Assembly of Western European Union

DOCUMENT 1485

6th November 1995

FORTY-FIRST ORDINARY SESSION
(First Part)

Parliamentary co-operation in the Mediterranean

REPORT
submitted on behalf of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations
by Mr. Kotsonis, Rapporteur
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1. Adopted unanimously by the committee.
2. Members of the committee: Mr. Masseret (Chairman); Sir Russell Johnston (Alternate: Baroness Hooper), Baroness Gould of Potternewton (Vice-Chairmen); Mr. Amaral, Mrs. Beer, MM. Benvenuti, Biriaux, Decagny, Dionisi, Sir Anthony Durant, Mr. Erler, Mrs. Err, Mr. Eversdijk, Mrs. Fernandez Sanz (Alternate: Herrera Merédez), MM. Fotiadis (Alternate: Kotsonis), Ghesquière, Gouteyron, Sir John Hunt, MM. Kempinaire, Korohalis, Lummer, Martins, Mattina, Robles Fraga, Sainz Garcia, Selva, Mrs. Terborg, Mrs. van Nieuwenhoven.

N.B. The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.
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The Assembly,

(i) Recalling Recommendation 538 on security in the Mediterranean in which it affirmed that "Western Europe's historic relations give it a specific responsibility to promote economic and social development, peace and security in the Mediterranean ";

(ii) Concerned by the persistence of conflict and various crisis situations in the Mediterranean region;

(iii) Noting that the proliferation of nuclear, biological, chemical and conventional armaments of all kinds in the Mediterranean region is a threat to peace and stability in the region;

(iv) Convinced that security problems cannot be separated from development problems which affect the stability of the whole Mediterranean region;

(v) Welcoming the development of the dialogue between WEU and the countries on the southern shores of the Mediterranean and the signing of Euro-Mediterranean association agreements between the European Union and certain Mediterranean countries;

(vi) Expressing the wish that the Euro-Mediterranean conference in November 1995 will make a decisive contribution to instituting true political means for promoting security and co-operation in the region,

INVITES THE PARLIAMENTS OF MEMBER COUNTRIES

1. To intensify interparliamentary co-operation in regard to Mediterranean questions;

2. To encourage exchanges between their respective foreign affairs and defence committees and co-operation between the latter and the corresponding committees of the WEU Assembly in order to work out a Euro-Mediterranean policy taking into account the problems of security and development;

3. To participate actively in the work of the interparliamentary conference on security and co-operation in the Mediterranean, endeavouring, insofar as possible, to present joint proposals by the parliaments of the countries and Assembly of WEU;

4. To encourage the governments of the Mediterranean countries which are members of WEU to express clearly their national priorities with regard to the Mediterranean and its problems;

5. To encourage and to foster contacts between parliamentarians on both sides of the Mediterranean with a view to developing the dialogue on political, economic, social, cultural and security questions.
Explanatory Memorandum

(submitted by Mr. Kotsonis, Rapporteur)

I. Introduction

1. The Assembly of WEU has always paid the closest attention to the problems of the Mediterranean region which have been the subject of several reports and recommendations to the Council of Ministers. In some cases, together with simultaneous intervention from other institutions, such as the Council of Europe and the Interparliamentary Union, practical results have been obtained such as the setting up of a Conference on Security and Co-operation in the Mediterranean (CSCM).

2. At first sight it does not seem easy to tackle this problem from a parliamentary point of view. The region is a heterogenous group of cultures, levels of development, and religious and ethnic groups. There are many causes of conflict both North and South and from East to West of the Mediterranean. The present report will not give preference to such distinctions but rather will attempt to tackle the question as a whole, putting forward the practical action undertaken by national parliaments of WEU member countries and by other institutions for interparliamentary cooperation in relation to the region.

3. It is clear that the problems of the Mediterranean primarily concern the riparian countries, but the political, economic and indeed military consequences of the development of the regional situation have repercussions on European countries as a whole. The economic imbalance, demographic and migratory pressures towards the northern shore, the proliferation of every kind of armament, to both East and South, the persistence of unresolved disputes and conflicts despite repeated intervention on the part of international and European authorities are factors contributing to crises which concern all European countries.

4. Parliamentary intervention here has a considerable rôle to play, providing the necessary complement to diplomatic action without always being bound by the same constraints as the latter. Friendship groups among parliamentarians, reciprocal visits, discussions, colloquies and other activities contribute significantly to the dialogue between Mediterranean countries and beyond. This parliamentary diplomacy encourages exchanges of views and an understanding of positions on all sides leading to long-term action whose results are not immediately perceptible but eventually promote development and stability in the Mediterranean region.

5. Interparliamentary institutions provide a wider framework for regional dialogue. The Council of Europe is one of the organisations most committed to this course even if its enlargement to the Central European countries might have given cause for fearing that a more continental focus might be adopted for its activities. The European Parliament, through its power of co-decision in certain areas in agreement with the Commission, is inevitably a major factor in relations between the European Union and the Mediterranean countries. The WEU Assembly and the North Atlantic Assembly are for their part more concerned with security and defence questions which are of vital importance in a region where potential or indeed open conflicts are a permanent feature.

II. Security and development in the Mediterranean

6. Given the extreme diversity of the components, it is difficult to deal with the overall issues in this area. Between North and South, East and West, there are many variations including within these geographical divisions. Unequal economic development, the plurality of political systems, divergent perceptions of security, quite strong demographic growth, are some of the factors which constitute its regional complexity. Nevertheless, it is possible to focus our analysis on two major axes which are both complimentary and interconnected: security and development.

7. The cold war had led to a reductive assessment being made of the security problems of the region. At that time, for NATO and to a lesser extent for WEU, it was a matter of countering the threat of the Soviet presence on European and American lines of communication and trade routes in the region. This was then the main preoccupation of decision-makers on the northern shore, although there were interregional tensions such as the crisis in Cyprus or the civil war in Lebanon.

8. From the late 1980s, perceptions changed and there was a move from a global assessment — the East-West conflict — to a regional analysis of...
security questions. The aftermath of the Gulf war created the impression for a short time of a major Mediterranean debate that might lead to settlement of certain situations of conflict. However, very quickly, as the end of the civil war in Lebanon showed, there was a return to traditional regional power relationships, the most striking examples being Cyprus and the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. At the same time another major question emerged—the proliferation of all types of armaments including ballistic missiles, chemical weapons and even nuclear programmes for military purposes in the region.

9. In parallel, the problem of development is becoming very acute. The disparity of economic standards between the northern and southern shores, relations between member countries of the European Union and countries which are not yet or are unlikely to be members, are sensitive and complicated issues, only a few main aspects of which will be examined. Economic issues here have virtually a direct impact on security matters, first within the states of the region themselves and then as regards their external relations. The absence of encouraging economic prospects in the medium term for certain countries in the South has made them vulnerable to penetration by Islamic extremism, which, in certain cases, has extended its activities to other countries; the increase in the birth rate and migratory pressures are also problems to be taken into account even if all countries do not share the same perceptions in this area.

(a) Conflict in the Mediterranean and European security

10. The Assembly of WEU has produced several reports on this topic which it has tackled from a political and military angle. In the framework of the present report, we will deal with the problem briefly by sketching an outline of the open and potential conflicts in the region and also of development and demographic issues having an impact on security.

1. Open and potential conflicts in the Mediterranean region

11. Several types of security problem can be distinguished: those internal to a country, those involving more than one country and matters of common concern, as in the case of conventional armaments proliferation and that of weapons of mass destruction. This distinction is not exhaustive and there are correlations between the different aspects. In order to simplify and to remain within the scope of our report we shall leave aside the conflict in the Balkans and the Arab-Israeli peace process (except in terms of the Palestinian aspect).

(i) Intra-state conflict

12. Since the late 1980s, several countries in the region have experienced internal disturbance due to opposition between the régime in power and more or less extremist Islamic groups. Algeria and Egypt provide a typical example even if their situation is not comparable. A characteristic of the Algerian crisis, which has reached virtually civil war proportions, is the transfer of terrorist acts to France which tends to some extent to involve Europe in the conflict.

13. Tunisia has so far succeeded in controlling the action of extremist groups but at the expense of significant encroachment on political freedom and of human rights violations. The Israeli-Palestinian peace process has not yet put an end to terrorist acts committed by both Islamic and Jewish extremists. Turkey has to face up to the actions of the PKK although the Kurdish problem cannot be reduced to this confrontation, its solution being linked to the evolution of Turkish society and Turkish institutions as a whole.

(ii) Inter-state conflicts

14. Turkish reaction to the application of the Convention on the Law of the Sea and especially the Cyprus question have for decades been a source of dispute between Greece and Turkey, although both are members of the Atlantic Alliance. The invasion of Cyprus by the Turkish army in 1974 led to the occupation of a large part of the island which continues to the present day, despite United Nations resolutions and the disapproval of the international community. The good offices of the United Nations have not led to a just and lasting settlement of the Cyprus question, which must be based on a Cypriot state with a single international personality and citizenship, whose independence and territorial integrity are guaranteed. In the meantime, the status quo in Cyprus, which is regarded as unacceptable by the United Nations and the European Union, is perpetuating the division of the island and causing the population to suffer, since it gives rise, inter alia to violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms.

15. Turkish opposition to Greece’s extension of its territorial waters in the Aegean Sea is also a potential source of conflict between the two countries. To Greece’s decision to implement to its advantage the provisions of Article 3 of the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea which stipulates that “Every state has the right to establish the breadth of its territorial sea up to a limit not

2. For detailed analysis of these questions see Document 1465 on the Eastern Mediterranean, Rapporteur: Mr. Cucó (Spain), 24th May 1995.

3. Turkey has been an associate member of WEU since 1995, with effect from the date of Greece’s accession to full membership.
exceeding 12 nautical miles, measured from baseline determined in accordance with this convention”, Turkey responded by invoking Article 300 of the same convention on abuse of rights, even going so far as to state that the extension would be regarded as a casus belli. The Greek Government, by stating that the entry into force of the convention would not have immediate effect, has however contributed to lowering the tension even though the risk of conflict has not been eliminated entirely.

(iii) Proliferation of conventional weapons and weapons of mass destruction

16. Armaments proliferation is one of the priority issues in security and defence matters in the Mediterranean region. The end of the cold war, the aftermath of the Gulf war and the start of the Arab-Israeli peace process seemed to indicate for a while that the Mediterranean would become a safer area. In reality, the level of weapons has not fallen, whatever the type of weapon considered. In terms of conventional weapons, Greece and Turkey have had the benefit of major transfers of heavy weapons due to the application of the CFE-1 and CFE-1A treaties on armaments reduction in Europe; Israel and Egypt still receive major military aid from the United States while the risks of an open conflict breaking out between Israel and its neighbours are diminishing.

17. Weapons of mass destruction, ballistic missiles, chemical and bacteriological weapons and nuclear proliferation are a major concern in the region. While Libya seems to have a fairly well developed chemical weapons programme, which is nevertheless subject to international and especially United States monitoring, other countries have opted for ballistic missiles and nuclear programmes, first among them being Israel which is an undeclared nuclear power. Algeria and more recently Egypt are also believed to have nuclear programmes for non-exclusively civilian purposes. In this area, it might be desirable to envisage at some future time a Mediterranean variant of all types of arms reduction agreements like those in force in continental Europe.

2. Development and demography in the Mediterranean region

18. The Mediterranean basin is an area of very marked diversity, not to say disparity, in levels of economic, social and political development. These differences exist not only between the northern and southern shores but also within each of these zones. Development problems have a demographic component, which is a source of concern in certain northern countries that are having difficulty in integrating immigrants of Mediterranean origin. This is also true, for example, for the development of relations between the European Union and Turkey.

19. The issue of development arises not only from purely economic factors (GDP, GNP, industrial production, etc.) but is also linked to the distribution of natural resources in the region. Foremost among them are oil and water. The bulk of oil resources are concentrated in two countries, Algeria and Libya; one is close to civil war and the other under international embargo. Without an improvement in the positions in these countries, Europe will have to turn to other sources of supply such as oil from Azerbaijan which might be brought through the Mediterranean region.

20. Water will be a source of conflict in the next century if a system of rational and balanced management is not established between the countries of the region; it is already at the centre of difficult discussions between Israel, the Palestinian authorities and Jordan and between Turkey, Syria and Iraq. Here again resources are unequally distributed and three types of country can be identified: those with generous supplies for decades to come (Albania, France, Greece, Italy, Lebanon, Turkey, former Yugoslavia); those whose resources will diminish during the next century but which can hope to maintain reasonable levels on condition that demand, and consequently population growth, remain stable (Algeria, Cyprus, Spain, Morocco) and those with very meagre resources, a situation likely to increase tension between neighbouring countries (Egypt, Israel, Libya, Malta, Syria, Tunisia).

21. Membership of different economic areas also helps to accentuate discrepancies in the region. The Mediterranean countries of the European Union benefit from major transfers of aid which have contributed to their development and integration in the community’s economic area. To varying degrees, countries such as Turkey and Morocco are having considerable difficulties in their relationship with the Union. Turkey, signatory of a major association agreement, has not yet succeeded in being considered as a true candidate for full accession for economic and demographic reasons, not to mention the religious aspect. Morocco, with more modest aspirations, has just had an important setback in negotiations with the Union over fishing rights. These two cases also illustrate the existence of political and cultural deadlocks in relations between Christian and Muslim Mediterranean countries.

22. Regional demographic growth, especially in Turkey and the Maghreb countries, and its

4. This question is dealt with in the appendix to the present report.

corollary, the exacerbation of the economic situation and increased migration towards the European Union countries of the northern shore, constitutes a considerable source of concern for years to come. This is nevertheless an area in which data has to be treated with caution, as demographic evolution is linked to cultural and social factors which are likely to change in future decades and any improvement in the economic situation or rise in cultural levels, especially for women, will help to slow down the growth in the birth rate.

23. The crux of the problem lies in the age differences between the populations of the two shores. If there are no major demographic changes, the countries of the European Union will experience increased aging of their populations in the twenty-first century while in the northern and southern Mediterranean countries outside the Union the section of the population under 15 years of age will continue to increase. Unless there is a perceptible improvement in present economic conditions, migratory pressure will continue to grow stronger constituting a threat to security in the region.

24. Although as yet no satisfactory solution has been found, an awareness of the problem is evident in the document adopted by the WEU Council of Ministers in Lisbon on 15th May 1995, entitled "Common reflection on the new European security conditions", which deals with problems relating to uncontrolled or illegal migration in a section on new risks for European security. After summarising briefly the factors underlying uncontrolled or illegal migration, the document states that these problems have become "an issue relevant to European stability and security" and raise "substantial security concerns" such as: "massive displacements of persons in particular as a consequence of internal upheavals or armed conflicts in areas adjacent to our countries; illegal migration which compose a threat to internal security and affect law and order in our societies (links with organised crime, "importation" of political conflicts elsewhere)". The Council also considers that "other problems may relate to the cost to host countries of dealing with large influxes of immigrants both financially and in social terms".

(b) WEU and the Mediterranean

25. During the cold war, WEU, lacking a military structure of its own, made only a very limited contribution in the region on behalf of the Atlantic Alliance. The Soviet military presence and the Arab-Israeli conflict were then the major preoccupations and, until 1990, only two member countries, France and Italy, were Mediterranean countries. Today, five of the ten member countries are situated either in the region or in the vicinity (Portugal), to which is added Turkey, an associate member. This presence has led to greater and more sustained attention being paid to the problems of the region.

26. With effect from the 1980s, Mediterranean questions began to be dealt with in their own right in the communiqués of the Council of Ministers and in its annual report. Initially, the topic was presented in a cold war perspective, but was subsequently to be dealt with on a broader basis. At the meeting held in Luxembourg on 13th-14th October 1986, "the French and Italian Delegations have agreed to undertake an examination of this subject, leading to the possible convening of a working group". The sub-group on security in the Mediterranean, composed of representatives of the ministries for foreign affairs and defence, and placed under the authority of the Permanent Council, was established in April 1987.

27. The sub-group is "the place for consultation and joint reflection on all questions affecting security in the Mediterranean. Where appropriate, this consultation will lead to the formulation of positions or joint recommendations that may be transmitted to the Permanent Council. The sub-group is competent to analyse all factors of destabilisation and developments in the countries situated in the vulnerable areas both as regards internal politics and international relations, whether bilateral or multilateral and including their specifically military aspects". The early work of the sub-group dealt with the Balkans, Cyprus, the Maghreb and Malta.

28. In 1988, WEU's "Mediterranean component" was strengthened by the accession of Spain and Portugal, while Turkey and Greece in their turn made known their wish to accede. In 1989 the Council agreed to establish a consultation procedure with the two countries at ministerial level pending a final decision on their application—a decision that was to be taken at the Petersberg meeting in 1992 when Greece and Turkey were invited to join WEU, the first as a full member and the second as an associate member.

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10. Idem.
29. For its part, the Mediterranean sub-group has, from the late 1980s, been concentrating its activities on Yugoslavia and the Maghreb. Regarding the latter, it considers that “In this region, threats to stability are not essentially of a political nature but derive from the political, social, demographic and above all economic factors apt to produce change in Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia”. At its meeting on 20th October, the sub-group also considered a “joint report regarding naval deployments in the Mediterranean which underlines the need for European countries to carry on shouldering their responsibilities in the Mediterranean basin with adequate forces to play an active peace-time role in the prevention, and if the need arises, management of local crises”.

30. From 1990 onwards, the Mediterranean sub-group began to take an interest in “the implications for European security of the proliferation of ballistic missiles which, in view of the range of this type of weapon ... constitute a greater potential threat not only to the WEU countries bordering on the Mediterranean”. The North-South dimension of European security and economic development should also be taken into consideration in the development of a European security policy. The Gulf crisis and then the Gulf war were to contribute to promoting the idea of a conference on security and co-operation in the Mediterranean, but without it being clear what role WEU might play in the process; the work of the sub-group also came to include an examination of contacts to be established between WEU and the Maghreb countries and the question of Islamic extremism (especially from 1992).

31. In 1993, the Mediterranean sub-group became the Mediterranean Group, with unchanging responsibilities. Its work made it possible to establish a permanent dialogue between WEU and the Maghreb countries, which is still continuing today, but without many practical initiatives being taken. Since 1994, the activities of the Group have been stepped up at the request of the Council, its responsibilities have been better defined and it may be assigned aspects of the work of other groups which fall within its purview. In its work, it must also take account of “the entry into force of the Treaty on European Union, the implementation of the CFSP, WEU’s role as the defence component of the European Union and measures aimed at ensuring close co-operation between the European Union and WEU” and “the close working relations between WEU and NATO, based on transparency and complementarity”.

32. The preliminary conclusions on the formulation of a common European defence policy adopted by the Council of Ministers at Noordwijk on 14th November 1994 were an important step in the development of a Mediterranean security policy. This document states that WEU governments “have an interest, in order to reinforce European security, in fostering stability in the southern Mediterranean countries” this being one of the levels of “European responsibilities and interests in the field of defence”. It is worthy of note that this document deals with relations with the Mediterranean region under the same heading as those with the Central European countries, not separately. It states, moreover, that “European security also has a Mediterranean dimension”. At the Noordwijk meeting, the Council also decided to expand to Egypt the dialogue with the southern Mediterranean countries.

33. In 1995, the Mediterranean dialogue was extended to Israel, but the most important decision was to create a marine force bringing together France, Italy, Portugal and Spain, open to other WEU countries and declared “a force answerable to WEU, EUROMARFOR”. This force is intended to operate primarily in the Mediterranean, in conjunction with a land force, EUFOR, organised by the same countries. This is an important initiative aiming to ensure that WEU has an operational presence in the region and it would be desirable for Greece to participate. The association of Turkey under arrangements commensurate with its status, would give total Mediterranean cover. The Lisbon ministerial meeting also adopted the document entitled “Common reflection on the new European security conditions” which pays particular attention to the Mediterranean basin as a “high priority for European security”. The Council of Ministers has also decided to enter into a dialogue with Cyprus.

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13. Document 1210, Information letter from Mr. van Eeke- len, Secretary-General of WEU, on the activities of the ministerial organs, 27th November 1989.
14. Document 1217, Information letter from Mr. van Eeke- len, Secretary-General of WEU, on the activities of the ministerial organs, 15th March 1990.
16. Document 1238, Information letter from Mr. van Eeke- len, Secretary-General of WEU, on the activities of the ministerial organs, 10th September 1990.
and Malta which is intended to evolve in line with the development of relations between these two countries and the European Union.

**III. Parliamentary action in the Mediterranean region**

34. The member countries of WEU and the European Union have not yet developed a coherent and viable policy on the Mediterranean for the medium and long term. Interests in this area diverge for geographic or historical reasons or in terms of perception of regional issues. Neither organisation has been able to respond clearly to the expectations of other countries in the region, foremost among which Turkey.

35. Apart from economic aid (the MEDA programme), the European Union has not yet expressed clear political aims for this region, owing to the lack of a common foreign policy — still under discussion since the entry into force of the Treaty on European Union. The November Euro-Mediterranean conference is an important step in the dialogue, but the effectiveness of such an initiative can be judged only in terms of concrete decisions. Nor should it be overlooked that the European countries around the perimeter of the Mediterranean are more sensitive to the problem than are their partners in Northern and Central Europe. Nevertheless, as the existence of networks of Islamic extremists and support networks for the activities of the PKK show, the conflicts in the southern countries and the Kurdish question in Turkey spill over into the territory of the European Union countries, becoming a source of concern to the latter.

36. However this may be, the fact remains that, short of being seen in the context of a future armed conflict between the two shores, European security initiatives are disproportionate to the real problems, which relate to the region’s development and management of its natural resources. The creation of EUROMARFOR is an important step towards developing WEU’s operational capabilities, but it must not be perceived by the southern countries as a military tool directed against them. The dialogue between WEU and the countries of the region thus assumes its full importance as a means of avoiding misunderstandings and dispelling suspicion of underlying political or military thoughts. The aim must be to establish a security partnership between the organisation and these countries within the framework of the proposed conference on security and co-operation in the Mediterranean.

37. In this context it is of the utmost importance for national parliaments and European parliamentary institutions also to participate in the process of dialogue and regional partnership. Their action can contribute to a better understanding of the problems and perceptions of the various players in the region, be they governments or regional units such as, for example, the Arab Maghreb Union. In particular, the parliaments of the WEU countries can make a substantial contribution to developing fledgling democratic institutions or establishing them in the countries of the region where they are still lacking, thus helping to reduce existing tension.

38. The European parliamentary institutions with their more specific responsibilities have an entirely different role: their action does not reflect the policy of a single nation but is the result of a consensus among their members. The WEU Assembly and the North Atlantic Assembly have a shared interest in security and defence matters and have frequently given expression to their views on Mediterranean issues by developing various proposals for settlement of existing problems. The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, which in recent years has adopted a Central and Eastern European focus, nevertheless continues to pay close attention to the development of the situation in the region, essentially in the areas of development and human rights. As to the European Parliament, it plays a specific and very important rôle in that it has power of co-decision with the Commission and the Council on budgetary matters and approval of the agreements in various areas between the Union and the Mediterranean countries.

(a) Parliamentary activities and Mediterranean issues

39. Debates, questions to governments, colloquies and conferences, working visits and interparliamentary dialogue are all aspects of the work of national and European assemblies. The Mediterranean region is an abiding topic of interest in the majority of these institutions, even though it is dealt with differently from one country to another, depending on the perceptions of each one. The WEU countries bordering on the Mediterranean are those primarily concerned, but the growing integration of WEU and European Union member countries makes the problems common to all.

40. Interparliamentary institutions covering more specific fields of action play an important part in the context of the search for lasting solutions to security and development questions. They have the advantage of some consistency in their action, despite changes affecting their composi-
tion, while a new majority in a national parliament may, depending on the prevailing political outlook, have a direct impact on its activities or on its interest in the problems of the region.

1. Action by national parliaments

41. The assemblies of the member countries of WEU, either on their own initiative or in the framework of concerted action with their counterparts in other countries, show varying degrees of interest in the problems of the countries around the Mediterranean, greater, although not exclusive, interest being paid by the parliaments of the countries on its shores. Debates, working visits, dialogue with the assemblies of countries not members of the organisation, specific aid programmes for democratic institutions and a concern for development and human rights are some aspects of day-to-day action endeavouring to achieve relatively successful medium- and long-term results.

(i) Germany

42. The Bundestag maintains bilateral relations of differing intensity with several of the countries of the region via its specialised committees, mainly through mutual contacts and visits. There are also contacts via so-called bilateral or multilateral groups of parliamentarians, which have increased continuously since 1993. The most important instruments for the work of these groups are study visits to the countries with which a partnership exists (all Mediterranean states, except Malta, Serbia/Montenegro and Cyprus, although an informal friendship group for Cyprus has also been created), as well as invitations for delegations of these partner groups to pay a study visit to Germany. Furthermore, members of these parliamentary groups regularly meet with representatives of the Mediterranean countries (embassy staff, ministers on visits to Germany).

43. The study visits focus mainly on the establishment or continuation of political contacts and can also be seen as offers to provide information. There are also contacts under the so-called inter-parliamentary training programme, which has been set up by the Bundestag and benefits members of parliamentary administrations in particular, as well as contacts in the framework of staff exchanges, in some cases on a mutual basis, between parliaments. The Bundestag is also following with close attention the evolution of the political situation in the Mediterranean and especially in Turkey, which has a large emigrant community in Germany, as the debates held at the time of the Turkish intervention in Northern Iraq or the questions put to the government on the ramifications of Algerian and Kurdish Islamic terrorism in Germany serve to demonstrate.

(ii) Belgium

44. The activities of the Belgian parliament concerning the Mediterranean are fairly limited, due to the fact that Belgium is not part of the Mediterranean region, but there is nevertheless a degree of co-operation, structured around bilateral friendship groups between the parliament and most of the countries of the region. In terms of countries which are not members of the European Union, the friendship groups for Cyprus, Algeria, Tunisia, Israel and Turkey are the most active, organising various activities such as meetings with ambassadors and other dignitaries of the region visiting Belgium and sending and receiving parliamentary delegations. Nevertheless, although the Chamber of Representatives and the Senate have repeatedly adopted resolutions and put numerous questions to the government on security problems in the Mediterranean, on Cyprus, on the Arab-Israeli peace process and on the Kurdish question, for example, the Belgian parliament does not appear to play a very prominent rôle in the discussion on developing a policy of co-operation between the two sides of the Mediterranean.

(iii) Spain

45. The Senate and the Congress of Deputies are actively engaged in preparing the Euro-Mediterranean Conference, to be held in Barcelona on 27th-28th November 1995, on the initiative of the European Union of which Spain currently holds the presidency. The two houses have prepared reports expressing their parliamentary point of view on the problems of the region, particularly on the question of economic development and prospects for co-operation. To this end, the chamber has established a sub-committee of the ad hoc Committee on co-operation and development aid to deal with co-operation in the Mediterranean region. The Senate has prepared a document on Spain’s policy of co-operation containing a proposal for increasing technical help to all the Maghreb countries in order to strengthen relations between Spain and those countries at every appropriate level. Moreover, the Maghreb, like Latin America, is regarded as a priority area in terms of co-operation with Spain.

(iv) France

46. The National Assembly and the French Senate are actively engaged in defining Mediterranean policy both at national and European levels, as testified by their active support for the MEDA programme, involving financial and technical measures backing the reform of the economic and social structures of Mediterranean territo-

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ries and third countries 24 and the ratification of Euro-Mediterranean association agreements which also contain measures providing for political dialogue 25. France, which is home to a large Muslim community, mainly from the Maghreb countries, is very sensitive to the evolution of the economic and political situation in countries on the southern shore. The Algerian situation and its implications for France's security place this question at the centre of the debates on the future of the region and relations between France and its Mediterranean neighbours. Bilateral groups of parliamentarians are also very active at the level of the two assemblies and their activities make a decisive contribution to the development of the dialogue and to a better perception of the policies of each country. As regards parliamentary action, the National Assembly and the Senate intend to make an active contribution to the preparation of the Euro-Mediterranean conference in November 1995, underlining the various aspects of a Mediterranean policy: political, security, economic and social. For historical and political reasons, the Mediterranean, and especially the Maghreb countries, are foremost among France's priorities in terms of foreign and European policy as the French National Assembly recalled when examining the preliminary draft general budget of the Communities for 1996, by adopting, on 4th July 1995, a resolution insisting on the importance of aid to Mediterranean countries as well as to those of Central and Eastern Europe.

(v) Greece

47. The Greek parliament plays an important rôle in Mediterranean politics. A member of the Interparliamentary Conference on Security and Co-operation in the Mediterranean, established in the framework of the Interparliamentary Union (IPU) in 1991, the Greek parliament is actively participating in the preparation of the second conference, to be held in Malta in November 1995. The Greek Delegation made a vital contribution to the search for solutions to regional security and social and economic development questions at the preparatory meetings held in Izmir (Turkey), on 18th November 1994 and in Alexandria (Egypt) on 3rd June 1995. Greek Delegations intend to make a positive contribution to current debates on regional problems in European parliamentary institutions such as the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, the Assembly of WEU and the North Atlantic Assembly, and to make their Mediterranean point of view heard.


25. The Euro-Mediterranean association agreement with Tunisia is the first of this kind. It is to be followed by similar agreements initially with Israel and Morocco; Assemblée Nationale, Information Report No 2152, page 56, 12th July 1995.

(vi) Italy

48. The Chamber of Deputies and the Senate regularly deal with various aspects of Mediterranean questions. Italy, like Spain, France and Greece, has major territorial extensions (Sicily and Sardinia) in the Mediterranean, whose security and development is a subject of major importance. The proximity of areas of conflict and of Libya, which is subject to a United Nations embargo, creates a situation of relative insecurity in the area, the evolution of which Italian parliamentarians are monitoring very closely. This concern is shown in debates in the two houses and through questions addressed to the relevant ministers on regional development, the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, problems of illegal immigration and security matters in general. This on-going concern is also expressed in interparliamentary forums, such as, for example, the seminar on security and stability in the Mediterranean region organised in co-operation with the North Atlantic Assembly in Capri on 10th-13th September 1994 26. In October 1995, the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Senate published a report on the Euro-Mediterranean partnership in the framework of the Italian parliamentary contribution to preparing the Euro-Mediterranean conference in Barcelona. This text gives an important place to questions of the environment, energy resources and migration as factors of regional interdependence 27. The report proposes a new European strategy based, on the one hand, on a global development programme necessary for joint security, the smooth running of economic and scientific co-operation, dialogue and cultural and human exchanges, and, on the other hand, on the specific implementation of bilateral agreements already signed or in preparation between the Union and countries south of the Mediterranean.

(vii) Luxembourg

49. Notwithstanding its geographic distance away, Luxembourg is nevertheless concerned with the problems of the Mediterranean, the Chamber of Deputies having declared its interest during debates and through questions to the government. Luxembourg parliamentarians, who are represented in the North Atlantic Assembly, the WEU Assembly and the parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, are able to express their opinion and position on the problems of the region on security and development issues.


(viii) Netherlands

50. As in Belgium and Luxembourg, the place accorded by the two Chambers of the Netherlands Parliament to the discussion of Mediterranean questions is somewhat limited. Nevertheless, through the interparliamentary groups and during debates on the country's European and foreign policy, the problems of the Mediterranean are the subject of discussions and exchanges of views which help to create awareness of regional difficulties among members and senators alike. Questions such as the situation of the Kurdish population in Turkey or the evolution of the internal situation in Algeria and its implications as regards terrorism or bilateral relations are dealt with regularly and with careful attention in the two chambers.

(ix) Portugal

51. The Portuguese parliament is paying greater attention to Mediterranean problems, as shown by the colloquy held on security problems in the Western Mediterranean on 17th May 1995, organised by the Assembly of the Republic on the occasion of the visit to Portugal of the President of the Republic, Defence and Political Committees of the Assembly of WEU. This colloquy brought together experts from both shores in an exchange of views that promoted better understanding of Mediterranean problems, tackled from a political and security angle and also from an economic, demographic and social perspective. In the framework of parliamentary activity, the Assembly of the Republic has furthermore ratified conventions covering military matters with Morocco (1994) and Tunisia (1995). Bilateral groups of parliamentarians and the Portuguese presence in European and transatlantic parliamentary institutions have also made an important contribution to defining a European policy for the Mediterranean.

(x) United Kingdom

52. Despite its geographic distance, the United Kingdom parliament has taken an interest in several aspects of developments in the Mediterranean. There are regular debates in the House of Commons on the situation in Cyprus. Most recently, in May 1995, the House of Lords Committee on the European Communities produced a report on relations between the EU and the Maghreb countries. That report noted the historic lack of knowledge of that region in the United Kingdom, but also its growing importance. The population in the region was growing rapidly and both increased migration and Islamic fundamentalism would have an impact upon the European Union and its member states. It noted that trade between the United Kingdom and the Maghreb countries was increasing, although from low levels. It observed that developments in the region were also closely linked to other matters of close interest to the European Union, such as the Palestinian question and relations with Israel, Turkey and Cyprus. The report analysed some of the problems in the region, most notably those relating to political instability in Algeria. It concluded that concerns over the rise of Islamic fundamentalism, in Morocco and Tunisia at least, had been exaggerated. It saw unemployment as the most important factor likely to contribute to instability in the region, and argued that the European Union should concentrate its efforts in the region on facilitating continued economic development, emphasising that free trade access was in some ways more important than financial aid. It also agreed that human rights performance should be subject to detailed scrutiny by both the European Parliament and the European Council as the ratification of the association agreements with the Maghreb countries proceeded.

(xi) Turkey

53. The Grand National Assembly of Turkey is following the development of European policy in the Mediterranean attentively, especially as regards bilateral relations and its future status in the European Union. In this perspective, ratification of the customs agreement with the European Union is a matter of priority for Turkish parliamentarians. Moreover, they regularly monitor the question of Cyprus and political differences with Greece. Parliamentarian groups and delegations in the principal European and transatlantic parliamentary institutions voice Turkey's views on questions relating to the security and development of the Mediterranean. Discussion is at times heated, especially on sensitive subjects such as the situation of Turkey's Kurdish population or Cyprus, but the active presence of Turkish parliamentarians in these institutions promotes dialogue and leads to a better shared perception of the points of view of all sides, in order to arrive at a solution to outstanding problems. Since Greece's accession to full membership of WEU, Turkish parliamentarians attend and participate as associate members in discussions in WEU committees and debates in the Assembly.

2. European parliamentary institutions

54. Through their parliamentary activities, these institutions of varying composition contribute, each in its own specific field, to the search

28. See for example Second Chamber of the States General, Brief van de Minister van Buitenlandse Zaken (Algerije), 23900 V. No. 49, 4th July 1995.
29. House of Lords, Select Committee on the European Communities, relations between the EU and the Maghreb countries; Session 1994-95, 11th report, 9th May 1995.
30. Although not a full member of WEU, Turkey is a Mediterranean country whose development is very important for the security and stability of the region as a whole.
for solutions to the problems of the Mediterranean region by constantly debating these questions, addressing themselves to governments and publishing studies and reports on the region. They play an important rôle in the development of the dialogue between the Mediterranean players involved, and with other countries that are less sensitive to regional problems. Alongside them, mention should also be made of the Interparliamentary Union, which, since 1992, organises interparliamentary conferences on security and co-operation in the Mediterranean.

(i) The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe

55. The evolution of the Mediterranean region is one of the essential areas to which the organisation's activities are directed. Colloquies and conferences, organised either by the Assembly alone or in co-operation with other institutions, together with numerous reports submitted on the subject are evidence of the region's importance in the eyes of the parliamentarians of the Council of Europe. One of the most important initiatives taken by this institution is the Conference of Mediterranean regions, organised in co-operation with the standing conference of local and regional authorities of Europe. Three such conferences have already been held, first in Marseilles on 27th-29th March 1985, then in Malaga on 16th-18th September 1987 and most recently in Taormina on 5th-7th April 1993, where questions relating to the environment, economic development, co-operation and the problems of human migration were discussed in a regional perspective.

56. On 7th October 1994, the Assembly adopted an important recommendation on co-operation in the Mediterranean basin. In this text, several proposals were formulated for the attention of the Council of Ministers, recommending in particular that it should:

- devote a special meeting to discussing the rôle and activities of the Council of Europe in the Mediterranean region (11.i.a);
- devote special attention to the Mediterranean ecosystem and commission scientific studies to gauge more accurately the consequence of population development for the region (11.i.e);
- ensure Council of Europe involvement in ongoing discussions regarding the Mediterranean region, particularly within the European Union, the CSCE, the working parties set up by the "Forum for Mediterranean dialogue and co-operation" (11.iii);
- consider appropriate ways of involving in certain activities of the Council of Europe the Mediterranean non-member countries which apply the principle of parliamentary democracy, respect of human rights and the rule of law (11.iv);
- consider the drafting of a partial agreement on Mediterranean co-operation open to Mediterranean non member states of the Council of Europe (11.v);

Other points of this recommendation accord particular interest to migration (11.vii, viii, xi.b, c), economic and social development (11.xi.a, b) and cultural co-operation (11.xi.e);

(ii) The European Parliament

57. The Treaty on European Union granted the parliament certain prerogatives in terms of co-decision, especially in budgetary matters, and of ratification of agreements concluded on behalf of the Union with the countries of the region, making the parliament an essential player in European politics in the region. At the same time, the Mediterranean debate is also a means for parliament to widen its powers and participation in the decision-making process.

58. Through its reports and the resolutions adopted, the parliament has declared itself in favour of "a political global Community strategy exceeding economic co-operation". This global strategy is centred on the following ideas:

- co-ordination of all areas of Mediterranean policy of the Union member states in the context of the common foreign and security policy of the EU;
- integration of economic, social, humanitarian, cultural and security measures of the EU for the region;
- institutionalisation of a political dialogue on matters of fundamental human rights and the development of democratic structures;
- vertical globalisation of political co-operation by active involvement of parliamentary representation and other non-governmental organisations;
- horizontal globalisation of co-operation by the gradual approximation of EU policies vis-à-vis the subregional political units in the southern Mediterranean (Maghreb, Maghreb, Middle East) and the establishment of common political co-operation structures.

The European Parliament furthermore considers that "the development of a consistent and realistic Mediterranean policy...is a marvellous opportunity to confirm its democratic claims both inwardly and outwardly and hence to contribute comprehensively to stability in Europe and its immediate neighbourhood."

(iii) The North Atlantic Assembly

59. As an informal parliamentary institution, the Assembly pays particular attention to security and defence problems in the region, promotes many activities directed primarily towards developing trans-Mediterranean dialogue, as evidenced by the granting of parliamentary observer status to Egypt (1995), Israel (1994) and Morocco (1994). These ties have been established following the decision taken in Oslo in May 1994 to indicate to the Mediterranean countries that the Assembly is directly concerned by the security and stability of this region and wishes to enter into a global dialogue with the parliaments of these countries. In this framework, it has been decided to organise an annual seminar on the Mediterranean in order to engage in and pursue a permanent exchange of views between the parliaments north and south of the Mediterranean on topics falling within the area of responsibility of the North Atlantic Alliance. Regional questions were also the subject-matter of four "Rose-Roth" seminars, named after the two American parliamentarians who originated this initiative of the Assembly - held in Athens (1992), Grenada (1993), Istanbul (1993) and Capri (1994). At the October 1995 session of the Assembly held in Turin, Italy, Resolution 257 was adopted on the contribution of the alliance to Mediterranean security. In this resolution, the parliamentarians were "...convinced also that the first priority for long-term security in the Mediterranean basin is steady economic development supported by regional co-operation in the southern and eastern Mediterranean countries" and invited the North Atlantic Council "...to pursue the current dialogue with Egypt, Israel, Morocco, Mauritania and Tunisia."

(iv) The Interparliamentary Union

60. The Interparliamentary Union brings together the representatives of 135 national parliaments and three international parliamentary assemblies, including the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. Between 1973 and 1991 the Union paid special attention to Mediterranean questions in the framework of seven interparliamentary conferences on security and co-operation in Europe. In 1990 it considered that it should take the initiative of a similar process to respond to the problems and challenges existing in the Mediterranean. This project took shape as the Interparliamentary Conference on Security and Co-operation in the Mediterranean (CSCM) which held its first meeting in Malaga, Spain, in June 1992. The originality of these conferences lies in the organisation of participation so as to take account of the specific political conditions in the area concerned. There are main participants (the parliaments of the countries of the region), associate participants (the WEU Assembly belongs to this category) and observers ("out of area" participants).

61. Drawing on the experience of the CSCE, the Interparliamentary Union has established three "baskets" to examine the range of Mediterranean questions: regional stability, co-development and partnership, dialogue on civilisation and human rights. Following its first conference, the Union decided to organise a meeting of the parties to the CSCM process on the occasion of each of its two statutory annual conferences, thus establishing a permanent mechanism for dialogue and negotiation at parliamentary level. Held twice a year, these meetings allow consultation to be pursued. They provide an opportunity for reviewing the setting up of an intergovernmental structure for the CSCM and foster bilateral and multilateral co-operation between the parties to the process. In this framework, it has been decided to prepare a second interparliamentary conference, held in Malta from 1st to 4th November 1995.

(b) The Assembly of WEU and Mediterranean questions

62. Mediterranean questions are followed continuously by the Assembly and its committees. Concerned with numerous problems of a political and military nature, the Assembly, during its sessions, has adopted many texts relating to this region.

1. The cold war period

63. During the cold war the Assembly obviously turned its attention to military and political penetration by the USSR in the Mediterranean region, especially in the 1980s. Hence the strengthening of the Soviet fleet, the increase in the submarine threat, arms sales to several Arab countries in the region and then the renewal of a kind of "Brezhnev doctrine" at the end of the 1970s, followed by a growing strategic presence were...
among developments frequently referred to and condemned in various recommendations (160, 177, 185, 288, 313, 366 and 439). The latter were characterised by a continual demand to strengthen the capabilities of the alliance in the region, while few references were made to WEU.

64. However, the WEU Assembly did not concentrate solely on the East-West conflict and on the tensions this caused in the Mediterranean but took an interest in other topics of equal concern, some of which are still topical.

65. This was particularly the case for the Arab-Israeli conflict regarding which the Assembly had always stated that it was in favour of a peaceful and negotiated settlement. Urging the countries of Western Europe to work towards direct negotiations between Israel and the Arab countries, regularly recalling conditions, without which peace seemed impossible, specifying who relevant intermediaries might be, the Assembly has constantly demonstrated its interest in this problem (Recommendations 160, 177, 288, 313, 366 and 439). Similarly in each period of crisis, it has strongly denounced any risk of escalating the conflict or expressed its sympathy to all the populations concerned (Recommendations 185 and 254).

66. Among other subjects of concern during the cold war period, mention can be made of armaments proliferation (the Assembly having repeatedly requested that "an international armaments register should be established under the auspices of the United Nations, which could record every transaction by which participating countries ... passed new or used arms to other countries " (Recommendations 160 and 177), regional conflicts such as Cyprus (Recommendations 160, 177, 256, 418 and 439), differences between Greece and Turkey (Recommendations 177, 296, 313, 366 and 439) and Lebanon (Recommendations 160 and 177); also the progress of democracy and economic development in various countries in the region. As to the state of democracy in the countries of the region, the Assembly often deplored the establishment of non-parliamentary or undemocratic régimes as in Greece in 1967 (Recommendations 160 and 177) or alternatively welcomed signs of progress towards fairer régimes in Portugal, in 1974 (Recommendations 254 and 288), in Spain (Recommendations 288 and 304) and in Turkey (Recommendation 366).

67. As to economic development in the region and differences of level between the countries concerned, the Assembly has made statements on several occasions on the need for increased cooperation with a view to achieving a profound change in the social and economic structure of the region and providing financial and technical help. In 1960 it was a question of creating a Mediterranean Development Organisation " through which the United States and the industrialised countries of Western Europe would contribute economic and technical aid to those countries of the Mediterranean area, which are prepared to use aid on economic development and not on military adventures or inflammatory propaganda, and in which both the donor and recipient countries would participate " (Recommendation 160). There is also reference to improvement of economic, cultural and technical co-operation in order to create greater stability in the region (Recommendations 177, 185 and 439).

68. The Assembly also recalls that free maritime passage and energy supplies remain prior conditions for any lasting economic development. Thus it requests that "an international body should be established under the auspices of the United Nations to supervise the implementation of the Convention of Constantinople of 1888 governing the passage of vessels through the Suez Canal " (Recommendation 160) and urges compliance with the Montreux Convention of 1936 concerning warship and aircraft-carriers (Recommendations 160, 254 and 288). Regarding oil supplies, the Council advocated, in the event of a crisis, adjusting reserves, diversifying sources of supply, constructing large tankers and pipelines and prospecting for oil in Europe and elsewhere. (Recommendation 160).

2. New challenges in the Mediterranean

69. With the end of the cold war and the war in the Gulf, East-West confrontation disappeared, while a new North-South dimension is taking shape in Mediterranean questions. Regional conflicts, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and economic development will from now on be in the centre of the Assembly’s attention. Mediterranean questions are therefore no longer analysed in terms of conflict between blocs. Symptomatic of this new approach is the fact that the recommendations adopted make no mention of the rôle of NATO in the region but rather invite WEU to play an autonomous and active rôle there in the service of European security.

70. The aftermath of the Gulf war has raised hopes of a final settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict with the start of negotiations between Israelis and Palestinians, extended subsequently to Jordanians and Syrians. The Assembly has shown its support for this process, particularly by recommending that the Council " in all areas within its purview, pursue the action undertaken by the European Council to allow Europe to help to establish and then maintain peace in the Middle East ... " (Recommendation 497). The favourable conclusion of this peace process, essential for the stability of the entire Mediterranean region, might also lead to increasing Europe’s responsibilities in
fostering economic and social development, peace and security in that region (Recommendation 538).

71. The idea of a Conference on Security and Co-operation in the Mediterranean (CSCM) on the same basis as the CSCE, now the OSCE, was backed by the Assembly from the end of the Gulf war. The aim sought was to ensure lasting peace by taking account of the realities of the region. The Assembly then asked the Council to “help to prepare a conference on peace and security in the Mediterranean and the Middle East by instructing its Mediterranean sub-group to work out Western Europe’s positions on all matters relating to the first basket ...” (Recommendation 497). Initially it was a matter of bringing together a conference on peace and security not only in the Mediterranean but also in the Middle East. However, the withdrawal of European diplomacy in the latter region in favour of that of the United States led to this idea being revised and the sphere of interest of the conference being limited essentially to the Maghreb-Machrek, Egypt and Israel. In 1993, the Assembly asked the Council to commit itself to the principle of a C SCM and, at the appropriate time, pursue its establishment with vigour and perseverance” (Recommendation 538). The Assembly also contributes, through its status of associate participant, to the work of the Interparliamentary Conference on Security and Co-operation in the Mediterranean.

72. After the Gulf war, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and chemical weapons were constantly a subject of concern in the documents of the Assembly. While specific reports tackled this topic with reference to the Mediterranean region (Documents 1339 and 1435 on anti-missile defence, Recommendations 533 and 571) many documents wholly devoted to security in the Mediterranean expressed the view that the proliferation of such weapons “might, if confirmed, be a serious threat to peace and stability in the Mediterranean region” (Recommendation 538). Among the weapons, the proliferation of which has to be limited, are nuclear, biological, chemical and conventional weapons systems. To this end the Assembly has urged the Council to “promote efforts by its member states, both in their bilateral trade relations and in international negotiations” (Recommendation 538) and to endeavour to “promote the achievement of a general agreement governing the possession of and trade in arms in the Middle East and insist on transparency in the arms trade by having the United Nations record contracts and sales” (Recommendation 497).

73. The end of the cold war did not however mean the end of regional conflict and the Assembly, in its work, has not failed to stress this. Thus the end of the Gulf war again brought the Kurdish question to the fore. Iraq was condemned for its attitude and WEU, further to the European Council decision of 8th April 1991, was tasked with coordinating military action undertaken to assist Kurdish refugees, at the same time providing them with essential humanitarian aid (Recommendation 497). However, the Assembly quickly made known its concern about the mounting violence in south-eastern Anatolia, which in 1992 prevented the Turkish Government from carrying out the balanced policy it had announced towards the Kurdish population in the region (Recommendation 527) and recalled in May 1995 that the refusal to grant the Kurds “some rights of cultural self-expression and a form of political and administrative autonomy ...” limited Turkey’s possibilities of being “integrated into Europe’s intergovernmental and supranational structures” (Recommendation 580).

74. The Assembly continually monitors the Cypriot question, which is still pending. Approving the initiatives of the United Nations, the aim of which is to achieve the creation of a two-zone federal state, the Assembly has stressed that “a continued massive presence of Turkish armed forces is one of the important issues standing in the way of a solution to the Cyprus question” and that “negotiations should be accompanied by a full census of the population of the island of Cyprus ... in order to solve the problems of settlers” and has made clear that any progress towards a settlement can be made only “in parallel with a progressive withdrawal of Turkish armed forces from northern Cyprus and their replacement by United Nations peace-keeping forces with a view to future demilitarisation of the whole island”. Similarly it welcomes “the decision of the Permanent Council of WEU to engage in a dialogue with Cyprus that will evolve with the development of links between Cyprus and the European Union” (Recommendation 580).

75. The Assembly attaches the same importance to achieving a breakthrough in negotiations between the Greek and Turkish communities of Cyprus and the settlement of differences between Greece and Turkey. Although the two countries’ status in WEU is not the same (Greece is a full member, Turkey an associate member) the two countries must be treated equitably in order to limit their “differences over many issues which could be solved if approached in a positive manner” (Recommendation 527). These many unresolved differences between the two countries “constitute a permanent threat to peace and stability in the Eastern Mediterranean and stand in the way of an effective European security and defence policy in the region” (Recommendation 580).

76. As a parliamentary Assembly composed of elected representatives of national parliaments, the WEU Assembly is paying increasing attention
to subjects such as human rights, minorities, economic development and even cultural co-operation. Following on from some of its recommendations during the cold war period, the Assembly has stated its position clearly on the need to promote economic and social development in the Mediterranean, which it describes as essential for reducing the imbalances existing at present between states (Recommendation 497). Moreover it remains "convinced that Western Europe's historic relations give it a specific responsibility to promote economic and social developments..." as confirmed at the EC's Lisbon summit in 1992" (Recommendation 538).

77. Regarding human rights and minority rights, apart from the Kurdish question already referred to, the Assembly has directed its attention to the Palestinian problem. Indeed, by "laying the foundations for a system of co-operation, good-neighbourliness, co-responsibility and interdependence between all countries in the region with respect for human rights" it might be hoped to obtain "respect for the legitimate rights of all peoples in the region, including those of the Palestinian people" (Recommendation 497). Nor is the Assembly unaware that "there is growing concern over the increasing threat of Islamic fundamentalist movements, while in some of these countries terrorism may endanger the stability of society" (Recommendation 538).

78. Finally, as regards cultural co-operation, the Assembly has declared itself "convinced that co-operation between universities and institutes for research into and studies of security matters on the northern and southern shores of the Mediterranean might lead to better mutual understanding" (Recommendation 538).

79. This non-exhaustive description shows clearly that the WEU Assembly has steadfastly followed problems and issues in the Mediterranean region, noting the facts, insisting on important points and formulating recommendations so as to make a contribution to the evolution in progress in this region. Nevertheless, its limited resources do not allow it to play as active a rôle as other parliamentary institutions. This is one of the reasons why it has delayed implementing the decisions of the Council of Ministers for intensifying the dialogue with the countries on the southern shore of the Mediterranean (Egypt, Israel and the Maghreb countries). Indeed, the Assembly has not been in a position to take practical measures to this effect, for example by granting guest or observer status to the parliamentarians of the countries concerned, a deficiency it would be desirable to make good in the months to come.
The Gulf war highlighted the dangers of proliferation of advanced conventional munitions and weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East:

(i) Both Arab countries and Israel have the ability to project power over far greater distances than in the past (Scud missiles, SSMs, etc.).

(ii) There has been an increase in the sophistication of combat aircraft in the region, with greater capability to project power over long distances using in-flight refuelling and long-range stand-off weapons.

(iii) There is a prospect for further nuclear proliferation in combination with long-range delivery systems.

(iv) There have been great improvements in artillery and rocket systems that can reach targets up to 100 km away. Modern multiple rocket launch systems [MRLS] have ranges in excess of 60 km, and they will increase in the future. Next generations of cruise missiles will be able to hit targets perhaps over 1000 km away.

The introduction of such technology into a highly unstable region with unresolved conflicts can only exacerbate existing tensions and it increases the danger of an escalating arms race. The playing fields are uneven. One country (Israel) already possesses a formidable nuclear force while others possess very significant chemical, biological and missile capabilities. The asymmetrical nature of the pace of the military build-up itself can be a source of instability.

This is why arms control and confidence-building have surfaced as a key goal for the post Gulf war, post cold war Middle East. The immediate objective of Middle East arms control – to assure that Iraq never again assembles a large and dangerous arsenal – should not distract from the other concerns:

(i) Military upgrading and modernisation in Egypt, Israel, Turkey and Syria.

(ii) Continuing chemical weapons programmes of Syria and Libya.

(iii) Sophisticated nuclear weapons and missile programmes in Israel, and growing nuclear ambitions of Iran and Libya.

(iv) Certainty that large quantities of military equipment made surplus as a result of conventional arms reduction in Europe will find their way to the Middle East and the Mediterranean region.

A variety of confidence-building and arms limitation proposals have been advanced in initiatives such as the one proposed by the United States in May 1991. The key elements of the United States plan included:

(i) a proposal to freeze and eventually ban the purchase, production and testing of SSMs;

(ii) a global ban on chemical and biological weapons;

(iii) an effort by key suppliers to identify the most dangerous conventional weapons in the region and curb their sales (suppliers would also inform each other of major sales);

(iv) a verifiable ban on the production and acquisition of weaponsusable enriched uranium and plutonium.

The 1991 Middle East arms control initiative, heavily dependent on diplomatic breakthroughs (especially in Syria) and changes in the domestic priorities of other Arab countries, made virtually no progress. The five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council – also the five principal weapons suppliers – met several times to discuss mutual restraints on conventional arms sales to the Middle East. However, they agreed on nothing but banal generalities before the effort collapsed in 1992. At the same time major new arms sales to the region by all the key suppliers were announced. A new forum among arms suppliers aimed at co-ordinating and reducing transfers could be organised, but competitive pressures make it unlikely that supplier restraint will achieve much without direct support from recipient countries as well. It thus appears that, in the future, Middle East arms restraint will rely more on domestic factors and informal understandings than on formal international agreements. This undoubtedly is an improvement over the uninhibited competition of the past, but it still is a weak basis for long-term stability.

One positive development on specific arms control relates to progress on chemical weapons.
The draft Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), negotiated for over twenty years at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, was sent to the United Nations General Assembly for signature and ratification in 1992. It opened for signature in Paris on 13th January 1993, but it still has not entered into force and is unlikely to do so before 1996. The signatories include Algeria, Greece, Iran, Israel, Mauritania, Morocco, Tunisia and Turkey. Greece deposited the instruments of ratification. Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Libya and Syria have not signed yet. Led by Egypt, the League of Arab states threatened to boycott the convention in December 1992, demanding that Israel first eliminate its nuclear weapons. However, several Arab nations broke ranks to join the CWC as early as January 1993. Most countries in the Middle East will probably sign it eventually, although most Arab countries are unlikely to ratify it until some linkage with Israel’s nuclear weapons is forthcoming.

As far as biological weapons are concerned, the Biological Weapons Convention was signed on 10th April 1972 and it entered into force on 26th March 1975. Most countries in the Middle East and in North Africa signed it (except Algeria, Israel and Mauritania), but very few took further action.

In 1991, as part of the Madrid peace process, minimal arms talks were organised under the Arms Control and Security Working Group (ACRS). The ACRS Working Group held five plenary sessions; however, progress was slow as parties focused on drafting a document of intents. One major obstacle was Egypt’s push for all nations in the region to sign the NPT and Israel’s refusal to do so. Moreover, Syria’s refusal to participate (along with the absence of Iran, Iraq and Lebanon) undermined the credibility of the talks and highlighted the extent of regional differences. However, the ACRS talks have not been completely unproductive. The most tangible accomplishment is an agreement to establish a network of Middle East conflict-prevention centres in Egypt, Israel and Jordan, with a co-ordination centre in The Hague to share information on troop movements and exercises.

As far as multilateral agreements on nuclear weapons are concerned, Algeria, Egypt, Greece, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia and Turkey all signed and/or acceded to the Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT). The Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) was ratified by Egypt, Greece, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Libya, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia and Turkey. Mauritania acceded to the NPT in October 1993 and Algeria joined in January 1995. Israel has not signed the NPT and does not intend to do so until a stable peace is institutionalised in the region. All those signatories are IAEA member-states (except Mauritania), and IAEA safeguards agreements are in force in all countries in the region except Algeria and Syria.

In May 1995 the NPT Conference agreed to extend the treaty indefinitely, without Israel and despite fierce opposition by Egypt and the Arab League. The latter eventually acceded to indefinite extension of the NPT, while emphasising that it was a majority decision and that they did not agree with the majority. The importance of the creation of a Middle East Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (NWFZ) was emphasised both during the ACRS talks and in a specific resolution of the final document passed by Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States. One of the extension resolutions of the NPT Conference also emphasised the objective of creating a NWFZ; it stated that “the development of NWFZs, especially in regions of tension, such as the Middle East, as well as the establishment of zones free of all weapons of mass destruction (WMD) should be encouraged as a matter of priority.” The NPT Conference also passed a specific resolution on the Middle East, which called on all states in the region to join the NPT and to accept IAEA safeguards, but which did not mention Israel by name.

Some analysts have argued that the Middle East and the Mediterranean region may be moving towards an era of strategic deterrence based on the acquisition of WMDs. According to those analysts, the era of massive conventional arming and conventional wars experienced in the region between the 1950s and 1980s is basically over. The inability of most Middle Eastern states to provide for national security by conventional means impels them to the logic of relying on WMDs, which are less costly to states in terms of political and social stability, regime legitimacy or economic development. Middle Eastern states will probably continue to seek effective military power in the future, and for most of them (especially those that cannot rely on political and military support from outside powers), the solution lies in the creation of a strategic deterrent based on WMDs.

**Algeria**

**Conventional military capability**

Numerically, Algeria is only second to Libya on a regional scale, but it is clearly superior to Morocco both in terms of area defence, air-to-surface systems and interceptors, and in numbers of tanks and ships. However, most of the matériel is obsolete and decaying, and troops are not trained for modern combat.

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1. We consider nuclear weapons (NW), chemical weapons (CW), biological weapons (BW) and ballistic missiles (BM) to be weapons of mass destruction (WMD).
Muslim extremist terrorists continue their campaign, targeting foreigners as much as the security forces. The failure of the extensive paramilitary and security forces to deal effectively with internal insurgencies is drawing the regular military into this task. The Algerian Government, with some French aid, is transforming a traditional conventional armoured and mechanised heavy army into a more mobile force with night-fighting capabilities to deal with Islamic insurgents on a continuous 24 hour basis.

Military budget

The military budget figures seem to be increasing as of 1990, whereas military expenditure figures tend to diminish. A possible explanation could be that the economic difficulties experienced by Algeria have led to a freeze in real military expenditures, while military budgets have been inflated to cope with the civil war. In Algerian dinars, the military budget rose from 6,070 in 1990 to 10,757 in 1993. In 1994, the budget amounted $1.1bn.

High technology equipment / Modernisation

The army has ten more 2S3 152 mm SP guns. During 1992, fifty-three APCs were imported from Egypt.

For the air force, Algeria recently acquired ten SU-24 strike bombers which gave it a long-distance attack capability thanks to in-flight refuelling. The rest of the force is composed of rather obsolete aircraft (including 14 MiG-25 Foxbat A, 70 MiG-23 MF Flogger G and 50 MiG-23/27 Flogger B/D). It recently acquired fifteen more Mi-8/17 helicopters (5 attack models, 10 transport models). The most advanced AS weapons are AS-10 Karen and AS-14 Kedge.

The navy combat forces include four SS, three FF, 8 corvettes, 11-12 FAC, all obsolete materiel of Soviet origin, except for two SS submarines Kilo-class.

Weapons of mass destruction (WMD)

Ballistic missiles (BM):

Algeria has tactical missile capability. It possesses 18 launching facilities for FROG-7 (called 'Luna' in Russia) and FROG-4, with 50 missiles [Or: 12 FROG-7 launching pads with 32 missiles]. The FROG-7 has a range of 70 km.

Chemical weapons (CW):

Algeria seems to have the research capability to obtain chemical agents but there is no evidence of operative capability. There are no apparent signs of activity to reach such a goal.

Nuclear weapons (NW):

As of 1989 Algeria possesses a research reactor in Ouera, which was built with the collaboration of Argentina. This reactor was placed under voluntary safeguards in an agreement which entered into force on 9th April 1990. Algeria also has a larger plant (with a nuclear reactor of 10-15 MW provided by China) under construction. The Algerian Government agreed to place the Chinese-built reactor under safeguards and declared its willingness to keep the IAEA informed on bilateral co-operation with China.

Algeria signed the PTBT but did not take further action. It finally acceded to the NPT at the beginning of 1995. It is an IAEA member-state but IAEA safeguards agreements are not in force yet.

Morocco

Modernisation

Recently, the Moroccan army has taken delivery of 240 United States M-60A3 tanks. Two Italian-built frigates, originally destined for Iraq, have not yet been delivered.

Nuclear capability

Morocco signed the PTBT in 1966, and it ratified the NPT in November 1970. It is an IAEA member state and IAEA safeguards are in force. Morocco also ratified the Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials.

There are no nuclear facilities in Morocco. However, the government has mentioned that it planned to build a nuclear plant by 2010-2020.

Mauritania

Mauritania signed the PTBT in 1964 and acceded to the NPT in October 1993. It is not an IAEA member-state and does not possess any nuclear reactor.

It has not signed the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC).

Tunisia

Tunisia signed the PTBT in 1965 and ratified the NPT in February 1970. It is an IAEA member-state and IAEA safeguards are in force. It does not have any nuclear facility.

Libya

Conventional military capability

For many years the most troublesome Middle East dangers appeared to come from Libya, where Colonel Mu'ammar Kadafi sup-
ported every trendy revolutionary group and built up massive stockpiles of advanced military hardware – far more than his nation could ever deploy.

Libya was the first export client for Soviet weapon systems like the Su-24 strike bomber and the MiG-25 interceptor. Its purchases were also instrumental in the emergence of new arms exporters such as Brazil.

The earliest restraints on arms proliferation in Libya came from abroad: China and Pakistan refused to share nuclear warheads; Brazil and the Soviet Union turned down requests for long-range ballistic missiles. Tired of Kadhafi’s political and military excesses, Moscow became increasingly less sympathetic. After the embarrassing defeat of his forces in Chad in 1987, even Kadhafi lost interest in military adventure. Economically weakened and politically isolated, Libya ceased much of its previous support for terrorism and allowed its military establishment to atrophy.

Libyan helicopter holdings have been reassessed: there are now 65 attack helicopters (5 more Mi-24 and 15 more Mi-35) and 19 more transport helicopters (Mi8/-17 and Mi-2).

The navy combat forces include six SS (Foxtrot), 3 FF, 7 corvettes, 9 modern FAC and 15 older FAC.

Military budget

Military expenditures (calculated in constant 1985 dollars) have been decreasing steadily and quite rapidly. Even the figures at current exchange rates seem to be declining until 1991. The end of the cold war and the effects of the economic embargo have resulted in the collapse of military accounts. In 1994, the military budget amounted to $1.4bn.

Weapons of mass destruction (WMDs)

Tripoli has not ordered any major conventional weapon since 1988. The United Nations embargo on further arms sales that followed the Lockerbie incident did raise some barriers, but it did not bring Libyan arms import to a halt. Rather, it imposed a choice that Libya had already made itself: it increasingly invested in alternative technologies instead of conventional weapons, especially in chemical weapons (CW) and ballistic missiles (BM).

Ballistic missiles:

Technology transfers and research programmes conducted by technicians hired on the international market might lead to Libya increasing its longer-range missile capabilities.

Libya’s tactical missile capability:
- or FROG-7, 40 + Scud-B, 80;
- or FROG-7, 48 with a total of 144 missiles + Scud-B, 80 with a total of 240 missiles.

Chemical weapons:

In 1985, Libya built a huge chemical dual-use complex. The Rabta complex was inaugurated in 1988.

In addition to the Rabta complex, it appears that a second plant is currently under construction near Wafa, 80 km south-east of Tripoli.

So far, most of the technical assistance has come from Swiss and German companies and technicians, as well as from Japanese technicians. Also, in February 1995, Libya was suspected to have sought CW information from South Africa.

Biological weapons:

Protection and decontamination materials are available and all SSM launching sites have NBC protection. It is important to note that Libya signed the BW Convention in 1982, without taking further action.

Nuclear capabilities:

Libya has attempted to achieve nuclear capability for years and Kadhafi has called for the need of an “Islamic bomb”. However, it signed the PTBT in 1968 and joined the NPT in 1975. It also became a IAEA member state and IAEA safeguards agreements are in force. It possesses a small research reactor of 10 MW (LWR type) located in Tajora, which was provided by the Soviet Union. Moreover, it seems that work on a 40 MW reactor has begun.

Egypt

Conventional military capability/Modernisation

Egyptian armed forces are considered among the best in the Arab world, despite some deficiencies in C3 I and in the weapon/military personnel ratio. Cairo has one of the most important defence industry in the Arab world (IAO).

Egypt has been one of the greatest beneficiaries of the end of the cold war, receiving at low or no cost hundreds of 1960s-vintage M60-A3 tanks, armoured personnel carriers, and other equipment decommissioned by United States forces in Europe (e.g., Hawk Phase III SAM, C-130 transport aircraft, KC tankers, etc). This “cascade” allowed Egypt to get rid of 1950s-vintage Soviet hardware, but it has not brought a significant improvement in Egyptian offense potential.

Egypt’s navy has a strong nucleus of conventional submarines 8-10 SS (four of which are Chinese type 033). An order has been
placed recently for two conventional submarines Oberon-class from the United Kingdom, to upgrade the obsolete Russian and Chinese subforce. In addition, the first of four Chinese-built Romeo-class submarines has returned after modernisation in the United States. More serious modernisation will include the gradual acquisition of 550 M-1 tanks and some 160 F-16 fighters. The latter will constitute the real nucleus of Egypt’s future military capability. In May 1993, fifteen F-16 C/D and forty F-16 C were delivered to Egypt. The air force has also taken delivery of its first two Turkish-assembled F-16 aircraft and 44 have been ordered to be delivered by the end of 1995.

Despite the limits imposed by United States aid policy, Egypt has displayed little interest in domestic arms production and has concluded few major agreements with European or former Soviet Union suppliers; this is probably due to the nation’s economic difficulties, and because peace with Israel has removed any motive for such investment.

**Military budget**

Egypt has the highest military expenses in the region (in real terms). The end of the cold war and of the conflict with Israel have resulted in a slow but constant decrease in real military expenditures. This trend is confirmed by the GDP/military expenditures ratio.

Military Balance and SIPRI agree that there has been a constant increment in military expenditures in monetary terms (be it in billions of dollars or in millions of Egyptian pounds), but the Israeli estimate is two or three times more important than that of Military Balance. In 1994, the military budget amounted to $1.8 bn.

**Weapons of mass destruction (WMD)**

In order to compensate for the lack of nuclear capabilities and to counterbalance what Egypt perceives to be Israel’s awesome conventional and non-conventional force, the conventional military has increasingly been seeking backing up by a basic and minimum force based on chemical weapons, ballistic missiles, and possibly biological warfare agents. Egyptian analysts call these WMDs “basic deterrence” because they are less sophisticated than nuclear weapons.

**Ballistic missiles:**

Since the 1960s Egypt has been attempting to acquire serious ballistic capabilities with the assistance of various countries. For instance, a 1989 project – in collaboration with the Soviet Union for the missiles themselves, North Korea for design and technical assistance, and Iraq for financing – led to the development of the Scud 100 (which has an estimated range of 600 km). It is important to note that the Scud 100 has the same characteristic as the so-called Scud-PIP (Product Improvement Plan) developed in North Korea with Egyptian and Japanese assistance. North Korea is also a regular supplier of domestically produced Scud-B missiles for Egypt.

**Chemical weapons:**

Egypt’s chemical capabilities are also extensive. It is worth mentioning that it still refuses to join the CW Convention unless Israel joins the NPT. Egypt produces most of its decontamination materials and possesses Soviet NBC protection. A number of plants for the production of blood and nerve agents (with small stocks of bombs, shells and launchers) still exist today. Moreover, industrial infrastructure that could allow the rapid production of hydrogen cyanide is also available.

In 1992 Israeli sources pointed to Egypt’s CW production capability, but did not allude to the possible deployment of CW, since a defensive capability was considered sufficient by Egypt.

**Biological weapons:**

Egypt has signed but not ratified the BW Convention, and it is believed to have developed biological warfare agents by the early 1970s.

**Nuclear weapons:**

Egypt signed the PTBT in 1964 and ratified the NPT in February 1971. It is a IAEA member state and IAEA safeguards agreements are in force.

It possesses one research reactor of 2 MW, later upgraded to 5 MW with East German and French assistance, located at Inshas. Construction of a 22 MW research reactor supplied by Argentina began in autumn 1994. In an interview published on 1st August 1994, Chair of the Egyptian Atomic Energy Authority Fawzi Hammad said Egypt planned to build the reactor to use “in the field of agriculture, industry, technology and monitoring of radiation.” In addition, the existing reactor at Inshas would be modernised as well. Egypt also planned to begin mining uranium deposits in Sinai and the eastern desert before 1997. It would install laboratories, research devices and equipment near the mining operations to process the uranium ore. This would be strictly for energy purposes. Another project, still lacking funding, is an accord with Westinghouse for a Sidi Kreir-1 600 MW reactor (PWR type) and with Framatome for two 2000 MW reactors (PWR type), to be located at Al Da’aba.

Even though one of the key people in the Iraqi Osiraq project was an Egyptian engineer, Egypt does not seem to be seriously engaged in military nuclear projects. It seems to have made the decision that its security does not require nuclear weapons a long time ago. Egypt has been taking a strong position against the introduction or proliferation of nuclear weapons in the region. However, whether this traditional position will be maintained by the Egyptian Government remains
to be seen. In May 1995 the NPT was indefinitely extended, without Israel's inclusion and against Egypt's will. After the 1995 NPT Conference, Arab analysts and intellectuals began debating the question whether Arab nuclearisation might be desirable or feasible. Egyptians have taken a lead in these debates.

**Israel**

**Military capability**

The Israeli defence industry is undoubtedly the best one in the Middle East and it has international renown. It has developed considerable tactical and strategic missile and space capabilities, and the aerospace and conventional arms industry is extremely advanced. However, the decrease in military budgets is forcing the defence industry to diversify production (circa 30% is now produced for civilian use) and to conduct an aggressive export policy.

It is worth mentioning that the end of the 1991 war did not trigger an Israeli military investment programme comparable to those that followed previous wars. Despite the fact that Israel's economy is healthier than it has been in more than a decade, growing by over 5% a year in the mid-1990s, defence is being cut. Instead of building it up, Israeli leaders seek to trim defence where possible while preserving existing military capabilities.

**Military budget**

Military expenditures as a share of GDP decreased from 1988 to 1991, even if expenditures in real terms have slightly increased during the Gulf war. In 1994, the military budget amounted to $7.2bn.

**High technology equipment / Modernisation**

The Israeli army has taken delivery of sixty more Merkava III tanks and a new heavy APC, the Achzarit, is being introduced (no other army has introduced heavy APCs). The army is also purchasing a number of MLRS from the United States.

The navy has commissioned the first of three Eilat-class corvettes. The Eilat are Sa'ar 5 and are being built in the United States, but with weapons systems installed in Israel. They are armed with Harpoon and Gabriel SSM as well as Barak SAM, and can embark a helicopter. In February 1994 the Kiodon missile craft, a Sa'ar 4.5, was relaunched (Sa'ar 4.5 models are rebuilt and improved Reshef-class missile boats and will also be armed with Harpoon, Gabriel and Barak).

The air force listing has been substantially revised. The conversion of two squadrons from F-4E to Phantom 2000 has been completed. Additional numbers of Kfir, F-4E and A-4 aircraft have been taken out of squadron service; (some may be refurbished and offered for export). The air force is to purchase some twenty F-15 I, costing about $100m each, and there are plans to replace the remaining Kfir and A-4 aircraft with fifty second-hand F-16 from surplus United States air force stocks. (Delivery began in August 1994). Finally, the air force attack helicopter capability has been increased by adding twenty four more AH-64A Apache helicopters.

In January 1994 Israeli industries unveiled a new missile warning device, Pino, which employs passive, electro-optic technology. Development of the ATBM Arrow continues, largely financed by the United States, although Arrow is no longer a component of the United States ballistic missile defence programme. An Arrow test was made in June 1994 when a target missile was successfully intercepted for the first time. In July 1995 Israel conducted the first test launch of the Arrow-2 missile. Israeli officials said that the Arrow-2 medium-range ballistic missiles interceptor could be deployed operationally within 18 months. It has a range of 100 km and an intercept altitude of 40 km.

Israel launched the Ofeq-3 surveillance satellite in April 1995; it is believed to be the first link in a space-based ballistic early warning system which Israel is developing to counter the perceived missile threat from neighbouring countries. A communication satellite, Amos-1 (possibly with the capability of eavesdropping on Arab satellites) was scheduled for launch in September 1995.

**Weapons of mass destruction (WMD)**

**Nuclear weapons (NW) and ballistic missiles (BM):**

Israel signed the PTBT in 1964. However, it has not joined the NPT. (The treaty was extended indefinitely in 1995 excluding Israel). It is an IAEA member state and IAEA safeguards agreements are in force, although the state still does not accept full-scope inspections. In 1981, the IAEA suspended technical assistance to Israel because it refused to allow some verifications. Israel also signed the Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials.

The government argues that a political peace settlement would need to be in place before Israel could support nuclear disarmament efforts. However, while attending an ACRS meeting in Jordan in November 1994, Mr. Peres signalled that Israel would accept inspection of its facilities once a comprehensive peace was reached in the region and after an accord had been reached on ridding the region of NW. Israel does support the creation of a Middle East NWFZ, but it views such multilateral agreement as the last step in the peace process. The Israeli position focuses on
confidence-building measures (CBMs) and political accommodation – such as those that took place in the ACRS talks – as the necessary precursors. Mr. Rabin once said that Israel would call for a series of bilateral nuclear agreements with the various Arab countries.

Israel, generally believed to have nuclear weapons, has nevertheless stated that it would not be the first to introduce them to the region. It bombed Iraq’s Osiraq reactor in June 1981 and took further steps to deter other countries.

In 1956 a French-Israeli accord led to the construction of a nuclear reactor in the Negev desert at Dimona. The 26 MW reactor was upgraded to 150 MW. Nuclear proliferation analysts have estimated that Israel possesses a diversified nuclear and thermonuclear arsenal of 100 to 200 warheads. Those warheads can be divided into two types: (a) on the Israeli air force; and (b) on the Israeli navy. The latter work is probably much slower in progress.

In November 1993, a specialised review in Washington revealed that a secret launching base for Jericho I and Jericho 2 missiles existed near Jerusalem.

Israel cancelled plans for a third nuclear power station in March 1994. In September 1994, the IAEA restored technical assistance to Israel. The international community is currently attempting to convince Israel to block the production of fissile material for military use in the plants that still are not under IAEA supervision. A fissile material cut-off has been proposed to Israel as part of a compromise on the NPT by the Clinton Administration. (Israel and the United States met in May 1995 in Helsinki to discuss the fissile material ban. This could be a future-oriented bargain, explicitly ignoring the past while implicitly acknowledging its reality. It would require Israel to accept some kind of verification of its adherence, but would not affect past production. On 5th April 1995 Foreign Ministers Peres and Moussa met in Paris to discuss some formulas that might reassure Egypt while not committing Israel to acknowledge its nuclear arsenal. The two sides agreed to upgrade the multilateral arms control talks to the level of Foreign Ministers.

Israel and Jordan signed a peace treaty in October 1994. It was the first between Israel and an Arab country since the 1979 treaty with Egypt. The third and final stage of the Arab-Israeli peace process, scheduled to begin in May 1996, will include negotiations on security arrangements. In September 1995 a major agreement was concluded by Israel and the Palestinians. The Egyptian and Jordanian leaders were present, but Syria was missing.

Syria

Military capability

The futility of building further numerical superiority became evident to Damascus in 1986. Syrian officials ceased speaking of pursuit of “strategic parity” with Israel and allowed defense purchases to decline rapidly. Purchase of Soviet-style equipment continues to this day, but at a much slower pace.

Since 1988, a total of 70 MiG-29 aircraft have been ordered to replace a force of some 300 obsolete MiG-21s and MiG-23s. The MiG-29 force may grow to 120-150 by the end of the decade.

It has become increasingly difficult for Syria to match Israel’s qualitative superiority; hence the recent shift in Syrian policy. A political dialogue with Israel was one result. Another result was a long-term shift in armament strategy, placing less emphasis on the ability to win wars through conventional forces; instead, Syria will increasingly tend to rely on WMDs.

Weapons of mass destruction (WMD)

Syria signed the PTBT in 1964 and ratified the NPT as early as September 1969. It has been an IAEA member state for a long time but only signed IAEA safeguards agreements in 1992. Syria also signed the BW Convention without taking further action.

Syria has no nuclear weapons nor a nuclear programme to obtain them. However, in 1985 and 1986, the Syrian defence minister declared that the Soviet Union would guarantee delivery of nuclear weapons if Israel attacked with nuclear weapons.

In 1991 China’s sale of a micro-reactor caused a certain amount of concern, but Syria abandoned plans for a small power reactor in October 1992.

Before and during the 1995 NPT Conference, Syria called upon Israel to accede to the NPT so that the states of the region would be able to agree on extending the treaty. Foreign Minister Farouk-al-Shara told the first committee of the UNGA that the accession of all states in the Middle East to the NPT constituted a vital step toward transforming the region into a WMDs-free zone.

Greece and Turkey

Taking advantage of NATO’s ability to reduce conventional forces under the CFE treaty by “cascading” them into alliance partners, Greece and Turkey each received hundreds of tanks and other pieces of equipment in 1993, coming mostly from the United States and Germany. Turkey alone received 1 017 tanks and Greece accepted delivery of 725 tanks.
### CFE ceilings to be reached by November 1995

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### National holdings of treaty-limited equipment

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