Between Irrelevance and Integration? New Challenges to Diplomacy in the 21st Century and the Role of the EEAS

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Abstract

The changing nature of diplomacy poses new challenges for diplomatic actors in the 21st century, who have to adapt their structures in order to remain relevant on the international stage. The growing interdependence and complexity of issues necessitate a more networked approach to diplomacy, while states retain their predominance in diplomacy. The main underlying challenge of modern diplomacy therefore requires finding a balance between traditional and new elements. This paper examines to what extent the European External Action Service (EEAS) meets the new challenges of modern diplomacy and copes with the diverse interests of the other stakeholders involved, namely the institutions and Member States of the European Union (EU). On the basis of a conceptual framework of modern diplomacy and an analysis of the different aspects of the EEAS' structures, the paper argues that the EEAS does not fully meet the new challenges to diplomacy, since the interests of the other stakeholders put constraints on its free development. The latter therefore have to choose between irrelevance and integration with regard to EU foreign policy and the future of the EEAS.

Introduction

Diplomacy is an institution of international order; it represents 'a method of political interaction at the international level'.[1] Several factors, like globalisation, regionalisation or localisation, affect this international order and interaction, thereby causing new developments in diplomacy. These trends of decentralisation and complexity of all levels of diplomatic action pose challenges to the traditional model of state diplomacy, thereby changing its character and giving rise to novel kinds of entities that partake in diplomacy.

The European External Action Service (EEAS), a new body of the European Union (EU) created by the Treaty of Lisbon, represents one of these novel diplomatic entities. However, the EEAS "is not a European Ministry of Foreign Affairs designed to replace Member States' ministries", as the former High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice-President of the European Commission (HR/VP), Catherine Ashton, pointed out.[2] By embodying a new type of diplomatic actor, the EEAS is much harder to analyse in terms of the above-mentioned changes in diplomacy which focus on traditional state actors. Nevertheless, this embodiment also underlines the importance of such an analysis, as it enhances our understanding of regional or international organisations as diplomatic actors.

The initial perception of a new diplomatic actor, like the EEAS, is that a 'fresh start' provides the chance to adapt to the new demands of modern diplomacy and to avoid the problems of older, traditional diplomatic services in order to become a relevant player in global diplomacy. This perception, however, has to be put in the context of the diplomatic conduct of the EEAS, taking account of all stakeholders and interests involved, since they substantially shape the process of what kind of diplomatic system is created. According to David O'Sullivan, Chief Operating Officer of the EEAS, the need for EU foreign policy coordination demonstrates a "race between irrelevance and integration".[3] Hence, this dichotomy points to the continuity-change nexus which underlies modern diplomacy and necessitates balancing in order to cope effectively with the new challenges to diplomacy. That means catering for growing interdependence and complexity in an increasingly

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[1] J.-R. Leguey-Feilleux, *The Dynamics of Diplomacy*, Boulder, Lynne Rienner, 2009, p. 1.

[2] European External Action Service, *EEAS Review* 2013, 2013, retrieved 28 December 2013, http://eeas.europa.eu/library/publications/2013/3/2013_eeas_review_en.pdf, p. 3.

[3] D. O'Sullivan, Chief Operating Officer EEAS, *The Global Positioning of the EU: Where Next?*, speech, Bruges, College of Europe, 18 March 2014.

networked environment, while embracing traditional elements and the state's predominance in diplomacy.

This paper examines to what extent the EEAS meets the new challenges of modern diplomacy and copes with the diverse interests of the stakeholders involved. The theoretical relevance of this research relates to the effectiveness of diplomatic structures that are produced on an intergovernmental level. While the EU represents a prime example of the creation and further development of political structures that unite very different interests and actors, the EEAS has the potential to become this kind of example in the realm of diplomacy. The success of the EEAS could set a significant precedent for other regional and global organisations that want to set up their own diplomatic systems in the future. Its empirical relevance concerns the practical problems that many institutions face in managing complex diplomatic situations, especially the EEAS' dependence on and relationship with Member States and other EU institutions. Furthermore, it is an important and interesting endeavour to take stock of what the EEAS has achieved in terms of diplomatic conduct before a potential remodelling under the new HR/VP.

The other EU institutions and the Member States influence the EEAS in two ways: their turf battles inhibit the constructive development of the Service in many regards, while their pooled expertise and united network quality adds to the EEAS' profile regarding modern diplomacy. Considering these diverse interests and the involvement of many different stakeholders, the hypothesis arises that the EEAS does not fully meet the new challenges to diplomacy, since the interests of the stakeholders involved put constraints on its development.

Structure and Methodology

In order to answer the research question, a qualitative case-study approach helps to analyse the EEAS as a new diplomatic service embedded in a greater institutional framework and in complex relationships with the other stakeholders. First, the main concepts are clarified: what is diplomacy and how has it changed in the 21st century? Second, the structure of the EEAS in relation to the main concepts of modern diplomacy and the other actors and interests involved are explained. The analysis will show to what extent the EEAS meets the challenges of modern diplomacy and how it copes with the diverse interests of the other actors.

In order to provide a comprehensive analysis, different kinds of sources are used. The next section follows the framework of 'Integrative Diplomacy' of Hocking *et al.*,[4] while additional academic literature provides more detailed insights on the concepts of diplomacy and its changes in the 21st century. The part on the EEAS draws on primary and secondary sources, expert interviews, speeches and lectures, in order to provide a more comprehensive picture. Due to its focus on the EEAS as an institution responsible for foreign policy rather than as a diplomatic system, academic literature has so far left gaps in areas such as the EEAS' engagement with non-state actors, the development of best practice, or the use of social media. Thus, these sources help fill these gaps and provide more first-hand insights into the EEAS' work. Three of the interviewees were chosen due to their responsibilities for the EEAS' coordination, communication and foreign policy-making role, while the other two represent long-standing officials of the EEAS and the Commission, respectively, thereby providing insights into the daily working relations of the two bodies. Furthermore, the EEAS officials consisted of former Council and Commission employees and seconded staff from the Member States, which adds to the representativeness of their statements.

Modern Diplomacy: Defining the Concepts

This part addresses the theoretical concepts of modern diplomacy, which are crucial to the later analysis of the EEAS' role in meeting the new challenges to diplomacy in the 21st century. It explains what diplomacy is, why it changed, and how it has changed with regard to four aspects: context and location, rules and norms, communication patterns, and actors and roles. The concepts and changes presented here are not exhaustive, but they illustrate the most important aspects, especially in view of the EEAS' non-state nature.

The Nature of Diplomacy

For a thorough understanding of the changes, the underlying concepts of diplomacy and the driving forces transforming the diplomatic environment need to be set out, since they constitute the leitmotif of modern diplomatic activity.

First of all, diplomacy is not equal to foreign policy-making but concerns its implementation and potential indirect shaping through the provision of information

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[4] B. Hocking, J. Melissen, S. Riordan & P. Sharp, "Futures for Diplomacy: Integrative Diplomacy in the 21st century", *Clingendael Report,* no. 1, The Hague, Netherlands Institute of International Relations, October 2012*.*

and expertise.[5] It is important to distinguish between the processes and structures of diplomacy; processes are its main functions, whereas structures are the means to carry out these functions.[6] Representation and communication constitute the two main processes of diplomacy. The former relates to the way actors behave towards others in the international system, while the latter represents a way to influence those others and promote own interests.[7] These functions are also essentially linked to the access-presence nexus: gaining access to political hubs all over the world in order to represent and communicate effectively necessitates permanent presence.[8]

Another important nexus concerns change and continuity. While global tendencies initiate change in diplomatic activity, the force of continuity also influences the development of diplomacy. Thus, modern diplomacy comprises novel and traditional elements.[9] The main tendencies that drive change in diplomacy consist of globalisation, regionalisation and localisation, thereby creating a form of governance that implies greater social connectivity in different locations and at different levels.[10] While these trends challenge the traditional dominance of the state in diplomacy, they also increase the interdependence of different levels of diplomatic activity, and therefore the complexity of issues. In this sense, networks interlink various actors in institutional or social structures and thereby generate new relationships between them,[11] facilitating collective action in order to deal with resulting multilevel problems. Coming back to the change-continuity nexus though, both traditional 'club' and new 'network' diplomacy are crucial to deal with the complexities of modern diplomacy.[12]

As a result, any actor that wants to establish relationships with others in order to promote its interests can undertake representation and communication, set up appropriate structures, a diplomatic service and network, and can theoretically

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[5] Leguey-Feilleux, *op.cit.*, p. 8; A.F. Cooper, J. Heine & R. Thakur, "Introduction: The Challenges of 21st Century Diplomacy", in Andrew F. Cooper, Jorge Heine & Ramesh Thakur (eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Modern Diplomacy*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2013, p. 2.

[6] B. Hocking, "The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the National Diplomatic System", in Pauline Kerr & Geoffrey Wiseman, *Diplomacy in a Globalizing World: Theories and Practices*, New York, Oxford University Press, 2012, p. 124.

[7] G.A. Pigman, *Contemporary Diplomacy*, Cambridge, Polity Press, 2010, pp. 5-7.

[8] Hocking, *op.cit.*, pp. 135-6.

[9] Hocking *et al.*, *op.cit.*, p. 11.

[10] J.A. Scholte, "From Government to Governance: Transition to a New Diplomacy", in Andrew F. Cooper, Brian Hocking & William Maley (eds.), *Global Governance and Diplomacy: Worlds Apart?*, Houndmills, Palgrave Macmillan, 2008, pp. 42-3.

[11] J. Metzl, "Network Diplomacy", *Georgetown Journal of International Affairs*, vol. 2, no.1, 2001, pp. 77-78.

[12] Cooper, Heine & Thakur, *op.cit.*, p. 24.

participate in diplomatic activity. Although several forces change modern diplomacy significantly, rendering it more networked, interdependent and complex, continuity plays an important role as well in the sense that states remain the predominant actors.

Context and Location

Nevertheless, due to the increased interdependence of actors and complexity of issues, the context and location of diplomacy has crucially changed in terms of agendas and multilateralism.

First, diplomatic agendas developed to incorporate new security threats, like climate change, global health risks or terrorism, but also human rights or migration concerns since they can stretch over the whole globe and connect different actors.[13] Diplomacy also became more concerned with regulatory issues, especially in the face of the global financial crisis.[14] The solutions to these issues often lie beyond the capacity of single states, so that diplomacy must also actively influence agendas through thought leadership and advocate collaboration between actors in order to find those solutions.[15]

Second, in order to find ways of collective action, multilateralism has grown more important since diplomatic actors increasingly partake in multilateral fora to make their voice heard and find solutions to common problems.[16] Summitry evolved as a prominent feature of modern diplomacy; besides regular meetings, top-level officials also growingly meet on an *ad-hoc* basis, generating so-called shuttle diplomacy, day trips that do not need permanent presence.[17] Multiple sites, including bilateral and multilateral channels, therefore remain significant for diplomacy.[18]

Due to the growing interdependence of actors and complexity of issues, problems are rarely only domestic anymore but increasingly global in nature, putting new security threats and regulatory issues on the global agenda and necessitating collective action. The resulting collaboration enhanced multilateralism, but also other sites remain significant for diplomatic activity. Thought leadership becomes more important than the sole promotion of national interests.

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[13] *Ibid.*, pp. 13-14; Hocking *et al.*, *op.cit.*, pp. 5, 126.
[14] Hocking *et al.*, *op.cit.*, p. 5.
[15] *Ibid.*, pp. 20-21, 34.
[16] Cooper, Heine & Thakur, *op.cit.*, p. 15.
[17] *Ibid.*, p. 18.
[18] Hocking *et al.*, *op.cit.*, pp. 22-23.

Rules and Norms

The shift in context and location also challenges sovereignty-based rules and other norms. Traditional state diplomacy relies on hierarchical structures, whereas network diplomacy implies two-way communication between actors. The development of more networked diplomacy allows for the involvement of new diplomatic actors which do not fit into the Westphalian system of nation-states.[19]

As opposed to traditional norms of secrecy and the legitimacy of diplomats,[20] the growing easy access to information and communication and the shift of domestic issues to the international level demand greater openness, transparency and accountability regarding the diplomatic profession.[21] However, the right balance between secrecy and openness is needed in the age of WikiLeaks, which posed questions on secure communication channels.[22] While states draw their accountability and legitimacy from their diplomatic history and institutional structures, the legitimacy of new diplomatic actors often relies on the collective will of the public they represent and the social goals they pursue, but accountability becomes a more difficult concept in networks that do not possess clear hierarchies, are not elected and sometimes unrepresentative.[23]

Furthermore, the increased intermingling of national and global problems blurs the dividing line between the domestic and the foreign, thereby undermining the special standing of diplomats and their distinctive recruitment and training.[24] This 'culture of exclusivity' stemming from certain norms of behaviour and diplomatic immunity tends to become more inclusive to admit new diplomatic actors on all levels.[25]

Nevertheless, although rules of engagement have to adapt to allow new diplomatic actors in the diplomatic realm, continuity exists here as well, since the most basic rules and norms that underpin diplomacy continue to play a crucial role.[26] Traditional club diplomacy involves only state actors that belong to a strong hierarchy and act according to secrecy norms, while network diplomacy allows for

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[19] *Ibid.*, pp. 26, 31.
[20] Cooper, Heine & Thakur, *op.cit.*, p. 24.
[21] *Ibid.*, p. 23; Hocking *et al.*, *op.cit.*, p. 21.
[22] Hocking, *op.cit.*, p. 135.
[23] J.R. Kelley, "The New Diplomacy: Evolution of a Revolution", *Diplomacy and Statecraft*, vol. 21, 2010, pp. 299-300; Metzl, *op.cit.*, p. 79.
[24] Hocking *et al.*, *op.cit.*, p. 26.
[25] *Ibid.*, p. 69.
[26] *Ibid.*, pp. 30-31.

more players in a flatter structure with greater transparency and openness.[27] Both types face problems of legitimacy and accountability though. The blurring of the line between the domestic and the foreign, and the involvement of new actors, challenge diplomats' 'culture of exclusivity' and traditional rules of engagement. Nevertheless, the basic diplomatic rules and norms uphold continuity and state predominance.

Communication Patterns

The above-mentioned trends, especially globalisation and with it the development of new technologies, also influence communication patterns of modern diplomacy whereby networks play a pivotal role.

New ways of communication allow for a multidirectional flow of information, not solely aimed at elites but also at the general public.[28] The universal and instant access to information diminished the states' informational monopoly, so that diplomatic services have to become more flexible and react quickly.[29] Combining new technologies with the norm of information-sharing, however, fosters the establishment of databases and best practice, to enhance internal access to knowledge as well.[30]

In particular social media and websites play a crucial role, since their effective use helps to target audiences and spread important messages by properly interacting with the public.[31] This internet-based pattern is coined 'e-diplomacy' and involves real time communication.[32] Web 2.0 or social networking gives the public the opportunity to create their own content in a rather informal way. Even the most essential diplomatic functions are enhanced by modern technology nowadays, if diplomats know how to use them which requires skills and training.[33]

Public diplomacy represents the process of influencing groups and interests in other countries in order to change the behaviour of an actor. It evolved as one of the most vital functions of diplomatic communication, it has to be conducted

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[27] Cooper, Heine & Thakur, *op.cit.*, p. 22.

[28] Hocking *et al.*, *op.cit.*, pp. 23, 38.

[29] Metzl, *op.cit.*, p. 79; S. Riordan, "Reforming Foreign Services for the Twenty-First Century", *The Hague Journal of Diplomacy*, vol. 2, no. 2, 2007, pp. 163-164.

[30] Metzl, *op.cit.*, pp. 81, 85-86.

[31] Hocking *et al.*, *op.cit.*, p. 6; K. Hamilton & R. Langhorne, *The Practice of Diplomacy: Its Evolution, Theory and Administration*, London, Routledge, 2010, 2nd edn., p. 236.

[32] Hocking *et al.*, *op.cit.*, p. 34.

[33] J. Kurbalija, Visiting Professor at the College of Europe, *E-diplomacy: Electronic Tools for Diplomats*, lecture, Bruges, College of Europe, 23 January 2014.

effectively and fully integrated into the diplomatic structures. It also benefits from multidirectional communication, as it provides the chance to engage with foreign publics and stakeholders, eventually promoting a global open dialogue.[34]

New technologies therefore render communication flows more multi-directional and immediate. The speed of information flows accelerated, demanding instant reactions and higher flexibility of diplomats. In order to have their message heard and to remain relevant, they must be the first ones to react and to share information. Especially e-diplomacy and public diplomacy play a crucial role in this regard.

Actors and Roles

The tendencies set out above have had another crucial impact that extended the number and variety of actors participating in diplomacy and transformed the role of traditional diplomatic services and diplomats.

Ministries of Foreign Affairs (MFAs) do not constitute exclusive diplomatic actors anymore but networked multi-stakeholder diplomacy has been emerging.[35] Non-state actors have proven very capable of representing and communicating the interests of broad publics at the international level and therefore shape policy-making,[36] rendering them crucial participants in modern diplomacy. MFAs have to give these actors a forum for making their voices heard.[37] Besides their importance as advocates of specific interests, non-state actors can be crucial to diplomacy in case they can provide pivotal knowledge. Non-governmental organisations, think tanks, academic researchers or businesses can often provide expertise and information for policy-making that professional diplomats cannot obtain.[38]

The blurred separation of the domestic from the foreign realm and the increased complexity of issues necessitate coordination between all stakeholders in order to foster a 'whole-of-government' involvement in the diplomatic sphere. Thus, a 'national diplomatic system' arises that comprises all domestic diplomatic actors, with the MFA and its overseas posts as subsystems.[39] Even the embassies abroad are increasingly staffed with non-professional diplomats from other government depart-

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[34] Hocking *et al.*, *op.cit.*, pp. 6, 39; Metzl, *op.cit.*, pp. 85-87.
[35] Hocking *et al.*, *op.cit.*, p. 23.
[36] Kelley, *op.cit.*, pp. 288-289.
[37] Cooper, Heine, & Thakur, *op.cit.*, p. 11.
[38] Hocking *et al.*, *op.cit.*, p. 35.
[39] *Ibid.*, pp. 5, 53; Hocking, *op.cit.*, pp. 126-127.

ments or ministries.[40] However, there is not only a tendency of fragmentation but also of centralisation, since heads of state and government have acquired more direct control over foreign affairs.[41]

To cope with the newly emerging global needs, modern MFAs must expand their role in providing intelligence and analysis, employing non-state actors' expertise, and being capable to flexibly deal with crises.[42] The diplomatic network abroad has to report effectively, provide policy advice and handle crises on the ground, which could be enhanced through regional 'crisis hubs'.[43]

The most important change in the MFA's role is therefore the shift from being a gatekeeper to an external boundary spanner and internal coordinator. Instead of guarding the borders between the domestic and the foreign, MFAs link internal and external networks and coordinate all relevant domestic diplomatic actors to provide more meaningful input for foreign policy-making.[44] Thus, MFAs become more like facilitators and entrepreneurs,[45] or even like global corporations.[46]

The 21st century has seen a rise in the significance of distinct diplomatic activities of overseas embassies and missions. A higher demand for stronger trade links and advice on how to do business overseas promotes more commercial diplomacy,[47] while the steep rise in transnational travel calls for more consular diplomacy. However, these also constitute fields in which diplomatic services could share burdens.[48] Furthermore, development issues become more and more intertwined with foreign policy and therefore move into the diplomatic domain of embassies.[49]

Considering the shift towards summitry and shuttle diplomacy and the resulting perceived redundancy of overseas networks in the access-presence nexus, many MFAs had to find ways to deal with decreased resources for their diplomatic

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[40] Cooper, Heine, & Thakur, *op.cit.*, p. 26.
[41] *Ibid.*, p. 16; Hocking, *op.cit.*, p. 129.
[42] Hocking *et al.*, *op.cit.*, p. 56.
[43] *Ibid.*, p. 67.
[44] *Ibid.*, p. 23; B. Hocking, "Gatekeepers and boundary spanners: thinking about foreign ministries in the European Union", in Brian Hocking & David Spence (eds.), *Foreign Ministries in the European Union: Integrating Diplomats*, Houndmills, Palgrave, 2005, p. 11.
[45] Hocking *et al.*, *op.cit.*, p. 23.
[46] Hamilton & Langhorne, *op.cit.*, p. 238.
[47] Cooper, Heine & Thakur, *op.cit.*, p. 15.
[48] Hocking *et al.*, *op.cit.*, pp. 6-7.
[49] Hocking, "The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the National Diplomatic System", *op.cit.*, p. 127.

systems,[50] such as non-resident ambassadors accredited to several countries, operating from regional core embassies, or co-locating missions.[51]

The diversification of issues and expansion of diplomatic functions requires not only more versatile diplomats but also more personnel and outside experts.[52] Hence, the profiles for the recruitment of diplomats and their training have also been adapted,[53] so that the most important discussion revolves around the 'generalist'-'specialist' dichotomy: in order to cope with the modern diplomatic environment, diplomats have to combine both skills.[54] The increased administrative work also requires ambassadors to possess significant managerial skills.[55]

Consequently, diplomacy is no longer the preserve of the MFA and the professional diplomat, as they cannot deal with the emerging interdependent and complex issues on their own and need to engage with other actors to pool knowledge. The main challenge for the MFAs becomes the incorporation of the network of all domestic diplomatic actors and their coordination, but also showing more entrepreneurship in policy planning. They are supposed to take on more tasks and diplomats must develop new skills to carry them out, whereas their budgets are decreasing, leading to more burden-sharing. Despite the proliferation of new diplomatic actors though, continuity persists in this regard as well, since states retain their importance by advocating the broad interests of their societies.[56]

This section explained the nature of diplomacy and the main forces that drive its change in four crucial aspects, forming the basic conceptual framework for the analysis of the EEAS' role in coping with the new challenges of modern diplomacy. It illustrated an overarching trend of all aspects of diplomatic activity in moving towards a more networked type of diplomacy, whereas the persisting predominance of the state also reinforces continuity. As a result, the inherent and most important challenge for modern diplomatic actors consists in adapting to the changing environment in order to remain relevant, thereby combining traditional club with new network diplomacy. In this light, also the EEAS has to find the right balance in order to meet the new challenges of modern diplomacy, a task which often represents a struggle between irrelevance and integration.

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[50] *Ibid.*, pp. 135-136; Cooper, Heine & Thakur, *op.cit.*, p. 24.
[51] Hocking *et al.*, *op.cit.*, pp. 68-69.
[52] Cooper, Heine, & Thakur, *op.cit.*, p. 26.
[53] Hocking *et al.*, *op.cit.*, p. 7.
[54] Cooper, Heine & Thakur, *op.cit.*, p. 15.
[55] *Ibid.*, p. 26.
[56] Hocking *et al.*, *op.cit.*, p. 5.

Modern Diplomacy and the EEAS: Meeting the New Challenges?

In theory, any actor has the opportunity to take part in diplomacy by establishing relations with others to enhance its position through representation and communication and by providing the necessary structures. In order to evaluate how the features of the EEAS match the changing environment of modern diplomacy, this part looks at each of the four aspects of the new challenges. It includes only the most important features for the analysis, since the more technical aspects would require more detail than the scope of this paper allows for.

Context and Location of EEAS' Diplomacy

The EEAS is trying to form an EU opinion on almost all policy fields of EU external action,[57] including energy security, climate change, migration, terrorism, or even financial regulation, and common positions are achieved more often than not.[58] The EEAS therefore provides internal thought leadership by setting the agenda for the EU's external action as its main coordinator.[59] However, problems of coordination and of division of labour arise between the Commission and the EEAS, as the former still possesses the main competences and expertise in policy areas like migration or humanitarian aid.[60] Furthermore, the EEAS does not possess enough resources to deal with issues like energy or climate change, which do not officially belong to its remit.[61]

The EU is committed to effective multilateralism, and the EEAS and the EU Delegations coordinate common positions with the Member States on each agenda item of a multilateral forum, which sometimes represents the hardest battle and takes very long.[62] In terms of summitry and shuttle diplomacy, the HR/VP's role is in no way inferior to that of a Foreign Minister.[63] Moreover, the EEAS is characterised by a strong belief in collective action to tackle global problems.[64] Yet, despite the EEAS' internal

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[57] EU external action is the umbrella term for all aspects of the EU's foreign policy.

[58] O'Sullivan, *op.cit.*; European External Action Service, *op.cit.*, p. 8.

[59] A. Hadfield & D. Fiott, "Europe and the Rest of the World", *Journal of Common Market Studies*, vol. 51, Annual Review, 2013, p. 170.

[60] European External Action Service, *op.cit.*, p. 8; R. Balfour & K. Raik, "Equipping the European Union for the 21st century", *FIIA Report*, no. 36, Helsinki, The Finnish Institute of International Affairs, 2013, p. 19.

[61] Interview with EEAS official 2, Brussels, 7 April 2014.

[62] *Ibid.*

[63] European External Action Service, *High Representative Catherine Ashton: Agenda*, 2014, retrieved 1 May 2014, http://eeas.europa.eu/agenda/index_en.htm; Art. 27(2) TEU.

[64] C. Ashton, High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, *Remarks to the European Parliament in the debate on foreign and defence policy*, speech, Brussels, 3 April 2014, p. 5.

thought leadership and increased concern with the new security threats and regulatory issues, the fragmentation of competences may hamper the Service's contribution. The EEAS uses multiple sites to emphasise the need for collective action, but its participation in multilateralism is hindered by the fact that – as a non-state entity – the EU cannot become a member of many international organisations. This hindrance points to the EEAS' dependence on the Commission and the Member States and the continuity of the state as the main actor in diplomacy. Despite this continuity, the EU and its EEAS represent post-Westphalian actors, thereby challenging the Westphalian diplomatic order.

Rules and Norms of EEAS' Diplomacy

Nevertheless, sovereignty remains pivotal with Member States often refusing to take a back seat in diplomacy.[65] Furthermore, the EEAS diplomats do not enjoy the same privileges and immunities as state diplomats, and the willingness of their Member States of origin to issue diplomatic passports varies greatly, while simultaneously heightening the EEAS' dependency on Member States.[66]

The EEAS' organisation illustrates a very bureaucratic, top heavy hierarchy.[67] The many layers of management and unclear chains of command negatively affect the flow of information between the Member States and the EEAS.[68] Many EEAS officials complain about a lack of trust from the top management to the system beneath and hope for the new HR/VP, Federica Mogherini, to streamline the current pyramid structure and to introduce a more decentralised, bottom-up approach.[69]

Although the Member States favour the EEAS' overall openness and transparency, they can also be counterproductive in sensitive areas. On the one hand, information is shared with many people and often provided upon request, multiplying the chances of leaks; on the other hand, officials regard the emailing

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[65] P. Petrov, K. Pomorska & S. Vanhoonacker, "The Emerging EU Diplomatic System: Opportunities and Challenges after 'Lisbon'", *The Hague Journal of Diplomacy*, no. 7, 2012, pp. 4, 8.
[66] J. Bátora, "The 'Mitrailleuse Effect': The EEAS as an Interstitial Organisation and the Dynamics of Innovation in Diplomacy", *Journal of Common Market Studies*, vol. 51, no. 4, 2013, p. 606.
[67] A.E. Juncos & K. Pomorska, "'In the face of adversity': explaining the attitude of EEAS officials vis-à-vis the new service", *Journal of European Public Policy*, vol. 20, no. 9, 2013, p. 1337.
[68] J. Wouters *et al.*, *The Organisation and Functioning of the European External Action Service: Achievements, Challenges and Opportunities*, European Parliament Directorate-General for External Policies of the Union, Study, February 2013, pp. 10, 44.
[69] Lecture with EEAS official 5, Bruges, 21 March 2014; Interview with EEAS official 4, Brussels, 7 April 2014.

system as not secure enough and ask for a strengthening of secret communication channels.[70] Even though the EEAS' institutional position and staffing enhances two-way communication with Member States and EU institutions, especially at the lower, more informal day-to-day level, the EEAS also struggles to make the Member States demonstrate the same openness in information-sharing.[71]

The European Parliament has gained considerable rights in scrutinising the HR/VP and the EEAS and frequently interacts with them, adding to the Service's democratic accountability and legitimacy.[72] Moreover, cooperation with national diplomatic services enhances the EEAS' legitimacy, as this inclusive involvement promotes a "sense of joint ownership" of the EEAS among the Member States.[73]

The top positions in the Service are held by Member States officials, meaning diminished career prospects and constant turf battles which cause frustration among EEAS officials and, combined with severe budget cuts, have led to a relatively low morale and a strained environment.[74] Indeed, the involvement of Member State diplomats hampers the development of a common diplomatic culture, as they are temporarily assigned and therefore still ingrained with national loyalty.[75] The lack of common training also inhibits a 'culture of exclusivity', since recruitment of policy experts without training does not produce professional diplomats.[76]

As a result, the EEAS' top heavy hierarchy, unclear chains of command and lack of trust negatively impact the development of two-way communication, whereas openness and transparency enhance it. The wide-spread sharing of and often too easy access to information calls for better confidential communication channels. The EEAS draws its accountability and legitimacy from the European Parliament's involvement and the Member States' sense of joint ownership, with the

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[70] Interview with EEAS official 1, Brussels, 7 April 2014; Interview with EEAS official 2, *op.cit.*

[71] Interview with EEAS official 2, *op.cit.*; Interview with EEAS official 3, Brussels, 7 April 2014; Interview with EEAS official 4, *op.cit.*

[72] R. Balfour & H. Ojanen, "Does the European External Action Service Represent a Model for the Challenges of Global Diplomacy?", *IAI Working Papers*, no. 1117, Rome, Instituto Affari Internazionali, June 2011, p. 6; Petrov, Pomorska, & Vanhoonacker, *op.cit.*, pp. 6-7; Wouters *et al.*, *op.cit.*, p. 61.

[73] Balfour & Raik, *op.cit.*, p. 13; Interview with EEAS official 1, *op.cit.*

[74] Juncos & Pomorska, op.cit., p. 1332; Information gained as part of a lecture course at the College of Europe, Bruges, 28 March 2014.

[75] S. Duke, "*Now We Are One... A Rough Start for the EEAS*", *EIPAScope*, 2012, no. 1, p. 28; House of Lords, European Union Committee, *The EU's External Action Service*, report, London, 19 March 2013, p. 59.

[76] F. Laursen, "The European External Action Service (EEAS): The Idea and Its Implementation", in Finn Laursen (ed.), *The EU's Lisbon Treaty: Institutional Choices and Implementation*, Farnham, Ashgate, 2012, p. 195.

majority of top-level positions filled by Member State officials. This political turf battle and the budget cuts cause frustration and low morale, which combined with the 'dual allegiance' problem of Member State officials inhibit the evolution of a strong 'esprit de corps'. The EEAS does not foster a 'culture of exclusivity' since the majority of its staff are not professional diplomats and there is no common training. Although the EEAS challenges the Westphalian diplomatic order, sovereignty prevails as the established international system favours states, underlining the change-continuity nexus once again.

Communication Patterns of EEAS' Diplomacy
The EEAS has kept up with the new technologies and its openness and willingness to engage with wider publics lays the groundwork for adapting well to the changing communication patterns of modern diplomacy.

The EEAS-Commission working arrangements foster a multi-directional flow of information in order to ensure coherence,[77] which does not always work without problems.[78] On the level of EU Delegations, the EEAS and Member States share information and pool political intelligence, often resulting in joint reports.[79] Neverthe-less, the quality and distribution of reports differ greatly from one Delegation to another.[80] Thus, databases or a system of best practice could be helpful.[81] While the Delegations provide political reports to all relevant EU institutions, they also receive information about new developments or lines to take from them and can access press briefings on a daily basis via telephone or video.[82] However, the EEAS lacks an operational electronic system of information-sharing and archiving, which slightly inhibits its work.[83]

The Commission provides the EEAS with communication services, such as the 'europa.eu' internet domain or the Europe Direct network for public enquiries.[84] Despite a common template, every unit and EU Delegation is responsible for

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[77] European Commission, *Working Arrangements between Commission Services and the EEAS in relation to External Relations Issues*, SEC(2012)48, Brussels, January 2012, p. 34.
[78] Wouters *et al.*, *op.cit.*, p. 57.
[79] European External Action Service, *EEAS Review 2013, op.cit.*, pp. 3, 12.
[80] F. Bicchi, "The European External Action Service: A Pivotal Actor in EU Foreign Policy Communications?", *The Hague Journal of Diplomacy*, no. 7, 2012, p. 90.
[81] Interview with EEAS official 2, *op.cit.*
[82] S. Duke, "The European External Action Service and Public Diplomacy", in Mai'a K. Davis Cross & Jan Melissen (eds.), *European Public Diplomacy: Soft Power at Work*, Houndmills, Palgrave Macmillan, 2013, p. 128.
[83] Wouters *et al.*, *op.cit.*, p. 36.
[84] European Commission, *Working Arrangements, op.cit.*, pp. 35-36.

updating their website, so that the lack of personnel often leads to inactivity.[85] Generally, the Service makes growing use of its electronic communication services.[86]

The EEAS headquarters and an incremental number of its Delegations also use social media, but its success greatly depends on the skills, training and even initiative of the responsible persons. Thus, due to the lack of human resources and the time-consuming coordination and approval procedure, the EEAS' social media sites are often less active than those of the other EU institutions. The EEAS mostly posts information with links to official documents and fails to interactively engage with the commentators.[87] Although social media could be used in a more targeted way, the EEAS uses its resources effectively to reach wider publics and set up important public diplomacy campaigns, mostly at the local level.[88]

The EU's post-Lisbon public diplomacy became more coherent through the EEAS and more visible through the HR/VP. The fragmentation of public diplomacy aspects (internal in the Commission and external in the EEAS) still poses the main challenge for a more consistent and effective public diplomacy.[89] The EEAS coordinates the public diplomacy efforts of all EU Delegations by providing general guidelines, daily lines to take and other material.[90] It coordinates a coherent approach with the Commission and the Member States in Brussels and on the ground, which also fosters a pooling of expertise.[91] On the ground, the EU Delegations' resources and staff capacities varies greatly, so that the larger Delegations set benchmarks.[92] The funding of the EEAS' public diplomacy represents a great oddity though, as the budgetary authority still lies with the Commission.[93] Another challenge is the failure of policy coordination: if there is no coordinated message, the EU cannot speak with one voice.[94]

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[85] Duke, "The European External Action Service and Public Diplomacy", *op.cit.*, p. 128; Interview with EEAS official 3, *op.cit.*

[86] Interview with EEAS official 3, *op.cit.*

[87] Duke, "The European External Action Service and Public Diplomacy", *op.cit.*, pp. 130-131; Interview with EEAS official 2, *op.cit*; Interview with EEAS official 4, *op.cit.*

[88] European External Action Service, *EEAS Review 2013, op.cit.*, p.13; Interview with EEAS official 4, *op.cit.*; Interview with EEAS official 2, *op.cit.*

[89] Duke, "The European External Action Service and Public Diplomacy", *op.cit.*, pp. 116, 119-120.

[90] European Commission, *Information and Communication Handbook for EU Delegations in Third Countries and to International Organisations*, Ref. Ares (2013)32604, Brussels, December 2012.

[91] Duke, "The European External Action Service and Public Diplomacy", *op.cit.*, p. 129.

[92] *Ibid.*, pp. 124-126.

[93] *Ibid.*, pp. 120-121.

[94] *Ibid.*, pp. 122-123.

Hence, the EEAS employs its communication network quite well, exchanging information with the other EU institutions and the Member States, while reaching a broad public through e-diplomacy and public diplomacy. However, there could be more pooling of expertise, better training and the establishment of best practice in many aspects, while the structures of public diplomacy are not properly integrated into the Service. The EEAS depends on the other stakeholders, and communication can only be meaningful if they successfully commit to policy coordination.

This dependence is further heightened by the EEAS' formal role of ensuring coherence between all stakeholders of EU external action. The EEAS' main tasks therefore involve interacting with and coordinating these stakeholders.

Actors and Roles of EEAS' Diplomacy

The literature and the interviews conducted by the author do not point to a very active engagement with non-state actors on the part of the EEAS although the interviewees recognised their growing role. On the level of policy planning, the EEAS reaches out and is approached by non-state actors, but Member States and other European and international partners play a more important role. On the level of the EU Delegations, however, the engagement with non-state actors is more advanced than in Brussels.[95]

The EEAS definitely undertakes a 'whole-of-government' approach, as it is located at the heart of a network comprising all stakeholders of EU external action.[96] The EEAS relies on the Council of the EU in terms of logistics for high-level events, however, the Council's willingness to cooperate often depends on the Member States' political interest in the subject matter.[97] Thus, Member States remain important stakeholders in the field of EU external action with more power than the EEAS, but their feeling of control over the latter generates more trust, integration and therefore leverage than compared to their pre-Lisbon relations with the Commission.[98]

The fact that several areas of external action remain in the Commission's domain poses a problem to the coherence of the EEAS' policies. The fragmentation

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[95] Interview with EEAS official 1, *op.cit.*; Interview with EEAS official 2, *op.cit.*; Interview with EEAS official 4, *op.cit.*
[96] European External Action Service, *EEAS Review 2013*, *op.cit.*, p. 3; Wouters *et al.*, *op.cit.*, p. 10.
[97] Interview with EEAS official 1, *op.cit.*; European External Action Service, *EEAS Review 2013*, *op.cit.*, p. 10.
[98] Interview with EEAS official 2, *op.cit.*; Interview with EEAS official 3, *op.cit.*

of policy areas renders the EEAS' cooperation with the Commission even more important, but its quality varies greatly depending on the field,[99] so much so that it has "proven to be one of the most serious setbacks to the first steps of the EEAS's existence".[100]

The EEAS has become a significant policy advisor who gives guidance to the other EU institutions and the Member States. The latter increasingly recognise and appreciate this role and even ask for lines to take on certain issues.[101] Also the EEAS' function of intelligence gathering has improved, especially through the shaping up of political reports from the EU Delegations, a crucial function for the EEAS' entrepreneurial, policy-shaping capacity. [102] So far, the Delegations could not expand their own capacity for policy advice and policy-shaping though.[103]

The EEAS' organisation is very different from MFAs, since it incorporates functions of defence ministries, crisis management agencies and even corporations – the latter through features uncommon for MFAs, like the 'corporate board', 'managing directors', open office space, and sharing the building with external shops and cafés.[104] Crisis management, however, is not yet well enough integrated into the EEAS' structures.[105]

The EEAS greatly improved the coordination of EU external action as a focal point in the system that involves all relevant actors. [106] Nevertheless, the EEAS is located outside the 'institutional triangle' and many stakeholders perceive it as merely a Service that exists to support their work.[107] David O'Sullivan rightly calls it a 'toolbox', as the EEAS comprises the instruments for EU external action; it does not replace any other institutions or MFAs but creates a network that makes their actions more coherent.[108] Many Member States see it as a "power multiplier" or a "vehicle for uploading national interests".[109] As such, its role as coordinator becomes most pivotal, and EEAS officials even increasingly perceive a steady harmonisation in EU

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[99] Wouters *et al.*, *op.cit.*, p. 10.
[100] R. Balfour & K. Raik, "Introduction", in Rosa Balfour & Kristi Raik (eds.), "The European External Action Service and National Diplomacies", *EPC Issue Paper*, no. 73, Brussels, European Policy Centre, 2013, p. 1.
[101] Interview with EEAS official 2, *op.cit.*
[102] Petrov, Pomorska & Vanhoonacker, *op.cit.*, p. 7; Bicchi, *op.cit.*, p. 91.
[103] Balfour & Raik, "Equipping the EU for the 21st century", *op.cit.*, p. 46.
[104] Bátora, *op.cit.*, pp. 607-608.
[105] European External Action Service, *EEAS Review 2013*, *op.cit.*, p. 5.
[106] Interview with EEAS official 4, *op.cit.*
[107] Interview with Commission official, via phone, 8 April 2014.
[108] O'Sullivan, *op.cit.*
[109] Balfour & Raik, "Introduction", *op.cit.*, p. 5.

foreign policy and a resulting sense of seeking guidance from the other institutions, in order to be consistent in foreign policy-making.[110]

As for the role of policy entrepreneur, the EEAS depends on the Member States and the Commission, as it often lacks the necessary competences and capacities for leadership. The Member States prefer to remain the leaders in foreign policy-making, which often undermines the EEAS' role in this regard.[111] Yet, some Member States, such as Germany or the Netherlands, would favour a shift of competences from the Commission to the EEAS.[112] Thus, the EEAS' entrepreneurship in strategic policy planning depends on finding the smallest common denominator with the other stakeholders of EU external action.[113]

The EEAS is relatively small for catering for the whole EU, at about the size of the Belgian or Dutch diplomatic services,[114] but considerably larger than those of the smaller Member States.[115] Considering the cuts to the budgets of MFAs in many Member States and the resulting reduction in personnel and embassies during the last years, burden-sharing becomes increasingly attractive.[116] Smaller Member States already benefit from the EEAS' political reporting and information-sharing.[117] Nonetheless, it only represents an added value to the Member States and not a form of burden-sharing yet, due to the specificities of national interest, language regimes and the lack of a truly common foreign policy.[118] While not all Member States like this idea, since especially the larger Member States link diplomatic presence with prestige and power, others favour co-location of their embassies or the placement of only one diplomat in the EU Delegations or in the missions of other EU countries.[119] In addition, the EEAS is not represented in every country in the world, which it tries to compensate through Delegations in the neighbourhood.[120]

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[110] Interview with EEAS official 1, *op.cit.*; European External Action Service, *EEAS Review 2013*, *op.cit.*, p. 12.

[111] Balfour & Raik, "Equipping the EU for the 21st century", *op.cit.*, pp. 21, 25, 29.

[112] *Ibid.*, p. 14; Balfour & Raik, "Introduction", *op.cit.*, p. 10.

[113] Interview with EEAS official 1, *op.cit.*

[114] M. Emerson *et al.*, *Upgrading the EU's Role as Global Actor: Institution, Law and the restructuring of European Diplomacy*, Brussels, Centre for European Policy Studies, 2011, p. 52.

[115] Duke, "The European External Action Service and Public Diplomacy", *op.cit.*, p. 124.

[116] Balfour & Ojanen, *op.cit.*, p.4; K. Raik and T. Rantanen, "Managing the decline of European diplomacy", *FIIA Comment*, no. 4, 2013, p. 1.

[117] Raik & Rantanen, *op.cit.*, p. 2.

[118] Balfour & Ojanen, *op.cit.*, p. 5.

[119] Emerson *et al.*, *op.cit.*, pp. 61, 63; Raik & Rantanen, *op.cit.*, p. 2; European Union, *EEAS and Spain sign Memorandum of Understanding to establish Spanish Embassy on premises of EU Delegation to Yemen*, A586/12, Brussels, 10 December 2012.

[120] European External Action Service, *EEAS Review 2013, op.cit.*, p. 11.

Commercial diplomacy represents one of the fields in which Member States retained their prerogatives.[121] Although the shifting of several aspects of the EU's development cooperation to the EEAS has integrated development more with foreign policy, the Commission is unlikely to give up more competences in this field, especially not the financial aspects, out of fear the EEAS could channel the funds into more foreign policy-related projects instead of aid.[122] Furthermore, the EEAS possesses neither sufficient resources nor expertise to fully deal with consular diplomacy at the moment, but it could potentially obtain a more meaningful role.[123]

The majority of the EEAS' personnel does not consist of professional diplomats and foreign policy specialists.[124] It is mainly the Member State officials recruited into the Service who have a diplomatic background, and the EEAS offers only limited training. However, especially the Heads of Delegations are overwhelmed by administrative tasks, increasingly taking on the function of managers.[125]

Even though interaction with non-state actors is still quite low, the EEAS is located at the heart of a networked, multi-stakeholder diplomatic system. Its 'whole-of-government' approach features an unprecedented centralisation of EU external action but also struggles with a fragmentation of competences. Cooperation with the different stakeholders varies greatly in quality and quantity and always depends on their willingness. While it performs well in its service and coordinating functions, it lacks political entrepreneurship. Thus, it represents a toolbox for EU external action but it cannot use these tools at free will, because its capacity for strategic leadership is hampered by the interests of the other stakeholders. Despite the increase in cooperation and joint action, Member States remain the predominant players in the fields of EEAS action, pointing to the change-continuity nexus once more.

This section evaluated how the EEAS performs in each of the four aspects of the new challenges of modern diplomacy. It has revealed the underlying thematic of the EEAS' dependence on the other stakeholders and the predominance of the

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[121] Interview with EEAS official 2, *op.cit*.

[122] E. Drieskens & L. van Schaik, "Clingendael Input Paper", in Edith Drieskens & Louise van Schaik (eds.), *The European External Action Service: Preparing for Success*, The Hague, Netherlands Institute of International Relations, December 2012, p. 13; M. Carbone, "The EU and the Developing World: Partnership, Poverty, Politicisation", in Christopher Hill and Michael Smith (eds.), *International Relations and the European Union*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2011, p. 341.

[123] European External Action Service, *EEAS Review 2013, op.cit*., p. 12; Emerson *et al.*, *op.cit*., pp. 61-62; Raik & Rantanen, *op.cit*., p. 2.

[124] Interview with EEAS official 1, *op.cit*.

[125] Wouters *et al.*, *op.cit*., p. 81.

Member States in EU diplomacy. This dependence requires a balance between change and continuity, and between integration and irrelevance: On the one hand, the EEAS has fundamentally changed the EU's conduct of diplomacy, main-streaming important tasks into the EU's remit and giving it more weight. On the other hand, the EEAS always has to keep the interests of the EU institutions and the Member States in mind, which have a fundamental desire not to be replaced and become obsolete in this prominent field.

Conclusions

This paper examined the extent to which the EEAS meets the new challenges of modern diplomacy. The application of the conceptual framework shows that the EEAS does not fully meet the new challenges to diplomacy due to its dependence on the interests of the other stakeholders.

The EEAS basically addresses the newly emerging global agenda items at multiple diplomatic sites, advocating for collective action. Its unique nature challenges sovereignty-based rules, while finding other sources of accountability and legitimacy at the same time. Generally, openness, transparency and two-way communication are fostered, while the development of a 'culture of exclusivity' is resisted. The EEAS' communication patterns are multidirectional and networked, employing different media and sharing information and engaging with broad publics through e-diplomacy and public diplomacy. While the EEAS starts to develop relations with non-state actors, especially on the ground, it mainly interacts with the other EU institutions and the Member States. Thus, the EEAS fosters a 'whole-of-government' approach, rendering its coordinating role pivotal in order to cope with the fragmentation and centralisation of competences in EU external action. The EU Delegations' reports provide intelligence, benefiting the EEAS policy analysis and advice. Its internal structures incorporate crisis management and development, resembling a corporation in certain aspects, while the EEAS could gain a more prominent role in consular diplomacy as well. Burden-sharing is implemented through co-locations or regional hubs. The EEAS unites generalists and specialists, while the Heads of Delegations increasingly assume managerial tasks.

Nevertheless, the EEAS does not address all of the challenges to modern diplomacy. It does not contribute enough to the new global agenda items, multilateralism and thought leadership. Its structures are very hierarchical, while exhibiting too much transparency at times. Its use of social media does not really

feature instant reactions and best practice and resources are lacking in the realm of information-sharing and e-diplomacy. Furthermore, its public diplomacy structures are not integrated enough into the system to work most effectively. The EEAS does not make sufficient use of non-state actors' knowledge. It has not developed as a policy entrepreneur, and it is not suitably equipped to properly shape policy and exhibit leadership as its competences are at times too fragmented. Commercial and consular diplomacy do not fall under the EEAS' remit yet, and there are more possibilities for burden-sharing. The EEAS staff does not combine the versatile skills of generalists and specialists in one person, and the training is insufficient to turn them into professional diplomats.

Considering the relatively short existence of the EEAS, it still follows that the Service does not meet all the demands of modern diplomacy but performs rather well in the four key aspects, since it manages to find a balance between change and continuity by combining traditional club and new network diplomacy elements. However, the underlying dynamics of these aspects point to the EEAS' dependence on the interests of the other stakeholders in EU external action and the continuing predominance of states in diplomacy.

Due to this dependence, the EEAS' structures and diplomatic conduct always take the diverse interests of the involved stakeholders into account. The main point of contention manifests itself in the fragmentation of competences in the various areas of EU external action and the fact that the EEAS serves several masters. Thus, it does not receive a formal role in policy-making but encompasses all foreign policy areas to some degree. Furthermore, the budget aspects decided by the Member States and the EU institutions constrain the EEAS' performance in many ways, while the top-level positions are mostly allocated to Member State officials. Hence, the EEAS' effective diplomatic conduct in all of the four key challenges of modern diplomacy depends on the willingness of the other EU institutions and the Member States, while traditional state diplomacy remains predominant.

As a consequence, this dependence means that the EEAS caters more for the interests of the involved stakeholders than the new challenges to modern diplomacy, which confirms the hypothesis that the EEAS does not fully meet the new challenges to diplomacy, since the involved stakeholders' interests put limitations on the free development of the EEAS.

Nonetheless, this finding also bears an adverse significance, since it follows that the EEAS then meets modern diplomacy's challenges precisely because of the other stakeholders' willingness to cooperate and to extend rights and privileges to the EEAS that it might otherwise not have. Thus, the EEAS could not work as well as it does without the other EU institutions and Member States. Considering the balance between change and continuity, the predominance of states does not have to be a bad thing either. Modern diplomacy contains novel and traditional elements, meaning that the EEAS fits well into the sphere of modern diplomacy, by embodying this balance. Furthermore, a purely post-Westphalian system might not stand a chance on the international stage, as the EEAS draws its prestige, expertise and global relationships from the Member States. The EEAS was also not designed as an MFA, so it cannot meet some of the challenges by its very nature, since it is supposed to add value to the work of the other stakeholders. The EEAS' role in diplomacy does not represent a zero-sum game. However, many players perceive it that way because the EEAS' success in diplomacy depends on the other stakeholders. Thus, remedying the EEAS' shortcomings also lies in their interest. The move towards more joint action and coordination is a first step, but it still represents a "race between irrelevance and integration".[126] The outcome of this race could depend greatly on the new HR/VP Federica Mogherini.

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[126] O'Sullivan, *op.cit.*

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
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