ASSEMBLY OF WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION

THIRTY-FIFTH ORDINARY SESSION

(First Part)

Current aspects of arms control: the Western European position - reply to the annual report of the Council

REPORT

submitted on behalf of the
Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments
by Mr. de Beer, Rapporteur
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Mandate for negotiation on conventional armed forces in Europe

1. Adopted in committee by 13 votes to 0 with 2 abstentions.
2. Members of the committee: Mr. Kielmann (Chairman); MM. Fourré (Alternate: Baume), de Beer (Vice-Chairmen); Mr. Alloncle, Mrs. Baarveld-Schilman, MM. Caniglia (Alternate: Mezzapesa), Cox, De Decker, Derycke (Alternate: Kempinaire), Ewing, Fiandrotti, Filion, Fioret (Alternate: Fassino), Irmer, Jung, Konen, de Kwaadsteniet, Mrs. Lalumière, MM. Pecchioli, Scheer (Alternate: Antretter), Sinesio, Sir Dudley Smith, MM. Speed, Steiner (Alternate: Klejdzinski), Steverlynck (Alternate: Uyttendaele), Sir John Stokes, Mr. Zierer.

N.B. The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.
Rapporteur's Preface

In preparation for this report, the Rapporteur had interviews with the following permanent representatives to conventional arms control talks and their staff in Vienna on 21st and 22nd February 1989:

H.E. Mr. L.W. Veenendaal, Ambassador, Head of the Netherlands Delegation;
Brigadier-General C. Kuypers, Defence Adviser. Netherlands Delegation;
H.E. Mr. G. Joetze, Ambassador. Head of the Federal German Delegation;
Mr. J. Pohlmann, Deputy Head of the Federal German Delegation;
Mr. E. Duchene, Deputy Head of the Belgian Delegation;
Mr. John D. Bryson, Deputy Head of the Canadian Delegation;
H.E. Mr. T. Strulak, Ambassador. Head of the Polish Delegation;
Mr. L. Breckon, Deputy Head of the United States Delegation;
Mr. D.J. Bowen, Deputy Head of the United Kingdom Delegation;
Mr. B.E. Cleghorn, Deputy Head of the United Kingdom Delegation;
H.E. Mr. Gleissner, Ambassador. Head of Arms Control Department. Austrian Ministry for Foreign Affairs;
Mr. I. Broz. Deputy Head of the Czechoslovakian Delegation.

He was also briefed in the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), London, on 3rd April 1989, by:

Colonel John Cross, Deputy Director;
Colonel Andrew Duncan, Assistant Director for Information.

The committee as a whole was addressed by The Hon. Archie Hamilton, MP. United Kingdom Minister of State for the Armed Forces, Ministry of Defence, in London, on 3rd November 1988, and by Mr. Jean-Pierre Chevènement, French Minister of Defence, in Paris, on 6th February 1989; and by Sir Geoffrey Howe, United Kingdom Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and The Rt. Hon. George Younger. United Kingdom Secretary of State for Defence, in London, on 4th April 1989.

The committee and the Rapporteur wish to express their special thanks to all the ministers, officials and senior officers who briefed the Rapporteur or the committee and replied to questions.
Draft Recommendation

on current aspects of arms control: the Western European position

The Assembly,

(i) Welcoming the successful outcome of the third review conference in Vienna in January 1989, and more specifically the signing of the mandate for negotiations on conventional armed forces in Europe and the promising start to these negotiations;

(ii) Stressing that the mistakes which hampered the MBFR negotiations should not be repeated, especially the disagreements over actual numbers and the quality of weapons systems and military personnel and differences regarding an effective and strict verification régime;

(iii) Certain that it is in the interests of all twenty-three participants in the CFE talks that the negotiations should be fruitful and harmonious, avoiding any unnecessary obstructive action;

(iv) Considering that political reality calls for equal ceilings of armaments and troops, visibly lower than the present NATO levels;

(v) Convinced that the absence of offensive equipment near the contact line would strengthen mutual confidence;

(vi) Recognising that SNF weapons are part of a credible deterrent – even with a balance of conventional armaments – and that a mix of nuclear and conventional weapons remains a necessity in the foreseeable future;

(vii) Noting, however, that time is required for further technical and tactical research on a replacement for the Lance missile and that a final decision about production does not require to be taken at present in consideration of the CFE talks;

(viii) Underlining the useful contribution to mutual confidence-building which would result from the publication of detailed and clear defence budgets,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Strive for simple definitions of equal ceilings in which qualitative complications should be avoided insofar as possible, and take the view that disagreements about the actual numbers of forces is a matter of secondary importance;

2. Advocate that, for the sake of effective and strict verification, the exchanges of information mentioned in the mandate should refer not only to levels of armaments and military personnel but also exact locations;

3. Take the necessary steps to ensure that practical research is carried out by WEU on the vital subject of verification and report fully to the Assembly;

4. Consider the possibility of including in the CFE talks all conventional weapons systems which are not explicitly excluded in the mandate, if this is essential for both parties for the smooth progress of the negotiations;

5. Aim to achieve equal ceilings by asymmetrical reductions, lower than the present NATO levels, a 10% reduction in tanks, armoured infantry fighting vehicles and artillery being a provisional goal;

6. Participate in all the preparations necessary for replacing the Lance missile, but decide on production/deployment at a later time;

7. Promote the publication of complete, detailed and clear defence budgets by all participants in the CSCE talks;

8. Urge the Chairman-in-Office to establish at the highest level in his country’s delegation in Vienna, a WEU liaison officer for the CFE talks.
Explanatory Memorandum
(submitted by Mr. de Beer, Rapporteur)

I. Introduction

1.1. Writing a report on “Current aspects of arms control” at the moment is a fascinating but risky matter: fascinating, because we are experiencing an improvement in East-West relations which until recently very few would have judged possible: risky, because events present themselves at such a high speed that what is written today might land in the wastepaper basket tomorrow and maybe this is why the annual report of the Council allows little opportunity for any comment on its work in the arms control domain! Your Rapporteur feels that the best course is therefore to begin with a consideration of the background setting.

1.2. It would be a mistake to assume that “glasnost” and “perestroika” are the products of new idealism in the Kremlin. They are nothing more than a necessity for Russian society, for the following reasons:

(i) the centralistic socialist economy is failing. The quality of life lags further and further behind that of the West. This is not only true for material aspects, but for less usual ones, like the environment, as well;

(ii) we are on the verge of a new worldwide industrial revolution. The keywords are: “information technology”. The most advanced countries will experience the greatest growth of prosperity. Information technology, however, can only thrive in an open society where information is freely available. The base necessary is a society which is used to handling freedom of expression and differences of opinion;

(iii) the Eastern European countries spend a much larger part of their national incomes on defence than do the countries of WEU, which weighs heavily on their relatively poor standard of living and increases the discontent of the population.

1.3. Apparently Mr. Gorbachev is convinced that glasnost, perestroika and cutting the defence budget are necessary to keep pace with the West. His new course certainly opens prospects for his own country, but for us as well. His success, however, is far from secure. He still has to go a very long way and he must take account of the resistance of the conservative faction in the Kremlin and of the party officials in the country who do not want to give up their privileged positions so easily. For him, two issues are of crucial interest. In the first place the living standards of the Soviet Union have to rise. “What benefits do we have from glasnost and perestroika?”, many Russians ask themselves, “if we still have to queue for lots of daily needs?”. Secondly, his foreign affairs policy should be successful in the opinion of the other Soviet party leaders. There is a fair chance that the hard line in the Kremlin will prevail again, should he fail.

1.4. Where information technology is concerned, what is true for the civilian sector also applies to the military and the Soviets must be aware that they are increasingly likely to trail the West, which would diminish any chance of rebuilding their economy even further.

1.5. The question arises, under current circumstances what would be the most sensible attitude for the West? It is quite clear that the Eastern European countries need a considerable reduction in their defence budgets – more than we do. The intended unilateral reduction of the conventional forces of the Warsaw Pact countries is a clear indication. The West could quietly wait and see how things are developing in the East, scarcely making any concessions, expecting that the advantages will automatically fall into our lap.

1.6. It is your Rapporteur’s opinion that this would not be a very wise move. By doing this we would give away the initiative. Furthermore, we too have a lot to gain. The offensive capacity of the Warsaw Pact forces is still a serious threat to us. Worse, this threat increases with the implementation of the INF treaty. The elimination of medium-range nuclear weapons makes the Warsaw Pact’s preponderance of tanks, armoured vehicles and artillery in the European theatre even more significant. An asymmetrical reduction of conventional armaments is now more vital than ever for our security. On top of this, “burden-sharing”, more and more emphasised by the USA, faces the WEU countries with higher expenditure for defence in the near future. A lightening of our defence task would therefore be welcome.

1.7. The conclusion is that, whereas the Warsaw Pact countries need a reduction of armed forces very badly, we too have a special interest in the successful outcome of the CFE talks. We should not let a favourable moment pass by. We must negotiate toughly at the CSCE
and CFE talks, but at the same time we cannot avoid taking Mr. Gorbachev's position into consideration. If we do not, we may spoil our own chances.

II. A brief retrospect

2.1. A chronological review of arms control negotiations over the last fifteen years makes interesting reading: 1

- 1973 (July)
  Start of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) in Helsinki.

- 1973 (October)
  Start of the negotiations on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR) in Vienna. In the course of the seventies, parties agree on the final aim: reduction of military personnel to a ceiling of 900 000 men (of whom 700 000 army personnel): the USA and USSR taking the lead. Disagreements about the correct numbers of present forces and the issue of national versus collective ceilings prevent an agreement.

- 1975 (August)
  Signing of the Helsinki Final Act. In the so-called first basket (military security), the countries promise to take various confidence-building measures such as the announcement of manoeuvres and the exchange of observers.

- 1976 (December)
  In Vienna, the West proposes deleting Russian tanks against American nuclear weapons. This so-called third option is the only occasion when NATO took up the wish from the eastern side to negotiate not only manpower but armaments as well. In 1979, when the USA decides on the unilateral withdrawal of 1 000 nuclear warheads from Europe as part of the dual-track decision, this third option vanishes.

- 1977-1978
  First follow-up conference to the Helsinki Final Act in Belgrade.

- 1980-1983
  Second follow-up conference to the Helsinki Final Act in Madrid.

- 1983
  In Montebello, NATO decides to reduce and replace shorter intermediate-range (SRINF) and short-range (SNF) nuclear forces.

- 1984
  Start of the Conference on Disarmament in Europe in Stockholm as a sequel to the Madrid decisions.

- 1986 (May)
  The Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the NATO member countries at their meeting in Halifax establish a "high-level task force", which should take "bold new steps" concerning conventional arms reductions.

- 1986 (June)
  In the Budapest appeal, the Warsaw Treaty proposes the mutual reduction of armed forces by 100 000 to 150 000 men in the next two years. Reductions of 25% should follow, which, according to the Warsaw Treaty Organisation, would amount to the same as reductions of half a million men on both sides.

- 1986 (September)
  At the Conference on Disarmament in Europe in Stockholm, an agreement is obtained on "confidence- and security-building measures" — amongst others the announcement of troop movements greater than 13 000 men. The USSR accepts on-site inspections.

- 1986 (November)
  Start of the third follow-up conference to the Helsinki Final Act in Vienna. One of the issues is a mandate for "conventional stability talks (CST)": changed (in 1989) into "conventional armed forces in Europe" (CFE).

- 1987 (April)
  During a speech in Brussels, the American Senator Sam Nunn pleads for an agreement on two points: (i) a Russian reduction in Central Europe of 13 divisions (or more) in exchange for an American reduction of 2 divisions (or more); (ii) mutual promises of no first use of nuclear weapons.

- 1987 (May)
  At a conference in East Berlin, the Warsaw Treaty Organisation gives priority to the removal of the most offensive weapons from Central Europe in order to reduce the danger of a surprise attack. Nuclear weapons should be part of the negotiations. NATO and the Warsaw Pact should start talks about their military doctrines.

- 1987 (June)
  The North Atlantic Council declares at its meeting in Reykjavik that reductions in Russian and American nuclear short-range armaments are only possible "in

conjunction with "a conventional balance and a worldwide ban on chemical weapons. The total approach on arms control by the alliance will be elaborated in a "comprehensive concept".

1987 (November)
A RAND-study concludes that military stability in Europe will be increased only when the Warsaw Pact makes asymmetric reductions of 5 to 1 (or more).

1987 (November)
General Jaruzelski proposes an exchange of tanks (on the Warsaw Pact side) against aircraft (on the NATO side).

1987 (December)
The signing of the INF treaty between the USA and the USSR in Washington. A global prohibition on the possession of intermediate-range nuclear forces.

1988 (March)
The communiqué of the NATO summit in Brussels announces that NATO will, within the framework of CST, aim at:
- the establishment of a secure and stable balance of conventional armed forces at lower ceilings;
- doing away with the inequalities which have a negative influence on stability and security;
- (as a matter of priority) abolishing any capability to start a surprise attack and undertake large-scale offensive action. In order to maintain the deterrent, a mix of conventional and nuclear armaments, which must be kept up to date, remains necessary.

1988 (7th December)
In a speech to the United Nations in New York, the Soviet leader, Mr. Gorbachev, announces that his country will withdraw 50 000 men and 5 000 tanks from Eastern Europe. Six tank divisions, located in the GDR, Czechoslovakia and Hungary will be disbanded.

1988 (8th December)
The Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the NATO countries propose in Brussels to reduce the total number of tanks in Europe to 40 000 (20 000 for NATO and 20 000 for the Warsaw Pact).

1989 (17th January)
The signing of the final document of the third follow-up conference of the CSCE in Vienna. It contains the mandate for the "negotiation on conventional armed forces in Europe", which started on 9th March in Vienna.

2.2. The MBFR talks, which began in October 1973 in Vienna, were limited to conventional forces. Seven NATO and four Warsaw Pact member countries took part: Belgium, Canada, FRG, Luxembourg, Netherlands, United Kingdom, United States, Czechoslovakia, GDR, Poland and the USSR. They silted up after a promising start - mainly because of disagreements over actual numbers and the quality of weapons systems and military personnel, and differences regarding an effective and strict verification system. After fifteen years, the MBFR negotiations are now formally finished. No consensus has been achieved but it is important that we learn a lesson from the mistakes made.

III. A fresh start in Vienna

3.1. A fresh start was made with the Concluding Document of the Vienna Meeting on 17th January 1989. All twenty-three NATO and Warsaw Pact countries are taking part in the CFE (conventional forces in Europe) talks. An outline for the negotiations has been given in a special mandate, signed by all twenty-three participants. The aim is to arrive at the establishment of a stable and secure balance of conventional armed forces (which include conventional armaments and equipment), at lower levels in Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals; the elimination of disparities prejudicial to stability and security; and the elimination, as a matter of priority, of the capability for launching surprise attacks and for initiating large-scale offensive action. These objectives shall be achieved by the application of militarily significant measures such as reductions, limitations, redeployment, equal ceilings and related measures, amongst others.

3.2. In the paragraphs of the mandate outlining "objectives and methods", reference is made in particular to "the elimination, as a matter of priority, of the capability for launching surprise attack and for initiating large-scale offensive action.", "Offensive action" for all Europeans, both in West and East is almost synonymous with the use of armoured vehicles and it is no coincidence that it is on the elimination of the present asymmetries and real reductions (on both sides) that the talks need to be focused. Which is why alliance nations particularly wish to see the categories of equipment for future cuts restricted initially to tanks, artillery and armoured fighting vehicles.


3. Total numbers of unilateral reductions announced are: 500 000 men and 10 000 tanks, 8 300 artillery pieces and 800 combat aircraft.
3.3. Other important aspects are:
- the subject shall be conventional armed forces, but the existence of multiple capabilities will not be a criterion for modifying the scope of the negotiations;
- nuclear weapons will not be a subject of these negotiations;
- naval forces and chemical weapons will not be discussed;
- there will be an effective and strict verification system which will include on-site inspections as a matter of right;
- information shall be exchanged about the capabilities of the forces involved;
- agreements reached shall be internationally binding.

IV. Mandate for negotiation on conventional armed forces in Europe
(The complete text of the mandate is reproduced at appendix)

4.1. With regard to Western European Union, the first item which is remarkable is the inclusion, in the opening paragraphs of the mandate itself, of specific reference to the Treaty of Brussels (1948). This reference was apparently included at the direct instigation of the French authorities in an effort to play down the "bloc to bloc" connotations of mentioning both the Washington (1949) and Warsaw (1955) Treaties.

4.2. Of course the implications and possible advantages of this specific reference to the Brussels Treaty are potentially many, although, whether for example, France, in particular, or any other member nation would go so far as attempting to propose a WEU caucus as a "club within a club" (or "bloc within a bloc") on the western side is debatable. The place for such discussion and formulation of a staunchly Western European attitude is obviously first and foremost in the WEU Council and its sub-groups: a move which the Assembly has advocated on a number of recent occasions. The Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments was delighted to hear from the Chairman-in-Office on 4th April 1989 that just such a discussion had taken place at the full Council meeting the preceding day.

(i) Force levels

4.3. Quite apart from the preparation, therefore, of positions before the CFE talks began, and on a quasi-permanent basis once they are in progress, the most evident competence of WEU is in relation to the reduced force levels which one hopes will result from the negotiation (the subject of a parallel report by the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments: "Force comparisons", Rapporteur: Mr. Steiner). Under the terms of Article VI of Protocol No. II to the modified Brussels Treaty, the United Kingdom undertook to "...maintain on the mainland of Europe, including Germany the effective strength of the United Kingdom forces which are now assigned to the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, that is to say four divisions and the Second Tactical Air Force, or such other forces as the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, regards as having equivalent fighting capacity." The United Kingdom undertook "not to withdraw these forces against the wishes of the majority of the high contracting parties...". In accordance with the procedure provided for in that article, the WEU Council subsequently acquiesced in the United Kingdom's request to reduce the levels of forces it maintains on the mainland of Europe, and the level now agreed is 55,000 men plus a tactical air force.

4.4. In the report on "Disarmament - reply to the thirty-third annual report of the Council" prepared for the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments in November 1988 (Rapporteur: Mr. Tummers), it was pointed out (paragraph 2.31) that "Where levels of forces present in Germany are concerned, the committee would like to underline the importance of maintaining agreed numbers and not making unilateral reductions, unless and until agreed and verifiable multilateral arms control measures are negotiated."

4.5. Current British force levels in the Federal Republic of Germany may eventually have to be reduced as a result of these negotiations, but such reductions would have to involve the necessary legal steps within Western European Union before implementation. Similarly, the maximum levels of ground and air forces which member states of WEU place under NATO command are fixed in Articles I and II of Protocol No. II to the modified Brussels Treaty and these limits also would probably have to be reconsidered and reviewed.

4.6. In the context of possible revision of the Brussels Treaty as a result of the recent enlargement of WEU to include Portugal and Spain, the implications of this link with the CFE/CSCE talks in Vienna are considerable and should not be neglected as the Council formulates its attitudes and proposals on both counts during the coming months.


5. See "Future of European security - reply to the annual report of the Council", report tabled by Mr. van der Sanden on behalf of the General Affairs Committee.
4.7. What Mr. Gorbachev's and his colleagues' apparent readiness to make radical cuts has done is to transform the outlook for the Vienna negotiations, raising expectations of quick progress. A breakthrough in this particular domain, by blunting the most threatening aspect of Soviet military power, could simplify and probably accelerate progress in other talks ranging from chemical weapons even to nuclear arms in Europe... By eliminating Warsaw Pact superiority in tanks, artillery and armoured fighting vehicles, the risk of a surprise eastern offensive which could seize and hold territory in Western Europe would be considerably reduced. Throughout the talks the simple criterion in assessing whether or not a particular weapons system can or cannot "seize and hold territory" should be borne in mind when deciding an order of priorities for reductions and limitations.

4.8. It is worth noting "en passant" that realists in the arms control world are fully aware that disarmament does not necessarily always mean vast reductions in defence spending. On occasion, what is involved is a simple redistribution of arms expenditure; for example, the GDR's leader, Mr. Honecker, has already coupled reductions of his country's offensive weapons with a parallel increase in numbers of anti-tank weapons and anti-tank artillery. (GDR proposals include reductions in tanks, and cutting the army by 10,000 men and defence expenditure by 10%; it is, of course, these reductions which are given considerable publicity, rather than increases in spending in other areas.)

(ii) Naval forces

4.9. In spite of the careful wording of the agreed mandate, there is nonetheless a strong probability that different participants will seek to draw particular advantage from their own interpretation and, even where specific exclusions apply (such as "naval forces" or "nuclear weapons"), attempts are already being made at linkage: implying that agreement in this forum might depend on progress in other realms. Naval forces are excluded from the CFE talks for good reasons: firstly, navies operate worldwide, they are not bound to the European theatre of operations; secondly, the Atlantic Ocean for NATO is the hinterland of Europe just as Russia is for the countries of the Warsaw Pact (i.e. a line of supply for reinforcement in case of military conflict). It is reasonable therefore for NATO to have the right to a strong surface fleet to guarantee the security of its sea-lines of communication. Although it may be true that NATO has a preponderance of surface vessels, the Soviet Union has a preponderance of attack submarines.

4.10. Soviet submarines pose a specific problem also which is worth highlighting because of other implications. Many such submarines are double-hulled and built of titanium. The main way for western navies to counter the threat they pose is to use nuclear depth charges against them as conventional torpedoes are of little effect. And these weapons are replaced or updated as necessary without seemingly arousing the same furore involved in replacing other tactical nuclear weapons... However, including such considerations, and indeed naval forces generally, in the present talks would immensely complicate them!

(iii) Troops

4.11. Less important than the main items of equipment covered by the mandate are the troops who man the equipment. MBFR should have taught the participants a salutary lesson: not to waste time counting heads to establish numbers which will then prove virtually impossible to verify. Discussions must concentrate on units and equipment: reductions in equipment should imply reductions in manpower as a direct result. (As a matter of interest, this same argument is currently being used in Washington to justify Republican Congressman Ireland's resolution to reduce United States troops in Europe -- by withdrawing the crews and those responsible for the maintenance and guarding of the cruise missiles to be abolished as a result of the INF agreement.) Quite apart from effectively diminishing the perceived threat, troop reductions will suit most countries concerned, particularly as the "demographic trough" begins to take effect over the next ten years or so.

(iv) "Zones"

4.12. Although a priori WEU has, because of its membership, concentrated hitherto on the central front in Europe, that should not necessarily mean that a "zonal approach" at the CFE talks is to be preferred. The "flank countries" (Turkey especially, in the south, and Norway particularly, in the north) are already concerned that their interests may be neglected. These interests are highlighted with respect to the northern flank in another report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, as they were with respect to the south in 1986.

4.13. Another aspect of the problem of "zones" is the Soviet proposal to create "special corridors": strips along the border between East and West where military activities and arms, including nuclear weapons, would be severely limited. Such an idea perpetuates the "nuclear-free zone" theme which the Soviets have frequently advanced in the past. The main effect of such an idea would be to limit western room for manoeuvre (literally so) in the Federal

6. "State of European security -- intervention forces and reinforcement for the centre and the north", Rapporteur: Mr. Speed.

Republic while leaving the East full potential for organising attack forces well behind its own lines. One quick glance at the map of Europe would be enough to realise that such proposals are highly unfavourable for WEU. They interfere with the NATO conception of forward defence. Nevertheless, we should consider the possibility of the creation of "defensive zones", free of equipment, specifically designed for aggression: such as bridge-building materials. A defensive army, not prepared for a surprise attack, does not need such equipment in a forward position. The zones could have a width of, say, 100 km. This idea could be a contribution to confidence-building in the framework of the actual talks.

4.14. A major advantage of proposing restrictions in certain areas or zones might be to spread present concentrations of weapons throughout Europe (both East and West) to lessen the likelihood of surprise gained through massive attack. This is why the alliance has proposed special restrictions on weapons deployed in the area comprised by East and West Germany, Czechoslovakia, Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands. Again, the prospect for the alliance flank countries of increased concentrations of weapons on their doorsteps as a result of redistribution, is not to be relished. Incidentally, for the Chinese the prospect of greater numbers of Soviet troops and armour East of the Urals is equally unwelcome – although Mr. Gorbachev has recently tried to allay Chinese alarm by announcing considerable reductions (reportedly virtually four fifths of the 55,000 troops present) in the forces stationed in Mongolia.

V. Verification

5.1. The one aspect of the mandate which seems to attract universal consensus is, of course, that of verification, the importance of which has been emphasised now on numerous occasions by the Assembly in general and the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments in particular. It is open to all nations to make whatever use is considered necessary of their own "technical means " to ensure adequate and sufficient verification of agreements, but in addition, because of the successful use of on-site inspections in the INF agreement, both sides appear to have accepted the general principle (which also applies to the "basing countries" involved and not just the two signatories). However, although the principle has been achieved, the practice of procedures on the enormous scale envisaged for the wide range of equipments now listed remains to be determined and will occupy a great deal of research and debate before the modalities are agreed.

5.2. The wording in the mandate indicates that both parties agree on the necessity of a thorough verification system to ensure the success of any arms control agreement. As we all know, verification has always been an essential issue for the West. Earlier proposals from the Warsaw Treaty countries have been rejected because they lacked reliable verification.

5.3. The INF treaty too contains provision for verification; but there the problem is much easier in practice. With the INF treaty all weapons systems concerned are eliminated. The inspections (including possibly the use of satellites) will be limited to the question of whether missiles are there or not. With the CFE talks, the issue is not elimination of whole systems but reduction to certain levels. That requires counting. Counting, however, is not possible without adequate data of numbers, location, etc., etc.

5.4. It therefore seems unavoidable that verification in the CFE context should be matched with an exact description by the participating countries of what weaponry systems are where and possibly even details of stationing of military personnel. Even then, verification will give us many practical problems, mainly because of the extent of territory involved and the numbers concerned.

5.5. Your Rapporteur, like all other recent Rapporteurs of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, is convinced that Western European Union should and must contribute to the verification process along the lines previously recommended. It is essential that the Council should ensure as a matter of urgency that practical research is carried out by WEU as such on this vital subject and made public.

VI. Prospects

6.1. When talking to the various national delegations, the Rapporteur encountered a general feeling that the prospects are favourable. There are signs of goodwill from the Warsaw Pact members. After years of stagnation we now see a breakthrough on several points:

(a) the fact that verification is no longer a stumbling-block;

(b) the publication of numbers in the statement by the Committee of the Ministers of Defence of the Warsaw Pact member states, on 30th January 1989; with the implicit recognition of their preponderance of tanks, armoured vehicles and artillery;

(c) the publication of some defence expenditure figures by a number of Warsaw Pact countries, amongst others the USSR (17.2 billion roubles worth of running costs – clearly not including capital costs); albeit still lacking any details;

(d) unilateral reductions, announced by Mr. Gorbachev, as a first step, and concerning 281,000 (240,000) personnel, 11,900 (10,000) tanks, 9,130 (8,500) artillery and 930 (800) aircraft (the USSR’s share being the numbers in brackets).

There are potentially numerous pitfalls. The parties concerned have very different estimates of each other’s numbers. These differences cannot always be explained by different definitions (e.g. of armoured vehicles). To summarise the different estimates:

<table>
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<th>NATO has, according to:</th>
<th>NATO itself</th>
<th>Warsaw Pact</th>
<th>IISS</th>
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<tr>
<td>Military personnel (× 1,000)</td>
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<td>Tanks</td>
<td>16,424</td>
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<td>Armoured vehicles</td>
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<td>6,200</td>
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<td>Artillery</td>
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<td>Anti-tank weapons</td>
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<td>Attack helicopters</td>
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<td>Attack aircraft</td>
<td>3,977</td>
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<th>The Warsaw Pact has, according to:</th>
<th>NATO</th>
<th>Warsaw Pact itself</th>
<th>IISS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Military personnel (× 1,000)</td>
<td>3,090</td>
<td>2,776</td>
<td>2,143</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanks</td>
<td>51,500</td>
<td>59,470</td>
<td>53,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armoured vehicles</td>
<td>22,400</td>
<td>70,330</td>
<td>23,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Artillery</td>
<td>43,300</td>
<td>71,560</td>
<td>44,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-tank weapons</td>
<td>44,200</td>
<td>11,465</td>
<td>13,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attack helicopters</td>
<td>3,700</td>
<td>2,785</td>
<td>1,220</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attack aircraft</td>
<td>8,250</td>
<td>5,355</td>
<td>7,650</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6.2. The most logical approach is, of course, to negotiate equal ceilings without bothering too much about the present numbers. It looks as if this is what may happen. What is important to establish in the opening rounds of the CFE negotiations is a step-by-step approach: interim accords even, rather than trying to establish baseline data before proposing reductions (a major problem during the long years of the MBFR talks). Efforts should be concentrated on levels to be achieved and verified after reductions have been implemented. It will also be necessary for parallel reflection on equipment and system definitions sometimes at a fairly basic level: for example in defining just what comprises a “main battle tank” – a combination perhaps of weight, propulsion, armour, gun calibre, speed, etc. This defining of systems is important from another and related point of view: the “equal ceilings” phrase written into the mandate. “Equality” has different meanings: in the judgment of some, the equality is simply numeric; others believe that a qualitative assessment as well as the quantitative is necessary (e.g. “is a tank built this year worth two made ten years ago?”). The Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments has already highlighted the thorny problem of quantity versus quality and the subject will be further considered in the committee’s forthcoming report on “Force comparisons” (Rapporteur: Mr. Steiner) although your Rapporteur believes that it would be wise not to go into too much detail on the qualitative aspects, but stick to straight numbers.

9. See “Atlantic News” (edition 1989/1-2). The sources are:
   - “Conventional forces in Europe: the facts”, NATO, November 1988;

6.3. Furthermore, East and West do not agree about the issue of aircraft (and helicopters). The Warsaw Pact countries want them to be included in the CFE; the NATO countries do not. The mandate leaves this an open question on purpose. It is generally assumed that NATO has a qualitative preponderance of attack aircraft. Apparently, the Warsaw Pact sees this as a threat. If NATO withdrew some of its squadrons to the USA, it would be considered as a reduction in the definition of the mandate. Rightly so, because the direct threat would be reduced by a longer warning time. It would certainly be a concession by the West, which would justify concessions from the East. On the other hand, we should realise that in case of an unexpected military crisis, these squadrons could be flown back to Europe within a few hours. Therefore, the question seems justified if it is correct for the West to see this as a predominant issue. Proposals by NATO should include substantial reductions in due course in western arsenals of such weapons.

6.4. Aircraft of whatever primary role (including “air defence” and “ground support”) are obviously capable of surprise attack by their very nature and it is exceedingly difficult therefore not to include all categories for consideration when it becomes a question of reductions. In addition, although naval forces _per se_ are excluded from the mandate, what is the position of naval air forces which are land-based only and cannot be embarked (such as the Federal German Navy’s Tornadoes and most maritime patrol aircraft, e.g. the P3 Orion)? Detailed agreement on interpretation of the “rules of the game” by all parties is vital if progress is to be made, which means bringing into the open issues such as those described above. We should, however, realise that this concerns only land-based aircraft in Europe.

6.5. The unilateral cuts already announced by the USSR and its allies would bring the total numbers of Warsaw Pact tanks in Eastern Europe below the ceiling NATO had originally planned to seek. The initial western proposal for the CFE talks would have allowed some 12,800 tanks in Warsaw Pact countries outside the Soviet Union, but President Gorbachev and Eastern European governments have already pledged cuts which would, if carried through in entirety, leave only 11,600. By now offering to cut 10% of western tanks (if not even more, although a “zero option” in such weapons cannot yet be contemplated: the tank raises far more emotions than an intermediate-range nuclear missile ever did!) instead of the 5% first considered, much greater Warsaw Pact reductions could be expected. Present Soviet concessions on tanks do not fundamentally alter the substance of the talks which involve a much larger overall total of armoured fighting vehicles, including thousands of tanks in western parts of the Soviet Union.

6.6. It is evident that, in general, ceilings should be visibly below the lowest one of the two parties. Politically speaking, this is an absolute necessity. Otherwise, it would be seen that the Warsaw Pact is reducing forces and that NATO is not. Besides, it is attractive to the West as well as a means of reducing defence expenditure (and appealing to public opinion).

6.7. Finally, the publication of a few figures from the defence budget by some Warsaw Pact countries can only be a first step which should be followed by further more complete details. Only when the defence budgets of all the CSCE countries are as detailed and transparent as those of the West can there be a substantive effect on confidence- and security-building.

_VII. Most recent developments_

7.1. The negotiations were resumed on 7th March 1989. Both parties came with their “opening bids”. The Warsaw Pact proposed three stages:

Stage 1: (1991-1994) with asymmetrical reductions of attack aircraft and helicopters, tanks, armoured vehicles and artillery; 10 to 15% below the lowest party. Special measures to prevent surprise attack on both sides of the whole of the contact line; the withdrawal of offensive weapons and several CSBM proposals.

Stage 2: (1994-1997) with the old “Budapest 1986” idea of a further 25% reduction of troops with their armaments.

Stage 3: (after 1997) with more reductions (not specified) to the level of defensive armed forces, and agreements on other weapons systems.

7.2. NATO proposed equal ceilings at 5 to 10% below its actual level and no involvement of attack aircraft in the CFE; numbers for NATO and Warsaw Pact each should be: 20,000 tanks, 28,000 armoured vehicles and 16,500 artillery; no country should have more than 30% of these numbers; more ceilings for armed forces outside own territory and specified regions. Apart from the issue of the attack aircraft, these proposals do not seem entirely incompatible.

_VIII. Short-range nuclear forces_

8.1. In the middle of the nineties, Lance missiles will be obsolete and NATO countries will have to make up their minds on their
replacement. The Montebello decision to reduce the number of nuclear warheads to 4,500 pieces, plays a rôle, as well as the recently developed ideas about the "shift" — the replacement of very short-range nuclear weapons (Lance and artillery) by others with a somewhat longer range (but not more than 500 km). Three crucial questions should be put:

(a) Should we not aim at a zero option for SNF, the so-called third zero option?
(b) If not, is replacement of the current weapon system necessary?
(c) When should a decision about such replacement be taken?

Your Rapporteur offers the following views:

(a) We should not give up hope of a nuclear weapon-free world. But it requires much more than a balance in conventional armaments to realise this. In history, conventional armaments have never deterred aggressors: nuclear armaments, however, have. In Europe we have not had a war for more than forty-three years. That is the longest period without an armed conflict between European countries since the Middle Ages, in spite of a cold war and serious tensions as during the rebellions of the people in Hungary and Czechoslovakia. Very few deny that we owe this to nuclear deterrence. Therefore, we need a mix of conventional and nuclear armaments, even in a situation of balance between conventional armed forces at a lower level. We can think of disposing of nuclear weapons only in a future where the political situation has profoundly changed for the better; and for that we still have a very long way to go.

Of course, there are encouraging developments in Eastern Europe. A new wind blows in the Soviet Union and the events in Poland and particularly in Hungary give us hope that civil rights will be more and more respected. But we have to see if this will continue, and besides that there are very dark facts. In Romania and Bulgaria, their own people and especially the cultural minorities are severely oppressed. In Czechoslovakia the author Havel and others from Charter '77 have been arrested. Activists for human rights like Vevelka and Petrova were recently sentenced to prison because on 18th January they demonstrated on the spot where Jan Palach set himself on fire 20 years ago. As long as we cannot be absolutely sure of the good intentions of the regimes in Eastern Europe, we cannot afford to abandon deterrence by nuclear weapons.

The Hague platform mentions very rightly that "to be credible and effective, the strategy of deterrence and defence must continue to be based on an adequate mix of appropriate nuclear and conventional forces, only the nuclear element of which can confront a potential aggressor with an unacceptable risk ".

(b) We cannot avoid the replacement of the Lance. Otherwise the missiles would become obsolete and finally lose their credibility as a deterrent. The Warsaw Pact has here too a preponderance over NATO. The following summary shows this quite clearly:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NATO and France</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Range</th>
<th>Warhead(s)</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lance</td>
<td>1972</td>
<td>110 km</td>
<td>1-100 Kt</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pluton</td>
<td>1974</td>
<td>120 km</td>
<td>15-25 Kt</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Warsaw Pact</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Range</th>
<th>Warhead(s)</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Frog</td>
<td>1957/1965</td>
<td>70 km</td>
<td>200 Kt</td>
<td>868</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scud</td>
<td>1965</td>
<td>300 km</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>791</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(c) The question is, by what system the Lance should be replaced and if it should necessarily be land-based? The possibility of a stand-off weapon (SOW) system should be covered in the framework of the comprehensive concept. SOWs are launched from an aircraft or a submarine and can hit a

target some hundreds of kilometres away. The Soviets have a problem in reconsidering their own position and even greater problems in changing their philosophy. Our own concerns will have to be applied to future lower levels of forces and we shall certainly need a period of technical and tactical research before we make a sensible decision. Besides, a definitive decision at present would cast an unnecessary shadow on the CFE talks and that would not be in the interests of either party. The countries of WEU should do all the necessary research and make all the preparations for the production of the successor to Lance, but take the final decision on production in, say, two or three years' time. Then we can decide about numbers, depending on the political situation. In the meantime, no valuable time will be lost.

IX. The Western European perspective

9.1. We Western Europeans have been fairly ambivalent on many questions of arms control. We sat back and listened to the debates between the two superpowers on nuclear weapons, without feeling too concerned ourselves (although we paid lip-service to the conclusions and, at least here in the Assembly, encouraged the ratification of the treaty (Resolution 77 adopted by the Assembly on 2nd December 1987). We have had a more active rôle in the debates in Geneva at the Conference on Disarmament and have even taken the initiative, as a result of the French-sponsored gathering on chemical weapons in Paris in January, in trying to give fresh impetus to deliberations which were showing signs of slowing down (albeit that these talks concern weapons which each of our states, bound by the provisions of the Brussels Treaty, declares formally every year not to possess).

9.2. Now, with the mandate for negotiation on conventional armed forces in Europe, we Western European Union members are all directly and inextricably concerned in arms control: the control of armaments which are not arms for deterrence (conventional arms have rarely deterred any would-be aggressor), which are not the nuclear weapons one hopes will never be used, but the "every-day" "ordinary" arms like tanks, guns and troops. These discussions are not about the supposed end of the world, which is incomprehensible, but about weapons for invasion and occupation which many people living today in our nations have experienced personally. That is why the Europeans must contribute directly, as Europeans first and foremost, in Vienna and never lose sight of the fact that these negotiations are crucial for the reduction and even eventually the elimination of any sense of threat to our security and independence. A first practical and immediately feasible step in the right direction would be for the country which is Chairman-in-Office of the Council to establish in its delegation in Vienna, a WEU liaison officer for the CFE talks.
APPENDIX

Mandate for negotiation on conventional armed forces in Europe

The representatives of Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, France, the German Democratic Republic, the Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Spain, Turkey, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom and the United States of America held consultations in Vienna from 17th February 1987 to 10th January 1989.

These states,
Conscious of the common responsibility which they all have for seeking to achieve greater stability and security in Europe;
Acknowledging that it is their armed forces which bear most immediately on the essential security relationship in Europe, in particular as they are signatories of the treaties of Brussels (1948), Washington (1949) or Warsaw (1955), and accordingly are members of the North Atlantic Alliance or parties to the Warsaw Treaty;
Recalling that they are all participants in the CSCE process;
Recalling that, as reaffirmed in the Helsinki Final Act, they have the right to belong or not to belong to international organisations, to be or not to be a party to bilateral or multilateral treaties including the right to be or not to be a party to treaties of alliance;
Determined that a negotiation on conventional armed forces in Europe should take place in the framework of the CSCE process;
Reaffirming also that they participate in negotiations as sovereign and independent states and on the basis of full equality;
Have agreed on the following provisions:

Participants

The participants in this negotiation shall be the 23 above-listed states hereinafter referred to as "the participants".

Objectives and methods

The objectives of the negotiation shall be to strengthen stability and security in Europe through the establishment of a stable and secure balance of conventional armed forces, which include conventional armaments and equipment, at lower levels; the elimination of disparities prejudicial to stability and security; and the elimination, as a matter of priority, of the capability for launching surprise attack and for initiating large-scale offensive action. Each and every participant undertakes to contribute to the attainment of these objectives.

These objectives shall be achieved by the application of militarily significant measures such as reductions, limitations, redeployment provisions, equal ceilings, and related measures, among others.

In order to achieve the above objectives, measures should be pursued for the whole area of application with provisions, if and where appropriate, for regional differentiation to redress disparities within the area of application and in a way which precludes circumvention.

The process of strengthening stability and security should proceed step-by-step, in a manner which will ensure that the security of each participant is not affected adversely at any stage.

Scope and area of application

The subject of the negotiation shall be the conventional armed forces, which include conventional armaments and equipment, of the participants based on land within the territory of the participants in Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals.

The existence of multiple capabilities will not be a criterion for modifying the scope of the negotiation:

– No conventional armaments or equipment will be excluded from the subject of the negotiation because they may have other capabilities in addition to conventional ones. Such armaments or equipment will not be singled out in a separate category:
  – Nuclear weapons will not be a subject of this negotiation.

Particular emphasis will initially be placed on those forces directly related to the achievement of the objectives of the negotiation set out above.

Naval forces and chemical weapons will not be addressed.

The area of application shall be the entire land territory of the participants in Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals, which includes all the European island territories of the participants. In the case of the Soviet Union the area of application includes all the territory lying west of the

1. Conventional armed forces include conventional armaments and equipment.
Ural River and the Caspian Sea. In the case of Turkey the area of application includes the territory of Turkey north and west of the following line: the point of intersection of the border with the 39th parallel, Muradiye, Patnos, Karayazi, Tekman, Kemaliye, Feke, Ceyhan, Dogankent, Gozne and thence to the sea.

Exchange of information and verification

Compliance with the provisions of any agreement shall be verified through an effective and strict verification regime which, among other things, will include on-site inspections as a matter of right and exchanges of information.

Information shall be exchanged in sufficient detail so as to allow a meaningful comparison of the capabilities of the forces involved. Information shall also be exchanged in sufficient detail so as to provide a basis for the verification of compliance.

The specific modalities for verification and the exchange of information, including the degree of detail of the information and the order of its exchange, shall be agreed at the negotiation proper.

Procedures and other arrangements

The procedures for the negotiation, including the agenda, work programme and timetable, working methods, financial issues and other organisational modalities, as agreed by the participants themselves, are set out in Annex 1. This mandate. They can be changed only by consensus of the participants.

The participants decided to take part in meetings of the states signatories of the Helsinki Final Act to be held at least twice during each round of the negotiation on conventional armed forces in Europe in order to exchange views and substantive information concerning the course of the negotiation on conventional armed forces in Europe. Detailed modalities for these meetings are contained in Annex 2 to this mandate.

The participants will take into consideration the views expressed in such meetings by other CSCE participating states concerning their own security.

Participants will also provide information bilaterally.

The participants undertake to inform the next CSCE follow-up meeting of their work and possible results and to exchange views, at that meeting, with the other CSCE participating states on progress achieved in the negotiation.

The participants foresee that, in the light of circumstances at the time, they will provide in their timetable for a temporary suspension to permit this exchange of views. The appropriate time and duration of this suspension is their sole responsibility.

Any modification of this mandate is the sole responsibility of the participants, whether they modify it themselves or concur in its modification at a future CSCE follow-up meeting.

The results of the negotiation will be determined only by the participants.

Character of agreements

Agreements reached shall be internationally binding. Modalities for their entry into force will be decided at the negotiation.

Venue

The negotiation shall commence in Vienna no later than in the seventh week following the closure of the Vienna CSCE meeting.

... Extracts from Annex 2 to the mandate for negotiation on conventional armed forces in Europe

Statement of the Representative of Denmark

On behalf of the Government of Denmark, I wish to confirm that the Faroe Islands are included in the area of application for the negotiation on conventional armed forces in Europe.

Statement of the Representative of Norway

On behalf of the Government of Norway, I confirm that Svalbard including Bear Island, is included in the area of application for the negotiation on conventional armed forces in Europe.

Statement of the Representative of Portugal

The islands of Azores and Madeira have by right the status of European islands. It has been agreed in the mandate that all the European island territories of the participants are included in the area of application. I can therefore state on behalf of my Government that the Azores and Madeira are within the area of application for the negotiation on conventional armed forces in Europe.

Statement of the Representative of Spain

On behalf of the Government of Spain, I confirm that the Canary Islands are included in the area of application for the negotiation on conventional armed forces in Europe.

Statement of the Representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

On behalf of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, I confirm that Franz Josef Land and Novaya Zemlya are included in the area of application for the negotiation on conventional armed forces in Europe.