Report

drawn up on behalf of the Political Affairs Committee

on

the situation in Central America

PART B : EXPLANATORY STATEMENT

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I. Preface

The European Parliament has commented a number of times, and occasionally controversially, on the situation in Central America and in El Salvador, Nicaragua, Guatemala and Grenada in particular. Since 1979 these discussions have resulted in a number of parliamentary initiatives, resolutions and reports. Numerous Group and parliamentary delegations have visited the region.

In the light of the international repercussions of the crises in the region and the differences of opinion in the European Parliament, the Political Affairs Committee decided on 27/28 October 1981 to draw up a report on the situation in El Salvador; on 24/25 May 1983 it broadened the scope of this report to include the whole situation in Central America. The rapporteur was authorized to visit Venezuela, El Salvador and Mexico (26 October to 4 November 1982) to gain on-the-spot information, assessments, opinions on the situation and outlook in El Salvador. Further information was gathered during a visit of a European Parliament delegation from 6 January to 13 January 1984 in response to an invitation to its Political Affairs Committee by the Governments of Nicaragua, Honduras, Costa Rica and El Salvador. The rapporteur lost no opportunity for talks with leading politicians from the government and opposition and representatives of the church and social groups.

The comments and conclusions in this report take account of all the information and documents and accounts of their visit by Members of the European Parliament available, in particular the resolutions adopted in relation to the abovementioned reports.

II. Objectives

The aim of this report is to provide better information, indicate criteria and provide a basis for possible solutions to the problems, particularly in relation to:

- the search for peaceful, political solutions to the tensions and conflicts which exist,
- the problem of respect for human rights,
- humanitarian aid,
- the development of pluralist, democratic structures by free elections,
- the role of the European Community in Central America and the scope for greater economic and development cooperation.

III. Introduction

In many respects, El Salvador has become the interface not only of the North-South but also of the East-West conflict. At the end of 1982 and during 1983 there has been a dramatic shift in emphasis in the region.

In El Salvador, the moderate democratic forces in government, the political parties and the armed forces are still in danger of being crushed between militant extreme right-wing groups both inside and outside government and a Marxist/Leninist dominated guerrilla force.

The ruthlessness of all those involved in the struggle has cost the lives of over 40,000 civilians since 1979. It is ruining the infrastructure and the economic foundations of the country. The reforms which were introduced have been repeatedly undermined.

'Today El Salvador, which is allied with Guatemala and Honduras, enjoys good relations with neutral Costa Rica and Panama and receives political, economic and military aid from the USA, has entered the conflict against Sandinist Nicaragua which - with Cuban backing - has assumed the role of a destabilizing Marxist/Leninist force in the region. Since 1982 tension has been steadily growing between Nicaragua - which is still backing the left-wing guerrillas of El Salvador - and its neighbours Honduras and Costa Rica.'

An ideological conflict, which Europeans often see in very black-and-white terms and occasionally exacerbate, is being fought out in this region at the expense of a people suffering from economic crisis, social problems and the misery of refugees.

The European Community must be concerned to find a swift, peaceful solution to the tensions in Central America and the Caribbean. Every trouble-spot, in which the interests of the super-powers are involved, threatens the precarious balance of world peace. The concern to prevent any expansion of the countless conflicts on the narrow isthmus between the two American continents has, after a number of attempts, led Columbia, Mexico, Panama and Venezuela to embark on a peace plan supported by all Central American states and the USA, the CONTADORA initiative, to seek a new approach to peace in the region.
The European Community should, therefore, support all proposals for peaceful development while strictly respecting the sovereignty and without interfering in the internal affairs of countries in this region, and as part of a comprehensive economic and development policy, help to create the conditions which will lead to a general respect for human rights, eliminate the misery of refugees, and ensure political pluralism, social progress and improve economic and trade opportunities on the world markets. The European Parliament has undertaken to play a greater role in trade relations with Central America.

IV. The position of El Salvador in the conflict in Central America

In order to appreciate the origins of the conflict in Central America, it is essential to understand the key role which El Salvador played - and is still playing.

1. Introduction

El Salvador, which has been independent since 1821 and until 1849 formed part of the Central American Federation with Guatemala, Honduras, Costa Rica and Nicaragua, enjoyed a period of relative peace and prosperity in the 19th century. The backbone of its economy was the coffee plantations introduced in 1860, which along with sugar and cotton, today still account for the bulk of agricultural production.

Social tensions led in 1932 to an uprising by farmworkers which was put down by the army. Since then the country has been governed by military régimes allied with the upper class which consists chiefly of the large landowners. These normally consolidated their position by holding sham elections.

In 1972, on a joint opposition list, the chairman of the Christian Democrats - Partido Democra Crisiano (PDC) - and mayor of the capital San Salvador, José Napoleon Duarte, on the platform of comprehensive social reform was elected president, and the head of the small Social Democratic 'Movimiento Nacional Revolucionario (MNR), Manuel G. Ungo, was elected vice-president. The army manipulated the election results to the benefit of their own candidates. A countercoup failed and Duarte, arrested and tortured, went with Ungo and others into exile in Venezuela.
The social tensions, above all among the rural population and on the fringes of the towns continued to grow. In close collaboration with the Frente Sandinista de la Liberación (FSLN) which was operating successfully against the Somoza régime in Nicaragua, the guerrilla movements which had been in existence in El Salvador for some time and which had combined in 1980 to form the Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional (FMLN) gained ground. The situation was made even worse by the ordering home of hundreds of thousands of Salvadoreans working in Honduras and this was the main cause of the war which broke out between the two neighbouring countries in 1969.

On 15 October 1979 a 'revolutionary government junta' consisting of young officers headed by Colonel Adolfo Majano and civilians including the Social Democrat Ungo, returned from exile, took over power in a coup against the dictator General Romero. Initially the junta with its social economic reform programme enjoyed considerable support among the population and social groups but was unable or unwilling to prevent the further growth of the FMLN guerrilla movement or its predecessor CR-PM.

The government collapsed at the beginning of 1980. Ungo, whose MNR had become a member of the Socialist International (SI) in 1978, went into exile in Mexico accompanied by some Christian Democrats who at a PDC congress at the beginning of 1980 had been defeated in a vote on a pact with the armed forces. Ungo became head of the political bureau of the Frente Democrático Revolucionario (FDR), an association comprising a large number of left-wing parties, organizations and groups among which the Communist Party is numerically by far the strongest. Ungo, the former Christian Democrat Zamora, Oqueli and others organized the revolutionary opposition and together with the SI directed the attention of world public opinion to the situation in El Salvador.

The FDR as the 'political wing' and the FMLN guerrillas as the 'military wing' of the resistance were now working together openly on a formal basis. In the FMLN too, Communists of various tendencies assumed the leading role among the 'commandantes'. The Secretary-General of the PCS Shafik Jorge Handal, also head of the 'Fuerzas Armadas para Liberación Nacional' (FALN) was clearly able to consolidate his position in the FMLN five-man Leadership following the death of the popular former Communist and leader Cayetano Carpio\(^1\), head of the

\(^1\)S. Cayetano Carpio committed suicide in the middle of April 1983 under mysterious circumstances after his deputy, Melinda Anaya Routes (Comandante Ana Moria) had been murdered, according to the Nicaraguan Minister of the Interior, Tomas Borge, by members of her own FPL guerrilla leadership.
'Fuerzas Populares de Liberación' (FPL). This revolutionary opposition openly declared civil war although their policies (destruction of the feudal oligarchic structures, reforms, more democracy) offered no alternatives to government policy.

The new junta, based on an alliance between the Christian Democrats and moderate leaders of the armed forces, which was in power until the elections on 28 March 1982, embarked on a comprehensive programme of reform (agricultural reform, nationalization of banks and foreign trade). It was determined to fight the guerrillas without however ruling out a political solution through negotiations with the FDR.

Napoleon Duarte took over as head of the junta in December 1980. In his statement of government policy, Duarte laid stress on the need for internal peace, implementation of reforms respect for human rights and the gradual elimination of the state of emergency and announced free, internationally supervised elections to a constituent assembly in March 1982.

2. The elections of 28 March 1982

The elections announced in the policy speech of December 1980 of 60 members of a constituent assembly took place on 28 March 1982.

While the opposition FDR/FMLN described the elections as a farce and called on the people to boycott the elections, six parties took part. These were the Christian Democrats (PDC), the Partido de Conciliación Nacional (PCN), the traditional populist government party of the oligarchy, the Alianza Republicana Nacionalista (ARENA) headed by the ex-major of the intelligence services, D'Aubuisson, who is alleged to have close links with the death squads, the Liberal-Conservative Partido Acción Democrática (AD) and two minority parties.

From the very outset the elections were accompanied by major international controversy. The likelihood of free elections actually being held was judged sceptically by the Socialist International because of the risk to the candidates and the boycott by the left-wing opposition. The SI sent no official delegation of observers.

By contrast, the elections were supported by the vast majority of the Latin American Members of the Organization of American States (OAS), except Mexico, Nicaragua, Grenada and Cuba, the USA and the leading Latin American Christian
Socialist and Social-Democratic trade union movements, CLAT and ORIT, who sent observers. The church also backed the elections.

The vast majority of the observers considered that the outcome of the elections, with a turnout of approximately 80% of the population despite intimidation by the opposition and armed attacks on the polling day was a demonstration against violence and in favour of the process of democratization and peace.

The outcome of the elections however failed to resolve the ambiguous political situation in the country. Although the Christian-Democrats, with some 41% of the votes cast and 24 seats, became by far the strongest political force in the country, a right wing majority formed consisting of ARENA (29% of the vote and 18 seats) and the PCN (18% of the vote and 14 seats). The moderate AD remained a negligible force with only 2 seats. Major D'Aubuisson was appointed president of the assembly. Massive internal and external political pressure succeeded in preventing a sharp swing to the right which the government had been expected to make and thus the risk of a roll-back of the reforms. The neutral technocrat, Magaña, was elected president, and the Christian-Democrats accepted a role in government to act as a counterweight to ARENA. The all-party 'Pact of Apaneca' (August 1982) ensured that the reforms would continue and put an end to the constant threat of a military take-over.

The constituent assembly in which the Christian-Democrats, the AD and part of the PCN formed a new and precarious majority adopted in December 1983 a draft constitution and fixed the presidential elections for 25 March 1984. The Right succeeded nevertheless in clearly reducing the scope of the agricultural reforms introduced by Duarte.

3. The military situation

The revolutionary opposition FDR/FMLN lack the broad popular support without which they cannot hope to win. But the armed forces and government too are beginning to doubt whether a military victory is possible despite increased aid from the United States and although they enjoy a clear strategic advantage.

According to various estimates some 30,000 soldiers face at least 5 to 6,000 guerrillas. The FMLN based in Managua are supported by propaganda and military aid from the Sandinistas in Nicaragua. The guerrillas are said to be well-trained and their political/military leaders, the 'commandantes', maintain strict discipline despite some conflicts within the FMLN leadership.
All major offensives by the armed opposition have failed. Their worst military setback was the collapse of the much publicised 'final offensive' of January 1981. They are, however, operating with a degree of success from secure bases, particularly in the impenetrable areas along the Honduran border (Chalatenango, Cabañas, Morazán) and with their flexible, fast-moving tactics have inflicted considerable damage on the economy and infrastructure of the country. Their strategy is to divide the country in particular by isolating the western provinces.

4. Economic and social reforms

The core of the policies of Duarte's Junta from the very beginning was a policy of reforms which they saw as the only way to achieve social justice by participation, to pave the way for democracy and to remove support for a violent revolutionary solution to the country's problems.

The main measure was the agricultural reform ushered in by Decree No. 153 of 5 March 1980 which provided in a number of stages for the transfer of all agricultural areas exceeding 100 to 150 ha irrespective of how they were being used into a cooperative system (Cooperativa agrícola). To support this reform, the banks and foreign trade were nationalized as both areas were controlled by the '14 families' of large landowners.

The agricultural reform was often pushed through by force by the military.

The economic situation has further deteriorated and is in a state of crisis.

The GNP has fallen by 25% since 1978.

5. Human rights

The sorry state of human rights in El Salvador is shown in the reports by Amnesty International, the American Congress, the OAS Human Rights Commission and the church. It is estimated that there have been approximately 40,000 civilian deaths since 1979, and many witnesses have given evidence of missing persons, refugees, cases of illegal imprisonment and torture. 120 Christian-

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1In the new constitution the threshold was set at 250 hectares.
Democrat mayors have been assassinated. The attribution of guilt, however, varies considerably according to political viewpoint. Whereas the representatives of the Salvadorean Human Rights Commission in Mexico which cooperates with the FDR/FMLN blame the army and security forces for some 85% of the offences, this is denied by the government, the political parties and army actually in the country itself, particularly since the FMLN refuses to allow investigations in the areas under its control. There are reports that people have been 'executed' there too. Within the FMLN itself there have also been bloody conflicts.

The truth in this complicated situation would appear to be something along the following lines:

The army is trying to respect human rights, especially since supreme command passed from García to Vides. At the same time the organization of command is inadequate to instil obedience in the paramilitary units which are only technically subject to the general command.

- A large number of innocent by-standers are killed in battles between the guerrillas and the armed forces in the conflict zones. The extreme right-wing are still operating death squads.

- Several thousand roaming armed men and an almost unlimited arms market are impossible to control.

- The legal system suffers from an outdated trial procedure and is subject to heavy political pressure and the threat of left or right-wing reprisals.

- The Human Rights Commission set up by the government is not sufficiently effective.

The 250,000 and more refugees from the conflict zones within the country and from the border regions of neighbouring countries increase the general climate of insecurity.

6. Conclusion: the search for a political solution

There has been no shortage of attempts to arrive at a peaceful political solution since 1979. Both sides have taken part although tactical subterfuges have often concealed real intentions. Thus for example a peace plan presented
by the FDR/FMLN at the beginning of 1981 turned out to be a pretext to gain time to stabilize weakened military positions. The negotiations arranged by Mr Stone, the US special envoy in October 1983 in Bogota in response to the offer made by Ungo at the end of October 1982 to embark on negotiations 'without preconditions' ended with both sides trading insults.

Nevertheless there is a willingness in El Salvador except at government level and among the extreme right wing, notwithstanding considerable scepticism, to continue negotiations. The official church favours talks and has offered to act as an intermediary.

These differing standpoints reveal the two crucial issues in talks with the FDR/FMLN:

- all political groups in El Salvador reject left-wing opposition participation in government without prior elections. The opposition in exile, however, is clearly seeking participation in government as a result of negotiations, not elections, in which it would stand little chance;

- it is not known how the guerrilla forces could be re-integrated if there were an amnesty, particularly as the FMLN Comandantes have a strong position, some would say too strong, vis-à-vis Ungo and the FDR Council and adhere to the idea of a 'people's army'.

A fruitful political dialogue between the government, the armed forces and the parties represented in the constituent assembly on the one hand and the revolutionary opposition on the other hand, would seem possible, however, only if armed confrontation ends.

The elections scheduled for 25 March 1984 could be a decisive step towards furthering the process of democratization, and a defeat of the extremists could end the sufferings of the people, who bear the brunt of the political conflict.

V. New conflicts

Other flashpoints have emerged more clearly or become stabilized in recent years. Many developments in El Salvador cannot be understood without this background.
1. Cuba

Despite some sympathy for the original Cuban revolution, Cuba is generally seen as a troublemaker and close ally of the Soviet Union operating according to Marxist/Leninist rules. Cuba used to be a flourishing and prosperous island owing to its sugar although it was dominated by large landowners and great social misery prevailed; it now is under the spartan régime of a socialist country with a new leading élite which allows itself privileges it condemns in others and does not tolerate opposition.

It is true that there has been some social progress for the broad mass of the population. This applies in particular to the system of education, medical care and agriculture. A heavy price has been exacted by the revolution: there is no longer any political or trades union opposition, the church is oppressed, two million out of a population of 12 million inhabitants are living in exile while tens of thousands are detained as 'terrorists' in Cuban prisons. Cuba is also a major Russian military base and receives high levels of aid from the Soviet Union.

There is disagreement as to the extent to which Cuba is seeking hegemony but there is no doubt that it has been giving 'revolutionary' support to various countries in Latin America, Central America (Nicaragua) and African countries both in the form of arms and in the form of soldiers, development workers, doctors, teachers, civil servants, etc. In its triple role as Marxist state, successful dictatorship in a developing country and ally of the non-aligned states, Cuba has become a dangerous presence in the Communist camp and various national liberation organizations; however, this has led some states (El Salvador, Grenada) to mistrust Cuba.

There can be no doubt that the destabilizing role played by Cuba in Central America and Caribbean. After the loss of Grenada as a launching pad in the Caribbean, the distancing of Surinam from Cuba and the more active presence of the United States in Central America, in particular in Honduras, Castro seems to be pursuing a more moderate line. This seems to be the import of Cuban statements to the effect that Nicaragua cannot count on active military aid in case of an invasion by the United States.

Cuba is in favour of closer cooperation with the EEC, possibly in the hope that it will serve as an intermediary with the USA. The problematic dependence of Cuba on the Soviet Union is clearly viewed in a more critical light than
previously. The possibility of an economic opening to the detested and admired giant in the north, the United States, is probably also viewed positively.

2. Nicaragua

(a) Introduction

Nicaragua has 2.7 million inhabitants and a territory of 139,000 sq. kms. making it the largest of the five Central American countries by area but the smallest by number of inhabitants; it lies between the Caribbean and the Pacific Ocean and has borders to the north-west with Honduras and the south with Costa Rica. The history of Nicaragua has been dominated externally by powerful North American economic interests and domestically by the struggle between Conservatives and Liberals; it was occupied from 1910 to 1925 by the United States. In 1929 the Liberals - and with them, the Somoza family - came to power; they ruled and exploited the country like a private estate either directly or through the intermediary of men of straw, confirmed in sham elections and controlled it by means of a national guard of approximately 15,000 men. Some 50% of the workforce is engaged in agriculture and in 1976 approximately two-thirds of the working population were unemployed while 40% of the population were illiterate.

(b) Resistance to Somoza

After the human rights situation in particular had drastically deteriorated under President General Anastasio Somoza (1967-1979) the struggle for liberation of the people of Nicaragua gained increasing world recognition, not least thanks to the Standing Commission on Human Rights (Comision Permanente de Derechos Humanos - CPDH) headed by José Esteban Gonzales. The democratic parties, trades unions and the Catholic church and nearly all social groups took part in this struggle. The struggle against Somoza was supported in the Press by the daily, La Prensa, which was frequently banned and the editor of which, Petro J. Chamorro, was murdered at the beginning of 1979 by Somoza's state security police.

The Frente Sandinista de la Liberación Nacional (FSLN) played a key role in the struggle against Somoza; it claimed to be the political child of Augusto Sandino, who was both a freedom fighter of the 1930s, anti-American and fiercely anti-communist, though the leadership veered at an early stage towards Marxist/Leninism.

1 Excluding Belize, previously British Honduras
Even before the overthrow of Somoza the FSLN had become assimilated to the Central American 'movements of liberation' ideologically dependent on and militarily supported by Fidel Castro's Cuba which in 1980 included the Frente Farabundo Marti para la Liberación Nacional (FMLN) comprising the left-wing revolutionary guerrillas of El Salvador.

(c) The internal situation since 1979

The overthrow of the dictator Anastasio Somoza in July 1979 met with unanimous approbation all over the world. The new government which began with a considerable stock of good will, received not only moral support but also massive economic and development aid from the United States, the European Community and its Member States. From 1980 to 1982 the EEC gave Nicaragua more aid than to all the other Central American states together.

The FSLN solemnly undertook to respect three essentials - democracy, pluralism and a mixed economy. This undertaking was not kept.

Today the FSLN with the aid of the 'Sandinista People's Army' (Ejército Popular Sandinista) which was relatively well armed at a very early stage, the tight monitoring system of the Sandinista Defence Committee (CDS) and 'basis organizations', exercises total control over the state and political and social life.

Officially, executive power lies with a three-member ruling junta and the Council of Ministers while legislative authority lies with a state Council (Consejo de Estado), appointed as a Parliament, where the Sandinistas enjoy a majority of three-quarters. In fact, decisions are made by the Sandinista 'Dirección Nacional' of the nine 'Comandantes de la Revolución' which, since its inception, has been controlled by a core of five - the coordinator of the junta, Daniel Ortega, his brother, the Minister of Defence Humberto Ortega, Tomas Borge the Minister of the Interior, Sergio Ramírez a member of the junta, and the President of the Council of State, Carlos Nuñez. The ultimate adoption of Marxist/Leninism as official ideology has been evidenced by many statements despite all denials.

'Sandinism is the source of our moral and political strength and Marxism/Leninism is our doctrine' stated Humberto Ortega in 'La principal tarea del pueblo es prepararse militarmente para defender su poder', Sección de Formación Política y Cultural del Ejército Popular Sandinista, Managua 1981, Page 9.
Many former comrades-in-arms of the Sandinistas who called on the régime to honour its commitments to introduce democracy and pluralism joined a steadily increasing stream of refugees in exile including a member of the second junta, the social democrat Alfonso Robelo; the Deputy Minister of Defence, Edén Pastora (‘Comandante Zero’) who had led the attack on the Presidential palace in 1979 and so ushered in the end of the Somoza dictatorship; the President of the Commission on Human Rights CPDH, José Esteban Gonzales and many others. At the beginning of 1983 Robelo and Pastora decided to launch an armed struggle against the Sandinista régime with several thousand men; Esteban preferred to found a non-violent opposition in exile. Unlike the Frente Democrático Nicaragüense (FDN), a force of eight to ten thousand men cooperating with former soldiers with Somoza's National Guard and operating from Honduras with financial support from the USA, the armed opposition movement of Robelo and Pastora has received only limited foreign aid. In 1983 the non-violent democratic opposition remaining in the country formed the 'Coordinadora Democrática' in the hope that by closing ranks it would be better able to exploit the steadily shrinking political leeway permitted by the 'Frente Patriótico' under Sandinist control. The Frente comprises parties loyal to the régime which are supposed to represent pluralist tendencies alongside the FSLN: the independent Liberal party (PLI), the Socialist Party of Nicaragua (PSN), the Social Christian People's Party (PP SC), the representatives of which are, however, given no room to manoeuvre by the Coordinadora.

(d) The threat to pluralist democracy and human rights

The construction of the powerful Sandinista Army, which even before the military operations of opposition groups began on the borders was far larger than other Central American armies, attracted strong political opposition from outside, above all from Honduras, Costa Rica and finally from the USA. The régime of the Comandantes used this situation as a pretext for delivering body-blows to democracy and pluralism.

1 The non-violent opposition in exile is gathered together in the Asamblea Nicaragüense de Unidad Democrática (ANUDE). The armed opposition includes the democratic Alianza Revolucionaria Democrática (ARDE) of Robelo and Pastora, some 3,000 Misquitos of the MISURASATA headed by Steadman Fagoth Müller and Fernando Chamorros democratic UDM-FARN as well as the FDN referred to above.

2 Members include: The partido Social Demócrata (PSD), the Partido Social Cristiano (PSC), the Partido Liberal Constitucionalista (PLC), the Social Democratic Union (CUS) and the Christian-Socialist Union (CTN).
The press, radio and television were gradually brought in line. All radio programmes and newspapers are censored every day. The effectiveness of the daily 'La Presna' which alone has remained independent is substantially limited, as in Somoza's day, by censorship and other repressive measures such as arbitrary restrictions on the allocation of paper or on sales. For example on Friday, 27 January 1984, 'La Prensa' failed to appear following the censorship of 70% of its contents, including a statement of the conference of bishops. Violeta Chamorro, the widow of the editor of 'La Prensa' murdered under Somoza who left the first junta is nevertheless trying to keep the newspaper in operation.

Since 1982 the Sandinistas have found an effective instrument for the arbitrary arrest of and imposition of sentences on opposition forces without any legal procedure in the form of the emergency laws (leyes de emergencia) and the blanket charge of 'counter-revolution' ('actividades contrarevolucionarias'). Christian-Socialist and Social Democratic trade unionists and left and right-wing politicians and conservatives are particularly at risk from the Sandinista legal system. (The independent Commission on Human Rights, CPDH, gives the following figures: from January to August 1983 there were some 802 political prisoners and 128 missing persons and 95 cases of torture were recorded.) Many of these political prisoners had already been persecuted under the Somoza dictatorship. In November 1983 alone 30 non-Sandinist trade unionists were arrested. Opposition politicians, trade unionists and their families, but also Christians and priests are terrorized and intimidated by 'turbas', organized shock troops. In view of this variety of repressive measures it is almost impossible to build up political and trade union organizations outside Sandinista control.

(e) The Indians

Another group persecuted with increasing ruthlessness by the Sandinistas since 1980 are the approximately 180,000 Misquito Indians who, together with the Sumos and Ramas, are the original inhabitants of Nicaragua in settlements predominantly on the border with Honduras and on the Atlantic coast. The Misquitos have traditionally been allowed linguistic, cultural, administrative and religious autonomy - the overwhelming majority belong to the Protestant Iglesia Moravia (brotherhood) - but the Sandinistas have tried to integrate them forcibly on the pretext that this would benefit the economic exploitation of the region inhabited for centuries by these tribes. When the three population
groups resisted forcible integration, the Sandinista People's Army destroyed some of their villages, churches and hospitals and deported some 30,000 natives into four concentration camps in the interior of the country. According to conservative estimates approximately 1,000 Indians were killed during this forcible re-settlement and in the course of their resistance. Approximately 18,500 or more than 10% fled to Honduras and some 3,000 joined the MISURASATA leader Fagoth Müller in armed opposition to the Sandinistas.

(f) The church

The Sandinistas have also entered into a conflict with the Catholic church which is now forced to campaign against violations of human rights and anti-democratic developments as in Somoza's day under the slogan 'peace, justice and freedom'. In addition, it attacks the Marxist/Leninist indoctrination in state schools and the militarization of the country. The Archbishop of Managua, Monsignor Miguel Obando y Bravo, has become a symbol for the self-assertion of the church against attempts to divide it and against the totalitarian state.

The Pope's visit to Nicaragua in 1983 turned into a demonstration of the people's loyalty to the church and of the régime's desire to manipulate the masses by stirring up trouble.

The Catholic church sharply opposed the introduction of conscription in the summer of 1983. Nicaragua now has approximately 100,000 Sandinista soldiers and militia men (out of 2.7 million inhabitants) - more men under arms than all other Central American states together. In August 1983 the Conference of Bishops spoke out clearly in favour of national defence but stated that no-one should be forced to do military service, in order to defend a particular ideology or to benefit one sole political party.

On 30 September 1983 'turbas divinas' (divine legions) attacked six churches and assaulted the suffrage bishop of Managua, Monsignor Bosco Vivas.

The régime aims, by means of basis communities, to build up a 'people's church' - as opposed to the 'official church' - as an opposition within a church. Prominent representatives of the government : Father Miguel D'Escoto (Foreign Minister), Ernesto Cardenal (Minister of Culture, who was awarded the peace prize of the German book trade) and Fernando Cardenal (Leader of Sandinist youth) support these attempts to undermine the unity of the church, which however meet with little sympathy among the population owing to the deep-rooted
Catholicism of the people of Nicaragua. Radio Católica is only allowed to broadcast religious programmes; the latter are censored as are the pastoral letters of the bishops. Nevertheless, contacts between church and state continue.

The tensions between the Sandinistas and the Catholic church were revealed once again when in December 1983 it was officially announced - and then denied - that the American bishop Schlaefer who had lived in the country for 20 years had been murdered by counter-revolutionaries, whereas in fact he was accompanying Misquito refugees to Honduras. The Catholic church in Germany referred in this connection to a 'deliberate lie'.

(g) The 1984 elections and the amnesty

After years of contradictory statements the coordinator of the junta, Daniel Ortega, announced at the beginning of December 1983 to the Council of State that elections would be held in 1985. In February 1984 it was then announced - after a temporary denial in response to an air raid by counter-revolutionaries - that the President of State and a constituent assembly would be elected with a six-year mandate. The draft electoral law has now been drawn up and the debate in the Council of State is due to take place in March 1984. On 20 February 1984 Daniel Ortega scheduled the elections for 4 November 1984, two days before the American presidential elections, on a 'pluralist basis', and fixed the minimum age for voting at 16 years.

The democratic opposition to the Coordinadora Democrática is sceptical whether in view of the conditions and these contradictory statements free democratic and pluralist elections will be possible. They call for a full restoration of democratic pluralism and consider that only then will the demands of the CONTADORA initiative be met.

The have reservations with regard to the emergency laws, the restrictions on the press, on freedom of opinion and assembly, the lack of access to the state-controlled media, the pressure exerted by the government and the Sandinista grass-roots organizations on the democratic parties and non-Sandinist unions and Article 2 of the preamble and other provisions of the Party Law of 1983 which state that all political Parties must be based on the principles of the Sandinist revolution. Furthermore, the Sandinistas either make no attempt to conceal that they are unwilling under any circumstances to hand over power, as
Minister of the Interior Borge stated in a television interview on ARD (Production No. 247071) in the summer of 1983, or they deny that elections are an essential part of modern democracy (this is what Daniel Ortega said in announcing the elections). It remains to be seen to what extent the selection of the Sandinista Presidential candidate leads to splits within the FSLN.

The Government's offer of an amnesty in December 1983, and the announcement of elections are clearly intended to reassure an increasingly critical public opinion abroad. One hundred and thirty detained Misquitos and some Christian Socialist politicians have in fact been released in Managua. At the same time however there have been new arrests and there is no question of a restoration of the traditional rights of the Misquitos. The wording of the amnesty allows the régime to exclude individual politicians to which it takes exception.

(h) Agricultural reform and the economic situation

The agricultural reform which, following the expropriation of the Somoza family from its 1 million ha. estate is in its second phase, provides above all for the distribution of the fallow land in estates over 370 hectares (law of 1982). According to the Government the aim of this measure is with reference to the standard of living and the structure of agriculture, to allow people to exploit agricultural land, rather than to create property. Membership of cooperatives opens the way to social and educational benefits. The sale of land is organized centrally for the whole country and applies to all forms of production, both the private sector and cooperatives. The object is thus to achieve a planned economy rather than pluralism. At the same time the social and economic situation of the country is catastrophic, like in Cuba basic foodstuffs are rationed. The reasons for this state of affairs - which are not just confined to Nicaragua - are the collapse of the world market prices for the main export products (sugar, coffee, cotton) and the increase in the prices of imports such as oil and raw materials; this leads to annual foreign debts of 850 million US$ for Nicaragua, which like El Salvador, is considered a serious creditor. In addition, there are domestic reasons such as the excessive militarization of the country and finally the consequences of armed opposition which is beginning to have a permanent impact on the infrastructure and economy of Nicaragua, as in El Salvador.
(i) The foreign policy situation

Two thousand Cuban military advisers (Havana acknowledges 200) are influencing Sandinist policy. Internationalists of all brands are present in the country and arms shipments from Libya disguised as medical products were recently detected in Brazil. It is generally accepted that the Sandinistas have political and military links with the FMLN guerrilla leadership in Managua (El Salvador) and have made incursions into Honduran territory. The Minister of the Interior, Tomas Borge, admitted in September 1983 quite openly that he was an exponent of the 'domino theory' in Central America and was thus pursuing the destabilization of the region.

The conflicts in which Nicaragua has become involved with Costa Rica and Honduras are the product of the aggressive and expansionist military creed of 'proletarian internationalism' of the Sandinistas. Both countries, but especially Costa Rica which has no army, feel threatened by the extremely powerful Sandinista armed forces which support subversive movements in their countries. Costa Rica has, as a preventive measure, called for an OAS peace force in the border region with Nicaragua and Honduras has, after six months' joint sea manoeuvres in 1983, further consolidated its close military cooperation with the United States by granting the latter a base on its territory. The revival of the CONDECA defence pact between El Salvador, Honduras and Guatemala is also directed against the destabilization instigated by Cuba through the intermediary of Nicaragua.

It is questionable, especially in view of the present forced militarization of the country, whether the Sandinista Government will depart from this course. Admittedly, Nicaragua very rapidly agreed to the CONTADORA peace initiative and submitted its own proposals, for instance, offers of a non-aggression pact with the USA, Costa Rica and Honduras. However, the next months will reveal to what extent this was a tactic to reassure world public opinion, the result of temporary concern at a possible counter-attack by the United States on the Grenada model or was based on a deeper insight into the need for peaceful developments for the benefit of all peoples in the region. In the medium-term the political and economic credibility of the régime will depend on the democratic development of the country and the restraint shown in foreign policy. If all democrats in free countries remain watchful then perhaps the final conversion of Nicaragua into a people's democracy on the Cuban model may be prevented.

1 Interview in 'Playboy' (American Edition), September 1983, p. 192
2 Officially Nicaragua is also a member.
3. **Costa Rica**

Situated between Panama to the south and Nicaragua to the north-west, Costa Rica is regarded as a haven of democracy in Central America. Since 1948 when the founder of the Social Democratic Partido de Liberación Nacional (PLN) and first democratic president, José Figueres, successfully overcame Communist opposition and established the presidential constitution which is still in force, Costa Rica has been a model of democratic stability in Latin America. Changes of power between the Government and opposition operate smoothly. The present Government of the Social Democrat Luis Alberto Monge (since 1982) which is based on a majority of 33 out of 57 Congress delegates (the oppositional UNIDAD - the Christian Democrats and Liberals - have 18 seats while the Communist Party has four seats) has set about implementing its programme of economic revival of the country.

Costa Rica is clearly pro-West in outlook. In the conflict between North and South Costa Rica is on the side of the developing countries but clearly favours pragmatic development solutions. As a result of this position Costa Rica enjoys a high degree of credibility and moral authority in all its foreign and security policy action. This is generally recognized. In 1949 Costa Rica adopted a new constitution and disbanded its armed forces and now only has a police force. The Social Democratic President of Costa Rica, Luis Alberto Monge, and his party take a highly discriminating view of the guerrilla movement in El Salvador and developments in Nicaragua which differ sharply from that of the Socialist International. Costa Rica is concerned that its 'democratic achievements won by defeating the Communists in 1948' (to quote the Social Democrat founding President Figueres) could be threaten by Nicaragua and a left-wing El Salvador. El Salvador is seen as part of a 'regional problem' (ex-President Carazo). The frame of reference here is Central America and the aim is a democratic solution for the entire region, and at all events no Sandinist solution. Costa Rica is determined to resist a Communist-inspired revolution and in this it has the support of a large majority of those in Government and opposition. It supports the CONTADORA initiative together with El Salvador, Honduras and Guatemala. It maintains a reserved - and occasionally even negative - attitude to the operations of Nicaraguan rebels from its territory (the ARDE of Pastora and Robelo in particular). Costa Rica has no desire to be forced into a military commitment.
Honduras borders on Nicaragua to the south, Guatemala to the north and El Salvador to the north-west along the Pacific coastline. The borders between the countries have always been a source of controversy in Central American history. Honduras is the poorest country in Central America. In 1981 the first parliamentary democracy was established there by a parliamentary and presidential election supported by the armed forces. Its precarious economic situation has been made worse by the fall in the world coffee price. Some 53% of the population is illiterate. As a result the recently established democratic government is faced with almost insuperable obstacles.

After the elections in November 1981 Honduras acquired a civil (constitutional) government for the first time after decades of more or less open military rule. President Suazo enjoys the support of an absolute majority of the Partido Liberal (PL; 44 out of 82 seats). The traditional majority Party, the Partido Nacional (PN) has 34 seats, the (new) centre-left Partido de Innovación y Unidad (PINU) has three seats and the left-wing Partido Democrática Cristiano (PDC) has one seat.

Honduras now finds it is between two areas of conflict. On the one side there is Nicaragua (with whom it previously enjoyed good relations) with its expansionist revolutionary ideas and dominant military power. The refugees consist not only of Somoza supporters organized in the FDN guerrilla force fleeing from the Sandinist revolution, but also former Sandinist supporters who feel the revolution has been betrayed and are fleeing across the border to operate from Honduras as guerrillas against Nicaragua. The Sandinists fighting Somoza came across the same border. The refugee problem has been made even worse by some 18,000 members of the Misquito, Sumo and Rama Indian tribes who fled across the border to Honduras because of the brutal Nicaraguan resettlement programme. So far the majority - i.e. those who do not join the MISURASATA in the struggle against the Government in Managua - have been absorbed by the Misquito tribes already in the country, with whom they are related. The escalating conflict has meant that Honduras has had to evacuate its own population from the border area.

On the other side, there is a long border with El Salvador, with which Honduras is constantly being involved in hostilities. The 'football war' in July 1969 was brought to an end only with great difficulty by the OAS.
Many refugees from El Salvador (approximately 35,000) who found themselves between the guerrillas and the armed forces are adding to the refugee problem which the country is quite unable to deal with. These camps were frequently used by FMLN guerrillas as supply bases and thus became an additional military and political risk. Some of them were therefore moved to the centre of the country. The refugee problem would be impossible to solve without international aid, especially from the UN to which the EEC also contributes. Relations with El Salvador have now returned to normal. Joint military operations on both sides of the borders against the supply routes of the FMLN guerrillas from Nicaragua to Honduran territory have proved successful. The military cooperation of both countries with Guatemala in the framework of the CONDECA Agreement has been resumed. Honduras enjoys closer political and military relations with the United States than any other country in the region; this is evidenced by the fact that it took part in joint sea manoeuvres for 6 months in 1983 and has granted the United States a military base on its territory. The aim of these measures is to deter military attacks from Nicaragua.

5. Guatemala

The international controversy surrounding Central America, and El Salvador in particular which reached a height in 1981 and the first half of 1982 has now turned in part to Guatemala. In March 1982, General Rios Montt, supported by young officers favouring reform, came to power in a coup and brought an end to the military dictatorship which had reigned for 20 years. The Rios Montt Government's main aim was to suppress the ever-stronger guerrillas and restore order. It undertook to improve the human rights situation and carry out a constitutional reform by 1985. After a one-month amnesty, however, the government resorted to harsh repressive measures to control the guerrillas. Captured guerrillas were sentenced to death by special tribunals. A particularly provocative gesture occurred shortly before Pope John Paul II visited the country when executions were carried out despite an appeal for clemency from the Pope.

In August 1983 the Rios Montt régime was overthrown in a coup by the armed forces after the President, who belongs to a Protestant sect, had begun to persecute the Catholic Church, to pursue different policy objectives and to suppress free pluralistic elections.
Following pressure from the OAS Human Rights Commission and the US Government, a national human rights commission was set up consisting of representatives of the government, university, employers, trade unions, press and Indian tribes but was unable to have a decisive effect on the situation.

The new President, General Oscar Mejia Victores, undertook to lead the country towards democracy and respect for human rights. However, so far there is no sign of any far-reaching improvement in the situation or indeed of any clear government policy. Oppression continues and the democratic opposition such as the Christian Democrats who initially had some faith in Rios Montt are increasingly persecuted and victims among the civil population are steadily increasing.

Much will depend on whether the elections announced for July 1984 can really be held - and democracy established - despite the struggle against the guerrillas. Freedom of the press and freedom of speech are non-existent. Despite some efforts to achieve a pluralist party system the armed forces dominate the scene. Guatemala has joined the CONTADORA initiative together with other states in the region, but at the same time has begun to play an active role in CONDECA, the Central American defence alliance, with Honduras and El Salvador which was revived in 1983. Social tensions persist. It seems as if the reforms introduced by Rios Montt, above all the agricultural reforms, are being dismantled.

VI. The role of the United States

The US is inevitably involved in any developments in this region. This applies not only to security, but also economic developments. The emergence of Marxist/Leninist revolutionary movements, such as those in Nicaragua, Grenada and the 'national liberation movements' in El Salvador and Guatemala since the Cuban revolution, has alarmed the United States.

Perhaps American governments in the past were not sufficiently concerned about the removal of the colonial régimes and the oligarchies and dictatorships which succeeded them, and which were supported by the United States for many years because of trade interests, and their replacement by democratic systems. This explains the traditionally strained relations between the USA and numerous Latin American countries although the extreme (official) anti-Americanism of Cuba and Nicaragua are exceptions.
But since the Carter Administration and even under President Reagan, the stabilization of democracy and a lasting improvement of human rights have played an increasingly important role. No political stabilization can come about without economic stabilization of the region. American support for the armed forces and thus support for a political power which is scarcely comprehensible for Europeans today creates difficulties for all Central American states although in some cases they see this as necessary. Within the whole of Latin America, apart from a few exceptions (Costa Rica and Mexico), the armed forces are almost a constituent part of every régime. It would be impossible anywhere to implement a policy directed against the armed forces. This applies both to right-wing and to left-wing régimes. Clearly the United States is nowadays adopting a more sophisticated approach to its support for the various attempts to create democratic governments and constitutions than in the past.

Any direct intervention by the United States - which seemed acceptable in the case of Grenada because Cuba had almost occupied the island - would have disastrous consequences for the region, and anyway is rejected by the Americans as utterly unthinkable. US policy is directed towards consolidating those governments willing to embark on reforms and democracy and against the revolutionary movements supported by Cuba. The United States has recognized that given the crass social distinctions which cannot be redressed by right-wing dictatorship, it is inevitable in the long term to support the more democratic forms of government if dictatorships of the right are not to be replaced in civil war, which bring unremitting misery for the population, by revolutionary dictatorships of the left. Those may rid the country of the extreme right-wing and rich oligarchies but cannot satisfy the needs of the people and promote their own initiatives and develop democratic forms of State and society.

The cornerstones of the changing policy of the United States towards Central America and the Caribbean are the following inter-related issues: the USA's own security interests, support for democratic and pluralist solutions and the rapid defusing of the potential social conflict fuelled by poverty and under-development.

American initiatives

- The Caribbean Plan

This new US policy is reflected in the proposals made by President Reagan in February 1982 for a 'Caribbean Basin Plan'. This plan provides for customs
preferences for imports to the USA for 12 years, apart from textiles (although 87% of Caribbean imports to the USA are already exempt from customs duty), incentives for US companies investing in the Caribbean basin for 12 years and financial aid of $350,000 to alleviate economic difficulties. The plan, of which Congress finally only approved a small proportion, is however encountering growing scepticism from all states in the Caribbean, because of its relatively low financial volume and the excessive delay in implementation.

The Kissinger Plan

Repeated visits by President Reagan's special envoy to Central America, Richard Stone, who has now resigned, to all countries of the region and the CONTADORA states - Columbia, Mexico, Panama and Venezuela - visits by Congress delegations and the setting-up of a national two-party commission headed by former Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, (the Kissinger Mission) have helped to improve the stock of information about the region and to establish the previously uncoordinated initiatives on a firmer and more dependable conceptual and financial basis.

The Kissinger Plan submitted in 1984 makes a decisive contribution to this objective. Using traditional forms of approach to Central America he establishes three main objectives:

(1) Democratic self-determination
(2) Support for economic and social development to the benefit of all
(3) Cooperation with the aim of averting the security threat to the region.

On this basis, to which is added a comprehensive analysis of the crisis in Central America from the point of view of poverty and social injustice, economic instability and the destabilization attempts instigated by Cuba and the Soviet Union in the region, the Commission proposes a package of specific mutually inter-related measures:

- on a stage-by-stage basis from 1984 to 1990 Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Panama would receive a total of US $20.6 billion\(^2\) and Nicaragua, which at present is excluded from the US aid programme, US $3.4 billion in the form of economic aid.


\(^2\) Costa Rica : 5.1; El Salvador : 5.5; Guatemala : 4.5; Honduras : 2.3; Panama : 3.2 billion US $.
o Under the heading 'Human Development' increased aid would be made available for culture, education, health and housing programmes.

o The creation of a stable peace in the region based on the principles of non-intervention and the sovereignty, independence and integrity of all Central American countries, the specific commitment to pluralist democracy and respect for human rights and a defusing of tension in the region by arms reductions; permanent crisis management is to be carried out by a council of the five Foreign Ministers, with the USA, Mexico, Panama, Columbia and Venezuela sending observers.

The report also recommends supporting the CONTADORA peace initiative and regular consultations with the European allies.

It is not yet clear whether the ambitious objectives of the Kissinger Plan, particularly as regards the financial part, can be fully implemented and now that the President has agreed to it in principle whether Congress will also approve the Plan. Theoretically, however, the Kissinger Plan is an essential contribution to a new American policy in Central America.

Generally speaking, the United States is now beginning to react in a more flexible and convincing manner to existing conflicts. The new turn taken by US policy in Central America is shown by the high priority given to respect for human rights, support for democratic and pluralist developments and reforms to create sounder economic and social structures and to defuse potentially revolutionary conflicts in the area. US policy could serve to disarm the threat of (military) force - whether left or right - and to prevent, in the medium term, Communist destabilization attempts.

VII. The CONTADORA peace initiative

In view of the explosive situation in Central America where at any time individual conflicts could spread throughout the whole region with incalculable international consequences for East-West relations, there have been repeated attempts since 1979 - the date of the overthrow of the Somoza dictatorship in Nicaragua and the escalation of the guerrilla war in El Salvador - to find peaceful political solutions. All states, parties and groups involved in the conflicts have taken part in these attempts but no concrete results have been achieved.
The most important peace moves have been launched by Mexico and Venezuela which, despite their different forms of state and society, have a vital interest in a reduction of tension in the region and have always acted as intermediaries in conflicts among their Central American neighbours. As a result of these efforts at the beginning of October 1982 the Foreign Ministers of eight Caribbean states, together with the USA, issued a statement in which they undertook to support the principles of peaceful democratic change and economic and social progress. These good declarations of intent have, however, not been followed up by concrete action and tensions have increased dramatically.

In this explosive situation, the peace initiative put forward by the CONTADORA states of Colombia, Mexico, Panama and Venezuela seems to offer the only gleam of hope. Early in September 1983, the principles of the 10-point statement of Cancún (17.7.1983) were consolidated in a draft 21-point non-aggression treaty \(^1\) which has meanwhile been formally approved by all the states involved in the conflict - Nicaragua, Honduras, Costa Rica, El Salvador and Guatemala - as a declaration of intent. The European Community supports this initiative, and the Sixth EC-Latin America Interparliamentary Conference (13-16.6.1983 in Brussels) also approved it unanimously. From all sides there have been only positive reactions.

If the prevailing attitude is still one of scepticism as to the chances of success, this is certainly not the fault of the - in every respect - logical and convincing text of the treaty which covers:

- halting the arms race in Central America;
- controlled reduction of the existing military resources;
- a ban on installing foreign bases and on outside military interference in domestic affairs;
- reduction in the number of foreign military advisors;
- the creation of democracy and pluralism and confidence-building measures;
- a halt to the destabilization of governments from the territory of any of the partners to the treaty.

In order to create a climate of confidence, the members of the CONTADORA group ought to ensure that the text of the treaty will be interpreted in a uniform way and introduce realistic and feasible sanctions for the event of any infringements of the treaty. The CONTADORA state of Mexico, for instance, allows, does

\(^{1}\) See Doc. PE 87.451 of 3.11.1983 (The Latin-American Delegation).
not prevent or cannot prevent the Guatemalan guerrillas from obtaining most of their recruits from its territory - for the danger point in the whole region is that liberation movements alternately operate directly or indirectly from foreign territories in order to destabilize their own or other countries.

The interests of the various parties are too disparate, the ideologically-based definitions of interference and non-interference, of justified or unjustified guerrilla action, are too different, and it remains quite unclear which instruments of control, supervision and sanction are to be introduced.

In addition, there are the following obvious problems:

- Since the conflict in Central America and the Caribbean is partly determined by the East-West opposition, any peaceful solution must also involve the USA and Cuba. Both approve the CONTADORA-group initiative in principle, but are delaying their decision on the nature of their cooperation, regardless of the fact that they are already closely involved in the treaty negotiations, pending the submission of an agreement on which a consensus can be reached.

- While Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras and El Salvador insist on the need for progress towards democracy as a precondition for peaceful solutions, Sandinist Nicaragua will not commit itself to any specific form of state or society.

- Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras and El Salvador want a purely Central American solution, although if need be they will accept the mediation of the CONTADORA group, while Nicaragua, in order to escape from its political isolation, is seeking the backing of the United Nations, among others, for its position.

Nevertheless, the European Community must continue to support the CONTADORA group's attempt to make the peace, and it must do so more emphatically than before. There appears to be no alternative, for if the existing conflicts continue this will further destroy the basis of survival of the various peoples, and any escalation into war could end in a catastrophe that could scarcely be kept confined to the region. It is in the European Community's own vital interests to ensure that the tensions are reduced and not exacerbated.
VII. The European Community and Central America

Relations between the Community and Central America are part of the complex pattern of relations between the European Community and Latin America.

In his statement on the German Presidency of the Council of 11 January 1983, the German President of the Council, the Federal Foreign Minister Mr Genscher said: 'The Ten view developments in Central America with concern. The political tensions in this region carry with them the risk of grave escalation with unforeseeable consequences. The countries of the European Community accordingly welcome initiatives from states of the region, which may lead to a reduction of tension.' There is cause for deep scepticism over developments in Nicaragua, which is moving further and further away from its original goals of pluralism, a mixed economy and non-alignment to become the focal point of crisis in Central America.

On 11 March 1982 the Commission forwarded to the European Parliament Document PE 77.723/Annex which reviewed Community aid to El Salvador. Aid had been restricted solely to emergency aid and food aid to a value of 6.875 m ECU. The aid for needy schoolchildren which the Commission stopped in 1980 has not been resumed. Up to and including 1980 the balance of trade between the Community and El Salvador fell by 137 points (imports 60, exports 233, source: Eurostat quoted in Doc. PE 78.590/Annex/fin.).

In the special programme for Central America adopted by the Council, El Salvador has been excluded for the time being because of the instability of its democratic institutions. Nicaragua was also excluded but received funds under aid for non-associated countries in 1982 though the Commission has stated that this aid is also subject to the vicissitudes in that country's democratic development.

In its resolution on relations between the EEC and Central America of 14 October 1982, the European Parliament observed: 'The European Parliament ... feels that the European Community should formulate a global policy towards Central America which incorporates the various factors and instruments at present operating individually ...'

In its resolution on aid to non-associated countries (Michel report) Doc. 1-784/82 of 19 November 1982 the European Parliament stressed 'the positive role which the Community can play in this region, a role which reflects the wishes of the countries concerned ...'. 'Approves the regional character of the initiative.'
which means that all the non-associated countries in the area, i.e. the countries of the Central American Common Market (El Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Costa Rica and Panama) and those on Hispaniola (Haiti and the Dominican Republic) will be eligible ....'

In both reports the European Parliament agrees on

- the development of a comprehensive Community policy towards Central America,
- the integration and further development of the existing criteria for this policy,
- concrete objectives which above all have as their aim the improvement of living conditions in one of the poorest and most severely disadvantaged regions of the world:
  o further development of agricultural reforms,
  o development of cooperatives,
  o development of the internal market,
  o development of indigenous alternative sources of energy,
  o development of transport infrastructure,
  o reduction of balance of payments deficits.

The conditions set by the Commission and the Council of Ministers in the special programme establish priorities for all areas in the region.

We can only agree with the Commission when, in its special action programme (COM(82) 257 final), it cites the following as the aims of greater Community involvement under paragraph I:

'... the Community should make a greater effort to help solve the problems in the socio-economic structures of these countries, which are the cause of the current instability ... (and) ... ensure that the impact is quick and substantial enough to produce tangible results not only from the political point of view but also in terms of economic efficiency.'

It is also to be welcomed that Costa Rica, Honduras and the Dominican Republic have been included in the programme from the outset. If account is to be taken of the overall development in the region, however, the current conflicts must not be exacerbated by uneven implementation of Community aid, which should instead be extended to all countries in the region. In particular, support should also be given to those countries which in addition to introducing pluralist democratic constitutions have also begun reforms to implement the abovementioned
programme. This includes El Salvador. In its development aid programmes the European Community should adopt a consistent and united approach, as do the neighbouring states in Central America, in order to avoid increasing tension and becoming involved in confrontation.

Although there is therefore unanimity about the principles of Community aid to Central America and the Caribbean, crucial questions of detail have not yet been settled or have been answered in an unsatisfactory way. They relate not only to the special programme for Central America, but also to the overall package of Community cooperation with the region, including humanitarian aid.

- The first problem is the criteria for selecting partner countries. Owing to the lack of agreement in the Council of the EEC about El Salvador, Guatemala and Nicaragua, the special programme is confined to Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic and Honduras. The current programmes include Nicaragua, but not El Salvador. If, as much evidence suggests, the selection criteria include the political situation, human rights and the degree of democracy, it is impossible to understand why El Salvador, which is involved in a difficult but constantly advancing democratic process, is excluded while Nicaragua is still included.

- The choice of projects should be determined not only by whether they satisfy the formal requirements set out in the list of criteria but also by whether they are of direct and practical help to the people. When we see, as in Nicaragua, that the Kolkhoz type of cooperative receives special state support in the framework of agricultural reform we must examine to what extent old forms of dependence on large landowners are merely replaced by new forms of dependence on state bureaucracy, instead of giving as many farmers as possible their own land.

- The Community aid programmes should in principle be carried out via non-state bodies and organizations, such as churches and ecclesiastical relief agencies, the Red Cross and, where appropriate, UN bodies (e.g. the High Commission for Refugees). This applies equally to countries with an unstable political situation and where democracy is either not advancing or is regressing.

- It is also urgently necessary to review the Commission's procedure for granting humanitarian aid. In individual cases, for instance the appropriation of 1 m ECU allocated by an urgent resolution of the European Parliament in January 1983 for Misquito refugees, it is not clear whether and how this aid really reached them.
- The Commission must, as a matter of urgency, review in depth the effectiveness of aid programmes — both planned and already implemented — so as to detect sources of error at an early stage.

- The Community will have to check whether it wants to take part in the United States' proposed 'mini-Marshall Plan' in the region as set out in the Kissinger report. The objective should be to implement and coordinate the aid as compactly and efficiently as possible by cooperation between the main industrialized countries, including Japan and Canada. The USA seems to take a favourable view of such plans, and our Latin American partners are very much in favour of triangular cooperation between the USA and Canada, the Community and Japan.

Conclusions

Great and possibly exaggerated hopes are placed in the European Community as a possible intermediary between the region of Central America and the USA, as an economic partner and as a source of support in the peaceful struggle for democracy and human rights. Despite all trade difficulties Latin Americans feel closely attached to Europeans and hope for a policy that will lead to better cooperation.

The EEC must therefore take all measures, while strictly adhering to the principle of non-intervention, to support and stabilize peaceful pluralist developments in the region by special aid programmes aimed at reducing social tensions.
MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION

tabled by Mr GLINNE, Mrs I. van den HEUVEL and
Mrs H. WIECZORZEK-ZEUL
on behalf of the Socialist Group

pursuant to Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure

on El Salvador

(PE 74.928)

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The European Parliament,

whereas since the beginning of 1981 7,000 lives have been lost in El Salvador and in 1980 almost 0.3% of the population in El Salvador was exterminated,

whereas without political intercession between the Junta and the government on the one hand and the FDR/FLMN opposition on the other and in the absence of a political settlement this decimation of the people will continue,

seeking to put an end to the war in El Salvador as swiftly as possible, to prevent further suffering among its people, to end violations of human rights and restore democracy in El Salvador,

whereas the people of El Salvador must be guaranteed, as must all peoples, the right of self-determination which includes the right to determine its own course and future,

whereas the causes of the war and social conflicts in El Salvador are to be found in that country's colonial past, glaring social injustice and inequalities and the years of opposition to the necessary social reforms,

1. Calls for the immediate opening of talks between the Junta and the FDR/FLMN and urges the USA to cease its opposition to a negotiated political settlement and to recognize the FDR/FLMN as a negotiating partner;

2. Condemns military intervention in El Salvador in the form of military advisers, arms supplies and support material. This violates the right of the people of El Salvador to self-determination. Such intervention represents an obstacle to a political settlement by encouraging the military leaders seeking a military 'solution' - at the expense of the civilian elements in the Junta and the government - and prolongs the suffering of the people. An end to military aid is therefore a prerequisite for a political settlement;

3. Condemns the systematic violation of human rights which is also practised by official state institutions and wishes every effort to be made without delay to end torture, deportations and murder and to restore a democratic system in El Salvador with freedom of activity for all political parties and trade unions, freedom of speech, etc.

4. Calls on the Commission and the governments of the Member States of the Community, as part of European Political Cooperation, to organize an international conference on El Salvador, analogous to that proposed by
the Foreign Ministers on Afghanistan, to promote the goal of a political settlement;

5. Wishes the Commission and the Council of Ministers to study proposals and submit these to the European Parliament on how the Community can contribute to furthering self-determination in Central America through economic, trade and development cooperation;

6. Wishes the Community to support through cooperation particularly those countries in Central America which have abolished dictatorships or restored democracy;

7. Calls for swift, unbureaucratic humanitarian and food aid to be given to Salvadorian refugees in Central America and the displaced persons in El Salvador, condemns any attempt to prevent the Community from giving such aid and wishes this aid to be supplied through non-governmental organizations such as the International Red Cross, the Green Cross or the Catholic Relief Service and at all events, on a larger scale;

8. Calls on the Commission and the Council to seek assurances from governments in Central America that their countries are adhering to the UN Convention on the Status of Refugees and not allowing refugees from El Salvador to be forcibly repatriated;

9. Instructs its President to follow this resolution to the Council and Commission and to the Foreign Ministers meeting in political cooperation.
MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION

tabled by Mrs DURY, Mr G. FUCHS, Mr VERNIMMEN, Mr LOMAS,
Mr ROGERS, Mr GABERT, Mrs van den HEUVEL, Mrs WIECZOREK-
ZEUL, Mr HANSCH, Mrs MACCICACCHI, Mr van HIEUWEN, Mrs FUILLIE, Mr ALBERS, Mr PAPANTONIOU, Mrs VAYSSADE, Mrs VAN HEMELDONCK,
Mr PELIKAN, Mr VGENOPOULOS, Mr GLINNE, Mrs PERY, Mr ARNDT,
Mr RIEGER, Mr PONIRIDIS, Mr PERCHERON, Mr PLASKOVITIS,
Mr BOYES, and Mr RADOUX,

pursuant to Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure

on Salvadoran refugees in Honduras

(PE 80.546)
The European Parliament,

A- whereas the Honduran authorities have already deported, against their will, 10,000 Salvadorean refugees from La Virtud and La Guarita, both near the Salvadorean frontier, to Mesa Grande where living conditions are inhuman,

B- whereas the Honduran authorities have also announced their intention to move the 6,000 Salvadorean refugees from the Colomancagua camp,

C- whereas the deportation of the refugees living initially at La Virtud and La Guarita, together with the departure of the representatives of international humanitarian organizations, was followed by the militarization of these regions,

D- whereas the majority of those living in the Colomancagua camp have stated in writing that they do not wish to be deported to Mesa Grande,

E- whereas the announcement of the deportation of people living at Colomancagua represents a strengthening of Honduras' policy of militarizing frontier regions,

F- whereas the aim of this militarization policy was to prevent new would-be refugees from El Salvador entering Honduras and to give free rein to the Salvadorean Guardia operating on Honduras territory,

G- whereas the Honduran authorities have rejected the proposal from international humanitarian organizations that reception centres should be set up in the frontier areas for would-be Salvadorean political refugees,

H- whereas the troops operating in the militarized zones systematically hunt Honduran peasants who have assisted Salvadorean refugees,
1. Calls on the President of the European Parliament and the President of the Council of Ministers to make immediate representations to the Honduran authorities to ensure that:

- the inhabitants of the Mesa Grande camp are transferred to a location where there are better sanitary, climatic and security conditions,

- the inhabitants of the Colomancagua camp are not deported to Mesa Grande,

- the international humanitarian organizations are able to set up reception centres in the frontier regions,

- the Honduran army no longer collaborates with the Salvadorean forces pursuing the refugees,

- the Honduran authorities adopt a general and positive policy of respecting the rights of refugees and would-be refugees;

2. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission and the Governments of the Member States.
MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION

tabled by Mr VANDENMEULEBROUCKE, Mrs VAN HEMELDONCK, Mrs PAUWELYN, Mrs DURY, Mr van MINNEN and Mr VAN MIERT

pursuant to Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure

on the situation in Central America
A. having regard to the persistent political violence in Central America,

B. concerned at the danger which this situation constitutes for world peace,

C. referring to the resolutions on various aspects of this situation and, more particularly, to:

   - the resolution of 17.9.81 on the violation of human rights in Guatemala (Doc. 1-835/80),
   - the resolution of 17.9.81 on the situation in El Salvador (Doc. 1-472/81 and Doc. 1-486/81),
   - the resolution of 17.6.82 on the situation in Nicaragua (Doc. 1-332/82) and
   - the resolution of 11.3.82 on the situation in El Salvador,

D. having regard to the reports by Amnesty International,

1. Calls for the establishment of a dialogue leading to negotiations between the main parties involved in the conflict in El Salvador and for the said parties to relax their intransigent attitude which is standing in the way of a just peace;

2. Requests the Commission of the European Communities and the Foreign Ministers meeting in political cooperation to take steps to facilitate a dialogue between the governments of Honduras and Nicaragua in order to prevent border disputes from escalating into a regional war which would cause great suffering to the entire population of Central America;

3. Condemns the massacres of the civilian population involving the annihilation of whole families and villages, such as has occurred amongst the peasant and Indian populations in Guatemala;

4. Condemns the policy of foreign military intervention and calls for arms deliveries and the sending of military advisers to Central America to be curtailed;

5. Requests the parliamentary delegation to the European Community/Latin America Conference to place the situation in Central America on the agenda of the sixth Interparliamentary Conference;

6. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Commission and the Council of the European Communities and to the Governments of El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua.
MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION

tabled by Mr BARBI, Mr VERGEER, Mr PEDINI,
Mr LANGES, Mr PENDERS, Mr MARCK, Mrs LENZ, Mrs WALZ,
Mr ALBER and Mrs LENTZ-CORNETTE

on behalf of the Group of the European People's
Party (C-D Group)

pursuant to Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure

on Nicaragua

(PE 84.504)
The European Parliament,

A. having regard to its resolutions Docs. 1-222/82 and 1-332/82,

B. concerned at the fact that the military regime in Nicaragua;

- is increasingly distancing itself from a move towards democracy and pluralism, contrary to the announcements made by the junta on taking power in 1979, and is thereby abandoning the basis on which all democratic forces combined to overcome the dictatorship of Somoza;
- is seeking, as all the evidence shows, to establish a monopoly role in state and society for the Sandinistas;
- is repeatedly postponing the holding of free elections;
- is drastically curtailing freedom of speech and freedom of the press;
- is prosecuting ethnic minorities such as the Misquitos, Sumos and Ramas, depriving them of their cultural, linguistic and religious identity and displacing them by force from their native regions to camps in the interior, or driving them into exile;
- is involved, to a large extent, with Cuba in destabilizing the region by giving open military support to so-called liberation movements, thereby encouraging external interference in the domestic affairs of the countries of Central America, with the aim of replacing the previous United States hegemony with a Soviet/Cuba version,

C. disturbed at the present hostilities in the border area between Honduras and Nicaragua, which constitute a serious threat to peace in the region,

D. convinced that only a policy directed towards the creation of democratic, pluralist structures can satisfy the interests of the people of Nicaragua and that any return to the Somoza regime or similar dictatorial systems is in conflict with those interests,

E. recognising the peace initiatives of Costa Rica, Colombia and Peru,
1. Calls on the Sandinista government of Nicaragua:

- to return to pluralist, democratic structures and to allow all political groups the unrestricted right to participate in the democratic opinion-forming process;

- to hold free elections as soon as possible under international supervision;

- to restore freedom of speech and freedom of the press;

- to cease persecuting and displacing ethnic and religious minorities and to restore to them their former right to independence and cultural and religious autonomy within the framework of the state;

- to desist forthwith from all attempts to destabilize the region by lending military support to guerilla groups in neighbouring countries, or to increase tensions and thus the danger of a regional conflict, since otherwise foreign powers might be induced to interfere in the internal affairs of the states of Central America;

2. Expects other countries, for their part, to refrain from any form of direct or indirect interference in the domestic affairs of Nicaragua, and condemns any interference from outside;

3. Supports all serious initiatives, including those of Costa Rica, Colombia and Peru, aimed at bringing about immediate negotiations on a peaceful solution to the explosive border conflict between Nicaragua and Honduras, but hopes that the overall situation in Central America will be the subject of a general peace conference as soon as possible;

4. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Presidents of the Council and the Commission, the governments of the countries concerned and the President of the Latin-American Parliament.
MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION
tabled by Mr EPHREMIDIS, Mr ADAMOU, Mr ALAVANOS,
Mrs BADUEL GLORIOSO, Mrs BARBARELLA, Mr BONACCINI,
Mr CARDIA, Mrs CERETTONI ROMAGNOLI, Mr CARROSSINO,
Mr CERAVOLO, Mrs CINCIARI RODANO, Mr D'ANGELOSANTE,
Mr DE PASQUALE, Mr FERRERO, Mr GALLUZZI, Mr GOUTHIER,
Mr IPPOLITO, Mr LEONARDI, Mr PAPAPIETRO, Mr SEGRE,
Mrs SQUARCIALUPI, Mr VERONESI, Mr VITELE, Mr GREMETZ,
Mr DENIS, Mr WURTZ, Mrs POIRIER, Mrs DE MARCH,
Mr FERNANDEZ, Mr VERGES, Mr MARTIN, Mr BAILLOT,
Mr PIQUET and Mr CHAMBEIRON

pursuant to Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure

on hostile action towards Nicaragua
The European Parliament,

A. having regard to the efforts of the Nicaraguan Government to bring about a political settlement of the tense situation existing on its borders,

B. having regard to the European Parliament's resolution on the European Community's economic relations with Central America (EEC 292/8/11/82),

C. having regard to the paragraph in the explanatory statement stressing the desire to sign a mutual agreement with Nicaragua, which overthrew the Somoza dictatorship but is threatened by lack of support from the USA and by the USA's openly hostile stance in view of its high military expenditure,

1. Condemns the attacks against Nicaragua made by the supporters of Somoza based in Honduras and all foreign aid for Somoza's supporters regardless of where it comes from;

2. Calls upon Honduras to cease all activities against Nicaragua;

3. Believes that the activities of Honduras are inconsistent with the principle referred to in the resolution of 14 October 1982 (OJ C 292,8/11/82) on the 'independent self-determined development and autonomy of the region';

4. Expresses its support for the people of Nicaragua subjected to these unjust attacks;

5. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council of Ministers, the Governments of the Member States, Nicaragua, Honduras and the USA.
MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION

tabled by Mr BOYES, Mr LINKOH, Mrs van den HEUVEL, Mr GLINNE,
Mrs VIEHOFF, Mr PLASKOVITIS, Mrs NIKOLAOU, Mr G FUCHS
and Mrs DURY, on behalf of the Socialist Group

pursuant to Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure

on the situation in Nicaragua

(PE 84.601)
A. concerned about the fighting in Nicaragua which is resulting in the deaths of many innocent people,

B. concerned that well-documented evidence indicates that there are 200 CIA agents operating in Central America,

C. aware that the Republican leader in the Senate, Mr Howard BAKER has said that many of his colleagues are deeply worried about the situation in Nicaragua,

D. aware that a secret document has been prepared by the National Security Planning Group in President REAGAN's administration and it states 'in Nicaragua, the Sandinistas are under increased pressure as a result of our covert efforts',

E. concerned that the activities on the Honduras/Nicaragua border are now in danger of escalating into a full-scale war in the region,

F. aware that aid to Honduras from the government of the USA has increased ten-fold from $3 million in 1980 to $30 million in 1982,


2. Calls on the Council of Ministers to ask the President of the United States of America to respect these principles;

3. Calls upon the Commission to increase economic aid to the government of Nicaragua, because destabilization of this country could lead to economic problems on a large scale in the region;

4. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Member States of the European Community, to the Commission, the Council of Ministers and the President of the United States of America.'
MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION
Tabled by Mrs VAN HEMELDONCK, Mr GLINNE and Mrs VAN DEN HEUVEL

on behalf of the Socialist Group

pursuant to Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure

on the arrest of ANA MARGARITA GASTEAZORO
The European Parliament,

A. having regard to its resolution on El Salvador¹,
B. having regard to its resolution on the situation in El Salvador²,
C. whereas on 12 May 1981 the Salvadorean authorities arrested ANA MARGARITA GASTEAZORO, a member of the MOVIMIENTO NACIONAL REVOLUTIONARIO (MNR), on a charge of having attended the conferences of Socialist International Women in Vancouver (1978) and Madrid (1980),
D. whereas ANA MARGARITA GASTEAZORO has not been brought before a court but is still in detention,

1. Condemns the treatment of ANA MARGARITA GASTEAZORO by the Salvadorean authorities;
2. Calls on the Salvadorean authorities to release her immediately;
3. Calls on the Foreign Ministers meeting in political cooperation to take the necessary steps to ensure that El Salvador complies with this request;
4. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Foreign Ministers meeting in political cooperation, the Council, the Commission, and the governments and parliaments of the Member States.

¹ OJ No C 260, 12.10.81, p.89
² OJ No C 87, 5.4.82, p.79.
MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION

tabled by Mrs FUILLET, Mr GLINNE, Mr JAQUET and Mr SABY

on behalf of the Socialist Group

pursuant to Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure

on the situation of Guatemalan refugees in Mexico.
The European Parliament,

A. having regard to the precarious situation facing the Guatemalan citizens who have taken refuge on Mexican territory,

B. aware of the difficult situation of the refugees in Mexico, whose numbers are increasing and who may have to remain there for a further period of time,

C. having regard to the United Nations resolution of 17 December 1982,

D. having regard to the report by the Madrid Peoples' Tribunal of 28 and 31 January 1983,

E. having regard to the resolution of 8 March 1983 by the United Nations Commission on Human Rights,

F. having regard to the violation of human rights in Guatemala,

G. having regard to the 1951 Geneva Convention,

H. having regard to the incursions by the Guatemalan army into refugee camps on 26 and 31 January 1983 denounced by Mr Poul HARTLING, the High Commissioner for Refugees,

1. Calls on the Guatemalan Government to respect the human rights and fundamental freedoms of the refugees;

2. Expresses its deep concern at the fate of the Guatemalan refugees on Mexican territory;

3. Condemns the incursions by the Guatemalan army into Mexican territory,

4. Welcomes the efforts of the humanitarian organizations in support of the measures being taken by Mexico in this region;

5. Requests the governments of the Member States to take measures to assist the refugees, ensuring that their safety is guaranteed, and that they receive recognized refugee status for as long as Guatemala fails to respect human righ

6. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Commission, the Council and the Foreign Ministers of the ten Community Member States.
MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION

tabled by Mrs CLWYD

pursuant to Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure

on the imprisonment of Ana Margarita Gasteazoro
The European Parliament,

A. noting that Ana Margarita Gasteazoro a 32 year old teacher of English is still awaiting trial at the women's prison in Ilopango El Salvador since 12 May 1981,

B. having regard to the violation of Articles 8 and 11 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,

C. having regard to many reports of the repression of Human Rights in El Salvador,

1. Reiterates its appeal for human rights to be respected throughout the world;

2. Calls on the Government of El Salvador to take swift action to clear up the case of Ana Margarita Gasteazoro by holding a fair civil trial conforming with national and international standards, or by granting her immediate and unconditional release;

3. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council and to the President of El Salvador.
MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION

tabled by Mr van AERSSEN, Mr BARBI, Mr PEDINI, Mr LANGES, Mrs LENZ, Mrs LENTZ-CORNETTE, Mr Konrad SCHÖN, Mr NOTENBOOM and Mr LUCKER

on behalf of the Group of the European People's Party (Christian-Democratic Group)

pursuant to Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure

on Nicaragua
The European Parliament,

A. concerned at the increasingly repressive measures taken by the Sandinist regime against the political opposition in Nicaragua;

B. disturbed in particular at the persecution suffered by trade-unionists of the Central de Trabajadores de Nicaragua (CTN), which is affiliated to the Central Latinoamericana de Trabajadores, the largest Latin American trade-union movement;

C. shocked at the fact that in May 1983, 18 members of the CTN were in prison for having done no more than defend the rights of workers in Nicaragua;

1. Condemns all repressive measures against the political opposition, and in particular against free trade unions, in Nicaragua;

2. Calls for the immediate release of all political prisoners;

3. Insists that the trade unions be allowed to perform their legitimate function without state interference;

4. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Latin-American Parliament and the Government of Nicaragua.
MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION

tabled by Mr PEDINI, Mr BARBI, Mr LANGES and Mrs Lenz
on behalf of the Group of the European People's Party
(CD Group)

pursuant to Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure

on the situation in Central America
The European Parliament,

A - concerned at the continuing and deepening political crisis in Central America which by breeding violence is augmenting the suffering of the peoples of the area, leading to repeated disregard for human and democratic rights and increasing the dangers to world peace,

B - having regard to its previous resolutions on this matter,

C - having regard to the Wiescorek-Zeul and Van Aerssen reports on Central America and Latin America,

D - having regard to the final resolution of the VIth Conference in Brussels between the European Parliament and the Latin American Parliament and the section devoted to the crisis in Central America,

E - having noted with confidence the efforts made by the so-called Contadora Group and the OAS for a peaceful and regional solution to the disputes underlying the crisis and the practical initiatives under review in other national and international organizations,

F - having noted the anxious recommendations put forward by the international movements of the major European democratic parties,

G - having noted with interest that the United States Congress, prompted by domestic public opinion, has instructed a bipartisan committee to monitor the situation in Central America,

H - convinced that all the forces working to bring peace to Central America should unite their efforts,

I - convinced that a freeze on all arms supplies and the withdrawal of military technicians are essential but that in the interests of peace it is important to persuade all the contending nations to participate in open negotiations and to agree to free elections on an internal political basis involving all the political forces as a move towards the establishment of normal democratic conditions,
J- convinced that the state of extreme poverty afflicting the peoples of Central America aggravated by the world economic recession is one of the reasons for the serious crisis,

1. URGES the Council of Ministers of the EEC to support the attempt at mediation made by the Contadora Group, to work towards peaceful negotiations within all organizations and to step up the friendly and open discussions on this issue with the United States of America;

2. URGES its delegation for relations with Spain, after requesting the views of the committees responsible, and its delegation for Latin America to arrange a debate on the issue with the participation of Spanish parliamentarians having regard to the initiatives contemplated by their government;

3. URGES the Commission, in accordance with the suggestions contained in the document of the VIth Interparliamentary Conference in Brussels, to plan further economic assistance and active cooperation for all the countries of Central America and to step up humanitarian aid to its peoples.
MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION

tabled by Mr WEDEKIND, Mrs SCHLEICHER, Mr HADSBURG,
Mr VON WOGAU and Mr K. SCHÖN

pursuant to Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure

on the persecution of members of the religious community
known as the 'Assemblies of God' in Nicaragua.
The European Parliament,

A - whereas the internment of members of this religious community is a flagrant violation of human rights and in particular of freedom of religion and creed;

B - having regard to the question by Mr von Habsburg on the persecution of Jews in Nicaragua (H-204/83);

C - having regard to the special responsibility of the European Community to secure respect for human rights throughout the world;

1. Condemns with the utmost vigour the internment of members of this religious community;

2. Expresses its consternation at the fact that the persecution of the members of this religious community is not an isolated case;

3. Is deeply concerned that members of this religious community have been tortured to death;

4. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council and the Commission with a view to obtaining a joint condemnation of this case by the European institutions;

5. Calls upon the Nicaraguan Government to release the persons interned forthwith.
MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION

tabled by Mr GLINNE
on behalf of the Socialist Group

pursuant to Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure

on the threats to Nicaragua
THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT,

- concerned at the threats facing Nicaragua, particularly:

(A) the attempts being made to use the 'food weapon' for purposes of destabilization by external opponents of the legal government in Managua,

(B) the recent military developments in the Caribbean and the constant harassment along the borders with Nicaragua,

1. States, therefore, the Community's desire to contribute to the protection of the right of peoples to self-determination free from all outside pressures;

2. Expresses its concern at the external and internal methods used against the process of moving towards democracy being carried out by the legal government;

3. Expresses its fear of any external intervention, warns against attempts to impose a solution by force and voices its concern as to the consequences of ill-considered actions in express violation of the United Nations Charter;

4. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Commission, the Council of Ministers meeting in political cooperation and, for information, the Government of Nicaragua.
MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION

tabled by Mr LANGES, Mrs Lenz, Mrs LENTZ-CORNETTE,
Mr VANKERKHOVEN, Mr GEROKOSTOPOULOS and Mr VAN AERSSEN

pursuant to Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure

on the speech delivered by the President of the
European Parliament to the Council of State of Nicaragua
on 10 January 1984 in Managua
The European Parliament,

A. having regard to the speech delivered by its President to the Council of State of Nicaragua on 10 January 1984 in Managua;

B. having regard to the European Parliament's resolutions of 17 June 1982 (Doc. 1-332/82) and 13 January 1983 (Doc. 1-1112/83) on Nicaragua;

C. having regard to the European Parliament's resolution of 16 November 1983 on the deployment of missiles in Western Europe (Doc. 1-1014/83);

I. Affirms the position adopted by a large majority in the above-mentioned resolutions;

II. Welcomes its President's support for the Contadora peace initiative taken by Colombia, Venezuela, Panama and Mexico and for an extension of economic and development cooperation with Central America;

III. Is unable, however, to approve of other substantial sections of the speech and notes, in particular, the following:

1. The President stated that 'Many have already noted with some satisfaction that the Nicaraguan Government has been able to accept a major criticism by the opposition of the draft electoral law'. (Page 18 of the original English text).

In fact, the Sandinist Government has not taken account of the fundamental reservations expressed by the democratic opposition alliance, the 'Coordinadora Democrática' 1. These primarily relate to Article II of the Preamble and other provisions of the political parties law, which restrict all parties to the principles of the 'Sandinist Revolution' without defining what these are, so that the general provisions of the election...

1 This includes the Partido Social Demócrata (PSD), the Partido Social Cristiano (PSC), the Partido Liberal Constitucionalista (PLC), the Partido Conservador Democrata (PCD), the Social-Democratic trade union, ORIT, the Confederación de Unificació n Sindical (CUS), and the Christian-Socialist trade union, CLAT Central de Trabajadores de Nicaragua (CTN).
law will serve as an excuse for further interference with party pluralism by the Sandinist Government and hence threaten the free character of the elections announced for 1985.

2. The President declared that 'We were particularly satisfied with the measures of clemency which were introduced for the Miskito population particularly as our Parliament, in fact, adopted a critical resolution on this subject a year ago on 13 January 1983', and he goes on to link the Miskitos' situation with the 'social and political problems of the indigenous populations' in Central America, the Andes and the Amazon region. (Page 21 of the English text).

This statement - which makes no reference to the European Parliament resolution of 17 June 1982 - minimizes the Sandinista persecution of the ethnic, cultural, religious and linguistic minorities of Miskitos, Sumos and Ramas in Nicaragua. Over 1,000 Indians have been killed, their villages destroyed and tens of thousands driven from their ancestral homelands on the Atlantic coast to be forcibly resettled in camps in the interior. About 10% of the Miskito population has fled to Honduras. The amnesty has not made amends for these human rights violations.

3. At several points in his speech the President attacked the United States with reference to Vietnam (page 3) and former US policy in Central America, under President Roosevelt for instance (page 16), and he also stated that 'Eastern European countries have long seen their own political and economic ambitions subordinated to the Soviet Union's security concerns. The countries of Latin America, particular of this region, so close to the United States, have felt the overbearing attitude of the United States .... both superpowers are guilty of this partial approach to the problems of the world'. (Pages 14-15 of the English text).

It is disconcerting that the President places the United States and the Soviet Union on a par with one another. Furthermore, there is virtually no mention of the general destabilizing role played by the Soviet Union and Cuba in Central America.

4. The President stated that 'In Western Europe, where thanks to the twin concept of defence and détente we used to be able to co-exist reasonably well with both super powers, we are now left with defence alone.' This is followed by references to the deep divisions in Western Europe over the deployment of nuclear missiles. (Pages 6-7 of the English text).
It is unacceptable that here again the President presents the European Community as adopting an intermediate position between the United States and the Soviet Union ('to co-exist!'), a view not shared by the majority of the European Parliament, and that his appraisal of the NATO twin-track decision failed to inform the Nicaraguan Council of State of the European Parliament's resolution of 16 November 1983 in support of this policy, which was adopted by a large majority.

IV. Regrets its President's failure

1. to convey unequivocally the European Parliament's disquiet at the situation with regard to human rights and fundamental freedoms in Nicaragua, the forced pace of militarization in the country, the Sandinista contribution to destabilization of the region and the repressive measures against the democratic opposition, the non-Sandinista trade unions and the church and thereby demonstrate the solidarity of the freely elected European Parliament with the oppressed democratic forces in Nicaragua;

2. to express his concern at the 'turbas', the organized bands of thugs that attempt to intimidate troublesome politicians, trade unionists and clergymen by means of mental and physical terror;

3. to make unequivocally clear to the Sandinista Government that the European Parliament regards the establishment of a pluralist system based on liberty and the rule of law, freedom of the press and free elections as pre-conditions for an improvement and normalization in relations between the European Community and Nicaragua.

V. Calls for the inclusion of this resolution and its President's speech in the report by the Political Affairs Committee on the situation in Central America.

PE 89-121/fin./Ann.XIV
MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION

tabled by Mr d'ORMESSON, Mrs Lenz and Mr PEDINI
on behalf of the Group of the European People's
Party (Christian-Democratic Group)

pursuant to Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure

on the situation in Central America

based on information gathered by its delegation to
COLOMBIA, NICARAGUA, HONDURAS and COSTA RICA

(PE 89.244)

PE 89.121/fin./Ann.XV
The European Parliament,

1. Declares its support for the action undertaken by the CONTADORA Group with a view to restoring civil peace wherever it is being disrupted in Central America, developing the economy and raising the standard of living in the Central American countries,

2. In this context gratefully welcomes the joint efforts being made by COLOMBIA, VENEZUELA, MEXICO and PANAMA (the CONTADORA Group),

3. Hopes that in coming years the EEC will grant substantial aid to the CONTADORA economic programme,

4. Notes with great interest the Nicaraguan Government's announced intention to hold democratic elections in February 1985,

5. Points out that the organisation and free conduct of such elections will not be possible until the following requirements have been met:

   - the release of all political prisoners (2,974 in 1980, 885 in 1981, 969 in 1982 and 1,169 in 1983), in accordance with the conclusions of the Standing Commission on Human Rights,

   - an explanation of what happened to all the people who have disappeared, including those summarily executed (337 in 1980, 121 in 1981, 149 in 1982 and 222 in 1983), according to information supplied by the same Commission,

   - the release of the MISKITOS Indians forcibly detained in the following 7 so-called resettlement camps:

      STOTOMBAS
      SWASWINOLA
      SUMU HILA
      SANNILAYA
      COLUMBOS
      FRANS A SIRPEC
      SANHSA

      which are nothing more than concentration camps where, according to information we have received, mothers have been parted from their children,

6. Requests that a committee of inquiry from the International Red Cross be admitted inside these camps,

7. Requests, moreover, that press censorship be abolished and, to this effect, calls in particular for the 'PRENSA' newspaper to be supplied with enough paper to meet its needs and to be allowed to circulate freely,

8. Likewise requests that government and opposition parties be granted the same amount of broadcasting time and freedom of speech on radio and television and that religious services be broadcast,

9. Urges the Commission, until these requests have been met, to provide the aid granted by Parliament to NICARAGUA solely through non-governmental bodies and to supervise closely how such aid is channelled,

10. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council of Ministers, the Commission and the governments of the States concerned.
MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION
tabled by Mrs WIECZOREK-ZEUL

for entry in the register
pursuant to Rule 49 of the Rules of Procedure

on Nicaragua
The European Parliament,

- reaffirming its support for the guaranteed right to self-determination of all peoples,

- extremely concerned by the USA's repeated threats of military intervention in Nicaragua, either directly or by means of a sea blockade, thereby violating Nicaragua's right to self-determination,

1. Calls on the US Government to refrain from all military intervention in Central America and from its constant threat to send in the Rapid Deployment Force, and instead to make a positive political and economic contribution to the development in self-determination of the people in Central America and Nicaragua;

2. Fears that these threats by the USA are a reaction to the dwindling influence of the military and the ruling junta in El Salvador and that the USA thus wants to regain its lost influence by military means;

3. Points out that any form of direct intervention by the USA would discredit it politically, not only in Latin America and in Europe but throughout the world;

4. Considers that relieving the Nicaraguan frontiers of the threat of attacks launched from Honduras or by the Rapid Deployment Force is a major precondition for relieving the Nicaraguan budget of the burden of military expenditure and for releasing appropriations for economic expansion;

5. Calls on the EEC and the Member States to approach the responsible institutions with a view to ensuring that the debts which have burdened Nicaragua since the time of the Somoza regime need not be repaid directly but may be used to set up a fund for the internal development of Nicaragua, given that its economic difficulties lie at the source of its current internal conflicts and problems.

6. Calls for further consideration of methods of relieving Nicaragua - and other countries - of the burden of the rising oil costs;

7. Calls on the Commission to increase economic aid to Nicaragua and thereby to ensure that democracy will have a chance in Nicaragua in future too;

8. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission and the Foreign Ministers meeting in Political Cooperation.
MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION

tabled by Mr LOMAS, Ms CLWYD, Mrs LIZIN, Mr BOYES, Mr CABORN, Mr BALFE, Mr van MINNEN, Mr MEGAHY and Mr SEAL

pursuant to Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure

concerning Nicaragua
The European Parliament,

A. notes its previous Resolution calling for support for Nicaragua;

B. notes the efforts of the Nicaraguan Government and people, which they are making to re-build its economy, following the overthrow of the dictatorship of Somoza;

C. notes the right of all countries to be able to pursue their policies free from interference and threats from other countries;

D. notes the widespread reports in the British press that President Reagan has authorised a $19 million plan to establish a force to operate from Honduras and to make raids across the border into Nicaragua to attack power stations and bridges, in an effort to de-stabilise Nicaragua's economy;

Calls on the Council of Ministers and Member Governments to condemn this plan and to re-affirm the right of Nicaragua to pursue its internal policies free from outside interference.