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SITTING ON THE FENCE
SWEDISH DEFENCE POLICY
AND THE BALTIC SEA REGION

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KEY POINTS

- From Sweden's point of view of, the post-Cold War strategic timeout in Europe is coming to an end. The international environment is reverting to a condition in which the use of force among states, including countries in the Baltic Sea region, is no longer an improbable scenario. Sweden believes that crises or conflicts that could directly or indirectly affect the country might potentially occur in Northern Europe in the future.

This perception stems from: (1) rising uncertainty in Northern Europe (the Baltic Sea and High North regions) where new possibilities are emerging for extraction and transportation of energy resources, maritime transport and fishing; (2) the reforms and modernisation of Russia's Armed Forces, and the lowering of the country's threshold for the use of force in its immediate neighbourhood.

- In this context, the transformations of Sweden's defence policy over the last twenty years have become a problem for the country. Sweden has moved from neutrality, i.e. non-involvement on any side of armed interstate conflicts, to non-alignment, whereby it remains outside military alliances and freely decides its policies during wartime. Those changes, combined with the integration in the region and Sweden's accession to the EU in 1995, as well as the country's limited capabilities to defend its own territory, have resulted in the need for Sweden to seek a new formula for its military security.

The 2009 unilateral declaration of solidarity with the Nordic and EU states, which also spelt out Sweden's expectation of solidarity from those countries in the event of a natural disaster or armed attack affecting Sweden, is politically and militarily only an illusory solution to Sweden's security dilemma.

- The real choice that Sweden faces is between maintaining the status of a non-aligned state and considerably increasing its defence spending on the one hand, and joining NATO on the other; even though other proposals, such as evolution of Nordic or Swedish-Finnish co-operation towards a military alliance, have also been raised in public debate in Sweden.

None of the solutions proposed is simple or practicable for the current conservative-liberal government. In the coming years Sweden will probably remain outside NATO, make some adjustments to its military reforms and slightly increase its defence spending (which currently stands at around 1.1% of GDP, or US\$6.2 billion). The country will continue to develop Nordic co-operation (even if some limitations are placed on this), and will work closer together with NATO.

- The changes in Sweden's defence discourse and policy may be conducive to strengthening security in the Baltic Sea region. Closer political and military co-operation in the region may serve as a preventative and deterrent measure, and enable a faster and better co-ordinated response in the event of a crisis.

Politically, Sweden's perception of the geopolitical changes in the Baltic Sea and the High North regions may strengthen those voices within NATO (and even within the EU) which have been warning about the growing instability and possibility of crises in the peripheries of NATO and the EU. Formats such as the Northern Group offer opportunities for enhanced regional security co-operation.

In the military dimension, Sweden will seek to improve the interoperability between its Armed Forces and NATO, for example by participating in the NATO Response Force within the Connected Forces Initiative. Co-operation may also extend to safeguarding energy and cyber-security, as well as the security of critical infrastructures in those areas.

- The Nordic states are Sweden's main partners for military co-operation with regard to both training & exercises as well as armament and military equipment co-operation. To a lesser extent, the changes in Swedish discourse will contribute to the development of bilateral defence co-operation with countries outside this group. Poland is not one of Sweden's priority partners for military co-operation, and is seen by Sweden mainly as a NATO member in the region.

INTRODUCTION

Sweden's defence policy has undergone profound changes over the last twenty years. For two centuries, or since the end of the Napoleonic wars, Sweden pursued a policy of neutrality, that is, non-involvement in armed interstate conflicts. It also maintained a considerable capacity to defend country's territory. As the security environment changed – after the break-up of the Soviet Union, the accession of Central European countries to the EU and NATO, and Sweden's own accession to the EU in 1995 – the country gradually started to transform its defence policy. In the 1990s it gave up neutrality and declared itself a non-aligned state, i.e. one that remained outside military alliances and freely decided its policies in wartime. Sweden started to perceive the traditional threats to state security as no longer being relevant, while the challenges posed by global phenomena such as terrorism or crises in failed states gained more prominence. Adapting to this new situation, Sweden reformed its armed forces to make them compatible with its policy of active participation in international crisis management. The result was that the Swedish military's capability to defend its national territory, which previously constituted one of the pillars of Sweden's neutrality and security, has been diminished.

Nowadays, the Swedish government perceives that the post-Cold War strategic timeout is coming to an end, and the security environment is reverting to a condition in which the use of force among countries in Europe is no longer an improbable scenario. Noting the declining stability of its region, Sweden adopted a doctrine of 'solidarity' with the Nordic and EU states in 2009, which also expressed an expectation of assistance from those countries if Sweden came under threat. The Swedish government declared that the security of Sweden and the region would be built up in solidarity and interdependence with the states named in the declaration (in effect, meaning NATO). However, recent statements by NATO representatives have called the legitimacy of this policy

into question and, together with recent analyses which have revealed the Swedish Armed Forces' limited capability to defend the country resulted in Sweden having to seek a new formula for its military security.

The doctrine of neutrality, to which Sweden adhered until the early 1990s, has become an element of national identity so deeply held by the public and sections of the political class that it now limits Sweden's room for manoeuvre with regard to its potential accession to NATO. Considering the need to consolidate public finances, which may put some limits on increasing defence spending in the coming years, Sweden now faces a serious challenge: how can it guarantee the military security of the state in a deteriorating regional security environment? And what consequences could the changes in Sweden's defence discourse and policy have for security and co-operation in the Baltic Sea region?

I. FROM NEUTRALITY TO NON-ALIGNMENT

Dating back to 1812, Swedish neutrality meant neutrality during wartime: it was not stipulated in international agreements, but stemmed from the government's unilateral declaration, as well as its consistent foreign and security policy in wartime (in other words, it was different from the constant neutrality of Austria or Switzerland, and more closely resembled the neutrality of Finland or Ireland)¹. The primary objective was to protect Sweden from becoming entangled in war operations. Indeed, its declared neutrality has ensured peace for Sweden for the last two centuries, and in addition has become one of the defining elements of Swedish national identity. However, the doctrine of neutrality has also been treated as an instrument of Sweden's broader security policy. Successive Swedish governments based their policies on the rhetoric of neutrality while pragmatically adapting to the challenges posed by the world around them. They were prone to make compromises that seriously dented the doctrine of neutrality, but were effective in keeping Sweden away from war theatres². During World War II, Sweden managed to avoid German occupation at the price of political and economic concessions to the Third Reich³.

¹ Neutral states make a commitment that during wartime they will not allow any passage of troops, arms or food transports *via* their land territory; any use of their air space by military aircraft of the states at war for passage, observation of troops movements or military operations in their air space; the establishment of operating bases in their territorial waters by the states at war, or the use of their ports by such states' warships. See Remigiusz Bierzanek, Janusz Symonides, *Prawo międzynarodowe publiczne*, Warsaw 2005, p. 436-440.

² Daniela Schüngel, *Schwedens Sicherheitspolitik im Wandel. Zwischen militärischer Allianzfreiheit, NATO und ESVP*, HSFK-Report 14/2005, Hessische Stiftung Friedens- und Konfliktforschung, Frankfurt am Main 2005, p. 4-6.

³ Sweden supplied high-quality iron ore to the Third Reich, covering 40% of German industry's needs during World War II. It also permitted the transport of Wehrmacht troops *via* its territory (around 17,000 Wehrmacht soldiers crossed Sweden during the initial phase of Operation Barbarossa, and later Sweden would allow German soldiers on leave to cross its territory on their way from Norway to Germany). See Tony Judt, *Powojnie. Historia Europy od roku 1945*, Poznań 2010, p. 108.

During the Cold War, Sweden also declared itself to be a neutral state. The aim was to avoid involvement in a possible confrontation between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, and to improve stability in Northern Europe by maintaining the so-called Nordic balance⁴. While declaring that it possessed sufficient capacity to defend the country independently, the Swedish Ministry of Defence nevertheless covertly admitted that the chances of avoiding involvement in war operations in Europe were slim, and that in the event of war, the only way to avoid a Soviet occupation would be to quickly obtain assistance from the West. Therefore, successive Swedish governments covertly co-operated with NATO member states, in order to ensure assistance for Sweden from the Alliance's air forces if needed⁵. Moreover, its status as a neutral state allowed Sweden to position itself as an impartial mediator in conflicts and crises the world over, and its active policies within the United Nations strengthened its international position. The Sweden's policy of neutrality applied to classic armed interstate conflicts but *not* to UN peace operations.

The end of the Cold War changed the fundamental circumstances of Sweden's defence policy. The geopolitical changes in the region and the integration of Central European states with the EU and NATO, as well as Sweden's own accession to the European Union in 1995 had a considerable impact on the country's security policy. Sweden found the traditional security threats to its own country and the region to no longer be relevant. It adopted a broad definition of national security in which the focus was on

⁴ The 'Nordic balance' during the Cold War was intended to ensure stability and security for Northern Europe, with Denmark and Norway as NATO members who, nevertheless, pursued strict policies with regard to the establishment of NATO military bases and storage of nuclear weapons in their territory during peace, with Sweden as a neutral state and with Finland connected with the Soviet Union by the 1948 Finnish-Soviet treaty.

⁵ As demonstrated by a 1994 report of the so-called Neutrality Commission appointed by the Swedish parliament to examine the neutrality policy during the Cold War. See Olof Santesson, *Neutralitetspolitiken i praktiken*, in *Kungl Krigsvetenskapsakademiens Handlingar och Tidskrift*, issue 1, Stockholm 2012, p. 157-160.

challenges posed by global phenomena such as terrorism or crises in failed states. In accordance with this definition, **Sweden became active in international crisis management.** A relatively small and peripheral country, Sweden has been using this activity to build up an image of itself as a state with a much stronger position and influence (both in the EU and globally) than the size of the Swedish state, economy or population would suggest. Since the 1990s, Sweden has pursued this crisis management policy within the framework provided by NATO, and later also by the EU, which largely replaced the country's original practice of participating in UN missions. Sweden joined NATO's Partnership for Peace programme in 1994. It took part in NATO's IFOR and SFOR operations in the Balkans in the 1990s. Currently it is still participating in NATO's KFOR operation in Kosovo and in ISAF in Afghanistan. It was also actively involved in the Unified Protector operation in Libya in 2011. From Sweden's point of view, it is NATO that offers the most developed command structures and capabilities to carry out military crisis management operations.

The end of the Cold War also marked the beginning of **Sweden's shift away from the policy of neutrality.** In 1992 the Swedish parliament adopted a doctrine of non-alignment, under which Sweden would stay out of military alliances, and which made neutrality in the event of war just one of the options available to the Swedish government. Further evolution of Sweden's policy was influenced by the progress of political and economic integration in Europe and in the region, and the debates on the 'solidarity clause' and the 'defence clause', first mentioned during work on the EU constitutional treaty, and ultimately embodied in the Treaty of Lisbon⁶. The notion of 'neutrality' gradually disappeared from the rhetoric of the Swedish government and official documents, and the 2004 security strategy

⁶ Although under the 'defence clause' (Art. 42(7)) the provisions on aid and assistance by all means in the countries' power in the event of an armed aggression on any Member State of the EU "shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain Member States", that is, including Sweden.

stated: “It is hard to imagine that Sweden would stay neutral in the event of an armed attack against another EU member state”⁷.

The activities of Russia in the Nordic-Baltic region (the resumption of strategic bomber flights in the High North, cyber-attacks and protests over the removal of the Bronze Soldier monument in Estonia) triggered a process of **re-evaluations of Sweden’s security policy**. However, the psychological breakthrough occurred only with the **Russian-Georgian war of 2008**, which came as a shock to Sweden. The country started to attach a greater significance to the changes taking place in its neighbourhood (so-called *närområdet*), especially in the regions of the Baltic Sea and the High North including the Barents Sea and the Arctic. In the Baltic Sea region, the volume of energy resource transports is increasing (Nord Stream, LNG, oil), and there is potential for destabilisation in Estonia and Latvia, due to these states’ large Russian-speaking minorities, and throughout the region due to possible Russian reactions to the development of NATO’s missile defence system. In the High North, on the other hand, new possibilities are opening up for the extraction and transportation of energy resources, for maritime transport and for fishing. In this context, the rise of Russia’s power ambitions, the reform of the Russian Armed Forces, the lowering of the threshold for the use of force by Russia and the modernisation of Russia’s military potential in the Kaliningrad oblast (air and missile defence systems, a prospective missile system) and in the Kola Peninsula are a source of concern. Sweden’s 2009 security strategy notes that while a direct armed attack against Sweden or other countries in the region is unlikely, one cannot rule out the emergence of crises in the future in which military measures may be used either in the region, or against Sweden directly⁸.

⁷ Gunila Herolf, Sweden and ESDP, in Klaus Brummer (ed.), *The North and ESDP. The Baltic States, Denmark, Finland and Sweden*, Bertelsmann Stiftung, Gutersloh June 2007.

⁸ Swedish government, *Regeringens proposition 2008/2009:140, Ett användbart försvar*, 19 March 2009, <http://www.regeringen.se/content/1/c6/12/29/57/853ca644.pdf>

II. FROM DEFENDING TERRITORY TO EXPEDITIONARY MISSIONS

The shift from neutrality to non-alignment, combined with a policy of active international involvement, was accompanied by reforms aimed at transforming the Swedish Armed Forces into an expeditionary force. As a result of this, however, the Swedish military's capabilities to defend its territory were diminished.

During the Cold War, while Sweden remained neutral, the country had to **build up capabilities to independently defend its territory** against potential armed aggression. In the event of a war in Europe, Warsaw Pact forces would have gained most by quickly seizing Swedish territory and moving its armies to northern and southern Norway. The Swedish Armed Forces therefore had to be strong enough to defend Sweden's neutrality (in reality, pending the arrival of assistance from NATO). This required maintaining large armed forces and universal conscription, considerable defence capabilities, and independence from external supplies of armament and military equipment. Sweden also applied the concept of so-called total defence, which involved civilian bodies in defence of the country. While Sweden did participate in UN operations during the Cold War, these were very low-priority in comparison with defending the country, from the point of view of the development of the armed forces.

After the end of the Cold War, Sweden stuck with the armed forces model focused on defending its territory until the end of the 1990s, as, according to its analysts, future developments in the post-Soviet area and the Baltic states seemed uncertain. But after 1999, when the Central European countries became NATO members, the Baltic states were on their way towards accession and both groups of states were negotiating their accession to the European Union, Sweden declared a strategic timeout. It started to reduce the size of its armed forces, made cuts in defence spending and **launched military reforms**. The first phase of those reforms

took place in the years 2000–2004, and were aimed primarily at reducing troop numbers. Implementing the objectives laid down in the Defence Decision of 2004⁹, the Swedish Ministry of Defence started the second phase of transformation, which lasted from 2005 to 2009, and were clearly aimed at transforming the Swedish Armed Forces in line with the **expeditionary force model**. These reforms were aimed at giving the armed forces capability to carry out tasks in international operations, while defence tasks were regarded as being of secondary importance. The EU's Nordic Battle Group (NBG) created at that time, of which Sweden has been the framework nation since 2008, provided an instrument (and a blueprint) for the transformation¹⁰. Apart from reducing the number of troops, the transformation was also aimed at expanding the Swedish Armed Forces' capability to participate in military co-operation, and thus to enhance their interoperability in EU, NATO and UN missions. Sweden also started to step up its involvement in training and exercises within NATO and the EU, as well as in bilateral and multilateral formats¹¹.

The Russian-Georgian war of August 2008 prompted Swedish politicians to revise their thinking about the strategic timeout. In the 2009 Defence Decision¹², the Swedish government put the task of safeguarding territorial integrity and

⁹ Defence Decision (*Försvarsbeslut*): a security strategy adopted by the Swedish government and parliament every four to five years, the provisions of which constitute guidelines for the implementation of security and defence policies and reform of the armed forces.

¹⁰ The NBG is deployed on a regular basis; it had its first tour of duty in 2008, then in 2011, and is planned to be on duty again in 2015. The Swedish contribution to the NBG consist of 1600 troops (of a total of 2200). The NBG also includes Finland, Estonia, Ireland and Norway.

¹¹ Speech by General Sverker Göranson, the Supreme Commander of the Swedish Armed Forces, at the National Defence Academy in Beijing, 20 May 2012, <http://www.forsvarsmakten.se/upload/dokumentfiler/tal/2012/120320%20NDU%20Peking.pdf>

¹² Swedish government, Regeringens proposition 2008/2009:140, Ett användbart försvar, 19 March 2009, <http://www.regeringen.se/content/1/c6/12/29/57/853ca644.pdf>

political sovereignty on a par with participation in crisis management operations. Traditional threats and new types of challenges (such as cyber-security) were given more prominence in the broad definition of national security, and Sweden's neighbourhood (*närområdet*) was made the main frame of reference. The government also obligated the Armed Forces to resume defence planning, which had been abandoned several years before¹³. At the same time, however, the previous plans for the transformation of the military did not undergo any major adjustments. A reform program was proposed for the years 2010–2014, whose provisions included the professionalisation of the Armed Forces as of July 2010. These changes, introduced in the direct aftermath of the Russian-Georgian war, concerned supplying more armament and military equipment to several reserve units, and the reintroduction as of 2013 of four regional commands (dissolved in the 1990s), whose task was to carry out joint operations and co-ordinate military and civilian activities in the individual regions of Sweden.

¹³ Karin Enström, S monterade ned försvaret, *Dalarnas Tidningar*, 23 January 2013, <http://www.dt.se/opinion/kronikor/1.5508508-s-monterade-ned-for-svaret>

III. SWEDEN DECLARES SOLIDARITY

The consequence of increased intraregional links, the transformation of the Swedish military into an expeditionary force, and the perceived deterioration of regional security led to the revision of Sweden's security policy and its break with the tradition of non-involvement and independence in its defence policy. The text of the Defence Decision for 2010-2014 adopted in March 2009 included a '**declaration of solidarity**'. In that document Sweden unilaterally declared that it would not remain passive in the event of a "disaster or armed aggression" affecting one of the EU members or a Nordic state (i.e. Norway or Iceland), and that it expected those countries to do the same. The declaration further stipulated that the Swedish Armed Forces had to be prepared to give and receive military assistance. The Swedish government declared that Sweden's security would be founded on solidarity and interdependence with the countries mentioned (*de facto* meaning NATO), and that an armed attack against one country in the region would in fact mean its neighbours becoming involved in the conflict.

Sweden's declaration was both an expression of geopolitical necessity and an attempt to solve the problem of ensuring the country's security in the face of perceived rising instability in the region. On the one hand, the 'declaration of solidarity' (or in fact 'non-passivity') amounted to recognition of the actual state of affairs. It is unlikely that political considerations would allow Sweden to adopt a neutral position in the event of an armed attack on another Nordic or EU country. Likewise, it would be hardly possible for Sweden to stand aside in such a case due to military considerations. In the scenarios of possible crises and conflicts in Northern Europe which Swedish analysts had considered (such as a conflict between the Baltic States and Russia)¹⁴, NATO's actions

¹⁴ Karlis Neretnieks, Military-Strategic Options, in Bo Hugemark (ed.), Friends in Need. Towards a Swedish Strategy of Solidarity with her Neighbours, Stockholm 2012, p. 175-220.

in the region would require Sweden to make available its air space, territorial waters or land. On the other hand, the expectation of solidarity from the other Nordic and EU states was equally important for the Swedish government, because the transformation of its military into an expeditionary force and its growing involvement in foreign operations had resulted in Sweden's diminished capabilities to defend its territory.

Sweden's adoption of the 'declaration of solidarity' coincided with a stepping-up of military co-operation with the Nordic states and NATO in Northern Europe.

Exercises by individual branches of the armed forces have become an important element of the **Nordic defence co-operation** (NORDEFECO) launched in 2009. This particularly concerns the air forces: exercises have taken place in the High North (involving Sweden, Norway and Finland); exercises will take place in southern Sweden and northern Denmark (involving Sweden and Denmark, as agreed in November 2012)¹⁵; and Sweden also plans to participate (together with Finland) in cooperation with Norway in NATO's Icelandic Air Policing and Surveillance mission¹⁶. Those activities are aimed at increasing Sweden's interoperability with its neighbours (NATO members) who share its understanding of security challenges, and to strengthen the region's defence capabilities and the potential 'Nordic solidarity' in the event of an external threat.

¹⁵ NORDEFECO, Cross-border cooperation, 27 December 2012, www.nordefco.org

¹⁶ Sweden and Finland agreed to participate, in co-operation with Norway, in the surveillance of Iceland's air space, but not in policing it; that is, they will not intercept aircraft violating Icelandic air space. In Sweden and Finland, the decision is referred to as the development of the Nordic air force exercise programme and as part of Nordic co-operation, rather than participation in a NATO mission, and consequently the Swedish and Finnish fighter aircraft will probably be unarmed. This 'exercise' is scheduled for the first quarter of 2014.

Sweden has also started to step up its **involvement in NATO exercises and operations**. While the development of military co-operation (in the beginning involving the Swedish Army alone) had originally been aimed at improving interoperability with a view to taking part in foreign operations, after 2009 regional collaboration increasingly became the point of reference. The Swedish Armed Forces started to take part more frequently in Partnership for Peace and NATO exercises in the region, for example, in Loyal Arrow in Sweden in 2009, NRF Brilliant Mariner in 2010, Baltic Regional Training Event in the Baltic States in 2011 and 2012, and the CMX crisis management exercises in 2011 and 2012. The Swedish Navy and Air Force also started to take part in EU and NATO operations: the Navy joined the operation in the Horn of Africa in 2009, and the Air Force took part in the operation in Libya in 2011. Co-operation with NATO was seen as a way to develop interoperability with the forces of NATO members and the NATO command structures. Sweden treated this as an investment in ‘joint defence capabilities’. It was also expected to raise political capital for Sweden within NATO and in the United States, and in this way gain additional guarantees for the country’s security despite Sweden not being a NATO member. Because of its active involvement in co-operation with NATO, Sweden even started to be dubbed “NATO’s partner number one” or “Ally twenty-nine”¹⁷.

¹⁷ Ann-Sofie Dahl, Partner number one or NATO ally twenty-nine. Sweden and NATO post-Libya, Research Paper No. 82, NATO Defense College, September 2012, <http://www.ndc.nato.int/research/series.php?icode=1>

IV. SWEDEN'S DEFENCE POLICY IN CRISIS

Nevertheless, the 'declaration of solidarity' began to be perceived in Sweden as an illusory solution to the problem of ensuring military security. In the context of the reform of the Russian Armed Forces and Russia's espionage activities in Northern Europe, Swedish analysts started to look into the defence capabilities of the Swedish Armed Forces, its ability to give and receive military assistance, and the political credibility of the policy of solidarity. Their conclusions reveal an ambivalent picture of the military. The audit of the Armed Forces' ability to accomplish their tasks, which was carried out in 2012 by analysts from the Royal Swedish Academy of War Sciences, presents a dual picture¹⁸.

The transformation into an expeditionary force capable of responding flexibly to various kinds of challenges in crisis management operations, which has been underway for several years, is generally regarded to have been a success. **Sweden currently possesses a military force that can be deployed on foreign missions, and has both high-quality armament and military equipment and well-trained troops.** This was demonstrated by Sweden's participation in foreign missions: its Army has been deployed in Afghanistan as part of NATO's ISAF, its Navy in the Horn of Africa as part of the EU's Atalanta operation, and its Air Force in Libya as part of NATO's Unified Protector operation. The analysts concluded that the direction of change, towards a smaller and technologically more advanced military, was in principle correct, in the context of the transformations of the neighbouring countries' armed forces.

¹⁸ Björn Anderson (ed.), *Kan vi försvara oss? (Can we defend ourselves?)*, Report prepared as part of the project 'Security of Sweden beyond 2014' carried out by the Royal Academy of War Sciences (KKrVA), Stockholm 2012; Karlis Neretnieks, *Military-Strategic Options*, in Bo Hugemark (ed.), *Friends in Need. Towards a Swedish Strategy of Solidarity with her Neighbours*, Stockholm 2012, p. 175-220.

At the same time, however, **serious doubts have been expressed about the Swedish Armed Forces' ability to fulfil tasks related to defending Sweden's territory and carry out effective operations in the event of crises or conflicts in the region.** Firstly, research by the Royal Academy of War Sciences¹⁹ showed that while the Swedish Armed Forces were prepared to co-operate with NATO in case of low-intensity crises, they would face mounting problems as the crises escalated, for instance if Swedish territory were to be used to establish bases for a NATO operation to support the Baltic states, and Sweden faced the risk of a pre-emptive strike from Russia aimed at creating political pressure and/or destroying military infrastructures. In the case of the Army, the problems include the absence of medium-range air (and missile) defence systems, and difficulties with deploying a larger number of adequately trained personnel. The use of the Navy (for example, to escort larger units) would be limited, as Swedish corvettes lack systems of air defence. The operations of the Air Force, Sweden's biggest asset, would be limited by the absence of long-range air to surface missiles (and the need to take over the tasks of medium-range land-based air defence systems). Even though Sweden has been working together with NATO, co-operation and co-ordination between the Swedish Armed Forces and NATO forces on Swedish territory and beyond could also pose problems. Besides, the Swedish Armed Forces have too few units to defend the country's territory independently over an extended period of time, and do not have all the necessary armament and military equipment. In the event of an isolated pre-emptive strike against Swedish territory (such as on one of the major cities, or a strategically important region such as Gotland), designed to impair Sweden's and NATO's military potential in the region, Sweden would not be able to defend itself over an extended period of time, and would have to rely on external assistance. In December 2012, General Sverker Göranson, Supreme Commander of the Swedish Armed Forces, confirmed as much when he said that in

¹⁹ Björn Anderson (ed.), *op. cit.*

the event of a limited armed attack, Sweden would be able to defend itself for a week, and even that only as of 2019, when all the branches of the Armed Forces become fully operational after the current reform²⁰.

The causes of this state of affairs include excessive cuts to the size of the Armed Forces over the last ten years (see Appendix 1), **and the recent abolition of universal conscription and the professionalisation of the military**, which currently results in personnel shortages. In accordance with the stated objectives of the recent reform, Sweden's Army is to achieve the full number of troops and the target level of training only in 2019. Meanwhile, a report by Sweden's *Riksrevisionen*, the national audit office, shows that the Swedish Air Force and Navy are struggling with long-term structural problems with manning their units, especially the combat units²¹. Furthermore, the Armed Forces are underfinanced which, according to the Supreme Commander, may in future even result in Sweden giving up one of the branches of its Armed Forces²². After a period of declining military spending, Sweden started to expand its defence budget in 2009. Military spending is expected to slightly increase in absolute terms in the coming years (currently it stands at around US\$6.2 billion; see Appendix 2). However, given Sweden's projected economic growth, the proportion of GDP earmarked for defence will *de facto* decrease to around 1%²³. The slight expansion of the

²⁰ Mikael Holmström, Försvar med tidsgräns, *Svenska Dagbladet*, 30 December 2012, http://www.svd.se/nyheter/inrikes/forsvar-med-tidsgrans_7789308.svd; Mikael Holmström, Det är något helt exceptionellt, *Svenska Dagbladet*, 25 January 2013, http://www.svd.se/nyheter/inrikes/det-ar-nagot-helt-exceptionellt_7858986.svd

²¹ Riksrevisionen, Bemanningen av marines och flygvapnets stående insatsförband, RIR 2012:18, November 2012, http://www.riksrevisionen.se/PageFiles/16556/Anpassad_12_18_Bemanningen%20av%20marinens%20och%20flygvapnets%20st%C3%A5ende%20insatsf%C3%B6rband.pdf

²² See footnote 20.

²³ Peter Nordlund, Janne Åkerström, Försvarsutgifter i budgetkrisens spår – en försvarsekonomisk omvärldsanalys, FOI Report, October 2012, p. 55–56, <http://www.foi.se/Documents/foir3508.pdf>

defence budget will probably be insufficient to cover the necessary expenses after 2015. The military will have to deal not only with the shortages of armament and military equipment, including the land-based air defence systems, artillery systems, air defence systems for the corvettes and ammunition for the JAS-39 fighter aircraft. The Swedish Armed Forces will also face considerable investment needs in the 2015–2018 planning period and will require around 30 billion Swedish kronor, i.e. around €3.5 billion, of additional financing over the period in question. In January 2013 the Swedish government decided to purchase 60 new multi-role JAS-39E/F fighter aircraft. That purchase will consume most of the investment budget in the coming years, while the Armed Forces also need to replace their fleet of transport aircraft (currently the C-130E) and submarines, replace/upgrade their infantry fighting vehicles, and purchase UAVs²⁴.

Those reports, in conjunction with the statement by NATO's Secretary General, who said in November 2012 that the Alliance was not responsible for the security of countries that were not its members²⁵, gave rise to **the most heated discussions since the end of the Cold War among analysts, the military and politicians, who have been arguing about Sweden's defence policy and the direction of the military reform.** The NATO Secretary General's statement undermined the Swedish government's rhetoric that there existed a 'solidarity' with Sweden (supposedly on the part of NATO). The Norwegian defence minister made a statement in a similar tone, making it clear that Norway would be unlikely to grant military assistance to Sweden in the event of a conflict, because its primary objective was to defend its own territory, and

²⁴ Gerard O'Dwyer, Norway Bucks Trend as Neighbors Curb Spending, *Defense News*, 24 October 2012, <http://www.defensenews.com/article/20121024/DEFREG01/310240001/Norway-Bucks-Trend-Neighbors-Curb-Spending>

²⁵ Interview with Anders Fogh Rasmussen during his visit to Sweden, Sverige kan inte räkna med stöd från Nato, 6 November 2012, <http://www.svt.se/nyheter/sverige/nato-syrien-storsta-utmaning>

because NATO was its main military alliance²⁶. The debate was further heated up by reports that Sweden's internal security services were investigating, at the request of the prosecutor's office, whether the Supreme Commander had not committed an offence by making a statement about Sweden's defence capabilities, and in this way revealing information that could compromise the country's security. In early 2013 the press joined the debate, which created heightened media interest in defence issues that had had no precedent in many years.

Those discussions are of major significance – in 2014 Sweden will hold parliamentary elections, and in 2015 the government and parliament are to adopt a new Defence Decision for the years 2015–2018, which may influence future military and political transformations. A strong polarisation over defence policy issues is symptomatic here. On the one hand, analysts, the military and some politicians (from the smaller Liberal and Christian Democrat parties that are part of the conservative-liberal government) have been pointing to the consequences of the Armed Forces' underfinancing, calling for considerably higher defence spending and adjustments to the military reform (including the purchase of medium-range air and missile defence system), and urging the start of a serious debate about possible accession to NATO. They have also been pointing to the growing threat posed by an increasingly unstable and ever better-armed Russia. On the other hand, the largest coalition party (the Moderates) and its leader, Prime Minister Fredrik Reinfeldt, who bear in mind the consolidation of public finances and the parliamentary election campaign in 2014, have been refusing to consider increasing defence spending at the expense of other objectives (such as welfare). The Moderates (as well as the opposition Social Democrats) are aware of the disquieting trends in Russian politics and the country's growing defence

²⁶ Interview with Anne-Grete Strøm-Erichsen, *Osäkert om Norge ställer upp om Sverige angrips*, Sveriges Radio, 24 February 2013, <http://sverigesradio.se/sida/artikel.aspx?programid=83&artikel=5453467>

spending, but recently have been playing down their direct impact on Sweden's military security. The temperature of the discussion is well illustrated by headlines in Sweden's major papers, one of which read "Sweden needs a military putsch"²⁷.

²⁷ Sverige behöver en militärkupp, *Expressen*, 15 January 2013, <http://www.expressen.se/ledare/sverige-behover-en-militarkupp-1/>

V. SWEDEN'S DILEMMAS

Sweden thus faces a major challenge of how to shape its defence policy in a deteriorating regional security setting. Several solutions are being debated, all of which involve political and social problems stemming largely from Swedish identity and history. The most important dilemma concerns the choice between remaining a non-aligned state and joining NATO, although other proposals have also been raised.

(1) Remaining outside NATO is one option which nevertheless would lead to increased military spending and defence capabilities, in line with the reasoning that non-involvement in military alliances entails an obligation to put more effort into ensuring one's own security. However, the largest coalition party, the Moderates, is unwilling to increase the defence budget considerably, as its priority now is to maintain budgetary discipline, even if the smaller coalition partners (the Liberals and the Christian Democrats) support increasing defence spending. The opposition is also split on the issue – the Social Democrats have not ruled out increased spending, while the Greens are critical of it²⁸.

(2) Joining NATO: in terms of Sweden's domestic politics, this would be a very difficult process, and carrying it out while conforming with Swedish political culture would require building a political consensus of a majority of parliamentary parties, as well as a massive public campaign. Sweden's major parties are split on the issue, and even those that are in favour of NATO membership (including the Moderates) have no political will to raise this unpopular issue with the public. Advocates of membership argue that Sweden would gain additional guarantees of security and could expect assistance from its allies. On the other hand,

²⁸ Swedish Government Split Over Defence Spending, Swedish Radio, 18 January 2013, <http://www.defencetalk.com/swedish-government-split-over-defence-spending-46387/#.UP-dEuHI4U1.twitter>

opponents (including the Social Democrats) believe that membership would lead to rising tensions and a greater risk of crises in the Baltic Sea region and the High North²⁹. They also argue that even if Sweden opted for NATO membership, it would still need to increase defence spending in order to be regarded as a reliable member of the Alliance. The negative attitude of the Swedish public is also an important factor in the membership debate. In a 2012 survey, 47% of Swedes favoured staying out of NATO, with 30% backing accession³⁰. The Swedish people still widely believe that non-alignment is the best guarantee of security, and that membership in NATO would entail excessive financial and political commitments. This shows how the concept of neutrality has become a defining element of the Swedish national identity, and has turned from an effective policy instrument into a brake on major change. Sweden should therefore not be expected to file an application for membership in NATO in the immediate future.

Still, the fact that NATO has been looking for new and diversified formulas for co-operation with its most active partners, which could be applied after the period of intensive co-operation on the Afghanistan mission is over, offers some opportunities for further rapprochement between Sweden (as well as Finland) and the Alliance. This would probably give Sweden broader opportunities to influence the shape of the future operations in which it would choose to participate, as well as more opportunities for exchange of information and co-ordination with regard to the new challenges such as cyber-security, energy security, combating terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

²⁹ Sven Hirdman, Medlemskap i Nato skulle öka spänningar, *Svenska Dagbladet*, 16 January 2013, http://www.svd.se/opinion/brannpunkt/medlemskap-i-nato-skulle-oka-spanningar_7827228.svd

³⁰ 23% of respondents had no opinion on the issue. See Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (MSB), *Delredovisning - Opinioner 2012*, Stockholm 2012, p. 22, https://www.msb.se/Upload/Nyheter_press/Pressmeddelanden/Opinioner2012_Delredovisning.pdf

However, such closer co-operation would not extend to activities under Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty³¹.

(3) Further development of Nordic defence co-operation³² aimed at establishing a military alliance: this option is backed by large numbers of the Swedish public. Co-operation within the framework of NORDEFECO is the first and most natural option for the development of regional military co-operation, not only from the point of view of Sweden, but also for Finland and Norway (albeit less so for Denmark). The strategic proximity, in both the regional and the global dimension, strongly underpinned by the economic and cultural context, provides a basis for such co-operation. Still, the proposal made in the 2009 Stoltenberg report³³, for all the Nordic states to adopt a mutual declaration of solidarity as a condition that military co-operation be further developed, has been rejected by all the Nordic states. Because their military potential is relatively small in comparison with the potentials of other regional players, the Nordic states are unwilling to limit their co-operation options to their neighbours alone. Denmark and Norway, being NATO members, have ruled out the possibility of Nordic co-operation becoming ‘independent’ and forming an alternative to NATO in the region. This is supposed to serve as the Nordic format for the ‘pooling & sharing’ projects, which nevertheless should not impose any limitations on sovereign decision-making. So far, Sweden and Finland have adopted the same position, recognising the significant role that NATO plays in ensuring security in Northern Europe. However, it is possible that in order to make up for the shortages of its own defence budget and military capabilities, Sweden will come up with proposals for

³¹ See footnote 17.

³² For more information on NORDEFECO, see Justyna Gotkowska, Smart defence Nordic style, CEWeekly, 19 September 2012, <http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/ceweekly/2012-09-19/smart-defence-nordic-style>

³³ Justyna Gotkowska, Olaf Osica (ed.), Closing the gap? Military co-operation from the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea, OSW Report, p. 23, 10 December 2012, http://www.osw.waw.pl/sites/default/files/Closing_the_gap_net.pdf

closer regional co-operation aimed at integrating the defence capabilities of the Nordic states. In a joint article published in January 2013, Sweden's ministers for foreign affairs and defence, Carl Bildt and Karin Enström, stated that "jointly possessing and using capabilities and resources, i.e. so-called pooling & sharing, is the cornerstone of Sweden's vision of Nordic co-operation"³⁴. This proposal goes further than even the most advanced NORDEF projects have done so far, such as the joint use of transport aircraft (NORTAT). Still, given the relatively higher defence spending of the other Nordic countries, and the possible implications of the use of joint capabilities within NATO, the feasibility of Sweden's proposals should be treated with caution.

(4) In the context described above, proposals have also been put forward in Sweden to establish a **Swedish-Finnish military alliance** based on the non-aligned status of both countries. Responding to those proposals, the Finnish minister of defence (from a party representing the Swedish minority) said that closer Nordic co-operation was a rather distant vision, which would moreover require adequate treaties to be concluded. And considering Norway's and Denmark's membership in NATO, such treaties could only involve Sweden and Finland³⁵. However, the Prime Minister of Finland expressed a clearly negative position on the concept of Nordic or Swedish-Finnish military alliances³⁶. Such statements are not the only indications that a Swedish-Finnish military alliance is unlikely to materialise. The Finns are cautious about military alliances with Sweden for historical reasons, which include Sweden's passive policy during Finland's War of

³⁴ Carl Bildt, Karin Enström, Försvarsmateriel kan ägas gemensamt i Norden, *Dagens Nyheter*, 13 January 2013, <http://www.dn.se/debatt/forsvarsmateriel-kan-agas-gemensamt-i-norden>

³⁵ Finnish Broadcasting Company YLE, Finnish-Swedish defence pact issue raised, 13 January 2013, http://yle.fi/uutiset/finnish-swedish_defense_pact_issue_raised/6449010

³⁶ Finnish Broadcasting Company YLE, PM Katainen: 'No' to Nordic defence pact, 14 January 2013, http://yle.fi/uutiset/pm_katainen_no_to_nordic_defense_pact/6450309

Independence in 1917–1918, and the fact that Sweden refused to offer military assistance to Finland during the Finnish-Soviet Winter War of 1939–1940. Even though the two countries had co-operated militarily in the 1930s, and Sweden had been discussing and sending signals of solidarity with Finland in the event that its neighbour came under attack (regarding this as an ‘extended’ defence of Sweden’s own territory)³⁷.

(5) Sweden could also consider emulating the example of Finland³⁸ and strengthening bilateral military co-operation with the United States. However, all the dilemmas involved in closer co-operation with NATO would equally apply to closer collaboration with the US.

On the other hand, Sweden is not considering the option of developing closer co-operation within the European Union. Even though the EU has adopted the ‘defence clause’, for Sweden the EU is not and will not be a military alliance. The development of (civil and) military capabilities within the EU is aimed at participation in foreign operations, and not at collective defence. From the point of view of Sweden, with NATO in place, there is no need to develop EU command structures similar to NATO’s or to create a military alliance excluding the United States.

None of the proposed solutions to Sweden’s security dilemmas is simple or easily practicable for the current ruling coalition. Considering the circumstances discussed above, it is unlikely that a thorough change of Sweden’s defence policy will be possible in the medium term. The reports of the Swedish

³⁷ Jacob Westberg, *Finskt och svenskt försvarssamarbete under mellankrigstiden*, in Fredrik Doerer, Magnus Petersson and Jacob Westberg (ed.), *Norden mellan stormakter och fredsförbund*, Stockholm 2012, p. 95–117.

³⁸ Mainly in the area of armament and military equipment co-operation. See the recent Finnish orders for US-made state-of-the-art weapons: AGM-158 JASSM air-to-surface guided missiles with a range of c. 370 km for the Air Force (F-18 combat aircraft), and the M57 ATACMS surface-to-surface missiles with a range of c. 300 km for the Army.

Defence Commission, on the basis of which the government will issue the new Defence Decision for 2015-2018, will be however of considerable importance. The Commission, which started its work in 2012, is tasked with assessing the evolution of the international security environment and the threats and challenges that it poses for Sweden. It will make proposals to the government concerning changes to the defence policy and reform of the Armed Forces, while building broad inter-party consensus on the issue. In the coming years Sweden will probably remain outside NATO, make some adjustments to its military reform and increase defence spending (in absolute terms), provided that there is sustained pressure to do so from the analyst community, backed by some media and political parties. Besides that, it will continue to be involved in the development of Nordic co-operation (which will nonetheless be subject to the limitations discussed above) and seek deeper co-operation with NATO.

VI. SWEDISH DEFENCE POLICY AND THE BALTIC SEA REGION

For Sweden's partners in the region, the absence of a major change in Swedish defence policy that would lead towards membership in NATO means continued uncertainty about what the country will do in the event of an actual crisis or conflict in the region. Will the Swedish government show 'solidarity' and offer assistance, should any such scenario materialise? Or will the public's deeply rooted tendency not to get involved in the problems of Sweden's neighbours prevail over a formally declared 'solidarity'? Will Sweden's 'solidarity' mean merely non-passivity, or will it come in the form of military assistance? And if military assistance is offered, will it be effective in practice, as Sweden still does not participate in NATO's defence planning?³⁹. For the Swedes themselves, continuation of the current defence policy will lead to questions about whether or not they can count on NATO if in need. This is not to say that the debates underway in Sweden are of no consequence for the country's partners in the region. **The changes in Sweden's defence discourse and policy may be conducive to strengthening security in the Baltic Sea region, even though they are less likely to lead to closer bilateral defence co-operation between Poland and Sweden.**

Regional formats of political and military co-operation offer possibilities for working together with Sweden. It should be noted in this context that bilateral, multilateral and regional military co-operation, either within or outside NATO, is becoming an increasingly important instrument in safeguarding the

³⁹ Bo Ljung, Tomas Malmöf, Karlis Neretnieks and Mike Winnerstig (publ.), The Security and Defensibility of the Baltic States. A Comprehensive Analysis of a Security Complex in the Making, FOI Report, October 2012, p. 59, http://www.foi.se/ReportFiles/foir_3471.pdf

security interests of individual NATO member states. Meanwhile Northern Europe, including the Baltic Sea area, is the only region in Poland's neighbourhood whose countries share similar assessments of current challenges and threats. Closer political and military co-operation in the region could serve as a 'preventative' and 'deterrent' measure, and enable faster and more co-ordinated reactions in the event of crises.

In the political dimension, Sweden's perception of the geopolitical changes taking place in the Baltic Sea and High North regions could strengthen those voices in NATO (and even in the EU) which point to the growing instability and likelihood of crises in the peripheries of NATO and the EU. For NATO and the EU, Sweden is an 'impartial' player in regional security issues, unlike Norway, which has its own interests in the High North, and Finland, which traditionally has always been concerned about its neighbour Russia. The fact that Sweden is not a NATO member partly excludes Stockholm from debates about NATO's defence policy. However, this limitation might be overcome by extending the security policy discussions to formats that do include Sweden (and Finland), such as the meetings of defence ministers of the so-called Northern Group, which brings together the Nordic states, the Baltic states, Poland, Germany and the United Kingdom.

In the military dimension, Sweden will be interested in seeking new forms of military co-operation with NATO in the region. The Swedes are aware of the need to ensure their Armed Forces' interoperability with NATO beyond the period of intensive co-operation on foreign missions in Afghanistan, Kosovo and Libya. They have also been promoting the concept of new-type partnerships between NATO and partner countries. Furthermore, they are aware of the growing importance of the NATO Response Force (NRF) in maintaining interoperability and co-operation among the NATO members within the framework of the Connected Forces Initiative, which is also open to partner

countries⁴⁰. For this reason, the Swedish government is currently considering participation in the NRF, an idea that will probably also have the backing of the largest opposition party, the Social Democrats, which would ensure Sweden's involvement in the NRF in the future⁴¹. It is not inconceivable that in the longer term, the dialogue on security of the Nordic-Baltic region could be underpinned by military co-operation within one rotation of the NATO Response Force.

We should also keep the so-called **new security challenges** in mind (concerning cyber- and energy security). The Swedish leadership realises that attacks against critical infrastructures (such as energy or IT infrastructures), which may or may not be accompanied by the use of military means, are becoming a staple element of future crisis and conflict scenarios, including in Northern Europe. Especially if one considers the current and planned development of infrastructures for the extraction, transportation and supply of energy resources in the region. For political and financial reasons, NATO will not be the main organisation in charge of dealing with the new challenges or ensuring cyber- or energy security, combating terrorism or preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in the member states. Nevertheless, NATO may facilitate information exchange, training, exercises and co-ordination among its members. NATO also sees opportunities for co-operation with partner countries in those areas, and the NATO facilities in the region (the Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence in Tallinn, Estonia, and the Energy Security Centre of Excellence in Vilnius,

⁴⁰ Anders Fogh Rasmussen, address at security conference in Sälen, Sweden, NATO and Sweden: Strong Partners in support of the United Nations, 14 January 2013, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/opinions_93824.htm. See also Guillaume Lasconjarias, The NRF: from a Key Driver of Transformation to a Laboratory of the Connected Forces Initiative, Research Paper No. 88, NATO Defense College, January 2013, <http://www.ndc.nato.int/research/series.php?icode=1>

⁴¹ Ewa Stenberg, Regeringen öppnar för att gå med i Natos insatsstyrka, *Dagens Nyheter*, 15 January 2013, <http://www.dn.se/nyheter/sverige/regeringen-oppnar-for-att-ga-med-i-natos-insatsstyrka>

Lithuania) could be used for closer co-operation among countries in the region, including NATO members as well as the non-members Sweden and Finland⁴².

As regards bilateral military co-operation (outside the framework of NATO), the Nordic states are Sweden's main partners for defence co-operation – this applies both to exercises and training, and to armament and military equipment co-operation – because of the geographical proximity, linguistic and cultural similarities, as well as some similarities with regard to the armament and military equipment held. For these reasons **Poland is not among Sweden's priority co-operation partners, and is regarded primarily as a NATO member in the region.** Sweden and Poland are involved in some co-operation projects concerning military exercises (such as the submarine rescue exercises held by the two countries' Navies), and could try to extend such co-operation to the Air Forces (for example, by including a Polish component in the Swedish-Danish exercise⁴³). From Sweden's point of view, bilateral co-operation with its non-Nordic partners could take the form of an economically justified collaboration on operation, servicing and upgrades of armament and military equipment (where the countries concerned possess the same systems), and related training and exercises. However, Sweden would have to see benefits from such co-operation, in the form of savings for the Swedish Armed Forces, and/or new orders for the Swedish arms industry, which would in reality require Poland to purchase Swedish-made armament and military equipment. This is of course does not rule out possibilities for deeper bilateral co-operation within the European Union, for example on civilian crisis management within the framework of the Common Security and Defence Policy, especially with regard to the European Union's eastern neighbourhood.


⁴² Ioanna-Nikoletta Zyga, *Emerging Security Challenges: A Glue for NATO and Partners?*, Research Paper No. 85, NATO Defense College, November 2012, <http://www.ndc.nato.int/research/series.php?icode=1>

⁴³ See footnote 15.

APPENDICES

Appendix 1

Size of the Swedish Armed Forces (operational component/ permanent units excluding the Home Guard) in 1997-2010⁴⁴



⁴⁴ Quoted from the IISS, The Military Balance for 1997-2010.

Size of the Swedish Armed Forces with the Home Guard in 2011⁴⁵


Swedish Army	7000 troops (permanent units) 15,100 troops (permanent units + contract units*) <i>*Soldiers of the contract units have civilian jobs, and are mobilised under temporary contracts when necessary.</i>
Navy	3100 troops (permanent units only)
Air Force	3400 troops (permanent units only)
Home Guard	22,000 troops ** <i>**Only a small proportion of Home Guard soldiers work for the military on a permanent basis. The remainder are volunteers with civilian jobs</i>

Several thousand troops serving in the command and logistics structures should be added to the above.

⁴⁵ Quoted from Försvarsmakten och Fickformat 2011. Stockholm 2011. p. 19, http://www.forsvarsmakten.se/upload/dokumentfiler/publikationer/fm_i_fickformat_2011_web.pdf

Appendix 2

Sweden's military spending in 1989–2011 (US\$ billion, according to SIPRI)



Sweden's military spending in 1989–2011

Year	Military spending in US\$ billion, according to SIPRI
1989	7.239
1990	7.375
1991	6.947
1992	6.751
1993	6.731
1994	6.716
1995	6.731
1996	6.819
1997	6.478
1998	6.663
1999	6.916
2000	7.167
2001	6.699
2002	6.521
2003	6.473
2004	6.092
2005	6.172
2006	6.075
2007	6.235
2008	5.545
2009	5.438
2010	5.886
2011	5.960