



# Assembly of Western European Union

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FORTY-THIRD SESSION

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The WEU Military Committee

**REPORT**

submitted on behalf of the Defence Committee  
by Mr Giannattasio, Rapporteur



*The WEU Military Committee*

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REPORT<sup>1</sup>

*submitted on behalf of the Defence Committee<sup>2</sup>  
by Mr Giannattasio, Rapporteur*

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submitted by Mr Giannattasio, Rapporteur

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<sup>1</sup> Adopted in Committee by 15 votes to 3 with 0 abstentions.

<sup>2</sup> *Members of the Committee* Mr De Decker (Chairman), MM Schloten, Marten (Vice-Chairmen), MM Alloncle, Baumel, *Beaufays*, Mrs Beer, Mrs Calleja, MM Cioni, Davis, Dees, Dhaille, Diaz de Mera, Giannattasio, Horn, Lemoine, Mrs Lentz-Cornette, MM Magginas, Mardones Sevilla (Alternate *Bolinaga*), Mr McNamara (Alternate Lord Judd), MM Medeiros Ferreira, *Micheloyiannis*, Mitterrand, *Mota Amaral*, Lord Newall, Mr Pereira Coelho (Alternate *Pocas Santos*), MM Polenta, Robles Fraga (Alternate *Martinez*), Lord Russell-Johnston, Mr Selva, Ms Shipley, Mrs Soutendijk van Appeldoorn, MM Speroni, Valk (Alternate *Blaauw*), MM Valkeniers, *Verivakis*, Zierer.

*Associate member*, Mr Sungur.

N B *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics*

*Draft Recommendation*  
*on the WEU Military Committee*

The Assembly,

- (i) Strongly endorsing the further development and reinforcement of a European security and defence identity which is at the same time the European pillar within NATO,
- (ii) Noting, however, that the relationship between WEU and NATO on the one hand, and WEU and the EU on the other, and the extent of Europe's autonomy in the field of security and defence still needs clarification;
- (iii) Noting that there is a need to define clearly to what extent and in what respect WEU is complementary to NATO,
- (iv) Noting that WEU's rationale is based on its capability to deploy forces for a military operation in order to protect the territories and security and defence interests of its member states,
- (v) Considering that Operation Alba, in which Eurofor-Euromarfor countries played a pivotal role, has shown that in such cases rapid intervention at an early stage can prevent a crisis from becoming uncontrollable,
- (vi) Aware that such relatively small-scale rapid interventions may only be suited to deal with crises in a limited theatre in the lower range of Petersberg missions for a period of a few months or less, when the risk of interference by other adverse forces is non-existent,
- (vii) Considering that decisions in NATO to deploy forces, even where this concerns immediate reaction forces, are requiring longer lead times than in the past and will require even longer lead times in the future due to enlargement and the changed relationship with European non-member states, including Russia,
- (viii) Noting that the inclusion of the "double-hatted" status in the concept of "forces answerable to WEU" (FAWEU) must not stand in the way of their immediate availability and their operational capability for possible rapid interventions by WEU;
- (ix) Noting that it is vital for WEU to have relatively small and flexible but immediately available forces at its disposal for operations where WEU acts without using NATO assets and capabilities,
- (x) Considering that such WEU forces should at least consist of a multinational light infantry division comprising some 10 000 to 12 000 troops supported by an air component providing transport, close air support and reconnaissance, and by naval forces being assigned mainly to transport and escort missions,
- (xi) Recalling that the availability of strategic air transport at short notice is essential for such smaller interventions which are tending to become a primary WEU task,
- (xii) Welcoming the Council's decision to establish a Military Committee and to reorganise the military structure at WEU headquarters and bring it under the authority of a three-star general/flag officer in order to reinforce and emphasise the increased importance of WEU's military component,
- (xiii) Noting that an agreement has not yet been reached concerning the relationship between the Politico-Military Group and the Military Delegates Committee with regard to the provision of harmonised military advice to the Council,
- (xiv) Considering that the establishment of a Military Committee makes little sense if this Committee is not able to provide the Council with advice on military and operational matters,
- (xv) Considering that the advice of the Military Committee should be given directly to the Council and simultaneously presented to the Politico-Military Group, which can take it into account in its politico-military advice to the Council,

- (xvi) Welcoming the decision to make the Situation Centre a military component under the authority of the three-star general/flag officer.
- (xvii) Emphasising the importance of the work now being done to review the terms of reference of the Planning Cell and the Situation Centre,
- (xviii) Considering that after completion of this review, the role of WEU's military components vis-à-vis the European Union's prospective Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit should be defined;
- (xix) Regretting that the Satellite Centre is not to become a military component while understanding that, under the present circumstances, the current status of the Centre may be the best possible guarantee for its functioning,
- (xx) Aware that the head of WEU's military staff will ensure close liaison with the Satellite Centre and looking forward to early results of the Space Group's work on the definition of relations between the Satellite Centre and the Planning Cell with a view to enhancing the role and functioning of each of them,

#### RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

- 1 React more quickly and adequately to any future crisis where it is clear there is a role for WEU,
2. Establish an immediate WEU reaction force consisting of a multinational light infantry division supported by an air and naval component, available at very short notice, in order to increase WEU's complementarity with NATO and to make the European security and defence identity visible at the level of military forces.
- 3 Ensure that the mandate of the WEU Military Committee also includes the task of assuming Military Steering Group functions in support of the WEU Council of Ministers during intervention operations.
4. Ensure that the advice of the Military Committee be given directly to the Council and simultaneously presented to the Politico-Military Group, which can take it into account in its politico-military advice to the Council.
- 5 Define the role of WEU's military components vis-à-vis the European Union's prospective Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit as soon as the review of the terms of reference of both the Planning Cell and the Situation Centre has been completed.
- 6 Urge the Space Group, in the work it has resumed on the definition of relations between the Planning Cell and the Satellite Centre, to make provision for the closest possible links between the two with a view to enhancing the role and functioning of each of them

## *Explanatory Memorandum*

*(submitted by Mr Giannattasio, Rapporteur)*

### *I. Introduction*

1. Any proposal to set up a WEU Military Committee must first address the fact that to regard NATO and WEU as complementary is meaningful only to the extent that the two organisations are comparable. In other words, even though NATO's predominance is at present unassailable and irreplaceable, WEU has to be given more military credibility in its own right, otherwise "complementary" will simply come to mean "subordinate" and WEU will be a political organisation without independent military means, forever doomed to subjection to the decisions of others.

2. There is, however, no need to create WEU's Military Committee in the same image and likeness as that of NATO – for it to be a mere scaled-down version of the latter. It should rather take on a new shape that allows it to offer practical support to any action adopted by the WEU Council of Ministers for the joint operations of WEU member states.

3. Viewed in this light, a guiding principle can be deduced from the following considerations. Each member of an alliance complements that alliance while retaining its autonomy and its sovereign power of decision within the overall framework. Hence although the purpose of the security and defence architecture conceived at Maastricht is in effect to build a European pillar within NATO that finds expression in a European security and defence identity (ESDI), this does not alter the validity of WEU's fundamental remit to secure the defence of the signatory states of the modified Brussels Treaty.

4. WEU's very ability to achieve, or regain, autonomy and at the same time be part of a whole will thus be the measure of how far Europe has achieved a true security and defence identity both in its affirmation of the Organisation as a full-blooded institution that carries substance and through the active contribution it thereby makes to European security within the meaning of Article J 4 of the Maastricht Treaty.

### *II. WEU's military organisation*

5. For a military organisation to be effective, it needs to have a clear definition of its tasks, forces assigned to it, a command structure and a politico-military decision-taking structure. Each of these issues will be discussed succinctly in the present chapter, after a discussion of the existing political context and recent experience in the field of European decision-taking and operations.

#### *(a) The political context*

6. The fundamental notion of a military structure's essential purpose is that it should be the means of achieving the political ends pursued by the institution from which it emanates, which implies that the political institution should in its turn have sufficient independent power of decision to be able to deploy the resources (military or otherwise) that it considers necessary to achieve those ends.

7. It is therefore important to understand and define (or redefine) correctly what is meant by complementarity in the relationship between NATO and WEU since the term can be applied to ideas that range from subordination to combining forces.

8. The wording of Article J 7 of the Treaty of Amsterdam does not provide a solution to this issue and the status accorded to complementarity will therefore depend on the political adeptness of WEU members and their determination to guarantee and defend their shared interests through the use of the military instrument available to them under the modified Brussels Treaty and ensure its compatibility with the NATO framework as set out in the Maastricht Treaty.

9. The CJTF (combined joint task forces) concept cannot even be considered an entirely safe proposition since the CJTF chain of command, a typical NATO command structure, and the politico-military decision-making hierarchy, which devolves downwards from the NAC (North Atlantic Council), have the effect of ensuring that NATO assets made available in this

way to WEU still remain significantly dependent on SHAPE

10. Therefore although it is possible to conceive of circumstances where the CJTF concept allows WEU to conduct a military operation with NATO assets under its command, it is perhaps no exaggeration to suggest that if certain criteria to be discussed later in more detail, are not met, this would merely serve to entrench WEU's subordination to NATO. This would appear from the outset to be a complete travesty of the notion of complementarity

*(b) Recent experience*

11. The Council of NATO defence ministers issued the following statement at the close of their meeting on 18 December 1996 " . . . we are committed to ensuring the Alliance's effectiveness, to strengthening the transatlantic link, to developing the European security and defence identity (ESDI) within the Alliance . . ." Of these objectives, development of the ESDI should be placed firmly at the head of WEU's list of priorities, if only for the sake of consistency.

12. Notwithstanding confirmation of the above statement in recent NATO documents including the Madrid communiqué of July 1997 where the seal was set on Alliance enlargement, it should be noted that two sets of circumstances have in the meantime served to make it abundantly clear that Europe still has a long way to go to find its European security and defence identity

13. The first of these was the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina which, in spite of a powerful European input, revealed the degree to which the European initiative was not complementary but subordinate to United States action, which was also instrumental in organising the substantial military operation under NATO command with many third countries participating. The organisational and political reasons for this are many but it should be noted that what was originally a limited conflict gradually gathered momentum at the very heart of Europe. Successive European interventions were unable to bring it under control and the situation reached a stage which was considered totally unacceptable in the eyes of public opinion before finally being resolved as a result of a decisive United States initiative, followed by the deployment of foreign military forces under NATO command

14. Whether NATO could have achieved anything without European help is debatable but the impression that remains is as described above. decisive intervention in Bosnia has to a far greater extent been under United States rather than European control

15. The second event was the crisis in Albania in spring 1997. It seems beyond question that this was a turning point as military intervention took place in a wholly European context. NATO could even be criticised in this instance for its indifference or scepticism

16. It is also worth recalling here that on 13 March, in the thick of the Albanian crisis therefore, the WEU Assembly's Standing Committee recommended that the WEU Council of Ministers should " . . . ask the Planning Cell to draw up contingency plans for possible operations in Albania covering the full range of Petersberg options, from humanitarian and rescue tasks to peacekeeping tasks and peacemaking, including control over the restitution of arms and munitions"<sup>1</sup>

17. However, for a variety of reasons on which it would be futile to go into detail, no specific commitment was entered into by the WEU Council of Ministers in response to this important Assembly recommendation, although practical involvement by Europeans did in fact ensue. It is important to note the pivotal role played by the Eurofor-Euromarfor countries in that intervention

18. Thus we can conclude, despite all the twists and turns due to the very difficult political situation that prevailed, that between the Bosnian and Albanian crises there was a perceptible shift in European thinking on crisis management. In particular, two new elements in European decision-taking regarding the crisis in Albania were crucial in helping to bring the emerging crisis under control:

- the establishment of a "coalition of the willing", consisting of countries that were prepared to participate in an operation based on a United Nations mandate.

<sup>1</sup> WEU Assembly Recommendation 609 on the situation in Albania, adopted unanimously by the Standing Committee on 13 March 1997.

- the rapid intervention with a military force of limited size, deployed before the crisis became uncontrollable

19 If it is generally true of this type of operation that the ideal solution takes time while what is best does not necessarily deliver operational and political effectiveness in the short term, then we must accept, in future, that timely, albeit imperfectly conceived intervention – which can also mean substantial resource savings – is preferable to waiting for broad consensus needing time and exhaustive consultation, the protracted nature of which tends to mean that crises constantly move beyond the range of one's ability to forestall them.

20. This kind of small-scale, rapid intervention is, for these very reasons, effective and Albania provides us with an example of how crises can at least be contained, if not prevented, before matters reach a pitch where more difficult and costly peace-enforcement operations have to be implemented

21 Predictably at this juncture somebody or other will take fright at the idea of security becoming regionalised – with some justification since rapid, small-scale intervention presupposes that individual European countries are spared the "opt in/opt out" dilemma

22 This particular fear, frequently invoked in the past, has led to – even imposed – a need to seek consensual solutions, with the inevitable delay that this entails

23. On the other hand it is clear that timely *à la carte* intervention is more effective under certain operational conditions than operations – albeit carefully planned and jointly agreed – that take place after the event. Operational conditions to which this type of intervention might be suited are those where the aim is to tackle crisis flash-points within a limited theatre, against forces that are poorly organised and under conditions which, broadly speaking, allow intervention to be confined to a period of a few months or less. This would seem to suggest circumstances where the vested interests involved are relatively few, and where those wishing to intervene can do so on the assumption, not that wholesale cooperation will be forthcoming from all concerned, but rather that they will not meet with any adverse intervention from other quarters

24 Furthermore the worsening of a crisis, even one with little initial momentum, can ultimately lead to European and other countries becoming directly and inextricably caught up in disputes over which they have no control, which could undermine European solidarity

25 For those still in any doubt on this point it is worth recalling that the NATO enlargement process effectively marked a regionalisation of interests within the Alliance – which is a far more significant development than defence regionalisation – but without Alliance solidarity so far being called into question

26. To this might be added the consideration that, according to well-established practice, legitimisation of international interventions now boils down to approval by the United Nations – a framework in which there will, however, be no joint European representation irrespective of how the Security Council reform proceeds. Agreement on a "European" course of action can therefore be met only in a specifically European forum, particularly in relation to crises which, as observed earlier, require speedy rather than sophisticated forms of intervention

#### (c) Tasks

27. The possible tasks of WEU were discussed in full in Assembly Document 1518. However, it is worth repeating the paragraph in the Petersberg Declaration of 19 June 1992 which stated

"Apart from contributing to the common defence in accordance with Article 5 of the Washington Treaty and Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty respectively, military units of WEU member states, acting under the authority of WEU, could be employed for

- humanitarian and rescue tasks,
- peacekeeping tasks,
- tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacekeeping "

28 It would be a tall order for WEU to implement the full range of tasks in the near future, particularly because of the Organisation's limited operational capabilities. At the same time, it should be noted that it has become common usage to label only the three tasks mentioned at the end of the preceding paragraph as Peters-

berg tasks. The beginning of the paragraph states clearly, however, that military units of WEU member states, acting under the authority of WEU, also contribute to the common defence in accordance with Article 5 of the Washington Treaty and Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty.

29. Should it in general be assumed that the common defence of allied territory is the primary task of NATO? This is one of the questions that needs clarification if the objective remains workable symbiosis between the EU, NATO and WEU.

*(i) Forces*

30. Everyone is aware that there are forces answerable to WEU (FAWEU). As was pointed out in Assembly Document 1518, the word "answerable" suggests a rather strong institutional and hierarchical link between such units and WEU, but this should be interpreted as "at the disposal of WEU" or "available on demand" and not "assigned to", as is the case in NATO with the national armed forces of its member states.

31. In light of the great advantage, as discussed above, of rapid intervention, there may be an urgent need for WEU to review the notion of "forces answerable to WEU" as accepted to date, in particular because of the "double-hatting" of these forces, which presupposes an operational readiness subordinate to NATO requirements. NATO operational forces are based, as is common knowledge, on a tripartite structure comprising Immediate Reaction Forces (IRFs), Rapid Reaction Forces (RRFs) and Augmentation Forces (AFs), whose remit is no longer to deal with threats that are imminent or likely to materialise in the short term. Deployment of NATO forces, even of Immediate Reaction Forces, at present requires longer lead times for decision-making than in the past and it will require even longer lead times in an enlarged NATO. Thus the time it takes for NATO to intervene is quite likely to increase rather than decrease.

32. Intervention by WEU without using NATO assets and capabilities is supposed to apply only to small-scale crises in the European theatre, if there is to be no duplication with NATO. It will be essential for WEU to be operationally ready for immediate deployment. It

therefore follows that what is required from WEU forces is not so much that they should be large and "answerable" but rather that they should be smaller and immediately available.

33. At an initial rough estimate, the availability of a "variable geometry" multinational light infantry division comprising some 10 000 to 12 000 troops to take account of individual countries' right to opt in or out might be an acceptable starting point for dealing with crises on the scale of the Albanian crisis, or indeed slightly more extensive. It is also clear that immediate intervention requires a strategic transport capability. The configuration of such forces would therefore have to include, apart from land forces, adapted components of air and especially naval forces, with the former providing transport, close air support (CAS) and reconnaissance (RECCE) and naval forces being assigned mainly to transport and escort missions.

*(ii) Commands*

34. Several recent Defence Committee reports have discussed and sufficiently demonstrated that WEU has now established a full command structure which would enable it to conduct operations of a limited size, as mentioned above, without having to rely on other organisations. A case-by-case approach may be the most appropriate for appointing the operations commander. Where staff is concerned, the framework-nation system has proved most effective in multinational operations, with the framework nation being the one making the largest contribution to the particular operation. However, there is still a need to envisage expanding the Planning Cell which must be organised as a proper operational planning headquarters, while maintaining its links with NATO bodies.

*(iii) The politico-military chain of decision*

35. It must be acknowledged that, at present, the highest political decision-making body of WEU, the Council of Ministers, gives the impression of being able to operate only theoretically. Quite simply, the lack of any forces that WEU can deploy immediately unfailingly makes WEU Council decisions appear untimely – either too early or too late in relation to those taken in NATO. Not surprisingly therefore, a pale shadow of European coordination, the "Eurodinner" (the working dinner attended by

European defence ministers on the eve of a NATO Defence Planning Committee meeting) gives rise to the travesty of a pillar which is itself non-existent, given that the European forces that are meant to be the mainstay of that pillar constantly fail to be deployed

36 Clearly then, WEU either takes control of the forces which are at its disposal in order to intervene in situations falling within its remit (without weakening NATO in any way) thereby strengthening NATO/WEU complementarity, or remains, to all appearances, in a state of arrested development. The word "appearances" is pertinent in this context as the reality of recent events has shown that where needs must, and where support from statutory institutions is lacking, spontaneous but effective *à la carte* arrangements are tending to develop, with few misgivings over WEU or its non-existent assets

37. Going ahead with the initiative to give WEU substance not only implies respecting the spirit and letter of the existing treaties, it also means preventing WEU, under pressure of unavoidable circumstances and as a result of equally unavoidable *à la carte* decisions, turning into something quite different to what it is at present. This last eventuality could easily come about given that it is still very difficult to define what WEU's European defence role actually is

38 Setting up a WEU politico-military chain of decision is in practice subject to a decision by the WEU Council of Ministers as to which European forces to operate with. Whatever the outcome, this much is obvious: WEU's Military Committee, though it may escape an *à la carte* formation, could not itself have a predefined, established leadership even if such were called for as the result of some NATO seal of approval

39 Very likely it is this same bias in favour of equality among members that is holding WEU back. Nevertheless, powerful a brake though it is, the gathering momentum pushing towards coalitions, because of the number of crises looming over the horizon, is an equally effective counterweight. It is therefore up to WEU to decide whether to press forward towards a practical goal or abandon the field to other forms of organisation born of tangible situations of common danger

40. If WEU is going to establish a Military Committee in order to reinforce its military components, then this Committee should be more than a consultative body for the WEU Council of Ministers and should start acting as a military interface. In other words, in the Military Committee, the WEU Council's political instructions would become military instructions for organising and training forces ahead of missions, mission definition and control and mission outcomes

41 In this connection, on the assumption that missions undertaken should be small-scale, for immediate implementation, with operational cycles of short duration, it might reasonably be expected that WEU's Military Committee should have the backing of a planning staff, possibly with G2 and G4 (intelligence and logistics) components, a bigger overall staff complement than that of the present Planning Cell but with positively no expensive, top-heavy implications

42 On this assumption, WEU's Military Committee structure might be similar (but less cumbersome than) NATO's Military Committee with each country having its WEU military representative attached to the relevant diplomatic body (the permanent representation to WEU)

43 The Military Committee's tasks would essentially relate to

- assessment of the military situation,
- drafting instructions for training, operational and logistical planning,
- operational control of the joint budget,
- standardisation and interoperability measures,
- NATO-WEU military coordination measures,
- making recommendations and requests to the WEU Council of Ministers,
- assuming Military Steering Group functions in support of the WEU Council of Ministers during intervention operations

44 As well as off-line planning staff, the following should be answerable to WEU's Military Committee: the Theatre Commander appointed for the particular task, who in turn would appoint the Force Commander. These two commanders,

who cannot be permanent but would be chosen on a case-by-case basis, could use their own staff to provide the framework in which the multinational forces contributed by WEU members would operate

45 It would be important too, for the purpose of giving substance to the European pillar, for WEU's Military Committee to identify an appropriate spokesman from within its own ranks who would have a leading role in the Committee and would act as its mouthpiece to convey the positions of the WEU CHODs in NATO's Military Committee

### *III. The WEU Military Committee*

#### *(a) The general framework*

46 At its meeting in Paris on 13 May 1997, the WEU Council of Ministers approved the proposal of the Chiefs of Defence Staff (CHODs) to clarify and strengthen their role within WEU and to improve the functioning of the Military Delegates Group (MDG). In accordance with this proposal, the Ministers decided to establish, under the Council's authority, "a military committee consisting of the Chiefs of Defence Staff represented, in permanent session, by the Military Delegates Group under a permanent Chairman".

47 They further instructed the Permanent Council to work out the detailed implementation of this decision. They also asked the Permanent Council to study all the ensuing institutional implications and to present proposals to the next Ministerial Council for any further adaptations that might prove necessary, within the current politico-military crisis-management arrangements

48 The main reason for the Council's decision to establish a military committee was the growing conviction that the military components of WEU needed to be reinforced if the Organisation was to give practical effect to its operational capabilities. In order to emphasise the increased importance of WEU's military component, it was decided that it should be headed by a three-star general or flag officer

49 After the Paris meeting of the WEU Council, various working groups started examining the different aspects of the Council's decision to establish a military committee

50 The Council Working Group (CWG), consisting of representatives from national delegations to WEU in Brussels, examined the institutional aspects. The Politico-Military Group (PMG), composed of national delegates representing the views of both the political and military authorities, examined in particular the implications of the Council's decision on crisis-management procedures.

51 At the same time, the Military Delegates Group which is composed of the military delegates representing the Chiefs of Defence Staff, further examined the roles of the CHODs, the functioning of the MDG and the allocation of responsibilities between the military components within WEU headquarters

#### *(b) The institutional aspects*

52 As noted above, the Council Working Group (CWG) focused on the institutional implications of the establishment of a WEU Military Committee

53 In its conclusions, the CWG said it was aware that the establishment of the military components under the authority of the three-star general/flag officer outside the Secretariat-General should not alter the politico-military character of WEU as an institution. Neither should this prejudice the functioning of the existing politico-military structures, such as the Politico-Military Group or the Politico-Military Working Group<sup>2</sup> or create new problems or delays in WEU's decision-taking process

54 The CWG further noted that the above-mentioned three-star general/flag officer will be the permanent chairman of the Military Delegates Group (the Military Committee in permanent session) conveying its military advice to the Council and, if need be, to other bodies, and that he will also provide advice on military matters as necessary to the Secretary-General. As the director of WEU's military components, he will further be responsible for their appropriate input

<sup>2</sup> This working group is responsible for matters relating to the combined joint task forces (CJTF) and for WEU's follow-up to NATO's decision in Berlin in 1996 to strengthen the European security and defence identity within the Alliance

into and effective participation in other WEU bodies which are under the direction of the Council.

55. The CWG emphasised the importance of clarity and transparency in these matters which was a reason for ensuring that harmonised advice based on purely military considerations should be made available promptly and in parallel to all WEU bodies concerned with the management of a crisis, in particular the PMG.

56. The CWG noted that the Satellite Centre will not become a military component but that the three-star general/flag officer will ensure close liaison with it. It mentioned that the Space Group had decided to resume its work on the definition of relations between the Satellite Centre and the Planning Cell.

57. It also noted that for reasons of clarity and operational efficiency, consensus had been reached that the Situation Centre should become a military component under the authority of the three-star general/flag officer. On the other hand, the CWG insisted that as such, the Situation Centre would continue to operate under the ultimate authority of the WEU Council which would always be in a position to assign general or specific tasks to the Centre. In the opinion of the CWG, the Council would always ensure full access to and collaboration between the Situation Centre and other WEU bodies, such as the Secretary-General and the PMG and PMWG, and guarantee the ability of the Situation Centre to play its role in developing cooperation with other relevant institutions such as the EU and NATO. The CWG further noted that both in normal times and in a crisis the Situation Centre should have the possibility to operate with a mixed civil and military staff and to receive and use a wide range of non-military information.

58. In its conclusions, the CWG noted finally that a number of issues affecting the evolution of the military components would have to be clarified in the future, including a general review of the functioning of the Planning Cell, the terms of reference of the Situation Centre, the further development of relations with NATO, and the role of WEU military components vis-à-vis the European Union's prospective Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit. Any institutional issues

arising from these developments could be examined in the CWG in due course.

(c) *Consequences for crisis-management procedures*

59. The Politico-Military Group focused in particular on the implications of the establishment of a military committee for WEU's crisis-management procedures.

60. In its conclusions, the PMG emphasised the distinction between *military advice*, which was harmonised and formulated in the Military Delegates Committee (i.e. the Military Committee in permanent session) and *politico-military advice*, which was harmonised and formulated in the Politico-Military Delegates Group. The PMG considered it of primary importance that the establishment of the Military Committee and the related proposals for the allocation of responsibilities between the military components in WEU headquarters should not lead to an institutionalised separation between the political and military sides of the Organisation. It should in no way create new complications and delays in the WEU decision-taking process but rather increase WEU's efficiency in crisis management.

61. In the PMG's opinion, the existing working relations of the military components within the politico-military structure would not be called into question. It noted that contributions by the military components should remain available for the PMG on a practical working basis both for the handling of crises and in other phases of its work. The PMG will receive military advice from the MDC (the Military Committee in permanent session), advice on military matters from other bodies such as the Planning Cell and other forms of support from the respective representatives of the military components. A maximum amount of transparency between the different bodies was considered to be absolutely essential.

62. The PMG mentioned that it would remain responsible for preparing harmonised politico-military advice for the Council on contingency planning, while harmonised military advice on such planning would be provided by the Military Committee. As for the nomination of the Point of Contact between the WEU Council and the operations commander of a WEU operation, the PMG noted the agreement reached that the three-star general/flag officer should, as a general rule,



# Assembly of Western European Union

Document 1585  
Corrigendum

3 December 1997

*The consequences of the Madrid NATO summit  
for the development of WEU's relations  
with central and eastern European countries and Russia*

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## CORRIGENDUM TO THE REPORT

*submitted on behalf of the Political Committee  
by Mr Martínez Casañ*

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In the 26th line of paragraph 1 of the explanatory memorandum, replace "third pillar" by "second pillar"



act as the Point of Contact during WEU military operations and, when designated by the Council, for other operations as well

63 No agreement was reached concerning the relationship between the PMG and the MDC (the Military Committee in permanent session) with regard to the provision of harmonised military advice. Some thought that military advice should be forwarded directly to the Council while the PMG was simultaneously informed, while others thought that military advice should be forwarded to the Council via the PMG. A third group was of the opinion that the harmonised military advice of the Military Committee should be given directly to the Council, but that the Council would only consider it once the PMG had taken it into account in its politico-military advice to the Council

64 It should be noted that since the Council's decision in Lisbon, in May 1995, to establish a Politico-Military Group, this group has done important work for the enhancement of WEU's operational capabilities, in particular with regard to the establishment of the Intelligence Section in the Planning Cell and of the Situation Centre. The PMG has also been instrumental in discussing a number of major issues regarding WEU operations in former Yugoslavia. The first part of the 43rd annual report of the Council to the Assembly (Document 1592) provides a full list of activities of the PMG in the first half of 1997. This list includes the following issues

- crisis in the Great Lakes region (at 28),
- situation in Albania (at 28),
- follow-up to Crisex 95-96 post-exercise discussion (at 28),
- WEU exercise policy (at 28),
- framework nation (at 18),
- lessons learned in former Yugoslavia (at 18 and 28),
- joint use of training facilities (at 28),
- WEU assistance to humanitarian landmine clearance operations (at 28);
- African peacekeeping (at 28),
- joint use of elements of multinational FAWEU (at 18)

65 During that same period, the Military Delegates Group concentrated on an examination of the role of the CHODs, its own functioning and the allocation of responsibilities between the military components in WEU headquarters. Without specifying, the first part of the above-mentioned annual report mentions that "Further work included the provision of military advice on the framework nation concept and the harmonisation of crisis-management mechanisms and procedures". This demonstrates clearly, as noted in an earlier Defence Committee report<sup>3</sup>, that the PMG has partly taken over the role of the military delegates in the earlier WEU configuration.

66. Obviously, the PMG feels uneasy about the establishment of a military committee since it will diminish its own role in the WEU structure, which at present is preponderant and all-embracing

*(d) The Council's decision at Erfurt*

67 At their meeting in Erfurt on 18 November 1997, the WEU Ministers

"Welcomed the progress achieved since their meeting in Paris, in the implementation of their decision to establish a military committee of WEU. They approved the recommendation of the Permanent Council on the implementation of the military committee and the reorganisation of the military structure at WEU headquarters to coincide with the rotation of the Director of the Planning Cell in 1998. They noted that the responsibilities of the military committee as regards WEU's contribution to NATO defence planning will have to be clarified."

*(i) The Military Committee*

68 It has been specified that the Military Committee consists of the Chiefs of Defence Staff (CHODs) who will be represented in permanent session by the Military Delegates Committee (MDC) under a permanent chairman (the three-star general/flag officer)

69. The Military Committee is the senior military authority in WEU. It will be supported

<sup>3</sup> The operational organisation of WEU - Reply to the forty-first annual report of the Council, submitted on behalf of the Defence Committee by Mr Schloten, Rapporteur (Assembly Document 1518)

by the WEU military staff (see paragraphs 35 and following of the present report) The Military Committee comprises the CHODs of the member, associate member and observer states, but it may meet in other configurations, including associate partners, on a case-by-case basis and may also invite other participants to take part in relevant work As is the present practice, the CHODs will continue to meet twice a year, in principle before ministerial meetings of the WEU Council, and whenever necessary. The CHODs meeting is prepared and chaired by the CHOD of the member state holding the Presidency He acts as spokesman for the Military Committee on all formal occasions He conveys, when appropriate, the harmonised advice of the Military Committee The standing chairman of the MDC will participate in these meetings

70 To enable the Military Committee to operate in permanent session with genuine authority to express military advice, each CHOD is to nominate a permanent military delegate to represent him When the CHODs are not in session, the MDC will address military questions on their behalf

71 The Military Committee will be responsible to the WEU Council for the general conduct of WEU's military affairs It will participate in the politico-military decision-taking process in WEU by providing advice on military and operational matters to the Council, based, as a rule, on consensus

72 As mentioned earlier in this report, there are still divergent views on the question of whether the Military Committee can provide military advice to the WEU Council directly, while informing the PMG simultaneously, or only via the PMG

73 The establishment of a military committee, which is meant to clarify and strengthen the role of the CHODs within WEU makes little sense if its military advice can only reach the Council after having been diluted, adapted and reprocessed into politico-military advice by the PMG

74. The main responsibilities of the Military Committee are as follows

- to recommend to the WEU Council the military measures necessary for the implementation of Petersberg tasks,
- to discuss and develop consolidated views on WEU military issues and advise the WEU Council accordingly,
- to provide military advice as necessary on all matters relating to forces answerable to WEU (FAWEU) and to NATO assets and capabilities to be transferred to WEU;
- to evaluate plans, such as contingency and operation plans, or subsequent modifications to already approved plans, and provide military advice on plans.
- to assist in the provision of military intelligence to WEU's relevant bodies where appropriate;
- to exercise the CHODs' prerogatives defined by agreed documents in regard to the mandate of Eurolongterm<sup>4</sup>, WELG<sup>5</sup> and Eurocom<sup>6</sup>, taking into account the particular status of these groups and WMWG<sup>7</sup>,
- to participate in WEU's contribution to NATO's defence planning process and provide military advice to the WEU Council in accordance with modalities to be determined,
- to contribute to strengthening the military cooperation and consultation processes between WEU and NATO, especially when WEU-led operations using NATO assets and capabilities are being considered or implemented.

<sup>4</sup> Eurolongterm is a sub-group of the Eurogroup with the task of developing long-term operational doctrines and drawing up specifications for armaments and equipment

<sup>5</sup> WELG Western European Logistics Group is concerned with logistic support for WEU operations At Erfurt, on 18 November 1997, the Council approved a Joint Logistic Support Concept for WEU which had been prepared by the WELG

<sup>6</sup> Eurocom is a sub-group of the Eurogroup with the task of ensuring that the various national communications systems of WEU nations meet previously fixed technical and operational requirements allowing interoperability of the various equipment in service

<sup>7</sup> WMWG Western European Union Mobility Working Group

- to formulate military advice on crisis situations, enabling the WEU Council to take decisions to mount an operation and improve the arrangements for an operation in progress if necessary, and to decide when an operation should end,
- to recommend to the WEU Council measures in order to improve the operational development of WEU;
- to task, notwithstanding the WEU Council's prerogatives, all military components of WEU headquarters through the Director of the Military Structure and to inform the WEU Council accordingly

*(ii) The reorganisation of the military structure at WEU headquarters*

75 As a logical consequence of the Council's decision to establish a military committee which should reflect the increased importance of WEU's military component, the military structure at WEU headquarters had to be reorganised. Decisions to that effect were taken at the WEU Council's ministerial meeting at Erfurt on 18 November 1997 with the proviso that this reorganisation should coincide with the rotation of the Director of the Planning Cell in 1998.

*The WEU military staff*

76 It was decided to set up, under the authority of the WEU Council, a military staff under a three-star general/flag officer in order to ensure greater cohesion and strengthen internal relations between the military components in WEU headquarters. The WEU military staff will consist of the three-star general/flag officer, his supporting staff, the Planning Cell and the Situation Centre

*The three-star general/flag officer*

77 The three-star general/flag officer, acting under the authority of the WEU Council, will be both permanent Chairman of the MDC and Director of the WEU military staff. He will have his own support staff, in principle within existing staff resources. The post of this officer will be a non-quota post given to a representative of the member states and replacing the current Director of the Planning Cell on the existing strength. It is noted here that the terms of reference of the three-star general/flag officer and his support

staff are now being drafted in close cooperation between the Director of the Planning Cell and the Military Delegates Group

78 It goes without saying that in his capacity as permanent Chairman of the Military Delegates Committee (MDC), he will have the usual responsibilities of the chairmanship, including the forwarding of military advice on behalf of the MDC to the Permanent Council and keeping the Secretary-General informed of issues being discussed in the MDC

79. The permanent Chairman of the MDC will also ensure that additional information on the military advice put forward by the Military Committee will be communicated to WEU bodies, in particular the PMG and PMWG, where necessary. Finally, he will act as the MDC's spokesman and report to the WEU Council and/or the Military Committee on the work of the MDC

80 In his capacity as Director of the WEU military staff, the three-star general/flag officer is answerable to the WEU Council. Among many other things, he is responsible for the implementation of decisions taken and directives issued by the WEU Council and by the Military Committee. The Director will also assist the Secretary-General in carrying out WEU Council decisions, plan for WEU operations and exercises and prepare studies and work in the military field

81 As regards relations with NATO and the EU, he is responsible for

- ensuring interfaces and coordination with NATO's Military Committee and military command structure, at the appropriate levels,
- drawing on NATO support as agreed between WEU and NATO,
- ensuring the exchange of military information and documents as agreed between WEU and NATO,
- ensuring the exchange of military information and documents as agreed between WEU and the EU.

82 During WEU military operations and, when designated by the WEU Council for other operations, the Director of the WEU military

staff will, as a general rule, act as the Point of Contact

83 It has been noted earlier that – rather illogically – the Satellite Centre will not become a military component of WEU. The Director of the WEU military staff will therefore be responsible for ensuring close liaison with the Satellite Centre in the framework of the Council's directives to the Centre

84 It should be remembered that the WEU Space Group has decided to resume its work on the definition of relations between the Satellite Centre and the Planning Cell.

#### *The Planning Cell*

85 The Planning Cell and its work have been discussed extensively in earlier reports of the Defence Committee<sup>8</sup>. In order to adapt its role and activities to new circumstances, the WEU Council and the CHODs have mandated work on the terms of reference and future role of the Planning Cell

86 In the reorganised military structure, the Planning Cell will continue to be the military planning staff of WEU, which is responsible for the implementation of policies and decisions as directed. In addition, the Planning Cell prepares plans, carries out studies and recommends policy on matters of an operational nature referred to WEU

87 The Planning Cell will be headed by a one-star officer as its Director. This post will be a non-quota post given to a representative of the member states and replacing the current Deputy Director of the Planning Cell on the existing strength

88 The Director of the Planning Cell acts under the authority of the three-star general/flag

<sup>8</sup> See in particular – The WEU Planning Cell, report submitted on behalf of the Defence Committee by Mrs Baarveld-Schlaman, Rapporteur, Assembly Document 1421

– The operational organisation of WEU – Reply to the forty-first annual report of the Council, report submitted on behalf of the Defence Committee by Mr Schloten, Rapporteur, Assembly Document 1518

officer, supports him in his capacities as Director of the WEU military staff and permanent Chairman of the MDC in carrying out his responsibilities vis-à-vis the WEU Council and the Military Committee, and directs the Planning Cell. In the absence of the three-star general/flag officer, he will represent him as the Director of the WEU military staff

#### *The Situation Centre*

89 The Situation Centre, which in the existing structure operates under the authority of the Secretary-General, will – after the reorganisation – act under the authority of the three-star general/flag officer. It is stipulated, however, that in the new structure the Secretary-General can still avail himself of the Situation Centre. The Situation Centre, in close cooperation with the Planning Cell, will monitor the situation in crisis areas designated by the WEU Council as well as the progress of WEU operations. It will also support the appropriate working groups in the preparation of WEU Council decisions on crisis management and politico-military control of operations

#### *IV. Conclusions*

90 A study usually starts by defining its aims. Here, however, we have left it to the last before revealing our hand and making clear that if the intention is for WEU's Military Committee to be a sinecure for generals from the various WEU countries, things can be left as they stand in the certain knowledge that the Committee will start meeting and will do no more damage than many other such bodies we could mention. It is quite another matter to say whether it will be useful to WEU, enhance its image, strengthen its action or make it complementary to NATO – complementary, not subordinate

91 If such is our aim, then we must clearly identify the forces WEU can rely on, however small, however limited their tasks. It has been suggested in the present report that an immediate reaction force consisting of 10 000 to 12 000 troops and including air and naval components is best suited to the purpose. Others may have different views. However the fact remains that WEU forces and WEU's Military Committee are but two facets of the same problem

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