



Assembly of Western European Union

DOCUMENT 1541

15 October 1996

FORTY-FIRST ORDINARY SESSION **(Second part)**

The role of Europe in Bosnia and Herzegovina

REPORT

submitted on behalf of the Defence Committee
by Mr Blaauw, Rapporteur

The role of Europe in Bosnia and Herzegovina

REPORT¹

*submitted on behalf of the Defence Committee²
by Mr Blaauw, Rapporteur*

TABLE OF CONTENTS

DRAFT RECOMMENDATION

on the role of Europe in Bosnia and Herzegovina

EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM

submitted by Mr Blaauw, Rapporteur

- I Introduction
- II Establishment and mandate of the Implementation Force (IFOR)
- III. The International Police Task Force (IPTF)
- IV. War criminals
- V. Mine-clearing
- VI Arms control agreement
- VII. The Vienna Agreement on confidence-building measures
- VIII Rearmament of the armed forces of the Muslim-Croat Federation in Bosnia (equip and train)
- IX. IFOR support for the United Nations Transitional Administration in eastern Slavonia (UNTAES)
- X. Return of refugees and displaced persons
- XI. Changes in the implementation of IFOR's mandate
- XII. Towards a post-IFOR
 - (a) The opinion of the European governments
 - (b) The opinion of the United States
 - (c) The alternatives
 - (d) NATO activities
- XIII. Post-IFOR tasks
- XIV. IFOR and the future of NATO
- XV. Conclusions

1. Adopted unanimously by the Committee

2. *Members of the Committee:* Mr Baumel (Chairman); MM De Decker, Horn (Vice-Chairmen); Mr Alloncle (Alternate: *Masseret*), Mr Beaufays, Mrs Beer, MM Bianchi, Briane (Alternate: *Galley*), MM Cox, Dees, Díaz de Mera (Alternate: *López Henares*), Mr Hardy (Alternate: *Thompson*), Mr Jacquat (Alternate: *Jeambrun*), MM La Russa, Legendre, Mrs Lentz-Cornette, MM Mardones Sevilla (Alternate: *Bolinaga*), MM Marten, Medeiros Ferreira, Mota Amaral, *Lord Newall*, MM Onaindia, Parisi, *Pavlidis*, Pereira Coelho, Petruccioli, Pottakis, Robles Fraga, Schloten, *Sir Dudley Smith*, Mrs Soutendijk van Appeldoorn, Sir Keith Speed, MM Speroni, Valkeniers, Vrettos, Woltjer (Alternate: *Blaauw*), Mr Zierer

Associate member: Mr Naess

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

Draft Recommendation
on the role of Europe in Bosnia and Herzegovina

The Assembly,

- (i) Welcoming the fact that since the signature of the "Peace Agreement on Bosnia and Herzegovina" in Paris on 14 December 1995, a cessation of hostilities has been established;
- (ii) Convinced that the presence of a robustly armed, well-equipped and extensive multinational military Implementation Force (IFOR) has been an indispensable instrument for keeping the peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina,
- (iii) Noting with satisfaction that the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Entities have redeployed their forces in three phases as stipulated in Article IV of the Agreement on the military aspects of the peace settlement.
- (iv) Aware that the 14 September 1996 elections have merely confirmed the ambitions of the nationalist leaders, contrary to the spirit of the Dayton Agreement which envisaged the creation of viable democratic and multi-ethnic institutions;
- (v) Regretting that with a few exceptions, all the indicted war criminals are still at large because neither the parties to the Dayton Agreement nor IFOR has been willing to arrest them and bring them to the International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia in The Hague;
- (vi) Convinced that there can be no reconciliation in Bosnia and Herzegovina unless individuals indicted for the appalling war crimes committed have been judged by The Hague tribunal,
- (vii) Aware that more than five million land mines are still causing serious problems for the population and that mine-clearing, a responsibility of the former parties to the conflict, is taking place at a very slow pace, if at all,
- (viii) Noting that IFOR is playing an important and indispensable role in providing additional support to the OSCE for tasks related to the implementation of the sub-regional arms control agreement and the Vienna Agreement on confidence-building measures signed by five parties in former Yugoslavia under the auspices of the OSCE,
- (ix) Noting that the International Police Task Force lacks the human resources and equipment to implement its main task of helping to re-establish the rule of law in Bosnia and Herzegovina,
- (x) Convinced that there is a need for a European-run public security force which should be an armed body, more substantial in size and better equipped but with the same general mandate as the IPTF and able to implement it without the support of an IFOR successor force,
- (xi) Convinced that the results of the equip and train programme under the auspices of the United States may nullify the aim of the Dayton Agreement and that instead of supplying new weapons, the main effort should now be directed at achieving an even balance by reducing arms all round;
- (xii) Noting that the freedom of movement and the return and resettlement of refugees and displaced persons, one of the core objectives of the Dayton Agreement, has by no means been achieved to date;
- (xiii) Considering that, under the present circumstances, the organisation of municipal elections in Bosnia, for which the parties are apparently not prepared, but for which IFOR has a mandate to provide

assistance and support, would severely undermine the position and credibility of IFOR and any successor force;

(xiv) Aware that as a consequence of the slowness with which new civil structures are being set up and of the strong rivalry that still exists between the various ethnic groups, IFOR will have to be replaced by a successor force if Europe and its allies want to make sure that Bosnia is not plunged into war again,

(xv) Convinced that a United States decision not to contribute a substantial contingent of ground troops to an IFOR successor force would put both the implementation of the Dayton Agreement and the future of Atlantic cooperation at risk,

(xvi) Considering that the assistance and support which IFOR is supposed to provide for a multitude of international humanitarian organisations is having an adverse impact on its effectiveness and that more attention should be paid to coordination between IFOR and those organisations in order to improve the use of its precious resources,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Strongly endorse the establishment of an IFOR successor force with a mandate up to and including the elections in 1998 and with the full participation of a substantial contingent of US ground troops,
2. Seriously examine the issue of mine-clearing in the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina, giving consideration to the possibility of a WEU mine-clearing operation in that country;
3. Consider the possibility of establishing a successor force to the International Police Task Force (IPTF) which should be an armed body under WEU command, more substantial in size and better equipped, but with the same general mandate as the IPTF and able to implement it without the support of an IFOR successor force;
4. Insist that municipal elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina be postponed until spring 1997 at the earliest, by which time the conditions for their organisation may have improved

Explanatory Memorandum

(submitted by Mr Blaauw, Rapporteur)

I. Introduction

1. After four years of unparalleled atrocities in a conflict which claimed the lives of more than 260 000 people, devastated 60% of property and a large part of the infrastructure of Bosnia, the Dayton Agreement, notwithstanding its recognised shortcomings, has brought relief to all concerned

2. For the population in Bosnia, it has given hope for a future without war and created the basic conditions to enable it to start rebuilding the country and its political institutions

3. For the international community, it has created a framework for realising at least some of its ambitions to help the Bosnians establish a credible state which can enjoy normal relations with other states.

4. A vital part of the Dayton Agreement is the "Agreement on the military aspects of the peace settlement", in which the parties "welcome the willingness of the international community to send to the region, for a period of approximately one year, a force to assist in implementation of the territorial and other military provisions of the agreement" The dedicated efforts of this implementation force, IFOR, have prevented the former warring parties from engaging in further hostilities. Apart from this, IFOR has taken many initiatives to help restore peace and start rebuilding the country.

5. According to its mandate, IFOR is supposed to pull out at the end of 1996. Obviously, Bosnia and Herzegovina is not yet ready to be left on its own. There is general agreement among both the countries participating in IFOR and the former warring parties that an IFOR successor force is needed, since there is still much to be done to implement the Dayton Agreement in full, and also because Bosnia and Herzegovina needs a breathing space.

6. The objective of the present report is to review the achievements of the past year and to assess what Europe and the international

community could do to promote the further implementation of the Dayton Agreement

II. Establishment and mandate of the Implementation Force (IFOR)

7. The Dayton Agreement provided for the creation of a 60 000 strong military force under NATO command to enforce the ceasefire of 5 October 1995 and to help implement a division of Bosnia into two entities sharing a loose political structure

8. This international implementation force (IFOR) was to enforce the withdrawal of former warring factions from a zone of separation and to make them leave an agreed area of land to be exchanged within 45 days. IFOR would also have to oversee and enforce the removal or dismantling of mines and other weapons from the zones of separation and the storing of all heavy weapons in designated places within a period of 120 days after the formal ceremony to sign the Agreement

9. The Dayton Agreement provided IFOR with a fairly extensive mandate which, apart from the abovementioned tasks, also included such tasks as facilitating refugees' freedom of movement and resettlement and the work of humanitarian aid organisations, resolving boundary disputes, creating secure conditions for free elections and responding to violence against civilians

10. A total of 15 NATO member states and 19 non-NATO member states contributed troops for the establishment of IFOR. Iceland participated with non-military means to show solidarity. On 28 November 1995, NATO and Russia agreed to establish a joint "consultative commission" which would allow Russian forces to operate under United States as opposed to NATO command

11. A Russian brigade of around 1 500 men was based near Brcko in an area controlled by Bosnian Serbs. Its commander cooperates with IFOR through the intermediary of General George Joulwan in his capacity as Commander-

in-Chief of US troops in Europe. A Coordinating Committee 16+N was created to ensure smooth implementation of the mandate of IFOR, in which so many nations were cooperating

12. For the deployment of IFOR, the Bosnian territory was divided into three sectors.

- a US-controlled "sector north" with headquarters in Tuzla and including troop contributions from the United States, Turkey, Russia, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Poland, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia and Finland;
- a British-controlled "sector south-west" with headquarters originally in Gornji Vakuf but now in Banja Luka, and including troop contributions from the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Canada, Pakistan, the Czech Republic and Malaysia,
- a French-controlled "sector south-east" with headquarters in Mostar and including troop contributions from France, Italy, Spain, Portugal and Luxembourg.

13. At the top of IFOR's command structure was NATO's Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), followed by NATO's Commander-in-Chief South (CINCSOUTH), who established field headquarters in Sarajevo and Zagreb, and the Commander of the Allied Rapid Reaction Corps (COMARRC) based in Sarajevo. Finally, there were three multinational division commanders with headquarters in Tuzla, Gornji Vakuf (now located in Banja Luka) and Mostar

14. On 18 February 1996, SACEUR (General Joulwan) reported to NATO's Secretary-General, Javier Solana, that IFOR's deployment had been completed

15. At the end of September 1996, the total strength of the IFOR troops in Bosnia was almost 47 000 including about 39 000 troops, or 83%, from NATO member states and some 8 000, or 17%, from non-NATO member states

16. IFOR met the first deadline in the implementation of its task on 19 January 1996,

when it announced the establishment of a four-kilometre wide zone of separation between the Muslim-Croat Federation and the Serb entity

17. In January and February, when Bosnian Serbs living in the suburbs of Sarajevo started leaving their homes and burning their houses, IFOR did not prevent this, arguing that it wanted to maintain its impartiality

18. On 30 January 1996, former parties to the conflict in Bosnia began to withdraw their heavy weapons, which they had to evacuate from the sectors not assigned to them by the Dayton Agreement by midnight on Saturday, 3 February 1996. These sectors were to remain free of all military presence, except for IFOR troops, up to the transfer of civil authority 45 days later, on 19 March 1996

19. By the end of February, the former warring factions had already withdrawn both their military forces and their equipment from the separation zone

20. By 19 March, D+90 of IFOR's operation, a ten-kilometre wide separation zone had been established over a 1 075 kilometre long inter-ethnic boundary line. At the same time, the division of Bosnia and Herzegovina into a Muslim-Croat Federation with 51% of Bosnian territory and a Serb Republic with 49% of the territory took effect

21. By the D+120 deadline, midnight on 18 April 1996, all the soldiers of the former warring parties were to have returned to their barracks and have placed all their heavy weapons in designated IFOR areas. Generally speaking, SACEUR considered that good progress had been made but felt that, mainly for technical reasons, more time would be needed in order to fully comply with the provisions of the Dayton Agreement. It was thought that between 200 000 and 300 000 soldiers should return to their barracks and that at least some of them should be demobilised

22. Apart from that, between 5 000 and 6 000 pieces of heavy artillery (including 800 tanks and 1 300 artillery pieces) were to be rounded up.

23. Altogether, after 120 days in Bosnia, IFOR had achieved many positive results. During the D+120 period, 90% of all tanks were

placed in cantonment areas, as were 85% of all artillery and 80-95% of all air defence systems. freedom of movement was ensured in principle, roads were opened, the ten-kilometre separation zone was established, six of the main bridges over the Sava "linking Bosnia to Europe" were repaired, 49 others were rebuilt and numerous engineering projects were approved

24 After having met its D+120 deadline, IFOR, while continuing to consider the implementation of its military tasks a priority, could afford to spend more time in assisting the civil agencies in Bosnia and Herzegovina. It continued to work on the repair or rebuilding of bridges, roads and railways, and helped to restore gas, water and electricity supplies, to rebuild schools and hospitals and restore telecommunications

25 IFOR also provided substantial assistance to the OSCE in preparing and conducting the 14 September 1996 elections. It supported other international and humanitarian organisations in performing their tasks, not only by providing a secure environment, but also by supplying emergency, logistic, medical and other assistance, as well as information.

26. In order to facilitate these various tasks, IFOR adapted its force structure by replacing heavy units with more mobile ones. It also tried to help make freedom of movement a reality, but this has proved to be one of the most difficult tasks

27 The changes in the implementation of IFOR's mandate will be discussed in more detail in Chapter IX of the present report

III. The International Police Task Force (IPTF)

28 In accordance with Annex 11 to the Dayton Agreement, an international police task force was created on the basis of UN Security Council Resolution 1035 of 21 December 1995. The main tasks of this police force, as set out in Annex 11 to the Dayton Agreement, were to observe police activities and the functioning of the judicial system, to promote the creation of a secure and stable environment for elections in Bosnia and to oversee the re-establishment of the Bosnian police force.

29 Deputy Defence Minister, Hasan Gengic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, admitted that the restructuring of police forces was a rather complicated issue and said progress could only be made step by step. First and foremost, the police in the Federation should start to wear one and the same uniform and operate under the same rules. One of the anomalies of the organisation of the police force in Bosnia and Herzegovina is that in the Federation, authority over the police has been decentralised to the cantons, while in the Republika Srpska it is centralised under the Minister of the Interior. Another anomaly is that each of the entities has a Minister of the Interior but that responsibility for justice has been centralised under a Justice Minister answerable to the presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Understandably, local or regional authorities have an interest in controlling the police, whose role is vital in determining the success or failure of the objective of freedom of movement and the return and resettlement of refugees and displaced persons. The Bosnian Government intends to create a three-entity state border police force which should be dependent on the presidency and should not be linked with the civilian law enforcement police forces

30 The IPTF reached more or less full strength in August 1996 with 1688 police officers on secondment from a large number of UN member states such as Germany, France, the Netherlands, the United States, Egypt, Honduras, Ghana, Nepal, Jordan and Pakistan. Of the total number, 531, or 31.5%, were contributed by EU countries and 156, or 9.2%, by the United States. Due to internal problems, the IPTF has until now concentrated on observation tasks, including joint patrols with local police forces and prison visits in order to verify observance of human rights. It is now planning to pay more attention to how the judicial system functions.

31 Bosnian sources have voiced the criticism that the IPTF is not very effective, arguing that the force is too small, that its officers are not armed and that there is no proper coordination between it and IFOR.

32 Although the IPTF was deliberately not armed, it is felt that under the present circumstances in Bosnia, carrying a weapon would definitely increase the likelihood of UN police officers being able to implement their tasks as set out in the mandate

33 Another problem is that the composition of the IPTF is very heterogeneous, with police officers coming from countries with different opinions and practices regarding the role and task of the police in law enforcement and the maintenance of public order.

34 Under its present mandate, the IPTF is supposed to assess threats to public order and advise on the ability of law enforcement agencies to deal with such threats. Inter-ethnic clashes are certainly an issue for the IPTF to deal with but, in its present state, it is neither equipped nor trained for riot control. Until now, IFOR has been requested to intervene in such situations, but this military force also lacks the proper means and training to do the job.

35 Notwithstanding some incidents early on, a good working relationship has now been established between the IPTF and IFOR, including the posting of IFOR liaison officers in all IPTF district headquarters and their dispatch to a number of smaller posts. On several occasions, IFOR has intervened at the request of the IPTF and has now been officially instructed by NATO to come to the aid of IPTF personnel.

36 The IPTF has only just started to monitor the restructuring of the Bosnian police force, including a considerable reduction of its complement of 40 000 personnel.

37 Under the Dayton Agreement, the IPTF was set up to help bring order to Bosnia and to facilitate the elections and the arrest of war criminals for trial at The Hague. It was to encourage the Bosnian police force to assume the main role in law enforcement and inspection. Although the wording of the mandate was kept vague, the IPTF can "assist and advise" local officials to locate and arrest indicted war criminals, which, under the Dayton Agreement, is a task assigned to the signatory parties.

38 According to its mandate, the IPTF has also been given the right to seek support and reinforcement, should it meet with any obstruction or "refusal to comply with an IPTF request".

39 Altogether, it is thought that the general mandate, as formulated in Article III of the agreement on the IPTF, is providing sufficient opportunities to help re-establish the rule of law

in Bosnia. It seems, however, that the IPTF, which was created to implement the mandate, by no means has the staff and equipment to meet its obligations. Almost a year after its official establishment, it has only just started to operate at full strength and many of the tasks mentioned in the mandate have not even been considered for implementation. Whenever there is a real problem, the IPTF needs IFOR support and intervention.

40 Given that the international community, and even more so the European Union, has a direct interest in a peaceful environment in the newly-established independent states in former Yugoslavia, it should be more determined in its ambition to re-establish the rule of law in Bosnia.

41 Obviously, in the present post-conflict situation in which feelings of hate and revenge do not disappear overnight and where the rights of the strongest prevail, there is a need for an internationally-run public security force. This should be an armed body with a remit to maintain law and order, ensure freedom of movement and assist the civilian police in other aspects of law enforcement, including arrests.

42 Such a force should be bigger than the present IPTF, consist of well-trained officers who are familiar with all the issues mentioned in Article III, paragraph 1, of the present agreement on the IPTF and who share common values and a common language as regards the issues to be addressed. This force should be adequately equipped to be able to implement its mandate without the support or assistance of an IFOR successor force.

IV. War criminals

43 The search for and arrest of indicted war criminals has been a particularly sensitive issue since IFOR began its operations.

44 It should be noted that, under the Dayton Agreement, IFOR's tasks do not include setting up search parties to look for indicted war criminals. According to Article IX, paragraph g, of Annex 1-A to the Dayton Agreement, responsibility for arresting indicted war criminals lies with the three signatory parties to that Agreement. IFOR's task is to apprehend indicted war criminals where it comes across them in the course of carrying out its duties.

45. A NATO document published on 14 February 1996, states:

"Our policy remains that IFOR will detain and transfer to the International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) persons indicted for war crimes by the Tribunal when it comes into contact with such persons in carrying out its duties. The ICTY is providing HQ IFOR with all available information on the persons indicted for war crimes and this information is being distributed to IFOR personnel."

46. Although, on 16 February 1996, a Memorandum of Understanding between NATO and ICTY was concluded in principle which included arrangements for detaining indicted war criminals who fall into the hands of the troops, it was not signed until 9 May 1996. In fact, the basic policy as defined by the Dayton Agreement had not changed. The MOU clearly defines the procedures now to be followed in such cases.

47. All Bosnian authorities have stressed that a new mandate for an IFOR successor force should include the task of searching for and arresting war criminals and bringing them to The Hague for trial.

48. Despite the fact that international arrest warrants have been issued for certain war criminals, in particular the Bosnian Serbs, Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic, IFOR will not mount specific operations to arrest them. An international arrest warrant places a legal obligation on all states to arrest the accused if they enter the area of their jurisdiction. The Contact Group has confirmed that responsibility for arresting war criminals and bringing them to trial in The Hague rests with the authorities in former Yugoslavia¹.

49. Only recently, the outgoing chief prosecutor for the International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia, Richard Goldstone, criticised the nations most closely involved in setting up the Tribunal for their failure to arrest the most notorious war criminals, and called it "pusillanimous"².

1. *International Herald Tribune*, 12 July 1996.

2. *International Herald Tribune*, 19 September 1996.

50. His successor, Mrs Louise Arbour, has appealed for a broader and more binding remit for the arrest of war criminals by any follow-up force in Bosnia, stating that NATO's restrictive interpretation of IFOR tasks was particularly disappointing.

51. A former chief prosecutor at Nuremberg has rightly said that there can be no reconciliation in Bosnia unless individual guilt for the appalling crimes committed during the conflict replaces the pernicious theory of collective guilt on which so much racial hatred hangs³.

52. It is known that war criminals such as Karadzic and Mladic are well protected by heavily armed bodyguards and that any operation to arrest them will cost human lives, including the lives of civilians who may be used as human shields. Political authorities also fear civilian unrest and retaliation by former Bosnian Serb troops against IFOR troops if important war criminals are arrested and brought to trial.

53. IFOR, and its commander, have repeatedly declared that it will arrest the war criminals by any means if the political leadership gives it the order to do so⁴.

54. At present, it seems unlikely that political authorities will instruct IFOR to search for and arrest war criminals for fear of unpredictable consequences. Under the Dayton Agreement, the governments of the signatory states are to hand over those indicted by the International Criminal Tribunal. If they refuse to do so, it is for the Contact Group to decide what measures to take, including the reimposition of sanctions.

55. It does not seem right for the Bosnian Government to point its finger at IFOR for not fulfilling what are, in effect, the Government's own obligations.

V. Mine-clearing

56. The territory of Bosnia is covered with mines. At present, roughly 50% of the estimated 14 500 mine fields have been identified and the data fed into a database. Many fields have not

3. *International Herald Tribune*, 23 May 1996.

4. *International Herald Tribune*, 8 July 1996.

yet been found because battle lines changed very rapidly during the conflict and also because mines were often laid in a haphazard way. Under the Dayton Agreement, mine-clearing is the responsibility of the parties to the conflict and they are indeed trying to help identify the location of mine fields.

57. According to estimates by experts, there are some five to six million mines in Bosnia. It will probably take up to 30 years to complete mine clearance in Bosnia. Although clearance is a task of the former warring factions, IFOR is providing practical support by sharing mine documentation information, assisting civilian agencies with mine awareness training and also providing them with transport assistance whenever possible.

58. Full-time mine-clearing has stopped for different reasons. Not only has demobilisation of large numbers of the armed forces sapped the human resources available for this activity, but the funds needed have also dried up. On the other hand, it should be noted that as far as IFOR is concerned, there is no urgent need to proceed because it has now met its displacement requirements.

59. Although IFOR will certainly insist on mine-clearing when there are overriding reasons for it, it takes the view that its authority to do so should only be exercised sparingly in order to keep it credible. At IFOR, it is also noted that making mine-clearing compulsory strongly erodes the quality of this activity whereas only 100% success is acceptable.

60. IFOR will, however, continue to refine its database and share its information. At the same time, it will deploy mine-marking packs and supervise the re-fencing of critical areas.

VI. Arms control agreement

61. In the Dayton Agreement, it was stipulated that negotiations on disarmament in former Yugoslavia should be completed by 6 June 1996 at the latest and result in a treaty reducing the size of the armed forces and the number of heavy weapons.

62. On 14 June 1996, the representatives of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Republic of

Croatia, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the two Bosnian entities – the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Serb Republic – signed an agreement on sub-regional arms control which was negotiated under the auspices of the OSCE in Vienna. The agreement included limitations for all parties in the following categories of heavy armaments: battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, artillery over 75 mm, combat aircraft and attack helicopters. For each of the parties, ceilings were set at the lowest possible level, following the model of the Treaty on the reduction of Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE).

63. The arms ceilings agreed are⁵:

	Tanks	Armoured combat vehicles	Artillery	Planes	Helicopters
FRY	1 025	850	3 750	155	53
Croatia	410	340	1 500	62	21
Bosnia	410	340	1 500	62	21
Serb Rep	137	113	500	21	7
Federation	273	227	1 000	41	14

64. Under the agreement, starting from 1 July 1996, the parties have 16 months in which to reduce the number of weapons they hold to specific levels. Excess weapons can be exported, destroyed, or put on fixed public display. Excess combat aircraft can be used for training if they are stripped of armaments.

65. After the signing of the arms control agreement, the United Nations Security Council voted on 18 June 1996 to end formally the arms embargo on the states of former Yugoslavia, but the European Union maintained its existing arms embargo. On 19 June, Operation Sharp Guard, the joint NATO-WEU naval blockade of former Yugoslavia was suspended, but not formally terminated.

66. On 2 October 1996, NATO and WEU announced the definitive end of Sharp Guard. During this operation, the naval units of both organisations stopped and questioned nearly 74 000 ships, boarded almost 6 000 and sent nearly 1 400 back to Italian ports. At the same time, WEU announced the end of its Danube

5. Source: *Atlantic News*, 11 June 1996.