Bouckaert, Jan and Degryse, Hans and van Dijk, Theon (2012) Bertrand Competition with an Asymmetric No-discrimination Constraint. Bruges European Economic Research (BEER) 23/June 2012. [Policy Paper]
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Abstract
Regulators and competition authorities often prevent firms with significant market power or dominant firms from practicing price discrimination. The goal of such an asymmetric no- discrimination constraint is to encourage entry and serve consumers’ interests. This constraint prohibits the firm with significant market power to practice both behaviour-based price discrimination within the competitive segment and third-degree price discrimination across the monopolistic and competitive segments. We find that this constraint hinders entry and reduces welfare when the monopolistic segment is small.
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| Item Type: | Policy Paper |
|---|---|
| Uncontrolled Keywords: | price discrimination, dominance |
| Subjects for non-EU documents: | EU policies and themes > Policies & related activities > competition policy EU policies and themes > Policies & related activities > economic and financial affairs > business/private economic activity |
| Subjects for EU documents: | UNSPECIFIED |
| EU Series and Periodicals: | UNSPECIFIED |
| EU Annual Reports: | UNSPECIFIED |
| Series: | Series > College of Europe (Brugge) > Bruges European Economic Research Papers (BEER) |
| Depositing User: | Phil Wilkin |
| Official EU Document: | No |
| Language: | English |
| Date Deposited: | 19 Dec 2014 09:26 |
| Number of Pages: | 30 |
| Last Modified: | 19 Dec 2014 09:26 |
| URI: | http://aei.pitt.edu/id/eprint/58616 |
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