Consequences of developments in Central and Eastern Europe for European security

REPORT

submitted on behalf of the Political Committee
by Mr. Caro, Rapporteur
Consequences of developments in Central and Eastern Europe for European security

REPORT
submitted on behalf of the Political Committee
by Mr. Caro, Rapporteur

TABLE OF CONTENTS

DRAFT RECOMMENDATION
on the consequences of developments in Central and Eastern Europe for European security

DRAFT ORDER
on the consequences of developments in Central and Eastern Europe for European security

EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM
submitted by Mr. Caro, Rapporteur

I. Introduction

II. Disarmament, security and co-operation in Europe
   (a) Disarmament
   (b) The Charter of Paris for a new Europe

III. Uncertainties in Eastern Europe
   (a) Soviet Union
   (b) Central Europe
   (c) Balkan Europe

IV. Europe’s security
   (a) The persistence of a threat
   (b) Risks of destabilisation in Europe
   (c) Risks outside Europe

V. Conclusions

1. Adopted in committee by 20 votes to 0 with one abstention.
2. Members of the committee: Mr. Ahrens (Chairman); Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Mr. De Decker (Vice-Chairmen); MM. Aarts (Alternate: VerbEEK), Beix (Alternate: Baumel), Böhm (Alternate: ReDDemann), Bristo, Candal, Caro, Collart, CuattrocASAs, Eich, Fabra, Forni (Alternate: LemOine), Foschi, Goerens, HItscher, Lord Kirkhill, MM. Koehl, van der Linden (Alternate: EIsma), Lord Mackie, MM. Martinez, Martino (Alternate: GabBuggianI), Müller (Alternate: SoelI), NataI, Pécriaux, PIERAllI, de Puig, Roseta, Sarti, Sir William Shelton, Mrs. Staats-DompaS, MM. StoFelen, Thyraud, Ward.

N.B. The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.
Draft Recommendation
on the consequences of developments in Central
and Eastern Europe for European security

The Assembly,
(i) Welcoming the fact that events in the Soviet Union have not modified the guidelines of its external policy;
(ii) Welcoming the Soviet Union's support in defending the cause of peace and law at the United Nations Security Council during the crisis provoked by the invasion of Kuwait;
(iii) Considering that the signing of the CFE agreement, although preceded by a redeployment of Soviet armed forces which places Western Europe out of reach of a surprise attack, has not yet led to a massive reduction in the level of Soviet armaments;
(iv) Considering as positive the Supreme Soviet's vote in favour of ratification of important parts of the agreement providing for the reunification of Germany;
(v) Recalling that the new international order, whose principles were affirmed in the Paris Charter of November 1990, implies maintaining freedom of expression for all and respect for the rights of minorities and calls for an intensive effort to find practical means of implementing these principles;
(vi) Recalling that the Charter of Paris expresses new principles and includes specific measures for disarmament, the establishment of a European security system and, in particular, the creation of a conflict prevention centre;
(vii) Noting the will shown by certain European countries to redirect their internal and external policies and to seek ways of drawing closer to Western Europe;
(viii) Also noting with great concern the re-emergence of national conflicts in the Soviet Union and in certain Central European and Balkan countries;
(ix) Noting the extreme difficulties encountered in reforming the economy of all the countries in these regions;
(x) Considering that, according to the preamble and Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty, one of WEU's tasks is "to promote the unity and to encourage the progressive integration of Europe", there being no limit to the geographical extension of this undertaking;
(xi) Recalling further that Article IV of the modified Brussels Treaty invites WEU to co-operate closely with NATO;
(xii) Underlining finally that Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty does not limit participation in the activities of the Council's subsidiary bodies to member countries and recalling that the Council has in certain cases invited representatives of non-member countries of WEU to its ministerial meetings;
(xiii) Welcoming the pursuit of its exchanges with the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union and the participation of observers from the parliaments of Central and Eastern European countries at its sessions.

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Promote, as provided for in the Charter of Paris and in accordance with the recommendations of the Assembly, the negotiation of a second agreement on conventional forces to establish a true balance of forces and armaments between the Soviet Union and the deployment of the Atlantic Alliance in Europe, a second agreement on confidence-building measures extended to the thirty-five countries participating in the CSCE and the rapid creation of the conflict prevention centre in Europe;
2. Examine with the democracies of Central and Eastern Europe which are no longer members of the Warsaw Pact, insofar as they so wish, the conditions for making them "associated countries" by allowing them to co-operate here and now in:

   (a) the activities of the WEU Institute for Security Studies;
   (b) bodies for European co-operation in armaments matters;
   (c) the activities of the Council's subsidiary bodies whose aim is to verify the application of agreements on the limitation of conventional armaments;
   (d) any activities of the Council itself intended to consolidate international peace in Europe or outside the area covered by the North Atlantic Treaty;

3. Foster a rapprochement between those countries and the Community and WEU;

4. Examine any steps that might be taken to ensure application of principles defined by the CSCE to all European countries, with particular regard to the inviolability of frontiers, in view of the requirements of security, respect for human rights and economic and social co-operation;

5. Foster the development of the international mechanism provided for in the supplementary document of the CSCE Charter of Paris and to this end support the establishment of a CSCE parliamentary assembly in which WEU would undertake its rightful rôle.
Draft Order

on the consequences of developments in Central and Eastern Europe
for European security

The Assembly,
Noting the increased interest shown by Central European countries, in particular Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary, in closer relations and co-operation with WEU;
Anxious to respond positively to the political will expressed by these countries;
Convinced of the importance for WEU of the requirements of Central European security,
1. DECIDES to examine carefully the possibility of associating these countries with the activities of WEU and to define ways and means so as to achieve co-operation that is as tangible and effective as possible;
2. INSTRUCTS its Political Committee to pursue its work in this sense and to report back at the second part of the thirty-seventh ordinary session;
3. DECIDES to organise, in 1992, a symposium on co-operation between WEU and the Central European countries which so wish on the establishment of a new security order in Europe.
1. Introduction

1. Europe’s immense hopes following the upheavals in the Soviet Union and the people’s democracies in 1989 and 1990 have been replaced by some disappointment throughout many sections of public opinion. There are several reasons for this:

2. (i) The summit meeting of CSCE countries held in Paris in November 1990 certainly had positive results but provided no real guarantees of a new peaceful and secure order in Europe.

3. (ii) The same is true of the agreement on the limitation of conventional armaments signed on that occasion. Western experts note that the Soviet Union has not started genuine disarmament, it has increased its defence budget for 1991 and has produced no real reduction in armaments because of the measures taken by the Soviet Union to divert its impact.

4. (iii) The conditions of the reunification of Germany were satisfactory but developments in Eastern European countries were not consistent and, while some of them, i.e. Hungary, Poland and Czechoslovakia, have adopted democratic regimes, changes in the other countries are far from clear. Furthermore, although the Warsaw Pact has lost its military structure and the decision seems to have been taken to disband it completely, Soviet armed forces are still to be found wherever they were stationed already, including in East Germany, even though dates for their withdrawal have been fixed or are being negotiated.

5. (iv) The Soviet Union itself seems to have encountered the utmost difficulty in implementing perestroika, both economically and politically. Government setbacks in this area have led to a two-pronged challenge: on the one hand, from those who wish the Soviet Union to move more quickly towards democracy, liberalism and autonomy for the republics and, on the other, from those in favour of keeping the civil, military and police elite leaders in power and continuing strict economic dirigism and centralisation round the party and state. In face of this opposition, the choices that appeared to have been made in autumn 1990 now seem to be called in question, particularly with the army’s new grip on Lithuania and then Latvia in January 1991, which was accompanied by measures limiting freedom of the press throughout Soviet territory and extending the powers of the army and KGB.

6. (v) Although the Soviet Union’s external policy does not yet seem to have been changed, the announcement in December 1990 of the resignation of Mr. Shevardnadze, one of its guiding lights and a prime mover, has aroused some concern. The United States Government has already shown its displeasure at the way the CFE agreement is being applied and at the Soviet military action in Lithuania by deciding to defer the meeting between President Bush and President Gorbachev which was to have been held in Moscow on 11th February. Yet the firm policy adopted by the Soviet Union towards Iraq during the Gulf crisis showed that it was still interested in working out a new international order. This encourages confidence in future relations with the Soviet Union.

7. Note should be taken of these changes in the situation in order to examine what Western Europe can and must do to ensure its security, as well as that of Europe as a whole, in the period of uncertainty and instability which seems to be ahead. Before considering the future organisation of peace in a reunified Europe, it is important to be sure that what is hoped to be a transitional, although long, period during which the Soviet Union and its former allies seek a new path does not threaten peace and security in Europe. This is the aim of the present report.

8. Your Rapporteur took advantage of the annual meeting between the WEU Assembly and the Supreme Soviet, held in Paris, to obtain and assess the views of the Soviet delegation. Apart from many interesting explanations relating to matters raised in the present report, the meeting provided an opportunity for a particularly frank and direct dialogue between representatives of the two assemblies. Above all, it proved that events in the Soviet Union in recent months did not undermine the will of our Soviet partners to pursue open exchanges with the West, thus considerably relieving the fear rightly felt by some on witnessing a hardening of Soviet internal policy calling in question the relations that had existed between that country and Western Europe for several years.

9. Your Rapporteur was also able to visit Poland and Hungary where he received a welcome for which he conveys his warmest gratitude to the authorities of the two countries. His talks there were extremely valuable for the preparation of this report because they allowed him to make a better assessment of the nature and importance of the reasons why the two countries wish to develop their relations with Western Europe.
II. Disarmament, security and co-operation in Europe

10. The countries participating in the CSCE held a meeting of heads of state or of government in Paris from 19th to 21st November 1990. With the number of states reduced from thirty-five to thirty-four because of the reunification of Germany, for the first time Albania was associated and attended the Paris meeting as an observer. On 19th November, before the thirty-four-power meeting was opened, the members of the Atlantic Alliance and the Warsaw Pact signed the first treaty on the limitation of conventional forces in Europe. On 21st November, the Thirty-Four, for their part, adopted three texts: a general declaration, a "Charter of Paris for a new Europe", which took up and elaborated on the principles affirmed in the 1975 Helsinki Final Act, and a supplementary document giving effect to certain of its provisions, which specifies the composition and rôle of the bodies set up in the framework of the CSCE.

11. The purpose of this conference was twofold. It was obviously a matter of recapitulating progress achieved by the CSCE since the adoption of the Helsinki Final Act in 1975 and of concluding the first CFE negotiations while taking into account the changes in Central and Eastern Europe in 1989 and 1990. From this point of view, one might say that it was definitely successful. However, the other aim of the Paris summit meeting was to design a new system of security and co-operation in Europe to guarantee sure and lasting peace, to ensure the progress of democratic freedom, to promote economic freedom and to take new steps towards disarmament. In this connection, the reality of the progress accomplished, and particularly what might be expected in future years, is a matter of conjecture.

(a) Disarmament

12. Where disarmament is concerned, the CFE agreement signed in Paris on 19th November 1990 has certain weaknesses and, furthermore, the way the Soviet Union is applying it is making the West question that country's good faith. The Vienna negotiations were actually conducted on bases which are now outdated. Although it was accepted that they were not inter-bloc negotiations, the aim was to establish a balance in Europe between the two great systems of alliance. However, by the time it was signed the Warsaw Pact had been deflated and the countries of the Atlantic Alliance had, to varying degrees, started to cut their defence budgets. The Federal Republic for its part had entered into commitments with the Soviet Union to limit the level of its forces in order to reassure the Soviet Union about the possible consequences of German reunification so as to make it easier for the Soviet authorities to ratify the two-plus-four agreement in view of the negative reactions of certain conservative elements towards Mr. Gorbachev's policy. The United States and the Soviet Union had also agreed to limit their forces in Central Europe and the United States Government did not conceal its intention to reduce its own forces well below the level of 195,000 men provided for in its agreement with the Soviet Union, while the Soviet Union had acceded to the requests of many member countries of the Warsaw Pact to take steps to withdraw its forces in the fairly near future. In Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Poland and the GDR, this withdrawal had started and the first three countries have underlined that the signing of the CFE agreement did not affect their remaining in the Warsaw Pact, to which the GDR no longer belonged. The ministerial meeting of the pact countries in Prague at the end of February terminated this alliance's integrated military system and most probably the pact itself will be abolished before the end of the year.

13. One of the West's aims in these negotiations had been to obtain a reduction in the pressure exercised by the stationing of Soviet forces on European countries members of the pact. In previous decades, this pressure had prevented any democratic evolution in those countries. From the purely military standpoint, it was mainly a matter of making a surprise attack on the western part of Europe impossible. It may be said that these two aims have been attained, less because of the agreement signed in Paris than because of the intention expressed by the Soviet Union and confirmed in several cases, such as that of Germany, by bilateral texts, to withdraw, within a reasonable, negotiated length of time, its armed forces from Central Europe. However this may be, as long as this withdrawal has not been completed, a change of tack in Soviet policy is still possible. Consequently, NATO's levels must take account of the stages in the reduction of Soviet forces in Central Europe and not be reduced too quickly.

14. However, there are certain shortcomings in the agreement of 19th November 1990 if the question is no longer to prevent surprise attacks but to achieve effective disarmament.

15. (i) The agreement is applicable only to a specific area: mainland and insular Europe. In other words, it excludes the United States and the Asian part of the Soviet Union beyond the Urals and the Caspian Sea. It provides for the establishment of a balance between the groups of states parties to the agreement within that area and, according to circumstances, the destruction or disarmament (in the case of helicopters) of weapons exceeding the ceilings fixed. However, because of the level of the Warsaw
Pact forces. NATO forces are only slightly affected by this commitment. In several cases, their weapons are even distinctly lower than the ceilings fixed in the CFE agreement. In 1989 and 1990, the Soviet Union for its part withdrew many of its armaments hitherto deployed in Europe to the other side of the Urals. Consequently, when the signatory countries to the agreement gave figures in Vienna for their armaments in Europe as at 18th November, Soviet levels were low enough for them to have to destroy only a few without causing a marked reduction in the Soviet Union's overall military potential, as shown in the table hereafter. Furthermore, some Soviet forces deployed in Europe were assigned, with their weapons, to the marine infantry, the coast guard and internal police forces, thus allowing them to avoid the limits laid down in the agreement. Mr. Shevarnadze admittedly explained this in Washington, London and Paris, where he said half the weapons withdrawn from Europe would be used to modernise the equipment of Soviet forces in the Far East, the rest having to be converted for civil use. However, these are not contractual undertakings; they are subject to no control and the person responsible for them has resigned, thus considerably limiting their impact.

### Destruction of weapons under the CFE agreement
(Source: NATO)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>WARSAW PACT</th>
<th>Figures published by the pact (January 1989)</th>
<th>Figures in the Shevardnadze letter (1st August 1990)</th>
<th>Figures given on signing (18th November 1990)</th>
<th>Ceilings under agreement</th>
<th>Equipment to be destroyed or below ceiling</th>
<th>According to earlier estimates</th>
<th>According to figures on signing</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tanks</td>
<td>59 470</td>
<td>24 898</td>
<td>33 191</td>
<td>20 000</td>
<td>39 470</td>
<td>13 191</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(of which Soviet Union)</td>
<td>41 580</td>
<td>20 694</td>
<td>13 300</td>
<td>28 280</td>
<td>51 560</td>
<td>6 953</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Artillery</td>
<td>71 560</td>
<td>26 953</td>
<td>13 828</td>
<td>20 000</td>
<td>36 575</td>
<td>128</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(of which Soviet Union)</td>
<td>50 275</td>
<td>13 700</td>
<td>30 000</td>
<td>40 330</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armoured vehicles</td>
<td>70 330</td>
<td>29 348</td>
<td>42 949</td>
<td>25 000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(of which Soviet Union)</td>
<td>45 000</td>
<td>18 300</td>
<td>32 320</td>
<td>9 348</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aircraft</td>
<td>10 659</td>
<td>8 372</td>
<td>6 800</td>
<td>3 859</td>
<td></td>
<td>1 572</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(of which Soviet Union)</td>
<td>7 563</td>
<td>6 445</td>
<td>5 150</td>
<td>2 413</td>
<td></td>
<td>1 295</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Helicopters</td>
<td>2 785</td>
<td>1 602</td>
<td>2 000</td>
<td>785</td>
<td></td>
<td>(- 398)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(of which Soviet Union)</td>
<td>2 200</td>
<td>1 330</td>
<td>1 500</td>
<td>700</td>
<td></td>
<td>(- 178)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| ATLANTIC ALLIANCE           | NATO figures (November 1988)                |                                                    |                                              |                          |                                          |                                 |                                 |
| Tanks                        | 22 974                                      | 25 091                                              | 20 000                                      | 2 974                    |                                          | 5 091                           |                                 |
| Artillery                    | 14 458                                      | 20 620                                              | 20 000                                      | (- 5 542)                |                                          | 620                             |                                 |
| Armoured vehicles            | 39 504                                      | 34 453                                              | 30 000                                      | 9 504                    |                                          | 4 353                           |                                 |
| Aircraft                     | 3 977                                       | 5 939                                               | 6 800                                       | (- 2 823)                |                                          | (- 861)                         |                                 |
| Helicopters                  | 2 419                                       | 1 748                                               | 2 000                                       | 419                      |                                          | (- 252)                         |                                 |

1. Artillery and multiple rocket-launchers calibre 75 mm and over and mortars 50 mm and over.
2. Tactical and anti-aircraft fighter aircraft and tactical bombers, fighter-bombers and assault aircraft.
3. Including helicopters of the naval air force (KA-25, KA-27, KA-29 and MI-14).
4. In this letter, it was stated that by the end of 1990 Soviet conventional armed forces in the zone would have only about 21 000 tanks, i.e. a reduction of 13.3% between 1st August 1990 and 18th November 1990. Over the same period, there was a reduction of 24.4% for artillery and 9.2% for armoured vehicles.
5. These ceilings are those which will apply to the Soviet Union throughout the application of the treaty under the sufficiency rule. In the allocation of ceilings of equipment in the pact, the Soviet Union has nevertheless agreed to national ceilings of 13 150 for tanks and 13 175 for pieces of artillery, for instance.
6. Plus the difference between the definition given by the pact in January 1989 (75 mm) and that given in the treaty (100 mm).

16. (ii) The ceilings fixed in the agreement are at three levels: groups of states parties, i.e. alliances as they existed at the close of the negotiations - the composition of these groups should not be affected by the possible withdrawal of a state from the Atlantic Alliance or the Warsaw Pact: sub-areas, the aim being to impose greater restrictions in regions where the two alliances are in contact so as to reduce further risk of surprise attack; and, finally, states. Moreover, the sufficiency concept forbids any state to hold more than one-third of the
total in each category of armaments. Application of all these principles leads to the fixing of ceilings that do not correspond to the economic facts and responsibilities of the various parties. Thus, some smaller Eastern European states have had particularly high ceilings set for them. To take only one example, the ceiling for the number of tanks is 1,300 for France but 1,800 for Bulgaria. Furthermore, Germany inherited the GDR's weapons but has a ceiling of 2,000 tanks and the United States is more affected than its partners by the obligation to destroy weapons. The result probably does not have undue serious consequences as matters now stand since most of the Atlantic Alliance countries are hardly affected by the obligation to destroy weapons, but the consequences might be more serious in future if certain countries start to increase their armaments in order to safeguard special interests and if the CFE agreement is not followed by further agreements that take account of the new situation in Europe where the alliances will probably play a smaller part.

17. (iii) There is no provision in the agreement on troop levels. Apart from a declaration by Germany, undertaking to limit its armed forces to 370,000 men and an undertaking by the signatory parties to pursue negotiations on the subject so that an agreement can be signed at the CSCE meeting in Helsinki in 1992. Finally, the United States and the Soviet Union have agreed to reduce their troop levels in Europe (outside Soviet territory) to 195,000 each.

18. (iv) The agreement gives the Soviet Union itself the right to have 5,150 aircraft in the arms limitation zone out of a total of 6,800 for each group of states parties whereas the Atlantic Alliance in fact has only about 6,000.

19. (v) The agreement specifies that if a country believes concentrations on the fringes of the disarmament zone threaten balance in the zone, it may appeal to a Joint Consultative Group and, finally, denounce the agreement. However, this provision contains no right of inspection outside the zone and consequently is of no great worth. It also provides for rather long delays between the threat being recorded and the right to denounce the agreement.

20. (vi) The destruction of weapons made compulsory in order to bring declared levels as at 19th November 1990 down to those provided for in the agreement must be at a rate of 23% in the first sixteen months, 60% within twenty-eight months and 100% within forty months from the ratification of the agreement. Hence, the parities laid down in the CFE agreement will be reached more than three years after ratification and it is not yet known when this will be achieved. It also seems that ratification is encountering opposition in the Soviet Union where some circles regret that the agreement does not concern naval disarmament. For some years there will therefore be uncertainty about the balance of armaments in Europe and the countries of the Atlantic Alliance should proceed with caution in reducing their forces and armaments.

21. (vii) Finally, the agreement provides for further disarmament negotiations. The first, planned for 1992, should deal mainly with troop levels and still be set in the framework of the members of the two alliances which, in view of the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact, will probably not be easy. Only then will global disarmament negotiations start, open to all the thirty-four countries participating in the CSCE. However, the basic aim of the negotiations has not been determined, and this leaves considerable uncertainty about the future course of disarmament in Europe.

22. (viii) It is not due to the CFE agreement but to the security and confidence-building measures negotiated on a thirty-four power basis in the framework of the CSCE that exchanges of information on the level of armaments among all these countries have been intensified. While, during the Vienna negotiations, there was a remarkable development of such exchanges, it should be noted that, since 19th November, the sincerity of Soviet declarations has been challenged, NATO considering that they fall far short of reality. The signatory states were given the right to challenge another state if they believed it necessary to verify military activities that might endanger their security. Such verification will be the responsibility of individual signatory states and, if the country challenged is not found to be at fault, the cost will be borne by the challenging state. This procedure may deter many countries, either because they lack the technical means or because they are not prepared to bear the cost of verification.

23. For these reasons, it may be concluded that, although the CFE agreement signed in Paris on 19th November 1990 was a step towards disarmament, it was still too strongly influenced by past preoccupations, particularly regarding the balance between the military blocs, to allow the establishment of structures for a new order of security and co-operation in Europe. It relegates preparations for this new order to subsequent negotiations, whose aims are but scantily defined. The results of these negotiations will depend mainly on internal developments in the European states and the policies they adopt in the next few years. The CFE agreement is probably a guarantee against some forms of aggression but is not enough to guarantee longer-term peace and disarmament. It may be wondered whether, in stressing the search for political advantages such as the withdrawal of Soviet forces from the territory of member countries of the Warsaw Pact and
increasing détente. Western negotiators paid
enough attention to the truly military aspects of
dismantlement. It may also be wondered whether,
in order to speed up completion of the negotia-
tions, the European participants did not rely
unduly on direct contacts between the United
States and the Soviet Union to work out com-
promises which were not always satisfactory for
Europe’s security. A more concerted effort by
members of WEU during the negotiations would
probably have allowed these drawbacks to be
avoided.

(b) The Charter of Paris for a new Europe

24. On 21st November 1990, at the close of
their meeting in Paris, the thirty-four participat-
ing heads of state or of government signed
this charter, plus a supplementary document on
its application. Here your Rapporteur will
merely analyse the security-related parts. How-
ever, in accordance with the course steadily
followed by the CSCE, this charter strongly
underlines the close connection that exists
between security and internal state practices, in
particular “democracy based on human rights
and fundamental freedoms” and “prosperity
through economic liberty and social justice”
provided a reasonable attitude is adopted
towards the environment.

25. Hence it is not unimportant that thirty-
four of the thirty-five European countries were
able to subscribe to such provisions as: “We
undertake to build, consolidate and strengthen
democracy as the only system of government of
our nations”, this democracy “having as its
foundation respect for the human person and
the rule of law”, which implies that “the ethnic,
cultural, linguistic and religious identity of
national minorities will be protected and that
persons belonging to national minorities have
the right freely to express, preserve and develop
that identity without any discrimination and in
full equality before the law”. These principles
lead the governments to “note with great satis-
faction the treaty on the final settle-
ment with respect to Germany signed in
Moscow on 12th September 1990”. They
justify the western countries’ protests at the
methods used by the Soviet Union in January
1991 against claims by the Baltic countries.

26. Where security is concerned, the govern-
ments refer to the United Nations Charter and
the Helsinki Final Act in declaring: “We renew
our pledge to refrain from the threat or use of
force against the territorial integrity or political
independence of any state, or from acting in any
other manner inconsistent with the principles or
purposes of those documents”. They believe the
CFE agreement and the CSCE process “will
lead to a new perception of security in Europe
and a new dimension in our relations. In this
context we fully recognise the freedom of states
to choose their own security arrangements”,
thus confirming the right claimed by certain
members of the Warsaw Pact to leave that
organisation. They also affirm that: “We
recognise with satisfaction the growing rôle of
the United Nations in world affairs and its
increasing effectiveness, fostered by the
improvement in relations among our states”,
which is of particularly great significance now
the United Nations is opposing Iraq’s invasion
and annexation of Kuwait.

27. However, the practical measures referred
to in the Paris Charter are extremely vague. In
most cases, the effective tackling of problems is
defered to subsequent conferences, not all the
dates of which have been fixed:

(i) Participating states “undertake to
continue the negotiations on confi-
dence- and security-building mea-
ures, and to seek to conclude them
no later than the follow-up meeting
of the CSCE to be held in Helsinki in
1992”.

(ii) They “call for the earliest possible
conclusion of the convention on an
effectively verifiable, global and com-
prehensive ban on chemical
weapons”. Negotiations have been
under way on this matter in Geneva
for several years without any
agreement having yet been con-
cluded.

(iii) They affirm their determination to
eradicate terrorism.

(iv) They will “join together in combating
illicit trafficking in drugs”.

(v) They will seek “effective ways of pre-
venting, through political means, con-
licts which may yet emerge”. A
meeting of experts was held in Valetta
from 15th January to 8th February
1991 to examine principles for set-
ting differences and arrangements for
CSCE procedure for settling such dif-
fences which might constitute a far-
reaching jurisdicpt step, particularly
when account is taken of the disorder
and national claims now rife in the
Balkan part of Europe, but, like all
CSCE work, no provision is made for
sanctions.

(vi) They will “continue efforts to
strengthen security and co-operation
in the Mediterranean as an important
factor for stability in Europe” and
“intensify efforts towards finding
just, viable and lasting solutions,
through peaceful means, to out-
standing crucial problems, based on
respect for the principles of the Final
Act” and strive “towards a sub-
stantial narrowing of the prosperity gap between Europe and its Mediterranean neighbours”.

28. It will be noted that, in the definition of these principles, very little progress has been made since the 1975 Final Act, at least where everything related to security is concerned. It is still couched in vague, general terms and includes no sanctions. However, developments in the international situation, with the end of the cold war and progress towards democracy in Eastern Europe and also the action taken under the aegis of the United Nations to enforce international law in the Middle East, give every reason to think that implementation of these principles will encounter far fewer obstacles than was the case after Helsinki.

29. Moreover, a supplementary document defines new structures to bolster, if not guarantee, implementation. These are:

- meetings of heads of state or of government;
- a council of ministers for foreign affairs, providing “the central forum for regular political consultations”, which will meet at least once a year;
- a committee of senior officials to prepare the work of the council and, if necessary, to meet in emergency situations;
- a small secretariat with its seat in Prague;
- an office for free elections to facilitate the exchange of information on elections in participating states and to foster the sending of observers to such elections. Its seat will be in Warsaw. It will be responsible to the council, which will assign it tasks;
- a parliamentary assembly whose prerogatives and composition were not defined;
- a conflict prevention centre, responsible to the council and located in Vienna, to “assist the council in reducing the risk of conflict”, to give “support to the implementation of confidence- and security-building measures such as mechanism for consultation ... as regards unusual military activities” and the “annual exchange of military information”. The centre might also assume other functions concerning procedure for the conciliation of disputes. It will have a consultative committee.

30. These institutional provisions originated in proposals made by both eastern and western governments. In particular, there was wide agreement on making the CSCE permanent, but on the western side the United States insisted on the secretariat remaining small. One of the two most controversial planned bodies was the parliamentary assembly which, admittedly, has not been solved. Taking the Council of Europe as a model or even using it as a basis for the all-European assembly was opposed by some countries, such as the United States, which would find it difficult to allow members of Congress to be assigned obligations which might distance them from their national activities. However, it is the conflict prevention centre that has provoked the most discussion. The Soviet Union and Germany had planned to give the centre very wide-ranging responsibilities, e.g. to arbitrate in conflicts, whereas the United States saw it merely as a forum for implementing confidence-building measures in order to ensure openness in military forces. Initially, at least, the centre has been assigned fairly modest tasks.

31. The bodies created by the CSCE are therefore not in themselves capable of carrying very great weight in European affairs: they hardly change the nature of the conference, better adapted to discussions and declarations of principle than to the exercise of any form of authority. In particular, it has no executive body to make reluctant countries apply the directives to which they have subscribed. Perhaps it will move in this direction, but this will depend mainly on internal developments in all the member countries. There is no guarantee that it will, however.

32. In the early stage, at least, it will therefore be for the countries to ensure respect for decisions taken in the framework of the CSCE, yet the past and present situation in Europe suggest that they will not be able to do so individually without arousing suspicion, mistrust and opposition. Conversely, any association of states capable of calling in large military forces and having a nuclear potential might play an essential rôle in the deterrent action which may become necessary if the principles on which the Thirty-Four managed to agree are violated. Far from replacing WEU, as some thought, the CSCE might need WEU to play the rôle in Europe which the Paris Charter assigned to it. The Assembly must not lose sight of this consideration in examining the repercussions for WEU of the emergence of an all-European organisation for security and co-operation.

III. Uncertainties in Eastern Europe

33. In fact, the shortcomings of the CFE agreement and Paris Charter would be quite minor if the trend that started in 1989 and seemed to have been confirmed by events in 1989 and 1990 had not been called in question in the Soviet Union itself since the end of 1990. Admittedly, there is now no reason to think that
the Soviet Union has changed its external policy, although Mr. Shevardnadze’s resignation, which was announced in November 1990 and took effect in January 1991, suggests that this policy might no longer be pursued in the same way. However, internal policy considerations were the reasons given by the outgoing minister, and his successor, Mr. Bessmertnykh, seems determined to continue the open policy pursued in previous years. However, following the signing of the Paris Charter, at a time when ratification by the Supreme Soviet of the two-plus-four agreement on Germany does not cover provisions relating to the withdrawal of Soviet forces from the former territory of the GDR and the CFE agreement has not yet been ratified, one may wonder whether the obvious hardening of Soviet internal policy may not jeopardise the application of the charter and whether the forces that provoked this hardening will not also bring their weight to bear in the next stages of establishing a new security order in Europe.

(a) Soviet Union

34. In order to understand recent events in the Soviet Union, it should perhaps be recalled that Mr. Gorbachev’s appointment as Secretary-General of the party in 1985 marked the rise of a group of relatively young men determined to put an end to the ultra-conservative régime that had gradually taken over the leadership of the party and country, of which Mr. Chernenko had been a humiliating symbol. It was to carry out far-reaching reforms, the nature and extent of which probably failed to obtain unanimity, that these reformers had formed a group around Mr. Gorbachev, who clearly had political talents but presumably did not intend to undermine the ideological foundations of the Soviet régime. As from 1985, these men took over crucial positions, while most of the former leaders from Mr. Brezhnev’s days were moved from office. They avoided an ideological struggle and started a series of reforms designed to revive the economy through a policy of liberalisation covering most sectors. In fact, the Soviet Union had no choice. The state of its economy, the inability of its political system to stimulate the economy in any way, the lack of community reaction, the reawakening of nationalism in the federated republics and the inability of the army to meet the challenge represented by the adoption of President Reagan’s administration’s star wars programme forced it to revise radically its economic structure and the course of its internal and foreign policy. The great merit of Mr. Gorbachev’s government is certainly to have assessed the degree of this redirection and to have taken the necessary initiative.

35. This awareness of the realities of the situation allowed the Soviet authorities to take a series of measures at home designed to revive the economy, stir up competition and restore a number of freedoms and, abroad, to terminate Soviet commitments outside its territory, particularly in Afghanistan, hold negotiations on the level of conventional forces in Europe, agree to German reunification in NATO, allow the people’s democracies to determine their own régimes and whether they should remain in the Warsaw Pact and Comecon and appeal to the good will of the NATO countries to provide the capital necessary for reviving the Soviet economy.

36. The main problem stems from the difficulties encountered in applying perestroika in recent years and, above all, recent months in regard to both the economy and the cohesion of the Soviet state. Where the economy is concerned, it is clear that the reforms carried out, far from reviving the economy, have, on the contrary, paralysed it, with the result that there seem to be insuperable difficulties in supplying the people with food. Freeing trade led to higher prices while at the same time the disorganised public services were unable to keep the markets supplied. The fact that citizens were free to demonstrate their claims and resort to democratic procedures for local, national and general elections on the one hand led many republics to seek, or sometimes proclaim, their autonomy, or even independence, and, on the other hand, throughout the territory there were broad demonstrations against the policy pursued by the central authorities.

37. These circumstances led to a group of conservatives being reconstituted. Their aims are probably as varied as those of the reformers but their influence in the state increased considerably in the last months of 1990. It is very difficult to analyse Mr. Gorbachev’s manoeuvre during that period when he shifted his duties from the party to the state, of which he became head. It is also difficult to assess the respective rôles of bodies such as the army, the KGB and the party in the initiatives taken to restore the old forms of power. Your Rapporteur will therefore take into account only facts about which one can be sure:

38. (i) The group of reformists around Mr. Gorbachev who guided perestroika in the period 1985-90 is gradually being eased out of office. They included economists such as Mr. Abalkin and Mr. Shatalin, responsible for giving Mr. Gorbachev’s government its main economic guidelines, and also Mr. Shevardnadze, whose resignation as Minister for Foreign Affairs was based on an accusation that Mr. Gorbachev wished to restore the dictatorship. The President of the Russian Republic, Mr. Boris Yeltsin, now seems to be the main leader of a movement challenging Mr. Gorbachev’s power, claiming to pursue and strengthen perestroika as champion of the power of the republics vis-à-vis the union.
39. (iii) Although the first signs of nationalism in the Baltic republics, Transcaucasia and Moldavia were met with relative neutrality on the part of the government, which allowed it to arbitrate in the dispute between the Azeris and the Armenians, this no longer seems to be so since, in January 1991, the army used force to restore the authority of the central power in the Baltic republics. Whether this was due to a government decision or to an initiative by local military authorities, as Mr. Gorbachev suggested and as claimed by members of the delegation from the Supreme Soviet in meetings with our Assembly, the matter is serious. In the latter case, it would mean that Mr. Gorbachev no longer has real control over the army or the state, thus making extremely hazardous any confidence one might have in the Soviet Union moving towards liberal practices.

40. (iii) If confirmed, the creation of “national salvation committees” in these republics, and then at union level, would mark the emergence of an organised anti-liberal force capable of exercising considerable pressure on the state authorities or even of taking over from them if they are not sufficiently docile, thus showing that the evolution since 1985 is now in danger. So far, these committees have not announced detailed programmes and it is impossible to know how far they are determined to go in resisting change.

41. (iv) The free elections held in 1990 to appoint local authorities were on the whole favourable to the reformists. In particular, they are in power in the main cities such as Moscow and Leningrad and in the Russian Republic, which includes most of Soviet territory and population. However, while they clearly do not wish the conservatives to take power, little is known about their probably not unequivocal positions in regard to the maintenance of the Soviet state, the extent of freedoms of all kinds, the rôle of the party, concessions to be made to minorities and foreign policy.

42. (v) In a country where there has never been stable democracy and where the Communist Party has monopolised power for seventy years, consulting the electorate is not a means of returning to stability in the absence of structures allowing a constitutional expression of opinion. Everything indicates that the public still strongly distrusts any form of political power and it no longer has confidence in Mr. Gorbachev to solve the economic crisis, restore state authority or ensure respect for the main freedoms.

43. (vi) On 17th March 1991, the Federal Government called upon all Soviet citizens to take part in a referendum on a text worded as follows:

“Do you think it is necessary to preserve the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as a renewed federation of equal sovereign republics in which human rights and freedoms of all nationalities will be fully guaranteed?”

In certain republics, subsidiary questions were also added, particularly in Russia: “Do you think it essential to create a post of President of the Federation of Russia elected by universal suffrage?”, but certain regions such as Bashkirskaya and North Ossetia did not agree to this second question being put. In Ukraine and Byelorussia, the subsidiary question referred to the renewal of the federation “on the basis of the declaration of sovereignty” of the republic.

44. The nature of the main question already makes it difficult to interpret the vote which relates at one and the same time to the maintenance of the union and its socialism, the sovereignty of the republics, human rights and the rights of nationalities. Six independence-seeking republics – the three Baltic republics, Moldavia, Georgia and Armenia – refused to organise the referendum on their territory, which gave a particularly “unionist” tone to the question put and made it difficult to interpret the number of abstentions. As Mr. Yeltsin, the main opposition leader, did not wish to issue orders on how to answer this question, the results of the referendum are particularly hard to interpret. Even assuming it was conducted everywhere in a satisfactorily democratic manner, which is doubtful in the case of the five Central Asian republics and Azerbaijan. It should be added that, for the question specific to the latter republic, the majority is not calculated in the same way as elsewhere in Russia and the answer has force of law only if adopted by 50% of the electorate. In the other republics and in Russia itself, in the case of the main question the majority is calculated according to the number of votes cast. By and large, the vote probably shows approval or disapproval of Mr. Gorbachev and the policy he has been pursuing for the last six years, although it is not possible to deduce a clear answer, even on that point, since local considerations are liable to have had a strong influence on the way the electorate voted.

45. At the time of writing, the final results of the vote are not yet known. It is therefore too early to draw lessons from it. It is not very likely that it will really solve the national problems that exist in the Soviet Union or allow an assessment to be made of the respective forces represented by Mr. Gorbachev, the conservatives and the liberals. It is a pity the first vote of this kind to be held in the Soviet Union was held in such cloudy circumstances and it will certainly not help progress to be made towards democracy in the country.

46. (vii) While Mr. Gorbachev’s external policy is not being openly called in question, it is, to say the least, likely that it will fuel dis-
content, particularly in the army, which has had to withdraw from European garrisons where it had a good standard of living to regions with disastrous living conditions. The evacuation of Afghanistan, the removal of advisers from many African countries, its withdrawal from several people’s democracies and the GDR, the collapse of the Warsaw Pact, the reunification of Germany in NATO, the CFE agreement, whose provisions do not cover naval forces, and finally abandonment of the former Iraqi ally during the crisis caused by the invasion of Kuwait are all seen by conservatives as serious setbacks inflicted by the state on the Soviet army which is nevertheless still the largest in the world.

47. In these circumstances, there is no doubt that many Soviet people consider Mr. Gorbachev’s government to be responsible for the dis-order throughout the country, the challenge to state unity, the weakening of its power and the ruin of its economy even if, in fact, it was the crisis that brought Mr. Gorbachev to power. The principal merit he still seems to be granted is to be able to retain a reserve of confidence in the West and consequently to bring the Soviet Union the assistance it needs in order to escape immediate constraints and revive the economy.

48. The West, for its part, effectively identified, perhaps excessively, the Soviet Union’s will for transformation with Mr. Gorbachev’s personality, however much talent he may be acknowledged to have, moreover. For five years, Mr. Gorbachev has certainly been a good interlocutor, expressing his requirements clearly, capable of making the necessary concessions to succeed, inspiring confidence in his partners, ready to recognise facts and, above all, more confident in the organisation of international order than in the strength of a military system to ensure his country’s security. He gave further proof of this during the crisis caused by Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait. The West was therefore well justified in offering the Soviet Union food, financial and economic assistance to help Mr. Gorbachev’s endeavour to succeed.

49. Nevertheless, it is not for the West to determine who should run the Soviet Union and, once Mr. Gorbachev no longer has the confidence of his compatriots, he might admittedly still enjoy our sympathy but he would no longer be a valid interlocutor for the West. However, it is difficult to know to what extent the Soviet people still accept his authority. It is, to say the least, strongly contested.

50. Another question is raised by the increasingly repressive trend of the Soviet régime in the last months of 1990 and the first weeks of 1991. After having had himself voted full powers by the Congress of Deputies, Mr. Gorbachev started, or allowed others to start, to take a series of measures that run counter to the democratic principles he used to endorse and to which the Soviet Union subscribed by signing the Paris Charter. Most serious was the repression of the independent authorities freely elected and supported by a large section of the population in the Baltic republics, in Vilnius and Riga, just when allied operations against Iraq were starting. The Soviet armed forces were brought in and fired on the crowd, killing several people and, on each occasion, wounding dozens of others. Although Mr. Gorbachev said he had nothing to do with this repression, which is a flagrant violation of the paragraph of the Paris Charter on national minorities, the responsibility of the Soviet head of state is obviously at stake even if, as he asserted, he had not given orders for the army to intervene, yet he has announced no punishment for offenders. The partial withdrawal of Soviet troops from the Baltic republics, announced on 30th January during talks between Mr. Baker and Mr. Bessmertnykh, while possibly having a calming effect, falls well short of answering all the questions raised by the use of force against the Baltic peoples. It is normal for the Soviet Union to insist on respect for constitutional procedures and a certain lapse of time before responding to the separatism of the Baltic states. However, undue use of force makes western public opinion question the true intentions of the Soviet Government in this matter.

51. What seems even more insidious is the increase in the area of action of the KGB and the army, the measures taken against freedom of the press or those limiting the police powers of local authorities and making them subject to the good will of the army since their build-up seems to announce a return to habits prior to Mr. Gorbachev’s assumption of power, i.e. the restoration of dictatorship denounced by Mr. Shevardnadze when he resigned. The Baltic leaders and leaders of the liberal movement invited the West to react by imposing sanctions on the Soviet Union. This they hesitated to do for several reasons. They continue to welcome the Soviet Union’s steady support for the United Nations since Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, not only because this helped to isolate Iraq but above all because it demonstrates the wish to establish a new order of peace and security throughout the world based on law. The West has also noted that this policy corresponds to that pursued by the Soviet Union in Europe, in particular in regard to the reunification of Germany, the self-determination accorded to the Warsaw Pact countries, disarmament and the organisation of security and co-operation in Europe. The West has no interest in interrupting the development of co-operation which is probably the best guarantee that this trend will continue, particularly when several of the international agreements on which it is based have not yet been ratified, or in creating additional
difficulties for the government that initiated it when its survival is threatened by forces less anxious for it to be continued. These considerations also guided our Assembly when the members of its Presidential Committee decided, on 31st January, to maintain its invitation to the Supreme Soviet for 27th and 28th February. This decision was vindicated, moreover, by the exchanges of views which allowed it to make a better assessment of the concerns rightly felt by the Soviet representatives for the survival and cohesion of their state.

52. Today, in fact, no one can predict whether perestroika, as launched by Mr. Gorbachev, will effectively be continued, whether or not Mr. Gorbachev remains in power. No one knows whether there is any guarantee of the continuity of the Soviet state and the lasting nature of the régime. Your Rapporteur therefore draws two conclusions. First, it is certainly not in the interests of Europe or of peace to link disarmament and co-operation in Europe either with the maintenance of a team of leaders in power or with the pursuit of a specific internal policy, at least as long as the Soviet Union respects international commitments to which it has subscribed, inter alia in the Paris Charter. However, this implies that, when these commitments are not respected, as was the case in the Baltic republics, Europe must react in proportion to the harm done to international order. Second, however regretfully, we must bear in mind that the bases on which the peaceful and secure order that we wish to see established in Europe are still fragile. On the one hand, this means maintaining the structures and means which, for more than forty years, have guaranteed peace in Europe based on deterrence and the ability to defend it and, on the other, in disarmament negotiations, not to sacrifice guarantees of Western European security to the development of détente whose pursuit is problematical, however much good will may be attributed to the present Soviet leaders.

(b) Central Europe

53. When the Warsaw Pact member countries realised the extent of the freedom that the Soviet Union had decided to allow them, they moved in directions which very quickly were no longer parallel and concomitant. In each of them, the party in power tried to make the necessary reforms so as to be able to remain in control, basing its authority no longer on the now fragile support of the Red Army but on that of a section of the population whose interests it considered to be closely linked with those of the Communist Party. In four countries – East Germany, Hungary, Poland and Czechoslovakia – this attempt failed and elections brought a new majority, now in power.

54. The German Democratic Republic disappeared in German reunification round the Federal Republic. As a result of agreements between the latter country and the Soviet Union, on the one hand. Poland, on the other, and, finally, the former occupying powers, all signed in autumn 1990. the former Democratic Republic is now part of NATO, WEU, the European Community and, consequently, Western Europe. As soon as each treaty has been signed by all parties, the “German problem” will be just another page of history.

55. In Hungary, Poland and Czechoslovakia, new majorities were formed as a result of elections and are now running those countries. All three then took a series of steps to guide their political and economic structures in a liberal direction and become progressively associated with Western Europe without, however, causing too many upheavals. They first ensured that the Soviet Union would withdraw its troops from their territory. In the case of Hungary and Czechoslovakia, this should be completed by June 1991. In the case of Poland, it is to take longer and is still the subject of negotiations between Poland and the Soviet Union. Poland asked that it not be linked with the evacuation of Soviet forces still stationed on the territory of the former GDR, which raises delicate transit problems, particularly as Poland has asked the Soviet Union to pay considerable damages for the transit of forces repatriated from the GDR through Polish territory. The three countries, joined in February 1991 by Bulgaria, announced their intention to withdraw from the Warsaw Pact military structures and finally, in February 1991, obtained the abolition of these structures. The pact itself is to be wound up at the end of this year. Furthermore, the three countries have decided to withdraw from the CMEA, whether it carries on without them or not, and to take part in no economic co-operation organisation that would associate them with the Soviet Union. Clearly they see their move towards the West as a more deep-rooted break with the links imposed on them by the Soviet Union. They certainly do not wish to do anything that might seem to be a provocation vis-à-vis that country but they have resolutely opted for an economic and political system that draws them closer to Western Europe and allows them to escape the uncertainty prevailing about the future of the Soviet Union and the other Eastern European countries.

56. In their relations with Western Europe, it seems evident that all three seek the closest possible association with the European Community and eventually wish to become members because they consider the Community to be the centre of the future organisation of Europe to which they intend to belong. They also know that it is from the Community they can expect the economic assistance and investment they
need to restore their economies, in ruins after half a century of communist dirigism and Soviet domination. Their approaches to the West therefore seem guided by this concern. Membership of the Council of Europe was a first step, already taken by Hungary in October 1990 and Czechoslovakia on 21st February 1991 and to be taken by Poland after its next elections, planned for October 1991. All three have signed trade and co-operation agreements with the Community, where they enjoy most-favoured-nation status, and aim to attain association status in the next few years. They have already started to make far-reaching changes in their internal legislation so that they can progressively open up to international competition and the foreign investment that they encourage. It will be a long time, however, before they can clear a large foreign debt and high inflation, particularly in the case of Poland, which owes $46 000 million and has an extremely high rate of inflation. Many Western European countries, the EEC, the OECD and the United States have at least granted them considerable assistance in various forms, including the postponement of debts, and they have already managed to attract much western investment. They fear, however, especially in Poland, that their economic situation, and particularly the size of their debt, may scare off European investors, thus making their rapprochement with the Community slower and more difficult.

57. Drawing conclusions from the fairly similar situation in which they find themselves and their relative isolation from a security point of view, Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary are thinking of extending their co-operation in this sector on the basis of bilateral agreements containing identical provisions so as to allow a three-power concerted approach, inter alia towards the CSCE and the organisation of a new security order in Europe, since reactions to a threat against any one of them or developments in the Soviet Union might reveal new risks for them. They believe that this in no way excludes rapprochement with Western Europe, i.e. with WEU, intended not only to facilitate their association with the Community but first and foremost to anchor their own security in a European organisation that is firmer than the CSCE can be.

58. These three countries certainly do not wish to move from one military alliance to another although they consider the Atlantic Alliance to be an essential structure for the security of Europe as a whole. But there can be no doubt that the three countries first considered that the transformations in Europe were leading to a fairly swift disbandment of the two military blocs and they seem to set great hope in the organisation of a new system of security and co-operation in Europe. However, they had to note that the Paris summit meeting on 19th and 20th November 1990, while introducing some parts of such a system, did not give them sufficient weight to provide a sure guarantee of the security of the signatories of the Charter for a new Europe and they consequently feared being isolated between Soviet strength and an Atlantic Pact which seems likely to weather the crisis. Hungary and Czechoslovakia thought of joining the alliance but were not encouraged by the NATO countries which likewise do not wish to make the Soviet Union feel events in 1989 and 1990 led to a reduction in Soviet security and a strengthening of the Atlantic Alliance. Although prepared to develop exchanges with the Central European countries, the alliance does not intend to foster destabilisation in Europe by allowing them to join.

59. For obvious reasons, these three countries were determined to give priority to their economic recovery rather than their defence policies, and their defence budgets are small, particularly as they do not seem to be facing an immediate threat. In order to escape the grip of the Soviet Union, they also seem resolved to diversify their armaments procurement and to find new partners for reorganising their armed forces. These partners they have sought in Western Europe. It is not yet possible to draw up a list of the contacts they have started and the decisions they have taken, but some of them, in particular Poland, clearly saw WEU as a truly European organisation, linked with the Community and able to play a major role in setting up a new order of peace and security in Europe. This emerges clearly from the participation of parliamentarians and ministers from Poland and Hungary in our Assembly's work. They also wished to show their solidarity with the other European countries by seeking symbolic ways of taking part in the Gulf operations, through medical assistance, sending two hospital ships and a medical team to Saudi Arabia in the case of Poland, and by sending a chemical weapons decontamination team in the case of Czechoslovakia. However, they are being cautious and seem to be waiting for relations between WEU, NATO, the Community and the CSCE to be clearer before going any further. As for the WEU countries, while contacts, particularly in the framework of the Assembly, have been encouraged by the Council, they seem to be hesitating to go any further, first in order to spare the Soviet Union, second because not all members of WEU have the same view of its vocation and finally because the latter perhaps do not wish to enter into commitments with those countries which might imply their accession to Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty and there is no explicitly-defined association status as in the case of the EEC.

60. It seems certain that, if Soviet policy does not evolve in a manner they consider threatening, these three countries will try to avoid
doing anything that might be seen as supporting a party hostile to that country. At the same time, they will support any policy aimed at safeguarding a European order based on the principles defined in the Paris Charter. Insofar as WEU proves active in this area it will be a worthwhile partner for them.

61. Moreover, whatever the faults of the Warsaw Pact, which was an instrument of domination and not of the security the peoples of Eastern Europe wanted, it had an obvious merit, that of imposing a peaceful order in relations between its member countries. It is essential that the now agreed disbandment of the pact should not lead to the disappearance of this order or lead to a revival of clashes between nationalities, particularly in the Balkan peninsula. The association, in an appropriate manner, of countries which intend to maintain and promote this peaceful order in a European security organisation more suitable than the CSCE now is might be a major step towards achieving shared security which is a necessary condition for a lasting organisation of peace in Europe. In Chapter IV, section (b), of the present report, your Rapporteur will examine the consequences he believes WEU should draw from this situation.

(c) Balkan Europe

62. The position of the Balkan European countries, be they members of the Warsaw Pact, like Romania and Bulgaria, or not, like Yugoslavia and Albania, is very different. In those four countries, the communist régime has been seriously challenged but in each, for its own reasons, the move towards democracy has run into serious difficulties and at present it is impossible to anticipate internal developments in these countries in the next few years. While, in the case of Czechoslovakia, Slovak calls for autonomy seem to have been solved in a way that does not endanger the foundations of the state and its foreign policy, the four southern countries are facing far more serious national minority problems that overlap with ideological differences and, to varying degrees, threaten the very survival of the state.

63. Yugoslavia is probably the most serious case. The first free elections were held in its six republics in 1990 and four of them now have non-communist governments whereas Serbia and Montenegro are still governed by the former leaders who call themselves socialists, as is the federation, whose collegial leadership has, since 15th March, been led by Mr. Milosevic, President of Serbia. The reasons for the electors' choices are obviously complex and there is no doubt that the will to maintain Serb domination over the Kosowo Albanians played an important part in making up the Serb electors' minds. Conversely, hostility to Serb domination of the federation may have pushed the electorate in the other four republics to oppose keeping the communists in power and the Slovene government to proclaim the republic's independence. The question of the survival of the federation is therefore raised. This cannot remain a purely internal affair because of the existence of large foreign minorities in most of the republics, and Yugoslavia may well become a hub of tension in the centre of the Balkan peninsula. During the first fortnight of March 1991, Belgrade was shaken by violent anti-government disturbances. Intervention by the army, quite brutal repression and the resignation on 15th March of the President of the collegial leadership of the federation, Mr. Jovic, were certainly not enough to quell the storm in Serbia and even less in the rest of Yugoslavia, since the leaders, like the anti-communist opposition in Belgrade, vie with each other in Serb nationalism, thus making the federation increasingly more difficult for the other nationalities to accept.

64. In Bulgaria, the proliferation of new political parties has made it very difficult to interpret the 1990 elections and tension created by the fate of a Turkish minority whose very existence is contested by the state does not help the establishment of a stable régime. In spite of the proclamation of a multi-party system, Albania too is having difficulties with its Greek minority and has made only very tentative progress towards democratisation, opening its frontiers and participating in the CSCE. The economic situation is disastrous and, whenever it has the opportunity, a large part of the population seems determined to emigrate.

65. Finally, the situation is still unclear in Romania, where the 1989 revolution was triggered off by an uprising of the large Hungarian minority in Transylvania. There is still a German minority and Romanian nationalists are laying claim to Soviet Moldavia where the Romanian element predominates. Again, the government is strongly challenged by various opposition movements.

66. Instability in those four countries has until now prevented the sweeping economic reforms their situation requires and is jeopardising the inflow of foreign capital needed for those reforms. Although the European Community has granted Romania considerable humanitarian assistance, it was intended solely to allow it to face up to the urgency of an extremely serious crisis. Such circumstances introduce much uncertainty about the course of the four countries' external policy, particularly as the slackening of the grip of communist dictatorship has brought out the strength of nationalist feelings and claims which might well lead to violence.
67. In the years ahead, therefore, the most serious dangers for internal state order and the maintenance of peace may surface in that part of Europe. Here, Europe should exercise sufficient authority to prevent internal confrontations or local conflicts from degenerating and states outside local disputes from intervening and thus extending them. Of course, only the CSCE might be able to arbitrate in such conflicts, but this is not yet the case and, anyway, it has no armed forces to act in the event of serious crises or consequently exercise a deterrent effect that would allow such crises to be avoided. Hence, it is important for WEU to have the political, and possibly military, means of averting the risks involved in the continued existence of an area in the Balkan peninsula whose instability may well last for quite a few more years.

IV. Europe's security

68. The above considerations lead to a series of important conclusions concerning Europe's security in the present decade, however one may speculate about the more distant and, as yet, indeterminate future.

(a) The persistence of a threat

69. The threat of a surprise attack by Warsaw Pact forces no longer exists. The pact itself is condemned either to disappear, which seems most probable, or to associate only a few southern European countries with the Soviet Union. In any event, it is no longer a threat. Furthermore, Soviet forces in Europe, already considerably reduced, are now limited under the CFE agreement in conditions which may be verified by the West. They can rebuild an offensive system only east of Poland, i.e. 600 km east of the former demarcation line between the two German states behind which they were deployed until 1990. Although there will be Soviet forces in Central Europe until 1993, they are fewer, isolated from the inhabitants of the countries in which they are stationed, separated from those countries' own armies and apparently prey to an internal crisis which should detract from their combat-readiness. Western Europe is therefore sure to have ample advance warning of any threat of aggression.

70. However, the Soviet Union still has considerable military strength, most of which evades the limits laid down in the CFE agreement, whereas the whole of Western Europe is subject to the constraints defined in that agreement. The loss of all Soviet ideology-inspired driving force, internal difficulties in the Soviet Union and threats to its economy, cohesion and direction make it, to say the least, highly unlikely that this strength will be used for an offensive policy in the years ahead. However, a number of possible threats to Europe's security cannot be wholly excluded:

- A civilian or military group might seize control in the Soviet Union and be determined to use every means to restore the old order and wipe out all that has been accomplished by Mr. Gorbachev both at home and abroad. Following the incidents in Vilnius and Riga in January 1991, Mr. Gorbachev recognised that the central authorities had no control over certain military decisions and that there was a conservative opposition capable of acting without regard for parliamentary procedure. The development of such an opposition and the pressure it might exercise would endanger the agreements concluded by the Soviet Union since 1985 and its leaders might well make use of external tension to justify resorting to force in order to re-establish the old order within the country.

- The Soviet state might disintegrate and the republics or opposition groups, with the support of part of the army, might use force to challenge the central authorities and the Soviet Union would succumb to anarchy. It is impossible to guess who would then have control of Soviet nuclear weapons and to what use they would be put. It is also impossible to imagine what attitude those concerned might have towards neighbouring countries, which would find it hard to escape the effects of internal ravages in the Soviet Union. The West would probably be unable to remain aloof if one or other of these countries were seriously threatened.

- The restoration of internal order in the Soviet Union or in a successor state might allow it again to become a great political and military power. This would inevitably result in it playing an active role in Europe and, in particular, in Eastern Europe, to try to recover positions lost during the present crisis by supporting powers whose friendship would not necessarily be based on ideology, just as, at the turn of the century, the Czarist empire supported Bulgaria, Serbia and Romania against the Ottoman or Austro-Hungarian empires. Thus, if crises were to break out between Central or Southern European states, a Russian state might be tempted to use its strength to solve it in its own best interests, while Western Europe might have to do likewise. It is obviously the rôle of the CSCE to prevent a
reversion to such situations, but it has been seen that, at the present juncture, it has no means of imposing solutions without the agreement of the participating countries.

71. In these circumstances, it is essential for Western Europe to retain a capability equal to that of the Soviet Union. If the latter makes clear, decisive progress towards disarmament, not only in the area laid down in the present CFE agreement but throughout its territory, Western Europe will be able to do likewise. However, the Soviet Union’s attitude is ambiguous in this connection since, as noted, it has managed to ensure that most of its armaments formerly deployed in Europe evade the destruction specified in the agreement and, in spite of its economic crisis, it is making a considerable effort to modernise its armaments. Western Europe cannot therefore abandon the means which have ensured its security for more than forty years, i.e. the Atlantic Alliance on the one hand and its conventional and nuclear forces on the other, except in the framework of duly negotiated and verified disarmament agreements designed to guarantee shared security for all.

72. First, therefore, it may be concluded that continued disarmament negotiations are an essential part of Europe’s security but that the present CFE agreement falls well short of guaranteeing that security. The next two stages will relate to troop levels in the two alliances and disarmament throughout the area concerned. This will be particularly delicate since it will be very difficult to go from the relatively simple search for a balance between two defensive systems to the search for a balance between countries which each have their own concerns and commitments. There is nothing to suggest that these negotiations will be able to take account of Soviet armaments outside Europe. These will probably have to be examined in another type of negotiations in which the United States will probably have a leading rôle to play, not only for forces in Europe, as in the CFE negotiations, but also for all its armed forces. It will be all the more difficult to find an acceptable solution since the Soviet Union has so far asked that the negotiations be extended to include naval forces, whereas the distance by sea between the United States and the old world, on the one hand, and the responsibilities exercised by the United States throughout the world, on the other, compel it to retain considerable naval power. Moreover, while an agreement may soon be reached between the two great powers in the START negotiations allowing a considerable reduction in the number of launchers, although in the long run not very significant in terms of the military capability of their strategic nuclear arsenals, negotiations on nuclear weapons, which should have a greater impact on these

arsenals, on medium-range missiles launched from aircraft and ships and on very short-range weapons, will be more complex and it is far from clear how the deterrent capability of the European powers might be brought into this framework. There is thus every reason to think that, as from 1992, the new stages of disarmament will be particularly long and exposed to all the uncertainty surrounding European security and that, for some considerable time, disarmament will not guarantee security in Europe.

73. Nevertheless, the CFE agreement shows, if proof is necessary, that the European members of the alliance have their own views to promote in the disarmament negotiations so as to avoid defining too narrow an area of application and to achieve a balance of forces which is not to their disadvantage compared with other European countries. They must also ensure, as our Assembly has emphasised on several occasions, that Europe is not left on the de jure or de facto side-lines of the essential verification measures. In this connection, it should be recalled that, although the Assembly proposed setting up a WEU verification satellite agency, the Council is now merely considering setting up an agency for co-ordinating the use of data gathered by observation satellites and has still not taken the decisions necessary for implementing this proposal. In spite of the standard of the documentation it was given at the symposium organised by the Assembly’s Scientific and Technological Committee in Rome in April 1990. Yet this agency is of only limited interest if it cannot have a European satellite system to provide it with data.

74. The second conclusion Europe can draw from the persistence of a threat is that it cannot dispense with a deterrent strategy. This has so far been based mainly on the presence of American forces in Europe, associated with NATO’s military deployment. France’s military efforts and those of a number of countries which are not members of the Atlantic Alliance but which wished at least to defend their own territory. This deployment assured future aggressors that they would be facing a strong enough defensive force to remove any hope of gaining worthwhile advantages from a surprise attack or, in the case of a massive, prolonged offensive, of avoiding retaliation by the American nuclear force, not to speak of those of the United Kingdom and France that, at each stage, could raise a possible confrontation to nuclear level. This system gave Europe forty years of peace. As long as the Soviet Union has conventional and nuclear power greater than that of Western Europe, the latter’s security will have to be based on the maintenance of its alliance with the United States. In any event, this alliance is an essential guarantee of stability and hence of security for Europe as a whole.
75. While the Atlantic Alliance is in no way being called in question, one may henceforth wonder about the future of the American presence in Europe and the NATO integrated military structure.

76. (a) First, while the United States agreed with the Soviet Union to fix a ceiling of 195 000 for their troop levels in Europe, there are signs that their forces will be reduced to less than 100 000 men to a level that has not yet been fixed. In all probability, American forces withdrawn from Europe to take part in operations in the Gulf at the end of 1990 and in January 1991 will not return to Europe once peace is restored in the Middle East. Western Europe should therefore make a special effort to bring alliance forces up to the same level as those of the Soviet Union and its allies. It will probably not be easy to do this because the public will have to be convinced of the need to make a further effort to guarantee its security just when more general considerations on peace and disarmament might induce their countries to make substantial reductions in their defence budgets and troop levels. For them not to jeopardise European security, these reductions will have to be linked with a better organisation of collective defence. they will have to be moderate and must not precede the disarmament agreements.

77. (b) Provision will also have to be made for a possible redeployment of American forces in Europe should this be considered necessary. In any event, this means continuing to defend transatlantic lines of communication and maintaining large stocks of arms, munitions and supplies in Europe to ensure that the time required for redeployment is not unduly long.

78. (c) From this point of view, the CFE agreements are a serious handicap to Europe’s security since, while the Soviet Union can still be ready to build up top-level military strength in Europe at short notice with its land lines of communication, this is not so for the Americans or their European allies, the former being dependent on long-distance air and naval lines of communication. The CFE agreement admittedly says each state party shall “have the right to withdraw from this treaty if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of this treaty have jeopardised its supreme interests. A state party intending to withdraw shall give notice of its decision to do so to the depositary and to all other states parties...at least 150 days prior to the intended withdrawal”, including a statement of these events. There would be a right to withdraw “if another state party increases its holdings” of armaments “which are outside the scope of the limitations of this treaty in such proportions as to pose an obvious threat to the balance of forces within the area of application”. This is tantamount to saying that a state party will not be able to withdraw from its treaty commitments until 150 days after noting and notifying a threat. Only then will it be able to start facing up to the threat. However, as it has no right to hold stocks of armaments in the area of limitation, where the territory of most signatory countries is situated, it will then have to start manufacturing or procuring the armaments necessary to meet the threat it has noted. Clearly this provision will be a decisive advantage for countries with stocks and means of production outside the area of limitation, i.e. the United States and Canada on one side and the Soviet Union on the other. Europeans are therefore liable to become more dependent on those countries, which will be the only ones capable of taking up arms fairly quickly in face of a threatening situation.

79. (d) This obviously does not mean NATO can and should cling to the concepts that governed its arrangements up to 1990, i.e. flexible response and, above all, forward defence, for which there is no longer any need once Warsaw Pact forces are no longer in conflict with countries of the Atlantic Alliance. If NATO maintains its system, it might be seen as a threat and consequently make further disarmament and confidence-building measures more difficult. Everything indicates that member countries have become aware of this and are henceforth endeavouring to define new concepts and a new organisation, on the one hand by providing for a minimum deployment, while retaining the possibility to increase their forces substantially in the event of tension or crisis. and, on the other hand, by creating army corps with divisions from several countries in order to increase the deterrent effect stemming from the cohesion of forces from member countries. Finally, NATO is considering a large increase in the size of its mobile force in order to be better able to intervene decisively in the event of threats to regions which have hitherto been on the periphery of its system.

80. (e) For these reasons, the structures of the Atlantic Alliance should be maintained as far as possible, but also European members of the alliance should be given a greater role in all areas of allied action in political and disarmament matters. There will be even greater reason for this if the United States reduces its role in a collective defence system. Contrary to what has sometimes been requested, your Rapporteur does not believe the appointment of a European commander-in-chief of NATO forces would be a satisfactory solution since continuing to have an American in this post is an important means of linking the United States with the alliance and NATO’s deterrent capability. Conversely, he feels that Europe might carry greater weight in allied action if WEU effectively played the role of European pillar of the alliance, one of its constant aims that has never really been effectively achieved. It is certainly not a matter of limiting
WEU's ambitions to that function alone, since it is indeed its recent activities in areas outside NATO's purview that have allowed it to develop consultations between its members in political and military matters, but this aspect of WEU's rôle must not be neglected.

81. In this connection, your Rapporteur personally considers that if France played a greater and steadier part in NATO's activities, without either its forces or its territory being integrated, this would help to strengthen Europe's rôle. The agreement between NATO and Spain shows that membership on such a basis is not impossible and the new situation in Europe has considerably reduced many of the reasons for the integration of forces being part and parcel of close participation in many NATO bodies.

82. In the long run, relations between WEU and NATO and WEU's rôle in Europe's response to the threat still represented by Soviet military strength depend on how NATO manages to adapt itself to the new situation and give Europe the security guarantees it needs. In any event, WEU will have to show that Europe is still determined not to accept Soviet domination, not only over Western Europe but also over those Central and Eastern European countries which have freely chosen to escape from it. To implement this determination, it will have to adapt itself to whatever the Atlantic Alliance becomes in order to give maximum effectiveness to a collective security system associating Europe with its United States and Canadian allies and to allow Europe to exercise more influence over alliance policy, particularly in everything related to détente and disarmament, in view of the less important rôle American forces will be playing in NATO's military deployment.

(b) Risks of destabilisation in Europe

83. The new-found freedom of former Warsaw Pact countries to choose their régimes and the course of their external policy corresponds to the West's constant aims. It is a welcome fact that some of them have used this freedom to set up truly democratic institutions, hold free elections and redirect their foreign policy. It has to be noted that others have not, or not yet, taken such clear decisions on these three points. However, these differences involve certain risks for the future, since:

(i) Ideological clashes are quite possible in some countries and these may jeopardise their relations with neighbouring countries.

(ii) The ethnic and linguistic shape of certain states is being called in question by part of the population belonging to minorities also represented in neighbouring countries which consequently cannot remain unmoved by internal developments in those countries. In fact, questions could be raised about nearly all the frontiers of Central and Eastern Europe and rivalries concealed for half a century by the order imposed by Soviet power may resurface with new intensity.

(iii) A number of conflicts may therefore come to the fore and certain great powers, like the Soviet Union with its Romanian minority in Moldavia and Ruthenian or Polish minorities in the Ukraine may be tempted to impose their views in ideological conflicts and national confrontations.

(iv) Although the CSCE, particularly at its Paris summit meeting in November 1990, has managed to define principles by which such conflicts should be solved, it has been unable to set up institutions or sufficiently binding procedures to impose peaceful solutions. It is a matter of some consternation that, two months after signing the Paris Charter, the Soviet Union openly violated its undertakings by resorting to brutal force to impose its will in the Baltic countries.

84. This situation is admittedly not a direct threat to Western Europe. It nevertheless involves a number of risks for Europe's peace which must not be ignored. On the one hand, it cannot allow a great power to take advantage of such circumstances to impose its domination in a region which has just slipped out of its grasp. On the other hand, the Western European countries have both bilateral and multilateral relations with the Central European countries that they are developing and preparing to increase. The most typical case is that of Italy, which has started to organise its relations with Austria, Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia in a new context, but this is not the only one. Poland and Hungary in particular now have very close relations with several Western European countries, including certain forms of co-operation in defence matters, alongside their relations with the Council of Europe. In other words, because détente is not between blocs but allows each country to re-establish traditional relations or establish new ones, it may lead Western European countries in diverging directions whenever relations between Central and Eastern European countries become difficult.

85. Your Rapporteur believes this has various consequences of direct concern to WEU:

86. (i) It is essential for all the WEU member countries to be kept continually informed about each other's relations with Central and Eastern
European countries. Before WEU was reactivated, such exchanges of information were the Council’s main activity at ministerial level. Since then, it is clear that its discussions have been reoriented, about which no one is complaining. However, it is important for these practices to be continued or resumed. Naturally, a large part of such exchanges are now a matter for political co-operation but, insofar as they concern security and defence matters, which is increasingly often the case, WEU is the appropriate framework for their development.

87. (ii) Since Greece and Turkey applied for membership of WEU, the Council has been keeping them informed of its activities. When the Gulf crisis started, the WEU Council invited a number of member countries of the Atlantic Alliance or of the European Community which are not members of WEU to take part in some of its activities, on one basis or another. To varying degrees, Denmark, Norway, Greece and Turkey showed their solidarity with the WEU countries on that occasion. Your Rapporteur considers that, when the Council handles matters relating to disarmament, security and co-operation in Europe, it might, in certain cases at least, send similar invitations to Central European countries which have shown they intend to pull away from the Soviet alliance, which co-operate in one way or another with WEU countries in security matters, which have set up democratic institutions and which show real interest in establishing a new security order in Europe and in all the aims assigned to WEU in the modified Brussels Treaty. For instance, this is the case of Hungary, but it is not the only one. It would be a particularly appropriate way of showing that Europe’s security is not the private stamping ground of nine countries but that the latter are determined to consider every aspect with all countries really prepared to do so. Furthermore, Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty allows non-member countries to be associated with subsidiary bodies of the Council. There is nothing to prevent these countries taking part in meetings of the Council, whose activities are of direct concern to them. Although association with WEU cannot be made a rigid status, flexible forms of association with its activities would correspond to its vocation today.

88. (iii) This practice should allow WEU to play a rôle that is essential until such time as the CSCE makes more definite progress towards organising and guaranteeing a new order of peace and security in Europe. It was noted above that the CSCE has no executive body and therefore does not have the executive means that are essential for the principles it defines to be applied and for it to be able to arbitrate in any conflicts. Only states are able to provide it with these means. However, in view of the quarrels, rivalries and protective practices, or even domination, that marked the nineteenth and twentieth century history of Europe, it hardly seems desirable for any individual state to be made responsible for enforcing CSCE decisions. An international organisation grouping states with varied interests and open to any European powers wishing to take part in some of its activities would quite obviously arouse fewer negative reactions than any individual state whatever. WEU might thus play a deterrent rôle in regard to all countries thinking of resorting to force to impose its own interests without taking account of the requirements of a European order.

89. (iv) Today, it is not easy to see how WEU should be organised in order to play this rôle of active CSCE instrument to ensure that a new order of peace and security is established in Europe. Recent experience of the Gulf war suggests that it will be well placed for such a task insofar as it will be distinct from other organisations with different aims. be it NATO, whose main aim is to guarantee the West against any threat from Soviet military power, or the Community, whose primary rôle is to unite member countries more closely in areas within its purview. WEU, whose task is to guarantee the security of European countries and whose structures are extremely flexible, is, at present, the body best prepared to take action to bring about a new European order defined in the framework of the CSCE. It must give shape to these possibilities to allow Europeans to place at the service of an international order, in Europe itself, their ability to deter and consequently to take action without the United States or the Soviet Union necessarily being involved in such matters. Measures taken to facilitate the co-ordination of national action outside the NATO area might help.

(c) Risks outside Europe

90. Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait recalled to what extent Europe’s security depends on maintaining peace in the rest of the world. It also showed that WEU, thanks to its flexible structures, was the most appropriate body to organise a reaction by European countries not all of which were prepared to become involved to the same degree and in the same way in an operation whose objectives had been determined by the United Nations and which meant placing national forces under American command in an affair that was outside NATO’s responsibilities. Apart from a few aspects directly affecting the new order of security in Europe, your Rapporteur will not develop this matter further as it is outside his terms of reference and will be dealt with in other reports.

91. (i) The development of détente, understanding and co-operation in Europe which followed the new trend of Soviet policy and the
independence won by a number of Eastern European countries was an essential factor when the Security Council had to condemn Iraq's use of force against Kuwait and to plan retaliatory measures to bring Iraq to heel. Thus, the Soviet Union voted for all the resolutions tabled in the Security Council in this connection after reaching agreement with the United States on their wording and China itself voiced no opposition. Nor did the Soviet Union oppose allowing its citizens the right to emigrate to Israel but used its consequent influence on the state of Israel to urge it, at the same time as the United States, not to use its right to respond to Iraqi attacks, thus showing its concern to prevent the conflict spreading or degenerating into a clash between the West and the Arab countries.

92. (ii) Several members of the Warsaw Pact - Hungary, Poland and Czechoslovakia - have participated in operations in the Gulf to enforce Security Council decisions by giving medical assistance or assistance in protection against the effects of chemical weapons. In this way, they intended to demonstrate their solidarity with countries contributing to military efforts and hence their endorsement of a new European order no longer based on the system of blocs. In these circumstances, it would seem normal for these countries to be asked to attend meetings of the Council when the aftermath of the Gulf affair is discussed on the same basis as other countries which are not members of WEU and within limits corresponding to the magnitude and nature of their commitment.

93. (iii) WEU's action should allow the European countries to voice their views on Middle East affairs, particularly in regard to the settlement of the Palestinian question and that of Lebanon and, perhaps, play a part when that of Kuwait is settled, when it will be a matter of guaranteeing respect for the provisions of the agreement on which peace is restored. Preventing the conflict appearing to be a clash between the United States and Israel, on the one hand, and the Arab peoples on the other, certainly helped to limit the extent of the confrontation and its consequences.

94. (iv) These considerations bring new importance to Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty which, on the basis of the fact that Europe's security is closely linked with keeping the peace in the rest of the world, gives WEU universal responsibilities which the North Atlantic Council lacks and allows the member countries to adopt very close measures of military co-operation without jeopardising their right freely to determine the principle and level of their participation in operations to maintain or restore peace, particularly in the context of the application of Security Council decisions. Thus, they lead to the conclusion that, although WEU can and must be the European pillar of the alliance, its rôle does not stop there. Outside the NATO area, it is the instrument by which an external European policy, as would be defined in the framework of twelve-power political co-operation, can be implemented from the moment it implies recourse to force.

V. Conclusions

95. In conclusion, your Rapporteur feels the prospects heralded by the transformation of the Soviet Union, the emancipation of the people's democracies and the reunification of Germany encouraged European public opinion to be over-optimistic. On the one hand, no account was taken of the obstacles that the Soviet Union and the Central and Eastern European countries would quite naturally encounter as soon as they had to make a radical reassessment of their ideology, political and economic organisation and external policies. Moreover, after more than forty years of measuring their defence efforts in terms of the immediate danger of Soviet military power at the service of an ideology and a threatening policy, the western countries are finding it rather difficult to grasp that the disappearance of this threat does not remove all the possible danger from the Soviet Union but, on the contrary, leads to the emergence of certain risks for international peace and consequently European security which might arise in Europe itself or in regions of the world outside the NATO area.

96. Revealing that the danger still exists and that these risks are emerging must certainly not be allowed to jeopardise what has been achieved and, in particular, to slow down the negotiations on disarmament and the organisation of a new order of peace and security in Europe. One of WEU's roles is to facilitate these negotiations. It is able to make a substantial contribution because it is the only European security structure which has not been called in question by recent events and because it is the only defence organisation in which European states meet outside the influence of the great powers. This rôle is also facilitated by the flexibility of its structures which allow all kinds of possibilities for non-member countries to be associated and the possible abstention of member countries in operations in which it does not suit them to take part, apart from those provided for in Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty. WEU also has the advantage of its de facto links with twelve-power Europe, i.e. with the Community, which, more than ever, forms the pole of attraction round which European union can one day be achieved, and with political co-operation. This link is admittedly not yet a juridical reality, but its institutionalisation by the creation of bridges between these three institutions is
among the aims the Twelve set themselves at the Rome conference in December 1990. National administrations are already co-ordinating their action in the three forums, as they did several times during the Gulf crisis and in particular in Paris on 17th January, when the Twelve met at the close of the meeting of the WEU Council of Ministers. This link is above all evident in the eyes of the governments of non-member countries. Wishing to draw closer to the Community, they are starting to make a similar movement towards WEU: after Norway and Turkey, Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Poland have just made this plain in the Gulf affair.

Thus, however fragile and incomplete the transformation of East-West relations may be, it marks the start of a period in which WEU must define itself in three different ways which are not contradictory but nor are they the same.

(i) WEU is the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance and, as such, it ensures Europe's participation in a system of defence and deterrence which remains necessary as long as the Soviet Union has a military potential that enables it to threaten peace in Europe and the security of Western Europe.

(ii) WEU offers member countries an instrument for examining together their aims in disarmament and the organisation and maintenance of peace and security in Europe. If necessary, it should give them the means to intervene to ensure respect for the principles defined by all states participating in the CSCE.

(iii) In areas within its purview, WEU heralds a future European union master of its foreign policy and its defence. Decisions taken by the Twelve in Rome guide it in this direction and place it among the bodies destined to come together under the authority of the European Council.

This is a considerable extension of the prospects open to WEU and it is evident that it cannot choose between them but must manage to conduct at one and the same time the action of the nine governments in these three directions. This is the necessary condition if countries, each of which is more or less inclined to advance in one or other direction, are to be able to agree to achieve decisive progress in all three.