



Assembly of Western European Union

DOCUMENT 1668

10 November 1999

FORTY-FIFTH SESSION

A European crisis reaction force –
reply to the annual report of the Council

REPORT

submitted on behalf of the Defence Committee
by Mr Zierer, Rapporteur

ASSEMBLY OF WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION
43, avenue du Président-Wilson, 75775 Paris Cedex 16
Tel. 01.53.67.22.00 – Fax: 01.53.67.22.01
E-mail: assembly@weu.int
Internet: <http://www.weu.int/assembly/welcome.html>

A European crisis reaction force – reply to the annual report of the Council

REPORT¹

*submitted on behalf of the Defence Committee²
by Mr Zierer, Rapporteur*

TABLE OF CONTENTS

DRAFT RECOMMENDATION

on a European crisis reaction force – reply to the annual report of the Council

EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM

submitted by Mr Zierer, Rapporteur

I. Introduction

II. Existing assets

1. The question of headquarters

- (i) FAWEU (forces answerable to WEU) headquarters
- (ii) CJTF (NATO Combined Joint Task Forces) headquarters

2. Forces

- (i) European multinational forces answerable to WEU
- (ii) Other European multinational forces
- (iii) European “national” forces

III. Shortcomings of European forces – desirable improvements

1. Headquarters

- (i) Operation headquarters (OHQ)
- (ii) Force headquarters (FHQ)

2. Forces

- (i) Qualitative shortcomings of the forces
- (ii) Capabilities required by forces
- (iii) Strengthening European cooperation

¹ Adopted in Committee by 10 votes to 3 with 4 abstentions.

² *Members of the Committee:* N ... (Chairman); MM Zierer, Schloten (Vice-Chairmen); MM Baumel, Blaauw, Mrs Calleja, MM Cioni, Colla, Contestabile, Cox, Davis, Dhaille, Díaz de Mera, Dreyfus-Schmidt, Goris, Goulet, Henry, Irmer, Leers, Lemoine, Maginas, Mardones Sevilla, McNamara, Medeiros Ferreira, Mota Amaral (Alternate: Mrs Aguiar), Neumann, Pereira Coelho, Polenta, Pottakis, Robles Fraga, Lord Russell-Johnston, MM Selva, Siebert, Speroni, Theis, Valk (Alternate: Dees), Verivakis (Alternate: Micheloyiannis), Wilshire (Alternate: Townend).

Associate members: MM Bársony, Godal, Mutman, Yürür, Tanik (Alternate: Kalkan).

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

(iv) The case of the European Corps

- (a) Tasks
- (b) Current configuration
- (c) The engagement in Bosnia
- (d) Desirable developments
- (e) Headquarters
- (f) Forces
- (g) Conclusions

IV. A genuine European crisis reaction force

V. Conclusions and prospects

APPENDICES

I. Declaration by the member states of the European Corps

II. Exercises of the European Corps

Draft Recommendation

on a European crisis reaction force – reply to the annual report of the Council

The Assembly,

- (i) Noting, in the light of the conflicts in former Yugoslavia, the need for Europe to acquire military capabilities in order to respond to similar crises;
- (ii) Pointing to the efforts to formulate a policy for giving the European Union “the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces”;
- (iii) Noting that the present European structure for the autonomous control of operations is based on national headquarters which are made available on a case-by-case basis;
- (iv) Noting that the member countries have made various headquarters available to WEU, the two most credible operation headquarters being Northwood (UK) and Creil (France);
- (v) Taking note also of the possibility of NATO CJTF HQs being made available to Europeans¹;
- (vi) Recalling the considerable number of forces available for use by Europeans¹, either as forces declared “answerable to WEU” (FAWEU) or as European multinational forces;
- (vii) Considering the lessons learnt from peace-support operations, which enable the requirements of a European crisis reaction force (ECRF) to be more clearly identified;
- (viii) Strongly regretting the current European shortcomings in the fields of decision-making structures, intelligence gathering and analysis, and planning;
- (ix) Considering that Europeans¹ may have recourse either to an operation headquarters proposed by a framework nation or to Alliance capabilities, which provides Europeans neither with sufficient visibility nor the autonomy they desire;
- (x) Considering that European headquarters which could serve as a core for a force headquarters are sufficient in number but that they do not have the capability for joint operations;
- (xi) Noting, as regards forces, that many units are designed essentially for territorial defence operations and that they are therefore ill-adapted to Petersberg missions;
- (xii) Regretting the numerous shortcomings of European forces, in particular as regards their strategic mobility, interoperability and capacity for long periods of deployment outside their national territory;
- (xiii) Noting the shortage of European high-tech assets in the fields of tactical intelligence acquisition (aircraft, UAVs), electronic warfare (jamming etc.) and precision-guided munitions;
- (xiv) Noting that the European Corps was designed to be part of Europe’s collective defence machinery, while its missions encompass humanitarian and peacekeeping operations;
- (xv) Observing nonetheless that an effort is being made to adapt the European Corps to Petersberg missions by means of the concepts of Light Intervention Force (LIF) and Mechanised Intervention Force (MIF);
- (xvi) Stressing the engagement of some FAWEU (forces answerable to WEU) headquarters in Bosnia;
- (xvii) Pointing out that the FAWEU headquarters, even though they do not have a joint component, are nonetheless capable of operating in a joint environment;

¹ “Europeans” means the 28 WEU countries.

(xviii) Noting finally that shortfalls remain with regard to computerised command systems for European force (FAWEU) headquarters and as regards the composition of pre-designated forces, which are made up almost exclusively of heavy units,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Invite the 28 members, associate members, associate partners and observers to consider establishing a genuine European crisis reaction force (ECRF), permanently available at very short notice, as well as a parallel decision-making body;
2. Establish, for the command of operations, a permanent combined joint headquarters which can work in close liaison with the WEU/EU Military Staff;
3. Encourage the development of the intelligence, analysis and planning capabilities of potential headquarters in the European autonomous chain of command;
4. Organise the joint training of potential forces and headquarters necessary for the command of a European crisis reaction force for autonomous operations, as well as the joint training of the various European multinational forces;
5. Improve the procedures for WEU's cooperation with NATO and member countries in the field of intelligence acquisition and analysis, in particular by framing a genuine European policy on satellite intelligence;
6. Establish agreements with NATO on the possible use of Alliance assets by the European crisis reaction force with a view to resolving crisis situations in Europe;
7. Draw up a proper inventory of the types of forces able to be deployed for a catalogue of Petersberg missions;
8. Develop a proper European military strategic transport capability and the pooling of existing transport assets, while maintaining the possibility of having recourse to civilian assets;
9. Enhance the deployability of European reaction forces by acquiring a range of deployable equipment such as the shelters required for installing headquarters in the field, or mobile units for the analysis of air- and space-based imagery;
10. Consider the possible construction of a European command ship to accommodate a deployed force headquarters for the purpose of a common operation;
11. Encourage the member countries of the European Corps to continue their efforts to adapt it to the missions of a rapid reaction corps;
12. Have WEU draw up a list of illustrative missions of the Petersberg type to enable the European Corps to produce a catalogue specifying the size and composition of the various types of deployable forces emanating from the European Corps.

Explanatory Memorandum

(submitted by Mr Zierer, Rapporteur)

I. Introduction

1. The appalling events which have been unfolding in former Yugoslavia for nearly ten years have brought home to western nations the need for military resources to carry out peace-support operations. In particular, as clearly confirmed by the declaration issued at the Cologne Summit on 3-4 June 1999, citing the Saint Malo Franco-British Declaration of 4 December 1998, Europe "must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them and a readiness to do so in order to respond to international crises (...)". The Saint Malo Declaration further stated that "the Union must have at its disposal the appropriate capabilities and instruments (European capabilities pre-designated within NATO's European pillar or national or multinational European means outside the NATO framework)".

2. Enactment of those declarations would also contribute to strengthening the European pillar within the Atlantic Alliance, in line with NATO's new Strategic Concept as defined at the Washington Summit on 23-24 April 1999: "In order to enhance peace and stability in Europe and more widely, the European Allies are strengthening their capacity for action, including by increasing their military capabilities. The increase of the responsibilities and capacities of the European Allies with respect to security and defence enhances the security environment of the Alliance¹".

3. This clearly shows the need for a real European crisis reaction force (ECRF) immediately deployable for Petersberg missions in an autonomous European context. However, this in itself would be of no use without the necessary headquarters for fielding such a force, which is why this report examines the issue of headquarters before that of forces work-up.

4. In this connection the recent decision, on the part of the countries from which the European Corps is drawn, to turn the latter into a rapid reaction force is a move in the right direc-

tion. Consequently there is a need to prepare Europe for genuine strategic autonomy, involving a permanent military crisis-management capability instead of the present *ad hoc* system. In order to draw up a real programme for building a defence Europe, it was decided to proceed with an audit of existing forces, a task currently in hand in WEU. Additionally it would be helpful to define real convergence criteria, along the lines of those drawn up for Economic and Monetary Union.

II. Existing assets

5. Since the 1992 Petersberg Declaration, WEU has put in place the various military components – headquarters, forces and operating procedures – required to conduct Petersberg operations.

1. The question of headquarters

6. Since WEU does not have a permanent military structure for conducting operations, it has to set up an *ad hoc* chain of command for each of its operations. It is essential to have a unified chain of command under the political control and strategic direction of the Council of WEU and to have headquarters available at short notice at each of the necessary levels:

- *Operation Headquarters (OHQ)*, a combined joint structure at strategic level, located in a WEU member country and responsible for operational planning. It is the command structure during an operation and provides an interface between the political authorities – in this instance the Council of WEU – and the forces on the ground;
- *Force Headquarters (FHQ)*, also a combined joint structure, situated at operational level, capable of being deployed in or close to the theatre of operations. It is the equivalent of NATO's CJTF HQ concept. It takes orders from the operation headquarters;
- *Component (Land, Air or Naval) Command Headquarters (CC)*, which are multinational and deployed locally. For

¹ Strategic Concept, (24 April 1999), Part II, paragraph 18.

ordinary peacekeeping operations, this will normally be a land component HQ (the case of IFOR/SFOR in Bosnia and KFOR in Kosovo). A land component headquarters like the European Corps or the ARRC (ACE Rapid Reaction Corps) is the ideal size for this function.

7. In order to successfully mount an autonomous operation under the authority of the WEU Council, potential headquarters must be pre-designated and undergo training in lifelike situations in order to achieve the necessary level of expertise and to become familiar with WEU procedures.

(i) FAWEU (forces answerable to WEU) headquarters

8. WEU has asked its member countries to identify those headquarters which they are prepared to make available to the Organisation:

- those countries have designated three *multinational force headquarters* as available to WEU (FAWEU), either as operation headquarters (OHQ) or force headquarters (FHQ), and three others as force headquarters (FHQ). However, it should be pointed out that these combined headquarters are not joint HQs (European Corps, ARRC, Euro-for etc.);
- furthermore, numerous *national headquarters* have been declared as being available to WEU:
 - eight joint and three land component headquarters at OHQ level;
 - two joint and three land component headquarters at FHQ level;
- in fact it is not yet possible to identify those headquarters which are really suited to the roles of OHQ or FHQ, for this is the purpose of the audit currently being carried out by the WEU Military Staff (MS). Clearly, if we apply realistic criteria such as those for an operation HQ at SFOR or IFOR level, there are few European headquarters which have all the necessary characteristics:

- joint HQs able to plan and command an operation involving 30 000-strong troops;
- capable of being made multinational, in other words with sufficient premises to accommodate foreign delegations;
- with signalling and computerised command systems at the requisite level and if necessary also deployable (FHQ);
- available at 30 days' notice.

9. For the moment, your Rapporteur can see only two possibilities, namely, the British and French joint operation HQs in Northwood and Creil (near Paris) respectively. Other European countries are in the process of setting up similar headquarters.

(ii) CJTF (NATO Combined Joint Task Forces) headquarters

10. At NATO's June 1996 Berlin ministerial meeting, the members of the Alliance agreed on the possibility of making CJTF (Combined Joint Task Forces) available to Europe for operations conducted "under the political control and strategic direction of WEU". The Berlin Communiqué explicitly makes provision for the elaboration of European command arrangements for conducting WEU-led operations. This principle implies designating and training appropriate personnel, with the European elements within the HQs performing a dual - Atlantic and European - function ("double-hatting"). This principle was recently endorsed at the Washington Summit, although the necessary arrangements between the two organisations for making the assets available have not yet been finalised (question of the "framework agreement").

11. For practical purposes, so that combined joint HQs deployable in the theatre of operations can be made available to WEU by decision of the North Atlantic Council, the Alliance has decided to designate, within so-called "parent headquarters", a core staff which can be strengthened on request by adding elements supplied by other NATO bodies or by the member states. This CJTF HQ concept allows a flexible, multinational approach. Indeed this was the principle

applied in the case of the IFOR/SFOR force in Bosnia.

12. The WEU CJTF HQ would have the same composition as a NATO one and be placed under the orders of an Operation Commander, who in turn would come under the political authority of the WEU Council. For the purposes of conducting a WEU-led operation, replacement of staff on the basis of nationality could ensure that the composition of the CJTF HQ reflected the countries participating in that operation. However, the NATO member countries have already agreed in principle that these NATO CJTF HQs – which are pre-designated – would be made available regardless of the national contributions to the operation in question.

13. With regard to the European chain of command within NATO, the two organisations are, according to your Rapporteur's information, trying to reach agreement on the principle of the European general appointed to the post of Deputy SACEUR at SHAPE (Mons) assuming specifically European responsibilities, which would make him a prime candidate for the job of Operation Commander in the case of a WEU-led operation. If he was not chosen for that role, D/SACEUR would still be in charge of coordinating the support supplied by NATO to WEU.

14. If D/SACEUR were to be chosen for the job of Operation Commander, the operation HQ (OHQ) would be the SHAPE headquarters within which "double-hatted" European officers would be designated.

15. Furthermore, a number of permanent NATO headquarters have been designated as "parent headquarters". In other words they will supply the core staff for a CJTF HQ deployable in the theatre of operations: the headquarters concerned are CINCENT, CINSOUTH etc.

2. Forces

(i) European multinational forces answerable to WEU (FAWEU)

16. The forces answerable to WEU (FAWEU), founded on a well-established concept dating back to 1993, offer a whole range of military resources to meet a broad spectrum of operational requirements. The multinational FAWEU, of which there are now seven, provide a major pool of forces which are available for WEU.

These multinational units and their HQs are: the European Corps, the UK/Netherlands Amphibious Force, the Multinational Division (Centre), Eurofor (Rapid Deployment Euroforce), Euro-marfor, the Spanish-Italian Amphibious Force and the 1st German-Netherlands Corps.

17. The European Corps (Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg and Spain), designated a FAWEU in May 1993, is composed of the 1st Belgian Mechanised Division, the Franco-German Brigade, the 1st French Armoured Division, the 10th German Armoured Division, the 10th Spanish Mechanised Infantry Brigade and a Luxembourg reconnaissance company. At full strength this force is composed of some 80 000 troops.

18. The UK/Netherlands Amphibious Force, designated a FAWEU in May 1993, is composed of four infantry battalions (three British and one Dutch), an Anglo-Dutch artillery brigade and two boat troops. It is a rapidly deployable fast landing force with some 6 500 troops.

19. The Multinational Division (Centre), (Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom) was designated a FAWEU in November 1993. This force, composed of a Belgian airborne brigade, the 31st German Airborne Brigade, the 11th Dutch Airmobile Brigade, the 24th British Airmobile Brigade and five battalions of division-level troops, is some 20 000 strong.

20. Eurofor (Rapid Deployment Euroforce), with French, Italian, Portuguese and Spanish elements, became a FAWEU in November 1995. It is composed of three units: one 1 000 strong at battalion level, one 3 000 strong at brigade level and one 10 000 strong at division level, making a total of some 14 000 troops.

21. Euromarfor (France, Italy, Portugal and Spain) also became a FAWEU in November 1995. This prestructured, non-standing naval force with both maritime and amphibious capabilities is composed of operational elements in a constant state of readiness so that they can regroup at short notice. A typical configuration might be: one aircraft carrier, four to six escort units, one landing force of at least brigade size, amphibious vessels for the landing force and one combat resupply vessel.

22. The Spanish-Italian Amphibious Force, designated a FAWEU in November 1997, is another prestructured, non-standing force. In the

event of its deployment, its amphibious elements would retain their own chains of command. The naval component is composed of units from the Italian Naval Division and the Spanish Delta Group. Further naval units are available, depending on operational requirements. The amphibious component must be designed and put together around a structure to be set up by common agreement, so that either country could supply the command structure and base units which could then be supplemented with headquarters staff and units from the other country. This force, which is some 4 000 strong, must be brigade size. Overall command would be assumed by each country in turn on a two-year rotating basis. The permanent multinational element would be composed of a few officers only.

23. The 1st German-Netherlands Corps, which became a FAWEU in November 1997, is composed of a German armoured division, a Dutch mechanised division and one support group. Its headquarters is in Münster and it can supply planning assistance and 40 000-strong troops for WEU missions.

(ii) Other European multinational forces

24. Numerous other European multinational forces have recently been set up. Even if they have not officially been declared forces answerable to WEU (FAWEU), they are prepared and trained for operations in a multinational framework such as WEU.

25. The European multinational forces set up in the NATO framework are:

- the Multinational Division (Centre), (Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom), the UK/Netherlands Amphibious Force and the 1st German-Netherlands Corps, all of which have been designated FAWEU and have already been described above;
- the Mediterranean mine counter-measures force MCM FORMED.

26. Other European forces have been set up at regional level:

- Multinational Army Corps North East (Denmark, Germany, Poland);
- European Air Group (France, Germany, Italy, United Kingdom);

- Benelux Deployable Air Task Force
- Baltic Naval Group;
- Hungarian-Romanian Battalion.

27. Finally, a number of those forces are devoted specifically to peacekeeping operations:

- Nordic Peacekeeping Brigade;
- Nordic Logistics Battalion (NORBAT);
- Baltic Peacekeeping Battalion (BALTBAT);
- Polish-Ukrainian Battalion;
- Multinational United Nations Standby Forces High-Readiness Brigade (SHIRBRIG)²;
- Lithuanian-Polish Battalion;
- South East European Brigade (SEEBRIG)³.

28. The process of creating multinational forces is ongoing and some fifteen multinational units are in the process of being set up. Almost all the countries of Europe are involved: Bulgaria, Denmark, Finland, Hungary, Italy, Moldavia, the Netherlands, Poland, Romania, Slovenia, Sweden, Ukraine etc.

(iii) European "national" forces

29. European countries have a large number of forces, most of which they are prepared to make available for European multinational operations, even if not all of them have been officially designated FAWEU. Furthermore, some of them have experience of deploying forces at great distance for operations abroad. France, for example, has intervened 22 times in Africa since 1962 and the United Kingdom also has a lot of experience in

² SHIRBRIG was set up on 15 December 1996 to conduct humanitarian and peace-support operations under a UN mandate in pursuance of Chapter VI of the UN Charter. The 11 participating countries are: Argentina, Austria, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Romania and Sweden. It entered into its operational phase on 1 January 1999.

³ On 26 September 1998, 7 states (Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, Italy, Macedonia, Romania and Turkey) signed the founding act of this 5 000-strong European multinational brigade. It is intended for peace-support operations under UN or OSCE auspices, essentially in the Black Sea region. Slovenia and the United States have observer status within this force.

this field, in particular from the Falklands war. Most European countries have been involved in various UN operations (Egypt, Israel, Lebanon, Cyprus, Cambodia, Africa, Yugoslavia etc.).

30. Even though the navies of European countries no longer rule the oceans of the world, most European countries are naval powers: the UK and French navies are the third and fourth in the world respectively, and the Mediterranean countries and Scandinavia have a strong naval tradition.

31. All the efforts currently under way in Europe to reorganise and restructure armed forces are geared towards enhancing the flexibility and mobility of those forces so that they can be deployed in operations outside the national territory. The abolition of national military service, Germany's creation of a crisis reaction force and the UK's desire to acquire aircraft carriers are just some illustrations of that trend.

32. By virtue of their presence all over the world, their experience of deploying expeditionary forces over great distances, their naval power and a land forces organisation increasingly geared towards multinational operations outside the national territory, European countries have an international strategic dimension. Indeed they are the only countries, after the United States, if a modest comparison may be permitted, to be able to boast of such a dimension.

33. On the basis of the experience acquired during recent peace-support operations under UN and NATO auspices, engaged forces can be divided into five categories:

- *battalion*, of 500-600 men;
- *task force*, 1 000 to 1 200 strong, formed around a regiment supplemented with support elements (artillery, signalling, engineering, helicopters etc.). This is the system most commonly used for participation in peace-support operations;
- *brigade*, 3 000 to 5 000 strong, composed of three to five regiments, with its own support (artillery, engineering, helicopters etc.) and capable of autonomous action. Even a cautious evaluation (Germany has the only crisis reaction force, half the forces of the countries concerned have an exclu-

sively territorial organisation) indicates that there are over 60 brigades for the ten full members of WEU alone;

- *division*, the level generally used to integrate national forces in a multinational framework, with a variable composition and configuration. Generally a division is composed of two or three brigades and some 10 000 to 18 000-strong troops, according to NATO standards. For example:
 - IFOR (60 000) and SFOR (30 000) were created from three divisions, each covering a specific geographic area. European countries together can set up about 15 division-level structures;
 - *army corps*, some 50 000 strong, composed of two or three divisions. This is the unit to engage in regional conflicts or peacekeeping operations (IFOR, SFOR, KFOR etc.). The ten full WEU members together can provide six headquarters at army corps level.

34. Thus we see that Europe has at its disposal a theoretically sufficient pool of forces to react rapidly to crises and provide reinforcements over a period of time. However, only a few countries, mainly France and the United Kingdom, have the necessary forces and structures (joint headquarters at strategic level, air and sea task forces etc.) to conduct joint operations during a regional-level conflict calling for the involvement of an army corps.

35. In fact the problem is not so much one of the capacity of forces, as of their availability.

III. Shortcomings of European forces – desirable improvements

36. In response to a request from the WEU ministers at the end of 1998, the German Presidency launched an audit of the assets and capabilities available for European-led operations. A first report was presented to the ministers at their meeting in Bremen in May 1999.

37. The initial findings may be summarised as follows:

- WEU member countries theoretically have sufficient assets to conduct Pe-

tersberg missions. However, in view of the shortcomings noted with regard to the decision-making structures, intelligence and planning, it was recommended that any autonomous WEU-led missions should be confined to simple operations. For larger-scale operations it is currently necessary to call on Alliance capabilities;

- to make European assets sufficiently effective, certain capabilities need to be developed, particularly for the preparation of operations (intelligence, analysis, planning etc.);
- the assets and capabilities required for autonomous WEU-led operations need to be developed. Particular attention should be paid to joint training and information exchange among forces and multinational headquarters answerable to WEU (FAWEU);
- finally, European forces must evolve in order to adapt to crisis-management tasks, particularly with regard to force readiness, mobility, deployability, interoperability, sustainability and flexibility of composition.

1. Headquarters

38. In parallel, the WEU Military Staff is carrying out a study of the actual capacities of the headquarters proposed by the various WEU member countries for conducting WEU-led operations. This study, which is under way at the moment, shows that some offers are unrealistic and apparently motivated more by political considerations than by a concern for military effectiveness. The Military Staff is therefore endeavouring to draw up a list of those headquarters which satisfy a number of criteria, so as to be sure that they have a real operational capability. The main criteria would seem to be: the ability to conduct joint operations, the possibility of adding a sufficient number of officers to turn a national HQ into a multinational HQ and the presence of a sufficiently extensive command, control and communications system (numerous links, contacts with the NATO networks, satellite capabilities etc.).

39. In order to set up its chain of command, in the absence of permanent structures, WEU uses

the concept of a "framework nation (or group of nations)". This means that the basic infrastructure and core staff for the headquarters is supplied by one member country, or possibly, by a group of countries, on the basis of an existing multinational headquarters.

(i) Operation headquarters (OHQ)

40. Europe is able to set up the appropriate command structures for planning, organising, deploying and conducting operations, using existing structures such as the French and British joint central headquarters (PJHQ in Northwood and COIA/AMIA in Creil near Paris), which on many occasions have proven their ability to mount operations abroad. Moreover, other European countries are in the process of setting up joint headquarters.

41. The alternative is to use Alliance assets and capabilities, which means, for the purposes of setting up the OHQ, a pre-designated European chain of command within SHAPE (Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers in Europe), in Mons. However this is linked with the choice of Operation Commander in the case of an operation using Alliance assets and capabilities.

42. The Assembly has already expressed doubts about the feasibility of designating Deputy SACEUR (D/SACEUR) Operation Commander for a European-led (WEU or EU) operation, since this general has many problems to deal with other than preparing himself for such a function. Moreover, he himself pointed out that during an emerging crisis, he would have other tasks within SHAPE which he could probably not abandon. If the commander of the WEU/EU-led operation cannot be D/SACEUR, another European general must be appointed within SHAPE with the sole task of preparing for that role. That officer would therefore be responsible for organising and running the European military pillar within the Alliance, in particular by setting up the European chain of command. All this would appear to be in line with the 1996 Berlin decisions, recently reaffirmed at NATO's Washington Summit, and is essential for establishing a genuinely European chain of command.

43. However, any decision to use a European chain of command within SHAPE must be approved by SACEUR himself. He will always have very valid reasons, during a crisis in or