on August 11. Kiszczak's focused his comments on dire predictions for Poland if Solidarność formed its own government, noting that one hundred senior military and interior ministry officials were meeting regularly to discuss the future. He also emphasized the threat of social conflict erupting on the streets as strike actions intensified, as well as growing signs that the Czechoslovakia, East Germany, and Soviet communist leaders were "very concerned with the course of events." Kiszczak ended his comments to Davis by explaining "the opinion in Poland is widespread, almost universal, that the opposition receives its principle support and financing and its orders from the West." Kiszczak was clearly trying to convince the embassy to use its influence to restrain the opposition and pressure it to stick to the Round Table talks, which had presumed a PZPR-led government. Bush had been instrumental in getting Jaruzelski

¹⁹² Paczkowski, *Spring*, 508.

¹⁹³ Cable from Amembassy Warsaw to SecState, "Strike Update August 3 and 4," dated August 4, 1989 and Cable from Amembassy Warsaw to SecState, "Strike Synopsis August 7," dated August 8, 1989; both in NSA, *End of the Cold War, Poland 1989 Cables*.

¹⁹⁴ Dudek, *Reglamentowana Rewolucja*, 376-377.

elected, now Kiszczak was looking for American support for his candidacy. Rebuffing Kiszczak's overture, Davis responded

that no one in the U.S. government was advising the opposition on its tactics, or as far as [he] was aware, had known in advance of the latest position Wałęsa had adopted. . . . [The United States] regarded the composition of the new government as a purely internal matter to be determined among Poles.

As Davis reported back to Washington, a U.S. effort "to restrain the opposition's thrust for power . . . is probably beyond our capacity now even if we chose to try."¹⁹⁵ Three days later Kiszczak officially stepped down as prime minister, leaving the door open for Solidarność to establish its own government.

As the opposition solidified the Solidarność-ZSL-SD coalition, a major issue of public and private concern became determining whether the Soviet Union and Gorbachev would allow such a move. Jaruzelski, himself, "was prepared to accept [a Solidarność-led government] only if communists were also included in the government. This would result in a grand coalition . . . , except that the center of gravity would be quite different—the core of the government would be formed not by the PZPR but by Solidarity."¹⁹⁶ Nevertheless, Kiszczak's warnings of contrary opinions in the Warsaw Pact were not patently false, but represented genuine fears within the government and the opposition. But strong indications were coming from Moscow that the Kremlin would allow a Solidarność government. On July 3 the editors of *Gazeta Wyborcza* asked Vadim Zagladin, Gorbachev's foreign policy advisor, if the Soviet Union would permit an opposition government and received the answer, "Decisions on that matter are an internal concern of our friends. We will maintain relations with every group [*wybranym*] in the

¹⁹⁵ Cable from Amembassy Warsaw to SecState, "Conversation with General Kiszczak," dated August 11, 1989, NSA, End of the Cold War, Poland 1989 Cables.

¹⁹⁶ Paczkowski, *Spring*, 508.

Polish government."¹⁹⁷ On July 11, Roman Malinowski, the leader of the ZSL, spoke with the Soviet ambassador to Poland, Vladimir Brovikov, about a Solidarność-ZSL-SD coalition and did not receive any warnings against the idea.¹⁹⁸ On August 16, Davis received analysis from the American embassy in Moscow that

the Soviets will acquiesce to a Soviet-led government. . . . What the Soviets want most is to promote in Poland is stability, and what they most want to avoid is an anti-Soviet outburst of emotion. If Solidarity can deliver on these issues, the Soviets under Gorbachev will adapt, albeit perhaps with reluctance, to the new order.¹⁹⁹

Soviet opinions on the matter were sealed on August 22, when Gorbachev called Rakowski (who became the head of the PZPR after Jaruzelski assumed the presidency) to convince him to acquiesce to the new situation.²⁰⁰ The exact Soviet and Warsaw Pact reaction could not be fully fleshed out, but by the third week of August it appeared that all remaining obstacles to a Solidarity-led government had been cleared.

On August 24, the Sejm voted to elect Wałęsa's choice, Tadeusz Mazowiecki, as the next prime minister, with 378 voting in favor, 4 against, and 41 abstentions (meaning that parliamentarians from the PZPR, SD, and ZSL voted in favor). Three weeks later the Sejm overwhelmingly accepted Mazowiecki's choice of government ministers. The final composition of the government reflected a push to create a ruling coalition with Solidarity at the core, but included PZPR members in the power ministries. Twelve of

¹⁹⁷ Dudek, *Reglamentowana Rewolucja*, 352.

¹⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, 384.

¹⁹⁹ Cable from Amembassy Moscow to SecState, "If Solidarity takes Charge, What will the Soviets Do?" dated August 16, 1989, NSA, End of the Cold War, Poland 1989 Cables. This cable, however, did not address the issue of how this move would affect Gorbachev's position in Moscow. Davis was actually most worried about a change in power in the Kremlin. As he recalls, "There was always the question of whether Gorbachev would be overthrown by the military or over-ruled by the military. In my mind, maybe I was dwelling on it too much. For me I always wondered what the Soviet military would think of giving up the jewel of the satellites, undermining their access to East Germany and so on. They didn't react at all, the way it worked out. They reacted much later, but were in no position to do anything anyway." (Interview with Davis, November 23, 1999)

²⁰⁰ Paczkowski, *Spring*, 509. See also, Dudek, *Reglamentowana Rewolucja*, 398.

twenty-four cabinet members were linked with the opposition, one minister had no party affiliation, four each belonged to the PZPR and ZSL, and three were given to the SD. Each major party received a spot as deputy prime minister. In a nod to Solidarność's long-held conviction not to question Poland's membership in the Warsaw Pact and in a clear attempt to calm more hard-line members of the security services, Kiszczak maintained his position as minister of internal affairs and General Florian Siwicki remained minister of defense.²⁰¹ The opposition was prudent enough not to attempt a clean sweep of the Polish government. Nonetheless, Mazowiecki now sat at the head of a democratically elected and representative government.

* * *

In February 1988, no one predicted that within twenty months Solidarność members would be elected to the Sejm, let alone that they would have formed their own ruling coalition to create a Solidarność-led government, supplanting the PZPR. Poland's political transformation had stagnated from 1982 through 1986 and then moved forward only slowly through Spring 1988. From 1988 onward transformation progressively accelerated, hastened by strikes rooted in Poland's underlying economic crisis. Once PZPR and Solidarność leaders began negotiating directly in the fall of 1988 a certain amount of political change became inevitable. Moreover, once possibilities for political change appeared, constantly shifting internal dynamics allowed Solidarność to take bolder and bolder stabs at power. At the heart of this rapid transformation was, as Davis predicted in April 1989, a miscalculation by the regime: "the sin of many crumbling

²⁰¹ Paczkowski, *Spring*, 509.

power elites [of] seriously underestimating the strength and depth of the opposition."²⁰² Conversely, Wałęsa and Solidarność showed considerable depth, analytical prowess, and creativity to navigate successfully the changing political waters and constantly make prudent decisions to come out on top.²⁰³ This creativity was, perhaps, most signified by the decision to create a coalition with the SD and ZSL to finally yank the reigns of power from the dissolving PZPR. Notably, this was a purely Polish move. As Davis recalls,

What I didn't predict, what I couldn't predict was that the two satellite parties would be willing to break away and form a government with Solidarity. . . . I may have been misled to some degree even by some of my Solidarity friends. It was an item of doctrine with them that these were contemptible satellites that had no independent views of any kind and should never be treated as anything separate from the party itself. That was the general view that prevailed for many, many years. And it misled us in the end, because they turned out to have their own interests. Wałesa and some of his people saw this and knew how to exploit it. . . . It was a brilliant political maneuver by Wałesa.²⁰⁴

The Poles themselves deserved credit for taking the chances and making the choices to transform their nation.

For the Americans, of course, this was cause to celebrate. For over forty years, U.S. policy was aimed at returning democracy to Eastern Europe. While repressive and unrepresentative regimes still existed in nearly all other countries behind the Iron Curtain (Hungary was the exception), Poles had stepped beyond a threshold into a new era of their history. This was a truly historic event, for which the Americans could claim some credit. As Bush wrote to Davis and his staff:

At this historic moment in the history of the postwar period, I wish to offer you my gratitude for the job that you and your staff have done as our

²⁰² "Election '89 - The Year of Solidarity."

²⁰³ Castle's analysis in *Triggering Communism's Collapse* focuses on these constantly changing political dynamics. For her conclusions see the final chapter, "Changing Power," 217-230.

²⁰⁴ Interview with Davis, November 23, 1999.

diplomatic representatives to Poland.

You have served your country with great honor and distinction during a period of transition that will be long remembered. On behalf of the American people I thank you all for your accomplishments to date, and wish you the best in meeting the challenges that lie ahead.²⁰⁵

The euphoria of the moment, however, was perhaps better summed up by a more tongue-and-cheek message from Davis's colleagues in Foggy Bottom:

Department notes with satisfaction the essential fulfillment of the political tasks in your letter of instructions.

Your next task is to promote and ensure the realization of economic prosperity in Poland, to include stable growth, full employment, low inflation, high productivity, and a Mercedes (or equivalent) in every garage.

Best wishes for continued success.²⁰⁶

Over the previous eight years, policy makers in Washington and the American embassy in Warsaw, mostly under the tutelage of John Davis, had helped promote Poland's transformation from a repressive totalitarian regime, which could only control its population by declaring martial law, into a fledging democracy complete with competing political blocks. Economic reform, restructuring, and prosperity now offered their own list of daunting challenges, but Poland had essentially completed its transformation to a functioning democracy. The Poles had ushered in a new era in their own history and in the history of Eastern Europe.

²⁰⁵ Cable from SecState to Amembassy Warsaw, "Message to Ambassador Davis and Staff from the President," dated August 26, 1989, NSA, End of the Cold War, Poland 1989 Cables.

²⁰⁶ Cable from SecState to Amembassy Warsaw, "Ambassador's Instructions," dated August 24, 1989, NSA, End of the Cold War, Poland 1989 Cables.

"We did not envision ourselves as moving into a country and overthrowing the government on behalf of the people. No, this thing had to be internal people themselves. . . We could just try to be helpful." —Ronald Reagan

"A successful democratic transformation in Central and Eastern Europe was the highest priority for U.S. foreign policy makers, yet these were events effectively beyond our ability to influence, except indirectly. In this sense, the U.S. role, like the Germans and Western allies collectively, was marginal." —Robert Hutchings

Conclusion:

The Question of American Leadership

The creation of the Solidarność-led Mazowiecki government in September 1989 fulfilled a forty-year-old goal of restoring democracy to Poland.¹ An independent, non-Communist government had taken power for the first time since World War II. The Polish opposition's victory in the elections had not been a clean sweep—Jaruzelski remained in the new office of president and PZPR members continued to hold positions in the power ministries—but this new government was quantitatively and qualitatively more representative and more democratic than it had been since the creation of the People's Republic of Poland. Building on years of underground activity and tough compromises before and during the Round Table process, the Polish opposition led by Solidarność, had won a landslide victory in semi-free elections in June 1989. This

¹ The epigraph from Reagan comes from Carl Bernstein and Marcus Politi, *His Holiness: John Paul II and the Hidden History of Our Time* (New York: Doubleday, 1996), 263. The epigraph from Hutchings comes from his *American Diplomacy and the End of the Cold War: An Insider's Account of U.S. Policy in Europe, 1989-1992* (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1997), 51-52.

victory, in turn, provided Lech Wałęsa an opportunity to forge a Parliamentary majority for the opposition by separating two smaller Communist coalition parties from their longtime, subordinate relationship with the PZPR. With that brilliant political move, Wałęsa and Solidarność brought true political power to the democratic opposition, leading the country beyond a threshold into new territory. The symbols and military realities of the Cold War had yet to be reorganized, but Eastern Europe's political landscape was permanently transformed.

While this was undoubtedly a beneficial development for the United States vis-a-vis the Soviet Union or, more broadly, democratic capitalism versus communism, conservative and neo-conservative commentators and scholars have been quick to assign credit to the Reagan administration's tough policies and hardball tactics for this win. This triumphalist argument has substantially and significantly shaped public perceptions and conventional wisdom on Reagan-era foreign policy, as evidenced by the adulatory coverage following Reagan's death in 2004. More relevant to the subject at hand, perceptions about America's central role in bringing democracy to Poland serve an important function within the triumphalist argument. As the influential scholar John Lewis Gaddis argues in his best-selling book, *The Cold War: A History*, "promoting democracy became the most visible way that the Americans and their West European allies could differentiate themselves" from their opponents, and was therefore a central and effective part of policy that led to the Cold War ending with the United States emerging as the only remaining superpower.²

The information, documentation, anecdotes, interviews, and arguments presented over the previous six chapters, however, do not yield such a clear-cut picture of American

² John Lewis Gaddis, *The Cold War* (London: Penguin, 2006): 225.

influence in Poland. Viewing American actions during the 1980s through Polish eyes—of both the government and the opposition—and combining those sources with evidence from non-governmental actors as well as newly available sources from U.S. government repositories provides a much more complex picture of both the triumphs and defeats sustained by American foreign policy. A close inspection provides very few examples of direct, causal links between American policies and shifts in Poland. Generally, Washington had little control over or impact on moves being made on the ground in Warsaw. Of course this does not mean that the United States played no role whatsoever in Poland's transformation. Instead, taking a final accounting of American policy is a matter of teasing out the specific, limited instances and forms in which American power affected Poland's development.

Political Influence

In one focus of the relationship, Washington attempted to influence government-to-government relations with Poland's Communist leadership through economic and political sanctions. This included decisions announced on December 23, 1981, following the declaration of martial law (restrictions on fishing rights, suspension of all LOT flights, discontinuance of credits for government loans, increased trade restrictions on high technology items, and the suspension of agricultural aid), as well as sanctions imposed over the course of 1982 (exercising veto power over IMF membership, suspending MFN trade status, allowing scientific exchange agreements to lapse, and blocking agreements to reschedule Poland's international loan agreements through the Paris Club). With the sanctions came a list of political demands: an end to martial law,

the release of all political prisoners, and the resumption of a dialogue with the “true representatives” of the Polish people (although the exact formulation of this third demand shifted over time it generally referred to the Church and representatives from the domestic opposition, i.e. Wałęsa and Solidarność).

In the first three years after the declaration of martial law, these sanctions and political demands had little effect on PZPR actions. In response to the Reagan administration’s policies, Jaruzelski and the Polish government strengthened political and economic ties with the Soviet bloc, weakening American economic leverage in the area. The PZPR also did all it could to stymie and restrict political relations, constantly berating American representatives in Warsaw for interfering in internal Polish affairs and intensifying efforts to harass and limit the American embassy’s activities in Warsaw. This included launching an extensive and incessant propaganda campaign against American economic sanctions and political interference. As the most public signs of discord, the effort to limit Polish-American relations at all costs led to three crises in which diplomatic personnel were declared *persona non grata*: in May 1982 and again in February and May 1985. In addition, utilizing one of their few levers for reverse pressure, the MSZ refused to grant agrément to Jack Scanlan to become ambassador, leaving both countries without full representation in their respective capitals after Romoald Spasowski defected in December 1981 and Francis Meehan left his post in February 1983. The PZPR’s final rejection of Scanlan came in January 1985 after more than two years of American lobbying and despite clear statements that refusal to accept Scanlan would lead the United States to “draw our own conclusions. We would then have no choice but to

establish relations at the Chargé level for the foreseeable future."³ In the years directly after the declaration of martial law, the PZPR knowingly and willingly did everything in their power to torpedo bilateral U.S.-Polish ties.

The intensity and longevity of Poland's attempts to sabotage relations with the United States was not a purely rational response. It would have been inconceivable for the United States to give in to Poland's feeble attempts at reverse pressure. As the Americans made clear a few times, if the Poles wanted to "take relations to zero," Washington was more than happy to oblige them.⁴ Simply the United States did not need Poland as much as Poland needed the United States and the West, and the Americans knew this. In looking for ways to comprehend Polish actions, it is more revealing to view Polish actions as an emotional response to American sanctions. Jaruzelski and the PZPR did not expect Reagan to impose strong sanctions after martial law, creating a deep sense of distrust in bilateral relations. The emotional response to this break in trust, expressed as anger, comes out most clearly in Jaruzelski's interactions with American congressmen and diplomats. This anger also came across in repeated confrontations between American and Polish diplomats over RFE and VOA broadcasts, particularly anything that referenced Jaruzelski in a negative light. The PZPR revealed its distrust in Washington by taking irrational steps to sabotage relations and to harm the United States by any diplomatic means possible. In response, Washington displayed its own distrust of Jaruzelski and the PZPR by following a very reserved and cautious policy, well into the second half of the decade.

³ Letter from John Davis to Stefan Olszowski with attached note, dated December 19, 1984, MSZ, 2/89, W-6, Dep III (1985), AP 10-5-85. For more general information on the Scanlan controversy see informal notes and brief records in MSZ, 2/89, W-6, Dep III (1985), AP 10-5-85.

⁴ This response was most eloquently expressed by Christopher Hill, but comes across in various American decisions and documents. Author's interview with Christopher Hill, May 12, 2004.

Against the backdrop of this emotional response and the corresponding decline in U.S.-Polish relations, the PZPR's limited steps to liberalize come into focus as responses to domestic, rather than Western or American pressures. Wałęsa was released in November 1982 following a series of meetings between Glemp and Jaruzelski.⁵ A very limited contingent of comparatively unthreatening political prisoners was released in December 1982 at the same time that the PZPR took the symbolic step of suspending martial law in order to focus on Poland's economic problems. The decision to allow Pope John Paul II to make a pilgrimage in June 1983 was only taken after lengthy negotiations with Vatican and Warsaw representatives confirming that the Pope would moderate his political messages, acting in an intermediary role between the people and the government which the Catholic church had played since the beginning of the Polish crisis in August 1980.⁶ Finally, the decision to lift martial law and declare a limited amnesty for political prisoners on July 22, 1983, was made after legal changes institutionalized many of the government's new powers and because the PZPR needed to further normalize the economy which had been severely burdened under the restrictions of martial law. For this period of a little more than three years, from December 1981 to early 1985, scant concrete evidence has surfaced to indicate connections between American pressure

⁵ For correspondence between Glemp and Jaruzelski see records for the June 29, 1982, Politburo meeting in: AAN, Sygn. 1833, Mikr. 3002, 1-16. For information on internal decision making see Mieczysław Rakowski, *Dzienniki Polityczne 1981-1983* (Warsaw: Wydawnictwo ISKRY, 2004), 362. For the final decision see Protokół nr. 56 z posiedzenia Biura Politycznego KC PZPR w dniu 18.xi.1982 [Protocol no. 56 from the proceedings of the PZPR Central Committee Politburo on 18.11.1982], dated November 18, 1982, AAN, KC PZPR, V/182, 217-252.

⁶ See Report, Wytoczne Polityki Wyznaniowej [Current Vatican Policy], dated February 4, 1983, AAN, KC PZPR, V/191, 11-16; Węzłowe Zadania Polityki Zagranicznej PRL w 1983 r. [Vital PRL Foreign Policy Tasks for 1983], dated c. January 1983, AAN, KC PZPR, V/190, 8-27, esp. 17; Untitled report [re Ikonowicz's visit to the Vatican], dated April 1983, AAN, XIA/1417, Korespondencja z członkami BP i Sekretarzami KC PZPR [Correspondence with Politburo Members and PZPR Central Committee Secretaries], 1983, 1-15; Report on the internal situation, Wydział Informacyjna KC PZPR, dated May 23, 1983, AAN, KC PZPR, V/198, 207-221; as well as published accounts John Kifner, "Free Prisoners, Pope asks Poland," *New York Times* (April 30, 1983): A4; and Rakowski, *Dzienniki 1981-1983*, 460, 494.

politics and significant Polish moves towards political or economic liberalization. A more accurate picture shows that the PZPR used every small piece of leverage it had against the United States to sabotage American influence in their country and pursued liberalization despite American policies.

Notwithstanding the strained political relationship between the PZPR and the White House, the American government did have limited success in leveraging economic sanctions for the release of a specific group of political prisoners. In May 1983, the National Security Council agreed to pursue a policy which embraced a step-by-step approach to relations, meaning that sanctions were no longer an all-or-nothing process.⁷ The first outward signs of this policy appeared in the summer of 1983 when the United States agreed "in principle" to allow the Polish government to begin negotiations with the Paris Club.⁸ In December 1983, the White House also agreed to lift some restrictions on fishing rights.⁹

The step-by-step approach won its greatest victory in 1984 when Davis and Eagleburger negotiated with Adam Schaff for the release of eleven high-profile political prisoners in return for removing sanctions.¹⁰ Four of the eleven political prisoners were

⁷ On May 13, President Reagan signed an NSPG titled, "Next Steps on Poland." The text of all of the memoranda mentioned in this paragraph remains classified. The information here is gleaned from withdrawal sheets from Paula Dobriansky's files at the Reagan Library. See the withdrawal sheets for January to May 1983 in RRPL, Paula Dobriansky Files, Box 90892, Poland Memoranda 1981-1983.

⁸ Briefing Memorandum, "Western Policy Towards Poland," dated August 10, 1983, NSA, End of the Cold War, Box 1, September 6-9, 1983: Shultz's Trip to Madrid.

⁹ Notatka Informacyjna z rozmowy z dyrektorem Biura d/s Europy Wschodniej w Departmencie Stanu Richardem Combs'em, w dniu 14.10.br. [Information Note from a conversation with the director of the East European Bureau at the Department of State, Richard Combs, on 14.10], dated October 19, 1983, MSZ, 48/86, W-1, Dep III (1983), AP 220-10-83; and Notatka Informacyjna z rozmowy z Charge d'Affaires a.i. USA - Johnem Davisem w dniu 31.x.1983 [Information Note from a conversation with U.S. charge d'affaires a.i. John Davis on 31.10.1983], dated October 31, 1983, MSZ, 48/86, W-2, Dep III (1983), AP 36-1-83 and AP 22-1-83.

¹⁰ Memorandum from Paula Dobriansky to Robert McFarlane, "Poland: Response to Unofficial Emissary Schaff," dated February 9, 1984, PPRL, NSC, European and Soviet Affairs Directorate, Box 91186, Vatican; and Memorandum from Robert McFarlane to the President, "Poland: Response to Unofficial

set to go on trial in the summer of 1984, but all eleven were released after only one day of one trial as part of another larger political amnesty announced on July 22, 1984. In return, as agreed, the Americans allowed LOT to resume regularly scheduled flights to the United States and announced that scientific-technical exchanges through the Marie Skłodowska-Curie Foundation would be allowed to restart.¹¹ Following this deal, however, Polish-American relations reverted to their very contentious foundation after the PZPR began a concerted campaign to re-intern political prisoners in 1985.

American government policy also directly influenced Polish government policy in the midst of the continual crises of 1989, although in an unexpected way. President Bush's decision to pursue a cautious and prudent policy on his trip in July 1989 by publicly and privately displaying support for Jaruzelski helped push the general to run for the presidency. Jaruzelski was also influenced by Gorbachev to restart his drive for election, but in contemporaneous accounts Bush's support appears to have been crucial in providing Jaruzelski with renewed confidence.

As Department of State and others within the Reagan administration knew from the beginning of martial law, America and the West's greatest point of leverage remained Poland's monumental debt to the Paris Club—\$26 billion in December 1981 which grew to \$38 billion by 1989—and their need for a new influx of Western currency to get the

Emissary Schaff," dated February 16, 1984, PPRL, NSC, European and Soviet Affairs Directorate, Box 91186, Vatican. See also Adam Schaff, *Notatki Kłopotnika* (Warsaw: Polska Oficyna Wydawnicza BGW, 1995). These eleven political prisoners included four activists linked to KOR (Jacek Kuron, Adam Michnik, Henryk Wujec, and Zbigniew Romaszewski) and seven activists linked to Solidarność (Andrzej Gwiazda, Seweryn Jaworski, Marian Jurczyk, Karol Modzielewski, Grzegorz Palce, Andrzej Rozpłochowski, and Jan Rulewski).

¹¹ Statement by Principal Deputy Press Secretary Speakes on United States Sanctions Against Poland, August 3, 1984, "Public Papers of the President (1984), available on the Reagan Library's website: www.reagan.utexas.edu.

Polish economy working.¹² As the PZPR sought to improve Poland's economy through internal reforms and increased cooperation with the Soviets and their Eastern European comrades in COMECON from December 1981 through the beginning of 1986,¹³ Jaruzelski and his leadership gradually came to accept that they could not extricate themselves from continuing stagnation without Western help. By 1986, the PZPR leadership understood that they could not get their economy working and begin servicing their immense foreign debt without increasing foreign exports to gain much-needed Western currency; however, to increase foreign exports the Poles needed to gain new Western credits to buy needed technology and raw materials in the West.¹⁴

To get out of this macro-economic Catch 22, the PZPR rewrote regulations regarding joint enterprises with Western investors. While Polish-American political and economic relations remained stagnant, the PZPR worked to reinvigorate relations with Japan and Western Europe, most notably Italy, West Germany, France, and the United Kingdom. This initiative included numerous lower-level visits by West European officials and culminated with Jaruzelski's meeting with French president Mitterand in

¹² For the initial Department of State documents discussing American leverage through Poland's loans, see: Action Memorandum from Robert Hormats and Lawrence Eagleburger to the Secretary, "Western Economic Leverage on Poland and Secure Phone Call to Regan," dated December 17, 1981, NSA, Soviet Flashpoints, Box 26, December 1-22, 1981.

¹³ For an example of this coordination see Informacja o spotkaniu konsultacyjnym Sekretarzy Komitetów Centralnym oraz Stałych Przedstawicieli krajów członkowskich RWPG w sprawie przygotowań do narady gospodarczej na najwyższym szczeblu [Information about the consultative meetings of the Secretaries of Central Committees as well as standing chairmen from member nations of COMECON on the matter of preparations for economic consultations at the highest level], dated March 30, 1983, AAN, KC PZPR, V/197, 249-253.

¹⁴ See: Weźlowe Zadania Polityki Zagranicznej PRL w 1986 r. [Vital PRL Foreign Policy Tasks for 1986], dated c. January 1986, AAN, KC PZPR, V/294, 9-31; Informacja o wspólnych przedsięwzięciach z udziałem kapitału obcego w krajach socjalistycznych [Information about cooperative ventures utilizing foreign capital in socialist countries], dated November 14, 1985, AAN, KC PZPR, V/292, 91-96; and Wydział Ekonomiczny Opinia dot.: projektu ustawy o spółkach z udziałem kapitału zagranicznego [Economic Department: Opinion about the legislation project for companies utilizing international capital], dated December 30, 1985, AAN, KC PZPR, V/292, 109-111.

December 1985, the general's first visit to a Western capital since the declaration of martial law.

Poland's hopes for economic gains became entwined with domestic political concerns in the first half of 1986. In early 1986, the PZPR again began to emit public hints that it was considering another amnesty for political prisoners, many of whom had been re-interned following the partial amnesties of 1983 and 1984. Through DCM Swartz, the Americans offered general statements in line with the standing step-by-step policy and suggested the possibility of ending sanctions if *all* political prisoners were released.¹⁵ More importantly, the EEC (led by Great Britain) sent a demarche explaining that if the expected amnesty was not complete and full Western European countries would summarily end all of the political and economic deals currently being negotiated. In effect, Poland would lose all of the gains it had made in the past eighteen months, returning to square one in its push to gain new Western credits.¹⁶ In the face of this united Western front, the PZPR acquiesced. Six weeks after a political amnesty was announced on July 22, 1986, the PZPR released all remaining political prisoners.

While the Polish record shows that this move was taken almost entirely in response to West European statements (Polish hopes for improved relations with Washington and the belief that their offer was genuine were tempered by five years of dismal relations), this amnesty was still a victory for long-term U.S. policy.¹⁷ From the beginning of martial law, the United States was a driving force behind Western sanctions

¹⁵ Notatka z rozmowy z radcą Ambasady USA w Warszawie Davidem Schwartzem [Note from a conversation with U.S. embassy counselor David Swartz], dated July 10, 1986, AAN, KC PZPR, XIA/1422, 292-293.

¹⁶ Notatka w sprawie implikacji naszej sytuacji wewnętrznej dla stosunków Polski z państwami Europy Zachodniej [Note concerning the implications of our internal situation for Polish relations with the nations of Western Europe], dated August 6, 1986, AAN, KC PZPR, V/314, 179-187.

¹⁷ Ibid.

against Poland. Although Washington had not been as successful at procuring as tough a response as hoped in NATO, the Reagan administration successfully limited Polish access to new Western credits. This vague but most substantive restriction pushed the PZPR to accept American and West European demands regarding changes in Poland's human rights policies, i.e. its treatment of the political opposition. Five years after the declaration of martial law, West European and American economic sanctions succeeded in getting the PZPR to bend to Western pressure. From this point forward, the opposition was accepted as a part of life in Poland, and opposition leaders were never again incarcerated. In turn, the reemergence of aboveground opposition structures reinvigorated Solidarność and allowed the opposition to seek greater accommodations with the PZPR, eventually leading to the Round Table agreements in February 1989. From Polish sources, however, it is clear that this was much more of a multilateral Allied victory, than a unilateral American triumph.

Because of the bi-polar framework of international politics during the 1980s, however, it is important to note the limited realm of possibilities for change that American policy *could* even provoke. Given the nature of military and political realities in Eastern Europe, the PZPR was beholden first and foremost to the Soviet Union. Whether one believes that the Soviet Union was willing to send troops into Poland if Jaruzelski's martial law plans failed or whether one believes that the Soviets had disavowed the Brezhnev Doctrine by 1981, it is undeniable that Jaruzelski was driven to declare martial law because of pressure emanating from the Kremlin. Under Brezhnev's leadership this pressure to confirm to Soviet dictates did not subside. With the death of Brezhnev, Jaruzelski found a much more willing partner for reform in Yuri Andropov.

As a reflection of Andropov's relative leniency, the PZPR pursued improved relations with the Catholic church and the Pope was allowed to make a pilgrimage during 1983, a decision that was constantly deferred while Brezhnev was still alive. This is not to say that Andropov was willing to liberalize Poland's political landscape or allow the Communist party to lose one-party control, but Andropov did understand better the individuality of each socialist country's development. This understanding and acceptance gave Jaruzelski increased room to maneuver vis-à-vis decisions that affected internal developments.

With Andropov's death in February 1984, however, General Secretary Chernenko pursued a much more controlling line. Using phrases couched in ideological meanings, Chernenko advocated stronger steps against the opposition and the Church, with a heavy reliance on ideological doctrine and much less room for Poland's "specificity." Second, Chernenko lectured the Poles on what policies they should implement. Andropov was much more willing to speak with Jaruzelski about their problems, and then following coordination, support the policies the Poles chose. With Chernenko's rise to party head Warsaw again found itself under demanding scrutiny from Moscow.

Following Gorbachev's rise to the general secretary's seat in 1985, all this shifted once again. As early as April 1985, Gorbachev gave subtle signs of his new approach to relations with the bloc. While continuing to emphasize the shared nature of class interests, he openly recognized each country's distinct social, economic, and political histories. Gorbachev went as far as stating that "every brotherly party alone determines

its policies and is responsible for them to their own nation."¹⁸ In the years following these initial statements, Gorbachev's fresh perspective blossomed into what became known as "new thinking" in which the Communist leaders in each bloc country was allowed to make their own domestic political decisions, with little interference from the Kremlin. Nowhere was this truer than in Poland, where Gorbachev and Jaruzelski fostered a close professional relationship, with Gorbachev supporting Jaruzelski's moves towards economic liberalization through the "second stage" of economic reform launched at the PZPR's Tenth Party Congress in June 1986, shortly after Gorbachev had announced his own policies of *perestroika* and *glasnost*. Through 1987, 1988, and 1989 this permissive relationship continued to expand, with Jaruzelski striking out on his own with increasingly radical moves and checking in with the Kremlin only to receive blessings to proceed. For Gorbachev, Poland even became a kind of laboratory to see how liberalization played out. In this way, Gorbachev's doctrine of new thinking in Poland was not so much pushing Poland toward transformation, but allowing Poland to follow its own course.

In the big picture, trends in Jaruzelski's meandering path vacillating between repression and liberalization from martial law to September 1986 were mirrored more closely by changes in the Soviet leadership than by shifts in American or Western policies. The PZPR Politburo made final decisions to lift and then suspend martial law only after Brezhnev died. In a striking coincidence, two days after Brezhnev died, Wałęsa was released from prison. This general trend toward liberalization continued through the middle of 1984, when Chernenko began pressuring Jaruzelski and his colleagues to slow

¹⁸ Notatka Informacyjna o Spotkaniu przywódców partii i państw-stron Układu Warszawskiego w Warszawie (26.04.1985 r.) [Information Note about the meeting of party and national leaders of the Warsaw Pact in Warsaw (26.4.1985)], dated April 29, 1985, AAN, KC PZPR, V/264, 11-20; quoted at 12.

the pace of change. Liberalization began anew again, only once Gorbachev came to power and gave Jaruzelski the room he needed to maneuver. Through the end of 1989, PZPR leaders continued to check in with Gorbachev and coordinate their reform and liberalization efforts. Thus, although the step-by-step policy won a few small victories and was responsible for the release of a handful of prominent political prisoners and Bush helped convince Jaruzelski to run for president, the causal relationship between American government policies and changes within Poland proves to be weak. The minor role played by the United States political and economic policies becomes even more apparent when compared with the overarching and predominant role played by the Soviet Union. Developments in Poland were far more closely tied to Soviet policies and developments than to American pressures or desires.

In an interesting corollary to this point, Soviet and American moves to pursue improved superpower relations following Gorbachev's assumption of power positively affected PZPR decision making. Specifically, the success of the Geneva summit in decreasing tensions in East-West relations drove the PZPR's decision to pursue improved economic and political relations with Western Europe. The emergence of a new period of superpower détente did not dictate moves within Poland, but it did lessen the international pressures felt by the PZPR. As with the Soviet-Polish relationship, the improved superpower dialogue and intensified arms negotiations provided Jaruzelski with more autonomy to maneuver. With Gorbachev pursuing a more flexible and cordial relationship with Western Europe, Jaruzelski and the MSZ could move more freely in their own relations with the West, in turn increasing Western Europe's economic and

political leverage which they exercised in summer and fall 1986 to gain the release of all remaining political prisoners.

Moral Leadership

Triumphalist accounts of the end of the Cold War also often include an argument regarding the Reagan administration's international moral leadership. In *Cold War: A History*, Gaddis focuses his last two chapters on three "actors" in the 1980s (Reagan, Gorbachev, and Pope John Paul II) and writes passionately about the rebirth of hope in the final decade of the Cold War. He argues implicitly that Reagan led this final transition to hope by returning to a kind of moral leadership which provoked others to act and react. In the case of Poland, however, it is not only incorrect but offensive to say that the American president led the way to this final transition. First and foremost, the events in Gdańsk in August 1980 which witnessed the creation of Solidarność and the rise of Wałęsa to the world stage predated Reagan's rise to international leadership. Moreover, events on the Baltic coast had nothing to do with the state of political life in the United States: Solidarność was an essentially spontaneous movement in which thousands and then millions of Polish workers decided to act out against decades of political repression and economic oppression. The roots of Solidarność are found more in domestic institutions like the Workers Defense Committee (KOR) and a history of strikes and riots, particularly events on the Baltic coast in 1970, than in any foreign pronouncement¹⁹

In addition, by the end of the 1970s the Polish opposition already had their moral leader: Pope John Paul II. Solidarność viewed their national Catholic Church and the

¹⁹ For an argument linking the progression of these strikes to the events of 1980-1981, see Andrzej Pączkowski, *Strajki, bunty, manifestacje jako "polska droga" przez socjalizm* (Poznań: Poznańskie Towarzystwo Przyjaciół Nauk, 2003).

Vatican as partners and guides in relations with the PZPR. Sitting at the top of this hierarchy was the former Cardinal from Kraków, Karol Wojtyła. The massive shows of public emotion during his pilgrimages in 1979, 1983, and 1987 attest to the Pope's role of providing moral guidance. Simply, Wałęsa signed the Gdańsk agreements using a novelty pen with a picture of Pope John Paul II in it, not Ronald Reagan. Chronologically and causally the concept of Ronald Reagan's moral leadership simply does not work for events within Poland.

In the period after December 1981 onward, when Reagan played a predominant role on the world stage, Poland did not look to the United States for heroes. This situation was, in fact, reversed, with American leaders looking to Solidarność and the wider opposition movement for its heroes. The Nobel Committee's decision to award the Peace Prize to Wałęsa in 1984 was just the most apparent example of this trend. In public statement after public statement, American leaders throughout the 1980s exhibited a reverence for Poland's suffering leaders and workers. The Reagan administration's heavy-handed but well meaning "Let Poland be Poland" public relations campaign made this clear: its purpose was not to provide American leadership in Poland, but to "to keep the media pot boiling," to express the outrage felt in the White House, to "create a great moral wave," and to keep international focus on abuses in Poland.²⁰

The view of Poland's opposition leaders as heroes and martyrs was best exemplified by American political visitors who made frequent pilgrimages of their own to Warsaw and Gdańsk beginning in 1986 and 1987. As Whitehead explained in 1987, he

²⁰ Memorandum of meeting, "U.S. Response to Polish Crisis," dated December 22, 1981, NSA, Soviet Flashpoints, Box 26, December 1-22, 1981.

wanted to meet with Wałęsa because he "admired him deeply."²¹ As the reporting cable stated, "Mr. Whitehead began the conversation by telling Wałęsa how honored he was to have the opportunity to meet him. Wałęsa is a famous man in American because people in the United States admire his courageous defense of his convictions."²² Similarly, Ted Kennedy came to Poland to award the Robert F. Kennedy Human Rights prize to Bujak, Michnik, and Father Jerzy Popiełuszko (posthumously). On the Gdańsk leg of his trip where he met with Wałęsa and attended a special mass, the senator invoked commended Solidarność for "fighting 'against tyranny, repression, and for human rights."²³ As Simons put it, "When John Davis threw one of his famous dinners, everybody was happy to be at it. [The opposition was] happy to eat well and drink well. We were happy to be with heroes."²⁴

More importantly, this reverence for the Polish opposition translated into a relationship in which the Americans looked to Solidarność for leadership and guidance about how to respond to shifts in PZPR's policy. In terms of relations with the opposition on the ground, Davis and his wife Helen became well known for holding informal monthly salon-like gatherings at the ambassador's residence beginning shortly after their arrival in fall 1983. The list of invitees included writers, artists, and opposition members once they were out of jail, as well as academics and journalists. The purpose of these meetings was not to explain to the opposition what they should do, but rather to give the opposition an opportunity to meet and discuss among themselves, simply in the presence of Davis and embassy officials. The Americans observed the conversations but did not

²¹ Whitehead, *Life in Leadership*, 166.

²² Ibid.

²³ Adam Clymer, *Edward M. Kennedy: A Biography* (New York: William Morrow and Company, Inc., 1999), 414.

²⁴ Author's interview with Tom Simons, July 7, 2000.

proactively participate. As Geremek recalled, "I do not think we would have accepted advice if it ever was given."²⁵

Relations with policy makers in Washington reflected a similar direction of information and influence. This included a regular flow of senators and congressmen through Warsaw looking to meet the Polish heroes. Meetings were not arranged with opposition officials to give Americans the chance to expound on Poland's situation, but for Americans to be given information so that they better understood the internal dynamics as seen by Solidarność leaders. Again, according to Geremek it reflected an "attitude of respect, admiration and friendship, without the teacher's attitude or even leader's, effective leadership attitude."²⁶ Through these visits Solidarność directly shaped the policy that Congress and the White House pursued vis-a-vis Poland.

For evidence of Geremek's recollections of this direction of leadership one need look no further than policy pronouncements by the White House. The White House's decision in December 1983 to grant fishing rights was preceded by Wałęsa's announcement that he favored weakening sanctions. Most importantly, Whitehead traveled to Warsaw just before the final decision to lift sanctions, to confirm that Wałęsa wanted the United States to take this action. During Whitehead's meeting with Wałęsa and his advisors, the opposition made clear to the American visitors that Solidarność "supported the lifting of the remaining American economic sanctions. . . . The time had come for a new approach."²⁷ This was the final piece of information the Reagan administration needed to move forward. As Reagan wrote in his diary on February 19,

²⁵ Author's interview with Bronisław Geremek, July 26, 2006.

²⁶ Interview with Geremek.

²⁷ Cable from Secstate to Amembassy Sofia, "Deputy Secretary Whitehead's Dinner Meeting with Lech Wałęsa, Friday, January 30, 1987," dated February 11, 1987, NSA, End of the Cold War Collection, scanned incoming FOIA documents.

1987, "I signed a measure lifting Polish sanctions in answer to pleas by Pope & Lech Wałęsa."²⁸ An even stronger example of Wałęsa's political clout in Washington, surfaced a few months later when Congress acquiesced to Wałęsa's request and directed \$1 million in aid to the Solidarność Social Fund. Both the White House and Congress consistently conferred with and deferred to the Polish opposition leaders when implementing policy that affected Solidarność.

All of the records reviewed document only one clear example of the American government concretely influencing the Polish opposition to make a political move it was reluctant to take on its own: Davis's dinner meeting with four unnamed opposition figures on June 22, 1989, to talk about strategies for electing Jaruzelski president. When Jaruzelski was voted in as president, opposition officials admitted to rigging the voting in a manner similar to the one Davis suggested. Davis did not convince the Solidarity leaders that they needed to vote for Jaruzelski—they had made this decision before approaching him—but the ambassador succeeded in instructing a foreign political party on how to achieve the election of an unpopular president and former enemy. The fact that Davis purposefully did not mention the names of the involved figures in a secret Department of State cable further demonstrated how extremely rare and sensitive situation this was. Davis knew he was overstepping his usual boundaries as a diplomat working with Solidarność.

The unique qualities of this cable should not be overlooked. Solidarność and the American embassy and American politicians were very closely linked. Though they trusted one another, the overwhelming body of evidence shows that the U.S. embassy and the U.S. government spent no time or effort trying to instruct Solidarność. As Davis has

²⁸ Douglas Brinkley, ed., *The Reagan Diaries* (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 2007), 476.

consistently and adamantly explained, "I did not make any effort to be directive to Solidarity. They had invented Solidarity. It was spontaneous. It was a Polish invention. It was brilliant. I would be happy to talk to them about what they planned to do, but it was not up to me to tell them how to conduct their business."²⁹

In terms of American influence on the Polish opposition, the direction of influence was frequently reversed from the one commonly assumed in triumphalist accounts. American leaders looked to Poland for their heroes, not the other way around. Poles were revered in Washington for their moral leadership. In terms of American influence on Solidarność members, a similar pattern bears out: Americans looked to Wałęsa and his colleagues for guidance on how American policies could help the opposition. Only under the rarest of circumstances did American politicians or diplomats provide—and opposition leaders accept—advice on how to act or react. Over the entire course of the 1980s through the creation of the Mazowiecki government, both internationally and domestically Solidarność truly deserved its full name: the *Independent Self-Governing* Trade Union Solidarność.

Empowering the Opposition

Beyond the issue of political influence on the Polish opposition, there is of course the question of the effects Americans had by sending large amounts of direct, monetary and material aid to Solidarność. Led by the AFL-CIO, small amounts of American aid began making its way to Solidarność before the declaration of martial law, and continued as the opposition rebuilt itself after the declaration of martial law. The CIA too soon got

²⁹ Andrzej Paczkowski, ed. *Polska 1986-1989: koniec systemu*, vol. II (Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Trio and Instytut Studiów Politycznych Polskiej Akademii Nauk, 2002), 238.

into the act. After the creation of the Congressionally funded National Endowment for Democracy in 1983, the amount of these funds increased many fold, providing much needed money not only to the underground organizations of Solidarność but to other important bastions of the opposition. From 1984 to 1989, the NED provided over \$9 million to support the democratic opposition in Poland (See Appendix 1), through various grantee organizations. However, in analyzing the meaning of this aid, it is necessary to determine if this aid came with strings attached or if the aid was used somehow to influence the way the opposition pursued its goals.

Direct Support to Solidarność

Less than a week after the Gdańsk agreements were signed, Kirkland and the AFL-CIO General Board announced the creation of the Polish Workers Aid Fund (PWAFF) which was given an initial donation of \$25,000, and grew to nearly \$250,000 by November 1981.³⁰ To determine how to spend these funds, the AFL-CIO turned to Solidarność for guidance. From the beginning Wałęsa was wary of accepting money from foreign sources; however he willingly accepted donations of "practical" support from specific unions in the form of office equipment, specifically duplicating machines, writing paper, and carbon copy paper.³¹ With that guidance, AFL-CIO funds distributed prior to December 13, 1981, were used precisely as Wałęsa requested: for the mundane

³⁰ "Statement on the Polish Workers Aid Fund," dated September 4, 1980, GMMA, Information Department, AFL-CIO Press Releases 1980, Box 45, 45/3. See also: The AFL-CIO Secretary-Treasurer kept immaculate records on donations to the Polish Workers Aid Fund from November 1980 through the end of 1981. Most of the individual donations are less than \$20, with larger donations from individual unions up to \$10,000. For donation information see: AFL-CIO International Affairs Department Files, Inactive Records, "After Nov. 24 PWAFF [Polish Workers Aid Fund]" and "Letters of Contribution from Individuals to the AFL-CIO Polish Workers Aid Fund, 1981."

³¹ "Report to the ICFTU on visits to Warschau and Gdańsk, 15/9-18/9/1980," undated, AFL-CIO, International Affairs Department, Inactive Records, "Wałęsa, Lech."

matters of office and printing supplies.³²

After the declaration of martial law, the AFL-CIO teamed up with a newly formed entity, the Committee in Support of Solidarity, to publicize human rights abuses in Poland and to funnel money to those members of the opposition who were not interned by Jaruzelski's government. The first covert aid channels ran through CSS co-director Irena Lasota, who sent illegal publications and printing supplies disguised in care packages to friends in the independent press movement, which popped up independent of American support immediately after the declaration of martial law. From 1982 to 1984, with financial support from the AFL-CIO Lasota also sent needed technology, like radios, transmitters, recording equipment, printing equipment, and eventually computers through trusted intermediaries in Western Europe to be smuggled into Poland.

The Central Intelligence Agency also took steps to improve the support network for Poland's democratic opposition. The declaration of martial law caught the CIA off guard, and the Agency was not as prepared as the AFL-CIO to begin funneling support to Solidarność. Rather than taking the usual step of issuing a covert action finding, the president and National Security Advisor Clark informally gave DCI Casey the authority to run the operation as he saw fit, which included efforts headquartered in Frankfurt to send money to Solidarność. Although Casey initiated the covert plan in spring 1982 and

³² As the second Polish Workers Aid Fund Update reported, "The AFL-CIO Polish Workers Aid Fund has supplied typewriters, both electric and manual, duplicating machines, office supplies and small appliances, and in a larger outlay of funds, a small bus-like vehicle which is now in regular use by Solidarity"; quoted from "Update #2," AFL-CIO, International Affairs Department, Unprocessed records, "Update #2." The largest single donation on record from the PWAF was sent to ICFTU President Jan Vanderveken, who utilized the money to purchase and send Solidarność a new off-set printing plant; see: Letter from J. Vanderveken to Lane Kirkland, dated August 20, 1981, AFL-CIO, International Department Files, inactive records, "Letters of Contribution from Individuals to the AFL-CIO Polish Workers Aid Fund, 1981 (Box 2)." According to internal accounting a total of \$152,000 was spent on office supplies and material for Solidarność prior to December 13; see: "Note to Editors," dated June 14, 1982, GMMA, AFL-CIO, Information Department, AFL-CIO Press Releases 1937-1995, Box 49, 49/2.

had some early success to run fifteen radio transmitters through a supply line from Sweden to northern Poland, his financial web did not start running until the end of that year. The exact amounts of these funds and the channels they were diverted through remain unclear (money is relatively easy to smuggle in compared to printing presses or containers of ink), but a fair estimate is that the CIA sent around \$10 million in money and materiel over the life of the program.³³

At the end of 1983, the AFL-CIO and the CSS gained a powerful new ally in their work to support the opposition in Poland: the National Endowment for Democracy. The NED was a non-governmental, private sector organization with roots in President Reagan's June 1982 address to the British parliament which called for Western democracies to do more to support democracy around the world. NED did not run democracy promotion programs themselves; they received money from Congress and passed grants on to other institutions, including four primary sub-grantee organizations. These four organizations, in turn, were responsible for actually overseeing programs meant to promote democracy.

With this new source of money, the AFL-CIO increased its direct aid to Solidarność significantly. From 1984 through 1989, the AFL-CIO funneled about \$300,000 per year in NED funds to the Solidarność Coordinating Office Abroad in Brussels through the AFL-CIO's Free Trade Union Institute. This money provided about

³³ The \$10 million figure comes from Andrzej Paczkowski's, "Playground of the Superpowers, Poland 1980-1989," in Olav Njolstad, ed., *The Last Decade of the Cold War* (London: Frank Cass, 2004), 385. According to Peter Schweizer in *Victory: The Reagan Administration's Secret Strategy that Hastened the Collapse of the Soviet Union* (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 1994), 76-77, the CIA funneled about \$2 million a year from 1983 to 1989; however he provides no specific evidence to support this claim. It is unlikely that the specifics of this program will ever be declassified given Freedom of Information Act restrictions on "means and methods" in intelligence work.

two-thirds of the Coordinating Office's annual operating budget.³⁴ When Congress appropriated \$1 million in additional funds to go to Solidarność in FY 1988 and FY 1989, these funds too, went through FTUI. Through Solidarność's Brussels office, American money was dispersed mainly to union structures for their daily work of organizing, supporting those who could not work, and publishing independent news and reports.

The creation of the NED in 1983 also provided funds for parts of the opposition which were not directly linked to Solidarność. Beginning in FY 1984, the Institute for Democracy in East Europe (an organization run by Irena Lasota and affiliated with CSS) received grants to support independent publishing in Poland. NED also consistently provided money to Polish émigré publications like *Zeszyty Literackie*, which were then smuggled into Poland. NED also gave yearly grants to groups like the Polish Institute of Arts and Sciences in America and the Polish American Congress Charitable Foundation to provide humanitarian assistance aimed specifically at opposition activists who were either interned or punished economically by the government. A similar program, POLCUL, was also funded to provide small grants to Polish artists, writers, journalists, lawyers, actors, intellectuals and scientists (who were also often economically repressed by the Polish authorities) for their work with the opposition. As the internal opposition movement matured in Poland, NED also steered funds to the Committee for Independent Culture, which ran flying universities and underground cultural activities. Finally NED supported human rights groups like the Polish Helsinki Watch Committee and the Polish

³⁴ This \$300,000 figure is substantiated by research done in Poland based on sources from the Polish underground. According to Andrzej Friszke, the Coordinating office received \$200,000 yearly from 1983 to 1984, and then \$300,000 for 1985 and 1986. See his "Tymczasowo Komisja Koordynacyjna NSZZ Solidarność (1981-1987)" in Andrzej Friszke, ed., *Solidarność Podziemna 1981-1989* (Warsaw: Instytut Studiów Politycznych PAN, 2006). Adrian Karatnycky confirmed this funding range when he referred to "our traditional \$300,000 allotment to Solidarność from FTUI's unrestricted NED funds." See memo from Adrian Karatnycky to Tom Kahn, "Eastern Europe and the USSR," dated November 29, 1989, AFL-CIO, International Affairs Department, Unprocessed Records, "Adrian Chron 1989."

Legal Defense Fund, which worked to defend opposition activists when they were placed on trial. NED also actively supported smaller publications by ANEKS and the Independent Polish Agency to keep Western audiences aware of developments in the Polish underground. Finally, NED supported subversive groups based outside of Poland like the Video Association which produced, archived, and smuggled video productions about Poland's recent past back into Poland where they were viewed by a large segment of society.

Without complete records from West European nations who were also supporting the opposition through their own governmental organizations and trade unions it remains difficult to accurately prove how much of the total sum of money going to the opposition came from the United States. However, it is safe to assume that, as with the Coordinating Office's budget, American funds accounted for at least two-thirds of all money flowing into Poland, if not more.³⁵ While the total sum of American support (disregarding CIA funds which may or may not have materialized) was under \$10 million, it is undeniable that the United States was the main source for funding opposition activities.³⁶ Through these conduits, therefore, the United States operated as the opposition's principle financier over the course of the 1980s.

³⁵ The two-thirds estimate was confirmed in conversations with Idesbaald Gooderis, who has worked extensively on West European trade unions' support for the Solidarność office in Brussels, the other major source of Solidarność's foreign support.

³⁶ It should be noted that private charitable groups like the Ford Foundation and the Soros Foundation also granted money to groups including IDEE and Freedom House for activities in Poland. In my research, however, the contributions by private foundations to support activities in Poland appears to have equaled less than 10 percent of the funds coming from NED to support these same operations. Also, from a cursory review it appears that these private funds were generally funneled toward the publicity functions performed by pro-Solidarność groups, rather than the more covert activities. The same is true about AFL-CIO programs for Poland, which after 1983 were almost completely funded by the NED. I have seen no evidence of a significant fundraising effort in the AFL-CIO to support activities in Poland after the PWWF dried up near the end of 1983. The one exception, which deserves further exploration, is the Soros Foundation which became increasingly involved beginning around 1987.

More surprising however, is the very low level of control that Americans maintained over how this money was used. First, the sub-grantee organizations listed in NED annual reports did not work directly with the opposition. These organizations functioned as another middlemen who passed money to organizations working in Western Europe, Scandinavia, and the United States, taking a small fee for administrative costs. The smaller, third-tier recipient groups in New York, Paris, London, Brussels, and Lund, Sweden, actually ran the programs to support the Polish opposition. So, in each case, money from the NED went through a number of hands before it reached those actually running the movement within Poland.

Based on reports from the sub-grantee organizations provided to American organizations, an important truth becomes apparent about the groups who directly sent money into Poland: they were almost purely Polish. The money came from America, but once NED funds were dispersed through the grantee organizations to its final sub-grantee destination, the money was in Polish hands. All the operations that NED funded were run by Polish émigrés living in the West, who then sent money and materiel on to their homeland. America acted as a financier, but once the money was out of American hands few if any Americans were directly involved in deciding how it was used. When, why, and how American money was spent was determined by Poles.

This system was based on a deep sense of trust between the Polish activists and their American patrons. Given the operational realities of running an underground opposition movement, Solidarność officials could not provide annual reports or complete accounting statements on how American money was being spent, a reality which caused some tension between Poles running the operations and their American benefactors.

Opposition members did try to provide a loose accounting of money and material received in Poland by printing receipt notices in independent publications then sent to the West, but this arrangement left room for extensive corruption. The NED was at the mercy of the groups operating the smuggling routes into Poland. Over time, the two simply learned to trust one another, accepting the limitations of what could be disclosed and what would be left unsaid.

Taken together, the overwhelming Polish-ness of the Western structures which supported the democratic opposition and the trust-based system American supporters relied upon in sending money provides convincing evidence of how little operational control Americans actually retained over how funds made their way into Poland and were spent once they got there. Washington completely relied upon the opposition itself to report truthfully what was being bought in Poland, verifying the democratic movement's extensive independence. While this independence led to some anxieties, policy makers in Washington clearly understood and accepted the policy. Independence was an integral part of the relationship between the AFL-CIO and the NED and the movements they supported. The endowment understood that it was not in the business of telling democracy activists how to do their job; rather, the NED was funded to respond when admirable movements and workable ideas surfaced, not to instigate them. Further, while the Polish opposition understood that, in general, this money came from the United States they maintained their operational independence because there was no real mechanism for converting American money into direct political influence.

In the case of CIA money, the U.S. government actively worked to obscure its origins so even opposition leaders did not know its origin. As Deputy Director for

Intelligence Gates recalls:

I was always told that CIA had no direct link with Solidarity and that, in fact, the union did not know in specific terms what, if anything, it was getting from CIA. Our people thought that deniability was important for Solidarity, and so we worked through third parties or other intermediaries in Western Europe.³⁷

At the embassy in Warsaw, Davis took this a step further and insisted that CIA at the embassy stay away from Solidarność. The reasoning behind Davis's position was quite simple: "The one thing I was afraid of was that the Solidarity leadership would get pinned as foreign agents. That was the danger. . . . I did not want the Polish government to be able to say or prove that, 'Here is, you know, Geremek, talking to a CIA agent. These people are not true Poles; they are acting as agents of the United States.' That's what I did not want."³⁸ The necessity of emphasizing "deniability" meant that there were very few, if any, operational links between the CIA and the democratic opposition.

So, while the United States Treasury was pumping money to the opposition through Congressional appropriations to NED, there were no significant connections through which Washington provided leadership to the opposition on how to use the money. As NED President Carl Gershman testified to Congress, his role was to be responsive to events around the world, not to instigate or guide them: "The Endowment does not seek to fashion solutions to problems in far off countries, or to impose programs developed in the U.S. on foreign democratic groups, but rather to respond to their initiatives and requests for assistance. . . . The Endowment's approach is to encourage the

³⁷ Robert Gates, *From the Shadows: The Ultimate Insider's Story of Five Presidents and How They Won the Cold War* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996), 237.

³⁸ Author's interview with Davis, November 23, 1999.

indigenous democratic groups to define their needs and set forth their priorities and goals."³⁹

Although Washington never tried to run *Solidarność*, American support for *Solidarność* did, however, almost certainly influence internal dynamics *within* the opposition. By supporting more moderate voices in *Solidarność* and the wider opposition movement, U.S. support gave leaders like Wałęsa greater visibility and gravitas than other more radical groups, like *Wolność i Pokój*, *Solidarność Walcząca* (Fighting *Solidarność*), or the *Konfederacja Polski Niepodległej* (Confederation for an Independent Poland). In their underground publications *Solidarność* publicized Wałęsa and other leaders' meetings with American celebrities and politicians to prove to the Polish public their position as international leaders, counteracting government propaganda campaigns which worked to marginalize them. Other groups could not claim such an international presence. Moreover, by sending aid through *Solidarność*, the United States gave Wałęsa and his colleagues the power of the purse. They could decide which opposition groups other than *Solidarność* received foreign support, limiting other opposition activists' ability to push their own, separate agendas.

Government Aid to Poland

Following the decision to lift all sanctions on February 19, 1987, the Polish and U.S. governments moved along a path toward normalizing relations which led to Vice President George Bush's September 1987 visit and to an exchange of ambassadors at the end of 1987. As part of Bush's first visit, the U.S. signalled that it had moved away from

³⁹ "Prepared Statement of Carl Gershman," in Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, *Foreign Relations Authorization Act: Hearings*, 100th Cong., 1st Session, 1987, 395-396. For the scope of this dissertation it is difficult to ascertain whether "responsiveness" was implemented equally in other NED programs in Latin America, Africa, or Asia; however, from the record on Poland Gershman's words were more than just hypothetical guidelines provided to give a rosy picture of NED policy to Senators overseeing the program.

the punitive strategy of sanctions that it had employed since 1981 and was now willing to reward Poland with new aid, debt relief, and possibly loans for steps towards further liberalization. Within Poland the Solidarność leaders turned these offers to their advantage. Since the declaration of martial law, Solidarnosc economists consistently argued that Poland's economy could only be fixed with a substantial influx of Western money, a supposition that the PZPR accepted in 1986. The opposition advisors also made clear that the West would not contribute new money to Poland without Solidarność returning to a position of responsibility.⁴⁰ While sanctions had been lifted, Washington continued to hold back any major investment, contingent on the PZPR engaging in a direct dialogue with Solidarność and, in particular, legalizing the union. This focus of Western sanctions, in turn, gave Solidarnosc much needed leverage against the PZPR, particularly in private negotiations at Magdalenka in fall 1988. Wałęsa's main source of leverage was undeniably the fact that without Solidarność's support for economic reforms, society would never accept them; however, this position was buttressed by the fact that including Solidarność in a political settlement was the key to gaining needed credits from the West.

The most concrete evidence of this link between the PZPR decision to seek reconciliation with Solidarność and the contingencies of Western support appear indirectly after the PZPR's decision in January 1989 to grant Solidarność legal status. At this point, both Solidarność and PZPR leaders began actively campaigning for new Western credits and investment: Polish Premier Mieczysław Rakowski visited Bonn in late January to speak with Kohl and Genscher; Undersecretary of State J. Kaczurby

⁴⁰ "Porozumienie a gospodarka" [Understanding and the Economy], *Tygodnik Mazowsze* nr. 20 (30.vi.1982), 2. "Porozumienie a gospodarka," 2; available at KARTA, Archiwum Opozycji.

visited Washington in February; a Polish delegation met with European Community leaders in March; in April French foreign minister Roland Dumas visited Warsaw and Wałęsa visited Rome; Solidarność activist Jacek Kuron, Minister of Finance Andrzej Wróbelki, Central Committee member Józef Czyrek, and Solidarność advisor Bronisław Geremek all visited Washington while Wałęsa went to Brussels in May; in June Jaruzelski traveled to Brussels and Mitterand visited Poland; in July Polish Foreign Minister Tadeusz Olechowski met with G7 representatives and President George H. W. Bush came to Warsaw. A primary purpose of each of these meetings was to inform Western leaders about the political changes occurring in Poland and to ask for economic support. From a brief comparison of PZPR and Solidarność requests made in Washington in May, it becomes clear that the former enemies were asking for very much the same kind of economic packages from the West.⁴¹ One of the major outcomes of the Round Table process in 1989, therefore, was to have Solidarność and the PZPR working in similar directions in hopes of attaining much-needed Western economic support. Despite the fact that the American and Western response through summer 1989 was disappointing to all sides, these coordinated appeals continued well into the months following Tadeusz Mazowiecki's assumption as prime minister. All of these efforts provide indirect evidence of the economic-aid-for-political-pluralism quid pro quo which underlay the agreement to go ahead with the Round Table Agreements.

In both these cases—direct American monetary support to Solidarność and the domestic Polish ramifications of American offers of aid—American policy worked to strengthen the opposition. American policy certainly had an effect on Poland's

⁴¹ See numerous cables dealing with PZPR and Solidarność activists trips to Washington and Western Europe in: Greg Domber, ed., *Ku zwycięstwu „Solidarność”: Korespondencja Ambasady USA z Departamentem Stanu, styczeń-wrzesień 1989* (Warsaw: Instytut Studiów Politycznych, 2006).

transformation in both of these ways, but Washington was never in a position of leadership. The Reagan and Bush administrations did not tell the Polish opposition how to negotiate or how to pursue their revolution. The revolution came from the Poles themselves, without the benefit or possible hindrance of American leadership. American aid helped provided needed support to the opposition against their adversaries in the PZPR and to push the PZPR to accept the opposition as an equal partner; in these ways Washington helped to empower the opposition in their own struggle for democracy, not spark or lead that struggle.

Morale Boosters

Beyond the issue of the usefulness of sanctions and support, the Reagan and Bush administrations also pursued a list of other policies that eased Poland's transformation to democracy. Again, however, these policies had only an indirect effect.

First of all, Washington helped to amplify the opposition's voice within Poland by putting the opposition's messages on the airwaves through Radio Free Europe. RFE Polish Section's director, Zdislaw Najder, used his "wide network of contacts among the opposition within and outside Poland and used his contacts to acquire inside information."⁴² Armed with this material RFE provided credible information to Poles about what was happening within their own country, counteracting the barrage of misinformation in the government-sponsored press. RFE broadcasts also spread opposition calls for strikes and demonstrations, providing specific instructions such as where and when protesters should meet, a service the Polish communists found

⁴² Arch Puddington, *Broadcasting Freedom*, 270.

particularly inflammatory.⁴³ In this way, the RFE played an important role amplifying information from the underground activists back to a wider Polish audience than could be reached through printed material alone.

Similarly, broadcasts of statements by American leaders in support of Solidarność over RFE provided morale support for what the Poles were doing. It is important to note, however, that hearing Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger call Jaruzelski a Soviet general in a Polish uniform or learn that Reagan considered the Soviet Union an "evil empire" hardly came as revelations to Poles. Rather, statements of this character were well received by Poles because they already believed them. American broadcasts on RFE or VOA were well received, not because they opened Poles's eyes to the evils of the Jaruzelski regime or of Communism, but because they showed that Poles were not alone in their existing convictions. Poles had an ally who felt the same way they did.

American humanitarian support to Poland also brought comfort. Even before the declaration of martial law organizations like Catholic Relief Services, CARE, Project HOPE, and the PACCF began sending humanitarian aid; following the declaration of martial law the amount of aid increased, a policy supported by the Reagan administration. From the U.S. government's standpoint this aid was provided more for political than humanitarian reasons. As an inter-agency group successfully argued in May 1982, "Our assistance is widely visible in Poland, undermining regime propaganda and providing material evidence of Western support for Solidarity and the Church."⁴⁴

⁴³ Pilna Notatka z rozmowy z charge d'Affaires USA w Warszawie John'em Davis'em w dniu 18 kwietnia 1984 r. [Urgent Note from a conversation with U.S. charge d'affaires in Warsaw John Davis on 18 April 1984], dated April 23, 1984, MSZ, 59/86, W-8, Dep III (1984), AP 53-5-8.

⁴⁴ See Confidential Memorandum, "Draft Decision Memo on Options for Humanitarian Assistance to Poland," dated May 12, 1982, NSA, Soviet Flashpoints, Box 27, April-June 1982.

In response to martial law and material suffering in Poland, American humanitarian groups sent significant amounts of privately donated and government-sponsored aid. According to Polish government records, between 1981 and 1985 American humanitarian aid sent through non-governmental organizations totaled 402 thousand tons worth \$362 million.⁴⁵ By the middle of the 1980s, a growing body of anecdotal evidence was surfacing to show that this aid was not going unnoticed by the Polish people. Publicly many of these voices came from Polish church officials who worked with the Americans to deliver aid and responded with public displays of gratitude. More importantly, thank-you messages also came directly from recipients. Gifts as simple as used clothing, diapers, baby food, surplus orange cheese, toothpaste, and shoes took on a symbolic as well as practical meaning. Like the church leaders, recipients wrote about the spiritual (usually *moralny* or *duchowo*, in Polish) importance of the gifts. When the writers went into more detail they frequently refer to a sense of no longer being alone in their struggle. Poles also showed their thankfulness in handwritten cards that often included personal touches like family pictures and Christmas Eve wafers, further evidence of how close the aid recipients felt with their American benefactors. American humanitarian aid reminded them that they were not alone and that their hardships were not being forgotten.

Lessons for Democratization

American and Polish experiences during the 1980s are not only important for understanding the growth of democracy and the end of the Cold War in the 1980s. The stories, anecdotes, facts, and documentation recorded in this dissertation suggest insights

⁴⁵ Ibid.

into how American foreign policy can successfully promote democracy in hostile and oppressive regimes.

The Importance of Governmental, Non-Governmental, and Private Actors

From its creation, Solidarność understood that accepting money and support from a foreign government would hand the PZPR a powerful tool to question the opposition's patriotism and legitimacy, a claim certainly any regime would make to marginalize its opponents. To circumvent this concern, Wałęsa and his colleagues decided that it would be acceptable for Solidarność to rely upon the well established tradition of international brotherhood between workers, and they openly accepted money and material support from other trade unions. All American money was funneled from Congress to the NED, and then to the AFL-CIO's FTUI where it was sent to Solidarność headquarters in Brussels. Because the FTUI relied on both governmental and union funding, Solidarność could honestly claim that all of its resources came from brotherly trade organizations. Similarly, independent publishers and supporters of independent culture could claim that their support came from well meaning Polish American groups and independent organizations working in Western Europe. Everyone knew where the money was actually coming from, but the NED's system of grantees and sub-grantees obscured the money's origins, creating deniability for opposition activists when they were questioned or accused by the PZPR of colluding with a foreign government. Direct governmental support would not have allowed this level of deniability.

However, American aid to democratic activists should not be completely covert. Throughout the 1980s, conspiracy theories involving the CIA and direct American involvement with Solidarność were rampant, regardless of the actual involvement by

these groups. This will certainly be the case in any hostile regime where the more nefarious activities of the American government are often used to excuse hyper-vigilance against alleged external threats. It would have been difficult for Solidarność to claim that it had no outside support, for instance, when the government intercepted smuggling operations. Therefore it needed to point to some source for the support. In this way, Lane Kirkland's public (yet vague) statements about the AFL-CIO's support for Solidarność legitimized Wałęsa's position. Of course this meant that the Polish security services could trace back the amount of funding the opposition was receiving. (All of the information about NED funding in the dissertation comes from unclassified sources.) However, because the path of American money was so convoluted and mixed (at least theoretically) with private funds, it was difficult for the PZPR to make public arguments that would be successful in a propaganda campaign. An element of openness is necessary in any policy to fund democracy activists to combat conspiracy theories.

Finally, the fact that NED money for Poland came from Congressional appropriations—rather than directly from the executive branch through agencies like USAID or USIA—also benefited the democratic opposition. By pushing appropriations through Congress, NED programs required a pre-existing bi-partisan agreement about the importance and efficacy of supporting democracy activists in Poland. Beyond the walls of the White House, representatives and senators from all over the political map, including Steven Solarz, Dante Fascell, Jack Kemp, Barbara Mikulski, Ted Kennedy, Bill Bradley, and even Jesse Helms were all advocates for strong support to Solidarność. With this wide swath of sponsors, no political firestorm ever broke out on Capitol Hill, helping

to ensure a steady stream of financial support that the democratic opposition could come to rely upon.

Patience and Nonviolence

At the beginning of Reagan's first term, no one in his White House thought that the Cold War would be in its final months by the end of the decade. As NSDD 75, "U.S. Relations with the USSR," laid out in January 1983, the purpose of American policy was "to promote, within the narrow limits available to us, the process of change. . . in which the power of the privileged ruling elite is gradually reduced."⁴⁶ Even the strongest statement of American policy against the Soviet Union presumed only gradual change, not necessarily even transformation. American policy makers and practitioners did not support the democratic opposition in Poland because they thought Solidarność would overthrow Communist power quickly. As people on all sides of the issue constantly acknowledged, the PZPR and the Soviet Union had all of the guns. The threat that the Kremlin would act as it had in earlier East European crises or that the PZPR would utilize military force to stop democratic transformation always lurked in the background. Even up to the end of 1989 it was unclear to policy makers in Washington that Solidarność would be fully successful in seizing the reins of power. The Reagan and Bush administrations and all of their co-conspirators supported Solidarność because it was the right thing to do, not because they were assured success. They hoped that Solidarność would triumph, but their realistic expectations for success in Poland were limited. These limited expectations allowed events on the ground in Poland to progress at their own pace, with all their victories and setbacks. Nonetheless, American support remained

⁴⁶ NSDD 75, "U.S. Relations with the USSR," dated January 17, 1983, 1. For a copy of the document see NARA's ARC system (www.archives.gov/research/arc/).

steadfast. Simply, the American government was patient enough to allow slow change to occur.

Part of this patience was dictated by the military realities of the Cold War. The Soviet Union was unquestionably dominant in Eastern Europe, so a military solution to transform Poland was never considered. As the epigraph to this chapter shows, Reagan himself understood this reality. Solidarność, too, accepted the limits of the changes they could propose, and never openly questioned essential Kremlin interests. Solidarność never called for Poland to pursue an independent foreign policy or to distance itself from the Warsaw Pact. Calculations about the military realities of their position behind the Iron Curtain were even apparent when the Mazowiecki government decided to include PZPR ministers in the internal affairs and defense ministries. Finally, throughout their struggle, Wałęsa and his fellow activists remained religiously non-violent. They understood that in confronting a repressive regime with a monopoly on force, violent tactics and outbreaks would only play to their enemies' strengths. Change could only occur if events remained peaceful.

Pragmatic Idealists

Much of this dissertation focused on internal discussions within the Reagan administration, specifically conflicts at the highest level between advocates for a pragmatic approach and others with a more ideological view of the Cold War. Cold War ideologues advocated policies to cut Poland off from the West and bankrupt the Communist system. These voices, usually originating from within the Defense Department and CIA, successfully pushed for economic and political sanctions in the first months after the declaration of martial law. In the wake of a crisis in the NATO alliance

over the Siberian natural gas pipeline, proponents of a more pragmatic approach which sought to engage with the PZPR through a step-by-step policy eventually put their long-lasting stamp on U.S.-Polish relations. Ultimately, this pragmatic approach of seeking negotiations and concessions helped push the PZPR toward a position where it was willing to accept Solidarność as a partner and move toward lasting political liberalization. This pragmatic approach was well suited to react and counteract to the vacillations in Poland's democratic transformation. A less flexible approach advocated by ideologues would not have been as successful.

But, Cold War ideologues were not completely mis-guided. Hard-line members of the Reagan and Bush White Houses ensured that concessions given to the PZPR never went too far and kept both administrations from moving too quickly to undercut the few pressure points the U.S. government had. The core anti-Communist ideals of these hardliners also ensured that Solidarność's needs and requests remained the focus of policy discussions. Therefore in dealing with repressive regimes, it is necessary to balance the flexibility of pragmatism with the steadfastness and strength of core beliefs.

The Power of Humanitarian Aid

To this day, Poles retain a positive view of the United States and American foreign policy, a much different picture than in many other European states. Undoubtedly these opinions reflect American soft power—the draw of American ideas, culture, and wealth—and the long historical and social ties between Poland and the United States. In addition, Poles who lived through the 1980s have memories of receiving some kind of aid from the United States. This humanitarian aid provided concrete proof of America's good intentions. Sacks of flour or cans of oil bearing the American flags and distributed

by Polish Catholic churches were tangibly expressed American support for the Polish people, greatly weakening government pronouncements that American sanctions were designed to hurt the nation. Humanitarian aid in the form of personalized care packages further undermined PZPR propaganda by strengthening ties between American families and their counterparts in Poland. Moreover humanitarian aid multiplied the propagandistic messages on RFE and VOA by providing a concrete manifestation of the words heard over the radio. Humanitarian aid also reached more people than just those who listened to American broadcasts. It is difficult to quantify the full effect of humanitarian aid in Poland. Combined with words and speeches heard via RFE and VOA, humanitarian aid enhanced the effectiveness of American propaganda in Poland, at the same time it alleviated real humanitarian needs.

Humanitarian aid also helped to undermine the legitimacy of the Jaruzelski regime. By distributing American aid through the Catholic Church rather than the state, Washington bolstered the church's already strong position vis-à-vis the government. The simple fact that the PZPR had to accept American humanitarian aid was also a constant reminder of the weakness of the Polish government and the ruling party. Humanitarian aid projected an image of power and prosperity for the United States, simultaneously demonstrating the inadequacy of the communist system which needed capitalist goods and food to feed and clothe their people. If well handled, humanitarian aid can be a powerful tool to enhance propaganda campaigns, showing the strength and improving the image of the United States at the same time.

Choosing the Right Partner

Focusing on the limitations of American policy in Poland's democratic transformation highlights the rather obvious fact of Solidarność's centrality in Poland's development. Therefore the most important part of a successful policy to promote democracy is choosing the right partner. Following the events of 1980 the choice in Poland was clear; in other situations the choice may not be so easy. However, as recent events in the Middle East have shown, installing a democracy from outside is exceedingly difficult and astronomically expensive. The U.S. government should not be in the business of trying to instigate changes or install our own system. The key is not to look to Washington to lead, but to locate and support the leaders and movements already working within repressive systems. As much as American diplomats, academics, and politicians might study a country, those who live under the repressive system comprehend it better than any outside expert. They understand the regime's weaknesses and how to exploit them. They also have a better understanding of domestic moods and shifting political realities. Solidarność grasped the opportunity to join with members of the government coalition in August 1989, not the Americans. Similarly, émigré groups can be helpful in making and maintaining contact with these groups, but it is essential that the movement be indigenous. Jan Nowak-Jezioranski and Jerzy Giedroyc shaped the Polish opposition, but did not lead it or fully define it.

Locating indigenous forces rather than applying outside solutions, also allows for movements to reflect their own country's historical intricacies and individual national characters. Solidarność's mix of Catholic patriotism and economic and workers' rights proved to be a deadly combination for the PZPR; it is unlikely that such a formula would work in Iran or China. American policy makers were intelligent and aware enough to

sense Solidarność's potential, but it is doubtful that any American could have enunciated Solidarność's goals and arguments as well as Lech Wałęsa, Adam Michnik, or Jacek Kuron. Solidarność was a Polish solution to a Polish problem. The movement received American support because the future it sought coincided with American goals, and their tactics suited American morals and standards. American policy can still be proactive, but it should not seek to initiate democratic revolutions. The best Washington can do is respond to internal developments quickly and decisively to provide democracy movements with the support they need when they need it.

Support versus Leadership

In understanding America's role in bringing democracy to Poland and ending the Cold War, it is important to highlight the limitations of American power, rather than crow about its successes. This dissertation indicates that U.S. policy did, indeed, meaningfully promote Poland's democratic transformation. However, these effects were limited. In the case of American political and economic sanctions against the Jaruzelski regime, American policies pushed the Polish government to accept the indigenous political opposition as rightful partners to the political process. These policies, however, only worked in coordination with America's allies in Western Europe. In addition, the impact of American policy was greatly limited by the level of transformation that was allowed by the Soviet Union. Without liberalization in Gorbachev's Moscow, it is doubtful that Jaruzelski would have been able to take the steps he did. Moreover, because Jaruzelski's acquiescence to political pressure arose specifically due to pressure from the European Economic Community, this begs the question of the extent to which Western European

actions were dictated by their own political and moral beliefs rather than pressure from the United States. Certainly British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher had as much to do with the British-led EEC demarche as Reagan. Given the scope of the research behind my dissertation and my focus on Polish-American relations, this central question remains unresolved.

In terms of American policy vis-à-vis the opposition movement, it is also clear that American policies were effective at *supporting* that opposition. The nature of American support, however, also shows that American policy makers in the White House, Capitol Hill, and the American embassy in Warsaw did not play a leadership role within the opposition. The opposition did not come to power in Poland by following dictates from Americans. Instead, the United States played a much humbler role in which American money and support was used by the opposition as they themselves saw fit. Neither Reagan nor any other American fulfilled a leadership role for Poland. The evidence in fact points in the opposite direction to show the causal ways in which Solidarność shaped America's response to events and trends within Poland. Ultimately, Wałęsa and the wider opposition movement triumphed not because of outside influences, but because of their own agency, dynamism, and internal support. They certainly came to depend on American aid, but that support was provided according to the needs and wants of the internal opposition, not leaders sitting outside and looking in. Poles themselves made the hard decisions on how to move forward and how to change their country. Poles transformed Poland, not Americans. It was only after the events of 1989 that the United States could exercise significant influence to shape Poland's continued economic and political transformation and fully promote American interests.

The difference between providing support and providing leadership is nuanced, but recognizing this difference is essential if scholars and the public are to understand the true causes of the end of the Cold War and the growth of democracy in Eastern Europe. In triumphalist accounts which point to the United States as the source of events leading to the end of the Cold War, this nuance is lost and the revolutions of 1989 become the story of one superpower triumphing over another. The real story is much more complex. Taking into account complexities shows that the activists, intellectuals, workers, and common people in countries like Poland deserve much more of the credit for bringing an end to the Cold War than they often receive. Politicians and strategists in Washington may have been focused on the superpower confrontation, but the collapse of the Soviet empire in East Central Europe came about because smaller actors worked independently within the confines of the Cold War to seek their own solutions to their own problems. The United States cannot and should not take credit for the heroism, political savvy, will, and patience of the leaders who brought freedom and democracy to Eastern Europe. American policy makers backed the right horse, but it was the horse that won the race, not the financiers.

Dependent variable: Bribe [= (Surcharges Paid/Contract Value)*100]

	Cultural Norms	Financial Transparency	Legal System	Press Freedom	Int'l Poli Connect	Composite Model
Constant	0.6009*** 0.089 0.079	0.5356*** 0.055 0.044	-0.058 0.773	0.38675*** 0.087 0.089	0.5727*** 0.054 0.044	0.670* 0.380 0.270
OLS S.E.	0.322** 0.152 0.148					0.714 0.426 0.236
GEE S.E.						0.796*** 0.272 0.221
Rent	0.1063*** 0.012 0.017	0.1063*** 0.012 0.016	0.079*** 0.016	0.10353*** 0.012 0.016	0.1061*** 0.012 0.016	0.073*** 0.014 0.021
CPI	0.1098*** 0.016 0.027					0.0722*** 0.015 0.020
BPI	-0.013 0.017 0.014					-0.068 0.041 0.040
FT	0.036 0.027 0.027	0.027 0.072 0.083				0.345** 0.137 0.075
dur_tot			-0.002 0.007			0.338 0.235 0.082
enforce			-0.055 0.087			0.089 0.079 0.082
legal integrity			0.027 0.044			0.3297** 0.132 0.082
confidence			0.266 0.163			0.043 0.043 0.046
disclose			-0.510 0.500			0.198* 0.119
UNSC						-0.346 0.373 0.433
Press Freedom						-0.404 0.377 0.368
R ²	0.160 0.156 0.124	0.156 0.152 0.457	0.176 0.141 0.147	0.0033** 0.002 0.002	-0.064 0.073 0.077	0.211 0.160 0.103
Adjusted R ²	0.131 0.124 0.266					0.172 0.168 0.003
Observations	436 266	434 457	147	0.006*** 0.003 0.003	0.006** 0.003 0.003	0.001 0.004 0.004
Clustering Country	45	50	43	0.006*** 0.002 0.003	0.001 0.004 0.004	0.001 0.004 0.123
	18	50	43	0.187 0.174 0.394	0.177 0.142 0.147	0.151 0.125 0.206
				0.182 0.169 0.377	0.177 0.142 0.147	0.157 0.128 0.207
				0.35	0.35	0.26
				37	37	26
				50	50	26
				43	43	26
				50	50	27

APPENDIX 1:

National Endowment for Democracy Funds Granted

for Work Inside Poland, 1984-1989

Fiscal Year	Grant Recipient	Purpose
1984	AFL-CIO Free Trade Union Institute	To support the Solidarność trade union through the Coordinating Office in Brussels
1984	Committee in Support of Solidarity/ Institute for Democracy in Eastern Europe	To provide financial assistance to the democratic opposition, distribute books and pamphlets already published, and publish and distribute a book of documents which tell the story of Solidarity in Czech, Hungarian, Russian, and Ukrainian
1984	Polish Institute for Arts and Sciences in America	To provide assistance to political prisoners, and to maintaining independent cultural, educational, and scholarly activities
1984	International Freedom to Publish Committee of the Association of American Publishers	To support the publication and distribution of <i>Zeszyty Literackie</i>
TOTAL 1984		
1985	AFL-CIO Free Trade Union Institute	To support the Committee for the Support of Solidarity in translation and publication of documents on work and human rights. Support was also provided for independent Polish exiles in Europe and for the Coordinating Office of Solidarność Abroad to collect detailed information on the state of the Solidarność trade union and to enable Solidarność to communicate with its members inside Poland.
1985	Aurora Foundation	To assist the work of the Polish Legal Defense Fund

1985	Freedom House	To assist the Committee for Independent Culture
1985	Aurora Foundation	To publish one issue of <i>Zeszyty Literackie</i>
TOTAL 1985		
1986	AFL-CIO Free Trade Union Institute	To support the Solidarność union through the Co-Office in Brussels and to the Committee in Support of Solidarity to translate and publish material on various human rights-related issues from the Solidarity press
1986	Polish American Congress Charitable Foundation	To provide material assistance to political prisoners and their families (\$90,000), support for the activities of the Polish Helsinki Watch Committee (\$100,000), support for the Polish Helsinki Watch Committee (\$5,000), support for independent video productions (\$50,000), purchase of a minivan to provide humanitarian assistance to political prisoners and their families (8,000), and administrative costs (\$10,000)
1986	Freedom House	To assist four journals distributed through Eastern Europe: <i>ANEKS Quarterly</i> , <i>Uncensored Poland News Bulletin</i> , <i>Internal Contradictions in the USSR</i> , and various other publications of the Independent Polish Agency (\$30,800) to provide additional assistance to the Independent Polish Agency to collect Western press and make it available in Poland (\$30,800)
1986	Institute for Democracy in Eastern Europe	To support the activities of the Consortium of Independent Publishers, independent publications, and self-education and human rights groups
1986	Aurora Foundation	To assist the work of the Polish Legal Defense Fund (±\$70,000) and for the publication of four issues of <i>Zeszyty Literackie</i> (±\$20,000)
1986	Polish Institute of Arts and Sciences in America	To publish in Polish three books on the development of democracy in Poland
TOTAL 1986		

1987	International Rescue Committee	To purchase medical supplies and medicine for the Solidarność Social Fund
1987	AFL-CIO Free Trade Union Institute	To assist Solidarność through the Coordinating Office in Brussels, and to the Committee in Support of Solidarność to translate and publish material on worker and human rights-related issues from the underground Solidarność press
1987	Polish American Congress Charitable Foundation	For assistance to political activists and their families (\$90,000), support for OKN-o (\$100,000), the Polish Helsinki Watch (\$10,000), POLCUL (\$15,000), the Independent Video Movement (\$50,000), and <i>Zeszyty Literackie</i> (\$20,000), and administrative costs (\$10,000)
1987	Institute for Democracy in Eastern Europe	For assistance to the Consortium of Independent Publishers and support to independent publishing organizations on human rights
1987	Freedom House	For support to ANEKS in London and the <i>Uncensored Poland News Bulletin</i>
1987	Solidarity Endowment/Polish American Congress Charitable Foundation	To support the Independent Polish Agency (\$39,000) and administrative costs (\$3,000)
TOTAL 1987		
1988	AFL-CIO Free Trade Union Institute	To administer funds appropriated by the U.S. Congress to provide assistance to the independent Polish trade union Solidarność for disseminating information, sustaining union activists, and maintaining its administrative infrastructure
1988	AFL-CIO Free Trade Union Institute	To assist Solidarność through the Coordinating Office in Brussels, and to the Institute for Democracy in Eastern Europe to translate and publish material on worker and human rights-related issues from the underground Solidarność press

1988	Polish American Congress Charitable Foundation	To provide assistance to political activists and the families (\$90,000), for OKN-o (\$100,000), the Pe Helsinki Watch (\$10,000), POLCUL (\$15,000), <i>Z Literackie</i> (\$24,000), publication of <i>Death in the</i> (\$10,000), a traveling Polish exhibit (\$4,000), and administrative costs
1988	Institute for Democracy in Eastern Europe	To support a broad range of independent publicat Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland, through th for Independent Publishing (\$195,000 in total fun allocated for all of Eastern Europe. This approxin based on previous IDEE programs in Poland.)
1988	Polish American Congress Charitable Foundation	To assist the Independent Poland Agency in supp independent democratic groups, particularly the independent press
1988	Freedom House	To enable the London-based Information Centre f Affairs to publish <i>Uncensored Poland News Bull</i>
TOTAL 1988		
1989	AFL-CIO Free Trade Union Institute	To provide assistance to Solidarność in dissemina information, sustaining union activists, and maint administrative infrastructure
1989	International Rescue Committee	To assist Solidarność in maintaining a social func established to provide medical assistance and services to workers and their families. Funds are purchase medical supplies and equipment, to supp SOS Coordination Pologne, a Paris-based commi provides health treatment for Poles, and to establi care and social services for children of members o Solidarność.
1989	AFL-CIO Free Trade Union Institute	To support the independent trade union movemer the Brussels-based Coordinating Office of Solida

		Abroad to disseminate information in the West on union rights in Poland and assist union activities in Poland. Support is also provided for the New York Institute for Democracy in Eastern Europe to translate and publish materials on worker and human rights-related issues inside Poland and other East European countries. In addition, assistance is given to others engaged in work for Solidarność publications in Poland.
1989	Polish American Congress Charitable Foundation	To administer seven projects designed to support democratic movement: OKN-o (\$90,000), Polish Watch Committee (\$25,000), the POLCUL Foundation (\$25,000), <i>Zeszyty Literackie</i> (\$24,000), independent productions (\$40,000), the <i>Uncensored Poland News Bulletin</i> (\$25,000), and the Independent Poland Association (\$39,000) with administrative fees (\$10,000)
1989	Institute for Democracy in Eastern Europe	To continue its activities in support of democracy in Eastern Europe through assistance to independent publishing houses and self-education and human rights groups. The grant provides the Consortium for Independent Publishing with funds for equipment, supplies, and personnel.
1989	Columbia University	To sponsor the Study Group on Polish Reform, a series of conferences with six leading economists from the United States, Great Britain, Canada, Switzerland, and Poland, and to recommend a plan for Poland's economic reconstruction.
1989	National Democratic Institute for International Affairs	To sponsor an international conference on "The Role of Parliaments in Developing National Economic Policy" providing Polish parliamentarians an opportunity to study the means used by legislatures in other countries to consider economic issues and develop national economic policy. Participants included 65 Polish parliamentarians.

		and 11 Western European parliamentarians from political spectrum and a five-member U.S. congressional delegation led by Walter Mondale and Howard B
1989	Center for International Private Enterprise	To develop a program of assistance to the Kraków Industrial Society
1989	Polish American Congress Charitable Foundation	To support the Foundation in Support of Local Democracy to create democratic government institutions at a local level, cultivate informed participation in political life, distribute instructional materials and working papers on local affairs
1989	AFL-CIO Free Trade Union Institute	To fund independent video production through the Video Center
1989	Institute for Democracy in Eastern Europe	To assist the Association for Free Speech, which was formed by the Consortium of Independent Publishers, to facilitate the expansion of independent publishing
1989	Polish American Congress Charitable Foundation	To support the publication of <i>Gazeta Wyborcza</i>
1989	AFL-CIO Free Trade Union Institute	To sponsor a three-year teacher-training program in conjunction with Teachers' Solidarity which will revise the social studies curriculum to be systematically revised in order to reflect the principles and practices of democracy
1989	National Republican Institute for International Affairs	To provide a grant to the Kraków Chapter of the American Friends of the Peace for the translation and publication of works by modern conservative intellectuals and the eventual production of a quarterly journal of opinion
1989	Center for International Private Enterprise	To develop a program of assistance to the Kraków Industrial Society, one of the founders of Economic Action, the Warsaw-based umbrella organization representing Poland's emerging industries
TOTAL 1989		

<i>TOTAL</i> <i>1984-1989</i>		

† was directly appropriated by Congress, not part of the NED's annual budget.

± is an approximation.

§ was funded by a grant from U.S. Agency for International Development, not part of the NED's annual budget.

This appendix is based on NED Annual Reports available in the National Endowment for Democracy Headquarters files and congressional records cited in the dissertation.

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Administrative Records; Catholic Relief Services Archives, Baltimore, Md.

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