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A European intelligence policy

REPORT

submitted on behalf of the Defence Committee
by Mr Baumel, Chairman and Rapporteur

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1. Adopted unanimously by the committee.

2. *Members of the Committee:* Mr Baumel (Chairman); Mr De Decker, Horn (Vice-Chairmen); MM Alloncle, Beaufays, Mrs Beer, MM Bianchi, Briane, Cox, Dees (Alternate: Blaauw), Mrs Fernández Ramiro, MM Hardy, Jacquat, La Russa, Legendre, Mrs Lentz-Cornette, MM López Valdivielso, Marten, Medeiros Ferreira, Lord Newall, MM Parisi, Pavlidis, Pereira Coelho, Petruccioli (Alternate: Guidi), Pottakis, Schloten, Sir Dudley Smith, Mr Solé Tura (Alternate: de Puig), Mrs Soutendijk van Appeldoorn (Alternate: van der Linden), Sir Keith Speed (Alternate: Marshall), MM Speroni, Valkeniers, Vázquez, Vrettos, Woltjer, Zierer.

Associate members: MM. Gül (Alternate: Akcali), Gürel, Yürür.

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

Draft Recommendation
on a European intelligence policy

The Assembly,

- (i) Recognising that, with the adoption of the document “ European security: a common concept of the 27 WEU countries ” in Madrid on 14 November 1995, a first step has been taken in assessing how these countries can contribute to security and stability in Europe and elsewhere in the world, particularly by intensifying political dialogue and enhancing European capabilities in the field of crisis prevention and management;
- (ii) Welcoming the decisions taken in Madrid on 14 November 1995 to strengthen further WEU’s operational capabilities;
- (iii) Welcoming the decision to establish a new politico-military group in support of the Council and to provide WEU with a situation centre and an intelligence section in the Planning Cell;
- (iv) Welcoming the Secretary General’s study on the Situation Centre and the Intelligence Section in the Planning Cell and the preparatory measures for its implementation, but regretting that too little progress has been made in this field;
- (v) Welcoming the fact that there is an increasing number of “ forces answerable to WEU ”, strengthening Europe’s own military capabilities for operations conducted pursuant to the Petersberg Declaration;
- (vi) Endorsing the Council’s decision to establish the Satellite Centre as a permanent WEU body and its objective of developing WEU’s capability to use satellite imagery for security purposes;
- (vii) Stressing the importance of the ministerial decision to instruct the Space Group to continue its activities and define the basic conditions for possible WEU participation in a developing multilateral European programme and to study questions related to a possible WEU ground segment;
- (viii) Aware that there is still a considerable gap between the implementation of the initial political idea which resulted in the creation of the WEU Satellite Centre and the security constraints connected with the provision and use of data from the Helios 1 satellite;
- (ix) Noting at the same time that satellite intelligence is important and extremely useful, but that it is only one of the many different elements enabling a complete assessment of a specific situation to be made;
- (x) Aware of the existence of the document on “ Intelligence support to the Planning Cell: short-term measures ”;
- (xi) Attaching great importance to the common reflection on new European security conditions of the 27 WEU nations which has already resulted in identifying their common interests as well as potential risks to European security;
- (xii) Noting that WEU can only be promoted as a useful forum for analysis and consultation on the defence implications of security issues of the common foreign and security policy and as an instrument to facilitate the formulation and implementation of EU decisions and actions related to the Petersberg tasks if it can rely upon a common European intelligence policy;
- (xiii) Noting that there is a need for intensified intelligence cooperation within the framework of WEU due to the fact that European armed forces are being prepared for the implementation of Petersberg tasks, possibly without the support of United States assets;
- (xiv) Noting that European intelligence efforts would have to concentrate on possible new risks and threats;
- (xv) Aware that the existing bilateral cooperation between different WEU member states in intelligence questions is not a satisfactory basis for a common European intelligence policy;
- (xvi) Aware that some WEU member states have established specific links with the Planning Cell in order to provide it with information on current affairs;
- (xvii) Noting that there is a need to enlarge the size of the Intelligence Section in the WEU Planning Cell, as is now being planned, in order to enable the Planning Cell to perform its planning task properly;

- (xviii) Considering that if member states seriously wish to enhance the operational capability of WEU, they should improve the effectiveness of the Planning Cell by agreeing to second a correspondent from their national intelligence services to the Planning Cell;
- (xix) Recognising that NATO has a database at its disposal with indispensable information which could help WEU to make a thorough assessment and analysis of the politico-military situation in Europe, if need be;
- (xx) Considering that the links between WEU and NATO must be strengthened in order to share the intelligence required for operational planning and activities of European armed forces in the framework of Petersberg tasks;
- (xxi) Aware of the difficulties encountered in implementing the combined joint task forces concept which was adopted almost two years ago at the NATO summit of January 1994 and, at the same time, of the fact that too little progress has been made in the discussions on WEU-NATO cooperation regarding intelligence;
- (xxii) Stressing that under these circumstances WEU cannot afford to rely completely on the eventual availability of the Atlantic Alliance's assets and capabilities and that, as a consequence, it will have to develop – among other things – a common European intelligence policy;
- (xxiii) Noting that the national governments of WEU member states are increasingly less able to assess independently the different risks and threats to the security of Europe as a whole and that, as a consequence, they will be obliged gradually to build a multilateral European network for the permanent sharing of intelligence data and resources;
- (xxiv) Recognising that increased synergy in European intelligence capacities would be an important contribution to the status of Europe as an equal partner in the transatlantic relationship;
- (xxv) Stressing that for a full assessment of risks and threats to Europe's security, political and military intelligence must go hand-in-hand with intelligence on economic, financial, social and environmental developments;
- (xxvi) Aware that intelligence cooperation, let alone the establishment of a common European intelligence policy, are sensitive issues where, due to many psychological and political obstacles and deep-rooted mistrust, no spectacular progress can be made overnight,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Strengthen the links between WEU and NATO with a view to sharing the intelligence required for operational planning and activities of European armed forces in the framework of Petersberg tasks;
2. Ask each WEU member state to second a correspondent from its national intelligence system to the Planning Cell in order to improve its capabilities in making up-to-date assessments and analyses of the situation in potential Petersberg task-theatres of operation.

Explanatory Memorandum

(submitted by Mr Baumel, Chairman and Rapporteur)

I. Introduction

1. In the Maastricht Treaty, concluded by the EC member states in 1991, they referred to the perspective of a "common foreign and security policy including the eventual framing of a common defence policy, which might in time lead to a common defence". The WEU Maastricht Declaration of December 1991 defined the role of WEU as "the defence component of the European Union and as a means to strengthen the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance".

2. Since 1991, a number of activities have been launched in order to implement the decisions taken in Maastricht. Relations have been developed between the European Union and WEU and also between NATO and WEU. Initiatives have been taken to develop the operational role of WEU. But in all the above, very little attention has been paid to intelligence, which is the basic condition for any foreign, security and defence policy. Understandably there has been, and still is, some reluctance in the member states to do anything which suggests the integration of national intelligence services into a supranational framework. So many historical, psychological, or practical reasons could be put forward to postpone close cooperation in this field on a multilateral basis.

3. On the other hand, recent major crises such as the Gulf war and the crisis in former Yugoslavia, to mention only two, have been traumatic enough to convey the message that if Europe is serious in achieving its objective of a common foreign, security and defence policy, there is an urgent requirement for a common European intelligence policy.

4. It would be wrong to think that a common intelligence system, however well-organised, will always be able to predict accurately the outbreak of a crisis or conflict. Intelligence services may be aware of the seeds of a conflict and its underlying causes but none of them, not even the most brilliant, is able to predict the human behaviour which lights the spark that makes the powder keg explode.

5. It should be kept in mind that the main purpose of intelligence is not simply to predict crises and trigger timely diplomatic action in order to prevent conflict or war. Good intelligence, it is true, may contribute to the effectiveness of preventive diplomacy. The main objective of intelli-

gence, however, is the collection and acquisition of information from different sources in order to build and update an extensive database and to provide analyses based on this information. Analyses and continuously updated information may help governments to follow the right course in their foreign policy and to take the right diplomatic or even military action in crisis situations.

II. What kind of intelligence does Europe need and can it be managed in a supranational European framework?

6. In the post-cold war world, old concepts, based on the antagonism between East and West, no longer apply. Intelligence cannot escape redefinition and adaptation to a new geostrategic situation.

7. The bipolar world with its fairly clear-cut division of spheres of influence and interests left relatively little to the imagination. Without simplifying too much, one could say that the western allies were united in their common effort to protect their territory and their worldwide interests against a real or perceived threat from the Soviet Union, in particular, and from the communist world in general. Understandably, this was the main focal point of intelligence in the western world. That situation has now changed radically and security in the greater part of the world is in a state of flux, compelling European states with worldwide economic and political interests to readjust and step up their intelligence activities. Moreover, it should be noted that new threats are numerous and not always easy to interpret and analyse without deep background intelligence. At the same time, with the disappearance of an obvious common threat, national interests – even in the case of allies – are diverging, depending on the nature of different threats. Even between the Atlantic allies there are differences of opinion on how to deal with crises and other phenomena. The different policies of Europe and the United States towards Bosnia and Iran are only two of the most conspicuous examples.

8. France has understood this message. Intelligence is one of the four principal operational tasks which the government has designated in the 1996 defence budget. After deterrence, force projection and protection, the fourth task is prevention, which includes intelligence, space and communications. Prevention is one of the few defence

sectors which will not be affected by budget constraints and with a budget of 23.1 billion francs and 57 555 personnel in 1996, it accounts for 12.2% of the defence budget and 9.6% of personnel against 12% and 9.4% respectively in 1995.

9. France has a wide array of intelligence gathering hardware, which includes the observation and communication satellites Helios and Syracuse, reconnaissance and surveillance aircraft, electronic warfare equipment and spy ships. It has three major intelligence services: the general directorate for external security (DGSE), the directorate for military intelligence (DRM) and the directorate for protection and defence security (DPDS). In addition to these, there is the delegation for strategic affairs (DAS). In particular, the DRM and DGSE will be considerably enlarged between now and the year 2000. The DRM, employing 1 600 staff at the moment, will have 1 900 by the year 2000. The DGSE with 2 500 civilian and 1 500 military staff will have an extra 500 civilian and 200 military staff by the year 200¹.

10. Apparently, intelligence today is of necessity an expanding activity covering an extremely wide area of interest. The former French military intelligence director, General Jean Heinrich, has indicated that the scope for military intelligence now reaches way beyond pure military facts and mere analysis of opposing forces. He prefers to speak of "military interest intelligence" which, according to his definition, "is the combination of knowledge and information of all kinds that the political or military decision-maker needs in order to take his decision". This activity would encompass more than the military domain and cover widely differing areas such as the ethnological, historical, social and cultural environments.

11. The present geostrategic situation has become far too complicated for individual European nations to keep up with all relevant developments taking place in different parts of the world and analyse them in detail. Limited and often still further diminishing intelligence budgets go hand in hand with an increasing number of hotbeds of tension and potential or real crises which may, some day, threaten Europe's economic or security interests.

12. What are the subjects and issues on which European intelligence will need to concentrate? The document "European security: a common concept of the 27 WEU countries" provides a more or less comprehensive inventory of all possible risks and threats to stability and security in Europe and the rest of the world, on which information and in-depth analyses would certainly be extremely useful.

13. Moreover, economic intelligence, which has been a relatively neglected field of interest, is bound to become increasingly important, given the fierce competition between a growing number of economic entities for their share of the world market. Obviously, economic intelligence includes financial, social, ethnological, environmental and industrial intelligence.

14. In this framework, it is to be noted that more use can be made of public sources for the acquisition of data through the media, commercial databanks or other legal means. The recent development and stormy expansion of Internet is just one example of an open source which seems to offer almost unlimited information. In the present-day world of open societies and easily accessible worldwide information and communication systems, this kind of intelligence gathering will be an increasingly important complement to the more traditional and often costly covert methods.

15. Is it realistic to conceive of the establishment of a supranational European intelligence policy given that member states of the European Union do not wish to give up their sovereignty in security and defence?

16. In principle, intelligence has always been a typically national activity aimed at detecting and analysing all possible risks and threats which could do harm to the interests of a state or even threaten its existence, from either within or without. The fruits of intelligence enable a state to conduct a responsible foreign, security and defence policy.

17. Although a fully-fledged supranational European intelligence policy may still have a long way to go because of national sensitivities, there are possibilities for a Europeanisation of intelligence. Obviously, the level of such Europeanisation depends on the degree of convergence of national interests of the states concerned. As member states of the European Union move towards a common foreign and security policy, they will need a common intelligence policy in order to be able to identify risks and threats to their common interests. At the moment, however, a pragmatic step-by-step approach seems to be the only viable way to attain this ultimate objective.

18. The long list of Europe's intelligence requirements mentioned above makes it clear that, with the present severe budget constraints, no single national intelligence service will be able to meet the many justified demands. Cooperation and task specialisation are inevitable if the purpose is to turn available resources to maximum account. New technology, which will facilitate the collection and analysis of data is also, very often, too expensive for individual nations to afford. This is true not only of observation satellite systems but also of information technology and high-capacity,

1. *Le Monde*, 18 April 1996.

secure data links. A system should be developed which would allow for a gradual increase in the sharing of data and resources, given that this could not be done overnight. A first step could be to second a correspondent from each country's national intelligence service to the Planning Cell in order to improve its ability to make up-to-date assessments and analyses of the situation in potential Petersberg-task theatres of operation.

19. The common foreign and security policy, ultimately to include a common defence policy, will not be achieved until convergence of the different national assessments of specific foreign and security policy issues becomes possible. In this respect, a serious effort is needed to integrate national intelligence analyses into a coherent European picture.

20. In this framework, mention should be made of the European Commission's recommendations for the European Union intergovernmental conference. The Commission has suggested setting up a Presidency-Commission team in order to ensure effective cooperation between the two institutions in the field of the common foreign and security policy.

21. In order to prepare decisions more thoroughly, the Commission has proposed establishing a common analysis cell, composed of experts from member states and from the Commission. It would be a common service, which could eventually profit from a contribution from WEU².

III. Is the CJTF concept the ultimate solution for Europe's intelligence deficiencies?

22. It has been repeated endlessly that because of the existing complementarity and transparency between NATO and WEU, there is no need for duplication. On the other hand, the agreement on combined joint task forces (CJTF), which is expected to be approved by the North Atlantic Council in Berlin in June 1996, could give rise to some reservations on this point.

23. It is common knowledge that serious shortcomings in intelligence gathering and processing in the armed forces of the European allies were among the main reasons for establishing CJTF. CJTF should enable Europeans to use Alliance assets, including the impressive array of US intelligence assets, in European-led military operations in which the United States does not participate.

24. The command structure for CJTF which now seems to have been agreed, with a supported commander of the European-led operation and a supporting commander to provide Alliance assets

for such operations, leaves doubt as to whether Europeans will under all circumstances be able to rely on the availability of these assets. Given the fact that the supporting commander, who is supposed to be a US officer, will be able to take control, the case may arise where the supporting commander will either not provide the full range of intelligence assets required, or will withdraw these assets from the theatre. In that case, the European-supported commander may have to decide to cancel the operation.

25. There can be no doubt that under present circumstances, CJTF are a vital element for European-led operations without the participation of the United States.

26. The NATO-led IFOR operation has triggered an impressive range of US intelligence activities. The results of those activities are at the disposal of other IFOR contingents in so far as they will need them for the smooth running of their part of the operation. The distribution of intelligence data takes place at the discretion of the owner of the assets used. In the US section in north-eastern Bosnia, well over 1000 army intelligence troops are deployed, while a national intelligence support team at the US headquarters in Tuzla includes representatives from the CIA, the Defence Intelligence Agency and the National Security Agency.

27. A number of satellites are tracking any movements of military equipment through the demilitarised zones separating the factions. Intelligence-gathering assets being used include Quickfix, an EH-60 helicopter which collects electronic signals, and Guardrail, an army intelligence targeting system. Also employed are US Air Force JSTARS to monitor arms smuggling activities. Listening posts, seismic, infrared and magnetic sensors have been installed and patrolling troops are engaged in point-blank surveillance.

28. All these assets have now been deployed at full strength because, after years of serious differences of opinion with the Europeans, the United States has decided to become involved in the crisis in Bosnia, even to the point of deploying US troops on the ground.

29. Europeans may have to recognise, however, that for the implementation of their common foreign, security and defence policy they may not be able to rely forever on the provision of US assets. The development of purely European operational capabilities should therefore be one of WEU's priorities, and it should go hand in hand with the provision of Alliance assets through CJTF in the field of intelligence. A fully-fledged intelligence system, ranging from different military satellites to intelligence processing and gathering centres and including direct links with C4I systems, would take years to develop and

2. *Le Monde*, 27 February 1996.

commission, even though the European defence industry has all the basic technologies available to build the components.

30. Present-day military operations cannot be successful without the use of comprehensive C4I systems to acquire intelligence and manage all control, command, communications, computer and intelligence operations. NATO has its own air command and control system (ACCS), which is matched by the compatible French surveillance and command system for aerial operations (SCCOA). The most sophisticated system for air-ground surveillance, the United States JSTARS, has no competitor at the moment but thought must now be given to a future successor. France has developed a helicopter-mounted Horizon battlefield surveillance system and it is now being proposed that, using technology it has at its disposal, the European defence industry develop a full air-ground surveillance system including a JSTARS successor to be operational after 2005. This could be done in cooperation with the United States defence industry, provided it is based on a satisfactory two-way agreement, and in such a way as to complement European systems under development, such as Horizon, Astor (United Kingdom) and Creso (Italy), for a new transatlantic system. Europe should not delay in making up its mind in this matter.

IV. Towards a European observation satellite system

31. A first important step towards the setting-up of a common European intelligence system was taken when the WEU Council decided to establish a WEU Satellite Centre in Torrejón, Spain, in order to provide satellite image intelligence for verification and crisis-monitoring purposes. In the initial experimental phase, the Satellite Centre worked with satellite data which it acquired on a commercial basis from various European and foreign sources. In May 1995, the Satellite Centre was confirmed as a permanent body of WEU. A basic agreement, as formulated in the Memorandum of Understanding of 17 April 1993, has been signed, enabling the Satellite Centre to use Helios 1 images, but further practical details still have to be worked out.

32. While the realisation of the idea of a WEU Satellite Centre with the right to use Helios 1 images for interpretation purposes is politically praiseworthy, there are clearly many practical problems to be solved in order to respect the many security and priority user constraints attached to the operation of Helios 1, which is in fact a satellite operated by three participating countries (France, Italy and Spain) each of which has its own interests as regards images.

33. The present operation of the Torrejón Centre still leaves much to be desired, not just on account of shortcomings which have become apparent in the choice of equipment but more particularly because of the delays involved in the interpretation and use of the images. Moreover, one still has the impression that the WEU Council's support for the Satellite Centre is not whole-hearted owing to differences of opinion between member states, which are resulting in the lowest common denominator for the Centre's objectives and terms of reference. A point to note here is that it took the Council six months to provide a very incomplete and unsatisfactory reply to a detailed written question by Mr Lenzer³ on the work of the Centre.

34. Observation satellites have the great advantage of being free of the legal constraints which apply to reconnaissance aircraft and thereby accommodate coverage of all territories without violating air space and, for the moment, without the risk of being destroyed.

35. They perform an extremely wide range of tasks: monitoring crises, providing advance warning of aggression, monitoring the application of disarmament treaties, supervising humanitarian peace missions and gathering strategic and tactical data.

36. It is well known that optical observation satellites such as Spot and Helios 1 have only limited capabilities because they cannot see in the dark or through clouds. A full observation satellite system should therefore also comprise infrared and radar sensors. In the more distant future, a European satellite system may also have to include weather, communications, location/navigation, early warning, eavesdropping and data-relay satellites.

37. It should be supplemented by ground stations and data-processing tools linked to battlefield sensors for real-time processing, decision-making and the ability to strike.

38. At their summit meeting of 7 December 1995 in Baden-Baden, France and Germany agreed to cooperate closely in the field of satellites. The main focus of Franco-German cooperation will be the development of a FF 11 000 million Helios 2 observation satellite with France as lead contractor, a FF 13 000 million Horus radar observation satellite with Germany as lead contractor and a cooperative study with regard to the possible development of data-relay satellites.

39. Helios 2, due to replace Helios 1 after the year 2000, will include many improvements, such as night observation with its infrared capability. After the year 2005, the Horus radar observation

3. Question No. 331 of 30 May 1995.