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(Third Part)

European armed forces

REPORT

submitted on behalf of the Defence Committee
by Mr. De Decker, Rapporteur

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1. Adopted in committee by 13 votes to 0 with 1 abstention.

2. *Members of the committee:* Mr. Baumel (Chairman); Mr. De Decker, Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman (Vice-Chairmen); Mr. Alloncle, Mrs. Beer, MM. Bianchi, Briane, Brito, Cox, Dees, Dumont, Fernandes Marques, Mrs. Fernandez Ramiro, MM. Hardy, Horn, Jacquat, Kastanidis, Kelchtermans, La Russa, Mrs. Lentz-Cornette, MM. Lopez Valdivielso (Alternate: *Lopez Henares*), Marten, Lord Newall (Alternate: *Sir Russell Johnston*), MM. Parisi, Pavlidis, Péciaux, Petruccioli (Alternate: *Guidi*), Reis Leite (Alternate: *Aguiar*), Scholten, Sir Dudley Smith, Mr. Sole Tura (Alternate: *de Puig*), Mrs. Soutendijk van Appeldoorn, Sir Keith Speed, MM. Speroni, Vazquez, Vrettos, Zierer.

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

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Preface

It is known only too well that the new security environment in Europe after the cold war has led to an overall revision of defence expenditures in all the member states of NATO and WEU.

In November 1991, NATO adopted a new strategic concept calling for highly-mobile, multinational and flexible forces to replace the former linear defence forces. Only a few months later, in June 1992, the WEU Ministerial Council issued the Petersberg declaration including a chapter on strengthening WEU's operational rôle. WEU member states declared that they were prepared to make available military units from the whole spectrum of their conventional armed forces for military tasks conducted under the authority of WEU. It was also said that military units would be organised on a multinational and multiservice basis and that WEU member states intended to develop and exercise the appropriate capabilities to enable the deployment of such units in accomplishing specific tasks.

Since then, many initiatives have been taken, both in NATO and WEU, to implement the decisions mentioned above and the Defence Committee of the WEU Assembly considered it appropriate to present a concise inventory of what has been accomplished in the area of bilateral or multilateral forces. Admittedly, some of the forces mentioned in the present report existed before the 1990s, but they also had to be adapted to the new strategic environment and find their place in new structures.

One chapter in the present report discusses the stage reached in the implementation of the combined joint task forces concept (CJTF) since its adoption at the January 1994 NATO summit meeting.

Originally, the committee had also intended to examine recent developments in defence budgets and armed forces of the individual WEU member states, but your Rapporteur, much to his regret, has not been able to accomplish all the necessary preparations for such a survey which proved to be more demanding than foreseen. It is hoped, however, that it will be possible to make this survey on another occasion.

Draft Recommendation

on European armed forces

The Assembly,

- (i) Noting the NATO Council's declared full support for the development of a European security and defence identity and the strengthening of the European pillar of the alliance through WEU;
- (ii) Noting that, according to the NATO Council's decision, the alliance's organisation and resources will be adjusted so as to facilitate this process;
- (iii) Believing, however, that in more than eighteen months since the endorsement of the CJTF concept at NATO's summit meeting in January 1994, no significant progress has been made in the implementation of this concept, even though it is almost a year ago now, on 29th June 1994, that WEU presented to NATO its report on criteria and modalities for the effective use of the CJTF;
- (iv) Noting that there is an ever more urgent need for WEU to identify clearly those assets and capabilities which WEU will need in possible future operations and to define its views on ways and means for the use of such assets and capabilities which the alliance could make available to WEU;
- (v) Recognising and calling upon the Council to demonstrate its own recognition that WEU member states will have to procure, through multinational co-operative programmes, those assets and capabilities which the alliance cannot make available to WEU;
- (vi) Emphasising that the European allies cannot afford to delay the establishment of appropriate operational capabilities and command structures for whatever European contingency operations in which NATO may choose not to act;
- (vii) Welcoming the decisions taken at the WEU ministerial meeting in Lisbon on 15th May 1995 regarding the development of WEU operational capabilities;
- (viii) Taking note of the increasing reluctance of the United States to commit ground troops to any operation on European soil which is not based on Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty;
- (ix) Recognising that on either side of the Atlantic there might be different perceptions of the threats to European security and the political and military means to handle them;
- (x) Welcoming the fact that, with the approval of a document identifying their common interests as well as potential risks to European security, the 27 WEU nations have taken the first steps towards joint thinking on the new European security conditions which should result in the publication of a white paper on European security;
- (xi) Welcoming the recent decision by France, Italy and Spain to establish a land force (EUROFOR) and a maritime force (EUROMARFOR) in both of which Portugal will participate and which will be declared forces answerable to WEU;
- (xii) Somewhat surprised that, whenever European multinational forces are established, NATO insists on its right to use them, while at the same time it seems increasingly reluctant to mount operations in the new type of post-cold war contingencies which are threatening Europe's security;
- (xiii) Welcoming the decision to establish the WEU Satellite Centre in Torrejón as a permanent WEU body;
- (xiv) In doubt whether the establishment in the near future of a WEU humanitarian intervention force would be an adequate solution for the hazardous and often hostile environments in which such a force would have to operate both on European soil and elsewhere in the world;
- (xv) Considering that the United Nations' lack of an appropriate command, control, communications and intelligence structure calls into question its ability to command humanitarian, peace-keeping or peace-enforcing operations which are taking place in hazardous circumstances;
- (xvi) Expressing the wish that the WEU Permanent Council's examination of peace-keeping and conflict prevention, combined with the initiative taken by France and the United Kingdom, will produce early and tangible results;

(xvii) Emphasising that recent developments in the Bosnian conflict have clearly demonstrated the urgent need for exclusively European rapid reaction forces for all WEU operations mentioned in the Petersberg declaration;

(xviii) Noting that geostrategic developments and reductions in the means European states are allocating to their defence are encouraging them to opt increasingly for multinational co-operation but that such co-operation is haphazard,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Invite WEU member states to stop reducing their defence expenditure;
2. Organise a summit meeting of heads of state and of government of WEU member countries in the first half of 1996 at the latest to examine European security and more particularly the need to co-ordinate means, policies and multinational co-operation in order to organise effective joint defence;
3. Devote its every effort to urge NATO to implement the CJTF concept by the end of 1995;
4. However this may be, by the end of 1995 at the latest, identify clearly those assets and capabilities which WEU will need in possible future operations and, in addition, as mentioned in the Lisbon declaration, define views on ways and means of using such assets and capabilities which the alliance should make available to WEU;
5. In parallel, identify those assets and capabilities which WEU should possess in its own right and which its member states will have to procure urgently through multinational co-operative programmes or otherwise;
6. Promote forthwith the establishment of permanent exclusively European rapid reaction forces, including headquarters and political-military command structures, for all WEU operations mentioned in the Petersberg declaration;
7. Refrain from accepting, or appearing to accept, further obligations or commitments where there is a lack of capacity or a will to fulfil them.

Explanatory Memorandum

(submitted by Mr. De Decker, Rapporteur)

I. The European Corps

1. On 14th October 1991, President François Mitterrand and Chancellor Helmut Kohl, who in 1987 started to create a French-German brigade which has been operational since October 1991, informed the President of the European Council, at that time the Prime Minister of the Netherlands, Ruud Lubbers, of their intention to create an army to which other member states of WEU could contribute. The official decision to create the European Corps was taken at the French-German summit meeting at La Rochelle on 22nd May 1992 with the adoption of the "joint report concerning the creation of the European Corps".

2. In July 1992, a provisional staff was created in Strasbourg with the task of setting-up the staff of the European Corps, which became fully operational on 1st July 1994. General-Lieutenant Helmut Willmann from Germany, who took office on 1st October 1993, marking the official creation of the European Corps, was nominated as the first General to command the European Corps.

(a) Membership

3. The European Corps is currently drawn from five member states: Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg and Spain. The Belgian Council of Ministers decided to request participation in the Franco-German corps on 22nd June 1993 and Belgium's official accession to the European Corps took place on 25th June 1993. The official Spanish accession was on 1st July 1994 and in June 1994 Luxembourg announced that it would like to join the European Corps. Although all member states of WEU have been invited to join the European Corps, it is thought that - if only for practical reasons - it should not be enlarged beyond its present composition. It is now generally agreed that if more nations are interested in participating, consideration should be given to the possible creation of a second European Corps.

(b) Relations with NATO

4. After the creation of the European Corps, based on their earlier understanding of December 1992. The French Chief-of-staff, Admiral Jacques Lanxade, and the German Chief-of-staff, General Klaus Naumann, signed an agreement with

NATO's Supreme Allied Commander Europe, General John M. Shalikashvili, on 21st January 1993, on the use of the European Corps. Belgium signed the SACEUR agreements on 12th October 1993. According to this agreement, the corps may be used by NATO either as a main defence force in Central Europe or as a rapid reaction peace-keeping or peace-making force in the European theatre, covered by the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. Relations between the European Corps and NATO are based on the specific nature of this new multinational European formation, which the participants wished to maintain. Moreover, it should be noted that the European Corps is adapted to the structures and procedures of the alliance, thus confirming it as compatible with NATO and as France's contribution (in that context) to the strengthening of the European pillar in NATO. As a consequence, in the event of a crisis and under specific circumstances, French troops could be placed under the operational command of NATO. However, such engagement of French troops could take place, after approval by the French authorities, for specific and preliminary-defined missions. In such a case, France would be prepared to participate in the debates of the Military Committee together with the other member states of the European Corps.

(c) Relations with WEU

5. The European Corps was also created with a view to reinforcing the European defence identity, and the forces of the European Corps have been designated as forces answerable to WEU (FAWEU) at the WEU Council's meeting held in Rome on 19th May 1993. The conditions for WEU's employment of the European Corps were then agreed on 20th September 1993 in the "joint declaration stating the conditions for the use of the European Corps in the framework of Western European Union". The joint declaration states that the corps could be subordinated, after a decision of the Council for use, to a command designated by WEU, for which the participating states will set up a joint committee for internal co-ordination. The European Corps can be deployed for all the tasks specified in the Petersberg declaration and its use by WEU would be based on plans formulated by the operation commander designated by WEU, in co-operation with the WEU Planning Cell.

(d) Missions

6. The European Corps itself has first call on the units allocated to it intended for joint operations. The joint decision to deploy the European Corps, remains the responsibility of the participating governments. The Joint Committee in charge of carrying out the governments' decisions defines the method and procedures for the deployment and transfer of command of the European Corps for each mission.

7. The missions of the European Corps are the common defence of the allied territory in application of Article 5 of the Treaty of Washington or Article V of the Brussels Treaty. It can also be deployed for peace-restoring and peace-keeping missions, humanitarian and rescue tasks, and tasks of combat forces in crisis-management, missions mentioned in the Petersberg declaration. Furthermore, the European Corps is to serve as the central core structure for European armed forces, to constitute an instrument for the common foreign and security policy and a means of reinforcing the European pillar within NATO.

(e) Composition

8. The first unit assigned to the European Corps was the Franco-German brigade of 5 250 men, operational since 1991, with headquarters in Müllheim. The other national contributions are:

- France: the 1st armoured division with headquarters in Baden-Baden;
- Germany: the 10th armoured division with headquarters in Sigmaringen, composed of the 12th armoured brigade and the 30th mechanised brigade;
- Belgium: the 1st mechanised division with headquarters in Saive, consisting of the 1st, the 7th and the 17th mechanised brigades;
- Spain: the 21st mechanised brigade based in Córdoba which will join the European Corps in 1995. The Spanish contribution will be completed to a full mechanised division in 1998.

9. Luxembourg intends to integrate a reconnaissance company into the Belgian 1st mechanised brigade.

10. The total strength of the European Corps is presently 50 800 men, spread over the member states as follows:

Belgium	9 600
France	10 300
Germany	18 500
Spain	4 500
Franco-German Brigade	5 250

(f) Training

11. The first exercise of the European Corps (Pegasus) was held from 7th-17th November 1994 with about 5 000 soldiers from all the participating states, practising interoperability of the corps staff and troops. Pegasus was based on counter-concentration, requiring quick movement of large units over long distances. The ultimate goal of the exercise was deep integration at a high operational level. The exercise has demonstrated that the objective of being operational on 1st October 1995 is feasible.

(g) Problems still to be resolved

12. The creation of the European Corps has caused a number of problems, all of which have not yet been solved satisfactorily. The most worrying is the absence of a juridical and institutional statute for the headquarters. At the moment, transposed NATO texts are used. The present situation affects the operational capability of the European Corps and is leading many observers to wonder whether political willingness will be enough. An even greater problem is the requirement for unanimity on every decision taken in the joint committee. Furthermore, there are difficulties with the heterogeneity of equipment, the lack of appropriate independent logistics, mobility and appropriate mission training, military airlift capability and military transport capacity. In particular, for logistics, communication systems and air transport capacity, the European Corps is still too dependent on the United States.

13. Although it is still in the process of being established, the European Corps has already fulfilled one important task of its mission: it has shown that the resilient and flexible working arrangements between NATO and WEU are capable of extension and expansion.

II. EUROFOR - EUROMARFOR

14. Initially, as discussed at the 20th November 1992 ministerial meeting in Rome, the idea had been to create a trilateral, non-permanent, air-maritime force eventually to be extended with an amphibious capability. At the meeting in Luxembourg on 22nd November 1993, ministers "welcomed and agreed to study the Italian initiative envisaging a multinational groundforce aimed at enhancing the operational significance of the air-maritime initiative". This ground force would be able to act alone or co-operate with the air-maritime force. At their meeting in Noordwijk (14th November 1994), WEU ministers discussed the progress made by France, Italy and Spain and asked them to present these forces at their ministerial meeting in the spring of 1995.

15. At a WEU ministerial meeting on 15th May 1995, France, Italy and Spain signed the founding documents for the creation of an army joint rapid reaction force (EUROFOR) and a European maritime force (EUROMARFOR) to provide extra security for the Mediterranean at a time of mounting concern over the security situation in the southern Mediterranean.

16. Also on 15th May, Portugal officially made its request to participate in the two forces. Spain, France and Italy have now agreed to Portugal's participation from the beginning of the establishment of these forces. The United Kingdom has already shown its interest in EUROMARFOR and its possible association in the future is not ruled out.

(a) Goals and missions

17. According to a joint communiqué issued by France, Spain and Italy, the EUROFOR and EUROMARFOR initiatives are meant to contribute to the creation of a military capability for Europe, notably in the field of force projection; create a multinational base structure for member states of WEU that wish to participate in its operations; contribute, while respecting the content of the Petersberg declaration, to initiatives of international organisations, to promote and maintain peace and security.

18. EUROFOR is a large multinational land force of up to a division in strength. It has a rapid reaction capability, easy deployment and can act on its own or together with EUROMARFOR. It will have no permanently-attached units but consists of pre-assigned professional elite units, which are available at short notice.

19. EUROMARFOR is a pre-structured, non-permanent multinational maritime force, with aeronaval and amphibious forces, capable of acting on their own or together with EUROFOR. The composition and structure of the EUROMARFOR will depend on the missions to be performed. A typical composition for certain tasks could be an aircraft-carrier with four to six escort units, a landing force, amphibious forces and a supply ship. EUROMARFOR will have no permanent structures nor a permanent headquarters but will come under rotating command of the participating states. Warships under WEU will be led by a French aircraft-carrier. In each of the participating states, marines will be designated to prepare a possible operation and will co-ordinate with their counterparts. Although some of the problems over how to finance the operations are still to be solved, the two forces will be established as of autumn 1995.

20. The missions for EUROFOR and EUROMARFOR correspond to those set out in the Petersberg declaration: humanitarian and rescue

tasks; peace-keeping tasks; tasks of combat forces in crisis-management, including peace-making. It is noted, however, that the fulfilment of these tasks must not involve the participation of these forces in defence missions in the sense of Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty or Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty.

(b) Relations with NATO and WEU

21. For the use of these forces in a trilateral framework, a common decision of the participating states is needed. Their use within the framework of WEU has priority, but they could also be used in the framework of NATO. In preliminary WEU discussions, the United Kingdom had insisted on the two forces being equally available to NATO and WEU, although WEU would have first priority. The British view was endorsed by Italy, which also wishes to avoid any weakening of NATO. As a consequence, NATO would have first call on the new forces should the territory of the alliance be threatened or attacked.

22. An agreement is being prepared on the conditions for the use of these forces in WEU with a view to WEU's rôle as the defence component of the European Union and as a reinforced pillar of NATO. It is noted that EUROFOR and EUROMARFOR will be declared forces answerable to WEU (FAWEU). A high-level interministerial committee will assure politico-military co-ordination, establish the conditions for use and provide directives for the command of these two forces. The Permanent Council was charged to specify the relations between WEU and these forces. The two forces are intended to complement the European Corps in its promotion of the operational rôle of WEU.

23. France has already suggested creating multinational and multiservice European intervention forces, under the command of a European general staff.

(c) Structure

24. EUROFOR will have a permanent command with a multinational headquarters in Florence and the capability to perform joint operations. It is expected to have about 5 000 troops with the possibility of being expanded to 10 000. It will be highly mobile and capable of long distance operations. Procedures will be prepared for WEU to use the rapid reaction force. The four participating nations plan to contribute infantry and light artillery units. Although no units will be specifically and permanently attached, they will be directly available for peace-keeping and humanitarian operations. Troops will remain with their national armed forces and be earmarked for WEU when needed for missions undertaken by WEU.

25. The command of EUROMARFOR does not require the creation of new permanent structures. Existing command structures will intensify their co-operation and learn how to co-operate better. In the case of an operation, a joint command will be established under the alternating command of one of the headquarters of the participating states. Other member states of WEU can, if they wish, be admitted to participate in the two forces, after acceptance by the other participants.

(d) Exercises

26. In preparation of the present initiative, France, Italy and Spain have held a number of air-maritime exercises.

27. The first exercise, Farfadet 92, was held in the South of France in 1992. This was only a French-Italian exercise in which Spain participated as an observer. The aim of the exercise was the simulation of a rescue mission, including the removal of residents from conflict zones.

28. The second exercise, Ardente 93, in the last two weeks of October 1993 in central Italy, comprised 10 000 troops from France, Italy and Spain with the participation of six other countries. This was considered the first ever WEU exercise. The main objectives of the exercise included the build-up and transfer of a combined multinational force in an out-of-area operation, command and control in overseas operations, the use of special forces and electronic warfare for intelligence gathering, organisation and conduct of search-and-evacuation operations, the study of rules of engagement.

29. The third exercise was Tramontana 94 with France, Italy and Spain as the main participants, on 14th-25th November 1994, in the southeast of Spain. Further participants were Greece, the Netherlands, Portugal and a battalion of the European Corps. This exercise, comprising 8 000 troops, was also concentrated on the simulation of evacuations in a humanitarian operation.

30. These exercises have already greatly improved co-operation among the air-maritime forces of France, Italy and Spain. The abovementioned exercises demonstrated the lack of ground forces in such operations.

31. In September 1995, the next exercise, Mistral 95, will again be held in the south of France.

III. The Dutch-British amphibious force

32. After having been nationally oriented since the second world war, the Dutch marines corps decided, in 1968, that it was necessary to have the ability to deploy amphibious-trained marines for the benefit of SACLANT. In 1970, the Netherlands realised that within the framework of the

Maritime Contingency Force Atlantic it was necessary to co-operate with the British marines, with the British also agreeing that co-operation would be beneficial for the efficiency of both corps. This resulted in modest exercises of both corps in 1971 and 1972.

33. On 9th May 1973, this co-operation was formalised by the signing of the memorandum of understanding (MoU), the officialisation of the Dutch-British amphibious force (UK/NL/AF), the prime example of NATO/European maritime co-operation and often seen as one of the most militarily effective (flexibility and operational effectiveness) multinational European forces. This MoU was re-adapted in 1979, 1987 and is at the moment being revised again.

34. The MoU covers, inter alia, the following aspects: the constituent units of UK/NL/AF and their way of concentration during deployment; command and control; logistic support; common exercises and training in times of peace.

(a) Missions

35. The UK/NL landing force is the land component of the UK/NL/AF and is a lightly-equipped unit which is quickly deployable and which operates independently. The UK/NL/LF is primarily destined for the execution of amphibious operations/landings and prolonged land operations. It is a mobile unit, capable of operations on any type of terrain and under any climatic conditions and, because of that, it is perfectly suited for crisis-management operations anywhere in the world (for example operation Haven, North Iraq, 1991).

36. In the framework of NATO, the UK/NL/LF can be deployed on the northern and southern flank of the territory of NATO and on the Atlantic Islands. With the growing emphasis nowadays on the problems of Southern Europe, the UK/NL/LF has also become available to Commander Allied Forces Mediterranean (CAFMED, when not needed by SACLANT).

(b) Composition

37. The British contribution to the UK/NL/LF is the 3rd Commando Brigade Royal Marines (3 CdoBdeRM, headquarters in Plymouth). The Dutch contribution is formed by units of the group operational units of the marine corps. During operations and exercises the units are placed under the command of the Commander UK/NL/LF.

38. The 3rd Commando Brigade consists of:

- a headquarters and signals squadron royal marine;
- three royal marines commandos;
- a royal marines air squadron (Gazelle helicopters);