The public perception of European security and defence after Cologne

REPORT

submitted on behalf of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations
by Mr McNamara, Rapporteur
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TABLE OF CONTENTS

DRAFT RECOMMENDATION
on the public perception of European security and defence after Cologne

EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM
submitted by Mr McNamara, Rapporteur

I. Public opinion of the different stages of European integration
   Rekindling support for the integration process

II. The Cologne Summit: a source of misguided interpretation in the media
   (a) The choice of High Representative for the CFSP
   (b) The shift away from the objectives of Amsterdam

III. Cologne and the “Kosovo” effect

IV. The announced demise of WEU and its effect on public opinion
    The result of the absence of a WEU communication policy aimed at public opinion

V. The need for a comprehensive public information policy

VI. Conclusions

APPENDIX
on the development of public opinion in central European countries: the case of Romania
submitted by Mr Mesca, Romania, co-Rapporteur

1. History
2. Romania – what kind of security?
3. The Kosovo war and the change in the public’s perception of NATO
4. Romanian official and public perception of European security and defence after Cologne – interests and perceptions of central European states
5. Communication, information and education – the need to involve and take account of public opinion in order to build a new security and defence system in Europe

1 Adopted in Committee by 11 votes to 0 with 1 abstention.
2 Members of the Committee: Mrs Squarcelupi (Chairman); Lord Russell-Johnston, Mr Eversdijk (Vice-Chairmen); MM Aleffi, Amoruso, de Assis, Debarge, Evin, Gehrcke, Graas, Mrs Guirado (Alternate: Arnau Navarro), Ms Hoffmann, Ms Jäger, Ms Jones (Alternate: McNamara), Mrs Katseli, Ms Kestelijn-Sierens, MM Legendre, Mignon, Moreels, Niza, Onaindia, Pottakis, Mrs Pulgar, Mr Rodeghiero (Alternate: Robol), Ms Sussmuth, MM Taylor, Timmermans, Vis.
   Associate members: Mrs Kaland, Mr Matoska.

N.B. The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.
Draft Recommendation

on the public perception of security and defence after Cologne

The Assembly,

(i) Considering that the war in Kosovo has helped to further increase European public awareness of the difficulties experienced by Europe in trying to deal with its own security problems;

(ii) Noting that several official declarations on the proposed reform of the European institutions have been issued recently, without any explanation being given of the logical sequence of events;

(iii) Convinced of the need to inform citizens in a simple but comprehensive fashion about the different stages of European integration, in particular in the field of security and defence, so that any reforms are supported by public opinion;

(iv) Aware of the responsibility it bears for conveying, through its role of parliamentary scrutiny, the wishes of the national electorates to the governments gathered together in the Council;

(v) Convinced nevertheless that the Council, member governments and WEU Secretary-General must assume their responsibilities in full for explaining to public opinion WEU’s unique purpose and the problems which must be resolved in order to complete the building of a security and defence dimension at a time which is particularly propitious for making this project a reality,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Apprise the Assembly of how it is informing public opinion about the difficulties encountered in building a security and defence Europe and about WEU’s specific role in this area;

2. Explain, in particular, the different stages of the process of reflection that is under way on institutional reform so that the public can understand what the plans announced for the end of the year 2000 entail;

3. Emphasise to the member governments the international democratic deficit in the institutional proposals, provide for the maintenance of a representative assembly and consider possible additional measures to overcome the lack of international democratic scrutiny;

4. Urge member governments to give all the proper priority to the dissemination of information on available assets and the commitments of WEU and each of its member countries to European security and defence;

5. Encourage the Presidency and the Secretary-General to strengthen their relations with the press and to continue publishing updated information documents such as the one entitled WEU today, ensuring that they are widely disseminated in all the languages of the member countries, and also following up Recommendation 638 on “WEU’s communication policy” adopted by the Assembly on 2 December 1998.
Explanatory Memorandum
(submitted by Mr McNamara, Rapporteur)

I. Public opinion of the different stages of European integration

1. A broader section of the public than ever before has recently been taking an interest in issues of European security and defence. Firstly, the citizens of member states have become more aware of the reality of Europe as a common edifice, following the introduction of the single currency, which showed that governments can reach agreement on Community issues when common interests are at stake and where there is a political resolve to find institutional solutions.

2. Secondly, there has been an acute public awareness of the many crises that Europe has encountered in the Balkans, so close in terms of culture and ties to many European states. In this case, however, it was difficult to generate the necessary common political will and when it did finally emerge, member states showed themselves incapable of translating it into action on the ground. Both in Bosnia and Kosovo, the United States was the one to show resolve, giving rise in public opinion to the conviction that only when there are major economic interests at stake is it possible to muster the support needed to forge a common policy, because such interests elude the power of governments and probably operate across national borders through the international financial networks. Opinion surveys carried out during the crisis showed a loss of confidence in governments, which are unwilling to tackle the transnational defence challenges. An aggravating factor was the recollection, still fresh in many minds, of the economic sacrifices that had been made to meet the conditions for joining the euro. Indeed, election results in several countries showed dwindling support for the parties in power.

Rekindling support for the integration process

3. There was therefore a need to find ways of rekindling the public’s support for the process of European integration which, in the meantime, had taken further steps forward with the Amsterdam Treaty and was reaffirmed at every summit or bilateral meeting.

4. This was no easy task, for the Kosovo war in particular had brought to the notice of all sections of public opinion the fact that Europe was not sufficiently present in the security and defence field. Confronted with television images of a war being waged by a NATO in which the US was the leading power, the man in the street could not fail to be struck by the contrast between the declarations of the European heads of state and those of the NATO military spokesman. It was soon realised that NATO had won not only the military battle in the field, but also the war in terms of information and images, imposing itself as a key player on the world stage for the third millennium. For the EU and WEU, by contrast, which were struggling to make an impact on public opinion, the meetings held at the end of Germany’s EU Presidency provided an opportunity that could not be missed.

II. The Cologne Summit: a source of misguided interpretation in the media

5. The Cologne Summit on 3 and 4 June 1999, which brought together the heads of state and government of the Fifteen, was an opportunity to renew the public’s confidence in the efforts of European governments to achieve integration. Held, as it was, at the height of the military action in Kosovo, the Summit tried to prepare the public for a historic decision in the field of the common European security and defence policy. The “European Council Declaration on strengthening the common European policy on security and defence” contains a number of statements, the full implications of which are only really grasped by well-informed specialists. Generally presented as a very ambitious programme for European integration, it masks a much more complex reality. It is therefore not surprising that the reactions of the media gave rise to a whole host of different and sometimes misguided interpretations.

6. In its Cologne Declaration, the European Council announced its determination “that the European Union shall play its full role on the international stage” and “to give the European Union the necessary means and capabilities to assume its responsibilities regarding a common European policy on security and defence”. But it goes on immediately to specify that “the Council should have the ability to take decisions on the full range of conflict-prevention and crisis-man-
7. Thus there are two different issues here which the public often confuses, particularly having followed the developments in the Balkans, where the terminology used to define the different types of humanitarian and military intervention has gradually been modified. Although there is not a total consensus, hardly anyone now seriously believes that there is a real danger of another war on the territory of the EU. It is much easier to imagine the EU taking action to settle crises in neighbouring areas, although the opinion polls reveal some scepticism on that score. The only idea which has been fully grasped by the public at large, in fact, is that of Europe’s dependence on decisions by the United States. The newspapers have made the most of this issue, attracting their readers’ attention with such provocative headlines as “Europeans want more Europe”, “The elusive European defence”, “A common defence to do what?” or “Europe: a continent of goodwill and last-ditch compromises”.

8. The common threads running through all such articles are: putting an end to Europe’s subordination to the United States, comparisons of defence spending and Europe’s unsatisfactory performance in general. They demonstrate – figures at hand – that the EU member states spend a not inconsiderable amount on defence with little to show for it. They emphasise the need for a reform of the common institutions in order to adapt them to new requirements, without preparing the public for the financial implications of the ambitious plans announced in Cologne.

9. In this respect, WEU has always been compared unfavourably with NATO, of which it has been presented as a pale and ineffectual imitation. Or else it has been presented as a complementary structure which it would be better to integrate in the European Union. None of these plans met with objections when they were announced, but it seems clear that governments will have great difficulty in putting them into practice.

(a) The choice of High Representative for the CFSP

10. Several seemingly disparate facts were announced to the public in Cologne. The first was the Fifteen’s designation of NATO’s former Secretary-General Javier Solana as High Representative for the CFSP (Common Foreign and Security Policy). Their choice of a well-known and experienced personality was reassuring to the public at large, without upsetting Europe’s internal situation or its transatlantic relations. Some time later, the idea of combining the post of High Representative for the CFSP with that of WEU Secretary-General began to take shape, given the unanimous support for Mr Solana’s appointment. Several statements of approval were reported in the media. It remains to be seen how this issue will develop, since the institutional debate has only just started. The idea has been warmly welcomed, but the means of putting it into practice have yet to be defined. The media once again are expected to convey encouraging messages about the future of the European Union and, indeed, the public in Europe is becoming accustomed to hearing announcements concerning new appointments of leaders of European institutions without really being told how the decision-making process is organised. This is the weak point in the process of European union, which, given its complexity, needs to be explained more clearly to the public at large.

(b) The shift away from the objectives of Amsterdam

11. In Cologne, the Fifteen above all announced their resolve to gradually frame a common defence policy, but not – and this is a nuance which has escaped public attention – to create a common defence as foreseen by the Amsterdam Treaty. Article 17 of that Treaty outlines a broader policy “which might lead to a common defence”, the progressive framing of which “will be supported, as Member States consider appropriate, by cooperation between them in the field of armaments”. Paragraph 2 states that “questions referred to in this Article shall include humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking”. And finally, paragraph 3 stipulates that “the Union will avail itself of the WEU to elaborate and implement decisions and actions of the Union which have defence implications”. Clearly there are two complementary hypotheses here: a general one, concerning an integrated common defence system, and a more specific one, concerning Petersberg operations. In any event it is stipulated that Western European
Union will “be an integral part of the development of the Union providing the Union with access to an operational capability notably in the context of paragraph 2”. Since the Amsterdam Treaty covered all areas concerning the future of the European Union, the media did not draw the public’s attention specifically to the issue of security and defence, preferring to focus on aspects with a more direct impact on peoples’ daily lives, such as employment, social and economic policy, the environment, reciprocal rights etc. They did, however, devote a lot of attention to the CFSP (Common Foreign and Security Policy) which was a new development of some general interest, more easily accessible to the public at large. A merger of WEU with the EU would be taking things a lot further than envisaged in Cologne, where any reference to a common defence was dropped. Indeed that issue is entirely absent from the Cologne Declaration which refers solely to conflict-prevention and crisis-management activities, and it is for such activities only that the Fifteen pledge to provide the Union with the necessary capabilities and instruments. These fine distinctions will not, of course, have escaped the specialist. However, the important message behind the Cologne Declaration is Europe’s desire to free itself of its dependence on the US and to show its resolve to shoulder responsibility for its own security, something which citizens, logically, can only support.

12. There was no question at all in Cologne of creating a European army, and yet this is the idea that has taken root in the public mind, and which was strengthened by the similar messages coming out of the Franco-German Summit in Toulouse several days before. Here, however, the language is less complex, since the decisions on joint military programmes are much more tangible, in that they refer to budgetary issues and to the more rational use of financial resources. This is probably one of the arguments to which taxpayers are the most amenable, for while the institutional aspects of the EU often only interest a small, well-informed section of public opinion, everyone is able to perceive a direct link between the taxes they pay and how the money is spent. Moreover, the public at large will be even more sensitive to decisions affecting the development of national defence industries, given their very practical implications for jobs in member states.

13. The Cologne Declaration refers, on the issue of a cooperation framework for giving the European partners an independent military capability, to the need for sustained efforts to strengthen the defence industrial and technological base, by fostering a restructuring of European defence industries and a harmonisation of military requirements and of armaments planning and procurement.

III. Cologne and the “Kosovo” effect

14. Seven years previously, the war in Bosnia had already highlighted Europe’s weaknesses. A general awareness had emerged during the bloody process of Yugoslavia’s dissolution that Europe, for all its ambition to become a greater world economic power, was totally absent from the picture. The Kosovo conflict, following as it did the collective achievement of the single currency, was a reminder that nothing seemed to have changed in this respect. Europe was still out of the picture and subordinated to its American ally during this conflict on European territory. Opinion surveys carried out at the time revealed the enormous uncertainty of Europeans as they saw their national positions weakened. A public debate soon developed on the need for Europe to play a role, particularly as everyone was following the war on their television screens.

15. This acted as a spur to decision-making in Cologne, with the Fifteen skipping some of the intermediate stages that would have been necessary for achieving a common defence and setting the end of 2000 – during the French EU Presidency – as a key date in that process. The aim of adopting a timetable was to make the project more tangible for public opinion, as though setting a deadline was a way of guaranteeing that it would come about. France’s commitment to this undertaking was another guarantee, given that it was a driving force at Saint Malo, together with the United Kingdom, and at Toulouse, with Germany.

16. Under the influence of the Kosovo war, virtually the whole political spectrum rallied in support of a European system of defence and the few dissenting voices – mostly on the extreme left and right – were sidelined by the media. One can hardly claim that there was any real discussion with the few opponents who voiced their opinion, particularly since there was a concern to avoid embarrassing the centre-left governments –
which meant the majority of European governments in 1999 – in the run-up either to national or European elections.

17. The press fell in with the movement, and stressed, with reference to similar situations in the past, how the EU and WEU had constantly failed to assert themselves in the region and had always been totally overshadowed by NATO.

18. Thus, once again, the citizens of Europe were strengthened in their scepticism with regard to the functioning of the European institutions, which they perceived as the result of decisions by an intellectual and political elite unable to assure democratic transparency in bodies which, at exactly the same time, were being tainted by their first media scandal following accusations of fraud and corruption.

IV. The announced demise of WEU and its effect on public opinion

19. In parallel to their growing awareness of the lack of a common security and defence policy in Europe, the media began to realise that there was a system which could have been used to deal with the situation, but which for reasons that had never been explained in detail, had not worked. Indeed, WEU’s nickname of “Sleeping Beauty” and the accusation of “congenital lethargy” were typical of the rather picturesque criticism accompanying any presentation of the Organisation. Since the Saint Malo Declaration, the public had been led to acknowledge the need for institutional change according to a range of possibilities which had never been properly gone into. What was important was to announce a fresh start on introducing reforms, the details of which remained to be clarified.

20. Those details have not been revealed to this day. Quite the contrary, when one tries to see one’s way more clearly, one begins to realise that the road ahead is a lot longer than it initially appeared.

21. However, a new step was taken in Cologne; indeed the EU General Affairs Council was instructed to “prepare the conditions and the measures necessary (...) including the definition of the modalities for the inclusion of those functions of the WEU which will be necessary for the EU to fulfil its new responsibilities in the area of the Petersberg tasks. In this regard our aim is to take the necessary decisions by the end of the year 2000. In that event, the WEU as an organisation would have completed its purpose”. The idea of setting a deadline was probably to provide the public with a precise point of reference and to establish a programme to be followed in the run-up to that date. In fact it is now being presented less as a deadline than as a starting point for the construction of a new system of security and defence on the basis of organisations which remain to be defined. The French Presidency is obliged to present European citizens with a project, not a result.

22. It is a pity that the Declaration, perhaps because it tries too hard, ends with a death sentence for WEU. That, surely, can only strengthen the widespread opinion that this institution is no longer up to the new tasks facing Europe in the third millennium.

The result of the absence of a WEU communication policy aimed at public opinion

23. In spite of the declared efforts and improvements in the area of communication policy, WEU remains largely unknown to the general public. This is not true of the more specialised circles which are more directly concerned, in other words, the other international organisations, the national parliaments, the defence and foreign affairs ministries, specialised research institutes and universities, which already receive sufficient information. The problem is with the man in the street and with those who shape public opinion and awaken the public’s interest through the media, in other words, journalists, who are key opinion-formers.

24. The WEU Assembly has tackled this problem by regularly drawing up communication plans which most certainly have helped to publicise its activities among specialised circles. Indeed, all that is needed is to adapt to the increasingly sophisticated technologies that are currently available by using the information channels which are already in place. However, the Organisation at intergovernmental level has been unable to muster the same enthusiasm, and apart from a few ministerial meetings — indistinguishable in the public’s mind from the various other European gatherings – it has not been able to make enough of an impact to win a place in the media. In fact, no specific event has been organised for publicity purposes, with the possible exception of
the official celebrations and declarations that marked the 50th anniversary of the Brussels Treaty. And, if anything, those events in fact contributed to misinforming public opinion, since it was not the 1948 Brussels Treaty which instituted WEU and its Assembly, but rather the modified Brussels Treaty of 1954, of which the 50th anniversary will be in 2004.

25. What is certainly lacking in WEU’s communication policy is a media image that is immediately associated with its name. The image should of course be that of its Secretary-General, as spokesman for and representative of the Organisation as a whole. The imminent appointment of a new Secretary-General will be a last chance to attract the interest of public opinion for the only European organisation with competence for common security and defence and this, at the end of the day, will be decisive for the successful creation of security and defence Europe.

V. The need for a comprehensive public information policy

26. One could have imagined that the tone adopted by the current Finnish EU Presidency might somewhat temper the initial enthusiasm and that a kind of Nordic pragmatism would take the place of sensationalist announcements. Indeed, leaving aside the issue of a common defence – on which apparently no headway is being made – Finland has on several occasions announced its resolve to make progress on the creation of a European capability for Petersberg operations. Emphasis is also being laid on the future participation of non-WEU member countries, and there are assurances on all sides that they will not be excluded from the new institutional framework. WEU’s acquis in this field have been duly acknowledged, although this does nothing to allay the serious concern felt by the public in those countries, particularly those which are not members of NATO, about the danger of being sidelined. The reader is referred on this issue to Mr Mesca’s valuable contribution to this report in which he sets out his views.

27. One question must soon be brought to the public’s attention: how is parliamentary scrutiny of decisions in the field of the common security and defence policy to be exercised in the future, given that it is not certain whether the European Parliament will have the necessary powers, and what reforms will be required? Indeed, the present structure of the European Parliament is inappropriate for the task of scrutinising intergovernmental decisions on security and defence; the members of the EP are directly elected by universal suffrage and exercise scrutiny over the activities of the European Commission, but have no powers vis-à-vis individual governments. In the plans for institutional reform that are currently being prepared, due attention must be paid to ensuring that there is continuity of democratic scrutiny. This could be exercised by a parliamentary body which, while it may not have a configuration identical to that of the WEU Assembly, could nonetheless be based on it, and would be composed of directly elected members of national parliaments and of the European Parliament, as well as observers from countries sharing a common interest in the security and defence of Europe. The task of informing the citizens of Europe on such issues falls to the members of the national parliaments and of the WEU Assembly. Given the determination reflected in government statements to move ahead fast, it is up to parliaments to constantly reiterate this demand for accountability, which is one of the principles of democracy. It is their responsibility to raise public awareness of this sensitive issue on which there is likely to be a broad consensus.

28. The Assembly of WEU is currently the only European institution which has competence for security and defence and which can exercise democratic scrutiny through its members, who are also members of their national parliaments. This dual mandate provides a link between the electorates of the member countries, national policy and decisions taken at international level. This system offers advantages which must be integrated, in the appropriate form, in the future institutional architecture, for an attempt to rapidly adapt the powers of the European Parliament might destroy this link in the democratic process. This would be particularly disastrous in the light of the dwindling confidence shown by the poor turnout for the European elections, a sign of widespread scepticism with regard to the usefulness of that institution.

29. All these issues need to be explained in more depth to the public at large, although many people, when presented with the details, may well fail to grasp them in full. The time has therefore come to take the situation in hand and to create the conditions for sound information to be sup-

7
plied through the media, in order to avoid having recourse at the end of 2000 to expedients which are bound to be detrimental to the democratic future of the common security and defence institutions, which in the eyes of the public may always be seen as being governed by a distant elite. All this means that governments will be unable, when the time comes, to rally the support they need to adopt vigorous measures at European summits, thereby dooming EU programmes to failure and making it impossible, once again, for the European Union to play its proper role on the international stage.

VI. Conclusions

30. Events are moving fast and the initial conclusions which one might have drawn have by now become outdated. The Assembly of WEU has set in motion a process of institutional reflection about which it would be useful to inform the outside world – first the parliaments and then the public at large. The coming year should provide a veritable testing-ground for new ideas. Each step must be clearly explained by the media, so that the project put together by the end of 2000 can count on a certain degree of public support. An information effort needs to be made vis-à-vis the national parliaments, which must be supplied with progress reports. It would be useful for that purpose to organise special Assembly colloquia or sessions with members of the foreign affairs and defence committees of the national parliaments, given that the institutional changes to be made within the European Union will one day have to be ratified by each national parliament.

31. A recommendation could be submitted to the Council, inviting it to supply detailed information at each new stage of the process, so that the national parliaments and the public receive explanations going well beyond the formal declarations issued at the close of summit meetings. Preparatory discussions on the new European security and defence architecture should be organised with the national parliaments and the European Parliament. There must also be a constant flow of information towards the Assembly of WEU, which will continue to provide the expertise which has always characterised its analyses and proposals.
APPENDIX

submitted by Mr Mesca, Romania, co-Rapporteur
on the development of public opinion in central European countries: the case of Romania

1. History

1. Abandoned for nearly half a century to the communist ideology and practices, Romania managed nonetheless to build for itself a specific attitude in the Warsaw Pact, to adopt an original position among the other partners – most of them entirely obedient to Soviet Union policy for long periods of time.

2. For instance, Romania was the first communist country to get rid of the Soviet Army troops in 1958 and the first eastern European country to formally recognise and establish diplomatic relations with West Germany. It maintained diplomatic and economic relations with Israel after the 1967 Arab-Israeli war and relations with the People’s Republic of China when this country’s relations with the Soviet Union had worsened to the point of war. Romania not only refused to take part in the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia, but even firmly criticised Moscow’s decision. During the whole cold war period, the Romanian leaders endeavoured to adopt a correct foreign policy and to convey a significant message to the West. For a time Romania was considered important because it challenged the huge power of the Soviet Union. Moreover, Romania played a role in the Egyptian-Israeli negotiations – in the Camp David Agreement.

3. Romanian citizens of a certain age – the category ranging from 40 to 70 years – feel a certain apprehension about the dangers which periodically threaten the security of their country. Nobody felt secure about being a citizen of one of the Soviet Union’s allies. Nobody in Romania liked to be part of the Warsaw Pact. Instead, all Romanians were proud of the attention paid to their country by the western world. The Presidents of France, the United States, and so on, as well as Prime Ministers, were frequent visitors to Bucharest or received their Romanian counterparts in the most important capitals of the western democracies.

4. Romania’s situation and its image in the West changed dramatically soon after 1985, following the coming to power of Mikhail Gorbatchev as the undisputed leader of the Soviet Union. Even the most secret and optimistic dreams of western leaders came true, thanks to this individual who had emerged from the very core of the communist system. He was in favour of a process he called “perestroika” and of an unvarnished manner of presenting realities he called “glasnost”.

5. Of course, interest in Romania dropped dramatically, and all the internal policy mistakes Nicolae Ceausescu had made became reasons for harsh accusations. In fact, Mikhail Gorbachev managed to disrupt the system as a whole, not only a part of it. Romania was supposed to follow the trend.

6. Romanians saw the positive side of the 1989 events, namely, access to democracy, the hope of achieving reunification with Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina, the possibility of distancing themselves from the Soviet Union and, to put it in a nutshell, of acquiring lasting security. Romanians noted that justice had been done vis-à-vis the Baltic states, which had recovered their independence (lost as a consequence of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact) and welcomed the reunification of Germany, in the secret hope that in the newly established pattern of relations, due consideration would also be given to Romania.

7. Now, ten years after the events of 1989, Romanians hope that a real and functional democracy will bring them, through a normal process, some degree of welfare, real independence and real security. Frustrated many times in its history, Romania is persuaded that its future lies within the Euro-Atlantic structures and that its security will be guaranteed either within the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, or a corresponding European structure.

8. Before the Madrid Summit, 85% of the Romanian population thought this was the right path for Romania to follow. Romanians were impressed and particularly convinced by the defensive character of NATO, the efficiency of its technology, its discipline, its deterrent capability and, last but not least, the solidarity among its members.
2. Romania – what kind of security?

9. An analysis of the particular case of Romania has revealed to us what Romanians think about security, how they describe their situation, what their expectations are, and how they intend to meet the challenges of the moment.

10. It is a fact that Romanian foreign policy has always been devoted to reducing sources of conflict and acting as a mediator. All the Romanian leaders, at least during the past half century, have been unequivocal about their commitment to peace. Romanian diplomacy played an important role in the Helsinki process and in all the processes dedicated to security and peace. In order to get closer to its objectives of joining European and Euro-Atlantic organisations, Romania entered into formal compromises, signing two treaties with Hungary and Ukraine. Romanian citizens used to perceive security essentially as a matter of territory and military forces, and until recently, thanks to the relative wealth of their lands, they paid less attention to economic, social or environmental sources of insecurity.

11. Nowadays Romania is a full member of the Council of Europe, an associate partner of Western European Union, and has applied for membership of NATO and the EU. Accession to these organisations has become a national priority and enjoys the full support of all the political parties in the Romanian Parliament. Romania has been involved to varying degrees in most of the United Nations humanitarian activities, such as the police or peacekeeping operations in Somalia, Angola, Albania, etc.1.

12. Romania has made every effort to adapt its armed forces to NATO requirements. A complex diplomatic programme was put into practice before the Madrid Summit in order to argue the case for NATO membership, because it was considered the one and only guarantee of security.

13. This accounts for the 85% share of Romanians who were in favour of joining NATO.

3. The Kosovo war and the change in the public perception of NATO

14. After the Kosovo crisis broke out and throughout the subsequent developments, the Romanian authorities – the President, the Government as a whole and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs – approved of NATO’s action. The view taken at official level from the very first moments of the bombing was that this action was entirely justified. The majority of the Romanian media, however, took the opposite stance.

15. In view of the good relations that had existed for centuries between Serbia and Romania and the fact that NATO had ignored the United Nations’ advice and acted without its approval, taking into account also the exaggerated reactions of certain great powers and of their leaders, the huge losses (both human and material), and finally the unquestionable fact that the Yugoslav Government had been freely and democratically elected, the public perception of NATO rapidly deteriorated in Romania.

16. Popularity ratings dropped dramatically, and by the end of the Kosovo war, only 45% of the population still considered it beneficial and morally acceptable for Romania to join the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation.

17. Romanians closely followed the evolution of the crisis and of the war and were disapproving, in particular of the lack of explicit UN endorsement of the strikes. At the same time, NATO’s refusal to take account of the Pope’s traditional “Urbi et Orbi” address at Easter time and its rejection of any armistice during the Easter time had an adverse impact on Romanian public opinion. The massive losses, both in human lives and in material terms, and the cool attitude of high-ranking NATO military officials towards so-called “collateral losses” increased sympathy for the “targets”2.

18. The Romanians’ attitude was by no means surprising, given that even in the United States, President Clinton’s popularity rating dropped from 63% to 57% over the same matter.

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1 The national programme for Romania’s accession to the European Union.

19. Experts in international law expressed wide-ranging opinions about the justification or lack of justification for NATO’s attacks. Some of the most severe criticism, in a way saving Europe’s honour, came from France, where 46% of citizens were against the bombings and only 40% in favour, and from the United Kingdom, where the media pointed to the metamorphosis of Bill Clinton, Tony Blair and Robin Cook from the young pacifists of the 1960s and 1970s to the war hawks of 1999. A very interesting position was expressed by two of the best qualified generals – Jean Cot from France and Sir Michael Rose from the UK – both former commanders of UNPROFOR in Bosnia. The former underlined the “incredible inhibitions of the Europeans who think they are not able to do anything without American help” and the latter “the lack of clarity of the legal background of NATO’s intervention in Kosovo”.

20. In Germany there was a great variety of opinion, ranging from unconditional support to the criticism expressed by Erich Schmidt-Eenboom, an expert in the secret services, who said in an interview with the Mittel Deutsches Rundfunk that “Germany has great responsibility for the escalation of the violence in Kosovo because the previous government in Bonn, led by Helmut Kohl, indirectly provided the UCK’s weapons”.

21. The Italian Prime Minister, Massimo d’Alema, had to prove his country’s dedication to NATO, in spite of its own political background. The results of a poll showed that 45.6% of Italians opposed NATO’s attack on Yugoslavia and that only 37.7% were in favour. Greece had the most radical opposition to NATO’s intervention, expressed both by the Prime Minister, Costas Simitis, and the Defence Minister, Akis Tsohatopoulos. The famous “Eleferotyopia” even accused the “Pax Americana (that) steps over the international law”.

22. Because of its moral aspects, it is certainly worth mentioning the position of the Vatican, which called for an immediate stop to the bombing and the “UN’s rapid intervention”.

23. Austria, considering that NATO’s action created a dangerous precedent for military alliances, expressed another interesting position. A poll showed that 72% of Austrians were against joining NATO.

24. It would seem that there is a certain difference between the official and the public perception of security and defence in Romania. Even though successive governments have ranked admission to NATO as the most important strategic goal from the security point of view, the public, for the reasons described above, has become more and more critical towards the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. (As a matter of fact, the feeling is not characteristic of Romania only. For common citizens, the positions and responsibilities of the European and Euro-Atlantic organisations and their structures and links with each other are quite difficult to understand.) Romania needs to maintain its commitment and dedication to a powerful and efficient organisation like NATO. At the same time there is a general feeling that NATO went much too far in trying to solve all the European problems of defence – sometimes overreacting. For a long time, most Romanians were confident, more than they had been during the “balance of terror” between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, in the power of the United Nations and of international law. Nowadays they cannot possibly disregard the position of the UN or simply overlook the principles enshrined in it of sovereignty, independence and non-interference in countries’ internal affairs.

25. It became clear to us, during our study, that Romanians would prefer to have a European defence structure with everything that this entails. Romanians believe that such a European structure would have a different attitude with regard to the population and infrastructure. There is a general feeling that the US is too big a country faced with global problems, and too far away to pay sufficient attention to a very small part of Europe. Otherwise – for instance – navigation would not still be blocked on the Danube as a consequence of bombing the Yugoslav bridges, to say nothing of the pollution problems in the countries through which the river passes.

26. Romanians would like to rely on a European defence structure, connected with or integrated in the EU, an organisation composed of countries that constantly and efficiently deal with issues related to ethnic and religious minorities,
because even when European standards on the rights of ethnic and religious minorities are observed, the possibility still remains that current or old misunderstandings, frustrations and resentment will emerge once again and develop into situations of tension.

27. In fact, it is none too early to implement the European Security and Defence Identity, taking into account the current and prospective situation on the continent. The Amsterdam Treaty, which refers to the need to ensure the security of EU’s external borders (Art. J.1) and to be able to take operational action where necessary (Art. J.4) provides a basis on which to deal with the delicate problem of American leadership and transatlantic relations.

28. As Tony Blair explained when presenting the UK’s new position in a speech in Edinburgh on 13 November 1998, “Europe needs to develop the ability to act alone in circumstances where, for whatever reason, the US is not able or does not wish to participate. Why should US taxpayers and US troops always have to resolve problems on our doorstep?”

29. Romania agrees with this point of view, and this is valid for both the official and public levels, although the reasons in each case may be different.

30. WEU Assembly Document 1638, “Time for Defence” is enlightening in this respect:

“At present, only WEU provides both the European members of NATO who are not members of EU and the central European countries with a real possibility of participating in the framing of a European security policy and benefiting from the advantages offered by a European security area. This is why it is essential that when WEU’s powers are transferred to the European Union, the WEU associate member and partners countries must be given a guarantee that they will continue to enjoy all the rights of participation they currently have in WEU”.

31. We firmly believe that this position granted to and required by associate member and partner countries is not a matter of prestige or pride – it is a matter of mutual confidence and security. It will give these countries the feeling of having a say in a Europe where the decision-making process can hardly overlook their viewpoints and interests.

5. Communication, information and education - the need to involve and take account of public opinion in order to build a new security and defence system in Europe

32. Thanks to a very large number of newspapers, television and radio stations and a good ratio of foreign language speakers, the Romanian population is generally well-informed about domestic and foreign affairs. Many Romanians read or listen to both Romanian and foreign media. Like everywhere else in Europe, in large areas near borders, people can follow the television and radio broadcasts of neighbouring countries. Indeed, people can form objective points of view on both domestic and external issues. The Government has publicised the National Programme for Romania’s Accession to the European Union and all the steps taken for the country’s integration in NATO. All the official contacts, all the decisions in the field of defence, the short- and medium-term priorities, institutional reform and financing, are well-publicised aspects of the Government’s activities. The traditional pro-western feelings of the Romanians will make the process of taking an active part in the new European security and defence policy a normal and well-accepted step. Romania expects its voice to be heard and listened to whenever European security and defence matters are dealt with, since a European security and defence policy without the central and eastern European countries’ involvement seems inconceivable. Romania is ready and willing to take its place in that process.

3 "WEU and European defence: beyond Amsterdam"; Assembly Document 1636.