Assembly of Western European Union

FORTY-THIRD SESSION

WEU’s operational role

REPORT

submitted on behalf of the Defence Committee
by Mr Urbain, Rapporteur
W.E.U.'s operational role

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1 Adopted unanimously by the Committee.

2 Members of the Committee: Mr De Decker (Chairman), MM Schloten, Marten (Vice-Chairmen); MM Alloncle, Baumel, Beaufays, Mrs beer, MM Briane, Cion, Cox (Alternate: Thompson), MM Dees, Díaz de Mera, Giannattasio, Horn, Jacquat, Legendre, Mrs Lentz-Cornette, MM Magginas, Mardones Sevilla (Alternate: Bolinaga), Mr Marshall (Alternate: Hardy), MM Medeiros Ferreira, Micheloyiannis, Mota Amaral, Lord Newall, MM Onaindia, Pereira Coelho, Polenta, Robles Fraga (Alternate: Lopez Henares), Mr Selva (Alternate: Ragno), Sir Dudley Smith, Mrs Soutendijk van Appeldoorn, Sir Keith Speed, MM Speroni, Valk, Valkemers (Alternate: Van der Maelen), Mr Verivakis (Alternate: Vrettos). Mr Zierer.

Associate members: MM Kukahli, Sungur, Yurtür.

N.B. The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.
Draft Recommendation

on WEU’s operational role

The Assembly,

(i) Welcoming the continuing efforts of the Council to further develop and reinforce WEU’s operational capability and effectiveness;

(ii) Aware that with the completion of the WEU Crisis 95-96 exercise, all three levels of WEU’s crisis-management doctrine have now been tested in a combined crisis-management, command-post and live exercise.

(iii) Assuming that WEU will take due account without delay of the consequences of the main lessons learnt from the exercise;

(iv) Welcoming the fact that in implementing the decisions taken by the Council in Birmingham and Ostend, the Planning Cell has now developed a coherent and progressive five-year WEU exercise programme which is designed to improve WEU’s ability to perform Petersberg tasks and which also includes exercises for WEU-led operations using CJTF;

(v) Welcoming the progress made in both NATO and WEU in implementing the CJTF concept.

(vi) Satisfied with the quantitative and qualitative improvement in working relations between NATO and WEU, which is essential for the rapid development of a European security and defence identity (ESDI) within NATO, as decided in June 1996.

(vii) Regretting that the reform of NATO’s command structure, a vital element in the development of an ESDI and therefore a precondition for further implementation of the CJTF concept, has not yet been completed;

(viii) Emphasising that a number of European countries consider that in due course – depending on future United States and European contributions to the southern region – the situation will be such that assigning the AFSOUTH command to a European will be a natural development;

(ix) Noting that the Council has only replied in part to Assembly Recommendation 597 on a European intelligence policy,

(x) Stressing again the vital importance of WEU intelligence on which the Council must rely when assuming responsibility for deploying FAVEU in any operation it may decide to conduct,

(xi) Considering that more flexibility is needed in the mandates of the Planning Cell and the Intelligence Section in order to enable the latter to provide assessments on potential regional crises or conflicts which may not have fully been brought to the attention of the Council and therefore may not have led to a formal Council request for them to be monitored and assessed;

(xii) Disappointed that no consensus could be found in WEU to do more in the field of humanitarian action in the crisis in the Great Lakes region, for which it would have had both the capabilities and the equipment available if the WEU countries had had the necessary courage and political will;

(xiii) Looking forward to fresh initiatives for establishing cooperation between WEU and the Organisation for African Unity (OAU) on possible support for peacekeeping operations in Africa conducted by the latter organisation;

(xiv) Regretting that WEU as such is not involved in any way in the 6 000-strong multinational force consisting solely of units from WEU countries and which is implementing a Petersberg-type humanitarian mission in Albania;
(xv) Noting that the alternative of deploying a multinational advisory police element, as decided by the Council, could suggest that WEU is a police organisation, whereas this activity is by no means WEU’s main area of responsibility,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Ask each WEU member state to second a correspondent from its national intelligence system to the Planning Cell in order to improve its capabilities in making up-to-date assessments and analyses of the situation in potential Petersberg-task theatres of operation;

2. Allow the Intelligence Section, without having been so instructed, to monitor regions where crises or conflicts may be developing and provide the relevant assessments so that an early warning in such cases may provide the precious time needed for swift action to prevent crises deteriorating,

3. Take fresh initiatives for establishing cooperation between WEU and the Organisation for African Unity (OAU) on possible support for peacekeeping operations in Africa conducted by the latter organisation,

4. Avoid creating the impression that WEU’s role is confined to the deployment of police missions;

5. Ensure that WEU plays its natural role in Petersberg-type missions with clearly specified tasks and rules of engagement rather than leaving all military operations to coalitions of the willing among the WEU countries, without the Organisation as such being involved;

6. Pay particular attention to the need for the Parliamentary Assembly to be kept fully informed of all its decisions and follow-up developments as well as of any provisions made for the dispatch of personnel to areas of crisis.
I. Introduction

1. Whenever the possibility of WEU operations have been mentioned in security discussions or crisis situations, critics have tended to fob it off with the dreary commonplace that WEU has no military forces and no operational capabilities.

2. France’s President struck the right note when, addressing an audience in June 1996, he said it was necessary to “put an end to what is seen in the world as Europe’s current incapacity to take on politico-military action of any scale under its own responsibility” and, as a consequence, Europe should endeavour to achieve “a better division of responsibilities between the United States and Europe”\(^1\).

3. In fact, for those Europeans who are prepared to listen to their transatlantic allies, the United States is sending out unambiguous signals regarding Europe’s obligation to assume more responsibility for its security and defence.

4. The US Permanent Representative to NATO declared in July 1996\(^2\) that the development of a European security and defence identity was not up to NATO alone and that WEU itself also had to be ready, willing and able to act because the United States could not be more committed to WEU than its member states.

5. In recent years, the WEU member states, conscious of such comments on both sides of the Atlantic, have made serious efforts to overcome these shortcomings.

6. A report by Mr Dieter Schloten\(^3\) described the state of affairs regarding WEU’s operational capabilities in early 1996. Since then, both the Belgian and French presidencies of WEU have made considerable efforts to further develop and reinforce these capabilities.

7. When addressing members of the WEU Assembly on 3 December 1996, the French Foreign Minister, Hervé de Charette, emphasised that:

“WEU is essential for turning Europe into a power that is capable of playing a full part within the new strategic context. WEU must genuinely become the European pillar of the Alliance and the defence component of the Union. This means that WEU occupies a pivotal position between the Alliance and the Union, it has to derive its full operational dimension from the former and its political legitimacy as the military branch of the European Union from the latter.”

8. In this perspective, one of the priorities of the French Presidency of WEU during the first half of 1997 has been to develop WEU’s operational capabilities.

9. In January 1997, the WEU Politico-Military Group was asked to study the notion of “pilot-nation” during operations for which WEU will not have recourse to NATO assets. The basic principle should be that in such cases WEU would base its actions on the capabilities of one or more member states prepared to make an extra effort in such an operation. The Politico-Military Group was also asked to examine the legal aspects of the joint use of multinational forces and to define a new mandate for the WEU Planning Cell.

10. The French Presidency also intended to work out a definition of a WEU policy for military exercises, in particular a timeframe which should cover both autonomous WEU exercises such as Crisex as well as those conducted together with NATO.

11. Decisions would be taken in order to adopt an “employment concept” for the Torrejón Satellite Centre which would transform it into an

\(^{1}\) Address to the Institut des hautes études de défense nationale on 8 June 1996.

\(^{2}\) Atlantic News, 26 July 1996.

\(^{3}\) Document 1518, The operational organisation of WEU – reply to the forty-first annual report of the Council, report submitted on behalf of the Defence Committee by Mr Schloten, Rapporteur.
operational strategic monitoring tool for the benefit of WEU. Recommendations would be made to the WEU Secretary-General on the operation of WEU headquarters in a crisis and, finally, a paper was to be presented on the harmonisation of crisis-management procedures.

12. The purpose of the present report is to give an account of the latest developments in WEU’s operational capabilities, including those in the wider framework of cooperation with NATO, which is being restructured to face new realities, one of which is the development of a European security and defence identity within that organisation.

II. WEU exercise policy

13. In order to prepare WEU for the implementation of Petersberg missions, early efforts concentrated on the exercise “WEU Crisex 95-96” which was designed to test WEU’s crisis-management instruments from the planning of a WEU operation through to its implementation in a specific crisis area. WEU implemented this exercise in three phases. The general framework for the exercise was a peacekeeping operation in accordance with Chapter VI of the United Nations Charter.

14. It should be noted that Crisex did not include any element of the CJTF concept which was only in the early stages of negotiation by the time planning for Crisex had been completed.

15. Phase I, which took place from 15 to 21 December 1995, concerned decision-making and procedural mechanisms within WEU and between WEU headquarters and the capitals. One of the lessons learnt from this exercise was that WEU communications were inadequate for crisis management and that there were shortcomings on the logistics side. As a result, a new communications network between WEU headquarters and the capitals is now gradually being established.

16. Phase II, which took place in June 1996, tested cooperation between WEU decision-making bodies, capitals and an operational headquarters in France. It included the creation of an operational staff headquarters and the deployment of a peacekeeping force to ensure a secure environment for the delivery of humanitarian aid to a fictitious country.

17. In December 1996, Phase III tested cooperation between operational headquarters and field headquarters. It focused WEU’s missions on strategic and operational levels and in particular on WEU forces projection. The objective was to implement operational mechanisms during management of a simulated crisis. This last phase of Crisex 95–96 took place from 12 to 17 December 1996. It comprised the establishment of a multinational headquarters for the participating forces and the deployment of an advanced element in Lanzarote (Canary Islands) which was the theatre of operations. The deployment of this advanced element by means of a genuine multinational airlift was planned by the newly-created WEU mobility working group under the chairmanship of a member of the Planning Cell.

18. The hard core of the headquarters was composed of elements from the five countries participating in the European Corps, while elements from the other five full WEU member states were also incorporated. Countries that are not full members of WEU participated as observers.

19. Phase III of Crisex saw the establishment for the first time of a secure video-conference link between WEU headquarters in Brussels and the operations commander and his headquarters.

20. Meanwhile, as mentioned in the Schloten report, it had increasingly been felt that these new Petersberg tasks should be practised using different formations in field exercises.

21. Under the United Kingdom’s Presidency in the first half of 1996, serious work was done to create the basis for an exercise programme tailored to WEU requirements. As a result, the WEU Council of Ministers said in its Birmingham Declaration of 7 May 1996 that an agreement had been reached on measures to implement WEU exercise policy more effectively, including the establishment of an annual WEU exercise planning conference which would set out a coherent and progressive exercise programme.

22. In the same Declaration, Ministers welcomed the decisions of the United Kingdom Government to make its operational sea training facilities available to WEU for national or collective use by WEU nations. Ministers noted that shared use of these types of facilities could improve military cooperation among WEU
nations and invited other WEU nations to make similar offers, taking into account the work on multinational task-sharing”.

23. They asked the Permanent Council “to consider how to extend the initiative of operational sea training so that WEU can make optimum use of similar offers in a wider range of military facilities”.

24. During the Belgian Presidency, efforts continued to establish a coordinated WEU exercise programme and in their Ostend Declaration of 19 November 1996, Ministers “welcomed the offers and requests received from WEU nations relating to the wider use of national training facilities and capabilities, with a view to WEU deriving optimum benefit from these offers, taking into account Eurolongterm’s work on multinational task-sharing”. They noted that “this networking of WEU countries’ training assets will enable each participant, having due regard to specific national characteristics, to benefit from the ensuing synergies”. Encouraged by these responses, Ministers “asked the Permanent Council to ensure that a database of offers and requests is maintained”.

25. After the initial replies of WEU member states regarding both offers and requests, the Planning Cell issued a complementary list of questions for more detailed specification. The Planning Cell has now made a first full catalogue of offers and requests. This catalogue will be distributed annually, with a half-yearly update.

26. The Planning Cell has a coordinating role in that it will establish contacts between the country which has made a request and the country which has made a corresponding offer. The practical arrangements for the actual use will have to be agreed in bilateral negotiations.

27. Military training is seen to be a national responsibility. Each country will designate a national point of contact with responsibility for the national training facilities which have been offered to other WEU countries. This national point of contact will, on a bilateral basis, also handle requests for deployment and conditions for use.

28. The objective of current WEU exercise policy is to define policy for (a) training headquarters staff and the forces that could be made available to WEU and (b) putting into operation the procedures and entities envisaged for the decision-making process.

29. From the outset, it was decided that WEU exercises should be planned on the basis of exercises organised by member states.

30. The Planning Cell has now developed a coherent and progressive five-year exercise programme which is to be revised yearly. The word “progressive” is meant to indicate that each new exercise should take account of the lessons learnt from the preceding one.

31. It was agreed that a coherent exercise programme should

- contribute to the development of WEU’s global capacity to conduct Petersberg operations;
- exploit in the best possible way the limited resources and infrastructures allocated to exercises in WEU member states;
- improve operational interoperability between the forces;
- improve coordination between the exercise programmes of WEU and NATO, including those of the Partnership for Peace.

32. Only a five-year programme will enable WEU to avoid duplications and incompatibilities with multinational or NATO-PfP exercises and at the same time enable its member states to plan their participation.

33. It is thought that in the future, joint WEU/NATO exercises should take place, in particular to validate the various elements of the CJTF concept.

34. An annual WEU conference, chaired by the Planning Cell, will be devoted to exercise planning, which should also take place in close cooperation with NATO. Such conferences should in particular:

- define the operational objectives of the exercise programme;
- define and revise the WEU exercise programme which should enable it to attain those objectives;
- specify the resources which will be made available by the participating countries;
- define exactly the participation of countries in different exercises;
- define exactly WEU participation in exercises being proposed by countries or groups of countries in order to test certain capacities;
- prepare a substantial contribution for the NATO Exercise Conference.

35. In the framework of implementing WEU exercise policy, it was decided to extend the mandate of the Planning Cell and to ask it to:

- propose objectives for WEU exercises (which will have to be approved by the Planning Conference);
- organise the Planning Conference and provide it with support;
- coordinate WEU’s requirements with exercise programmes existing in individual countries, the multinational FAWEU and NATO;
- coordinate offers from the WEU countries to make resources available (in particular for logistics support and planning);
- coordinate offers concerning the participation of forces;
- submit to the Council for approval the results of the Planning Conference, once the countries have given their agreement, and in particular the objectives set for WEU exercises and the exercise programme;
- present WEU’s contribution to the NATO Exercise Conference.

36. It should be remembered that in the original terms of reference for the Planning Cell, the mandate given to the Operations and Exercises Section was to set forth and promote WEU exercise requirements and take responsibility for coordinating plans and timetables for multinational exercises, to enable the Organisation to deal with any crises.

37. The Planning Cell has now developed WEU exercise objectives and programmes for the period 1997-2001. The 1997-98 exercises have been firmly agreed, while the programme for 1999-2001 is still up for review. For the 1997-98 exercises it has defined the following objectives:

- test the WEU crisis-management documents, procedures and arrangements including the consultation mechanisms between WEU and the capitals;
- promote cooperation with observer and partner countries;
- cooperate with other multinational and supranational organisations;
- provide procedural training for WEU permanent bodies and WEU staffs;
- implement generic plans, develop contingency plans and draft a Directive to the Operations Commander,
- test the process of providing WEU with intelligence;
- provide inputs for the planning of future WEU exercises.

38. It should be emphasised, as noted in paragraph 31, that the troops, resources and infrastructures which WEU member states are allocating to exercises are limited. The WEU exercise programme is therefore rightly concentrated on those issues which are of particular interest for possible WEU operations. Crisis-like exercises and exercises to test the use of NATO assets in a WEU-led operation, together with the other objectives mentioned in paragraph 37, such as testing the process of providing WEU with intelligence must indeed be the priorities over the coming years.

39. The first WEU exercise conference in March 1997 was attended by all 28 WEU countries and the results were approved by the Permanent Council.

40. NATO is particularly involved in devising a programme to test command structures. The important activities in this programme will be:

- a joint crisis-management exercise in 1999 in which a first test will take place with WEU asking to be provided with NATO assets;
- a command post exercise with NATO in 2000 in which the concept of NATO making command structures available for a WEU-led operation will be tested.
41. Obviously, these exercises can only take place after the first CJTF headquarters trials in NATO, which are scheduled for 1997 and 1998

III. Combined joint task forces (CJTF) and the reform of NATO’s command structures

42. At the NATO summit meeting in Brussels on 10-11 January 1994, important decisions were taken as regards the adaptation of NATO’s military structures and procedures with a view to accommodating the enlarged spectrum of Alliance missions. This summit also endorsed the concept of combined joint task forces (CJTF) to make Allied assets available to Europeans for conducting military operations in which the United States did not participate.

43. Implementing these far-reaching decisions was shown to be no easy task, although all those concerned made the greatest possible efforts to provide early results.

44. A milestone was reached with the North Atlantic Council’s meeting in Berlin on 3 June 1996 which confirmed the 1994 decisions and took note of the progress made since January 1994. At this meeting it was also decided to develop the European security and defence identity within the Alliance.

45. It has been noted earlier that all the abovementioned decisions are hugely important for the development of WEU’s operational capabilities. A report prepared by Mr Marten for the December 1996 session of the Assembly4 gave a detailed account of the progress made in the implementation of these decisions up to November 1996. Since then, further steady progress has been made but apparently the reform of NATO’s command structures is the most difficult hurdle.

46. NATO has now developed a CJTF headquarters doctrine which includes the following features:

- a suitable ad hoc CJTF headquarters will be built up around a multinational, joint “nucleus” selected from a range of such permanently available “nuclei, embedded, mostly with dual-hatted per-

sonnel, in parent headquarters of the current, and future, military structure of the Alliance”;

- these nuclei will provide the core of the “key” staff functions of a CJTF headquarters and will be complemented by the required additional personnel and additional staff capabilities as needed; such “augmentation modules” will be drawn from other parent NATO headquarters, or from other appropriate multinational headquarters or national sources;

- a fully-fledged CJTF headquarters will furthermore require the addition of “support modules”, that is, specialised support units and elements of a various nature; they will be drawn from the same sources as the “augmentation modules”;

- each nucleus will be tasked with the preparation of its build-up. In addition, centralised CJTF headquarters planning will be conducted in a “Combined Joint Planning Staff” at the major NATO commander level. A “Capabilities Coordination Cell” will assist the Military Committee in providing planning guidance to the major NATO commanders and related advice to the North Atlantic Council.

47. Completed in this way, CJTF headquarters would then be able to take control of the units selected to make up the task force and to deploy them in the theatre of operations.5

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4. Document 1545, Defence and security in an enlarged Europe – reply to the annual report of the Council, report submitted on behalf of the Defence Committee by Mr Marten, Rapporteur

5. NATO’s CJTF headquarters doctrine as explained by Mr Marc Bentinck, Defence Planning and Policy Division, NATO, at the joint seminar held by the WEU Institute for Security Studies and the Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies on “CJTFs – a lifeline for a European defence policy”, Paris, 21-22 April 1997.
phase, the initial establishment of parent headquarters will allow the major NATO commanders to commence CJTF headquarters trials and exercises and thus create the basis for an initial Alliance capability that will deploy CJTF headquarters. The first CJTF headquarters trials are scheduled for late 1997 and early 1998. To that end, three initial headquarters nuclei have been set up: STRIKFLTLANT in Norfolk, Virginia, with the command ship USS “Mount Whitney” for sea-supported CJTF operations, and AFCENT in Brunssum and AFSOUTH in Naples for land-supported CJTF operations. The second phase will be devoted to a thorough assessment of the Alliance’s capability to deploy small- and large-scale land and sea-based CJTF headquarters. This assessment could, for instance, result in the designation of additional CJTF parent headquarters. The third and last phase should see the CJTF concept being fully implemented. By that time it will have to be adapted to the new NATO command structure. A

48. It has been noted that the Implementation Force (IFOR) and its successor Stabilisation Force (SFOR) in Bosnia and Herzegovina has many elements in common with a CJTF. Lessons learnt in the deployment of these forces will therefore play an important role in the further development of the CJTF concept. One element of NATO’s overall CJTF concept is to offer the possibility of WEU-led CJTF operations which in their turn are an expression of the development of an ESDI within the Alliance.

49. The development of an ESDI requires the elaboration of European command arrangements within NATO which will enable operations to be prepared, commanded and conducted under the political control and strategic direction of WEU. In this field, much work remains to be done on many specific and detailed questions, not least because – understandably – it is the view in NATO that the consequences of ESDI development should not endanger the transatlantic partnership or NATO’s integrated military structure.

50. At the moment, work in progress includes the following main issues:

- military planning and exercises for the illustrative missions identified by WEU

In August 1996, the WEU Planning Cell developed from its existing generic plans about twenty “illustrative profiles” with an evaluation in each as to whether NATO assets and capabilities might or might not be required. The Permanent Council then selected six profiles determining whether or not NATO assets and capabilities might be required and presented them to NATO for further consideration. Out of the six, NATO selected two which could be dubbed the most extensive and the most restricted profile – a division and a brigade-size operation respectively. The Planning Cell is now providing assistance to NATO’s Combined Joint Planning Staff for further detailed work on these profiles:

- terms of reference and method of appointment of Deputy SACEUR with a view to his ESDI role

At its meeting on 22 April 1997, NATO’s Military Committee approved the terms of reference for the responsibilities of the Deputy SACEUR in his ESDI role and the arrangements concerning the chain of command for a WEU-led operation with CJTF.

- NATO/WEU information-sharing arrangements for WEU-led operations

In this framework, it is recalled that on 6 May 1996 a security agreement was concluded between NATO and WEU which concentrates on the sharing of documents between both organisations and the reciprocal use of operational capabilities. In particular, the agreement includes procedures for protecting and safeguarding classified information and material exchanged by them.

The conclusion of the security agreement can be considered an important step forward in cooperation between NATO and WEU, not least because it will facilitate the use of NATO assets by WEU for the implementation of Petersberg missions, based on the agreed principles of complementarity and transparency.

It envisages facilitating the transmission of NATO intelligence to WEU, both between the secretariats of each organisation and between SHAPE and the WEU Planning Cell. It defines the conditions for the transmission or exchange of documents
and establishes rules for the protection of classified documents, with each of the parties establishing minimum security standards for information exchanged.

The security agreement also provides WEU with easier access to confidential NATO documents concerning intra-Alliance procedures, secret communication codes and military intelligence.

The first formal release of NATO documents to the Planning Cell was agreed by NATO’s Military Committee in September 1996, and the first such release to NATO’s International Military Staff, was agreed by the WEU Permanent Council in October 1996. The agreement will make it easier for both organisations to implement their respective missions and adapt their military structures while contributing to the development of the European security and defence identity within NATO and facilitating the deployment of CJTF.

Finally, it should be noted that as a result of the conclusion of this security agreement, the earlier Memorandum of Understanding between NATO and WEU on a communications network is taking effect. WEU is now connected to NATO’s secure and insecure voice and data networks. Connections became operational in December 1996, just prior to Phase III of the Crisex exercise.

In the wake of the NATO-WEU security agreement, WEU is now signing security agreements with observer states and associate partners in order to facilitate internal communications at WEU and its cooperation with NATO. Such agreements have now been signed with Austria, Sweden, Finland and some associate partners. Agreements with Ireland and the other associate partners are being prepared.

- arrangements for the release, monitoring and return of the assets and capabilities made available to WEU
- support from NATO’s defence-planning process for the conduct of WEU-led operations

The Planning Section of WEU’s Planning Cell is now working with NATO in order to examine how WEU requirements can play a role in the adaptation and refinement of NATO’s defence-planning process for non-Article five tasks at the higher end of the spectrum of Petersberg tasks.

- the development of procedures for NATO-WEU consultations in the context of a WEU-led operation with NATO support

The problem of how to involve associate members in the procedure for coordination between WEU and NATO for a WEU-led CJTF operation now has been solved. It will be remembered that at the Ostend meeting of the WEU Council of Ministers, Turkey had asked to be involved in preparatory work and the conduct of WEU operations requiring NATO assets. This request had met with opposition from Greece which had argued that the status of associate member did not allow for involvement in the planning and conduct of operations at such an early stage. Recently, a solution has been found to this problem in WEU through an unambiguous interpretation of the associate member status which is satisfactory to all those involved. It has now been agreed that those NATO member states which are associate members of WEU – Turkey, Iceland and Norway – or WEU observers – Denmark – will be able to participate fully in WEU decisions concerning missions requiring the use of NATO infrastructures.

51. It should be noted that with a fully-developed ESDI within NATO, the structures of the Alliance in the future will have to be able to function in an Atlantic or, alternatively, European configuration. NATO authorities are therefore particularly keen to develop structures and procedures which, in the face of an emerging crisis, will allow a switch from one configuration to the other in a timely, flexible and decisive manner.

52. As regards the restructuring of NATO’s command structure, which is closely linked to the CJTF concept and the development of the European security and defence identity, NATO’s Military Committee, meeting on 22 April 1997, came down strongly in favour of a reduction from four to three command levels and a reduction from 65 to 20 headquarters. At the strategic level, both the Atlantic (ACLANT) and Euro-
pean headquarters will be maintained. ACLANT will have three regional commands and two functional headquarters: Strike Fleet Atlantic for surface operations and SUBACLANT for submarine activities (there will not be a third level of command for ACLANT). In Europe, there would be only two regional headquarters, North (the present AFCENT) with two component commands for the air and naval forces and three subregional headquarters, and South (the present AFSOUTH). The number and distribution of the southern subregional headquarters is still the subject of discussion. One of the reasons is that differences continue to exist over a Spanish claim to a subregional headquarters and the associated request for a transfer of the Canary Islands to the European command area. The distribution of the subregional headquarters between Greece and Turkey is also a problem. A rotation of command between Greece and Turkey has been proposed as a possible solution.

53. No way has yet been found of settling the controversy within NATO over the nationality of the Commander of the Allied Forces South (AFSOUTH). It is common knowledge that France has made the Europeanisation of NATO a condition for its reintegration in NATO’s military structures. France wants to achieve a new military balance between the United States and Europe, and share responsibilities on an equal footing. It wants parity in the southern region. France has unambiguously asked that the commander of AFSOUTH be a European. This command could then rotate between different European member states.

54. It is to be noted that several European countries consider that at a given time – among other things, depending on future United States and European contributions in the southern region – the situation will be such that assigning the command to a European will become a natural development.

55. At present, it seems more likely that the Allies will agree on a compromise as advocated earlier by both Germany and Italy, which would involve leaving the southern command in the hands of the United States for the time being and reconsidering the issue in five to seven years’ time. In the meantime, Europeans should make an effort to strengthen their participation in the southern command and at the same time sufficiently reinforce the presence of European navies in the Mediterranean so as to better renegotiate the existing arrangements.

56. The French reaction to the different proposals for a compromise on the AFSOUTH command is not known at the time of writing this report (April 1997). Although the forthcoming French parliamentary elections have introduced a new element of uncertainty, it is thought that France, even if it does not obtain full satisfaction as regards AFSOUTH, would not prevent decisions on the Alliance’s internal military restructuring being adopted. It is also thought that France will not give up its enhanced presence in NATO, in particular its participation in the Military Committee and in the North Atlantic Council in Defence Minister session. France realises full well that any reversal of its approach to NATO which it started in December 1995 would be a severe blow to the further development of the ESDI within NATO and would also hamper progress on the implementation of CJTF for WEU-led operations. Both these issues are main axes of France’s policy on the development of Europe’s operational capabilities, which it would certainly not want to give up.

IV. Forces answerable to WEU (FAWEU)

57. The Schloten report, reviewed the FAWEU concept and its status. This has now become a well-established concept and no major new developments have taken place since. With the further implementation of the CJTF concept, WEU has been provided with even more flexibility since it can now call upon three different categories of troops, assets and capabilities according to its requirements:

- national FAWEU, military units and headquarters designated by states which can be made available on a case-by-case basis to carry out tasks conducted under the authority of WEU;
- FAWEU have now been designated by each of the ten member states, Norway and Turkey (associate members), Austria, Finland and Sweden (observers) and nine of the ten associate partners, with Slovenia – which recently became the tenth associate partner – now pre-

6 Assembly Document 1518, Chapters VI and VII.
paring the designation of its FAWEU. Proposals for FAWEU made by Ukraine have not been incorporated in the standing list of FAWEU but they will be considered on a case-by-case basis;

- multinational FAWEU, established multinational military units and headquarters, jointly designated for the same purpose by the participating states. At present the five multinational FAWEU are the European Corps, the Multinational Division Central (with Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom participating), the Anglo-Dutch Amphibious Force, Euromarfor and Eurofor.

58. Euromarfor was created in 1995. Similarly to the European Corps, arrangements have now been made for Eurofor and Euromarfor to be made available to NATO for operations which are not covered by Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty.

59. On 9 November 1996, Eurofor, a European multinational force with units from France, Italy, Portugal and Spain was established in Florence. Eurofor was created mainly to implement WEU's so-called Petersberg missions but it can also act in order to implement NATO decisions or comply with requests from the United Nations.

60. The Planning Cell is working on the 1997 update and has completed its analysis of the 1996 update. It has now embarked upon a programme of liaison with the staffs of the potential joint operations headquarters proposed by the various nations and has concluded memoranda of understanding establishing permanent liaisons between the Planning Cell and each of the five abovementioned multinational forces.

61. In Birmingham on 7 May 1996, Luxembourg formally completed the procedures for accession to the European Corps.

62. On 11 December, the Chiefs of Staff of the Luxembourg army and the Belgian land forces signed the agreement concerning the integration of the Luxembourg reconnaissance company of 180 troops, equipped with light armoured vehicles, into the 1st Belgian mechanised division via the 7th Brigade from March-en-Famenne which is already part of the European Corps.

63. The European Corps now consists of the following units:

   - the 1st Belgian Mechanised Division;
   - the Franco-German Brigade;
   - the 1st French Armoured Division;
   - the 10th German Armoured Division;
   - the 21st Spanish Mechanised Infantry Brigade;
   - the reconnaissance company from Luxembourg.

64. In 1996, the European Corps held its annual exercise from 10 to 20 June. A total of 8 500 soldiers, 3 300 vehicles and 20 helicopters participated in the exercise called "Pegasus 96". The objective was to test the Corp's capability for joint defence under NATO auspices and, in particular, to improve the interoperability of the major units, their command training and their ability for rapid projection of combat forces over large distances. An additional objective was to improve the interoperability of the German and French information and command systems.

65. It should be noted here that the Commander of the European Corps, the French General, Pierre-Henri For terre, stated on 9 May 1996 that he was in favour of this corps being fully professional in order to make sure that in the event of a crisis it could take part with all its resources. As is known, the German forces are still subject to a number of restrictions, due in part to the fact that it is a conscript army.

66. At the beginning of August 1996, the United Kingdom announced that it would establish a joint rapid deployment force, to be drawn from the army, navy, amphibious and air forces which should be able to react to emergency situations worldwide, conducting missions ranging from the evacuation of civilians to peacekeeping. Since these are typical Petersberg missions, such a force could make a positive contribution as a FAWEU.

V. Intelligence Section

67. The Intelligence Section of the Planning Cell, which started operating in September 1995,
reached its full strength of 6, including the head of section, in autumn 1996. It receives frequent inputs of intelligence data from a number of WEU member states, on the basis of which the Intelligence Section produces a weekly intelligence summary for the members and associate members of WEU. This summary includes assessments of the regions which the Planning Cell monitors and reports on in accordance with its official remit from the Permanent Council. At present, these regions comprise Albania, the Great Lakes region in Africa, former Yugoslavia and Somalia. If the Intelligence Section considers that the Permanent Council should be aware of other developments on which it has no instructions, it can report on these under any other business.

68. It should be noted that at the Planning Cell, the Intelligence Section’s close working relations with the Situation Centre and the Satellite Centre at Torrejón are being deepened. A formal memorandum of understanding on the exchange of information between the Intelligence Section and the Situation Centre has been signed.

69. It will be remembered in this connection that last year the Assembly of WEU adopted a Recommendation on a European Intelligence Policy (No. 597) in which it recommended that the Council

"1. Strengthen the links between WEU and NATO with a view to sharing the intelligence required for operational planning and activities of European armed forces in the framework of Petersberg tasks;

2. Ask each WEU member state to second a correspondent from its national intelligence system to the Planning Cell in order to improve its capabilities in making up-to-date assessments and analyses of the situation in potential Petersberg task-theatres of operation."

70. The Council communicated its reply to the Assembly on 27 November 1996, too late to be taken into account in the Committee’s reports for the December session, as they had already been adopted on 12 November.

71. As regards the Council’s reply to the first paragraph of the Recommendation, it seems that developments since June 1996 have provided full satisfaction on this issue. The signature of the security agreement between NATO and WEU and positive cooperation between NATO and WEU on the implementation of the CJTF concept, along the lines of the decisions taken by the NATO Ministerial Council in Berlin in June 1996 and the WEU Council of Ministers in Birmingham and Ostend, have left little doubt about the progress that has been made on strengthening the links between the two organisations and the exchange of information and intelligence.

72. In the second paragraph of its reply, however, the Council reverts to its old ways. In the second paragraph of its Recommendation, the Assembly had very specifically requested it to ask each WEU member state to second a correspondent from its national intelligence system to the Planning Cell. The Council, in its reply, limits itself to quoting documents which it adopted in Madrid in November 1995 and in Birmingham in May 1996 and referring to other generalities without so much as a word on the specific proposal made by the Assembly.

73. Once again, the Assembly does not question the Council’s right to criticise or reject a proposal but believes it should react to a proposal in clear language and say whether it likes it or not instead of ignoring it. The Assembly would prefer straightforward replies from the Council rather than empty phrases. It makes no sense for the Council to turn a deaf ear.

74. If the Council really takes the view that there is no prospect of implementing the proposal made in the second paragraph of Recommendation 597, it may consider a suggestion which was made at a seminar organised by the WEU Institute for Security Studies in March 1997, where it was proposed that the permanent representations at WEU designate points of contact between national intelligence systems and the Intelligence Section of the Planning Cell?.

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75 As was said in the earlier Assembly report on a European intelligence policy, the Intelligence Section should be the starting point for more WEU autonomy in intelligence, so that the Council has all the information it requires to assume responsibility for deploying FAWEU in any operation it decides to conduct.

76. For missions in certain cases, it will be easy for WEU to rely on planning information from member states which, for historical reasons, have a thorough knowledge of the area.

77. On the other hand, it is vital that the Intelligence Section exchanges information with NATO with a view to possible future WEU-led operations using CJTF. In this respect, the security agreement between NATO and WEU is an important step forward because it accommodates agreement on the procedures governing the classification of confidential documents and their communication codes with a view to adapting NATO standards for future military operations carried out by Europeans.

78. Apart from this, the great importance of using open sources for intelligence gathering should once again be emphasised.

79. A drawback to the present functioning of the Intelligence Section is that it can only provide assessments on the regions which the Planning Cell monitors and reports on in accordance with an official remit. More flexibility in the remit of the Planning Cell and Intelligence Section would enable the latter to provide assessments on regions where crises or conflicts may be developing and which have not yet come to the notice of the media and the Permanent Council. Early warning may provide the precious time needed for swift action to prevent crises deteriorating.

80. A close and direct working relationship between the Intelligence Section and the Satellite Centre in Torrejón is considered to be essential for WEU's intelligence capability. Although progress has been made, it seems that there is still room for improvement in this field.

VI. WEU initiatives on African peacekeeping

81. In the document on "European security, a common concept of the 27 WEU countries", adopted by the WEU Council at its meeting of 14 November 1995 in Madrid, it was said that WEU was in the process of studying the possibility of supporting initiatives taken by the Africans in the field of peacekeeping, notably via regional and sub-regional institutions.

82. Meeting in Lisbon in May 1995, the Council instructed the Permanent Council to "take forward its reflections on peacekeeping and conflict prevention in Africa", in line with the EU's request to WEU to draw up and implement specific measures which could help mobilise African capabilities in UN forces.

83. In Birmingham on 7 May 1996, the Ministers endorsed the Permanent Council's decision to send a fact-finding mission to Africa.

84. In the same month, Belgium declared that, on the basis of its experience in Somalia and Rwanda during its presidency of WEU in the second half of 1996, it was planning to develop relations between WEU and the OAU in the context of peacekeeping operations which the latter carried out in Africa.

85. In August 1996, a WEU fact-finding mission including staff officers from the Planning Cell visited the seat of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), Ethiopia, Kenya, Tanzania, and Malawi.

86. The Permanent Council later decided to invite the Secretary-General of the OAU to visit WEU in Brussels in order to inform the OAU about WEU's crisis-management procedures, draw attention to common fields of interest and specific cooperation possibilities and discuss the complementary roles of the EU and WEU in conflict prevention and peacekeeping in Africa. It was thought that the discussion could also focus on ways of improving the existing capabilities of the OAU, sub-regional African

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9 A number of paragraphs of this chapter also appear in the report on WEU's contribution to reinforcing peace in central Africa, submitted on behalf of the Defence Committee by Mr Masseret, Rapporteur, Document 1566.
organisations and African countries that might contribute troops for peacekeeping and of establishing better contacts between WEU and the OAU. At present, no such visit has yet taken place but WEU is continuing to explore possibilities for cooperation with the OAU.

87. In that framework, the Permanent Council considered the possibility of maintaining contacts with the appropriate technical working groups of the OAU through the WEU Politico-Military Group

88. The 28 WEU countries were invited to examine ways in which they might support the OAU, sub-regional organisations or African countries in the framework of peacekeeping using various means, such as:

- putting equipment for communications or logistical support at the OAU’s disposal;
- making a contribution to the formation and training of troops in Africa or Europe.

89. The Politico-Military Group recommended the Council to give WEU a clearing-house role, to be assumed by the Planning Cell. The Planning Cell should in particular be a point of contact for the training needs of the OAU, sub-regional African organisations or African countries. It should identify regional training centres and keep a record of any support needs they may have.

90. The Planning Cell, it was said, could also be the point of contact for the material needs of the OAU, sub-regional African organisations or African countries. Following up decisions taken by the Ministerial Council at Ostend in November 1996, the Planning Cell has now established databases for offers of training from European nations to African countries, as well as more general databases on training for humanitarian landmine clearance operations.

91. A follow-up observer mission visited the first combined African peacekeeping field exercise, NANGBETO 97, in March 1997. This trilateral exercise conducted by Benin, Togo and France with the participation of Burkina-Faso, was held on the territory of Benin and Togo. The main theme of the exercise was to deploy a multinational force under the aegis of the United Nations in order to secure a humanitarian zone for refugees. More than 4 000 troops participated, while units from land, sea and air also took part in the exercise.

92. France considers such exercises, which are similar to Petersberg missions, as possible preparation for the establishment of multinational African intervention forces for humanitarian and peacekeeping operations

VII. WEU and the crisis in Albania

93. When the situation in Albania rapidly deteriorated at the end of February and the beginning of March 1997, it seemed as if the Council of WEU was intent upon ignoring what was happening, even though two full members of WEU are neighbours of Albania. It was left to the OSCE to act through its special envoy, Franz Vranitzky. Even after the latter had spoken out in favour of sending a military stabilisation force of 4 000 troops and police officers to the region, reactions were lukewarm.

94. The Assembly of WEU, meeting in Athens on 13 March 1997, adopted a Recommendation, No. 609, in which it stressed Europe’s responsibility for the maintenance of peace and security throughout the continent. It endorsed the declarations and efforts of the EU, OSCE and Council of Europe to achieve a peaceful reconciliation in Albania but, at the same time, recalled that it was WEU’s role, if the situation so required, to implement the military aspects of the common foreign and security policy of the EU. It recommended that the Council.

1. Monitor very closely the development of the situation in Albania in order to be prepared to act if requested to do so,

2. Instruct the WEU Satellite Centre in Torrejón to provide ongoing assessments of the situation in Albania for use by both the Council and the Planning Cell and provide it with the means to accelerate its working procedures;

3. Ask the Planning Cell to draw up contingency plans for possible operations in Albania covering the full range of Petersberg operations from humanitarian and rescue tasks to peacekeeping tasks and peacemaking, including control over the restitution of arms and munitions.”

95. The Foreign Ministers of the European Union, meeting in Apeldoorn on 15 March
decided to send a high-level mission to Tirana, which also included representatives from the OSCE, the European Commission, Italy and Greece in order to examine with the Albanian authorities ways in which the EU could help re-establish security in the country, in particular by sending a mission of civilian and military advisers. At that meeting, Germany and the United Kingdom in particular were said to have argued against any military intervention.

96. The Italian Foreign Secretary said that the EU was seeking a political and diplomatic solution, not a military one. The French Foreign Minister, Hervé de Charette, also Chairman-in-Office of the WEU Council, declared on 17 March that it was “inconceivable” that the EU should send troops to Albania to restore order. It was not up to European troops to confiscate weapons, but it was possible to help the Albanian army and police to rebuild their forces.

97. At its meeting on 14 March 1997, the WEU Permanent Council adopted the following statement:

“The WEU views the situation in Albania with great concern. It expresses its concern at the violent troubles there. The WEU is following the situation closely. It fully supports the initiatives of international organisations, especially the OSCE and the EU. It calls on all parties to instantly abstain from all recourse to violence and to establish a dialogue so that the democratic process can resume its course.”

98. The Planning Cell was asked to monitor and assess developments in Albania without being tasked to do anything else, such as drafting a contingency plan. A Planning Cell police officer participated in the mission of a EU advance team which visited Albania at the end of March in order to assess the situation.

99. At a press conference some days later, WEU’s Secretary-General, Mr Cutileiro, declared that WEU was “ready to act” and that it did not rule out “action in the future”. He ventured that WEU continued to prepare itself in order to have the necessary capacities and to be ready, in the future, to respond to any request made by the European Union or to act upon a decision by its members. “The Planning Cell can move onto an operational plan very quickly”, the headquarters (national and allied) were “well catalogued”, so that those in charge know whom they should rapidly address if need be. If the EU and the OSCE, he added, asked us to protect humanitarian aid in Albania “we would probably be able to do so but this depends on exactly what the countries ask”.

100. Meanwhile, a coalition of countries under Italian leadership had decided to set up a multinational protection force for Albania. The 6 000-strong force with the Italian General, Luciano Forlani, as force commander, started its deployment on 14 April 1997 and consisted of troops from France, Greece, Italy and Spain as WEU member states; Turkey as a WEU associate member, Austria and Denmark as WEU observers; and Romania as a WEU associate partner.

101. Following a decision of the WEU Permanent Council, the Planning Cell has now seconded a liaison officer to the operational headquarters of Operation Alba in Rome as an observer.

102. On 22 April 1997, the WEU Council decided to send a fact-finding mission to Albania, in agreement with the Albanian authorities and in cooperation with the multinational Protection Force, in order to assess police capabilities in the country and to study “the practical modalities of a possible deployment of a multinational advisory element”. The mission, headed by the French Presidency of the WEU Council, is composed of a WEU Planning Cell officer and representatives from Austria, Denmark, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, and the United Kingdom. The objective of the WEU mission was to study arrangements for training Albanian police officers and instructors in logistics, legal command, communications and operational fields. In the light of the report produced by this mission, the WEU Council decided to deploy a multinational advisory police element (MAPE). A draft mandate for the MAPE was adopted by the WEU Permanent Council on 2 May 1997.
