Defence and security in an enlarged Europe – reply to the annual report of the Council

REPORT
submitted on behalf of the Defence Committee
by Mr Marten, Rapporteur
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1. Adopted in Committee by 10 votes to 0 with 2 abstentions.

2. Members of the Committee: Mr Baumel (Chairman); MM De Decker (Alternate: Urbain), Horn (Vice-Chairmen), MM Alloncle, Beaufays. Mrs Beer, MM Brianc, Cioni, Cox, Dees. Diaz de Mera, Giannattasio, Hardy, Jacquat, Legendre, Mrs Lentz-Cornette, MM Mardones Sevilla, Marten, Medeiros Ferreira, Mota Amaral, Lord Newall, MM Onandia Natxiondo (Alternate: de Puig), Pavlidis (Alternate: Magginas), Pereira Coelho, Polenta, Pottakis, Robles Fraga (Alternate: Pache Rodriguez), Schloten, Selva, Sir Dudley Smith, Mrs Soutendijk van Appeldoorn (Alternate: van der Linden), Sir Keith Speed. MM Speroni, Valkeniers, Vrettos, Woltjer, Zierer

NB. The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.
Draft Recommendation

on defence and security in an enlarged Europe

The Assembly,

(i) Welcoming the decisions of the North Atlantic Council in Berlin on 3 June 1996 as regards the development of the European security and defence identity (ESDI) which should lead to the creation of a visible and viable European capability to assume responsibilities vis-à-vis the security risks Europe is facing;

(ii) Considering that the development of the ESDI within NATO can only be successful if the Atlantic Alliance, in close cooperation with WEU, is able to implement the combined joint task force (CJTF) concept as indicated in the Berlin communiqué and in accordance with the guidelines laid down by the Defence Ministers of the North Atlantic Council at their meeting in Brussels on 13 June 1996;

(iii) Aware that development of the ESDI within NATO and implementation of the CJTF concept are closely linked with the reform of NATO's command structures for which preparations are now being made in the Long-Term Study produced by NATO's Military Committee;

(iv) Considering that NATO's future military command structure should ensure military effectiveness, preserve the transatlantic link and feature a high degree of visibility with regard to the European security and defence identity;

(v) Recognising that, within NATO, the ESDI will be established through the identification of assets and capabilities, the planning and exercising of forces and the definition of European command arrangements for WEU-led operations;

(vi) Considering that WEU will now have to clarify the principles and arrangements for the participation of other European allies, who are not full members of WEU, in every stage of WEU-led European operations making use of NATO assets and capabilities, including their preparation and execution;

(vii) Welcoming the fact that WEU is actively involved in the implementation of the CJTF concept and that illustrative profiles of likely types of WEU-led operations have already been presented to NATO;

(viii) Taking account of the fact that the NATO enlargement process could seriously hamper ratification of the START II Treaty by the Russian State Duma and lead to Russian requests for fundamental changes in the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE);

(ix) Considering that, as a consequence of its development within NATO, Europe's security and defence identity will be fully dependent on the North Atlantic Council, which will not only have to approve the release of NATO assets and capabilities for WEU-led operations but will also monitor their use and keep it under review, with this including the right to recall such assets in order for NATO to be able to perform its own traditional and new missions;

(x) Considering that in the North Atlantic Council both the decision to approve the release of NATO assets and capabilities for WEU-led operations and the decision to recall such assets will have to be unanimous in view of their vital importance for the success of European-led operations;

(xi) Convinced that in view of developments in the establishment of a European security architecture, the definition of a European security and defence identity and the process to enlarge NATO, the EU and WEU, there is a need to review the WEU Maastricht Declaration of 10 December 1991 in order to propose more imaginative solutions for security arrangements involving European non-NATO member states,
(xii) Considering that the possibility of abandoning NATO membership as a condition for granting WEU membership merits special attention even though it is desirable for membership of both organisations to coincide;

(xiii) Considering that any enlargement of NATO which is supposed to enhance security in Europe can only be the result of a thorough process of negotiation and dialogue, not only with candidates for early membership but also with all other European non-NATO member states which have an interest in safeguarding security and stability in Europe;

(xiv) Emphasising that NATO enlargement should in no way be rushed through in order to make the 50th anniversary celebrations of the Atlantic Alliance in 1999 a more triumphant occasion;

(xv) Noting that early NATO enlargement to take in only a few select central European countries, without paying careful attention to the security requirements of other central European countries, could provide more security for those countries in the region who need it least and create more danger for those already most at risk;

(xvi) Stressing that in parallel with a limited enlargement of NATO, satisfactory arrangements must be made with those countries which have asked to be admitted but which will not belong to the first group of new member states;

(xvii) Deploiring the wholly unsatisfactory reply of the Council to the specific proposals made in Assembly Recommendation 585 on security and military cooperation in the Baltic Sea area,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Pay specific attention to the position of the Baltic states as Europe's security architecture takes shape by:

   (a) making plans to create a body within WEU to coordinate and establish priorities for military assistance offered to the Baltic states by WEU member, associate member and observer states;

   (b) promoting the establishment of a "Standing Baltic Sea Force" with Denmark, Estonia, Germany, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland as founding members, while stipulating that, at a later stage, other Baltic Sea countries should be able to join,

   (c) instructing the WEU Planning Cell to initiate and coordinate the operational planning of the "Standing Baltic Sea Force" once it is established, bearing in mind that the tasks of this force should include border control, monitoring of fishing and environmental regulations, shipping control, search and rescue and, at a later stage, the implementation of Petersberg tasks;

   (d) making a joint review of the situation in the Baltic Sea area in order to identify threats and disorder and assess and counter them in accordance with generally-accepted criteria;

   (e) supporting the establishment in one of the Baltic states of a WEU Information Centre similar to the one opened in Bucharest in November 1994, which has since proved that it can play a useful role in enhancing knowledge and understanding of WEU in political and academic circles and also among the representatives of the media in that part of Europe.
2. Reconsider present WEU policy as regards conditions for membership with a view to proposing more imaginative solutions for security arrangements involving European non-NATO member states, in particular by examining the possibility of abandoning NATO membership as a condition for granting WEU membership and also taking account, with a view to a genuine ESDI, of the advantage of congruence of membership in WEU, NATO and the European Union;

3. Clarify the principles and arrangements for the participation of other European allies, who are not full members of WEU, in every stage of WEU-led European operations making use of NATO assets and capabilities, including their preparation and execution;

4. Resume the dialogue with the Russian Federation, which could be of major interest to both sides given that WEU is a wholly European organisation.
Explanatory Memorandum
(submitted by Mr Marten, Rapporteur)

I. Introduction

1. What will be the future of Europe's security? Since the collapse of the Berlin wall, this has been a major, if not the major, issue in security and defence discussions in Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals. Nobody ever expected that it would be easy to find solutions acceptable to all concerned. It seems, however, that much progress has been made in recent months and that at least the contours of a future European security framework are taking shape.

2. Under the United Kingdom's presidency, the WEU Council concentrated on efforts to make WEU more operational. Structures were developed to allow the quick and effective deployment of forces and to ensure satisfactory systems of command and control. Important work was done to find ways of using NATO assets rather than duplicating them. The Birmingham Declaration of May 1996 marked important steps in the right direction towards WEU's operational capability.

3. In June 1996, NATO Foreign Ministers in Berlin and Defence Ministers in Brussels made a breakthrough in the implementation of the Combined Joint Task Force concept and in their consensus to build a European security and defence identity within the Atlantic Alliance. Apart from this, NATO continued to discuss the issue of enlargement and its relations with Russia.

4. Altogether, there are abundant reasons to review the present state of affairs in the efforts being made to extend defence and security in Europe.

5. It should be noted that for the purposes of the present report, your Rapporteur has worked in close cooperation with Mr Antretter, the Political Committee's Rapporteur for the report entitled "The eastern dimension of European security". As regards the issue of enlargement, both reports are complementary. In the present report, which is partly a follow-up to the report on "Security and military cooperation in the Baltic Sea area"1, special attention is paid to the position of the Baltic states, Poland and Russia.

II. Security and military cooperation in the Baltic Sea area

6. In Recommendation 585 on security and military cooperation in the Baltic Sea area, adopted on 5 December 1995, the Assembly made the following specific recommendations.

"1. Make plans for creating a body within WEU to coordinate and establish priorities for military assistance offered by its members, associate member and observer states to the Baltic states;

2. Promote the establishment of a "Standing Baltic Sea Force" with Denmark, Estonia, Germany, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland as founding members, while stipulating that, at a later stage, other Baltic Sea countries should be able to join;

3. Instruct the WEU Planning Cell to initiate and coordinate the operational planning of the "Standing Baltic Sea Force", once it is established, bearing in mind that the tasks of this force should include border control, monitoring of fishing and environmental regulations, shipping control, search and rescue, and at a later stage the implementation of Petersberg missions;

4. Make a joint review of the situation in the Baltic Sea area in order to identify threats and disorder and to assess and overcome them in accordance with generally-accepted criteria;

5. Support the establishment of a WEU Information Centre in one of the Baltic states similar to the one opened in Bucharest in November 1994 and which has since proved to play a useful role in enhancing knowledge and understanding of WEU in political and academic circles and also among the.

1. Assembly Document 1494.
representatives of the media in that part of Europe"

7 In its reply, communicated to the Assembly on 22 May 1996, the Council did not give any reaction to these five recommendations.

8 On the other hand, the Council indulged in a number of rather awkward generalities which bear no relation whatsoever to the specific recommendations made by the Assembly. In its reply, understandably, the Council firstly "takes note of the recommendations of the Parliamentary Assembly on security and military cooperation in the Baltic Sea area, and welcomes the Assembly's interest in the security of the Baltic Sea area".

9 Then, the Council subtly reminds the Assembly "that at the time when the document on a status of association was agreed in Luxembourg in May 1994, a specific reference was made in the Kirchberg Declaration to the situation in the Baltic area". This specific reference, made in paragraph 12 of the Kirchberg Declaration of May 1994, reads as follows:

"Underlining the political significance which the withdrawal of foreign troops from the territories of the Baltic states represents for stability in Europe, Ministers welcomed the recent Russian-Latvian agreements and expressed their support for the early conclusion of the talks between Russia and Estonia."

One wonders what sense it makes to refer solemnly to a rather non-committal comment on a situation which has long since been overtaken by more recent developments.

10 In the following paragraph of its reply, the Council refers to the Noordwijk Declaration of November 1994, in which it welcomed "the withdrawal of foreign troops from the Baltic states, which represents a significant contribution to the security situation in the region and enhances general stability in Europe". The Assembly cannot but agree with this opinion, but the event to which it refers is past history and although it is relevant, it should also be noted that it has by no means allayed the security concerns of the Baltic states.

11 The Council then states that.

"In paragraph 9 of the Kirchberg Declaration, WEU also instituted a process of contacts with Russia so as to allow for the development of the existing dialogue and of exchanges of information on issues of common interest. These contacts complement efforts in other fora to enhance stability in Europe."

The Assembly fully recognises the importance of institutional contacts with Russia and at the time welcomed this initiative of the Council, but it is aware that it has borne little fruit so far. Indeed, Russia has tabled a number of proposals for the development of a serious institutional dialogue with WEU, but while in Russia, your Rapporteur was told by foreign affairs officials that so far WEU has not reacted to them. It was said that no progress had been made and that the dialogue with WEU was at a dead end, notwithstanding the recent visit of the WEU Secretary-General to Mostar.

12 In the following paragraph of the Council's reply, it is stated that.

"The states of the Baltic region which have become associate partners of WEU have contributed to work in the Organisation, notably in the drafting of the document "European security: a common concept of the 27 WEU countries". The Council of Ministers has recognised the importance of this exercise, in promoting a better understanding among the WEU member states, associate members, observers and associate partners of each other's policies, and as a first step towards a contribution to security and stability in Europe, in neighbouring areas and in the wider world, particularly by intensifying political dialogue and enhancing European capabilities in the field of crisis prevention and management."

13. This is all very well and the Assembly would never dream of playing down the importance of this exercise, but it would like to remind the Council that nowhere in the entire document "European security: a common concept of the 27 WEU countries" is there any reference to the precarious position of the three Baltic states in particular or even to security in the Baltic Sea area in general.

14 In the paragraphs that follow, the Council excels itself in its Delphic replies when it says:

"With regard to the adoption of specific measures, the Council would like to remind
the Parliamentary Assembly of paragraph 2 of the document on a status of association, which notes that associate partners may associate themselves with decisions taken by member states concerning the tasks envisaged in paragraph II.4 of the Petersberg Declaration, and that when they participate in their implementation, "they will have the same obligations as other participants, as well as the right of involvement in the command structures and in the Council's subsequent decision-making process".

15 The attention of the Assembly is further drawn to paragraph 21 of the Madrid Declaration, in which Ministers agreed that "on the basis of the common ground developed in the common reflection on the new European security conditions and within the context of their present status, the associate partners should be more involved in the ongoing work on the development of the operational role of WEU with regard to Petersberg missions".

16 The Assembly is perfectly aware of the text of the document on a status of association and of the text of the Madrid Declaration. It is most kind and almost over-zealous of the Council to remind the Assembly of these texts, whose content is only too well-known since they constitute the basic framework for relations between WEU and associate partner states.

17 It is, on the other hand, extremely regrettable that apart from the rather hollow repetition of these well-known texts that have been in existence for some considerable time, the Council either did not bother or was not able to reply to the five paragraphs in the operative text of Recommendation 585 These recommendations were drafted in clear and unambiguous terms. If the Council, for whatever reason, does not agree with the proposals made by the Assembly, it should make that clear in its reply. If the Council is not able to reply because it thinks that the time is not ripe for the implementation of such proposals, a substantiated reply would be fully understandable.

18 The Council's reply to Recommendation 585 concluding with the paragraph.

"The Council considers that the evolving security dialogue with its nine associate partners, including those from the Baltic area in WEU, contributes to the stability of the region."

has all the hallmarks of contempt of parliament. It does not provide a single reply to the very specific proposals made. A meaningless reply, as has now been given more than five months after the Council received the text of the Recommendation, makes no contribution at all to the debate between the Council and Assembly.

19. At the end of the Birmingham Declaration of 7 May 1996, the Council "recognised the valuable contribution of the WEU Parliamentary Assembly to the work of the organisation, and expressed appreciation for the Assembly's input to the debate on security and defence in Europe".

20. If the Council is serious when making such statements, it would do better to try to reply to the Assembly's recommendations, which are the main ingredient of its input to the debate on security and defence in Europe.

III. The reform of NATO's command structures

21. As a consequence of the many changes in Europe's political and military environment during recent years, the political leadership of NATO decided to adapt the organisation to the new circumstances. New missions were added to the essential core functions of consultation and collective defence.

22. The new strategic concept, as agreed at the Rome summit meeting of 7 and 8 November 1991, reaffirmed the core functions but added dialogue and cooperation with European non-NATO members as a new task. In addition, crisis management including peacekeeping was also agreed as a new area of activity for NATO. Moreover, enhancement of the role and responsibilities of the European member states was considered an important basis for the transformation of the Alliance.

23. The NATO summit meeting in Brussels on 10-11 January 1994 required NATO to adapt its military structures and procedures to accommodate the enlarged spectrum of Alliance missions. It also endorsed the concept of combined joint task forces (CJTF) to make allied assets available to Europeans for conducting military operations in which the United States did not participate. Furthermore, it endorsed the Partnership for Peace programme, offering European non-NATO states a wide range of possibilities for cooperation with NATO.
Finally, arms control, disarmament and counter-proliferation were also introduced as important NATO missions.

24 In April 1994, the Alliance's Medium-Term Resource Plan questioned the real spending power in NATO's military budget over the years ahead.

25 Against this backdrop of diminishing resources on the one hand and the political mandate to adapt NATO's structures on the other, the Military Committee initiated what came to be known as the NATO Long-Term Study.

26 The Military Committee's basic idea was to update document MC-400, the military implementation of Alliance strategy, in order to provide a solid platform from which to address the ultimate goal of reviewing the Alliance's command structure. At its meeting on 23 April 1996, the Military Committee, at Chief-of-Staff level, adopted recommendations which were to be examined by the North Atlantic Council in Berlin in June.

27 At their meeting in Berlin on 3 June 1996, NATO ministers referred to this study, stating that they welcomed

"the first results of the Military Committee's Long-Term Study, which will result in recommendations for a military command structure better suited to current and future Euro-Atlantic security".

The communiqué then stated:

"We task the Military Committee to continue its work on the Long-Term Study, consistent with the decisions we have taken today."

28 On 13 June 1996, the Defence Ministers of the North Atlantic Council, as stated in the final communiqué of their meeting,

"directed the Military Committee to continue its work on the Long-Term Study on the basis of decisions taken in Berlin. This further work should also take account of the need for a single, multinational command structure, respecting the principle of unity of command, in which all nations should have an appropriate role, capable of performing its core function of collective defence and, through flexible and agreed procedures, of undertaking new roles in the changing circumstances, taking full advantage of the CJTF concept; the need to improve NATO's effectiveness and flexibility; the continued involvement of the North American allies across the command and force structure; the development, with the participation of all European allies, of the ESDI within the Alliance; the need to be able to absorb enlargement without major restructuring; and the need for cost effectiveness. Adaptations should not be driven only by savings but every attempt should be made to reduce running costs. Arrangements should be developed to provide for increased participation of partner countries."

29. The Ministers "requested the Council in permanent session to provide any necessary further political guidance. We look forward to speedy progress in completing this task and have asked the Council in permanent session, with the advice of the NATO military authorities, to make recommendations on the possible outlines of the future command structure and related key issues for decision at our next meeting in December."

30. The Military Committee is now proceeding on the working assumption of two strategic commands, SACEUR and SACLANT; both under a US commander, and the retention of the existing Canada/US Regional Planning Group in a future command structure. At their most recent meeting, the Chiefs of Defence Staff decided to proceed, on the basis of a working assumption, with a single three-level command structure instead of the present four-level model, comprising two strategic commands, four to six regional commands and a number of sub-regional commands. Detailed proposals for the new command structure will be presented to the Chiefs of Defence Staff at their meeting on 20 November for subsequent political consideration by Ministers in December 1996.

31. Detailed issues such as internal headquarters structures will be considered in phase three of the Long-Term Study, which is scheduled to begin in January 1997.

32. A discussion is still under way as to whether there should be two or three regions in Europe. At present, Europe still has three regional headquarters: AFCENT in Brunssum (the Netherlands), AFNORTH in High Wycombe (the United Kingdom) and AFSOUTH in Naples (Italy). A majority is in favour of adopting the two-region
model, which would most likely lead to the closing of AFNORTH.

33. It has been agreed that further structural work will be continued on the basis of "joint regional commands" and of a mixture of "joint" and "component commands" at a sub-regional level adapted to present regional requirements.

34. It can be said that the Long-Term Study has made substantial progress although much remains to be done. At the next meeting of the Military Committee in Chiefs-of-Staff session, structural alternatives will be presented which will be much leaner than the present military command structure. The future structure should ensure military effectiveness, preserve the transatlantic link and feature a high degree of visibility with regard to the European security and defence identity. It will also be able to absorb enlargement and an enhanced PfP, in the latter case mainly by applying the principle of centralised planning and decentralised execution.

35. In principle, there is indeed little disagreement among NATO member states over the need to streamline the existing command structures. Their size can be reduced and a more flexible organisation can be established in order to enable NATO to respond more easily to the requirements of its new tasks and missions. The problem, however, is how these new structures are going to be manned, in particular to allow the Europeanisation of NATO to take shape, and to make the development of a European security and defence identity more visible. This thorny issue will be examined in Chapter V of the present report.

IV. Combined joint task forces (CJTF)

36. At its summit meeting in Brussels in January 1994, NATO endorsed the principle that collective assets and capabilities of the Alliance can be made available for WEU operations given that WEU will not be able to perform any of the Petersberg tasks successfully until it has developed its operational capabilities. The purpose of the so-called combined joint task force (CJTF) concept which was adopted at that meeting, is to provide separable, but not separate, military capabilities that could be employed by NATO or WEU, enabling the European allies to conduct military operations in the framework of WEU if NATO were unable, or unwilling, to act. Since the beginning of 1994, negotiations on the implementation of the CJTF concept have been dragging on for more than two years without any tangible result.

37. A real breakthrough became possible when, in December 1995, the French Government made it clear that under certain conditions, France was prepared to take its place in NATO's military structures.

38. The French Foreign Minister, Hervé de Charette, then declared that, from that moment on, France would again occupy its seat in NATO's Military Committee and in the various military agencies which depended on it. At the same time, Mr de Charette said that the French Defence Minister could participate in the activities of the Alliance on a regular basis. At the time, French sources noted that it was too early to conclude that France would automatically participate in the half-yearly meetings of the allied defence ministers in the framework of the Defence Planning Committee and the Nuclear Planning Group.

39. Since then, negotiations on implementing the CJTF concept have accelerated. At the ministerial meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Berlin on 3 June 1996, ministers welcomed the progress achieved in negotiations on the CJTF concept. They stated that:

"By permitting a more flexible and mobile deployment of forces, including for new missions, this concept will facilitate the mounting of NATO contingency operations, the use of separable but not separate military capabilities in operations led by WEU, and the participation of nations outside the Alliance in operations such as IFOR. We now request the Military Committee to make recommendations to the Council for the implementation of this concept to the satisfaction of all Allies, taking into account ongoing work to adapt military structures and procedures."

40. On the other hand, despite the euphoric comments of all the ministers present, it is quite clear that the devilish task of working out the detail still has to be tackled.

41. The breakthrough which led to this reconfirmation of the CJTF concept as a viable solution consisted mainly in the acceptance by all allies of the need to identify and prepare in advance the military assets, structures and staff that could be
required for an operation undertaken by and under the responsibility of WEU. The separable but not separate forces may thus be given a specific European identity with a dual task.

42. It is thought that in the foreseeable future the most likely military actions will take place in a non-Article 5 framework of peacekeeping, peace restoration, and humanitarian and rescue tasks. Such actions could be put under NATO command by a group of NATO member states or, as is now the case in Bosnia and Herzegovina, by a combination of NATO and non-NATO member states. If such actions fitted into the framework of the Petersberg tasks, they could also take place under WEU command, possibly with the participation of non-WEU member states. WEU could then ask NATO to activate the CJTF concept.

43. At present, it is still too early to conclude that CJTFs are ready for deployment. NATO's political and military authorities, in close cooperation with WEU, are still working out the many details, involving not only technical but also major political issues.

44. In its Berlin communiqué the Council gave an indication of the complexity of the issues at hand, when it set out the guiding fundamental objectives for an improvement of the Alliance's capability to fulfil its roles and missions. It stated that its first objective was:

"To ensure the Alliance's military effectiveness so that it is able, in the changing security environment facing Europe, to perform its traditional mission of collective defence and through flexible and agreed procedures to undertake new roles in changing circumstances, based on:

- a renovated single multinational command structure which reflects the strategic situation in Europe and enables all allies to participate fully and which is able to undertake all missions through procedures to be defined in accordance with decisions by the Council;

- HQ structures which are more deployable and forces which are more mobile, both capable of being sustained for extended periods;

- the ability to provide for increased participation of partner countries and to integrate new members into the Alliance's military structure;

- the ability to mount NATO non-Article 5 operations, guided by the concept of one system capable of performing multiple functions. We will further develop flexible arrangements capable of undertaking a variety of missions and taking into account national decisions on participation in each operation, building upon the strength of NATO's existing arrangements. These operations may differ from one another in contributions by Allies and, as a result of Council decisions on a case-by-case basis, aspects of military command and control. The CJTF concept is central to our approach for assembling forces for contingency operations and organising their command within the Alliance. Consistent with the goal of building the European security and defence identity within NATO, these arrangements should permit all European allies to play a larger role in NATO's military and command structures and, as appropriate, in contingency operations undertaken by the Alliance;

- increased political-military cooperation in particular through the Policy Coordination Group (PCG) and effective exercise of political control by the North Atlantic Council through the Military Committee;

- the need for cost-effectiveness."

45. At their meeting in Brussels on 13 June 1996, the Defence Ministers of the North Atlantic Council provided the Permanent Council and the Military Committee with political guidelines in order to enable them to implement in practice the decisions taken in Berlin. In their final communiqué, ministers declared the following:

"We welcomed the approval of the combined joint task force (CJTF) concept and noted in particular that arrangements will be made for the participation of all allies in CJTF nuclei established in Alliance headquarters. CJTFs - multinational and multi-service formations established for specific contingency operations - will provide a more flexible and efficient means to enable the Alliance to
generate forces at short notice. The CJTF concept will also help to improve cooperation with WEU. It will in addition facilitate the participation of non-NATO nations in the Alliance’s new missions.

We directed the NAC in permanent session with the advice of the NATO military authorities to take forward the implementation of the CJTF concept to the satisfaction of all allies, as a matter of priority, including in particular the location, size, number and structure of CJTF headquarters elements and their operating procedures, taking into account the evolving work on the future NATO command structure. This should include facilitating participation by partners in CJTFs at an early stage. There should be continuing coordination with WEU. We requested the Council in permanent session to report on progress at our meeting in December. We decided that, as part of this process, an exercise should be conducted as soon as practicable, based on the deployment of a CJTF for a NATO-led contingency operation. We also invite WEU to work with NATO on the preparation for a subsequent CJTF exercise based on a WEU-led operation.

We instructed the Military Committee to develop rapidly the terms of reference for a Capabilities Coordination Cell. It will provide staff support to the Military Committee on contingency-related matters and assist the Military Committee in providing planning guidance to the major NATO commanders. We have also instructed the NATO military authorities to develop the terms of reference of the combined joint planning staff which would perform centralised CJTF headquarters planning functions and coordination with all relevant headquarters, as well as with forces that might serve under a CJTF headquarters, and as appropriate with the WEU Planning Cell.”

46. A summary of this shows that the CJTF concept is intended to:

- provide rapidly-deployable, multinational, multi-service task forces, together with command and control capabilities, drawn from the Alliance’s integrated military command structure,
- enhance the European security and defence identity by making CJTF headquarters and CJTFs – and/or components thereof – available to WEU for specific operations, and
- facilitate the incorporation of potential contributions from non-NATO nations in contingency operations outside the realm of the Alliance’s collective defence.

47. The primary mission of a CJTF is to conduct contingency operations outside the immediate scope of NATO collective defence missions, including those carried out in accordance with United Nations Security Council resolutions, or on the basis of an OSCE mandate, either NATO- or WEU-led. The attempt has therefore been made from the outset to facilitate partner participation in the CJTF concept. In close coordination with WEU, NATO is now developing an exercise schedule which, in the first instance, will see an exercise based on the deployment of a CJTF for a NATO-led contingency operation. The next step will be to invite WEU to work with NATO on preparations for a subsequent CJTF exercise based on a WEU-led operation. It should be noted that the valuable experiences gained by non-Alliance nations through their participation in the IFOR mission in former Yugoslavia will play an important role in the further development of the participation of non-NATO nations in CJTFs.

48. At a meeting at NATO headquarters, the Defence Committee was informed about some specific issues related to CJTFs, which clarified the progress recently made in the implementation of this concept:

- CJTF capabilities: CJTFs are considered to be a functional capability and an integral part of Alliance structures. It must be possible for CJTFs to be deployed promptly and efficiently, and for them to be sustainable for a whole spectrum of peace support operations as well as other non-collective defence contingencies which we now face in our emerging security environment;

- CJTF planning: to support the new planning dimension of CJTF, a Capabilities Coordination Cell has been
established within the international military staff at NATO headquarters. Broadly speaking, this Cell is required to provide staff support to the Military Committee on contingency-related matters and assist the Military Committee in providing planning guidance to the major NATO commanders. Terms of reference are also being drawn up for the newly-established combined joint planning staff (CJPS) at SHAPE headquarters. The CJPS will perform centralised CJTF headquarters planning functions and will coordinate with all relevant headquarters, as well as with forces that might serve under a CJTF headquarters and, as appropriate, with the WEU Planning Cell.

- CJTF headquarters command arrangements and headquarters are obviously an important element of the CJTF concept. A modular approach has been adopted for CJTF headquarters based on "nuclei" or core staffs and "modules", in general formed by double-hatted personnel in various NATO headquarters. Under this approach, a CJTF headquarters would be created by activating a nucleus in one NATO headquarters and then expanding into a full CJTF headquarters with modules from other headquarters of the NATO command structure as well as from other national and multinational headquarters of Alliance members. Although the details of the CJTF headquarters model are yet to be developed, the involvement of personnel from non-allied nations in CJTF headquarters staffs can be assumed, as appropriate, for planning and operations, depending on national force contributions. A fully-developed CJTF concept should facilitate the incorporation of staff representation, forces and other contributions from non-NATO nations in CJTF planning and activation, including CJTF headquarters, for exercises and actual operations, as directed by the Council.

- WEU-led CJTF operations: in circumstances where the Alliance would choose not to be involved, on the basis of NATO/WEU Council consultations, it is anticipated that WEU could request the use of NATO CJTF headquarters for an operation under its command. It would be for the Council, taking Military Committee advice into account, to authorise the transfer of CJTF headquarters, or elements thereof, and other Alliance assets to WEU. The consultative process, request options and command and control issues will have to be defined in due course.

49 In the immediate future, the attention of NATO's military authorities will focus on the following specific issues:

- development of a Military Committee directive for the implementation of the CJTF concept.

- submission of detailed recommendations to the North Atlantic Council on the establishment of CJTF nuclei in existing NATO headquarters; and

- production of a major NATO commander doctrine on the functioning, size and composition of headquarters, nuclei, modules and forces.

50. At NATO, it was emphasised that, to begin with, implementation will be applied to current command structures and assets, but that this will in time be adapted to a new command structure which should be the result of the efforts now being made to adapt the internal structures of the Alliance.

51 Meanwhile, it has been unanimously decided that the North Atlantic Council should, in the first instance, designate as parent headquarters with "nuclei" or core staffs STRIKFLTLANT in Norfolk, Virginia, with the Command Ship USS "Mount Whitney" for sea-supported CJTF operations, and AFCENT in Brussusam and AFSGOUTH in Naples for land-supported CJTF operations. At the same time, this decision does not exclude the designation of other headquarters in the future NATO command structures.

52. Notwithstanding ministerial euphonia over Europeanisation through implementation of the CJTF concept after the Berlin meeting in June 1996, the real gains for Europe should not be exaggerated.
53. According to the agreement reached in Berlin, Europeans can in theory use NATO assets in operations in which the United States does not wish to participate. On the other hand, the United States has imposed its own conditions, according to which

- the United States must agree with the operation,

- SACEUR, a United States commander, remains commander with overall responsibility for NATO assets used in a European-led operation,

- the forces involved in a European-led operation must be approved by NATO and follow NATO procedures.

54. In other words, as has been said in an earlier Defence Committee report, the European security and defence identity will still be dependent on the United States, which controls the assets that are considered essential for European-led operations. It has rightly been pointed out that NATO has very few assets of its own an air defence system, some - mostly fixed - command, control and communications assets which do not serve much use in interventions, oil pipelines and about three dozen AWACs aircraft. For operations of any importance, Europeans would need American assets, long-range heavy transport aircraft, air-refuelling capabilities and satellite intelligence systems.

55. If Europeans were really serious about the development of their security and defence identity, they would have no choice other than to develop and acquire their own assets. The view taken in the abovementioned Defence Committee report has not changed following the Berlin and Brussels meetings. It was noted then that.

"The agreement now reached on CJTF provides them with an interim period to put their own house in order. For many years, Europe has ensured its security and defence fairly cheaply because it has been able to rely on the United States for all possible emergencies. In the foreseeable future, it will still be able to rely on the Americans for North Atlantic Treaty Article 5 emergencies. For non-Article 5 emergencies, there is a non-Treaty-based grey zone. In such cases, either the United States may participate fully and on a voluntary basis in what can be called a NATO operation, or the North Atlantic Council may provide, also on a voluntary basis, CJTF for European-led operations. There are no obligations and no guarantees for these emergencies, but Europe has no choice but to accept this situation simply because it lacks the means to do otherwise.

On the other hand, nobody can deny that this inadequate security arrangement can only be accepted temporarily. Europe will have to meet the serious shortcomings in its security and defence by starting to develop and acquire its own strategic assets in the fields of lift, logistics and C4I, without delay, if it seriously intends to develop a European security and defence identity."

56. At present, however, most - if not all - western European countries are showing great reluctance to develop real military capabilities. Deeper cuts are being made in defence budgets almost every year. France, traditionally an important defence spender, is bringing in sweeping reforms and is reducing its armed forces and procurement programmes, which may affect major programmes such as the Future Large Aircraft and the Tiger anti-tank helicopter. At the same time, the German defence budget is under heavy pressure, which may seriously delay vital programmes such as the Franco-German strategic programme to build the Helios 2 and Horus satellites and the cooperative programme with Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom to build the Eurofighter.

57. An American analyst has called the present Europeanisation of NATO little more than a convenient myth, partly because the European Union is apparently not prepared to establish a genuine common foreign and security policy at its current intergovernmental conference and also because European countries are fiercely reducing their defence budgets in order to meet the budget deficit criteria for monetary union.

2. Assembly Document 1519, paragraph 23, The United States and security in Europe, Rapporteur Mr Blauw

V. Development of the European security and defence identity (ESDI)

58. At the North Atlantic Council’s meeting in Berlin on 3 June 1996, important decisions were also taken as regards the development of the European security and defence identity (ESDI). These decisions would not have been possible in the absence of parallel developments in the implementation of the CJTF concept and the adaptation of NATO’s command structures.

59. To understand the full significance of this development, it is essential to note the relevant paragraphs of the communiqué issued after the Berlin meeting, which read as follows:

"The third objective is the development of the European security and defence identity within the Alliance. Taking full advantage of the approved CJTF concept, this identity will be grounded on sound military principles and supported by appropriate military planning and permit the creation of militarily coherent and effective forces capable of operating under the political control and strategic direction of WEU.

As an essential element of the development of this identity, we will prepare, with the involvement of NATO and WEU, for WEU-led operations (including planning and exercising of command elements and forces). Such preparations within the Alliance should take into account the participation, including in European command arrangements, of all European allies if they were so to choose. It will be based on:

- identification, within the Alliance, of the types of separable but not separate capabilities, assets and support assets as well as, in order to prepare for WEU-led operations, separable but not separate headquarters, headquarters elements and command positions, that would be required to command and conduct WEU-led operations and which could be made available, subject to decision by the North Atlantic Council;

- elaboration of appropriate multinational European command arrangements within NATO, consistent with and taking full advantage of the CJTF concept, able to prepare, support, command and conduct the WEU-led operations. This implies double-hatting appropriate personnel with the NATO command structure to perform these functions. Such European command arrangements should be identifiable and the arrangements should be sufficiently well articulated to permit the rapid constitution of a militarily coherent and effective operational force.

Further, the Alliance will support the development of the ESDI within NATO by conducting at the request of and in coordination with WEU, military planning and exercises for illustrative WEU missions identified by WEU. On the basis of political guidance to be provided by the WEU Council and the NAC, such planning would at a minimum:

- prepare relevant information on objectives, scope and participation for illustrative WEU missions;

- identify requirements for planning and exercising of command elements and forces for illustrative WEU-led operations;

- develop appropriate plans for submission through the Military Committee and the North Atlantic Council to WEU for review and approval.

NATO and WEU should agree on arrangements for implementing such plans. The North Atlantic Council will approve the release of NATO assets and capabilities for WEU-led operations, keep itself informed on their use through monitoring with the advice of the NATO military authorities and through regular consultations with the WEU Council and keep their use under review.

On the basis of the guidelines agreed today, we have tasked the Council in permanent session, with the advice of NATO’s military authorities,

- to provide guidance and develop specific proposals for further adapting the Alliance’s structures and procedures;
to develop, with regard to the European security and defence identity within the Alliance, appropriate measures and arrangements for implementing the provisions of paragraph 7. Among the arrangements which require detailed elaboration will be provisions for the identification and release for use by WEU of NATO capabilities, assets, and headquarters and headquarters elements for missions to be performed by WEU: any necessary supplement to existing information-sharing arrangements for the conduct of WEU operations; and how consultations will be conducted with the North Atlantic Council on the use of NATO assets and capabilities, including the NATO monitoring of the use of these assets, and to report to our December meeting with recommendations for decisions.

As part of this work, we have tasked the Council in permanent session to review the ongoing work on NATO's military command structure and to report to us at our next meeting with recommendations."

60. The Defence Ministers of the North Atlantic Council, meeting in Brussels on 13 June 1996, associated themselves with the abovementioned decisions taken in Berlin. They also stated that:

"As part of NATO's contribution to developing ESDI within the Alliance, we have tasked our Permanent Representatives, with advice from the NATO military authorities, and with participation of all allies, to review the defence planning process to ensure that it continues to develop the forces and capabilities needed to conduct the full range of Alliance missions and in addition is able to support within the Alliance all European allies in planning for the conduct of WEU-led operations. This work should be completed in time to be considered at our December meeting."

61. The Defence Ministers also asked the Council (a) to keep under review the work on the Long-Term Study on the implementation of the CJTF concept and on the adaptation of the Alliance according to the principles agreed in Berlin, including the building, with the participation of all allies, of the ESDI within the Alliance, to ensure they were conducted in a rapid, consistent and mutually compatible way, and (b) to report to them in December.

62. Both at NATO headquarters and at WEU, the Defence Committee was assured that both organisations are closely coordinating their efforts to implement the Berlin decisions. Among other things, NATO is now attempting to make a precise definition of the NATO assets, headquarters, headquarters elements and command positions which would be appropriate for use in WEU-led operations.

63. NATO's political-military bodies, such as the Policy Coordination Group established in Berlin to meet the need for closer coordination of political and military viewpoints, are now working to establish procedures to provide for continuing NATO-WEU consultations and monitoring of the use of NATO assets by NATO military authorities. In accordance with the Defence Ministers' instructions as mentioned above, NATO's military authorities are reviewing the defence planning process in order to continue to develop the full range of NATO missions, while supporting within the Alliance all European allies in planning for the conduct of WEU-led operations.

64. The main idea behind the decision to develop an ESDI within NATO is that, inside NATO, Europe should be given the capability to plan and lead autonomous operations for crisis management and peacekeeping, while using Alliance structures. It should be possible to deploy European armed forces and assets and capabilities from the Alliance structure once the appropriate decision has been taken by the North Atlantic Council.

65. The objective is to make sure that both NATO and WEU can employ the same command structure in order to prevent superfluous duplication. Additional elements of a WEU military structure should be formed if they were absolutely essential. It is thought that, in principle, the entire NATO command structure should be at the disposal of both NATO and WEU because it is impossible to predict the size, scenarios, circumstances and requirements of future operations, either within or without the framework of Article 5. The question of what requirements are needed and whether NATO or WEU will lead an operation can only be decided on a case-by-case basis.
66. It is understood that NATO's regional headquarters are to play a decisive role in WEU-led operations. These headquarters not only accommodate the CJTF core staffs but, with double-hatted personnel, can also put their planning and command capacity at the disposal of WEU. Regional commands are therefore able to support both the operations commander and the force commander of a WEU-led operation. The sub-regional commands will be used as "component commands" or "joint commands" for smaller NATO-led or WEU-led operations.

67. Double-hatted structural elements and personnel should also be provided at strategic level in order to prepare and coordinate the necessary support at that level for WEU-led operations. Apart from this, it is thought that the present major NATO commands - in future to become strategic commands - will function as Supporting Commanders in the case of WEU-led operations which require planning and coordination on a strategic level, for instance for strategic airlift or the deployment of AWAC's aircraft. This arrangement could pave the way for the use of US assets for European-led operations. It could make it easier for the United States to support such operations, even if it did not provide troops.

68. The generic planning process, which builds on the illustrative plans for WEU operations, forms the basis of contingency and later operational planning by the operational commanders. Responsibility for the coordination of generic planning, the planning of exercises and initial contingency planning could be given to the Deputy SACEUR, who would be supported in this role by the Combined Joint Planning Staff (CJPS).

69. It was mentioned earlier on that France's decision in December 1995 to become involved once again in certain NATO military structures greatly helped to accelerate negotiations on the CJTF and the related issue of the development of Europe's security and defence identity.

70. France has apparently chosen to transform NATO from within rather than try to circumvent it by developing an independent European security and defence identity through WEU alone. It should be noted, however, that Minister de Charette has also said "Our initiative does not mean that France is rejoicing the integrated structures, for one very simple reason: our request for the European pillar to be strengthened implies a review of the Alliance's structures". He noted that since NATO's Brussels summit meeting of January 1994, when it had committed itself to new, non-Article 5 missions and recognised the need to develop a European security and defence identity, not enough progress had been made in this field.

71. The compromise leading to the Berlin communiqué was reached after intensive negotiations and hard last-minute bargaining between the allies.

72. The United States, apparently inspired by SACEUR, believed that the authority of SACEUR (a US commander) would be diminished if his European subordinates also functioned, even in peacetime, as a military command prepared to handle operations mounted by Europe alone European allies, in particular France, Germany and the United Kingdom, argued that the American refusal to accommodate double-hatted European subordinates would destroy the political purpose of NATO restructuring and jeopardise "a momentous opportunity to revitalise the Alliance for the next decade".

73. France has made it clear that it will further intensify its cooperation and fully participate in NATO's military structures on condition that the positive import of the communiqué issued after the June 1996 Berlin and Brussels ministerial meetings is actually given practical effect. It considers it essential that the adaptation of NATO's command structures should give the Europeans permanent and visible representation at the highest levels in the NATO command structures together with a possibility for it to implement its own operations, using Alliance assets if the allies agree. In the first place, France wants a European deputy SACEUR to be double-hatted, acting both as SACEUR's deputy and at the same time embodying Europe's identity within NATO. Apart from this, other things will also have to be changed, subject to negotiation, in order to share responsibilities between Europeans and Americans.

74. France acknowledges that WEU lacks NATO's assets and capabilities, but considers it a natural environment for cooperation between European countries. They should take advantage of this framework by trying to create both the political and military capabilities for cooperation in their priority areas.

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4 Le Monde, 7 June 1996
5 International Herald Tribune, 31 May 1996.
fields of interest and by coordinating their views on security and defence. In particular, joint training of troops should be developed as a common military practice of WEU member states in complete harmony with that of the Atlantic Alliance.  

75. At the informal meeting of NATO Defence Ministers in Bergen on 25-26 September 1996, Charles Millon, the French Defence Minister, said that France will halt its process of reconciliation with NATO if French demands for a reform of the Alliance's command structure are not met. Later, Mr Millon said that France wanted the two main regional commands to be headed by Europeans. This was an issue of "fundamental importance". 

76. Progress on reform of the Alliance's command structure to allow it to expand eastwards has stalled because of French and US disagreements about who should head the key southern command in Europe. The United States holds the two major posts in each of NATO's strategic commands, SACLANT and SACEUR. However, France has insisted that the next two major posts in the pecking order – the southern and northern commands in Europe – rotate among the European allies. That, Mr Millon said, would give the Europeans "permanent and irreversible" visibility. Mr Millon added that "if a certain number of conditions are not respected, France will stay in its present position". But Robert Hunter, the US Ambassador to NATO, has stated that "it is absolutely essential and crucial for the United States to retain an American commander at the head of NATO headquarters in Naples". Washington refuses to give up this regional command because of the vital importance of its geographic situation, its area of responsibility and the presence of the 6th American fleet in the Mediterranean, equipped with nuclear weapons.

77. By now, it has become clear that France is extremely serious in its demands regarding the restructuring and Europeanisation of NATO. If these demands are not met, France may very well reverse its position as regards NATO. As has already been explained in the recent report on "Organising security in Europe – defence aspects" by Mr Bauml, Rapporteur, France has a number of good reasons to reconsider its position regarding NATO. But it is adamant in its demands for the Organisation's restructuring and Europeanisation. It would appear that many of its European allies in NATO appreciate France's attitude.

78. A solution to the present stalemate may depend on relations between the Presidents of the United States and of France. The French President, Jacques Chirac, has written a letter to his United States counterpart, Bill Clinton, to explain the French position. In it, Mr Chirac considers it only natural that Europeans should take over NATO's European commands and that the deputy commander-in-chief of NATO forces should also be a European. He also stresses that it should be possible to identify the European elements in the chain of command at all times including peacetime. Mr Clinton has expressed opposition to the principle of rotating the Naples-based southern command among Europeans. The Naples command will become even more important in a restructured NATO in which the current three regional commands are to be streamlined under two headquarters a southern one in Naples and a northern one in Bergen. In view of continuing unrest and instability in the southern Mediterranean and the Middle East, it is not surprising that AFOUTH is taking on more importance for the Europeans.

VI. NATO enlargement

79. In its June 1996 Berlin communiqué, the North Atlantic Council also reaffirmed the continuing work on enlargement and among other things declared the following.

"We reaffirm our commitment to open the Alliance to new members. The process of enlargement is on track and we are convinced that the overall adaptation of the Alliance will facilitate this process. As decided last December, we have a threefold process for advancing our preparations this year: we are conducting an intensified dialogue with interested countries; working on a further enhancement of PfP both to help possible new members to join and to provide a strong long-term partnership with NATO for others; and we are considering the necessary internal adaptations for enlargement."
80. At present, consultations are taking place in the framework of an intensified dialogue between NATO and each of the 11 states which have explicitly asked to become a member of NATO. These states are: Albania, the Czech Republic, Estonia, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia. Apart from this, NATO is conducting an intensified dialogue with Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Finland and Ukraine, its main purpose being to extend cooperation in the framework of the Partnership for Peace. It is to be noted that enlargement considerations are at the same time being taken into account in NATO's deliberations and decisions on its internal adaptation process. The North Atlantic Council has further reaffirmed its determination "that the process of opening the Alliance to new members should not create new dividing lines in Europe, or isolate any country". Its objective remains "ever closer and deeper cooperative ties with all North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) and Partnership for Peace (PPP) partners who wish to build such relations" with the Alliance.

81. A synopsis of the state of affairs in the enlargement discussion last summer, including the latest developments at that time, was included in the Defence Committee's report "The United States and security in Europe", submitted by Mr Blaauw, Rapporteur, which was adopted by the Assembly in June 1996.

82. Since then, there have been a number of new developments which are worth mentioning NATO's member states have in particular recognised that Europe's security will not improve if relations with Russia are neglected.

83. As regards the timetable of the enlargement process, there now seems to be a general understanding among NATO member states that a formal invitation for new members to join might be issued at the 1997 NATO summit meeting, to be followed by negotiations on their entry which, if the present preparations are successful, could be wound up within a few months. This might leave enough time for an amendment to the Washington Treaty to be ratified by the member states before April 1999, the 50th anniversary of the Treaty.

84. NATO is to meet in December 1996 to set a date for a summit conference. It will probably be held before July and will name the first countries eligible for membership. The NATO Secretary-General, Javier Solana, has said that NATO is engaged in a "threefold process, each part of which should converge towards a common goal and lead to an Alliance summit half way through 1997". The three parts of the process are: NATO's internal adaptation to the new situation, negotiations on the opening up of the Organisation to new countries and a redefinition of relations with Moscow.

(a) Relations with Russia as seen by NATO and its member states

85. In Berlin, on 4 June 1996, the 16 NATO Foreign Ministers had a meeting with Russia's Foreign Minister, Yevgeny Primakov, at which relations between the Alliance and Russia were one of the subjects discussed. After this meeting, Mr Primakov declared that Russia was seeking to develop its relations with NATO and welcomed the fact that enlargement was not "predetermined" and allowed room for discussion. According to Western diplomats involved in talks with Russia, the Russian leadership could agree to some central European countries joining NATO, on condition that it did not station either allied troops or nuclear weapons on the territory of the new member states. Accession of the Baltic states to NATO is anathema to Russia.

86. Both Germany and the United States have been seeking actively to intensify the dialogue with Russia, perfectly aware that there can be no security and stability arrangement in Europe without proper Russian involvement. Neither country can afford to have strained relations with Russia for strategic, political and economic reasons.

87. At the beginning of September 1996, the United States Secretary of State, Warren Christopher, therefore called for a formal charter to govern NATO's relations with Russia. This charter, providing for political consultations and security cooperation, should be ready in time for the summit meeting - tentatively scheduled for June 1997 - at which NATO will announce its enlargement plans.

88. At the same time, Mr Christopher called for the European Union to "move forward swiftly with an expansive programme of enlargement". Aware that many central and eastern European countries would not be able to join NATO, he ventured that this EU enlargement programme would help "lock

10. Assembly Document 1519

11. Le Figaro, 8 October 1996
in democratic and market reforms in central and eastern Europe".  

89. In an important address to the German Bundestag on 11 September 1996 after visiting President Yeltsin, Chancellor Kohl declared that he had reached agreement with the United States, the United Kingdom and France that, in view of the internal political situation in Russia, the debate on NATO enlargement should not resume until next year. Russia should not be confronted with a fait accompli during President Yeltsin's illness. According to the Chancellor, President Yeltsin was prepared to have the necessary talks on NATO enlargement. The Chancellor warned that efforts to enlarge NATO should not stir up a hornet's nest in the process. The enlargement process should take account of the security interests of all the states in the region, including Russia and Ukraine. Until the end of 1996, NATO should concentrate on its own restructuring and on talks with those candidate countries seeking admission to an enlarged NATO.  

90. Addressing the Forum for the Future, in Paris on 23 September 1996, the NATO Secretary-General, Javier Solana, said NATO would have to continue to work on a series of proposals giving proper substance to the term "special relations", with reference to Russia. Mr Solana said there were two aspects to NATO's stance on Russia: on the one hand, Moscow must not be allowed to have a veto on enlargement but, on the other, it had to be involved in European security issues.  

91. A number of proposals are already on the table: the first of these is a charter that would put relations between NATO and Russia on a formal footing; the second makes provision for mutual representation at NATO headquarters in Europe and at Russian military headquarters; the third envisages cooperation between NATO and Russia on armaments.  

92. NATO's proposal to the Kremlin is that a charter on a strategic partnership should contain three parts: the first dealing with principles, the second with procedures for consultation between NATO and Russia on European security, and the third with those areas in which there is scope for cooperation. Mr Solana recently added to his earlier statements that NATO has no intention of stationing nuclear weapons in central European countries that might be invited to join NATO.  

93. NATO has made it clear that it does not like the idea of a "non-aggression" pact, because that could imply that it, NATO, might have aggressive designs.  

94. At the informal meeting of NATO Defence Ministers in Bergen on 25-26 September 1996, Mr Perry, the US Defence Secretary, who had earlier stressed that the enlargement process would begin next year whatever Moscow said, offered to accommodate Russian liaison officers at every level of the Alliance's command structure, with permanent offices for them and their NATO counterparts in each other's headquarters. Mr Perry declared that NATO is building a circle of security in Europe and he believes that Europe cannot be secure unless Russia is inside that circle, working together with the Alliance. The Pentagon says Russia could be involved in virtually everything NATO does and that the only exception to this concerns its collective defence obligations based on Article 5. This formula would enable Russia to take part in a host of NATO committees and forums for military planning purposes.  

95. After a meeting in Berlin on 7 October 1996, the French and German Foreign Ministers said Russia should be included in any new European security system. The French Foreign Minister, Hervé de Charette, said NATO and Russia must agree on a "special relationship" and the Russians should not be shut out of the process of expanding NATO to eastern Europe. He also emphasised that NATO's relationship with Russia must be "sustained in a spirit of partnership". Both Ministers said they agreed that in developing a new European security structure, no "grey areas" should evolve. The Ministers also said that Russia and Ukraine should be drawn into the new European security process at a level reflecting their size and influence. The French and the Germans, even more so, are urging that a charter with Russia be worked out before going ahead with NATO enlargement.  

12 Address in Stuttgart, 6 September 1996.  
13 The Independent, 17 October 1996.  
15 The Financial Times, 3 October 1996.  
17 International Herald Tribune, 11 October 1996.  

19
During a visit to Russia on 16-18 October 1996, William Perry, the US Defence Secretary, assured the Russian Duma that "NATO is no threat to Russia" Mr Perry told the Duma that the objective was to create a wide area of security, including Russia, which would also be invited to sign a special accord that would institutionalise consultation, training programmes, and the exchange of officers at military schools and headquarters Mr Perry appealed to Russian politicians to ratify the START II arms reduction treaty, signed in January 1993. On the other hand, before he arrived in Moscow, Mr Perry warned Russia that refusal to ratify the treaty would have no effect on NATO's plans to enlarge by taking in eastern European countries, and emphasised that there was no link between the two issues. It is to be noted here that cooperation between NATO and Russia is crucial to secure the implementation of the START II strategic arms treaty, which will reduce superpower nuclear warheads from 6 000 each to fewer than 3 500 each by 2003

In a major foreign policy speech delivered in Detroit, the President of the United States. Bill Clinton, clearly alluding to Russia, said that while no country would have a veto on NATO enlargement, the process would be undertaken in such a way that all nations, Russia included, would benefit. Mr Clinton said that the United States insists that "NATO enlargement is not directed against anyone but rather aims to promote stability and nurture young democracies". Mr Clinton pledged that no-one would be left in "a grey zone of insecurity".

(b) Relations with Russia – the Russian view

Understandably, Russia has never shown any enthusiasm about NATO's intentions to admit central European countries. Although NATO has never had any offensive intentions, it should be understood that Russia – even if not actually threatened – feels uneasy about the possible expansion of its former adversary into central European countries which previously came under the sphere of influence of the former Soviet Union in every respect. The Russian political and military leadership has tried everything ranging from overt threats with countermeasures to friendly and conciliatory proposals to convince NATO that it would be unwise, dangerous and pointless to enlarge, all without much success. On the other hand, as a consequence of all this jockeying, NATO member states have been reminded that they cannot try to establish a new security order in Europe without seriously taking into account Russia's position and interests.

Over the past months, Russia has been more forthcoming on this issue, aware that its former central European allies are now independent states free to choose their alliances, and that it cannot claim the right to exercise a veto on NATO enlargement.

At the NATO summit meeting in Berlin on 3-4 June 1996, the Russian Foreign Minister, Yevgeny Primakov, told NATO Foreign Ministers that Moscow acknowledged the right of eastern European nations to join NATO but could not tolerate western military forces being deployed near Russia's borders. According to a NATO official, Mr Primakov praised cooperation between Russian and NATO troops in Bosnia as a model for future operations and urged tighter coordination between Moscow and the West on nuclear proliferation and anti-ballistic missile research. Mr Primakov also said he was "pleased to see that NATO was not forcing the issue of enlarging its structures towards Russia's border by taking unilateral decisions, but was instead engaging in a dialogue with Russia on this subject." 19

In a communiqué issued in late September 1996, the Kremlin said that while Boris Yeltsin, the Russian head of state, could entertain the possibility of NATO enlargement towards eastern Europe, this would only be possible after an agreement to that end had been signed with Russia and the process could not take place the other way round. For his part, Mr Primakov said that if NATO went ahead with its enlargement plans, a whole series of agreements would have to be reviewed, in particular to "readjust the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe to the new situation" 20

It has been known for a long time that Russia is experiencing problems with implementing the 1990 Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE), in particular because of chronic unrest on its southern border in the Caucasus region and in central Asia. It had specifically asked to be exempted from implementing the CFE agreement in

18 International Herald Tribune, 24 October 1996.

19 Le Monde, 6 June 1996
20 Le Monde, 1 October 1996.
four regions in the south. Finally, on 1 June 1996, the signatory states, meeting at the CFE review conference in Vienna, backed an earlier United States-Russian agreement authorising the deployment of Russian forces, especially in the Caucasus, in excess of the ceilings set by the original CFE Treaty.

103. Russia might now argue that if Poland and other eastern European countries become part of NATO, their troops should count as a part of the Alliance, which would mean that NATO would be violating the Treaty.

104. Another treaty which could be a bone of contention in the coming discussions with Russia is the START II treaty on strategic nuclear weapons, signed in January 1993. This treaty, ratified by the United States Senate in January 1996 but not yet ratified by the Russian Duma, commits the United States and Russia to reduce the number of their long-range nuclear warheads to 3,500 or less by the year 2003, while banning all land-based nuclear weapons with multiple warheads, including Russia's most powerful missile, the SS-18.

105. There are many reasons for the Russian Duma to delay ratification of START II, as well as the fact that President Yeltsin, who is facing enough problems as it is with Russia's internal political situation, has not made much of an effort to persuade it to do so.

106. Firstly, START II has been criticised by Russian hardliners for eliminating land-based nuclear weapons with multiple warheads, one of the Soviet Union's strongest assets, while keeping submarine-based systems, an area in which the United States had the upper hand.

107. Secondly, Russian politicians argue that continuing economic and military problems have severely hampered the country's ability to move away from multiple-warhead missiles. In order to maintain its maximum START II limits, Russia would have to build an additional 500 to 700 single-warhead missiles together with their launch systems at a cost of US dollars 40 to 50 billion. Thirdly, some suggest linking ratification of START II to a US promise that it will abide by a strict interpretation of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and not develop an anti-missile defence system.

108. In the Russian Duma, both communist and nationalist deputies have attempted to link ratification of the START II treaty with NATO's enlargement plans. A Russian Defence Ministry official has been quoted as saying that his country would seek quantitative and qualitative changes in START II.

109. On his first visit to NATO headquarters in Brussels on 7-8 October 1996, Russia's National Security Adviser, Alexander Lebed, who was dismissed two weeks later, warned NATO not to rush its plans for eastward expansion, hinting at the possibility that the Russian Duma may not ratify either the START II treaty or a host of other arms control treaties. Mr Lebed said Russia would not react "hysterically" if NATO did decide to go ahead, tearing down his earlier allusions to a renewed nuclear threat from Russia. He emphasised that NATO should negotiate with Russia about the latter's position before extending invitations to join NATO to other countries in eastern Europe. A charter was not enough. A treaty should be concluded that was "very specific about what Russia's duties would be". Mr Lebed proposed that NATO complete its goals one step at a time, starting with solving the Organisation's internal restructuring problems, and following this up with negotiations with Russia about NATO enlargement. Moscow continues to call for a legally binding treaty under which the process of NATO enlargement would be subject to joint decisions. On the other hand, Mr Lebed acknowledged that "politically and legally" Russia could not veto NATO expansion. According to the Russian Foreign Minister, Yevgeny Primakov, Russia must be treated as a European superpower on an equal footing with the Western Alliance. Mr Primakov said that a compromise on NATO enlargement was possible if "NATO is developed through a dialogue with Russia and an understanding with Russia is reached before decisions on enlargement are made.

(c) The Baltic states

110. The security concerns of the three Baltic states are justified both on account of their historical experience, their geostrategic position and above all their proximity to a very big country, Russia, which in the past has at various times dominated the entire region. Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania therefore

regard integration in the West's three political or politico-military institutions, namely, NATO, the European Union and Western European Union, as a guarantee not only of their independence but also of their domestic stability and the security of their frontiers. At this stage it should be stressed that the presence in Estonia and Latvia of very sizeable Russian minorities, coupled with shared frontiers with Russia – which are disputed in the case of Estonia – and with Belarus are generally considered by the Baltic states, perhaps rightly so, as factors with a potential for destabilising the domestic situation.

However, the ratio of forces in the region is such that the three Baltic states take the view that, while their combined armies may be able to foreclose the possibility of a lightning victory for any adversaries who might attack them, they do not constitute an adequate dissuasive force in the long term. The three governments therefore wish to establish close ties with neighbouring countries such as Poland, and the formation of a Lithuanian-Polish peacekeeping unit is the expression of only one example in this connection. To that end, increased cooperation with other countries of the region, whether they are NATO members or take a neutral stance, would be possible and even desirable. In this connection, it is worth mentioning the agreement on training given to the Baltic battalion by British and Scandinavian instructors, and, more generally, the existence of the Council of the Baltic Sea States, which was set up in 1992.

The Baltic states' accession to NATO is definitely their prime objective in the security field. All three governments are convinced that membership of the Atlantic Alliance is the only vehicle that can furnish them with a dissuasive element and enhance their stability, both of which are indispensable for maintaining a balance in their societies and for their economic and social development.

Under the present circumstances, however, it has been made clear that the three Baltic states will not belong to the first group of central and eastern European countries to accede to NATO. In this framework, it is worth mentioning that the Prime Minister of Finland, Paavo Lipponen, has ruled out suggestions voiced in Europe in recent months that the issue of the Baltic states should be solved through the creation of a regional security zone led by Finland and Sweden. 24

116. Aware of these considerations, and even though they have not given up their NATO aspirations, the Baltic states are now aiming at early

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membership of the European Union and Western European Union. They recently stepped up the considerable efforts they have been making for some years to restructure their economies and have clearly stated that they hope to become members of the European Union in 2001. There is no doubt that the entry of the three Baltic states to the European Union and their accession to WEU would strengthen their security position on the international stage especially as they would simultaneously continue with their consistent efforts to improve relations with their neighbours and further their trilateral cooperation on security and defence.

117. One remaining obstacle on the road to early membership of WEU is the policy of WEU member states, according to which full membership of WEU can only be granted to those states which are both members of the EU and NATO. This policy, combined with the various security and defence policies of a number of European states, has now led to anomalies preventing the establishment of a European security architecture which takes account of peculiarities and positions resulting from Europe's eventful history.

118. At present, there are several EU member states that do not wish to join NATO because they do not wish to join a military alliance. In contrast, some of the candidates for EU membership, such as the Baltic states, are also asking for admittance to NATO, which is not likely to be granted in the near future.

119. In order to enable more imaginative solutions for security arrangements involving European non-NATO member states, such as some Scandinavian countries and the Baltic states, to be found, the possibility should be examined of abandoning the principle of NATO membership as a condition for granting WEU membership.

25 In this framework, it is important to accommodate the United States' fear that it will be drawn into European collective defence commitments over which it has no influence. Disconnecting NATO and WEU membership would pave the way for more complete European integration without anomalies because of the different levels of participation in the EU and WEU, and would also exclude an indirect US veto on WEU membership.

120. The decisions taken in Berlin in June 1996 to develop a European security and defence identity within the Alliance, taking full advantage of the approved CJTF concept, do not present an obstacle. On the contrary, they would seem to be very helpful for making imaginative solutions more effective.

121. Under the present circumstances, it will certainly be difficult to prevent the Baltic states receiving the impression that they have been left in a "grey area" by the West following the first wave of NATO enlargement. Initiatives therefore need to be taken in the short term to consolidate the feeling of security in these countries and give them an assurance that they are accepted as partners, if not allies, by the rest of Europe and the West as a whole. This could give rise to an improved military cooperation procedure in the region, which – among other things – would make provision for regular consultations between headquarters, the organisation of manoeuvres and cooperation on training (as is already the case for the training of officers and NCOs of the three countries by British and Scandinavian instructors). WEU would be perfectly capable of taking initiatives to that end.

122. In this context, it should be mentioned that during a recent Defence Committee visit to Bonn and Rostock, the German navy made it clear that it considers the Baltic Sea as an area particularly suited for cooperation and partnership. It has been actively involved in goodwill visits and humanitarian aid and it considers the bilateral and multilateral exercises with Partnership for Peace countries to be an important contribution to stability in the region. Due to the fact that the German navy cannot accommodate all the desires and requests for cooperation, it has now decided resolutely to support the enhancement of cooperation within the Baltic region and to focus available resources on the navies of Poland, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. As part of Germany's special bilateral programmes, the German navy provides material support, has established advisory groups and is conducting training or exercise activities covering all aspects of military affairs.

123. Germany has also proposed developing, under the auspices of the OSCE, a regional structure for confidence- and security-building measures (CSBM) in the Baltic Sea area. Such CSBMs, which should conform to the provisions of the CFE Treaty and the recent Vienna document, could make a specific contribution to security in the Baltic Sea area.

124. In an earlier report on "Security and military cooperation in the Baltic Sea area", a number of practical recommendations were made, among them the establishment of a "Standing Baltic Sea Force" with Denmark, Estonia, Germany, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland as founding members, with the proviso that at a later stage, other Baltic Sea countries should be able to join. The tasks of this force should include border control, monitoring of fishing and environmental regulations, shipping control, search and rescue, and in due course the implementation of Petersberg missions. In the light of the present discussion on the enlargement of NATO, which will apparently be limited to a few countries and will certainly not include the Baltic states, the proposals made in Assembly Recommendation 585 have become even more pertinent. It is widely recognised that western European countries, and WEU too, must make a serious effort to meet the security demands of the Baltic states, which are only too well-known and understandable. These efforts cannot be confined to drawing up consultation procedures and holding half-yearly top-level meetings. Cooperation among the armed forces in such fields as planning and exercises is vital. Maritime force cooperation comes naturally in the Baltic Sea region and can in no way be interpreted as an offensive activity. WEU, in which the Baltic states participate as associate partners, is the logical framework for such cooperation.

(d) Poland

125. Proud of its recent achievements, particularly as regards the economy, aware of the precariousness of geopolitical balances in the region and reassured as to the West's political resolve to include it in the new political and security structures of western Europe (an expanded NATO, EU and WEU), Poland is nonetheless realistic both about its own objectives and the methods it intends to employ to gain admittance to western structures.

126. In his address to the Royal Institute of International Affairs (Chatham House, London) on 24 October, President Kwasniewski clearly ruled out any idea of stationing nuclear weapons on Polish territory and stressed that NATO's forthcoming enlargement would have to be accompanied by a charter governing Russia's relations with the Atlantic Alliance and by a security agreement between NATO and Ukraine. Eastern Europe's security architecture would have to be complemented by a wider cooperation programme than the current Partnership for Peace, to take in those countries of the region not included in the first wave of NATO enlargement.

127. Poland's concern to improve relations with its neighbours and the security climate in the region, along with its efforts to join what are purely western structures, have been a characteristic feature of the country's foreign policy since the collapse of communism and, above all, illustrate the current government's international strategy. The sharp improvement in the economic situation, borne out by a strong upswing in production, clearly bolsters confidence among Poland's leaders and is helping to restructure the economy, a process that is indispensable if the country is to join the European Union and take on the financial burden that will result from its forthcoming incorporation in Euro-Atlantic structures. The country's political will to contribute to the costs of new structures has been clearly stated throughout the Polish hierarchy, the most recent occasion being the President's address in London. Plans to procure 100 combat aircraft with a view to modernising the air force are part of these efforts.

128. Poland is very active in the field of regional cooperation, which is one of the pillars of its security policy. It is still a member of the Visegard Group, which can perhaps be said to have been the most important regional movement in central and eastern Europe following the collapse of communism. The fact that it has opened up its foreign and security policy to the Baltic states is equally remarkable especially as it is becoming increasingly clear that, at least to begin with, NATO will not assume responsibility for the security of this region and thus is particularly true in the case of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. More specifically, Poland has established what can almost be described as special relations with Lithuania, with the signature of the 1993 bilateral agreement which, among other things, made provision for military cooperation and led to the creation of a Polish-Lithuanian peacekeeping unit. The decision taken at the Baltic Sea commercial and industrial summit (Stockholm, April 1996) to create a free-trade zone between the Baltic Sea countries and Poland is a further example of Polish policy.

129. The adoption of confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs) in the region is also one of the main features of Poland's regional policy. The list of CSBMs drawn up by Poland thus provides not only for increased naval cooperation (accident prevention, prior notification of exercises,
invitations to observers and joint training) but also for the withdrawal of nuclear weapons from the region, together with chemical weapons abandoned at the bottom of the Baltic Sea. It also addresses the problem of evacuating nuclear waste.

130. Poland's regional policy, the declared objective of which is to promote security in central and eastern Europe and in the Baltic Sea region, might also provide the country with the means to assert itself as a medium-sized power, albeit, but nevertheless one of capital importance for this part of the world. The creation of a Polish-Ukrainian peacekeeping battalion, the tripartite cooperation agreement signed with Ukraine and the United Kingdom on military training and the organisation of manoeuvres (the first exercise took place in Poland in September in the presence of three national defence ministers and with the participation of 4 500 men) and agreements concluded with Germany (1993) and Denmark are all examples of Poland's classic diplomatic approach and point to innovation in the initiatives making up the regional dimension of its foreign policy.

131. It was noted earlier in this report that the German navy has decided to concentrate its cooperation efforts in the Baltic Sea area on the Polish navy and the navies of the Baltic states.

132. In August 1996, the German fast patrol boat flotilla based in Warnemünde and the 8th Polish coastal defence flotilla based in Swinemünde established an official partnership. Both partners have now agreed on a cooperation programme, to be approved by higher authorities, which covers staff talks, visits, exchanges of officers and many other activities. The Defence Ministers of Denmark, Germany and Poland have now agreed to widen this partnership by integrating a Danish unit.

VII. Conclusions

133. The dust thrown up by the great changes and upheavals in central and eastern Europe is gradually settling and the states of the region, whether newly-independent or liberated from the humiliating bonds of the monolithic political culture of communism, are trying to find or rediscover their place in what has become a different Europe. So many important changes have taken place that the western European states and their United States allies have also been obliged to redefine their policies and alliances. After some early and somewhat rather panic-stricken initiatives such as NATO's North Atlantic Cooperation Council, which were not always of much use but understandable from a historical perspective, it was very quickly realised that more serious initiatives were required. The Rome summit of NATO in 1991 and WEU's Petersberg Declaration in 1992 heralded a new era of task redefinition and the internal transformation of both security organisations. Gradually, it was admitted by some and recognised by others that in the new circumstances, the Americans wanted fewer obligations and the Europeans wanted more responsibilities in Europe's security and defence. Especially in the beginning, this discussion over a shift in responsibilities was painful. Hinting at American disengagement was lese-majesty, to be punished severely, and talk about the establishment of a European security and defence identity was ludicrous Euro-idealism, arrogance and a disgraceful slap in the face of the nation which had liberated Europe from fascist rule.

134. The debate on responsibilities in the Alliance is not over yet, but the earlier surrealistic phase has fortunately been replaced by a more realistic and down-to-earth phase in which each participant can voice his opinion without being ridiculed in a kangaroo court. The conflict in Bosnia was an important catalyst for changing the tone of the debate.

135. NATO's Brussels summit of January 1994 launched the combined joint task force concept, the idea being to make collective assets and capabilities of the Alliance available for WEU-led operations. The discussions over implementation of this concept dragged on unsuccessfully for two years until, in December 1995, France decided to reoccupy its seat in NATO's Military Committee while promising to participate even more fully if certain conditions, such as a thorough transformation of NATO's command structures and a Europeanisation of NATO, were fulfilled. An important reason for France was that if Europe's security and defence identity could not be created without NATO, it should be done within it. The intensified discussions within NATO, where sacred cows were no longer a taboo, led to the North Atlantic Council decisions in Berlin, which, if successfully implemented, may become an important turning point in the Alliance's and Europe's security and defence policy.

136. Directives were issued for a further thorough review of NATO's military command structure, for the implementation of the CJTF concept and for the
development of the European security and defence identity.

137 Although there is agreement over the principles of these closely related issues, it will not be easy to put them into practice. It is essential that the adaptation of NATO's command structures should give the Europeans permanent and visible representation at the highest levels, together with a possibility for them to mount their own operations, using Allied assets if the allies agree. The discussion of these issues is not yet closed and it would be a miracle if solutions to all these complicated issues were found before the next North Atlantic Council meeting in December 1996.

138. A major point in the discussions concerns the occupancy of command posts. The United States now holds the two major posts in each of NATO's strategic commands, SACLANT and SACEUR. France has insisted that the next two major posts, the southern and northern commands in Europe, should rotate among the European allies. At the moment, the debate is concentrated on AFSOUTH, which France wants to be a European command. It should be noted that the United States insists that it will not give up AFSOUTH because of the presence of its 6th fleet under this command. It should, however, be noted that in fact the 6th fleet is exclusively dependent on the United States national command chain, of which the American AFSOUTH commander is also part, in addition to holding his NATO post.

139. Remarkably enough in this stand-off between France and the United States, the European allies have not sided with the United States and their position varies from support for the French view to neutrality. This is a clear indication of changed attitudes within the Alliance.

140. Enlargement, or how to provide more stability and security for central and eastern Europe is the other important discussion in progress. Although no countries have officially been named, it has become quite clear that NATO is aiming at enlargement, supposedly by 1999, with a limited number of countries. NATO has repeatedly stated that its enlargement should not create new divisions in Europe but it can be argued that a first limited wave of enlargement will give more security to those central European countries who need it least and will create more instability and insecurity for those which are already at most risk.

141. Even if there are now more misgivings because of what might be some negative consequences of early and partial enlargement, stopping or postponing the process is no longer an option. Under the present circumstances, this would seriously damage the credibility of NATO and those member states that have declared themselves firm advocates of enlargement.

142. It is also to be noted that the central and eastern European candidates for membership are reaching out for political, psychological and military reassurance while Russia is trying to shape its new role and identity. NATO and its member states have no choice other than to be responsive to their concerns. Even though some of those countries are not yet eligible for membership, serious efforts should be made by the Alliance and its member states to provide maximum comfort in the form of cooperation and consultation. There is also an important role here for WEU which should reconsider the possibility of abandoning NATO membership as a condition for WEU membership in order to produce more imaginative solutions for security arrangements involving European non-NATO member states.

143. Finally, it cannot be emphasised strongly enough that good relations between NATO and Russia are of paramount importance for stability and security in Europe. There is no doubt that Russia cannot exercise a veto on NATO enlargement or on the security ambitions of central and eastern European countries, but it would be extremely unwise for the Atlantic Alliance to go ahead without having reached an appropriate agreement on its relations with Russia. Nobody can deny that Russia is an important player in the field of European security and it is no secret that concerns over stability in Russia are the main reason why central and eastern European countries are asking for NATO membership.

144. Here too, WEU, as an uniquely European defence organisation with a less emotionally charged history than NATO, can play a role in resuming the dialogue with Russia.