Assembly of Western European Union

FORTIETH ORDINARY SESSION

(Third Part)

European armed forces

REPORT

submitted on behalf of the Defence Committee
by Mr. De Decker, Rapporteur
European armed forces

REPORT

submitted on behalf of the Defence Committee by Mr. De Decker, Rapporteur

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PREFACE

DRAFT RECOMMENDATION

on a European armed forces

EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM

submitted by Mr. De Decker, Rapporteur

I. The European Corps
   (a) Membership
   (b) Relations with NATO
   (c) Relations with WEU
   (d) Missions
   (e) Composition
   (f) Training
   (g) Problems still to be resolved

II. EUROFOR- EUROMARFOR
   (a) Goals and missions
   (b) Relations with NATO and WEU
   (c) Structure
   (d) Exercises

III. The Dutch-British amphibious force
   (a) Missions
   (b) Composition
   (c) Relations with NATO and WEU
   (d) Exercises
   (e) New developments

IV. The Allied Command Europe rapid reaction corps (ARRC)
   (a) Missions
   (b) Composition
   (c) Training
   (d) Shortcomings of the ARRC

V. The Dutch-German army corps
   (a) Missions
   (b) Composition

1. Adopted in committee by 13 votes to 0 with 1 abstention.
2. Members of the committee: Mr. Baumel (Chairman); Mr. De Decker, Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman (Vice-Chairmen); Mr. Alloéncle, Mrs. Beer, MM. Bianchi, Briane, Brito, Cox, Does, Dumont, Fernandez Marques, Mrs. Fernandez Ramiro, MM. Hardy, Horn, Jacquat, Kastanidis, Kelchtermans, La Russa, Mrs. Lenz-Cornette, MM. Lopez Valdivielso (Alternate: Lopez Henares), Marten, Lord Newall (Alternate: Sir Russell Johnston), MM. Parisi, Pavlidis, Péciaux, Petrucciolì (Alternate: Guidi), Reis Leite (Alternate: Aguiar), Scholten, Sir Dudley Smith, Mr. Sole Tura (Alternate: de Puig), Mrs. Soutendijk van Appeldoorn, Sir Keith Speed, MM. Speroni, Vazquez, Vrettos, Zierer.

N.B. The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.
VI. LANDJUT (Headquarters allied land forces, Schleswig-Holstein and Jutland)
   (a) Missions
   (b) Composition
   (c) Exercises
   (d) Critical points

VII. Co-operation initiatives in Belgium and the Netherlands
   (a) Belgian-Netherlands naval co-operation
   (b) The Belgian-Netherlands deployable air task force

VIII. The Franco-British Euro air group
   (a) Tasks, objective and importance
   (b) Structure

IX. Affiliation of the Danish reaction brigade and the 1st United Kingdom armoured division
   (a) Missions
   (b) Composition
   (c) Relations with NATO and WEU

X. Two German-American corps
   (a) Composition
   (b) Difficulties in co-operation
   (c) Exercises

XI. The combined joint task forces (CJTF)
   (a) Command and control
   (b) CJTF under WEU
   (c) Advantages of CJTF
   (d) Problems concerning the implementation of CJTF

XII. Conclusions

APPENDICES

I. Contributions to the European Corps

II. Rapid reaction forces (land)
Preface

It is known only too well that the new security environment in Europe after the cold war has led to an overall revision of defence expenditures in all the member states of NATO and WEU.

In November 1991, NATO adopted a new strategic concept calling for highly-mobile, multinational and flexible forces to replace the former linear defence forces. Only a few months later, in June 1992, the WEU Ministerial Council issued the Petersberg declaration including a chapter on strengthening WEU’s operational rôle. WEU member states declared that they were prepared to make available military units from the whole spectrum of their conventional armed forces for military tasks conducted under the authority of WEU. It was also said that military units would be organised on a multinational and multiservice basis and that WEU member states intended to develop and exercise the appropriate capabilities to enable the deployment of such units in accomplishing specific tasks.

Since then, many initiatives have been taken, both in NATO and WEU, to implement the decisions mentioned above and the Defence Committee of the WEU Assembly considered it appropriate to present a concise inventory of what has been accomplished in the area of bilateral or multilateral forces. Admittedly, some of the forces mentioned in the present report existed before the 1990s, but they also had to be adapted to the new strategic environment and find their place in new structures.

One chapter in the present report discusses the stage reached in the implementation of the combined joint task forces concept (CJTF) since its adoption at the January 1994 NATO summit meeting.

Originally, the committee had also intended to examine recent developments in defence budgets and armed forces of the individual WEU member states, but your Rapporteur, much to his regret, has not been able to accomplish all the necessary preparations for such a survey which proved to be more demanding than foreseen. It is hoped, however, that it will be possible to make this survey on another occasion.
Draft Recommendation
on European armed forces

The Assembly,

(i) Noting the NATO Council’s declared full support for the development of a European security and defence identity and the strengthening of the European pillar of the alliance through WEU;

(ii) Noting that, according to the NATO Council’s decision, the alliance’s organisation and resources will be adjusted so as to facilitate this process;

(iii) Believing, however, that in more than eighteen months since the endorsement of the CJTF concept at NATO’s summit meeting in January 1994, no significant progress has been made in the implementation of this concept, even though it is almost a year ago now, on 29th June 1994, that WEU presented to NATO its report on criteria and modalities for the effective use of the CJTF;

(iv) Noting that there is an ever more urgent need for WEU to identify clearly those assets and capabilities which WEU will need in possible future operations and to define its views on ways and means for the use of such assets and capabilities which the alliance could make available to WEU;

(v) Recognising and calling upon the Council to demonstrate its own recognition that WEU member states will have to procure, through multinational co-operative programmes, those assets and capabilities which the alliance cannot make available to WEU;

(vi) Emphasising that the European allies cannot afford to delay the establishment of appropriate operational capabilities and command structures for whatever European contingency operations in which NATO may choose not to act;

(vii) Welcoming the decisions taken at the WEU ministerial meeting in Lisbon on 15th May 1995 regarding the development of WEU operational capabilities;

(viii) Taking note of the increasing reluctance of the United States to commit ground troops to any operation on European soil which is not based on Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty;

(ix) Recognising that on either side of the Atlantic there might be different perceptions of the threats to European security and the political and military means to handle them;

(x) Welcoming the fact that, with the approval of a document identifying their common interests as well as potential risks to European security, the 27 WEU nations have taken the first steps towards joint thinking on the new European security conditions which should result in the publication of a white paper on European security;

(xi) Welcoming the recent decision by France, Italy and Spain to establish a land force (EUROFOR) and a maritime force (EUROMARFOR) in both of which Portugal will participate and which will be declared forces answerable to WEU;

(xii) Somewhat surprised that, whenever European multinational forces are established, NATO insists on its right to use them, while at the same time it seems increasingly reluctant to mount operations in the new type of post-cold war contingencies which are threatening Europe’s security;

(xiii) Welcoming the decision to establish the WEU Satellite Centre in Torrejón as a permanent WEU body;

(xiv) In doubt whether the establishment in the near future of a WEU humanitarian intervention force would be an adequate solution for the hazardous and often hostile environments in which such a force would have to operate both on European soil and elsewhere in the world;

(xv) Considering that the United Nations’ lack of an appropriate command, control, communications and intelligence structure calls into question its ability to command humanitarian, peace-keeping or peace-enforcing operations which are taking place in hazardous circumstances;

(xvi) Expressing the wish that the WEU Permanent Council’s examination of peace-keeping and conflict prevention, combined with the initiative taken by France and the United Kingdom, will produce early and tangible results;
(xvii) Emphasising that recent developments in the Bosnian conflict have clearly demonstrated the urgent need for exclusively European rapid reaction forces for all WEU operations mentioned in the Petersberg declaration;

(xviii) Noting that geostrategic developments and reductions in the means European states are allocating to their defence are encouraging them to opt increasingly for multinational co-operation but that such co-operation is haphazard,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Invite WEU member states to stop reducing their defence expenditure;

2. Organise a summit meeting of heads of state and of government of WEU member countries in the first half of 1996 at the latest to examine European security and more particularly the need to co-ordinate means, policies and multinational co-operation in order to organise effective joint defence;

3. Devote its every effort to urge NATO to implement the CJTF concept by the end of 1995;

4. However this may be, by the end of 1995 at the latest, identify clearly those assets and capabilities which WEU will need in possible future operations and, in addition, as mentioned in the Lisbon declaration, define views on ways and means of using such assets and capabilities which the alliance should make available to WEU;

5. In parallel, identify those assets and capabilities which WEU should possess in its own right and which its member states will have to procure urgently through multinational co-operative programmes or otherwise;

6. Promote forthwith the establishment of permanent exclusively European rapid reaction forces, including headquarters and political-military command structures, for all WEU operations mentioned in the Petersberg declaration;

7. Refrain from accepting, or appearing to accept, further obligations or commitments where there is a lack of capacity or a will to fulfil them.
Explanatory Memorandum
(submitted by Mr. De Decker, Rapporteur)

I. The European Corps

1. On 14th October 1991, President François Mitterrand and Chancellor Helmut Kohl, who in 1987 started to create a French-German brigade which has been operational since October 1991, informed the President of the European Council, at that time the Prime Minister of the Netherlands, Ruud Lubbers, of their intention to create an army to which other member states of WEU could contribute. The official decision to create the European Corps was taken at the French-German summit meeting at La Rochelle on 22nd May 1992 with the adoption of the "joint report concerning the creation of the European Corps".

2. In July 1992, a provisional staff was created in Strasbourg with the task of setting-up the staff of the European Corps, which became fully operational on 1st July 1994. General-Lieutenant Helmut Willmann from Germany, who took office on 1st October 1993, marking the official creation of the European Corps, was nominated as the first General to command the European Corps.

(a) Membership

3. The European Corps is currently drawn from five member states: Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg and Spain. The Belgian Council of Ministers decided to request participation in the Franco-German corps on 22nd June 1993 and Belgium’s official accession to the European Corps took place on 25th June 1993. The official Spanish accession was on 1st July 1994 and in June 1994 Luxembourg announced that it would like to join the European Corps. Although all member states of WEU have been invited to join the European Corps, it is thought that - if only for practical reasons - it should not be enlarged beyond its present composition. It is now generally agreed that if more nations are interested in participating, consideration should be given to the possible creation of a second European Corps.

(b) Relations with NATO

4. After the creation of the European Corps, based on their earlier understanding of December 1992. The French Chief-of-staff, Admiral Jacques Lanxade, and the German Chief-of-staff, General Klaus Naumann, signed an agreement with NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander Europe, General John M. Shalikashvili, on 21st January 1993, on the use of the European Corps. Belgium signed the SACEUR agreements on 12th October 1993. According to this agreement, the corps may be used by NATO either as a main defence force in Central Europe or as a rapid reaction peacekeeping or peace-making force in the European theatre, covered by the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. Relations between the European Corps and NATO are based on the specific nature of this new multinational European formation, which the participants wished to maintain. Moreover, it should be noted that the European Corps is adapted to the structures and procedures of the alliance, thus confirming it as compatible with NATO and as France’s contribution (in that context) to the strengthening of the European pillar in NATO. As a consequence, in the event of a crisis and under specific circumstances, French troops could be placed under the operational command of NATO. However, such engagement of French troops could take place, after approval by the French authorities, for specific and preliminary-defined missions. In such a case, France would be prepared to participate in the debates of the Military Committee together with the other member states of the European Corps.

(c) Relations with WEU

5. The European Corps was also created with a view to reinforcing the European defence identity, and the forces of the European Corps have been designated as forces answerable to WEU (FAWEU) at the WEU Council’s meeting held in Rome on 19th May 1993. The conditions for WEU’s employment of the European Corps were then agreed on 20th September 1993 in the “joint declaration stating the conditions for the use of the European Corps in the framework of Western European Union”. The joint declaration states that the corps could be subordinated, after a decision of the Council for use, to a command designated by WEU, for which the participating states will set up a joint committee for internal co-ordination. The European Corps can be deployed for all the tasks specified in the Petersberg declaration and its use by WEU would be based on plans formulated by the operation commander designated by WEU, in co-operation with the WEU Planning Cell.
6. The European Corps itself has first call on the units allocated to it intended for joint operations. The joint decision to deploy the European Corps, remains the responsibility of the participating governments. The Joint Committee in charge of carrying out the governments' decisions defines the method and procedures for the deployment and transfer of command of the European Corps for each mission.

7. The missions of the European Corps are the common defence of the allied territory in application of Article 5 of the Treaty of Washington or Article V of the Brussels Treaty. It can also be deployed for peace-restoring and peace-keeping missions, humanitarian and rescue tasks, and tasks of combat forces in crisis-management, missions mentioned in the Petersberg declaration. Furthermore, the European Corps is to serve as the central core structure for European armed forces, to constitute an instrument for the common foreign and security policy and a means of reinforcing the European pillar within NATO.

(e) Composition

8. The first unit assigned to the European Corps was the Franco-German brigade of 5 250 men, operational since 1991, with headquarters in Müllheim. The other national contributions are:

- France: the 1st armoured division with headquarters in Baden-Baden;
- Germany: the 10th armoured division with headquarters in Sigmaringen, composed of the 12th armoured brigade and the 30th mechanised brigade;
- Belgium: the 1st mechanised division with headquarters in Sainr, consisting of the 1st, the 7th and the 17th mechanised brigades;
- Spain: the 21st mechanised brigade based in Córdoba which will join the European Corps in 1995. The Spanish contribution will be completed to a full mechanised division in 1998.

9. Luxembourg intends to integrate a reconnaissance company into the Belgian 1st mechanised brigade.

10. The total strength of the European Corps is presently 50 800 men, spread over the member states as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Strength</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>9 600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>10 300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>18 500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>4 500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Franco-German Brigade</td>
<td>5 250</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(f) Training

11. The first exercise of the European Corps (Pegasus) was held from 7th-17th November 1994 with about 5 000 soldiers from all the participating states, practising interoperability of the corps staff and troops. Pegasus was based on counter-concentration, requiring quick movement of large units over long distances. The ultimate goal of the exercise was deep integration at a high operational level. The exercise has demonstrated that the objective of being operational on 1st October 1995 is feasible.

(g) Problems still to be resolved

12. The creation of the European Corps has caused a number of problems, all of which have not yet been solved satisfactorily. The most worrying is the absence of a juridical and institutional statute for the headquarters. At the moment, transposed NATO texts are used. The present situation affects the operational capability of the European Corps and is leading many observers to wonder whether political willingness will be enough. An even greater problem is the requirement for unanimity on every decision taken in the joint committee. Furthermore, there are difficulties with the heterogeneity of equipment, the lack of appropriate independent logistics, mobility and appropriate mission training, military airlift capability and military transport capacity. In particular, for logistics, communication systems and air transport capacity, the European Corps is still too dependent on the United States.

13. Although it is still in the process of being established, the European Corps has already fulfilled one important task of its mission: it has shown that the resilient and flexible working arrangements between NATO and WEU are capable of extension and expansion.

II. EUROFOR - EUROMARFOR

14. Initially, as discussed at the 20th November 1992 ministerial meeting in Rome, the idea had been to create a trilateral, non-permanent, air-maritime force eventually to be extended with an amphibious capability. At the meeting in Luxembourg on 22nd November 1993, ministers "welcomed and agreed to study the Italian initiative envisaging a multinational groundforce aimed at enhancing the operational significance of the air-maritime initiative ". This ground force would be able to act alone or co-operate with the air-maritime force. At their meeting in Noordwijk (14th November 1994), WEU ministers discussed the progress made by France, Italy and Spain and asked them to present these forces at their ministerial meeting in the spring of 1995.
15. At a WEU ministerial meeting on 15th May 1995, France, Italy and Spain signed the founding documents for the creation of an army joint rapid reaction force (EUROFOR) and a European maritime force (EUROMARFOR) to provide extra security for the Mediterranean at a time of mounting concern over the security situation in the southern Mediterranean.

16. Also on 15th May, Portugal officially made its request to participate in the two forces. Spain, France and Italy have now agreed to Portugal’s participation from the beginning of the establishment of these forces. The United Kingdom has already shown its interest in EUROMARFOR and its possible association in the future is not ruled out.

(a) Goals and missions

17. According to a joint communiqué issued by France, Spain and Italy, the EUROFOR and EUROMARFOR initiatives are meant to contribute to the creation of a military capability for Europe, notably in the field of force projection; create a multinational base structure for member states of WEU that wish to participate in its operations; contribute, while respecting the content of the Petersberg declaration, to initiatives of international organisations, to promote and maintain peace and security.

18. EUROFOR is a large multinational land force of up to a division in strength. It has a rapid reaction capability, easy deployment and can act on its own or together with EUROMARFOR. It will have no permanently-attached units but consists of pre-assigned professional elite units, which are available at short notice.

19. EUROMARFOR is a pre-structured, non-permanent multinational maritime force, with aeronaval and amphibious forces, capable of acting on their own or together with EUROFOR. The composition and structure of the EUROMARFOR will depend on the missions to be performed. A typical composition for certain tasks could be an aircraft-carrier with four to six escort units, a landing force, amphibious forces and a supply ship. EUROMARFOR will have no permanent structures nor a permanent headquarters but will come under rotating command of the participating states. Warships under WEU will be led by a French aircraft-carrier. In each of the participating states, marines will be designated to prepare a possible operation and will co-ordinate with their counterparts. Although some of the problems over how to finance the operations are still to be solved, the two forces will be established as of autumn 1995.

20. The missions for EUROFOR and EUROMARFOR correspond to those set out in the Petersberg declaration: humanitarian and rescue tasks; peace-keeping tasks; tasks of combat forces in crisis-management, including peace-making. It is noted, however, that the fulfilment of these tasks must not involve the participation of these forces in defence missions in the sense of Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty or Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty.

(b) Relations with NATO and WEU

21. For the use of these forces in a trilateral framework, a common decision of the participating states is needed. Their use within the framework of WEU has priority, but they could also be used in the framework of NATO. In preliminary WEU discussions, the United Kingdom had insisted on the two forces being equally available to NATO and WEU, although WEU would have first priority. The British view was endorsed by Italy, which also wishes to avoid any weakening of NATO. As a consequence, NATO would have first call on the new forces should the territory of the alliance be threatened or attacked.

22. An agreement is being prepared on the conditions for the use of these forces in WEU with a view to WEU’s rôle as the defence component of the European Union and as a reinforced pillar of NATO. It is noted that EUROFOR and EUROMARFOR will be declared forces answerable to WEU (FAWEU). A high-level interministerial committee will assure politico-military coordination, establish the conditions for use and provide directives for the command of these two forces. The Permanent Council was charged to specify the relations between WEU and these forces. The two forces are intended to complement the European Corps in its promotion of the operational rôle of WEU.

23. France has already suggested creating multinational and multiservice European intervention forces, under the command of a European general staff.

(c) Structure

24. EUROFOR will have a permanent command with a multinational headquarters in Florence and the capability to perform joint operations. It is expected to have about 5 000 troops with the possibility of being expanded to 10 000. It will be highly mobile and capable of long distance operations. Procedures will be prepared for WEU to use the rapid reaction force. The four participating nations plan to contribute infantry and light artillery units. Although no units will be specifically and permanently attached, they will be directly available for peace-keeping and humanitarian operations. Troops will remain with their national armed forces and be earmarked for WEU when needed for missions undertaken by WEU.
25. The command of EUROMARFOR does not require the creation of new permanent structures. Existing command structures will intensify their co-operation and learn how to co-operate better. In the case of an operation, a joint command will be established under the alternating command of one of the headquarters of the participating states. Other member states of WEU can, if they wish, be admitted to participate in the two forces, after acceptance by the other participants.

(d) Exercises

26. In preparation of the present initiative, France, Italy and Spain have held a number of air-maritime exercises.

27. The first exercise, Farfadet 92, was held in the South of France in 1992. This was only a French-Italian exercise in which Spain participated as an observer. The aim of the exercise was the simulation of a rescue mission, including the removal of residents from conflict zones.

28. The second exercise, Ardente 93, in the last two weeks of October 1993 in central Italy, comprised 10 000 troops from France, Italy and Spain with the participation of six other countries. This was considered the first ever WEU exercise. The main objectives of the exercise included the build-up and transfer of a combined multinational force in an out-of-area operation, command and control in overseas operations, the use of special forces and electronic warfare for intelligence gathering, organisation and conduct of search-and-evacuation operations, the study of rules of engagement.

29. The third exercise was Tramontana 94 with France, Italy and Spain as the main participants, on 14th-25th November 1994, in the southeast of Spain. Further participants were Greece, the Netherlands, Portugal and a battalion of the European Corps. This exercise, comprising 8 000 troops, was also concentrated on the simulation of evacuations in a humanitarian operation.

30. These exercises have already greatly improved co-operation among the air-maritime forces of France, Italy and Spain. The abovementioned exercises demonstrated the lack of ground forces in such operations.

31. In September 1995, the next exercise, Mistral 95, will again be held in the south of France.

III. The Dutch-British amphibious force

32. After having been nationally oriented since the second world war, the Dutch marines corps decided, in 1968, that it was necessary to have the ability to deploy amphibious-trained marines for the benefit of SACLANT. In 1970, the Netherlands realised that within the framework of the Maritime Contingency Force Atlantic it was necessary to co-operate with the British marines, with the British also agreeing that co-operation would be beneficial for the efficiency of both corps. This resulted in modest exercises of both corps in 1971 and 1972.

33. On 9th May 1973, this co-operation was formalised by the signing of the memorandum of understanding (MoU), the officialisation of the Dutch-British amphibious force (UK/NL/AF), the prime example of NATO/European maritime co-operation and often seen as one of the most militarily effective (flexibility and operational effectiveness) multinational European forces. This MoU was re-adapted in 1979, 1987 and is at the moment being revised again.

34. The MoU covers, inter alia, the following aspects: the constituent units of UK/NL/AF and their way of concentration during deployment; command and control; logistic support; common exercises and training in times of peace.

(a) Missions

35. The UK/NL landing force is the land component of the UK/NL/AF and is a lightly-equipped unit which is quickly deployable and which operates independently. The UK/NL/LF is primarily destined for the execution of amphibious operations/landings and prolonged land operations. It is a mobile unit, capable of operations on any type of terrain and under any climatic conditions and, because of that, it is perfectly suited for crisis-management operations anywhere in the world (for example operation Haven, North Iraq, 1991).

36. In the framework of NATO, the UK/NL/LF can be deployed on the northern and southern flank of the territory of NATO and on the Atlantic Islands. With the growing emphasis nowadays on the problems of Southern Europe, the UK/NL/LF has also become available to Commander Allied Forces Mediterranean (CAFMED, when not needed by SACLANT).

(b) Composition

37. The British contribution to the UK/NL/LF is the 3rd Commando Brigade Royal Marines (3 CdoBdeRM, headquarters in Plymouth). The Dutch contribution is formed by units of the group operational units of the marine corps. During operations and exercises the units are placed under the command of the Commander UK/NL/LF.

38. The 3rd Commando Brigade consists of:
   - a headquarters and signals squadron royal marine;
   - three royal marines commandos;
   - a royal marines air squadron (Gazelle helicopters);
the 29th royal artillery commando regiment;
845/846 naval air squadron (NAS);
the 59 independent commando squadron royal engineers;
a commando logistics regiment royal marines;
the 539 assault squadron royal marines.

39. The Dutch units, contributed to the UK/NL/LF, are:
- the 1st marines battalion;
- the 1st mortar company;
- a part of the engineers platoon;
- the anti-aircraft platoon;
a platoon and staff element of the boat company;
a part of the amphibious reconnaissance platoon;
a logistic element.

40. The UK/NL/LF has 5 200 men in times of peace (3 600 British, 900 Dutch).

41. The combat support units are expected to support the manoeuvre units and because the UK/NL/LF is partly deployable by means of helicopters there are certain special requirements for the weapon systems. Support is given by:
- the 29th royal artillery commando regiment with the light 105 mm gun. The 1st Dutch mortar company is integrated in this unit and has the 120 mm mortar;
- air defence troops, which belong to the headquarters and signal squadron RM equipped with the anti-aircraft weapons, in which the Dutch anti-aircraft platoon is integrated and is equipped with the Stinger;
- the 59th independent commando squadron royal engineers, for the engineers support. The Dutch engineers platoon can be integrated in this unit;
- helicopter support (for reconnaissance, command and control and troops support);
- the 539th assault squadron RM, takes care of the transfer of the UK/NL/LF from ship to landing strand, the bigger units of which are landing crafts vehicle and landing crafts utility.

42. Logistic support is provided by the commando logistic regiment RM, which includes a transport squadron, a combat supply group, a medical squadron, a workshop squadron and administrative units. For the transport of supplies, merchant ships are hired in times of peace, and commandeered in times of war. The communication system used in the UK/NL/LF is the British "Clansman" radio-system.

43. The headquarters of the Royal Marines is located in Portsmouth, together with Commandant-General Royal Marines, the Head of the Royal Marines. The Command-General RM falls under CINCFLEET (Commander-in-Chief). The Commander of the Dutch sea forces retains full command over the units of the marines corps during the deployment of the UK/NL/LF. The commander of the commando logistic regiment RM is the deputy brigade commander of the UK/NL/LF.

44. The units of the Dutch marine corps have been fully integrated into the UK/NL/LF. Tactical and logistic procedures have been completely assimilated and the material has been standardised where possible.

(c) Relations with NATO and WEU

45. Within NATO, the UK/NL/LF forms a part of the rapid reaction forces under SACLANT, especially meant for combat crisis situations.

46. The UK/NL/AF is available for possible out-of-area military tasks under the auspices of WEU, as specified by the Petersberg declaration. The UK/NL/AF was declared a force answerable to WEU (FAWEU) at the Rome summit meeting on 19th May 1993. The UK/NL/AF, or part of it, can be deployed after a WEU Council decision to do so and a common decision of both participating countries to place the UK/NL/AF at the disposal of WEU. The deployment of the UK/NL/AF is based on plans formulated by the Planning Cell and the Operational Commander, designated by WEU. To this purpose, the UK/NL/AF regularly provides the Planning Cell with updated information. In the framework of NATO a point of contact provides regularly updated information to CINCFLEET. In the case of an operation, the British and Dutch units are placed under the operational command and control of the Operation Commander. After this transfer of authority, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom retain responsibility for personnel and administrative matters and for logistic support.

(d) Exercises

47. The UK/NL/LF participates every year in the NATO exercise on the northern flank, for which preparational training is held every January to March in Norway. Furthermore the UK/NL/LF takes part in the Combined Amphibious Force Mediterranean (CAFMED) exercises, once or twice a year, in the Mediterranean. Every autumn, the UK/NL/LF takes part in NATO exercises in Norway or Denmark or in the United Kingdom.

48. In the foreseeable future, the UK/NL/LF will participate in the following exercises: Tartan Venture (June 1995), Rolling Deep (September 1995), Mistral (September 1995), Dynamic Mix
(October 1995), Battle Griffin (March 1996), Destined Glory (May 1996).

(e) New developments

49. On 6th April 1995, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands signed an exchange of letters regarding common interests in the area of maritime defence and a reaffirmation and strengthening of co-operation between the two navies in such areas as logistics, personnel, training, research and development, information, hydrography, oceanography etc. It shows the common will of both countries to develop closer links in all naval activities and to contribute to the development of the European common foreign and security policy. The exchange of letters does not alter the many existing MoUs regarding the UK/NL/AF and the navy to navy agreements concerning submarine matters, nor does it prevent the signing of further MoUs, but it seeks to draw them together under a single policy directive.

50. These closer links, to be developed, include:

- closer co-operation between the respective defence departments and the constitution of even closer maritime links;

- closer co-operation between operational and planning staffs and those of their subordinate commanders. Probably this will be further enhanced by the development of a navy to navy letter of intent on closer co-operation in the Caribbean. Co-operation in other areas such as submarine forces is envisaged. Another domain of close co-operation is the regular participation of Royal Netherlands Navy surface ships in all aspects of Royal Navy operational sea training, in exchange for the provision of essential submarine support to flag officer sea training (FOST) under the Portland credit scheme, with permanent Royal Netherlands Navy liaison officers assigned to the FOST staff. The above-mentioned exchange of letters also mentions that further opportunities for co-operation should be investigated;

- exploration of the arrangements on logistic co-operation and co-operation in the domain of equipment are to be encouraged, both on a bilateral and NATO basis. Examples of these arrangements are: the close links between naval support command and the Royal Netherlands Navy; the ties between the defence helicopter support authority and the Royal Netherlands Navy through the Lynx multinational support committee; liaison between the director general fleet support and the Royal Netherlands Navy liaison officer;

- more exchange of personnel and common training;

- extension of research and development and the pooling of knowledge and experience, under the Anglo-Netherlands Joint Naval Committee, created by the Defence Research MoU, 1991;

- enhancement of co-operation by regular and good quality information exchanges in all areas of mutual interest (technical data, doctrine and tactical developments etc.);

- more co-operation between the two respective hydrographic offices.

51. On 6th April 1995, the Secretary of State for Defence of the United Kingdom, Malcolm Rifkind, and the Dutch Minister of Defence, Joris Voorhoeve, also signed a statement of intent on tri-service defence co-operation. It concerns their intention to extend existing co-operation in naval matters to other areas within their organisation, including land and air forces.

IV. The Allied Command Europe
rapid reaction corps (ARRC)

52. In late May 1991, the NATO Defence Planning Committee agreed in principle to create an allied rapid reaction corps (ARRC). This was endorsed at the NATO summit meeting in Rome in November 1991 as a part of NATO's adaptation to the changing strategic security environment and was worked out in the new strategic concept, in which highly-mobile, multinational and flexible forces replace the former linear defence forces of NATO.

53. The ARRC headquarters was officially activated at Bielefeld, Germany, on 2nd October 1992, with the ARRC being officially recognised by General John M. Shalikashvili, Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR). The corps will be able to draw forces from thirteen nations, NATO member states: Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States. In peacetime the ARRC takes its guidance from SACEUR. The ARRC headquarters is an international headquarters directly subordinate to SACEUR and the Commander ARRC (COMARRC), who co-ordinates authority over the divisions, reports to SACEUR and ARRC headquarters. Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) has overall control over the ARRC, a decision to deploy forces must follow the appropriate procedure before SHAPE can commit the ARRC.
54. The United Kingdom, as the framework nation, will always provide the commander of the ARRC, a three-star general. From October 1992 until December 1994, Lieutenant-General Sir Jeremy McKenzie commanded the ARRC. He was replaced in December 1994 by Lieutenant-General M.J.D. Walker.

(a) Missions

55. Within the NATO new strategic concept, the ARRC forms the land component of the Allied Command Europe (ACE) rapid reaction forces. The air and sea elements of this rapid reaction force can operate independently or alongside the ARRC. In support of SACEUR's crisis-management options at short notice, the ARRC has five rôles, in a so-called "ACE-wide-plus-area":

- demonstration of resolve to be prepared for any aggression;
- reinforcement of NATO's main defence forces and of national forces;
- combat rôle in sustained multinational operations up to corps level in case of a major conflict;
- peace support operations (PSOs) in response to regional conflicts or at the request of the United Nations or the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). Such peace support operations will include, amongst others, monitoring tasks, humanitarian assistance and peace-keeping;
- the performance of other related tasks as monitoring, movement control or disarmament verification tasks.

(b) Composition

56. The ARRC has a permanent headquarters, located in Rheindahlen since May 1994. Troops and units assigned to it will be allocated for specific operations as a force package. The ARRC comprises a headquarters staff, combat support units, combat service support units and the assigned divisions. The ARRC force structure includes ten divisions, which fall into the following categories:

- National divisions which consist of formations solely from one nation, the following forces being assigned to the ARRC:
  - Germany: the 7th armoured division with up to three brigades (headquarters in Düsseldorf);
  - United Kingdom: the 1st armoured division (headquarters in Herford), with three brigades;
  - Greece: the 2nd mechanised division (headquarters in Edessa), with two mechanised brigades;
  - Turkey: a Turkish division will be operational within the ARRC in 1995, but the assigned Turkish mechanised brigade and the Turkish armoured brigade are currently already operational;
  - United States: the 1st armoured division (headquarters in Bad Kreuznach), with two armoured and one mechanised brigade;
  - Spain: the fully operational Spanish rapid reaction force (FAR), consisting of a Para brigade, a light aeromobile brigade, a legion brigade and support units.

- Framework divisions, which contain troops from two nations, in which the nation making the major contribution provides the framework. Framework divisions within the ARRC are:
  - The 3rd UK division (headquarters in Bulford) consisting of the 1st and 19th mechanised brigades, the 5th airborne brigade and an Italian brigade, the Ariette armoured brigade;
  - The Italian mechanised division (headquarters near Milan) operational by 1995. It will consist of the Garibaldi brigade, the Legnano brigade and a Portuguese airborne brigade.

- Multinational divisions in which three or more nations make an equal contribution. Multinational divisions within the ARRC are:
  - The multinational division (Central) (MND(C))
    The MND(C) will be an airmobile division comprised of airborne brigades from Belgium and Germany and airmobile brigades from the Netherlands (the 11th brigade) and the United Kingdom (the 24th brigade). The MND(C) headquarters is located in Rheindahlen;
  - The multinational division (South) (MND(S))
    The MND(S) will include a Greek infantry brigade, an Italian airborne brigade and a Turkish commando brigade.

(c) Training

57. Ready to tackle a whole mix of missions, the ARRC had 34 exercises planned for 1994, the most important of which were:
- **Mapex**, 19th-20th January 1994, to study the capacity of ARRC headquarters for possible action of the ARRC in Bosnia-Herzegovina;

- **Arrcade Guard**, a command exercise with some 2,000 troops participating with the objective of validating procedures for deployment to a foreign country under a United Nations mandated peace support operation. A similar Arrcade Guard exercise will be held from 21st to 28th April 1995. The training of the combat troops takes place at national and divisional level.

**(d) Shortcomings of the ARRC**

58. Participants regret the absence of France in the ARRC, but they are aware that France's non-participation in NATO's integrated military structure is an unsurmountable impediment.

59. As for the ARRC itself, it is thought that the disparate nature of the main elements and the fact that its troops are widely dispersed in peacetime will cause problems. The ARRC has no authority to train the forces assigned; it can only request the participating states to provide troops assigned to the ARRC with the appropriate training.

60. Furthermore, it is suggested that the dominance of the United Kingdom within the ARRC (the United Kingdom provides the day-to-day infrastructure, running costs, 60% of the staff and the Commander and the Chief-of-Staff of the ARRC) might one day cause problems. Given its preponderant position in ARRC, it might not be attractive for the United Kingdom to participate in other European armed forces initiatives where it would play a different and most probably less important role. Other European states have in fact reluctantly criticised the dominance of the United Kingdom within the ARRC.

61. Although all nations provide their own logistical support, the ARRC is heavily dependent upon the United States for strategic lift - mostly aircraft and partially shipping - and satellite intelligence. The United Kingdom provides the largest part of long-haul communications with some contributions from other countries.

62. Initially, the ARRC was planned to be operational by 1995, but NATO Headquarters had sufficient confidence in the progress to commit units of the ARRC to peace-keeping duties in Bosnia-Herzegovina as early as summer 1993.

**V. The Dutch-German army corps**

63. On 30th March 1993, the Ministers of Defence of Germany and the Netherlands, Relus Ter Beek and Volker Riße, acting upon NATO's London declaration of July 1990 and Rome declaration of November 1991, signed a common declaration concerning the creation of a multinational corps. The joint declaration announced the creation of a multinational corps, with initially Dutch and German participation as a main defence force, in conformity with the new strategic concept of NATO. The Dutch-German corps will be open to other NATO member states for participation.

64. Although the corps has not yet been made officially available to WEU, units of the corps may be deployed in WEU operations. Joint operations with the European Corps, although it is not a part of the integrated NATO military structure, are not excluded because some of the forces in the European Corps are also earmarked as NATO main defence force units.

65. The headquarters of the Dutch-German army corps, which is located in Münster (Germany) and became operational in March 1995, has a unique, completely integrated corps staff with partial task specialisation, composed of 400 men (50% Dutch, 50% German). The command of the army corps will rotate every three years, the first commander being a Dutchman, Lieutenant-General Ruurd Reitsema. The official language of the corps will be English. The Dutch-German army corps is expected to be operational by the end of August 1995.

**(a) Missions**

66. The Dutch-German army corps is part of the main defence forces of NATO, integrated in NATO's command structures and will come under direct LANDCENT command. When half of the Dutch army was dissolved as a consequence of defence budget cuts, it was decided to merge the remaining forces with German forces so that the Dutch army would still be able to co-operate effectively in military defence operations within NATO. It was also thought that this move, with its ineluctable international obligations, would protect the Dutch army against further budget cuts. The army corps will function only in situations of war; in peacetime it will remain under national command, so that the two countries will be free to use parts of the corps for crisis-management operations within NATO or any other international context.

**(b) Composition**

67. The Dutch-German army corps will be composed of the following units:

- the 1st Dutch division (headquarters in Apeldoorn) consisting of:
  - the 41st light brigade;
  - the 11th airborne brigade;
  - the 13th, the 43rd and the 52nd mechanised brigades.
VI. LANDJUT (Headquarters allied land forces, Schleswig-Holstein and Jutland)

70. NATO's LANDJUT corps is the oldest example of a multinational corps within the NATO organisation. The multinational headquarters - Headquarters Allied Land Forces, Schleswig-Holstein and Jutland (LANDJUT) - located in Rendsburg, Germany, was created in 1962. In the Oslo agreement of 1951, it was decided to form a combined and joint defence headquarters (Baltic Approaches, BALTAP) with two corps, LANDJUT and LANDZEALAND, to protect the critical land area controlling the Baltic approaches and exits.

71. In peacetime LANDJUT is manned only by Danish and German forces (although the headquarters also involves other NATO officers), but in times of war it can be expanded to include forces from Canada, the United Kingdom and the United States. The Commander of LANDJUT, currently the Danish Lieutenant-General Gustav Grünér, reports directly to the Commander Allied Forces Baltic Approaches in Karup, Denmark, who, in turn, in accordance with the new strategic concept of November 1991, reports to the Commander-in-Chief Central Europe (CINCENT, Brunssum). Overall control reverts to the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR).

72. The commander and chief-of-staff rotate in a three-year cycle between Denmark and Germany, the other permanent staff positions are distributed on an equal basis among the nations.

73. There are no formal relations between LANDJUT and WEU. In the summer of 1994, however, the Danish Parliament decided that if WEU made a request to use Danish forces assigned to NATO, it could rely on Denmark's LANDJUT units.

(a) Missions

74. The initial mission of the Commander LANDJUT (COMLANDJUT) was to ensure the flexible forward defence of the territory controlling the Baltic approaches and exits and to deny an attack into the heart of Schleswig-Holstein and Jutland and the Baltic Sea area up to Poland. Possession of the strategically important Baltic approaches is essential for the cohesion of NATO's defence of Europe.

75. With the end of the Warsaw Pact, the need for a strong defence towards Poland has diminished but the collective defence tasks of LANDJUT remain.

(b) Composition

76. The Danish contribution to the LANDJUT corps consists of the armoured infantry Jutland division with headquarters in Frederica, Denmark.

77. Since NATO's increased focus on peacekeeping and crisis-management as indicated in its new strategic concept of November 1991, Denmark reorganised its forces on 1st July 1994 and created a new force, the Danish reaction brigade, its objective being to integrate this force into the ARRC by the end of 1995. The Danish reaction brigade has become a modern, heavy-armoured infantry brigade of about 4,500 men. The most important parts of the reaction brigade are:

- one armoured battalion with among others three tank squadrons, equipped with Leopard 1A5 tanks;
- two mechanised infantry battalions;
- one self-propelled artillery battalion.

78. This Danish reaction brigade does not operate with LANDJUT in peacetime, but in times of war can be allocated to the LANDJUT corps for reinforcement.

79. The German contribution to LANDJUT consists of the 6th armoured infantry division with headquarters in Neumünster (Kiel, Germany), composed of the 7th mechanised brigade (Hamburg, Germany) and the 18th mechanised brigade (Booested, Denmark). Also part of the German contribution is the German defence group 13, a territorial brigade-size formation located at Eutin, Germany, with a defence mission in the forward defence area.

80. Normally, corps combat support and service troops come from both countries with each country supporting its own troops, but exceptionally a
few combined units are to be created. Combined communication systems already exist.

81. The headquarters has a reduced peacetime strength of around 100 men, including officers and non-commissioned officers from Germany, Denmark, Canada, the United Kingdom and the United States. The latter three countries have certain contingency forces earmarked for the area.

82. LANDJUT's left flank neighbour is the Allied Land Forces, Zealnd, in peacetime a national Danish corps command at Rungsted, operating together with the Danish fleet, the Danish airforce and parts of German naval forces. The LANDJUT corps maintains close liaison with these forces as well as with its neighbour to the right, the 1st German corps south of the river Elbe.

(c) Exercises

83. To enhance interoperability, a constant and permanent exercise programme is conducted at all levels from headquarters to the company throughout the year, on German and Danish soil. Every four years, a major live exercise is conducted under the name of Bold Guard, in which, since 1989, American and British naval- and landforces can take part. The exercises are held under the command of the multinational corps headquarters.

(d) Critical points

84. The introduction of external reinforcements from the United Kingdom or the United States into the area brings a number of host nation support problems that only national commands can solve. Furthermore, there is a problem of availability of forces. The German forces are readily available and near their wartime positions but the Danish forces must be partially mobilised and moved to wartime positions.

85. Notwithstanding the abovementioned problems, it is noted that, because of its long experience, the LANDJUT corps has already overcome its most urgent problems including language. Together with the Anglo-Dutch amphibious force and the European Corps, the LANDJUT corps can therefore be considered as the only operational multinational force.

VII. Co-operation initiatives in Belgium and the Netherlands

(a) Belgian-Netherlands naval co-operation

86. On 28th June 1994, the Dutch and Belgian Ministers of Defence, Relus Ter Beek and Leo Delcroix, signed a declaration of common intent on the reinforcement of the Dutch-Belgian naval co-operation in times of peace and war and in times of crisis and tension. The agreement called for both navies to co-operate in operations, logistics, instruction and training. Both countries had severely cut their defence budgets and abolished conscription. The ensuing fundamental review of their naval forces and the standing down of the Belgian navy's maritime command centre at Ostend, further increased their desire to achieve more intensive multinational military co-operation. Some observers consider the initiative as a possible nucleus for closer co-operation between the two nations and even in a wider international context.

87. During the annual meeting of the Ministers of Defence of Benelux, in Alden-Biezzen, Belgium, on 28th March 1995, the current Ministers of Defence of the Netherlands and Belgium, Joris Voorhove and Karel Pinxten, formalised the intent of both countries in an extensive co-operation agreement. Co-operation is intended to be effective on 1st January 1996 and will result in the creation of one of the largest naval forces in NATO.

88. The objective of the Dutch-Belgian naval co-operation is to promote efficiency and better mutual use of existing expertise and means, and to improve operational readiness. The two navies will also operate together in peacetime, possibly outside their territorial waters, which means an extension of the 1951 Admiral Benelux agreement, which only envisaged co-operation in times of war.

89. The 1995 co-operation agreement in particular envisages the following activities:

- the creation of an integrated bi-national operational command staff centre in Den Helder, the Netherlands, jointly manned by Belgian and Dutch officers but it is stipulated that each country retains the possibility of committing its ships to purely national missions or making them available to international organisations. The centre will be under the command of a Benelux Admiral (currently Dutch, Vice-Admiral Luuk Kroon), but it is not excluded that a Belgian naval officer may be assigned this command. The staff will have command of 40 Dutch and about 10 Belgian surface vessels - submarines and naval patrol boats have been excluded. The official languages will be Dutch and French, with English used for operations and procedures within NATO;

- common operation/command of operational fleets;

- adjustment and integration of training and education;
deepening of existing co-operation agreements in matériel and logistics, standardisation of equipment and use of common infrastructure.

90. A very wide range of opportunities for co-operation has been outlined, comprising:

- joint schemes for ocean surveillance;
- greater transparency in procurement plans and in strategic intelligence, the pooling of expertise in ship design and construction and logistic standardisation;
- combined operational exercises;
- joint action in the enforcement of international law and order at sea.

91. The objectives of joint planning and joint exercises are undertaking missions regarding peace-keeping, search and rescue and humanitarian operations.

92. Around the year 2000, the combined Dutch-Belgian fleet is planned to have under its command 19 frigates (16 Dutch and 3 Belgian), 1 landing platform dock (LPD), 4 underway replenishment and command ships, up to 26 mine countermeasure vessels (MCMVs) and support and survey ships. Belgium might contribute one or more amphibious transport ships (LPDs).

(b) The Belgian-Netherlands deployable air task force

93. In June 1994, when Belgium and the Netherlands signed the declaration of common intent on naval co-operation, both parties also stressed the importance of closer co-operation between their air forces. At their meeting in Alden-Biesen, on 28th March 1995, the Ministers Pinxten and Voorhoeve also signed a declaration of intent on the creation of a deployable air task force (DATF), which is meant to be a joint intervention air wing, to be employed first and foremost for peace operations. The division of tasks and the concepts for the use of this force have yet to be defined and a definitive agreement, specifying the different elements of co-operation will, in principle, be signed before 1st January 1996. The idea is to create a force which can be easily adapted to the situation and the tasks to be fulfilled.

94. Both Belgium and the Netherlands think that the creation of this deployable air task force will help them to reduce costs through the use of common and complementary assets, especially in the domain of logistics and command and to improve operational efficiency for common air operations. They also take the view that it could be the first step towards the creation of a Europe-wide partnership of smaller air forces. Depending on the situation, the Benelux wing could be deployed in support of United Nations, WEU, NATO or OSCE sponsored operations.

95. The intent is to maintain the independence of each of the two participating air forces, particularly in policy and planning. It is also thought that this form of co-operation should not be extended too far, given the experience that in general smaller air forces are more productive than larger ones. Force multiplication through collaboration in complementarity is to be preferred.

VIII. The Franco-British Euro air group

(a) Tasks, objective and importance

96. The ministerial announcement of the formation of the Franco-British Euro Air Group (FBEAG), a joint air command, was one outcome of the 17th Anglo-French summit meeting at Chartres on 18th November 1994. The framework agreement, a formal agreement regarding the creation of the FBEAG, is currently in the final stages of drafting.

97. The new air group is in fact a planning and co-ordination cell with no aircraft permanently allocated to it, which could designate, if need be and on a case-by-case base, the best adapted combat or transport squadrons of the two countries to participate in operations and exercises. It will be responsible for preparing requirements and procedures for combat and transport missions and common use of assets in combined out-of-area and non-NATO-Article 5 peace-keeping and humanitarian operations which are compatible with missions mentioned in the Petersberg declaration.

98. The FBEAG constitutes an operational cell for distributing assignments between French and British fliers and drawing forces from existing units, in the framework of combined operations set up on short notice, with the respective forces remaining under national command. These operations will be conducted either bilaterally or possibly under the auspices of WEU. At Chartres, it was stated that other European Union air forces could join the group at a later stage.

99. At this stage, the political interest of this initiative is far more important than its military significance. Apparently, on the one hand, France has started to attach more importance to co-operation in military planning, while, on the other hand, the United Kingdom is showing more interest in European initiatives and a greater commitment to European defence. Moreover, the FBEAG constitutes the first joint military initiative between the only two European countries capable of significantly projecting their military power overseas.

100. It is expected that ties will be developed with WEU and probably also with NATO, as the United Kingdom has stressed the complementarity of the FBEAG to NATO. The FBEAG is planned to be operational by 1st September 1995.
(b) Structure

101. France and the United Kingdom have agreed to establish a permanent staff of ten senior officers (five from each nation) at the Royal Air Force base at High Wycombe. The first director of the FBEAG will be a French two star general, combining this task with his duties in the French national air force. His deputy will be a British one star air commodore, who will combine this task with his assignment at Strike Command. These posts will alternate between the two nations.

102. The permanent staff will have a chief of staff and a deputy with the rank of colonel or group captain, again one from each nation and alternating between the two nations. Serving under their command there will be four staff officers from each nation, specialised in operational and logistical matters, who will be tasked with making both air forces complementary and inter-operational. Overarching control will be in the hands of a steering group at ministerial or Chief of Defence staff level. A lower level working group will deal with the day-to-day activities of the FBEAG.

103. The staff will be able to draw forces from any unit of the two countries air forces, including transport aircraft, maritime patrol aircraft, offensive airpower and communications or troops to establish and guard ground bases. The FBEAG may also be able to call on naval aircraft.

IX. Affiliation of the Danish reaction brigade and the 1st United Kingdom armoured division

104. After the restructuring of the Danish forces and the creation of the Danish reaction brigade which started in October 1993, discussions began on how to integrate this reaction brigade into NATO and especially into the ARRC. In order to enable it to carry out a broad spectrum of international missions, the Danish reaction brigade pursued co-operation with forces of other NATO member states. It was thought that after Germany, to which Danish forces were already closely linked in the LANDJUT corps, the United Kingdom, in view of its geographical proximity, was the next logical co-operation partner.

105. On 13th December 1994, the Danish Chief of Staff of the armed forces, General J. Lyng, and his counterpart from the United Kingdom, Field Marshal Sir Peter Inge, signed a letter of intent on the affiliation between the Danish reaction brigade and the 1st UK armoured division. This affiliation is intended to lead to the establishment of a divisional formation within the framework of the 1st UK armoured division, to be part of NATO’s ARRC as from 1st January 1996. In case of activation of the ARRC, the Danish brigade will be practically integrated into the British division, which will facilitate and simplify command in the ARRC.

(a) Missions

106. The Danish and British forces are expected to co-operate in support of the ARRC’s missions which are, as mentioned in paragraph 17 of this report: demonstration of resolve, reinforcement of main defence, combat and peace support operations such as humanitarian assistance and peace-keeping.

107. There is still doubt about whether the Danish reaction brigade will be able to implement missions outside NATO’s treaty area in Central and Eastern Europe.

(b) Composition

108. The 4 500-strong Danish reaction brigade comprises amongst others one armoured battalion, two mechanised infantry battalions and one self-propelled artillery battalion. The 1st United Kingdom armoured division consists of the 4th, 7th and 20th armoured brigades.

109. Since these forces are only affiliated there is no joint headquarters, only an exchange of liaison officers. There is no common commander and both countries support their own troops, without a pre-established support co-operation system. Logistical support provision is also separate. There might be integration in transport and communications, the Danish headquarters company is linked to British communication systems.

(c) Relations with NATO and WEU

110. In view of the loose structure of the Danish-British affiliation, there was no need for any formal agreement with NATO in the ARRC framework. Provisions have been made for some form of command co-operation in case of combined deployment of the affiliated Danish and British forces. Only in this case does the Danish commander report to the British commander, otherwise command is separated. There is no permanent infrastructural co-operation.

111. Unlike the Danish brigade, the 1st United Kingdom armoured division is also available for WEU missions. It is, however, noted that the Danish Parliament has decided that Denmark will not withdraw its forces if WEU "borrows" forces from NATO in which Danish forces participate. The Danish reaction brigade participating in British exercises in Germany under the control of the ARRC have already demonstrated a perfect symbiosis.
X. Two German-American corps

112. On 25th February 1993, the then American Secretary of Defence, Les Aspin, and the German Minister of Defence, Rühe, agreed in Washington on the creation of two German-American corps, which were constituted on 22nd April 1993 in Giebelstadt in the neighbourhood of Würzburg, to increase the number of multinational military units in Central Europe. These corps were created as a central element of NATO's new main defence force. It is recalled here that NATO's new strategic concept called for smaller, more flexible, and more mobile forces. Initially, co-operation was limited to the exchange of headquarters officers, but in May 1994 it was decided to give both corps a multinational structure.

(a) Composition

113. The two German-American corps are: the 2nd German-US corps (53 000 men) and the 5th US-German corps (56 000 men), each being a so-called framework corps with a "lead nation".

114. The 2nd German-US corps comprises the 2nd German corps based in Ulm and the 1st US armoured division (18 000 men) based in Bad Kreuznach. The 2nd German corps which is also available to the Multinational Division Central and Allied Command Europe (ACE) Mobile Forces-Europe, consists of two divisions: the 10th tank division, located in Sigmaringen (18 000 men) which is also part of the European Corps and the 1st Mountain division, located in Munich (17 000 men).

115. The 5th US-German corps comprises the 5th US corps based in Frankfurt and the 5th German mechanised division (19 000) based in Mainz. The 5th US corps consists of two divisions, the 3rd mechanised division (18 500 men) and the 1st armoured division (18 500 men) both based in Bad Kreuznach. The 1st US armoured division is also assigned to the ARRC; the United States decides at the critical moment which mission the division will have.

116. The staffs of both corps will, in principle, retain their national structures but it is understood that for exercises and operations in the framework of NATO, the 1st US armoured division and the 5th German mechanised division will be subordinated to the 2nd German-US corps and the 5th US-German corps, respectively, with joint staff for planning and command. The subordinated divisions are expected to have their own support and logistics means, intelligence and the decision for deployment is taken under national authority.

(b) Difficulties in co-operation

117. Co-operation within the two German-US corps may face some problems as a result of dissimilarities between the forces of the two countries. For example, the United States force is a professional force which is fully available at any given time, while German forces depend on conscripts and receive their general and special tasks during deployment within alliances. This basic dissimilarity affects advanced planning co-ordination between the two forces.

118. There are several structural differences, such as the fact that the 5th US corps includes an armoured brigade and an engineer brigade, units which are no longer part of the 2nd German corps. Furthermore, it is noted that the 1st US armoured division is better equipped, more readily available and more easily deployed, because of its helicopter brigade, than the German units which are, in general, less mobile. Also, the two corps are dependent on the United States for the constitution of reserves. These differences in forces could also frustrate their mobility and flexibility.

(c) Exercises

119. The technical arrangement, signed on 14th June 1994, improved the willingness for deployment and both bi-national corps have declared that they are prepared to subscribe to field standing operation procedures (FSOP). The degree of interoperability will be tested for the first time in a framework exercise of the 2nd German-US corps to be held in the Spring of 1995.

XI. The combined joint task forces (CJTF)

120. At their meeting in Luxembourg, on 22nd November 1993, WEU Ministers, aware of the need to allow for specific European military operations outside the cases of collective defence specified under Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, looked to the NATO summit meeting to endorse the principle that WEU should be able to use not only European allies' forces and resources, but also collective assets of the Atlantic Alliance such as communication systems, command facilities and headquarters.

121. The NATO summit meeting held in Brussels on 10th and 11th January 1994 then responded to the requests made by WEU Ministers in Luxembourg. It endorsed the concept of combined joint task forces "as a means to facilitate contingency operations, including operations with participating nations outside the alliance". It directed the North Atlantic Council with the advice of the NATO military authorities to develop this concept and establish the necessary capabilities. In the communiqué it was also said that "The Council, with the advice of the NATO military authorities, and in co-ordination with WEU, will work on implementation in a manner which provides separable but not separate capabilities that could be
employed by NATO or WEU”. The CJTF concept was the result of co-operation between the United States Department of State and the Pentagon, witnessing United States support for WEU employment of NATO assets and a further development of a European security and defence identity.

122. The CJTF proposal aimed at a flexible and efficient multinational, tri-service headquarters capability for non-Article 5 contingency operations, facilitating the use of NATO collective assets by WEU, should NATO choose not to act, preventing useless duplication. It concerns short-term, quick reaction multinational (combined) and multiservice (joint) self-contained contingency elements within NATO, which on the basis of an ad hoc North Atlantic Council decision could be detached for certain missions and put under the command of WEU should NATO choose not to participate in an operation. The idea is to create a stand-by capability for out-of-area operations, including conflict-prevention, peace-keeping, humanitarian aid and peace-enforcement, drawing elements from AFNORTHWEST, AFNORTHWEST and AFNORTHWEST. According to the original concept, nations outside the alliance could participate.

123. It is thought that WEU would, in particular, use CJTF for humanitarian and rescue tasks, peace-keeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis-management, including peace-making, as outlined in the Petersberg declaration of June 1992.

124. Since early 1994, the implementation of the CJTF concept has been discussed at three levels under the authority of the North Atlantic Council and in co-operation with the military authorities of NATO. At the Military and Political Committee level, the Provisional Policy Co-ordination Group (PPCG), is treating questions such as the role of SACEUR, the activation process of CJTF, etc. At the major NATO command level, under the command of SACEUR, the Military Transition Issue Working Group is examining operational aspects for CJTF command and control and harmonisation of the positions of member states, while the Allied Command Europe (ACE) and Allied Command Atlantic (ACLANT) are studying the procedures, training and equipment aspects. Finally, a co-ordination group at SHAPE is discussing the composition and designation of potential CJTF forces, though this might also be possible on an ad hoc basis. WEU has established a special CJTF political-military working group and authorised the Planning Cell to take part in the working group’s weekly working meetings and support its work. The terms of reference for this group were approved by the Council on 15th March.

(a) Command and control

125. The basic idea of the CJTF concept is to maintain the original objectives of NATO, while adapting it to the new security environment. Collective defence of the territory of the alliance, preservation of the transatlantic character and continuation of the integrated military structure of the alliance remain NATO’s priorities. CJTF will therefore be separable but never separate from NATO’s structures.

126. The command and control of CJTF should, in particular, enable it to provide timely responses out-of-area, ensure smooth co-ordination between NATO and WEU and accommodate staff from participating non-NATO members. Such operations will require the assimilation of intelligence, logistics and management, reception and commitment of forces and maintenance of communication at all levels.

127. The CJTF headquarters will be hosted by one of the eight NATO major subordinate commands (MSC), AFNORTHWEST, AFNORTHWEST or AFNORTHWEST in the case of ACE, which might task subordinate commands to provide assets and might receive resources from other MSCs, with the commanders reporting directly to the MSC. Both ACE and Allied Command Atlantic (ACLANT) will develop capabilities for possible CJTF operations. NATO keeps insisting that CJTF lines of command always lead back to the major NATO command responsible for Article 5 defence in the region, taking the view that any CJTF operation could escalate a straight-forward NATO Article 5 operation to defend allied territory. For WEU-led CJTF, procedures will be established to recall forces under NATO in the case of territorial collective defence.

(b) CJTF under WEU

128. There are three possibilities for the employment of CJTF; purely under NATO, a NATO-plus CJTF including forces from non-NATO member states and a CJTF under WEU.

129. After a unanimous decision of the North Atlantic Council, a CJTF headquarters and support could be provided, on an ad hoc basis, to WEU, which can ask for contributions from its members, observers, associate members and associate partners, altogether 27 states. It should be noted here again that the essential shortcoming of WEU in case of military operations remains the absence of a political-military structure within WEU. For the European Corps, however, an adequate political-military structure has been created and this force could therefore carry out a CJTF mission, obtaining those elements from NATO which the European Corps is lacking (logistics, communication systems, air transport capacity,
airlift and sealift), acting under the aegis of WEU. A solution must still be found for the participation of France in CJTF, given the fact that it does not participate in NATO's integrated military structure. Different proposals are now being discussed but the problem has not yet been solved.

130. In the discussion about CJTF, the question of which units will participate in a task force, has not been discussed because most of the parties expect that this will be solved without too many problems. For the Europeans, the CJTF remains an essential tool for building up the European security and defence identity (ESDI).

131. After stating the importance of CJTF in the Kirchberg declaration (9th May 1994), WEU has worked out a report on the criteria and modalities for effective use of the CJTF which was presented to NATO on 29th June 1994.

132. Once the North Atlantic Council has decided to provide WEU with a CJTF, NATO will select CJTF headquarters elements (including support assets) from one of its MSCs and prepare it for deployment, the control of which will at a certain moment be given to WEU. The forces will come from WEU member states maintaining forces answerable to WEU (FAWEU) such as the European Corps, the United Kingdom-Netherlands Amphibious Force and the Multinational Division Central. Co-ordination between CJTF and FAWEU, and possibly their integration, would simplify force generation processes and arrangements.

133. An important issue on this field will be the role of SACEUR and of SACLANT. Given the fact that SACEUR is a United States General, at present Lieutenant-General Jouliwan, many Europeans are concerned that in a WEU operation, supported with CJTF, ultimate military decision-making would be in American hands. France, in particular, has problems in accepting the day-to-day planning function of SACEUR, in which it does not want to participate since this function is part of NATO's integrated military structure.

134. Recent declarations by the United States that the CJTF cannot count on logistic support from NATO if the CJTF are not placed under the military command of NATO, because of its concern for escalation into Article 5 operations, have provoked especially French opposition. None of this changes the fact that the European political-military structure for a CJTF under WEU command is inadequate. Joint military planning capabilities will have to be developed and WEU's operational headquarters strengthened. The CJTF concept does not provide for the automatic availability of assets; WEU will therefore have to retain its autonomous planning capability and should continue to develop a credible operational rôle. In this regard especially the rôle of the WEU Planning Cell has to be developed further so as to serve more as the intended motor for exclusively European military operations. As long as WEU lacks its own command/staff/military command structures, questions about military control remain premature.

(c) Advantages of CJTF

135. The implementation of the CJTF proposal may help NATO to adapt its command and force structure in line with the requirements of the alliance's strategic concept. First of all, it could make current NATO procedures and structures more flexible, simplify communication links and rationalise mobilisations, also because it will increasingly rely on experienced, well-trained units. The possibility of employing "coalitions of the willing", with some countries participating and others not, certainly increases flexibility in the use of forces, but it is thought that, in decision-making, the unanimity rule in the North Atlantic Council will not be abandoned under any circumstances.

136. Second, CJTF may help to reinforce the European security and defence identity (ESDI), avoiding duplication which might cause waste and damaging competition. It is also a clear demonstration of the United States' determined support for the development of the ESDI.

137. A third advantage, not to be neglected, is the possibility of conducting operations with participating nations outside the alliance. Earlier experience in ad hoc operations such as the Gulf war and the enforcement of the embargo in the Adriatic Sea have proved the feasibility of the CJTF concept. At present, there is an urgent requirement for smaller, more flexible and detachable headquarters, which can be reinforced with different NATO assets according to the circumstances. As a consequence, there is a need to draft possible contingency plans, indicating the operational and material requirements for different circumstances.

138. Fourth, CJTF may be a tool to engage both France and Spain in NATO's military planning process for certain contingency operations.

(d) Problems concerning the implementation of CJTF

139. After sixteen months of intensive discussions in many different working groups, task forces and committees, it has become quite clear that implementation of the CJTF idea is even more complicated than it was thought to be at the moment of its conception. In the following paragraphs, some of the problems encountered will be reviewed.
140. First of all, negotiators have noted that the notion of joint or multiservice activities, one of the foundations of CJTF, is not yet widely accepted in the armed forces activities. The fact that joint activities are supposed to include mobilisation, interoperability of on-hand communications and intelligence, airlift, sealift, transport and multiservice preparation and planning, shows the range and complexity of the concept. Notwithstanding the extended efforts made so far, the implementation of CJTF is still at a preliminary stage. Basic elements such as a financial framework and a command and control system for combined and joint forces and for ground force missions are still lacking.

141. The CJTF concept is still a semi-official project and until now work has been developing on this semi-official basis, still awaiting a command system, control of combined and joint forces and missions for ground forces. Another important deficiency in this regard is the lack of a financial system.

142. Some key allies have diverging views on the required interface between political and military decision-making authorities. In particular, the level of political control over military operations to attain a politically decided objective are subject to discussion.

143. The role of SACEUR in CJTF operations is another vital issue. The European allies would not like SACEUR, under present arrangements always a United States General, to have the ultimate military decision-making authority over CJTF when it operated under WEU. They consider CJTF to be an element to reinforce the European security and defence identity. Ultimate control by NATO’s SACEUR would in fact subordinate WEU operations with CJTF to United States control and considerably limit Europe’s opportunities to conduct military operations independently.

144. The United States, however, will never allow its own assets, or those of the alliance, to be used in a non-NATO CJTF framework without the possibility of exerting control. Nor will the United States allow any infringement of NATO’s integrated military structure.

145. Will CJTF cause a radical reorganisation of NATO’s integrated military structure? Some member states, France in particular, seem to take the view that the creation of CJTF makes little sense if it not accompanied by a thorough reorganisation of NATO’s integrated military structure and a flexible system to provide those assets needed for operations under European command. Others, in particular Denmark and the United Kingdom, have made it clear that CJTF should not lead to any infringement of NATO’s integrated military structure and command, which they regard as a guarantee of United States military presence in Europe and a prerequisite for the continuation of the transatlantic link.

146. If the allies succeed in establishing CJTF which are substantial enough to provide European-led operations with the assets which are present in the European inventory, such as satellite intelligence, logistics and strategic airlift, the question will arise as to whether this might not diminish the incentive for Europeans to develop and acquire their own independent strategic assets. In other words, CJTF intended to reinforce the European security and defence identity, could ultimately result in weakening it.

147. For the security and defence of their territory, Western Europe’s NATO member states have always relied on the strategic assets of the United States. The development of a European security and defence identity is meant to enable Europe to assume greater responsibility in this field. It was finally endorsed by the United States because it was, and still is, thought that an economically strong Europe should also pay for its own defence and security.

148. The CJTF idea was conceived to fill the deficiencies in Europe’s operational capabilities and enable European allies to carry out contingency operations should NATO choose not to act. This is a useful and rational procedure in the present times of transition. It would fail in its purpose if it led to ultimate United States decision-making authority over non-Article 5 European contingency operations. At the same time, it should not deter European allies from acquiring their own strategic assets which, in the long term, should enable them to develop and implement their own security and defence policy.

XII. Conclusions

149. Taking into account the many initiatives in recent years to create bilateral or multilateral forces and to adapt existing forces to new missions and structures, there is a clear determination, especially among WEU member states, to adapt their forces in order to meet the challenges of a new security environment.

150. It should be noted, however, that the new patterns of co-operation are not only the result of decisions taken in the framework of NATO or WEU. One other compulsory reason was, and still is, that reductions in defence budgets and armed forces in a number of member states have been so drastic that there has been no alternative to more intensive co-operation with other nations if the effectiveness of what was left of their armed forces was to be maintained.
151. At the same time, one cannot avoid feeling that the overall result of the many different initiatives, some bilateral, others tri- or multilateral, somehow lacks coherence.

152. The implementation of the CJTF concept decided eighteen months ago, and considered essential for specific European military contingency operations where NATO chooses not to act, leaves much to be desired. Negotiations clearly seem to be at a dead end. The WEU Council should devote its every effort to urge NATO to implement the CJTF concept by the end of 1995. On the other hand, European allies will have to realise that, whether the CJTF concept is implemented or not, they will not be able to rely eternally upon others for their security.

153. In the near or more distant future, WEU should possess in its own right a number of strategic assets, in particular strategic military transport, a satellite observation system and military headquarters.

154. Finally, United Nations operations in Somalia, Rwanda and Bosnia-Herzegovina have clearly demonstrated that the United Nations chain of command, even after recent improvements, is a failure, causing unacceptable risks for military units involved in such operations. In the future, European units operating in contingency situations under the aegis of the United Nations should rely upon WEU headquarters.

155. Apparently, there is an urgent need to organise a summit meeting of heads of state and of government of WEU member states to examine European security and more particularly the need to co-ordinate means, policies and multinational co-operation in order to organise effective joint defence.
RAPID REACTION FORCES (LAND)

XXX

COMMAND FORCES = OPCOM

ASSIGNED FORCES = COORDINATING AUTHORITY

21/07/94

ARRC2/15/01 JUN94

XXX : Corps
XX : Division
X : Brigade
TPS : Troops
MECH : Mechanised
PARA : Parachute
ARM : Armoured
AIRM(O) : Air mobile
INF : Infantry
CDO : Command
A HEL : Attack helicopter
PAR : Rapid reaction force
AVN : Aviation
MND(C) : Multinational division central
MND(S) : Multinational division south
ON : Other (NATO) nations
OPCOM : Operational command
MC : Military Committee (NATO)
TBC : To be confirmed

(1) SP contributions within the framework of coordination agreements and MC 313.
(2) Dual role in Central Region with GE Corps.
(3) Subject to contingency plans.
(4) Operational 1995. Assignment TBC.