



Assembly of Western European Union

DOCUMENT 1483

6th November 1995

FORTY-FIRST ORDINARY SESSION

(First Part)

WEAG: the course to be followed

REPORT

submitted on behalf of the Technological and Aerospace Committee
by Mrs. Guirado and Lord Dundee, co-Rapporteurs

WEAG: the course to be followed

REPORT ¹

*submitted on behalf of the Technological and Aerospace Committee ²
by Mrs. Guirado and Lord Dundee, co-Rapporteurs*

TABLE OF CONTENTS

DRAFT RECOMMENDATION

on WEAG: the course to be followed

EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM

submitted by Mrs. Guirado and Lord Dundee, co-Rapporteurs

- I. Introduction
- II. The institutional framework and armaments co-operation policy: historical background
 - (a) FINABEL
 - (b) The Standing Armaments Committee (SAC)
 - (c) Eurogroup
 - (d) Independent European Programme Group (IEPG)
 - (e) The reactivation of WEU
 - (f) The transfer of the Independent European Programme Group to WEU: birth of the Western European Armaments Group (WEAG)
- III. Armaments procurement and situation of the defence industry in Europe
 - (a) Budgetary constraints of military policy in Europe
 - (b) Characteristics of the defence industry in Europe
 - (c) Disparities between countries
 - (d) European co-operation in armaments
- IV. WEAG
 - (a) Aims and operation
 - (b) The work of the panels: preparation of and assistance in decision-making
 - (i) Panel I
 - (ii) Panel II
 - (iii) Panel III

1. Adopted unanimously by the committee.

2. *Members of the committee:* Mr. López Henares (Chairman); MM. *Lenzer, Marshall* (Vice-Chairmen); MM. *Arata, Atkinson, Biefnot, Mrs. Blunck, MM. Cherribi, Coviello, Curto, Mrs. Durrieu, Mr. Feldmann* (Alternate: *Kriedner*), Mrs. *Gelderblom-Lankhout, Mrs. Guirado, MM. Jeambrun, Le Grand, Litherland* (Alternate: *Alexander*), *Lorenzi, Magginas, Nania, Poças Santos, Probst, Sarens, Sofoulis, Theis, Sir Donald Thompson, Mr. Valleix.*

Associate member: Ms. *Jørgensen.*

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

V. The European Armaments Agency (EAA)

- (a) General
- (b) The European Armaments Agency: form and substance
- (c) The Franco-German initiative

VI. Conclusions

APPENDICES

I. WEAG structure

II. The European defence industry – an agenda item for the 1996 intergovernmental conference: executive summary

Draft Recommendation***on WEAG: the course to be followed***

The Assembly,

- (i) Considering that the security and defence of Europe as provided for in the Treaty on European Union call for independent military means and that this necessarily depends upon an independent European defence industry which is competitive at world level;
- (ii) Noting the shrinking armaments market, greater competition in this area and the increased cost of military equipment, particularly due to technological evolution;
- (iii) Noting that Europe has an advanced defence industry but which has a surplus capacity and also suffers from poor co-ordination of efforts in research and development, technology and production;
- (iv) Drawing a comparison between the European defence industry and the American industry which both need the backing of a large domestic market to amortise investments in research and development, production and industrialisation in economic conditions acceptable to national budgets;
- (v) Noting that three countries, France, Germany and the United Kingdom, have 80% of the defence industry capabilities in Europe;
- (vi) Taking into account, however, the fact that no country in Europe can now hope to maintain an industry which alone would be capable of satisfying all its military requirements;
- (vii) Believing that the defence industry should be improved and restructured at national and European level in order to encourage transnational European firms;
- (viii) Considering that the need for European co-operation in armaments matters is based on political, military, economic and industrial reasons which are still topical and are today more pertinent and imperative than ever;
- (ix) Believing that at the present time the strengthening of European co-operation in armaments matters is an essential condition for maintaining a European defence industry which must form the basis of the future European defence system which it is destined to serve;
- (x) Taking into account the fact that the revision of national military policies and the consequential restrictions made in the armed forces of the various countries are a direct and immediate effect of the disappearance of the Soviet threat accompanied by a widespread financial crisis, which justifies a more or less general reduction in national defence budgets;
- (xi) Pointing out that these budgetary reductions, coming at a time when defence policies have to be defined, are based more on financial considerations than on reasons of security and defence;
- (xii) Recalling that many efforts have been made by Europe in the last forty years in regard to armaments co-operation but not much real progress has yet been made;
- (xiii) Recalling, inter alia, the Rome declaration of 1984 whose aims include “ the development of European co-operation in the field of armaments, in respect of which WEU can provide a political impetus ”, that the declaration by the WEU member countries annexed to the Treaty on European Union refers to the need for enhanced co-operation in the field of armaments “ with the aim of creating a European armaments agency ” and that the Noordwijk declaration notes that the elaboration of a European armaments policy is based, on the one hand, on the activities developed by the Western European Armaments Group (WEAG) and, on the other, on studies pursued for creating a European armaments agency and on the conclusions of the informal group of government experts of member states of WEU-WEAG and of the European Union which has just studied the options for a European armaments policy;
- (xiv) Considering that the transfer to WEU of the IEPG, now WEAG, is a consequence of the wishes set out in the preceding paragraph;
- (xv) Considering that WEAG is the most suitable body to encourage a European defence identity, particularly because it covers all the activities linked to armaments which are considered complementary and should be developed in a coherent manner, i.e. the harmonisation of requirements, programmes in co-operation, research and development and procurements policy;

- (xvi) Considering that co-operation between state and industry is the surest means of creating a strong European domestic market;
- (xvii) Considering that co-operation is more effective when started at the development stage or even at the stage of research and that, consequently, it requires a true effort to harmonise operational requirements between states which WEU does not seem to be able to achieve at present in the absence of strong political impetus;
- (xviii) Considering that the resources attributed to research, development and technology by the European governments are three to four times lower than the resources granted by the United States Government for these activities and that this disparity is widening further;
- (xix) Believing that, in spite of current progress, the EUCLID programme has structural weaknesses and is thus encountering competition from bi- or trilateral co-operation which is easier to manage;
- (xx) Considering that surplus production capacity should be eliminated wherever it exists, some diversion of capacity, however, should be preserved in Europe insofar as the vital interests of sovereign nations have to be taken into account;
- (xxi) Regretting that measures to open European defence equipment markets are not being applied in practice and exist only as declarations of intent;
- (xxii) Considering, however, that the systematic application of fair return is an economic handicap which increases costs and surplus production capacities;
- (xxiii) Noting the difficulty which the various countries have in reaching agreement on delicate questions such as competition, the creation of a defence industry and technology base, the backing to be given to smaller countries and regulations governing procurement;
- (xxiv) Gratified that the priorities of Panel III include the strengthening of the European defence industry and technology base, the aim of which is not to wage a war against the United States but to have a competitive European defence industry at world level;
- (xxv) Emphasising the importance of competition between WEAG and the European defence industries represented by EDIG for strengthening the industrial and technological basis of European defence;
- (xxvi) Regretting, nevertheless, the absence of a true partnership between the NADs and EDIG and the absence of an answer from national authorities to the EDIG memorandum on the 1996 intergovernmental conference;
- (xxvii) Finally, regretting that the NADs, at their meeting on 20th October 1995, failed to reach agreement on the creation of a European armaments agency;
- (xxviii) Noting that at that meeting the NADs preferred not to give an opinion on the creation of a Franco-German co-operative structure, believing that this decision was a matter for defence ministers at their meeting in Madrid on 13th November,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Concerning the WEAG Panels:

Panel I

- establish closer relations between Panel I and the Eurolongterm sub-group allowing members to establish contact and remain in contact with the national representatives of Eurolongterm in order to improve the interaction and exchange of information;
- redefine the terms of reference of Eurolongterm;
- encourage countries to present their equipment replacement schedules in an authentic manner at equipment review meetings;
- facilitate the assistance of land, sea and air experts from each country in equipment review meetings in order to maximise the chances of success of projects identified as potential;

- reflect on the means of achieving the goal of a ten-year plan, updated yearly, for equipping European armed forces, at least for the major programmes;
- encourage and institutionalise the harmonisation of operational requirements in order to identify those which are suitable for the achievement or use of common equipment, taking into account the need to harmonise military requirements as early as possible, at the research or development stage;
- envisage the drafting of a white paper identifying defence requirements of European countries in order to allow them to produce equipment in conformity with joint requirements insofar as possible;
- establish permanent committees between the sub-groups of Panel I and the corresponding CEPA steering committees;
- strengthen relations between Panels I and III insofar as questions linked to fair return, offsetting and competition, which are obstacles to agreement on the establishment of an efficient European defence equipment market, are of direct interest to Panel I;

Panel II

- decide to give greater autonomy to the Research Cell by giving it the status of subsidiary body of WEU (passage to step 2) which would allow it to award and follow up contracts;
- envisage, as soon as the Western European Armaments Organisation is created, including the EUCLID cell in that body in order to give the agency an operational activity and new impetus to the EUCLID programme;
- envisage the possibility for the EUCLID cell, once it has an independent budget, to work out a research and development plan on the basis of military requirements extending beyond the present responsibilities of the WEU Planning Cell and of Eurolongterm;
- seek and apply means of rectifying EUCLID's weaknesses by shortening timescales, streamlining procedure and facilitating negotiations;
- take into account in the EUCLID programme the subjects of research identified in the other co-operation agreements and frameworks which exist between the WEAG countries;
- decide to launch a study on the basis of the one proposed by EDIG on the identification of technologies considered to be priority for the defence of WEAG countries;
- multiply and intensify relations between Panel II and EDIG on the basis of mutual confidence;
- arrange for the Eurofinder machinery, which would allow EUCLID to evolve, to become operational at the beginning of 1996;

Panel III

- encourage the creation of European standards for an open market;
- reflect on the preparation and final shape of a type of contract to cover procurements in the framework of the European armaments agency;
- decide that the WEAG panels no longer work on a voluntary basis but be composed of permanent members with full responsibility for the work of those panels in order to gain in terms of time, efficiency and continuity;

finally, encourage the establishment of more sustained relations between the various panels and the ad hoc group, in view of the complementarity and coherence of the work pursued in WEAG;

2. Create a committee of chiefs of staff as a necessary framework for identifying requirements and joint equipment;

3. Plan a variable geometry European armaments agency which would associate on the one hand in a wider framework the thirteen countries to which would apply a set of general rules and regulations and, on the other hand, in a more restricted framework, countries likely to agree on specific rules, and ensure that this organisation uses the complementarity of Community and intergovernmental blocs, taking into account the fact that the Commission has financial ways and means which could be of benefit to the defence industry in Europe;

4. Specify ways and means of creating the European projects offices;
5. Study changes to the concept of fair return by means of intelligent compensatory measures or economic spin-off, particularly through a policy of existing areas of interest leading to specialisation;
6. Promote the definition of a European defence industry and technology base;
7. Establish a true partnership between the national armaments directors and EDIG;
8. Urge national authorities to answer the EDIG memorandum on the 1996 intergovernmental conference;
9. Give its views on the creation of a Franco-German structure for co-operation, taking into account the fact that this initiative is not competitive but complementary.

Explanatory Memorandum

(submitted by Mrs. Guirado and Lord Dundee, co-Rapporteurs)

I. Introduction

1. The idea of giving Europe an institutional framework for promoting European co-operation in armaments is not new. After the end of the second world war and the establishment of the western defence alliances, WEU and NATO, armaments co-operation became a permanent goal, progress towards which through many initiatives is, as we shall see later, proving both tortuous and limited.

2. To the political and military reasons originally underlying these ideas, which are still fully relevant today, must be added other economic and industrial factors which the present situation has helped to make more significant.

3. The choice of Western European countries to use high technology to improve the performance of weapons systems has led to steady increases in the cost of procurement and possession of armaments. Moreover, the segregation of armament industries and fragmentation of defence efforts is leading to costly duplication; at the same time, the reduction in defence budgets has as its corollary a loss of purchasing power.

4. Europe must consequently find a place for exchanging ideas and for joint action to strengthen European co-operation in armaments, now more essential than ever for maintaining a European defence industry in the service of a future European defence.

II. The institutional framework and armaments co-operation policy: historical background

(a) FINABEL

5. In October 1953, the chiefs of staff of the armies of France (F), Italy (I), the Netherlands (NL), Belgium (Be) and Luxembourg (L), decided to form an organisation, FINABEL, the aim of which was to enable them to study jointly the measures and means necessary to achieve closer and more effective co-ordination in the area of weapons for use on land. In 1954, the Atlantic Alliance gave FINABEL *de facto* recognition as a regional organisation within its framework but independent of it.

6. The formation of FINABEL can therefore be considered as Europe's first step towards institu-

tionalising co-operation in armaments; forty years later this project still features, as an increasingly urgent item, on Europe's agenda.

7. After joining NATO in May 1955, Germany was invited to follow FINABEL's work by acquiring observer status and in 1956 it joined that organisation as a full member¹.

8. The United Kingdom, at the time reluctant to participate in multilateral organisations outside the strict framework of NATO did not decide to join FINABEL until 1972, the date of its entry into the European Community. The arrival of the United Kingdom made that organisation coincide with WEU in terms of member countries, but this was not the case as regards the objectives of the two organisations. FINABEL's main object was to promote close military co-operation between NATO member countries, which, on account of their geographic position, shared similar concerns and needs. To this end, it endeavoured to define and harmonise operational needs by looking to the following areas of application:

- tactical and logistic studies;
- studies of the use of tactical units;
- studies of military specifications for equipment for land armies;
- studies of training methods and procedures;
- joint assessments;
- exchanges of information (including classified information).

9. Joint production of defence equipment does not fall within FINABEL's area of responsibility, as it is not normally within the remit of army chiefs of staff.

10. As a co-ordinating body, FINABEL based its operations on two principles: complete freedom of participants and unanimous decision-making.

11. FINABEL was a first attempt to standardise land-based weapons: the organisation reached a series of agreements on specifications and operational concepts and sub-concepts. Once these agreements were signed, each country was free to take them into account in their national development work in so far as this was considered timely and appropriate. In short, FINABEL's work led to

¹ From that time FINABEL changed its initials to FINABEL.

progress, albeit modest, along a path which, as the facts show, has scarcely been marked by success.

(b) The Standing Armaments Committee (SAC)

12. In May 1955, the WEU Council decided to create the Standing Armaments Committee as one of its subsidiary bodies. This decision was based on recognition of the "desirability of increasing the efficiency of the forces of the countries of Western European Union and improving their logistics; of seeking the best method of using the resources available to these countries for equipping and supplying their forces and of sharing tasks in the best interests of all".

13. The decision of the Council stipulated:

"The Standing Armaments Committee shall, in close relation with the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, seek to improve consultation and co-operation in the sphere of armaments with a view to finding joint solutions which would assist governments of member countries in meeting their equipment requirements.

To that end, it shall encourage, on a case by case basis, agreements or arrangements on such subjects as the development, standardisation, production and procurement of armaments.

These agreements or arrangements may be concluded between all the countries of Western European Union or between some of them. They would remain open to participation by other countries of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation².

14. Subsequently, the Rome declaration of October 1984 and the ministerial meeting held in Bonn in April 1985 led to the creation of three new agencies with responsibility for security matters. Agency I's task was to study questions relating to armaments control and disarmament, Agency II had responsibility for studying security and defence questions and Agency III for the development of armaments co-operation, together with the international secretariat of the Standing Armaments Committee.

15. In fact, the Rome declaration included among other provisions "the development of European co-operation in the field of armaments in respect of which WEU can provide a political impetus".

16. These three agencies and the Standing Armaments Committee were abolished by the Council of Ministers of WEU in November 1989. Paragraph 12 of the decision setting up this com-

mittee stated that "the government of each member country may submit to the Council of Western European Union proposals for the modification of the functions or structure of the Standing Armaments Committee in the light of experience gained and results obtained".

17. Thus a body has disappeared which, over its thirty-four years of existence, failed to exercise the important functions attributed to it and which never managed to secure the production of equipment suitable for WEU. The development of bodies with parallel tasks and then the creation in 1976 of the Independent European Programme Group (IEPG) no doubt hindered the achievement of the objectives entrusted to the Standing Armaments Committee in 1955, but most probably the main cause of the failure of the joint production of armaments, irrespective of the institutional framework, is the inability of national military staffs to define jointly their needs and requirements. It should nevertheless be noted that the Standing Armaments Committee succeeded in establishing relations between the authorities responsible for armaments in Europe, which have, over time, borne fruit, as various co-operation programmes show.

(c) Eurogroup

18. Eurogroup was formed on 14th November 1968 as an informal association of defence ministers of the European countries members of NATO. The purpose of the group was to strengthen the alliance as a whole by making a more cohesive and effective European contribution. Eurogroup was intended to provide defence ministers with an informal forum to debate questions of particular political and strategic interest and to promote practical co-operation.

19. The member countries of Eurogroup are Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Turkey and the United Kingdom. Neither Iceland nor France are members.

20. Eurogroup operates on a flexible and pragmatic basis and the meetings of ministers of defence immediately prior to the ministerial meetings of the NATO Defence Planning Committee (twice a year) lay the foundations for the work of the Staff Group. The Chairmanship of Eurogroup rotates on an annual basis.

21. The Staff Group is composed of members of the national delegations to NATO Headquarters and its task is to follow up day-to-day work. The United Kingdom provides the necessary secretariat.

22. In 1970 Eurogroup launched the European Defence Improvement Programme (EDIP). This provided for substantial investment over five

2. Decision of the Council of Western European Union setting up a Standing Armaments Committee, 7th May 1955.

years in infrastructure work, the development of an integrated communications network and the financing of arms procurement and transport aircraft.

23. Where armaments are concerned, Eurogroup has co-ordinated Europe's procurement of American equipment, for example the Lance surface-to-surface tactical missile and the F-16 aircraft purchased by various European countries. For the organisation of its work, Eurogroup is divided into a series of sub-groups, some of which were transferred to WEU subsequent to a decision of the Council in March 1993:

- EUROCOM: Eurocom's work is to ensure that the various national communications systems meet previously fixed technical and operational requirements allowing interoperability of the various equipment in service. From 1985, all equipment under development has been required to comply with Eurocom standards.
- EUROLOG: The aim of this subgroup is to promote logistic co-operation in order to achieve increased efficiency and savings in managing the procurement system. Eurolog has monitored armaments co-operation programmes closely, identifying logistical aspects of which further account needs to be taken. We shall return to this later.
- EUROLONGTERM: Its brief is to develop long-term operational doctrines and draw up specifications for armaments and military equipment. In order to carry out these tasks, Eurolongterm has set itself two general objectives, to establish joint operational concepts and to define harmonised specifications for equipment, both of very great importance and at the same time difficult to achieve. We will return to this subject later.
- EUROMED: This subgroup was created to enhance co-operation in military medicine.
- EURONAD: This subgroup brings together the National Armaments Directors, whose aim is to reduce the cost of armaments and defence systems through standardisation and joint procurement. The creation of the IEPG virtually brought an end to the work of this subgroup.
- EURO/NATO training: Its purpose is to organise training in a multinational framework.

24. After its initial years of consolidation, Eurogroup has achieved substantial work in attempting to lay foundations for the standardisa-

tion of armaments and military equipment. However the absence of a weapons producer state such as France has hindered its efforts.

(d) Independent European Programme Group (IEPG)

25. The IEPG, a structure for consultation and co-operation between the European partners of NATO except Iceland, was formed in 1976.

26. The creation of the IEPG arose from the will to increase co-operation between member countries in the area of defence equipment, the realisation of the need to promote European co-operation and the desire to strengthen the cohesion of the Atlantic Alliance and maintain its conventional forces at an adequate level.

27. The main reasons for creating this body were to use efficiently the financial means available for research and development and the production of equipment, to increase the standardisation and interoperability of equipment, which implies co-operation in logistics and training, to maintain a firm European technological and industrial base and to strengthen European co-operation in trade areas.

28. In order to achieve these aims the IEPG, in accordance with the spirit of the Atlantic Alliance and without calling national responsibilities into question, carried out work more specifically in the areas of:

- harmonisation of programmes and equipment replacement timetables;
- agreements for carrying out joint projects;
- elimination of duplication of effort in developing weapon systems.

29. Until 1984, the Group's work was confined to exchanges of information on national armaments and equipment procurement procedures and the search for and analysis of possible models for managing joint projects. Starting in 1984, IEPG began to meet at minister of defence level with the purpose of giving greater impetus to armaments co-operation. Ministers were agreed on the need to revive the IEPG through more intense and systematic co-operation.

30. New objectives proposed by the ministers included the development of European co-operation in research and technology and a study on improving firms' competitiveness and strengthening Europe's industrial base in the defence field. This study "Towards a stronger Europe" was carried out by a group of independent experts and submitted in early 1987. Among its recommendations should be highlighted the need progressively to establish an open and competitive market in armaments, to boost the European research effort

and provide stimulus to countries with a developing defence industry (DDI countries – Greece, Portugal and Turkey).

31. Following this study, a plan of action was drawn up with a view to establishing a European defence equipment market and a European technological plan, both of which were approved by defence ministers in Luxembourg in November 1988. Following this same meeting the EUCLID (European co-operation for the long term in defence) programme was launched – a joint technological research programme for military purposes.

32. In 1990, the IEPG structure was joined by the EDIG (European Defence Industrial Group). EDIG is a forum created by national professional associations bringing together the defence industries of IEPG member countries. EDIG has undoubtedly contributed to developing co-operation by giving firms a direct interest in it.

33. IEPG's achievements were modest but positive. The Group had the advantage of providing a political framework in which European defence ministers met regularly in order to define ways of intensifying armaments co-operation. However, it has quickly become urgent to put to use the experience gained in this field in order to develop a common defence equipment procurement policy in the longer term. Just when the organisation risked losing all credibility, the defence ministers decided, in Oslo in March 1992, to analyse the future rôle of the IEPG in the new European security architecture, along the lines laid down at Maastricht.

(e) The reactivation of WEU

34. The Ministers for Foreign Affairs and of Defence of the WEU member countries, meeting in Rome on 26th and 27th October 1984 on the thirtieth anniversary of the signing of the Paris Agreements modifying the Brussels Treaty, adopted the Rome declaration – the true point of departure for the renewal of WEU, which it was hoped to relaunch and expand.

35. The Rome declaration was thus the outcome of the debate conducted in recent years on the need to strengthen the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance.

36. In short, WEU was to be made an efficient organisation by taking advantage of the possibilities it offered and adapting it to the new European reality.

37. The aim of the Rome declaration was to harmonise views on the security conditions in Europe and in particular: “ the development of European co-operation in the field of armaments in respect of which WEU can provide a political impetus. ”

38. The platform on European security interests adopted in The Hague in October 1987 limited itself to setting the directions in which the organisation should work with a view to defining the conditions and criteria of European security. The logical consequence of this process would be the renewal, through the Treaty on European Union and the annexed declarations, of the aims described above.

39. Title V, Article J.4 of the Treaty on European Union stipulates that “ The common foreign and security policy shall include all questions related to the security of the Union, including the eventual framing of a common defence policy, which might in time lead to a common defence ”. Paragraph 2 of this article specifies that “ the Union requests Western European Union (WEU), which is an integral part of the development of the Union, to elaborate and implement decisions and actions of the Union which have defence implications ”.

40. The declaration of the member countries of WEU, annexed to the Treaty on European Union, which concerns the functions of WEU and its relations with the Atlantic Alliance states that “ member states agree on the need to develop a genuine European security and defence identity and a greater European responsibility in defence matters ... WEU will be developed as the defence component of the European Union and as a means to strengthen the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance. To this end, it will formulate common European defence policy and carry forward its concrete implementation through the further development of its own operational rôle ”.

41. An aspect of the operational rôle of WEU referred to in the declaration states that “ other proposals will be examined further, including enhanced co-operation in the field of armaments with the aim of creating a European armaments agency ”.

42. The Council of Ministers for Foreign Affairs and of Defence of WEU, meeting in Bonn, in June 1992, approved the Petersberg declaration and redefined and reinforced the operational rôle of the organisation: “ WEU member states have been examining and defining appropriate missions, structures and means covering in particular a WEU planning cell and military units answerable to WEU... ”. These military units available to WEU and under its authority will be organised on a “ multinational and multiservice basis ”.

43. Finally, in the Kirchberg declaration of May 1994, the ministers tasked the Permanent Council to begin work on the formulation of a common European defence policy. A document on this subject was adopted at the Noordwijk ministerial meeting in November 1994. In the Noordwijk declaration “ the ministers revived, in an active and specific manner, thinking on the