A European intelligence policy

REPORT

submitted on behalf of the Defence Committee
by Mr Baumel, Chairman and Rapporteur
A European intelligence policy

REPORT

submitted on behalf of the Defence Committee
by Mr Baumel, Chairman and Rapporteur

TABLE OF CONTENTS

DRAFT RECOMMENDATION
on a European intelligence policy

EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM
submitted by Mr Baumel, Chairman and Rapporteur

I. Introduction
II. What kind of intelligence does Europe need and can it be managed in a supranational European framework?
III. Is CJTF the final solution for Europe's intelligence deficiencies?
IV. Towards a European observation satellite system
V. The intelligence section of the WEU Planning Cell
VI. Conclusion: What might a real WEU intelligence policy consist of?
   (a) The Intelligence Centre
   (b) The Satellite Centre

1. Adopted unanimously by the committee.
2. Members of the Committee: Mr Baumel (Chairman); Mr De Decker, Horn (Vice-Chairmen); MM Alloncle, Beaufays, Mrs Beer, MM Bianchi, Brianse, Cox, Dees (Alternate: Blauw), Mrs Fernandez Ramiro, MM Hardy, Jacquot, La Russa, Legendre, Mrs Lentz-Cornette, MM Lopez Valdivielso, Marten, Medeiros Ferreira, Lord Newall, MM Parisi, Pavlidis, Pereira Coelho, Petruccioli (Alternate: Guidi), Pottakis, Schielen, Sir Dudley Smith, Mr Solé Tura (Alternate: de Puig), Mrs Soutendijk van Appeldoorn (Alternate: van der Linden), Sir Keith Speed (Alternate: Marshall), MM Speroni, Valkeniers, Vazquez, Vrettos, Wolters, Zinten.

Associate members: MM Gül (Alternate: Akcali), Gürel, Yüriç.

N.B. The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.
Draft Recommendation

on a European intelligence policy

The Assembly,

(i) Recognising that, with the adoption of the document "European security: a common concept of the 27 WEU countries" in Madrid on 14 November 1995, a first step has been taken in assessing how these countries can contribute to security and stability in Europe and elsewhere in the world, particularly by intensifying political dialogue and enhancing European capabilities in the field of crisis prevention and management;

(ii) Welcoming the decisions taken in Madrid on 14 November 1995 to strengthen further WEU’s operational capabilities;

(iii) Welcoming the decision to establish a new politico-military group in support of the Council and to provide WEU with a situation centre and an intelligence section in the Planning Cell;

(iv) Welcoming the Secretary General’s study on the Situation Centre and the Intelligence Section in the Planning Cell and the preparatory measures for its implementation, but regretting that too little progress has been made in this field;

(v) Welcoming the fact that there is an increasing number of "forces answerable to WEU", strengthening Europe’s own military capabilities for operations conducted pursuant to the Petersberg Declaration;

(vi) Endorsing the Council’s decision to establish the Satellite Centre as a permanent WEU body and its objective of developing WEU’s capability to use satellite imagery for security purposes;

(vii) Stressing the importance of the ministerial decision to instruct the Space Group to continue its activities and define the basic conditions for possible WEU participation in a developing multilateral European programme and to study questions related to a possible WEU ground segment;

(viii) Aware that there is still a considerable gap between the implementation of the initial political idea which resulted in the creation of the WEU Satellite Centre and the security constraints connected with the provision and use of data from the Helios 1 satellite;

(ix) Noting at the same time that satellite intelligence is important and extremely useful, but that it is only one of the many different elements enabling a complete assessment of a specific situation to be made;

(x) Aware of the existence of the document on "Intelligence support to the Planning Cell: short-term measures";

(xi) Attaching great importance to the common reflection on new European security conditions of the 27 WEU nations which has already resulted in identifying their common interests as well as potential risks to European security;

(xii) Noting that WEU can only be promoted as a useful forum for analysis and consultation on the defence implications of security issues of the common foreign and security policy and as an instrument to facilitate the formulation and implementation of EU decisions and actions related to the Petersberg tasks if it can rely upon a common European intelligence policy;

(xiii) Noting that there is a need for intensified intelligence cooperation within the framework of WEU due to the fact that European armed forces are being prepared for the implementation of Petersberg tasks, possibly without the support of United States assets;

(xiv) Noting that European intelligence efforts would have to concentrate on possible new risks and threats;

(xv) Aware that the existing bilateral cooperation between different WEU member states in intelligence questions is not a satisfactory basis for a common European intelligence policy;

(xvi) Aware that some WEU member states have established specific links with the Planning Cell in order to provide it with information on current affairs;

(xvii) Noting that there is a need to enlarge the size of the Intelligence Section in the WEU Planning Cell, as is now being planned, in order to enable the Planning Cell to perform its planning task properly;
Considering that if member states seriously wish to enhance the operational capability of WEU, they should improve the effectiveness of the Planning Cell by agreeing to second a correspondent from their national intelligence services to the Planning Cell;

Recognising that NATO has a database at its disposal with indispensable information which could help WEU to make a thorough assessment and analysis of the politico-military situation in Europe, if need be;

Considering that the links between WEU and NATO must be strengthened in order to share the intelligence required for operational planning and activities of European armed forces in the framework of Petersberg tasks;

Aware of the difficulties encountered in implementing the combined joint task forces concept which was adopted almost two years ago at the NATO summit of January 1994 and, at the same time, of the fact that too little progress has been made in the discussions on WEU-NATO cooperation regarding intelligence;

Stressing that under these circumstances WEU cannot afford to rely completely on the eventual availability of the Atlantic Alliance's assets and capabilities and that, as a consequence, it will have to develop - among other things - a common European intelligence policy;

Noting that the national governments of WEU member states are increasingly less able to assess independently the different risks and threats to the security of Europe as a whole and that, as a consequence, they will be obliged gradually to build a multilateral European network for the permanent sharing of intelligence data and resources;

Recognising that increased synergy in European intelligence capacities would be an important contribution to the status of Europe as an equal partner in the transatlantic relationship;

Stressing that for a full assessment of risks and threats to Europe's security, political and military intelligence must go hand-in-hand with intelligence on economic, financial, social and environmental developments;

Aware that intelligence cooperation, let alone the establishment of a common European intelligence policy, are sensitive issues where, due to many psychological and political obstacles and deep-rooted mistrust, no spectacular progress can be made overnight,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Strengthen the links between WEU and NATO with a view to sharing the intelligence required for operational planning and activities of European armed forces in the framework of Petersberg tasks;

2. Ask each WEU member state to second a correspondent from its national intelligence system to the Planning Cell in order to improve its capabilities in making up-to-date assessments and analyses of the situation in potential Petersberg task-theatres of operation.
Explanatory Memorandum

(submitted by Mr Baumel, Chairman and Rapporteur)

I. Introduction

1. In the Maastricht Treaty, concluded by the EC member states in 1991, they referred to the perspective of a "common foreign and security policy including the eventual framing of a common defence policy, which might in time lead to a common defence". The WEU Maastricht Declaration of December 1991 defined the role of WEU as "the defence component of the European Union and as a means to strengthen the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance".

2. Since 1991, a number of activities have been launched in order to implement the decisions taken in Maastricht. Relations have been developed between the European Union and WEU and also between NATO and WEU. Initiatives have been taken to develop the operational role of WEU. But in all the above, very little attention has been paid to intelligence, which is the basic condition for any foreign, security and defence policy. Understandably there has been, and still is, some reluctance in the member states to do anything which suggests the integration of national intelligence services into a supranational framework. So many historical, psychological, or practical reasons could be put forward to postpone close cooperation in this field on a multilateral basis.

3. On the other hand, recent major crises such as the Gulf war and the crisis in former Yugoslavia, to mention only two, have been traumatic enough to convey the message that if Europe is serious in achieving its objective of a common foreign, security and defence policy, there is an urgent requirement for a common European intelligence policy.

4. It would be wrong to think that a common intelligence system, however well-organised, will always be able to predict accurately the outbreak of a crisis or conflict. Intelligence services may be aware of the seeds of a conflict and its underlying causes but none of them, not even the most brilliant, is able to predict the human behaviour which lights the spark that makes the powder keg explode.

5. It should be kept in mind that the main purpose of intelligence is not simply to predict crises and trigger timely diplomatic action in order to prevent conflict or war. Good intelligence, it is true, may contribute to the effectiveness of preventive diplomacy. The main objective of intelligence, however, is the collection and acquisition of information from different sources in order to build and update an extensive database and to provide analyses based on this information. Analyses and continuously updated information may help governments to follow the right course in their foreign policy and to take the right diplomatic or even military action in crisis situations.

II. What kind of intelligence does Europe need and can it be managed in a supranational European framework?

6. In the post-cold war world, old concepts, based on the antagonism between East and West, no longer apply. Intelligence cannot escape redefinition and adaptation to a new geostrategic situation.

7. The bipolar world with its fairly clear-cut division of spheres of influence and interests left relatively little to the imagination. Without simplifying too much, one could say that the western allies were united in their common effort to protect their territory and their worldwide interests against a real or perceived threat from the Soviet Union, in particular, and from the communist world in general. Understandably, this was the main focal point of intelligence in the western world. That situation has now changed radically and security in the greater part of the world is in a state of flux, compelling European states with worldwide economic and political interests to readjust and step up their intelligence activities. Moreover, it should be noted that new threats are numerous and not always easy to interpret and analyse without deep background intelligence. At the same time, with the disappearance of an obvious common threat, national interests - even in the case of allies - are diverging, depending on the nature of different threats. Even between the Atlantic allies there are differences of opinion on how to deal with crises and other phenomena. The different policies of Europe and the United States towards Bosnia and Iran are only two of the most conspicuous examples.

8. France has understood this message. Intelligence is one of the four principal operational tasks which the government has designated in the 1996 defence budget. After deterrence, force projection and protection, the fourth task is prevention, which includes intelligence, space and communications. Prevention is one of the few defence
sectors which will not be affected by budget constraints and with a budget of 23.1 billion francs and 57,555 personnel in 1996, it accounts for 12.2% of the defence budget and 9.6% of personnel against 12% and 9.4% respectively in 1995.

9. France has a wide array of intelligence gathering hardware, which includes the observation and communication satellites Helios and Syracuse, electronic warfare equipment and spy ships. It has three major intelligence services: the general directorate for external security (DGSE), the directorate for military intelligence (DRM) and the directorate for protection and defence security (DPSD). In addition to these, there is the delegation for strategic affairs (DAS). In particular, the DRM and DGSE will be considerably enlarged between now and the year 2000. The DRM, employing 1,600 staff at the moment, will have 1,900 by the year 2000. The DGSE with 2,500 civilian and 1,500 military staff will have an extra 500 civilian and 200 military staff by the year 2001.

10. Apparently, intelligence today is of necessity an expanding activity covering an extremely wide area of interest. The former French military intelligence director, General Jean Heinrich, has indicated that the scope for military intelligence now reaches way beyond pure military facts and mere analysis of opposing forces. He prefers to speak of "military interest intelligence" which, according to his definition, "is the combination of knowledge and information of all kinds that the political or military decision-maker needs in order to take his decision". This activity would encompass more than the military domain and cover widely differing areas such as the ethnological, historical, social and cultural environments.

11. The present geostrategic situation has become far too complicated for individual European nations to keep up with all relevant developments taking place in different parts of the world and analyse them in detail. Limited and often still further diminishing intelligence budgets go hand in hand with an increasing number of hotbeds of tension and potential or real crises which may, some day, threaten Europe's economic or security interests.

12. What are the subjects and issues on which European intelligence will need to concentrate? The document "European security: a common concept of the 27 WEU countries" provides a more or less comprehensive inventory of all possible risks and threats to stability and security in Europe and the rest of the world, on which information and in-depth analyses would certainly be extremely useful.

13. Moreover, economic intelligence, which has been a relatively neglected field of interest, is bound to become increasingly important, given the fierce competition between a growing number of economic entities for their share of the world market. Obviously, economic intelligence includes financial, social, ethnological, environmental and industrial intelligence.

14. In this framework, it is to be noted that more use can be made of public sources for the acquisition of data through the media, commercial databanks or other legal means. The recent development and stormy expansion of Internet is just one example of an open source which seems to offer almost unlimited information. In the present-day world of open societies and easily accessible worldwide information and communication systems, this kind of intelligence gathering will be an increasingly important complement to the more traditional and often costly covert methods.

15. Is it realistic to conceive of the establishment of a supranational European intelligence policy given that member states of the European Union do not wish to give up their sovereignty in security and defence?

16. In principle, intelligence has always been a typically national activity aimed at detecting and analysing all possible risks and threats which could do harm to the interests of a state or even threaten its existence, from either within or without. The fruits of intelligence enable a state to conduct a responsible foreign, security and defence policy.

17. Although a fully-fledged supranational European intelligence policy may still have a long way to go because of national sensitivities, there are possibilities for a Europeanisation of intelligence. Obviously, the level of such Europeanisation depends on the degree of convergence of national interests of the states concerned. As member states of the European Union move towards a common foreign and security policy, they will need a common intelligence policy in order to be able to identify risks and threats to their common interests. At the moment, however, a pragmatic step-by-step approach seems to be the only viable way to attain this ultimate objective.

18. The long list of Europe's intelligence requirements mentioned above makes it clear that, with the present severe budget constraints, no single national intelligence service will be able to meet the many justified demands. Cooperation and task specialisation are inevitable if the purpose is to turn available resources to maximum account. New technology, which will facilitate the collection and analysis of data is also, very often, too expensive for individual nations to afford. This is true not only of observation satellite systems but also of information technology and high-capacity,
secure data links. A system should be developed which would allow for a gradual increase in the sharing of data and resources, given that this could not be done overnight. A first step could be to second a correspondent from each country's national intelligence service to the Planning Cell in order to improve its ability to make up-to-date assessments and analyses of the situation in potential Petersberg-task theatres of operation.

19. The common foreign and security policy, ultimately to include a common defence policy, will not be achieved until convergence of the different national assessments of specific foreign and security policy issues becomes possible. In this respect, a serious effort is needed to integrate national intelligence analyses into a coherent European picture.

20. In this framework, mention should be made of the European Commission's recommendations for the European Union intergovernmental conference. The Commission has suggested setting up a Presidency-Commission team in order to ensure effective cooperation between the two institutions in the field of the common foreign and security policy.

21. In order to prepare decisions more thoroughly, the Commission has proposed establishing a common analysis cell, composed of experts from member states and from the Commission. It would be a common service, which could eventually profit from a contribution from WEU.

III. Is the CJTF concept the ultimate solution for Europe's intelligence deficiencies?

22. It has been repeated endlessly that because of the existing complementarity and transparency between NATO and WEU, there is no need for duplication. On the other hand, the agreement on combined joint task forces (CJTF), which is expected to be approved by the North Atlantic Council in Berlin in June 1996, could give rise to some reservations on this point.

23. It is common knowledge that serious short-comings in intelligence gathering and processing in the armed forces of the European allies were among the main reasons for establishing CJTF. CJTF should enable Europeans to use Alliance assets, including the impressive array of US intelligence assets, in European-led military operations in which the United States does not participate.

24. The command structure for CJTF which now seems to have been agreed, with a supported commander of the European-led operation and a supporting commander to provide Alliance assets for such operations, leaves doubt as to whether Europeans will under all circumstances be able to rely on the availability of these assets. Given the fact that the supporting commander, who is supposed to be a US officer, will be able to take control, the case may arise where the supporting commander will either not provide the full range of intelligence assets required, or will withdraw these assets from the theatre. In that case, the European-supported commander may have to decide to cancel the operation.

25. There can be no doubt that under present circumstances, CJTF are a vital element for European-led operations without the participation of the United States.

26. The NATO-led IFOR operation has triggered an impressive range of US intelligence activities. The results of those activities are at the disposal of other IFOR contingents in so far as they will need them for the smooth running of their part of the operation. The distribution of intelligence data takes place at the discretion of the owner of the assets used. In the US section in north-eastern Bosnia, well over 1000 army intelligence troops are deployed, while a national intelligence support team at the US headquarters in Tuzla includes representatives from the CIA, the Defence Intelligence Agency and the National Security Agency.

27. A number of satellites are tracking any movements of military equipment through the demilitarised zones separating the factions. Intelligence-gathering assets being used include Quickfix, an EH-60 helicopter which collects electronic signals, and Guardrail, an army intelligence targeting system. Also employed are US Air Force JSTARS to monitor arms smuggling activities. Listening posts, seismic, infrared and magnetic sensors have been installed and patrolling troops are engaged in point-blank surveillance.

28. All these assets have now been deployed at full strength because, after years of serious differences of opinion with the Europeans, the United States has decided to become involved in the crisis in Bosnia, even to the point of deploying US troops on the ground.

29. Europeans may have to recognise, however, that for the implementation of their common foreign, security and defence policy they may not be able to rely forever on the provision of US assets. The development of purely European operational capabilities should therefore be one of WEU's priorities, and it should go hand in hand with the provision of Alliance assets through CJTF in the field of intelligence. A fully-equipped intelligence system, ranging from different military satellites to intelligence processing and gathering centres and including direct links with C4I systems, would take years to develop and

---

commission, even though the European defence industry has all the basic technologies available to build the components.

30. Present-day military operations cannot be successful without the use of comprehensive C4I systems to acquire intelligence and manage all control, command, communications, computer and intelligence operations. NATO has its own air command and control system (ACCs), which is matched by the compatible French surveillance and command system for aerial operations (Soccoa). The most sophisticated system for air-ground surveillance, the United States JSTARS, has no competitor at the moment but thought must now be given to a future successor. France has developed a helicopter-mounted Horizon battlefield surveillance system and it is now being proposed that, using technology it has at its disposal, the European defence industry develop a full air-ground surveillance system including a JSTARS successor to be operational after 2005. This could be done in cooperation with the United States defence industry, provided it is based on a satisfactory two-way agreement, and in such a way as to complement European systems under development, such as Horizon, Astor (United Kingdom) and Creso (Italy), for a new transatlantic system. Europe should not delay in making up its mind in this matter.

IV. Towards a European observation satellite system

31. A first important step towards the setting-up of a common European intelligence system was taken when the WEU Council decided to establish a WEU Satellite Centre in Torrejón, Spain, in order to provide satellite image intelligence for verification and crisis-monitoring purposes. In the initial experimental phase, the Satellite Centre worked with satellite data which it acquired on a commercial basis from various European and foreign sources. In May 1995, the Satellite Centre was certified as a permanent body of WEU. A basic agreement, as formulated in the Memorandum of Understanding of 17 April 1993, has been signed, enabling the Satellite Centre to use Helios 1 images, but further practical details still have to be worked out.

32. While the realisation of the idea of a WEU Satellite Centre with the right to use Helios 1 images for interpretation purposes is politically praiseworthy, there are clearly many practical problems to be solved in order to respect the many security and priority user constraints attached to the operation of Helios 1, which is in fact a satellite operated by three participating countries (France, Italy and Spain) each of which has its own interests as regards images.

33. The present operation of the Torrejón Centre still leaves much to be desired, not just on account of shortcomings which have become apparent in the choice of equipment but more particularly because of the delays involved in the interpretation and use of the images. Moreover, one still has the impression that the WEU Council's support for the Satellite Centre is not whole-hearted owing to differences of opinion between member states, which are resulting in the lowest common denominator for the Centre's objectives and terms of reference. A point to note here is that it took the Council six months to provide a very incomplete and unsatisfactory reply to a detailed written question by Mr Lenzer3 on the work of the Centre.

34. Observation satellites have the great advantage of being free of the legal constraints which apply to reconnaissance aircraft and thereby accommodate coverage of all territories without violating air space and, for the moment, without the risk of being destroyed.

35. They perform an extremely wide range of tasks: monitoring crises, providing advance warning of aggression, monitoring the application of disarmament treaties, supervising humanitarian peace missions and gathering strategic and tactical data.

36. It is well known that optical observation satellites such as Spot and Helios 1 have only limited capabilities because they cannot see in the dark or through clouds. A full observation satellite system should therefore also comprise infrared and radar sensors. In the more distant future, a European satellite system may also have to include weather, communications, location/navigation, early warning, eavesdropping and data-relay satellites.

37. It should be supplemented by ground stations and data-processing tools linked to battlefield sensors for real-time processing, decision-making and the ability to strike.

38. At their summit meeting of 7 December 1995 in Baden-Baden, France and Germany agreed to cooperate closely in the field of satellites. The main focus of Franco-German cooperation will be the development of a FF 11 000 million Helios 2 observation satellite with France as lead contractor, a FF 13 000 million Horus radar observation satellite with Germany as lead contractor and a cooperative study with regard to the possible development of data-relay satellites.

39. Helios 2, due to replace Helios 1 after the year 2000, will include many improvements, such as night observation with its infrared capability. After the year 2005, the Horus radar observation

satellite will provide an all-weather day and night observation capability.

40. Clearly, the Franco-German satellite cooperation programme is an important step towards the emergence of a European satellite system. Both partners share the conviction that a common European security and defence policy, in particular in the fields of crisis prevention, crisis management and peacekeeping obliges Europeans to have a reliable and independent space observation capability at their disposal. Both France and Germany are prepared to share their satellite cooperation programme with other WEU member states.

41. At its meeting in Madrid on 14 November 1995, the WEU Ministerial Council instructed its Space Group to define the basic conditions for "possible WEU participation in a developing multilateral European programme and to study questions related to a possible WEU ground segment, taking account of existing ground segments within WEU nations ".

42. Many questions regarding relations between WEU and Helios 2 are being dealt with in the report on this subject by the Technological and Aerospace Committee, submitted by Mr Lenzer, Rapporteur.

43. The Council further noted that " In the meantime, WEU will continue its activities with the procurement of satellite imagery. " Finally, it " warmly welcomed the Hellenic Republic's participation in WEU space activities and the fact that associate members may now participate in such activities in accordance with their status ".

44. The Satellite Centre and other WEU space activities should certainly be welcomed as a step towards a common European intelligence policy but, at the same time, it should be noted that satellite intelligence as now used by the Centre is mainly useful for providing background information on, among other things, infrastructure. Much remains to be done before the Centre will be a real operational tool in European crisis management.

45. Moreover, it should also be noted that, in general, satellite observation is only one of many sources of intelligence. The results it produces, if combined skilfully, analysed and continuously updated, could provide the information needed for a reasonable and accountable common foreign, security and defence policy.

V. The Intelligence Section in the WEU Planning Cell

46. In the framework of its policy to enhance WEU's operational capabilities, the WEU Council, in its Petersberg Declaration, also decided to establish a military Planning Cell, which began work in 1993. In 1994 however, the Council, aware of the far too limited field of action of the Planning Cell in its initial shape and size, initiated preliminary studies for a situation centre and an intelligence section, being of the opinion that " the Secretariat and Planning Cell needed to be complemented by capacities in the area of intelligence and crisis management in order to fulfill the tasks mandated by the Petersberg Declaration ".

47. In May 1995, the Council meeting in Lisbon took note of a document on " Intelligence support in the Planning Cell short-term measures " without further comment. The Council's Madrid Declaration, adopted on 14 November, stated the following:

" Ministers took note of and welcomed the Secretary-General's study on the situation centre and the intelligence section in the Planning Cell, as well as the preparatory measures for its implementation, such as the setting-up of a project team, and the necessary budgetary provisions. They constitute an important step in the strengthening of WEU's operational capabilities. Ministers look forward to the establishment of the situation centre and its complete implementation for phase II of " WEU Crisis 95-96 ". "

48. Although it should be recognised that the Council is very well aware of WEU's shortcomings in the area of intelligence, it seems that only little progress is being made in this field that is vital both for the development of a common foreign and security policy and for the development of WEU's operational capabilities and which should enable it to play its role as the defence arm of the European Union and implement the tasks set out in the Petersberg Declaration.

49. At its meeting in Madrid on 14 November 1995, the WEU Council approved a document with the title " European security: a common concept of the 27 WEU countries ".

50. In this document, the WEU countries made an effort to identify the common interests of Europeans, the risks and potential threats, and Europe's responsibilities as regards security and stability both in Europe and in the rest of the world.

51. The document rightly concludes that " as the defence component of the European Union and as a means to strengthen the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance, WEU is in a position to respond to many of the challenges identified in the politico-military field ".

52. At the same time it recognises, however, that there are still gaps and deficiencies which are inhibiting WEU from undertaking large-scale operations. Reconnaissance and intelligence are
among the important deficiencies identified in the document. It says that there is a need for WEU:

"to establish or have access to an adequate observation capability and to develop an intelligence-processing capability which are decisive for the conduct of operations in complex, shifting, politico-military environments."

53. When addressing the Assembly of WEU in December 1995, the French Minister for European Affairs, Michel Barnier, said that the development of operational capabilities required continuing efforts in the fields of space and armaments cooperation in order for WEU to have a real intelligence policy at its disposal 4.

54. Seen against the background of this recommendation, the Intelligence Section in its present form is indeed an extremely modest body. Working with a staff of five, the section's main task is filing the intelligence data it receives. This data is provided by some member states on a voluntary basis with a degree of classification chosen by each nation. There is agreement that the Intelligence Section only provides an analysis of the intelligence data in its files at the request of the Council.

55. In principle, the intelligence provided by member states is to be used as part of the Planning Cell's generic planning. Proposals have now been worked out, ready for approval by the Council, to give the Intelligence Section a role in intelligence support for operations, again based on the intelligence provided on a voluntary base by member states.

56. Although the Planning Cell's Intelligence Section and the Satellite Centre are connected by computer, there is still a need to formalise contacts, including the possibility of the Planning Cell giving the Satellite Centre orders, subject to the agreement of the member states, on the satellite programme.

57. At present, intelligence in WEU is still in the making and an intelligence policy, including the means for making an autonomous WEU analyses, has not yet been defined because of a lack of political will in the member states.

58. In the future, WEU should be able to provide its political authorities with an assessment of the strategic situation in areas where they might have to act in order to prevent conflicts. Decisions are needed now to enable WEU to provide its own security analysis as a building block for the European common foreign and security policy by the year 2000.

59. In relations with NATO, complementarity and transparency between WEU and NATO

should be taken for granted and since both organisations have common areas of general interest, they have the same basic intelligence requirements. A dialogue between WEU and NATO on intelligence is under way. Recently, the WEU Planning Cell participated in a meeting of the NATO Intelligence Board.

60. A regular exchange of intelligence documents will take place as soon as the long-awaited security agreement between WEU and NATO has been signed and enters into force. Conclusion of this agreement is expected to take place in June 1996. One of the problems in negotiating the agreement has been that NATO, understandably, wanted guarantees as to a clear distinction in the distribution of exchanged documents to, on the one hand, WEU's members and associate members and on the other, WEU's observers and associate partners.

61. In the exchange of documents with NATO, it is agreed that a pragmatic step-by-step approach will lead to the best results. In a first stage, documents on a few specific areas of obvious interest will be exchanged. The range of subjects and areas of interest could gradually be extended at a later stage.

62. At the Intelligence Section it has been suggested that a further useful development in its work could be the creation of an Intelligence Division consisting of ten staff members who, after a NATO training course, could provide analyses on the basis of intelligence messages sent by member states to both NATO and WEU simultaneously. For important issues, common briefings for member state representatives could be organised by WEU and NATO.

VI. Conclusion:
What might a real WEU intelligence policy consist of?

63. Following the WEU summit meeting in Madrid, it is necessary, taking the creation of a real Intelligence Section within the Planning Cell as a starting point, to agree on measures that would give WEU real autonomy in intelligence, so that the Council has all the information it requires to assume responsibility for deploying forces answerable to WEU in any operation it decides to conduct.

64. An intelligence policy should naturally fall within the more general framework of a defence policy that alone establishes the strategic interests for the purpose of which all resources, including intelligence resources, should be deployed, unobstructed and unhindered by the principle of "non-duplication" which is often conveniently used as an excuse for preventing any operational structuring of WEU independently of NATO.

4. Address to the WEU Assembly, 6 December 1995.
65. Negotiations with NATO should start forthwith to link the seat of WEU with NATO's protected telecommunications networks and to secure access by the Cell to NATO intelligence databases.

66. It is not too soon to envisage a WEU intelligence policy even though the objectives of the much publicised defence policy agreed at Maastricht have not yet been clearly defined.

67. The Council is a body which should be capable of taking decisions necessary for the defence of common interests case by case, even in the absence of a formal defence policy, assessing each one on a wholly independent basis.

68. For missions involving a given area, WEU has more chance of obtaining useful planning information from member states with a thorough knowledge of that area than from NATO.

69. WEU has, if it wished to use it, more information than it supposes, especially since the commissioning of the Satellite Centre at Torrejón. It is therefore a matter of establishing a few short-term objectives that would be useful to it. In order to define such objectives more precisely, three types of intelligence are necessary to render WEU operational.

(i) Documentary intelligence – including all permanent geographical, political, economic and military data and instability factors (political and religious) making for an assessment of the risk of the emergence of threats or the outbreak of crises.

(ii) Operational situation intelligence necessary to those in charge of carrying out an operation.

Each member state having its own resources should establish bilateral links between its own services and the Intelligence Section in the Planning Cell, providing weekly analyses and situation messages. The creation of a real intelligence section would allow a WEU group of intelligence experts to be formed. The second objective would be to give the Cell some sort of intelligence-processing capability by putting it in contact with national intelligence agencies and with the Satellite Centre. NATO might supply substantial amounts of data, in order to avoid duplication.

(iii) Taking Torrejón as a starting point, it will be necessary to quickly acquire an independent space capability to free Europeans from their dependence on the United States for intelligence which may be given or withheld but which in any event is selective and sifted by NATO.

70. Because of matters of urgency, priorities and rapid developments, operational situation intelligence calls for a different organisation of the Planning Cell. Once again this raises the issue of WEU's need for a real permanent headquarters and chief-of-staff.

71. Immediate exploitation of operational intelligence would require a different structure for the small "Intelligence Section in the Planning Cell", but it would have to adapt to each individual operation. The "pilot state" for the operation would provide the operation commander.

72. There can be no defence organisation without an intelligence service. This is consistently borne out by military history.

73. This also applies to WEU's common defence policy.

74. There should be no illusion about the geo-strategic upheaval that has taken place over the last four years and the disintegration of the USSR. With the emergence of new threats such as conflicts of the Bosnian type, nuclear proliferation, terrorism, drugs and international crime, the overwhelming need for intelligence is more acute than ever. As Auguste Comte put it, action depends on forecasts and the more information there is, the better the forecasts.

75. Since intelligence is a lengthy business, all sources of information whether "open" (newspapers, radio, etc.) or confidential, human or computer generated, should be used to gather as much information as possible using the proper facilities, so that it can be used as quickly as possible.

76. If intelligence is to be credible and reliable, advantage should be taken of the clear complementarity of human resources and technical facilities, particularly computer and satellite technology.

77. Intelligence gathering should not be confined to specific targets but must include and put in order all types of information available in the political, human, economic, and religious fields and should also cover mainly unclassified military information.

78. For a very long time, intelligence was a technique based on information provided by humans for mainly military purposes.

79. Today, it is an essential component of decisions that naturally include military aspects but also go much further in view of the existence of new threats and economic, political and religious confrontations.

80. This new international landscape offers enormous scope for research and analysis. The
contribution intelligence will make to crisis management and decision-making will have no precedent provided we abandon the universally held traditional but artificial image of espionage and counter-espionage, which is more the stuff of novels and films than of reality.

81. In its efforts to establish a European intelligence policy, WEU should be on its guard against two dangers: exposing itself to the criticism of duplicating what has been done in NATO, and counteracting what might be seen as the prerogatives and interests of its member states. As regards duplication, WEU should strive to gain access to NATO databases and extend its data-gathering efforts to cover a wider range of areas (economic, religious, cultural, etc.) and geographic zones (outside the former Soviet bloc). To avoid any interference with national interests, WEU should in the first instance concentrate on making use of non-classified documentation and should only use its own sources (the Satellite Centre) for matters on which there is consensus among its member states.

82. In this context the recent signature of a "security agreement" between WEU and NATO is a small but significant step forward since it accommodates agreement on the procedures governing the classification of confidential documents and their communication codes with a view to adopting NATO standards for future military operations carried out by Europeans.

83. In the distinction generally drawn between documentary intelligence and situation intelligence, WEU's first priority should therefore go to the former. It would then be ready to supply situation intelligence as soon as the political and/or military circumstances allowed and required it.

(a) The Intelligence Centre

84. To implement this policy, the Organisation needs a centre operating under far less restrictive arrangements than those that apply to the Intelligence Section in the Planning Cell. It is not so much the Section's resources that are to blame as the actual conditions in which it operates. At present, it cannot begin to study a subject or region until the Organisation has officially declared it an object of intelligence. But by then it is far too late as it takes several weeks to gather the relevant information and draw up a summary report. The Intelligence Centre must be authorised to deal with zones of potential conflict precisely in order to inform the Council - and, if necessary, the countries concerned - about the emergence of a crisis.

85. This would mean that the Organisation would not be taking a neutral stance and therein lie certain dangers. In a zone of potential conflict involving one or more member states, it or they could accuse WEU of interfering in their domestic affairs. That is why the Centre should begin by gathering information contained in unclassified documentation only. Since such documentation is accessible to everyone, it could be considered as being politically neutral.

86. From the outset, the range of possibilities to be explored is vast. The first thing that needs to be done is to collect geographical documents (maps, digitised terrain data, etc.), which are a prerequisite for any investigation. This is not to say that such an exercise is not intelligence-gathering proper because a precise map with fine detail is in itself a precious source of intelligence and as such is considered to be classified information in many countries. This is an area in which complementarity with NATO can play a role, as can collaboration with states. However, long-standing bilateral agreements in this area leave little scope for requests from an organisation which, for the time being, has nothing to offer in exchange.

87. Investigations could then encompass economic, social, cultural and religious aspects, with an emphasis on what is often considered to be of secondary importance by national intelligence services. In fact, intelligence services the world over operate on a barter basis with each striving to obtain exclusive information it can then exchange with other services in possession of intelligence to which it cannot gain access.

88. The WEU Centre will not be able to offer original intelligence since it will mainly be working with unclassified documentation but its highly detailed analyses based on the information it collects will result in a high value-added product that could be exchanged.

89. What the WEU Intelligence Centre therefore needs are not so much intelligence specialists in the military sense (contact men) as information-processing professionals. It will be necessary to process a vast mass of data emanating from all types of media including the most up-to-date (such as the Internet and digital television) and draw up summary reports that are required by WEU bodies or can be used as bartering tender.

90. If it is organised in this way, the Intelligence Centre will be able to conduct intelligence-gathering effectively, using its own resources - with the Satellite Centre foremost among them - either to supplement the documentary intelligence it already possesses or to obtain situation intelligence if the situation so requires and if the sensors used are capable of providing it. It should be noted in passing that, as things currently stand, in the case of a request for a dossier from a WEU body, the task can justify a request for Helios images, which is not the case for a task initiated by a national request.
91. Finally, a solution needs to be found to the difficult problem of access to classified information produced or obtained by the Centre. Will it be accessible to all the states (members, associate members, associate partners, etc.), and to WEU bodies (the Council, Committee of Chiefs of Defence Staff, etc.) or will it only be specific summary reports that are supplied to targeted recipients without revealing anything about the sources used to obtain them? This is a question that requires an answer because it determines not only the Centre’s credibility but control over its operations as well.

(b) The Satellite Centre

92. The Satellite Centre has to be seen as being a valuable instrument the Intelligence Centre can use to apply the Organisation’s intelligence policy, rather than as an independent intelligence centre.

93. Satellite observation of the Earth is only one precious source of information and image interpreters cannot be asked to produce conclusions when that task should be done by those whose job it is to draw up summary reports based on a set of sources. Furthermore, if it is the intention that the Centre should supply relevant and detailed data, requests should be accompanied by geographic information (such as maps, etc.) and, depending on the case, by economic, military or social data. There is therefore a need for close links to be established between the Intelligence Centre and the Satellite Centre.

94. However, whereas the Satellite Centre has been in operation for four years, the Intelligence Centre is still only a concept based on the Intelligence Section in the Planning Cell. Should the Satellite Centre simply stand by waiting until the Intelligence Centre is ready to make use of it? Of course it shouldn’t! Instead, it should make preparations to ensure that it acts as effectively as possible when the time comes.

95. As the Satellite Centre does not have the same operating constraints as national centres, it could strive to become a recognised centre of excellence in Europe. In order to do so it will have to concentrate on its task of developing the most modern techniques of image interpretation and processing. In so doing, it should attract the best European specialists and, through their work and the techniques they use, develop or update the expertise of a whole generation of image analysts. This endeavour should be supported by equipment (hardware and software) that is constantly upgraded to the latest state of the art. This it not to say that the Centre’s current equipment is deficient in its design but in this particular area technology develops so quickly that there is a new generation every four to five years.

96. To keep in touch with reality, these techniques will have to be used to address issues relevant to the Organisation but, in order to avoid the two pitfalls of duplication of national facilities and the problem of obtaining auxiliary data, the choice of tasks to be undertaken will have to be very selective. It could, for instance, target environmental questions; information on such matters is more often than not to be found in unclassified documentation and they are still rarely dealt with by remote-sensing image analysis centres.

97. The shortcomings that came to light during the Centre’s experimental phase (1992-95) were mainly due to deficiencies in the procurement of quality images. The efforts made to make high-resolution space imagery (from the Helios 1 satellite or Russian military systems) available within a reasonable time are praiseworthy but insufficient. WEU must acquire an independent satellite data-acquisition system. This does not mean it has to be a comprehensive system including, among other things, specialised space sensors, but it must at least be a ground segment sharing resources with other national programme users or using them on a cooperative basis.

98. If an intelligence policy were to be implemented in WEU in this way, it would provide Europe with the wherewithal to make a significant contribution to the establishment of peace and security on its territory.