

ASSEMBLY OF WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION

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THIRTY-SEVENTH ORDINARY SESSION

(First Part)

European security and threats outside Europe –  
the organisation of peace and security  
in the Mediterranean region and the Middle East

REPORT

submitted on behalf of the Political Committee  
by Mr. Martinez, Rapporteur



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the organisation of peace and security  
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1. Adopted unanimously by the committee.

2. *Members of the committee.* N... (Chairman); *Sir Geoffrey Finsberg*, Mr. De Decker (Vice-Chairmen); MM. *Aarts*, *Beix* (Alternate: *Baumel*), *Brito*, *Candal* (Alternate: *Soares Costa*), *Caro*, *Collart* (Alternate: *De Bondt*), *Cuatrecasas* (Alternate: *Barrionuevo*), *Fabra*, *Feldmann*, *Forni*, *Foschi*, *Goerens* (Alternate: *Kollwelter*), *Guizzi*, *Lord Kirkhill*, MM. *Kittelmann*, *Koehl*, *van der Linden* (Alternate: *Eisma*), *Lord Mackie of Benshie*, MM. *Martinez*, *Martino*, *Müller*, *Péciaux*, *Pieralli*, *de Puig*, *Reddemann*, *Roseta*, *Sarti*, *Sir William Shelton* (Alternate: *Speed*), Mr. *Soell*, Mrs. *Staels-Dompas*, MM. *Stoffelen*, *Thyraud*, *Ward*

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

***Draft Recommendation***

*on European security and threats outside Europe –  
the organisation of peace and security in the Mediterranean region and the Middle East*

The Assembly,

- (i) Considering that the crisis caused by Iraq's aggression against Kuwait aggravated an already difficult situation in the Middle East which makes it urgent for Europe to take steps to promote a solution to conflicts in the Middle East and the establishment of a peaceful, secure order throughout the Mediterranean basin and the Middle East with due respect for the cultural and religious traditions of each people;
- (ii) Welcoming Arab initiatives to establish a regional security system and considering that a reduction of tension requires co-operation between the countries of the region, respect for human rights and the promotion of balanced economic and social development;
- (iii) Considering that an international conference is needed in order to solve Middle East problems on the basis of the relevant Security Council resolutions and approving the intention expressed by the European Council on 8th April 1991 to have Europe play an active part in settling conflicts in the Middle East;
- (iv) Considering that the organisation of lasting peace requires immediate preparations to be made for a conference on peace and security in the Mediterranean and the Middle East (CSCM) after the fashion of the CSCE, duly adapted for application in the Mediterranean region;
- (v) Considering that the limitation of arms supplies to countries in the region calls for international agreement associating purchasing countries and selling countries in order to fix levels of armaments for countries in the region;
- (vi) Considering that the proliferation of all conventional weapons and weapons of mass destruction, in particular chemical weapons, in the Mediterranean basin and the Middle East is a serious threat to peace;
- (vii) Gratified that WEU, after helping to apply the embargo imposed on Iraq as decided by the Security Council, has taken responsibility for co-ordinating military action to assist Kurdish refugees following the decision taken by the European Council on 8th April 1991,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

I

With a view to helping to bring about peace in the Near and Middle East, should, where appropriate:

1. In all areas within its purview, pursue the action undertaken by the European Council to allow Europe to help to establish and then maintain peace in the Middle East and security in the Mediterranean, in particular by laying the foundations for a system of co-operation, good-neighbourliness, co-responsibility and interdependence between all countries in the region with respect for human rights;
2. Continue to implement European Council decisions relating to humanitarian aid to the Kurdish people;
3. In all its activities, use the good offices of the Secretariat-General;
4. Instruct the WEU committee of chiefs of defence staff to:
  - (a) determine, if so requested by the countries concerned or decided by the United Nations Security Council, the kind of military assistance member countries are able to make at the present time in order to guarantee any peace agreements which may be reached in the Middle East and organise the co-ordination of such assistance;

- (b) ensure an improvement in member countries' means of information, communication and transport with a view to affording such assistance if necessary;
  - (c) co-ordinate the use of military and other resources for the benefit of the Kurdish refugees;
- 5. Promote the achievement of a general agreement governing the possession of and trade in arms in the Middle East and insist on transparency in the arms trade by having the United Nations record contracts and sales;
- 6. Promote agreement between member countries to end or at least to reduce supplies of arms to the Middle East with a view to making peace and stability possible;
- 7. To this end, invite the Institute for Security Studies to:
  - (a) study the ongoings of armaments of all kinds in the Middle East;
  - (b) gather information supplied to it by member countries on the armaments contracts they or their private firms sign with countries in the region and on the possible transfer of technology that might be used to produce armaments and ensure compliance, wherever possible, with end-user certificates;
  - (c) report back to the Assembly;

## II

Help to prepare a conference on security and peace in the Mediterranean and the Middle East by instructing its Mediterranean Sub-Group to work out Western Europe's positions on all matters relating to the first basket, in particular:

- (a) the non-proliferation of all kinds of weapons of mass destruction and a ban on the production and holding of chemical and bacteriological weapons as a first step towards the creation of a zone free of atomic, biological and chemical weapons;
- (b) controlling the arms trade;
- (c) the limitation and verification of conventional armaments;
- (d) confidence-building measures;
- (e) the creation of a conflict prevention centre;

## III

Append to its annual report detailed information on the activities and conclusions of the Mediterranean Sub-Group and information obtained by the unit responsible for studying armaments in the Middle East.

## *Explanatory Memorandum*

*(submitted by Mr. Martinez, Rapporteur)*

### *I. Introduction*

1. The subject of the present report was fixed many months ago. It corresponded to global concerns relating to the application of Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty. However, threats to international peace and Europe's security in regions close to the Mediterranean have grown in magnitude since summer 1990 and it seemed reasonable for this report to deal with them together with attempts to solve them now that, in other parts of the world, Europe's interests are less directly at stake and its means of action more limited. Your Rapporteur has therefore elected to limit his study to the Mediterranean region and the Middle East, leaving the Political Committee the possibility of studying the other aspects of such a vast subject at a later date. The visit by the Assembly's Presidential Committee to Egypt on 29th and 30th April 1991, when it held lengthy meetings with the highest authorities of the Egyptian state, including President Mubarak, allowed your Rapporteur to obtain first-hand information on some important aspects of his study.

2. Whereas developments in the Soviet Union and the eastern part of Europe since 1989 have allowed the organisation of security in Europe to be extended to cover the limitation of armaments, economic and even technological co-operation, the joint adoption of directives governing the external relations of all countries on this continent and even principles concerning their internal régimes and their way of life, relations between Western Europe and its neighbours to the south have encountered serious problems, the gravity of which was illustrated by the crisis unleashed by the Iraqi army's invasion of Kuwait. Europe can no longer view its security solely in terms of the establishment of peace on the continent of Europe; it must also bear in mind that its relations with its southern neighbours also concern its security and involve risks which at first sight are probably not of a military nature but affect its internal stability and the conduct of its economy and, if allowed to develop, might in the long run jeopardise what now seems to have been acquired in terms of peace.

3. Naturally, the countries of the southern part of the European continent were more sensitive than others to the deteriorating balances in the Mediterranean region and from them came most of the calls for a new international order to be extended to that part of the world. They did not always find the audience for their

concerns that they deserved among their partners and one of the aims of the present report should be to make Europe as a whole aware of this situation. This seems particularly necessary since the opening towards the East has started to draw much of the interest of Europeans in that direction, and in particular their investment capability. There is every reason to think that this attraction will gradually become stronger, making those southern countries in particular which benefit from European assistance and capital fear that if these means are redirected their own development may suffer. This fear has been expressed particularly forcefully by the Maghreb countries. Europeans should certainly pay heed to this.

4. However, it must be noted that North-South relations cannot be the same as East-West relations. On the one hand, there are greater differences between standards of living, mentalities, scales of social values and degrees of economic development on the two shores of the Mediterranean than there were, in spite of the clash of official ideologies, on the two sides of the former iron curtain. Furthermore, the colonial era left an aftermath of mistrust, misunderstanding, psychological traumatism and rejection which are far from having been overcome and which concern the societies as a whole. It is therefore far more difficult to reach understanding on common values. Yet, particularly in the economic area, there are more complementary aspects that could give substance to an understanding that conforms to the understandable interests of both sides. To a far greater extent than in East-West relations, it is economic convergences that should be exploited in this case because they are the main area in which it is possible to build up solidarity that might then be extended to other sectors which are more difficult for Europe to tackle immediately since it does not wish to be suspected of trying to win back, in a different way, the political, military, ideological and cultural positions that it once controlled through colonisation. It is nevertheless clear that all the countries in the region have a common interest in the establishment of a peaceful and secure order.

5. Your Rapporteur therefore proposes to examine first the fundamental aspects of a Mediterranean order, then the steps that might be taken to organise such an order and, finally, the possibilities available at a juncture still scored by the aftermath of the intervention of northern countries, under United Nations aegis, in the Gulf conflict.

## II. Factors of a Mediterranean order

### (a) The region concerned

6. A first approach to the problem is to start from a purely geographical basis: the Mediterranean is an inland sea that, for thousands of years, has associated the peoples around its shores in a common destiny: Phoenicians, Greeks, Romans, Arabs, Franks, Normans, Byzantines, Turks, Spaniards and Venitians in turn thronged all the shores of this sea, leaving traces everywhere that have remained alive in peoples' memories and present in their cultures. There really is a Mediterranean area and one of its characteristics is the contact of civilisations, economies and cultures and the manifold exchanges between the peoples round its shores.

7. However, in the course of history human communities spread far from the banks of the Mediterranean and no attempt should now be made to cut them off. North of the Mediterranean, they are essentially in Europe, where solidarity, particularly economic, has in recent years become crystallised round an economic community whose boundaries might have to be extended northwards and eastwards in future years. Where the economy is concerned, it is no longer possible to envisage a European policy committing only some of its members. Hence it is the community as a whole, as it now is or as it is destined to become, that is concerned. South of the Mediterranean, the Arab world is also a community but of quite a different type; its inhabitants are strongly aware of this, in spite of the diversity of Arab societies and the divergent interests of the states. A programme of co-operation with Europe would be doomed to failure if not open to the whole Arab world, including non-Mediterranean countries such as Mauritania, the Arabian Peninsula and Iraq. The question may arise of the inclusion in this group of countries such as Sudan, which is a member of the Arab League, or Iran, which belongs to another civilisation, is not a member of the Arab League but is closely involved in all Middle East affairs. It is naturally for those concerned to say whether they wish to take part in a Mediterranean order but they should not be excluded automatically. This extension of Mediterranean co-operation has become more than ever necessary following the Gulf war since it is hard to see how countries like Israel and Syria could be associated with it and not Jordan and Iraq, or even Iran, without seeming to take a course in the Middle East disturbances that would prevent Europe being an acceptable partner for the Arab nation.

8. Any European action to promote an order of peace and security in the Mediterranean must therefore be aimed at all the Arab countries and

also concern the whole of Europe, otherwise it would look like an attempt to divide the Arab world and not be based on European realities.

### (b) Demographic aspects

9. While demography is rising rapidly throughout the countries south of the Mediterranean, the phenomenon is particularly striking along the southern shore where the progress of medicine and hygiene and an improved standard of living have led to longer life expectations whereas the adjustments that occur in industrialised countries have not yet had any clear and lasting effect. The following tables illustrate this better than lengthy comments. For each country, your Rapporteur has shown the main demographic data followed by the most important economic indicators, a few details about the EEC's share in their external trade and figures showing the place of defence in their economies.

10. These statistics show, on the one hand, a very low per capita GDP in countries that do not produce oil and, on the other hand, a growth in the population which far exceeds the growth in GDP, which means that the standard of living of the people, already almost intolerable in many cases, is destined to fall in future years, and this could well lead to serious disturbances. Disturbances have already occurred in some countries, such as in Sudan and Lebanon, resulting in a drop in GDP. This means that the inhabitants of the southern shore of the Mediterranean will inexorably be tempted to emigrate to more favoured regions, be it the oil-producing Middle East countries or Western Europe. There have already been several million immigrants from that region. There is every indication that this flow of migrants will continue and accentuate if swift economic development does not soon provide employment for the population.

11. In the last ten years, however, there has been a significant fall in the birth rate in the Maghreb countries, where the average number of children per woman fell, between 1977 and 1988, by 35% in Algeria, 27% in Tunisia and 22% in Morocco, i.e. from 7.4, 5.5 and 5.9 to 4.8, 4 and 4.6. These figures are still high compared with a figure of less than 2 for Western Europe and, if maintained, they would produce a population of about 108 million for the three countries as a whole by about 2025, compared with 58 million in 1989, but it may be thought that the trend recently indicated by demographers will be confirmed. The three countries have family planning policies, inaugurated in Tunisia in 1965, a little later in Morocco and only in 1983 in Algeria. A particularly disturbing case, however, is Egypt, where the population is still increasing by 2.8% per year.

*Africa*

	Units	Algeria	Libya	Morocco	Tunisia	Egypt	Sudan
Population .....	Mill. inhab.	24.6	4.4	24.5	8	53	24.5
Annual growth .....	%	3.1	3.7	2.6	2.4	2.6	2.9
Life expectancy .....	years	62.5	60.7	60.7	65.3	60.6	49.8
GDP .....	\$ '000 million	60	23	23.25	10.5	33	11.4
Annual growth average 1980-88 .....	%	3	- 6	3.5	3.2	5.6	- 1.3
1989 .....	%	2.8	-	3	3.1	5	- 2
Per capita .....	\$	2 273	5 439	950	1 315	640	480
External debt .....	M. \$	25	3.3	21	5.6	50	13
Energy production .....	M. ton coal equiv.	124	75	1	7.7	72.7	0
Energy consumption .....	-	33.3	11.6	7.8	5	34	1.5
Imports .....	M. \$	8 610	6 800	5 100	4 310	7 378	1 400
of which EEC .....	%	59	53		79	35	33.5
Exports .....	M. \$	8 813	6 100	3 700	2 930	2 634	450
of which EEC .....	%	62	74	55	74	43	30
Defence budget as % of GDP	%	1.9	6.8	5.2	5	9.8	6.9
Troop levels .....	Thousand men	138.5	85	192.5	38	378	73

*Arabia*

	Units	Saudi Arabia	Bahrain	UAE	Kuwait	Oman	Qatar	Yemen
Population .....	Mill. inhab.	14.5	0.5	1.6	2	1.4	0.35	10
Annual growth .....	%	4	3.6	3.3	4	3.3	4.2	3.2
Life expectancy .....	years	63.4	70.7	70.7	72.8	55.4	69.3	50.8
GDP .....	\$ '000 million	78.4	3.2	26.1	23.75	8		6.7
Annual growth average 1980-88 .....	%	- 22	2.3	- 4.6	1.7	11.7	- 3.9	2
1989 .....	%	- 0.7	2.5	3	7.5	6	3	4
Per capita .....	\$	5 433	6 513	16 882	11 584	5 657	15 288	600
External debt .....	M. \$	-	1 191	10 990	7 250	2 940	15 288	1 200
Energy production .....	M. ton coal equiv.	331	9	132	99.6	51.6	27.6	1.3
Energy consumption ..	-	80	7	27.5	17	11.2	7.2	3.4
Imports .....	M. \$	23 044	2 800	10 110	5 550	2 450	1 300	1 750
of which EEC .....	%	38.4	19	30.3	29	31	36.8	28
Exports .....	M. \$	27 120	2 685	15 610	8 000	3 930	1 610	660
of which EEC .....	%	21.6	5	5.7	26.2	15	8	45
Defence budget as % of GDP .....	%	18.7	5	5.6	6.6	18.2	3.2	13
Troop levels .....	Thousand men	62	3.3	43	20	25.5	7	64



*Asia Minor*

	Units	Iraq	Israel	Jordan	Lebanon	Syria	Iran	Turkey
Population .....	Mill. inhab.	18.28	4.51	4.1	2.9	11.7	54.9	56.8
Annual growth .....	%	3.5	1.6	3.9	2.1	3.6	3.5	2
Life expectancy .....	years	63.9	75.4	66	67	65	65.2	64.1
GDP .....	\$ '000 million	34	38.4	4.65	95	21.1	167.3	77.8
Annual growth average 1980-88 .....	%	8.1	3.2	2.3	-14.4	0.4	1.3	5.4
1989 .....	%	-	1	2.3	-	2	-1	1.8
Per capita .....	\$	1 950	8 650	1 134	327	1 800	3 264	1 454
External debt .....	M. \$	85	26.3	5.5	0.5	5	5	33.6
Energy production ....	M. ton coal equiv.	151	0	0	0	18	186.4	28
Energy consumption ..	-	12.5	12.2	4	3.7	11.5	65.9	52
Imports .....	M. \$	10 200	13 000	3 150	2 460	2 076	9 535	14 800
of which EEC .....	%	27.6	51.1	31.2	46.7	36.3	39.4	41.2
Exports .....	M. \$	14 200	10 740	1 400	709	2 658	12 523	10 650
of which EEC .....	%	26.1	29.8	9.3	29	30	40.8	43.7
Defence budget as % of GDP .....	%	28.6	13.4	15	-	13.3	3	3.4
Troop levels .....	Thousand men	1 000	141	85	22	344	355	651

*Immigrants from Mediterranean countries in EEC countries*

	Turkey	Algeria	Morocco	Tunisia	Yugoslavia	Egypt	Others	All non-EEC Medit. countries
B .....	76.1	10.1	126.1	5.9	4.6	-	-	222.8
DK .....	22.3	0.3	2.1	0.1	9	-	-	33.8
D .....	1 481.3	5.5	55.8	24.3	597.6	-	-	2 164.5
GR .....	30.2	-	-	1.4	0.9	2.7	7.9	43.21
SP .....	0.2	0.6	35.1	0.2	0.3	0.4	3.1	39.9
F .....	123.5	796	431	190	64.5	-	-	1 605
IR .....	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
I .....	0.7	-	21	15	19	1.1	10	67
L .....	0.2	-	-	-	1.7	-	-	2
NL .....	167	0.6	130	2.6	11.7	-	-	312
P .....	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.2	0.36
GB .....	12	2	5	-	6	-	-	25
Total .....	1 914	815	806	239	715.5	4.2	21	4 513.9

12. In the EEC countries, which have about 325 million inhabitants, there are now about 7.8 million foreigners (not including 5 million nationals of other EEC countries), of which 4.6 million are nationals of third countries bordering on the Mediterranean. It should be added that, in certain countries receiving immi-

grants, foreigners who have been resident for a number of years are not included in these statistics because they have been given the nationality of the host country, although this does not necessarily mean that they have been fully assimilated. In any event, these countries cannot open their doors unreservedly to immigration.

There are only limited employment possibilities and the present economic contraction, accompanied in some cases by an increase in immigration from Eastern European countries, means that foreign nationals, often ill-adapted to the needs of modern industrial society, cannot be allowed to settle without control. Even when they are allowed to enter, they sometimes have great difficulty in being assimilated and overcoming the linguistic, economic and cultural barriers separating the two shores of the Mediterranean. The protective measures that may be taken by states on the northern shore will not be enough to save them from the flow of immigrants, but they are already helping to deepen the rift that is steadily opening between nations to the north and south of the Mediterranean. Only the development of the south can provide a solution to this problem by offering work and a standard of living acceptable to its people. However, such development requires investment and guaranteed outlets for the production of southern economies.

*(c) Economic aspects*

13. Where wealth and possibilities of expansion are concerned, there is no homogeneity between countries, be they north or south of the Mediterranean. Among the latter, some, such as Kuwait, the Gulf Emirates and, to a large extent, Saudi Arabia, have large oil resources but very small populations. Others, such as Iraq, Iran, Libya, Algeria or Egypt have vast oil reserves and draw considerable benefit from their exploitation but have to devote most of these resources to developing their economies and people. Some have no large oil resources nor, in general, enough natural resources to compensate for the low income they derive from industries which are not developed enough for lack of capital and properly-trained staff, from insufficiently modernised agriculture and from commercial and tourist activities that are too irregular and swayed by changing situations. The Iraqi war further reduced the capabilities of Kuwait and Iraq. The former was ruined, probably for several years to come, by the destruction wrought by the Iraqi occupants, while the latter, already very much in debt following its war against Iran from 1980 to 1988, placed itself, because of its invasion of Kuwait, in a situation from which it will quite clearly be unable to escape for a great many years. The civil wars that followed these external wars have further helped to ruin its economic potential and the cohesion of its society.

14. Kuwait and Saudi Arabia have admittedly organised financial assistance for the least privileged Arab countries so as to remedy, to a certain extent, inequalities due to the geographical location of oil resources. However,

these are merely palliatives, however important, since the OPEC countries provide 28% of the assistance to Mediterranean countries, but they are quite out of proportion with true requirements and it may be wondered to what extent such assistance will survive the 1990-91 crisis, particularly in the case of countries which did not take part in the coalition. The United States for its part supplies 31% of the assistance to these countries and the EEC 17%, which is relatively little.

15. Although the countries on the northern shore of the Mediterranean are in general better placed, some of them, such as Albania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia or even Greece or Turkey have a GDP very much lower than that of the industrialised Western European countries. Mediterranean problems, even from an economic standpoint, can therefore not be summed up as a clash between wealthy countries in the north and poor countries in the south but involve complex relationships between countries with varying resources that are very unequally distributed.

16. It should also be noted that the agricultural economy and tourism play an important part in the activities of those countries and that, generally speaking, Mediterranean agriculture is in no way complementary but, on the contrary, competitive, particularly in the case of wine, fruit, vegetables and olives. The same is true of tourism. In other words, the problems raised by the Mediterranean economy cannot be solved in a purely regional framework but require close association between all European countries, in particular the Community, which alone accounts for almost 50% of the trade of the Mediterranean countries and 30% of that of the Gulf.

17. The situation is very similar in regard to the acceptance of workers from the most densely-populated Mediterranean countries, who can be taken in only by the most industrialised European countries. There is a clear link between the economic problem and that of emigration since expatriate labour is one of the principal resources of the poorest, most densely-populated countries. In particular, it ensures a constant flow of foreign currency, essential for the equipment of those countries, thanks to the regular remittance of part of wages to families who remain in the home country, the payment of allowances and pensions and capital brought back by workers returning at the end of their contracts. It cannot be denied that this aspect of the exchanges between the two shores of the Mediterranean has many disadvantages, particularly for those forced to emigrate. It would be desirable in every respect if the development of the southern countries provided enough well-paid work for the whole population. However, the economic and demographic data shown in the tables suggest that such migration

by workers will be necessary for a long time to come. On the other hand, the aim of a Mediterranean policy should be to limit its scale and ensure the best possible conditions for those concerned and for the economies of the countries on both shores of the Mediterranean.

*(d) Contacts between civilisations*

18. Although in ancient times there was some degree of unity in the Mediterranean world, thanks inter alia to the maritime activities of the Phoenicians and the Greeks and then the rise of the Roman Empire, in the middle ages this empire was divided and a large part of the Mediterranean basin was conquered by the Arabs and then the Turks. There ensued many centuries of difficult relations between Christian Europe and Moslem powers and only in the aftermath of the second world war did the collapse of the Ottoman Empire lead to the establishment of the present states in the Middle East, the last of them, Israel, having been created only in 1947. In various ways, the European powers continued to dominate the southern Mediterranean countries until some time between the second world war and 1962 and this did not facilitate the establishment of harmonious relations between the peoples of the Mediterranean basin.

19. Nowadays, opposite the states on the northern shore, whose frontiers seem firmly established and where Christianity has left a strong imprint on a civilisation that is tending increasingly to separate the political from the religious, the major part of the southern shore is occupied by countries where the Arab language and civilisation dominate and the Moslem religion, to varying degrees, inspires social institutions and political practices. Only Israel and Turkey, not to speak of Iran, do not consider themselves Arab, while Egypt and Lebanon, which are Arab, still have large Christian populations. The fate of Palestine and Lebanon show how difficult multicultural and multireligious cohabitation still is in the region, just as, to the north of the Mediterranean, Yugoslavia's national unity is jeopardised by the coexistence of peoples with different cultural and religious traditions.

20. The recent Kuwait crisis has just shown once again the difference between societies' concepts of themselves north and south of the Mediterranean. Whereas in the north the national state is the essential socio-political structure and all wider forms of association are first based on inter-state relations, in the south the feeling of unity of Arab society is still very strong, thus sometimes making it hard to grasp just who is the true spokesman in international relations: for instance, during the war against Iraq, even in countries forming part of the coalition set up to

ensure respect for Security Council decisions, a large part of the population felt solidarity with Iraq and its leader because they interpreted events as a clash between part of the Arab nation and the industrialised world.

21. The fact that the state does not play such a decisive rôle in Arab society as in western society is not necessarily an obstacle to structuring international society south of the Mediterranean. It may, on the contrary, make it easier, but any such organisation may follow a course that is not necessarily the same as the CSCE followed for Europe.

22. The rôle of Islam is still more difficult to understand in view of the divisions that exist in Moslem society, particularly between Shiites and Sunnis but also between more or less liberal or fundamentalist tendencies and of the diversity of relations between states and religion. The recent reactivation of Islam does not necessarily mean victory for fundamentalist theology. It is rather situations of need and extreme underdevelopment that fuel despair – the breeding ground for fundamentalism. However, there was some hesitation among the people of certain non-Arab Moslem countries during the Gulf war, particularly in Iran and even Turkey, where appeals by Saddam Hussein, leader of a party and president of a state which nevertheless claim to be secular, for Moslem solidarity in a war against the unfaithful did not go unheeded, although Turkey and Iran, for reasons of their own, were on the side of the United Nations from the very outset and throughout the crisis.

23. Thus, the foundation of states in the East seems less sound than in the West. States are factors of dissociation between an Arab nation and a Moslem umma which existed before the states did and for which the people are rather nostalgic. In the West, associations of states stem from a political will which claims to be based on reason. In the East, it is the community that seems the most deeply-rooted element and the state the result of a political will to adapt to local circumstances and a specific set of circumstances but which can be constantly called in question: plans for unions once put forward by Nasser and more recently by Kadhafi, like the annexation of Kuwait by Saddam Hussein, seem to derive from such a concept of Arab and Moslem society. Nor can one ignore the fact that most states in the present Arab world inherited their frontiers from a colonial past and they did not always correspond to national realities. Civil wars in Lebanon, struggles between Kurds and the Iraqi authorities and unrest on other occasions in Syria, Iranian Kurdistan and the Moroccan Sahara show that many states, as they now exist, group communities whose cohesion is in no way guaranteed.

24. These considerations imply that the organisation of a Mediterranean security system may not be pursued in exactly the same way as the CSCE in Europe, where the homogenous concept of the state and international society is, in spite of the ideological clashes that dominated Europe until 1989, far greater than in the Mediterranean area. In this case, account will have to be taken of the reality of societies on the southern shore and no attempt made to impose on it specifically European political concepts. The dialogue will not be easy and will mean all concerned making conceptual efforts whose importance must not be underestimated.

*(e) Political aspects*

25. The recent crisis that accompanied and followed Iraq's annexation of Kuwait leaves a strong imprint on relations between countries north and south of the Mediterranean because the situation the West thought it perceived did not quite tally with the one actually experienced, particularly in the Arab countries. The West saw a dictatorial régime, unscrupulously using barbarious means to maintain an internal order that was contested by part of the population. It procured excessively powerful armaments, including weapons of mass destruction, long-range missiles and sophisticated arms and developed a policy of aggression, first against Iran and then against Kuwait. The invasion of Kuwait and its subsequent annexation, the taking of thousands of western nationals as hostages, the pillage of Kuwait, the installation of the Iraqi army close to the Gulf oilfields, which contain 60% of known reserves, and the ensuing threat for the world economy justified very firm diplomatic action and the embargo decided upon by the United Nations. Iraq's downright refusal to negotiate and its attempts to spread the conflict by appealing to Arab and Moslem peoples to rally to its cause finally resulted in the use of force to restore Kuwait's sovereignty and enforce Security Council resolutions.

26. It is not so easy to describe the reactions of the governments and people of the southern Mediterranean to this crisis. The governments of the Gulf countries undoubtedly felt threatened by Iraq, and this allowed the Arab League to obtain a majority to condemn the invasion of Kuwait and Egypt and Morocco, as well as Syria, probably for reasons very much its own, sent large forces to join those of Saudi Arabia and the Emirates as part of the coalition military effort. One might well be surprised by the discretion of Libya's position and its rapprochement with Egypt which bore little resemblance to the image hitherto attributed to Colonel Kadhafi's régime. Conversely, other governments, such as those of Algeria, Jordan, Tunisia and Yemen, plus the PLO, were, to say

the least, more hesitant about taking part and expressed more or less firm reservations about the coalition action. This was due to the way their people reacted to the crisis: they had little feeling about the infringement of international law and the annexation of one Arab country by another but saw the crisis as a brutal action by rich and powerful northern countries to prevent an attempt to unify the Arab world, to oppose the revalorisation of Arab oil, to keep Arab countries unarmed vis-à-vis Israel and to perpetuate authoritarian, corrupt régimes in the Arabian Peninsula, more concerned with the particular interests of the élite in power than the general interests of their people and the Arab people as a whole. Some may view the military crushing of Iraq as an outburst of northern strength against a fraction of Arab and Moslem society.

27. The question is not which of these two interpretations is the most justified but of being aware that the Gulf crisis crystallised opposing factors that were of long standing and deep-rooted. Although it may certainly be hoped that the negotiations following the crisis will allow more or less satisfactory solutions to be found to outstanding questions such as the Israeli-Arab conflict, Iraq's frontiers, the fate of the Kurds and guarantees to be given to Cyprus, Kuwait, Lebanon and Palestine, etc., the international community must also organise its remedy to those deeper problems that affect all Mediterranean societies. This is the aim of the proposal made by France, Italy, Portugal and Spain for holding a conference on security and co-operation in the Mediterranean.

*(f) Military aspects*

28. Political tension, on the one hand, the wealth of certain oil-producing countries, on the other, and, finally, the repercussions of the confrontation between eastern and western blocs have for many years led to a real arms race in the eastern Mediterranean. Israel's isolation in a hostile Arab world has encouraged it, from the very start of its existence, to devote a large proportion of its budget and efforts to ensuring its defence, but in so doing it raised fears among its neighbours that it was developing an expansionist policy of force and they too built up their armaments. One country's armament leading to that of the others, the build-up of arms in the region has become a cause of economic imbalance, fear and tension and it may be said that Iraq's overarmament played a major rôle in recent crises.

29. The industrialised countries contributed very largely to overarmament in the region by supplying weapons, often including the most highly sophisticated, to many countries. This

was due primarily to economic considerations. Important fluctuations in oil prices encouraged them to restore their trade balance with the Middle East countries by selling arms. Over-bidding linked with the sophistication of modern weapons also led industrialists to make up for shrinking national markets by selling abroad in order to remain in business. In many cases, they turned a blind eye to their own countries' legislation in order to achieve commercial results. Finally, concern to prevent certain countries dominating the entire region and to maintain a balance of forces there helped to direct arms sales, and particularly towards Iraq when, in the early eighties, the Iranian Islamic revolution made Iraq appear to be the rampart of international order vis-à-vis rising Islamic fundamentalism and terrorism. Following its victory over Iran, anxiety about Iraqi over-armament induced some western countries to arm Saudi Arabia and the Emirates. In 1988, the Middle East imported about \$18 000 million worth of armaments, i.e. 38% of the world total.

30. Most Middle East countries were happy to purchase weapons, but others have sought to import equipment in order to be able to produce them. Thus, after the 1967 war, Israel also wished to become as independent as possible of the good will of suppliers who tried to bring pressure to bear on it to encourage moderation. Several Arab countries wished to develop a nuclear weapons capability, since the non-proliferation treaty precluded their procurement

abroad, and also chemical weapons and missiles, regarding which the exporting countries were particularly restrictive. Iraq had worked out a particularly elaborate policy for obtaining, in various countries, equipment and technology that allowed the production on its territory of chemical weapons and ballistic missiles.

31. It is difficult to draw up an accurate inventory of weapons now held by countries on the southern shore of the Mediterranean, but certain facts seem certain:

- (i) Israel seems to be the only country to have operational nuclear weapons;
- (ii) there is no doubt that Iraq produces and has stocks of chemical weapons. Egypt, Iran, Israel and Syria also have them. Everything indicates that Libya too is now producing them;
- (iii) several countries have started to produce missiles with a range of several hundred kilometres thanks to imported technology, i.e. Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Libya, Saudi Arabia, Syria and Yemen;
- (iv) where conventional weapons are concerned, the table hereafter gives a few details of those held by countries in the Gulf region. They naturally predate the Gulf war and figures relating to Iraq must obviously be revised sharply downwards.

*Forces of the principal military powers in the Middle East<sup>1</sup>*

Country	Force levels	Combat aircraft	Battle tanks	Armoured vehicles	Artillery pieces	Armed helicopters
Egypt .....	450 000	475	3 190	3 515	2	74
Iran .....	504 000	185	540	650	800	434
Iraq .....	1 000 000	689	5 600	10 000	3 500	489
Israel .....	141 000	655	4 288	6 300	1 395	75
Jordan .....	85 000	35	1 150	1 329	458	18
Libya .....	85 000	513	2 300	3 385	1 740	35
Saudi Arabia .....	40 000	189	550	1 850	444	80
Syria .....	300 000	558	4 000	500	2 000	145
United Arab Emirates .	44 000	91	131	520	77	19

1. Table prepared on the basis of data given in *The Military Balance 1990-91*, published by the International Institute for Security Studies in London. As a comparison, in Western Europe only the Federal Republic has more than 5 000 tanks. Italy, France and the United Kingdom have only 1 533, 1 340 and 1 300 respectively. France has 597 combat aircraft, the United Kingdom 538, the Federal Republic 503, Italy 425 and Spain 221, plus 838 tanks. The level of forces in the EEC is 2.37 million compared with 2.7 for the Arab East and 0.45 for the Maghreb.

32. These data must also be corrected, as operations in the Gulf proved, by a coefficient that it is impossible to calculate, i.e. that of each country's ability to make maximum use of its weapons. This coefficient is clearly much higher

for Israel than for some Arab countries, but the latter have made very rapid progress in mastering military technology and they cannot be expected to remain permanently below par in this area.

33. In any event, the danger stems from the strength of armaments held by countries whose internal stability is not certain, whose frontiers are contested and which have aggressive intentions vis-à-vis neighbouring countries. For comparative purposes, it may be noted that none of the WEU countries had troop levels as high as those of the Iraqi army and none could deploy as many combat aircraft, tanks, armoured vehicles or artillery pieces although, for helicopters, missiles and the most sophisticated weapons, they were in general better equipped. In such conditions, it would be utopian to try to obtain a limit on the level of armaments in those countries without seeking to establish a peaceful order throughout the region. Again, it would be equally vain to try to establish such an order without accompanying measures designed to limit the arms race.

34. Mediterranean problems must therefore be tackled from two separate angles: the settlement of matters outstanding since the Gulf war and the establishment of a peaceful order in the region.

### ***III. The proposed conference on security and co-operation in the Mediterranean***

35. The idea of trying to organise peace in the Mediterranean to give it a more stable basis dates back to the very origins of the conference on security and co-operation in Europe since it was proposed in 1972 by the then Italian Prime Minister, Aldo Moro, and the CSCE has since devoted part of its work to the Mediterranean. However, the many regional conflicts that have occurred in the Mediterranean basin have so far precluded significant progress in this sense. For instance, Israel and the Arab countries had to be induced to meet around the same table, which assumed a solution to problems with which international diplomacy has been confronted since 1947. Nevertheless, the confrontation caused in summer 1990 by Iraq's invasion of Kuwait on the one hand showed the urgency of making an effort to prevent further conflicts and on the other hand, thanks to the massive American military presence in the Middle East, created new conditions that might open the way to initiatives in this direction.

36. Italy and Spain prepared a proposal for a conference on security and co-operation in the Mediterranean and Middle East which France and Portugal endorsed for submission at the Palma meeting held in September 1990 in the framework of the CSCE. This CSCM should, according to the proposal, be an independent entity although based on the principles set out in the United Nations Charter and drawing upon the experience of the CSCE, while realising that the problems that will have to be solved in this

new context will often be quite different from those encountered by the CSCE. The conference would also be wholly separate from any negotiations or conferences that might be held to restore peace in the Middle East following the Gulf war. At its meeting on 8th April 1991, the European Council, without formally adopting the proposal, made a clear and positive reference to it in its final communiqué.

37. There is no doubt that recent experience with the CSCE inspired and provided grist for the document presented by the four countries, particularly their concern to associate security, economic co-operation and the human dimension of Mediterranean problems with a view to drawing up a list of principles which would be set out in a "Mediterranean act" specifying rules of conduct and coexistence that countries in the region would agree to adopt, adapting the CSCE experience to conditions specific to that region. This adaptation would not affect the organisation of the conference's work round three baskets: security, co-operation and the human dimension. On this basis, the CSCM might promote stability and understanding and create bodies specifically designed to solve disputes. As an accompanying structure, the CSCM might, according to the authors of the document, help to settle questions stemming from the Gulf crisis or seek a solution to the Palestinian problem.

38. The four powers' proposal defines the aims of the CSCM as follows:

- (i) to safeguard the *security* of all countries in the region and help to make it globally more stable;
- (ii) to promote balanced *economic and social development* in the region by reducing economic, social, demographic, political and cultural imbalances;
- (iii) to establish a framework within which various civilisations might *coexist in peace*;
- (iv) to establish a *more peaceful* order in the region based on solidarity, replacing confrontation by co-operation;
- (v) to lay the foundations of a *system of good-neighbourliness, co-responsibility and interdependence* between all countries in the region;
- (vi) to ensure that the Mediterranean and Middle East region plays an active rôle within *the new international order* that is to be established.

The aims of the CSCM might well also include co-operation between the states round the shores of the Mediterranean to combat pollution and protect the environment in the region. The

question of the rights of minorities should also be included in the tasks of the conference.

39. The document sets out the *criteria* on which the conference should be based, stating that the CSCM will adopt a global, progressive approach.

(a) It will be *global* in its area, membership and content:

- (i) geographically, the CSCM will cover the Mediterranean region in the widest meaning of the word, including the Middle East and the Gulf;
- (ii) the CSCM will be open to all countries in the region and to countries having interests there;
- (iii) the CSCM will deal with all matters relating to co-operation and stability in the region in accordance with a system of balance and compensation.

(b) It will be *progressive* from the point of view of choice of subjects and the dynamism of the process, which is extendable. The CSCM will tackle these subjects bearing in mind their degree of maturity and will progress by stages, opening new channels of agreement as and when results are obtained.

40. Countries in the region and those with interests there will be invited to take part. The CSCM has political prospects which go beyond the purely geographical side. It will therefore take account of the need to include all countries that might help to ensure co-operation and stability in the region. Consequently, all countries in the Mediterranean basin, Middle East and Gulf region will be invited to take part, plus the European Community and its member countries, the United States and the Soviet Union. Palestinians will be represented in an appropriate manner.

41. The proposal by the four powers underlies the idea that the practice of democracy and respect for human rights are essential conditions for the stability and development of societies and the efficiency of the public authorities. Stability, development and efficiency are obviously compulsory factors in the organisation and maintenance of peace, which means that the three baskets grouping the aims of the CSCM are closely interdependent.

42. The baskets will be defined as follows:

(a) The aim of the *security basket* is to build a stable order in the region. This aim will be attained by tackling the underlying causes of insecurity and at the same time placing limits on the most destabilising effects of military compe-

tion. The underlying causes of instability are mainly economic, social and political. The proliferation of arms of mass destruction has a particularly destabilising effect.

To ensure stability in the region, priority should first be given to the geographical dimension of the problem, especially in South-South relations. As a start a number of preliminary, voluntary confidence-building measures should be taken (Mediterranean confidence-building measures) as well as political measures aimed at controlling the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

(b) The *co-operation* basket is essential if the CSCM is to attain its aims. Its fundamental purpose is to promote co-development, necessary for tackling economic and demographic imbalances in the region. Without replacing other bi- or multilateral bodies, this basket will aim to achieve a synthesis of all forms of co-operation, establish economic and financial solidarity, develop existing instruments, above all in the framework of the EEC's Mediterranean policy, strengthen the process of regional integration and respond to the expectations of the peoples.

(c) The *human dimension* basket will aim to bring the peoples of the region closer together. Such an aim would be pursued in a two-fold direction: first, the establishment of a framework of coexistence through dialogue, tolerance and understanding between societies, civilisations and creeds and, second, the definition of a common approach to human rights, both in theory and in practice.

43. The *time-table* for this programme will take account of the ambitious, complex nature of a CSCM initiative. Its preliminary stage would be informal and should go as far as possible. The formal stage, which would be opened by the meeting of a preparatory committee, would start as soon as there was a sufficient consensus. At the same time, prospects that the CSCM might offer for the future of the region would be stressed in an appropriate manner.

44. A *Mediterranean* platform would be based on the idea that the Mediterranean region is an area of great diversity. In order to establish an initial common denominator and ensure a sufficient degree of convergence, all countries wishing to join the CSCM would be invited to form part of the process by first subscribing to a series of fundamental principles, or "Mediterranean platform", as an expression of their determination and commitment.

45. These principles would include:

- (i) territorial integrity, the inviolability of frontiers, renunciation of the use of force and peaceful settlement of disputes;

- (ii) co-development and economic and financial solidarity;
- (iii) tolerance, coexistence and mutual understanding between civilisations.

46. This proposal obviously takes account of what has been acquired in the CSCE and the specifically Mediterranean dimensions. Its implementation is clearly aimed at establishing a new Mediterranean order based on the same principles as the order created in Europe by the CSCE, but it does not overlook the special difficulties stemming from many differences over frontiers, non-recognition of Israel by many Arab countries and the refusal of a large section of Islamic society to accept western, rationalist concepts of human rights. It is particularly vague on this last point. The effort the countries on the southern shore of the Mediterranean will be required to make in order to accept the principles on which the new Mediterranean order might be based will be far greater than the one required of the countries on the northern shore, especially as the latter have already subscribed to such principles under the 1975 Helsinki final act and the 1990 Paris Charter. Coherent, prolonged diplomatic action will certainly have to be taken to rally the support of those in the south.

47. The West is not without arguments to encourage this. On the one hand, it provides a number of guarantees for migrant workers moving from the southern to the northern shore. Again, and above all, the proposed economic co-operation will operate mainly in favour of the southern countries. This is already well under way, particularly in the framework of the European Community and its Mediterranean policy. For instance, in February 1991, the Twelve agreed to renew for the third time the financial protocols governing their relations with eight countries on the southern shore for the period 1st November 1991 to 31st October 1996. They accepted the Commission's proposals by increasing substantially the subsidies and loans to these countries in the previous five-year period and by making available under the Mediterranean policy for this new period a total of 4 405 million ecus of subsidies and loans by the European Investment Bank to Egypt, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Syria, Jordan, Israel and Lebanon, in the order of the size of the sums granted. This was an important gesture because of its magnitude for the benefit of the most densely-populated countries which are the least privileged by their natural resources and this illustrates the importance the European Community attaches to the Mediterranean dimension of its policy. It is in addition to bilateral action by certain states, whether or not members of the Community, and in particular the United States, which grants considerable assistance to certain countries in the region such as Egypt, which receives \$2 300 million each year.

Moreover, on the occasion of the Gulf crisis, President Bush proposed to Congress that Egypt's military debt (believed to be about \$7 000 million) to the United States be cancelled. The European Community for its part has undertaken to give \$1 500 million to Egypt, Jordan and Turkey to compensate for losses due to the Gulf crisis, this sum being shared between the Community budget and contributions from member states, not forgetting emergency food assistance to certain countries such as Egypt, the occupied territories, Sudan or countries directly affected by the Gulf war and its sequels. Furthermore, several European countries have granted unilateral assistance to these countries, in particular by writing off all or part of their debts. For instance, this is what Spain has done for Egypt.

48. All these measures show clearly that, with the CSCM proposal, the purpose is not for Western Europe to embark upon a new policy but to give greater coherence to a policy that is already under way by trying, in exchange for increased economic co-operation with the southern Mediterranean countries, to improve the application of the principles on which the evolution of states towards democracy and the organisation of a more stable peace might be based to the greater benefit of the peoples in the region.

49. Nevertheless, the traumatism caused in many Arab countries by the Gulf crisis and its sequels will not make it easy for those countries to embark upon preparations for such a conference. They will be able to do so only progressively insofar as their national problems are solved, moreover, and particularly the question of the fate of the Palestinians. The success of the CSCM, whose aim would not be to solve current conflicts but far more to ward off recourse to force and establish a new peaceful order for the long term, therefore very largely depends on solutions being found to outstanding questions, particularly those stemming from the war with Iraq.

50. Clearly, WEU's own rôle in the establishment of the CSCM arrangements relates mainly to the first basket, security, but its rôle will be crucial here because WEU is the instrument by which Europe can define joint positions:

- (a) on the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, particularly chemical weapons, which form a large part of the military arsenal of several countries in the region. It should be recalled that in Recommendation 475 the Assembly had already called for a freeze on chemical weapons in the Middle East;
- (b) on supplies of conventional weapons. Several proposals have been made to



the European Council for regulating the sale of arms to the region, particularly at its meeting on 8th April 1991. The Twelve or the Nine can obviously not on their own pass legislation on the arms trade with countries in the region. The proposal adopted by the Twelve to ask the United Nations to open a register to record the declarations of member countries regarding their arms sales would introduce, if followed up, slightly more openness into the arms trade, but would not be enough to solve the problem. It would also be difficult to accept an agreement solely between arms-exporting countries fixing the level of armaments authorised for the other countries. The aim of the CSCM in this area should be to seek agreement between exporting and importing countries to fix ceilings on armaments for each country in the region, thus making it possible to limit sales of arms in accordance with such ceilings;

- (c) on the verification of agreements limiting arms of all kinds;
- (d) on confidence-building measures, including the announcement of military manœuvres and the access of observers to such manœuvres. Although according to the four-country proposal these measures should remain voluntary, it would be useful for the WEU countries to study them together so as to agree on concrete proposals to be addressed to countries taking part in the conference.

51. At the plan's present preliminary stage, WEU can only make preparatory studies of these four points. However, the Council's Mediterranean Sub-Group provides a framework in which such studies might and should be started. There is every reason to fear that the scanty information the Council gives the Assembly on the work of this sub-group conceals the slim volume of its work. Your Rapporteur therefore proposes that the sub-group be set the task of preparing everything relating to the first basket of the CSCM, which seems to conform with what has already been started, judging by Chapter VII of the annual report of the Council on its activities in 1990.

#### *IV. The sequels of the Gulf war*

52. There was a real concert of indignation in the media at Europe's absence from the operations carried out against Iraq as from 2nd August 1990. This view seems singularly partial if the crisis is considered as a whole: from the

very outset, political co-operation defined a European policy based on respect for Security Council decisions and participation in implementing them and on reliance on the Arab countries to settle the conflict. WEU for its part co-ordinated naval action by member countries in the Gulf, which allowed several countries, which would not, on their own, have had the essential means of logistic support, to take part in the operations. This action was most important in the question of enforcing the embargo, since about two-thirds of the controls effected were carried out by ships from WEU countries. The embargo had the effects that might have been expected: it was intended to show that the international community was not prepared to tolerate the annexation of Kuwait and to convince Saddam Hussein that he should adopt a more reasonable attitude. He could not be forced to capitulate very quickly by this means alone.

53. The political commitment of Europe, or of European countries, was, from the outset, complementary to that of the Americans. Admittedly, it did not have enough forces capable of intervening a long way from Europe to be able to balance American strength. Finally, the United Kingdom and France made a major contribution. The participation of three other WEU countries in air operations, naval action to enforce the embargo and the logistic support afforded by Spain showed that, even if it might have been thought desirable for Europe to play a larger rôle, it was not absent during the crisis. Its rôle was neither insignificant nor ridiculous as has too often been claimed. It was certainly a secondary one and we must draw the political consequences.

54. When the operations came to an end, the situation changed again. The naval blockade was continued, helping to keep pressure on the Iraqi Government, compelling it to accept most of the conditions for a return to peace set out in Security Council Resolution 687 of 3rd April 1991. Above all, however, twelve-power political co-operation reacted strongly to the Iraqi Government's repression of the Kurds before the United States Government, and member countries played a major rôle, first in the adoption of Resolution 688 on 8th April which, for the first time, condemned a country for a policy of repression pursued within its own frontiers and, second, in the steps taken to contain the Iraqi army's repressive operations in Kurdish territory. The same day, the European Council voted in favour of setting up a safe haven for the Kurds on Iraqi territory under United Nations control. Action was then taken on this initiative.

55. This is the context in which three WEU meetings should be set: that of the Ministers, held in Luxembourg on 8th April on the occasion of the meeting of the European Council

at the level of heads of state or of government, that of an ad hoc group in Paris on 9th April and that of the chiefs of defence staff on 10th April. The latter had been planned some time before but its agenda was considerably modified to take account of the new questions that had arisen. The first two meetings were decided at very short notice, at the request of the French Chairmanship-in-Office.

56. The latter doubtless had a twofold aim: to solve an immediate problem, i.e how to bring assistance to the Kurdish refugees, and to show in practice how WEU could operate in the framework of the European Council in accordance with several proposals presented at the twelve-power intergovernmental conference. It was in fact in the framework of the European Council of heads of state or of government of the Twelve that the political decision was taken to come to the help of the Kurds. It is the Community that was instructed to organise the necessary funds and goods. The WEU Council was set the task of co-ordinating the logistic aspects because they implied the use of military aircraft. It is to be regretted, however, that the concern of certain countries to organise their participation in affording humanitarian assistance to the Kurds under their national flag limited the practical impact of these initiatives.

57. Another aspect of co-operation between WEU and the European Council was the invitation to Denmark, Greece and Ireland to attend the WEU ministerial meeting as observers. Turkey was also invited to send its ambassador as an observer. Denmark, Greece and Turkey have apparently accepted the invitation. Ireland was reported to have turned it down but, since the nature of the task did not jeopardise its neutrality, it is believed to have decided to take part in implementing the decisions, which would be the first time this country has taken part in a WEU activity.

58. No information has been released about the meeting of the ad hoc group but the chiefs of defence staff of the WEU member states issued a communiqué at the close of their meeting on 10th April in which they specified that: "On that occasion, the chiefs of defence staff also held the necessary preliminary consultations on the military aspects of the WEU countries' contributions to the implementation of Security Council Resolutions 687 and 688." In other words, like the Ministers on the 8th, they discussed not only assistance to the Kurds but also the conditions for restoring peace with Iraq.

59. The communiqué also says "the meeting allowed the chiefs of defence staff to hold an informal exchange of views on the development of European military co-operation, particularly in the light of lessons learned from the Iraqi conflict", which was their initial task, and gave the following detail: "The Secretary-General of

WEU, Mr. Willem van Eekelen, also took part in the meeting" whereas, as far as your Rapporteur knows, he did not attend the ministerial meeting.

60. All this information suggests that, together with twelve-power political co-operation, the WEU Council is now directly involved in Middle East affairs, at least where the immediate consequences of the conflict with Iraq are concerned, and that it will be involved in other aspects of regional matters as soon as the question arises of the intervention of armed forces of member countries, which may be the case for settling several of these matters.

61. The end of the war between the coalition and Iraq was the subject of Security Council Resolution 687, adopted on 3rd April 1991 by 11 votes to 1 (Cuba) and 2 abstentions (Equador and Yemen). The main points may be summed up as follows:

- (a) the frontiers fixed in the Iraqi-Kuwaiti agreement of 4th October 1963 will be re-established, marked out with the assistance of the United Nations Secretary-General and declared inviolable, and a demilitarised zone will be established on each side of these frontiers under the control of a group of United Nations observers before the withdrawal of coalition forces from Iraqi territory;
- (b) all chemical and biological weapons and all ballistic missiles with a range of more than 150 km held by Iraq will be declared, verified by the United Nations and destroyed within forty-five days. Iraq will undertake to produce no more such weapons. The application of the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons of 1st July 1968 will, in the same way, be reaffirmed and verified by the International Atomic Energy Agency. Paragraph 14 adds "that the actions to be taken by Iraq ... represent steps towards the goal of establishing in the Middle East a zone free from weapons of mass destruction and all missiles for their delivery and the objective of a global ban on chemical weapons", thus linking the end of the conflict with Iraq with the planned organisation of a new order of peace and security in the Middle East, as provided for in the proposed CSCM;
- (c) all Kuwaiti property seized by Iraq will be returned and Iraq will be "liable ... for any direct loss, damage, including environmental damage and the depletion of natural resources"

that occurred during the conflict. Moreover, the Security Council "demands that Iraq adhere scrupulously to all of its obligations concerning servicing and repayment of its foreign debt". Under the supervision of the United Nations Secretary-General, a fund will be established within thirty days to pay compensation to victims of the Iraqi aggression. One may wonder whether Iraq will be able to meet such commitments, even if a percentage of its oil profits are levied at the source:

- (d) all the measures of the embargo on basic products or goods supplied to Iraq will cease immediately in the case of foodstuffs and essential goods. The list of products still under embargo will be revised every two months. These measures will be lifted as soon as the Security Council notes Iraq's effective application of the preceding provisions;
- (e) the sale to Iraq of arms, equipment or technology that might be used to produce them, and the sending of staff who might help in the production of arms will still be prohibited, even if provided for under earlier agreements, and this without any financial or other compensation. This decision may be revised within three months only in the case of conventional weapons;
- (f) Iraq will co-operate with the International Committee of the Red Cross for the repatriation of foreign citizens who were in Iraq on 2nd August 1990;
- (g) Iraq will undertake not to resort to terrorism and will forbid its territory to any terrorist organisation;
- (h) the cease-fire will come into force as soon as Iraq has subscribed to these commitments;
- (i) the Security Council "decides to remain seized of the matter and to take such further steps as may be required for the implementation of the present resolution and to secure peace and security in the area".

62. Resolution 688, adopted on 7th April, condemns the methods used by Iraq to repress the internal rebellions that followed the return to peace and provides for humanitarian aid to the Kurdish refugees on Iraqi territory. This decision takes account of the ban notified by General Schwarzkopf, Commander-in-Chief of coalition forces, to the Iraqi authorities concerning flights by military aircraft and attacks

on coalition aircraft carrying out this humanitarian operation but does not take account of Iraq's opposition to any further foreign intervention on its territory. In fact, Iraq seems to have resigned itself to allowing the application of measures that it could not seriously oppose.

63. Thus, Resolution 687 launches action that already goes further than the conflict between Iraq and Kuwait since it refers to the creation in the Middle East of a zone free of weapons of mass destruction. Furthermore, to show their coherent approach, the allies have undertaken, during the period of tension, to try to call a general conference on solving Middle East problems with a view to settling them on the basis of United Nations resolutions. In fact, it seems doubtful whether such a conference can be held at all soon and American diplomacy is trying rather to settle each of the outstanding questions separately. In any event, it may be considered positive that this diplomatic approach is showing particular determination in trying to induce Israel to negotiate on the future of the occupied territories.

64. It is essential for Europe to be present when an attempt is made to settle these various questions because this is a region where it has considerable interests and, above all, because its participation is keenly desired by several of the countries directly concerned. The Presidential Committee received confirmation of this from the highest Egyptian authorities during its visit to Cairo on 29th and 30th April.

65. The most important of these questions is a settlement of relations between Israel and its neighbours on the one hand and the Palestinians on the other. Following approaches by the United States Government, the Israeli Government seems to have accepted the idea of separate negotiations with each of its neighbours. However, it is not yet clear on what bases such an agreement might be concluded in respect of four essential matters:

- (i) the Golan Heights, annexed unilaterally by Israel;
- (ii) Jerusalem, the eastern part of which was also annexed by Israel;
- (iii) the fringe of Lebanese territory occupied by Israel for security-related reasons;
- (iv) relations between the West Bank and Jordan, linked with the even more delicate question of the status of the West Bank.

66. The opening of negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians, the principle of which Israel now seems to accept, runs into particular difficulties:

- (i) With whom Israel would agree to negotiate, since it refuses to negotiate with the PLO?

The United States authorities believe the latter has the disadvantage of having backed Saddam Hussein during the conflict. It nevertheless enjoys the support of a large, but impossible to measure, proportion of the Palestinians, which makes it impossible to leave it right out of the negotiations. The Shamir plan presented by Israel calls for the negotiators to be appointed in elections in which Palestinians still living in the occupied territories would take part, but not those living in East Jerusalem, considered to have been annexed by Israel, and those who have been expelled by the Israeli authorities. This limitation of the electorate, which pre-judges the result of a future negotiation and excludes many people because of their political activities, would seem to be difficult for the Palestinians to accept.

(ii) The future status of Arab Palestine and the nature of its relationship with Israel on the one hand and Jordan on the other since Israel considers it essential for the negotiations to be held on the basis of prior agreement leaving it at least military control over the West Bank.

(iii) Jewish settlements in the West Bank and Golan Heights which are continuing in spite of warnings from the international community and in particular Europe and the United States.

67. It should be noted that Europe has not adopted identical positions to those of the United States on these various matters but, not having the necessary means of its own to give a credible guarantee of Israel's security, it carries far less weight than the United States since the latter forced Iraq to evacuate Kuwait. Nevertheless, there is no doubt that, if Europe insisted on using WEU to act in the East, it was to show that its action was not to be confused with that of the United States. Unlike the latter, the Twelve did not terminate their recognition of the PLO as being representative or the assistance they granted Jordan in retaliation to the accommodating attitude of that organisation and that state towards Iraq during the crisis. However, the idea that "no solution must be excluded, including the creation of a Palestinian state", contained in the text handed to journalists at the close of the European Council meeting on 8th April was eliminated from the final text distributed on the 9th, which indicates that there is, to say the least, some hesitation among the Twelve.

68. At its meeting on 8th April 1991, the European Council, while paying tribute to efforts made by the United States and hoping it would be successful, called on "the foreign ministers to pursue their consultations with all the parties directly concerned in the region and other interested states, particularly the United States and the USSR, in order to contribute to the definition" of the principles on which peace might be restored by means of "one or several

peace conferences, under an impartial aegis, to provide assurances and the necessary guarantees from the international community. As an important actor in the Mediterranean, the European Community should also be associated with this process". This means that it must be prepared to play an active part in guaranteeing possible peace agreements, with the military consequences this may imply.

69. The European Council also reaffirmed its support for the implementation, for Lebanon, of the Taif Agreement which allows free elections to be organised quickly, a start to be made with rebuilding the country, the withdrawal of all foreign forces and an end to Syria's expansionist designs in this direction. Where Cyprus is concerned, it supported efforts by the United Nations Secretary-General to enable Cyprus to recover its unity and sovereignty, trusting that these efforts, with the support of a resumed dialogue between the two parties, would soon come to a successful conclusion<sup>2</sup>.

70. However, on 8th April the European Council went further in regard to the re-establishment of security in the Middle East. Recognising that it was first for the states in the region to decide their own security arrangements, it announced its support for the eight Arab countries in the coalition to create a first security nucleus, but recommended that they extend this circle to other states in the region and announced that certain member states of the Community were prepared to take part in security undertakings if the states in the region so wished – this is likely to involve WEU.

71. Above all, the European Council agreed measures to stop the arms race in the region and to this end:

- (i) to strive with determination to strengthen systems for the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and first and foremost chemical weapons;
- (ii) to promote the prevention of the build-up of conventional weapons while bearing in mind the legitimate and reasonable defence needs of countries in the region;
- (iii) to ask the ministers for foreign affairs to make proposals with a view to a multilateral dialogue on this subject and to specify the Twelve's own contribution to non-proliferation systems;
- (iv) to propose using experience acquired by the Twelve in the framework of the

2. The last phrase, which was included in the text released at the press conference of the Chairman-in-Office of the European Council, Mr. Jacques Santer, on 8th April, was eliminated from the final text published on the 9th.

CSCE to establish confidence-building measures and openness in military activities such as:

- the creation of a conflict prevention centre;
  - the establishment of a communications network;
  - notification of certain military activities;
- (v) to introduce a system of openness in the sale of arms by supporting, in New York, the working group set up by the United Nations to establish a United Nations arms register. Such openness is clearly aimed at reducing and limiting the sale of arms and one may wonder if it does not run counter to the policy of large sales of arms, which the United States has just started, to a number of Middle East countries, particularly Saudi Arabia, since the return to peace in the Gulf. According to information in the press, the figure for a first series of contracts is worth \$33 000 million. Such a policy would seriously compromise European proposals to establish a new order of peace in the Mediterranean and hence in the world. These proposals do not seem to be attracting much attention in the United States Government.

72. It will be noted that the application of such measures in such a sensitive region as the Middle East would be an important step towards establishing this order which is necessary if a conference on security and co-operation in the Mediterranean is to meet to any useful purpose. It also implies co-ordinating member countries' military action in many sectors that cannot yet be clearly defined because the prior agreement of the countries in the region is essential but which only WEU can ensure by associating non-member countries if necessary, as it did for the application of Security Council resolutions against Iraq during the crisis and in favour of the Kurdish refugees in April.

### *V. Conclusions*

73. The crisis throughout the Middle East since summer 1990 quite obviously disturbed to some extent relations between the countries north and south of the Mediterranean. If Europe does not take the necessary steps to lay new foundations for peace and security throughout the Mediterranean area, it is liable to start a period of instability and tension on a fearful scale.

74. However, the coalition victory over Iraq created a new situation which, with strong chances of success, allows the initiative to be taken, if not for a global settlement, at least for negotiations allowing a solution to be found to most of the problems that have disturbed peace in the Mediterranean in recent decades. Faced with Iraq's aggression against Kuwait, the international community showed that it was prepared to act to restore order in accordance with law and with the support of the United Nations. Europe can and must be in a position to give its guarantee to the agreements it has signed. Moreover, in view of the rôle it played in the crisis, it can play an important part in the negotiations that are starting because it has had connections with the countries south of the Mediterranean for centuries and is more aware of some aspects of their problems. Many countries to the south therefore wish it to intervene. It will no doubt have to play an active part in establishing a new order, inter alia, if the countries directly concerned so wish, by deploying armed forces in the region to guarantee frontiers and keep the peace.

75. Furthermore, the proposal to organise a conference on peace and security in the Mediterranean must take advantage of these circumstances and the settlement of the conflict makes it urgent to take steps to restore mutual confidence, develop exchanges and co-operation and set peace on new bases. European diplomacy must move on from the stage of restoring peace to that of preparing for a new collective security system in accordance with the plan of which the European Council sketched the broad lines on 8th April 1991.

76. Finally, for Europe itself the Gulf crisis accelerated and stimulated thinking that had been only too slow about the organisation of the security of twelve-power Europe. There was indeed quite remarkable coherence between the work started after the Rome summit meeting in December 1990 by the intergovernmental conference on political co-operation and the action taken by European political co-operation, on the one hand, and that of the WEU Council, on the other. The respective rôles of the European Council, political co-operation and WEU emerged from actual facts before being defined by the intergovernmental conference. WEU was clearly seen to be the flexible instrument for European security co-operation, capable of bringing in non-member countries to handle specific questions and co-ordinating the action of European countries which had decided to intervene to follow up European Council decisions either, by a naval deployment, to enforce the Security Council's embargo decision or to examine the military aspects of restoring peace with Iraq or to organise the military logistics for humanitarian aid to the Kurdish refugees.

77. Everything about WEU's rôle is not yet clear and, in particular, the question raised by its links with the institutions of the Twelve has not yet been answered clearly. The participation of the WEU secretariat in intergovernmental

activities is still insufficient. However, there is no doubt that, in this matter, WEU has better than ever asserted itself as the Western European military organisation at the service of the policy of the Twelve.



