

ASSEMBLY OF WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION

THIRTY-FIFTH ORDINARY SESSION

(First Part)

**State of European security – intervention forces
and reinforcement for the centre and the north**

REPORT

submitted on behalf of
the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments
by Mr. Speed, Rapporteur

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Motion for a recommendation on the exchange of armed forces personnel
between the national units of the individual member nations

1. Adopted unanimously by the committee.

2. *Members of the committee:* Mr. Kittelmann (Chairman); MM. de Beer (Alternate: *Maris*), *Fourré* (Vice-Chairmen); Mr. Alloncle (Alternate: *Baumel*), Mrs. *Baarveld-Schlaman*, MM. Cariglia (Alternate: *Mezzapesa*), *Cox*, De Decker, Derycke (Alternate: *Kempinaire*), *Ewing*, *Fiandrotti*, *Fillon*, *Fioret* (Alternate: *Fassino*), *Irmer*, *Jung*, *Konen*, *de Kwaadsteniet*, Mrs. *Lalumière*, MM. *Pecchioli*, *Scheer*, *Sinesio*, *Sir Dudley Smith*, MM. *Speed*, *Steiner*, *Steverlynck* (Alternate: *Uyttendaele*), *Sir John Stokes*, Mr. *Zierer*.

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

Rapporteur's Preface

In preparation for his report:

The Rapporteur took part as an observer (on 22nd and 23rd September 1988) in the exercise Free Lion in the Federal Republic of Germany.

He also had the following interviews:

11th October 1988

Headquarters of the rapid action force (FAR), Maisons-Laffitte, France

General Henry Préaud, Commanding Officer, FAR.

The Rapporteur was also invited to the presentation of the FAR at Canjuers, near Draguignan, on 25th October 1988.

9th and 10th November 1988

SHAPE, Mons, Belgium

General John R. Galvin, United States Army, Supreme Allied Commander, Europe;

General Sir John Akehurst, United Kingdom Army, Deputy Supreme Allied Commander, Europe;

Vice Admiral Fiorenzo Rosso, Italian Navy, Deputy Chief-of-staff, Support;

Rear Admiral James Weatherall, Royal Navy, Deputy Assistant Chief-of-staff, Operations;

Minister Counsellor Don Gelber, Special Assistant for International Affairs;

Mr. Harry Brown, Special Assistant, Strategic and global events; Captain Nick Paige, Royal Navy, Deputy United Kingdom National Military Representative;

Col. Farrar-Hockley, United Kingdom Army;

Lt. Col. Heidler, Danish Army, Operations Division;

Commander Rath, German Navy, Policy Division.

14th December 1988

Ministry of Defence, The Hague, Netherlands

Mr. Frits Bolkestein, Minister of Defence;

Rear Admiral H. van Foreest, Director of Personnel, RNLN;

Commodore J.W. Stuurman, Deputy Chief Operations, Naval Staff.

Headquarters RNLMC, Rotterdam, and Royal Netherlands Marine Corps, Doorn

Major-General Willem J.I. van Breukelen, Commandant RNLMC;

Col. G.G. Weenink, RNLMC, Commanding Officer, Marine Barracks, Doorn.

15th December 1988

Dutch Parliament, The Hague

Mr. W.F. van Eekelen, former Minister of Defence.

The Rapporteur was invited to attend the inauguration ceremony of the Franco-German brigade which took place in Böblingen, Federal Republic of Germany, on 12th January 1989.

After the ceremony, discussions were held with:

General Gilbert Forray, French Army, Chief of the Army Staff;
 Lieutenant-General Henning von Ondarza, German Army, Inspector of the Bundeswehr;
 Brigadier-General Helmut Willmann, Ministry of Defence, Bonn;
 Brigadier-General Jean-Pierre Sengeisen, French Army, Commandant, Franco-German
 brigade;
 Colonel Günther Wassenberg, Germany Army, Deputy Commandant.

24th January 1989

Headquarters 24th Airmobile Brigade, Catterick, United Kingdom

Brigadier A.I.G. Kennedy, OBE, Commanding Officer;
 Major Charles Sloane, Gordon Highlanders, Chief-of-Staff.

7th February 1989

NATO Air Base, Geilenkirchen, Federal Republic of Germany

Col. C.M. van den Hoven, RNLAF, Deputy Commander;
 Col. Eugene Deibert, USAF, Assistant to the Commander for Special Projects.

In the course of his visit, the Rapporteur was given an in-flight demonstration of the NATO AWACS (airborne warning and control system).

The committee as a whole held meetings and was briefed as follows:

Norway

13th June 1988

Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Oslo

Mr. Dagfin Stenseth, Director, Planning Department.

Storting, Norwegian Parliament, Oslo

Mr. Thor Knudsen (Conservative), Vice-Chairman of the Committee on Defence;
 Mr. Rikard Olsvik (Labour Party), Elected Secretary of the Committee on Defence;
 Mrs. Marit Lovvig (Conservative), member of the committee;
 Mr. Age Ramberg (Christian Democrat), member of the committee;
 Mrs. Aud Blattmann (Labour Party), member of the committee;
 Mr. Hans J. Rosjorde (Party of Progress), member of the committee;
 Mrs. Kaci Kullmann Five (Conservative), member of the committee;
 Mr. Jan Petersen (Conservative), member of the committee;
 Mrs. Ingeborg Botnen (Labour Party), member of the committee.

Institute for Defence Studies

Mr. Olav Riste, Director of the Institute;
 Mr. Rolf Tamnes, senior research associate;
 Lt. General Tonne Huitfeldt, Strategic Studies Co-ordinator;
 Dr. Tomas Ries, research fellow;
 Mr. Ragnvald Solstrand, Director of the Defence Research Institute;
 Vice Admiral C. Lütken, research associate;
 Dr. Finn Sollie, expert consultant;
 Captain Gjelsten, Naval Staff College;
 Mr. John Kristen Skogan, research fellow, Institute of International Affairs.

MS CARNEVAL, Oslo Fjord

Mr. Johan Jorgen Holst, Minister of Defence.

14th June 1988

Ministry of Defence, Oslo

Mr. Finn Molvig, Director-General, Ministry of Defence;
Rear Admiral Per Sollien, Headquarters Defence Command;
Mr. Tom Eidesen, Policy Division;
Captain Arne Sperbund, Headquarters Defence Command.

Headquarters Allied Forces Northern Europe, Kolsas

Rear Admiral K.J. Steindorff, GE N, Chief-of-Staff, AFNORTH;
Major-General J. Schriver, DA A;
Rear Admiral J. Ruth, DA N;
Brig. General P.J. Rowe, USMC;
Brig. General D.R. Williams, CA AF;
Colonel J.M. von Radowitz, GE A;
Colonel L. Ness, NO A.

CS FINNMARKEN (at sea)

Commodore Per Anton Enghaug, Commanding Officer, Narvik Naval District.

15th June 1988

Headquarters Defence Command Northern Norway, Reitan

Brigadier Alv Midthun, Chief-of-Staff;
Colonel Per Bothun, No AF, Deputy Chief-of-Staff Plans and Operations;
Captain (N) Torbjorn Romuld, No N, Allied Naval Forces North Norway.

Bodo Main Air Station

Brigadier Egil Omdal, No AF, Commanding Officer Bodo Main Air Station;
Major Rolf Noel, No AF, Commanding Officer 331 Squadron.

Denmark

16th June 1988

Foreign Ministry, Copenhagen

Mr. Uffe Ellemann-Jensen, Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Folketing (Danish Parliament), Copenhagen

(morning)

Mr. Bjoern Elmquist (Liberal), Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee;
Mr. Hans Haekkerup (Social Democrat), member of the committee;
Mrs Ritt Bjerregaard (Social Democrat), member of the committee;
Mr. Anker Soergensen (Social Democrat), member of the committee;
Mr. Hanne Severinsen (Liberal), member of the committee;
Mrs Connie Hedegaard (Conservative), member of the committee;
Mr. Per Stig Moeller (Conservative), member of the committee;
Mr. B. Bollmann (Centre Democrat), member of the committee.

(afternoon)

Mr. Knud Enggaard, Minister of Defence.

17th June 1988

Defence headquarters, Vedbaek

Lieutenant-General Joergen Lyng, Acting Chief of the Defence Staff;
Lieutenant-Colonel O.L. Kandborg;
Major T. Kruger;
Commander L. Kragelund;

Major B. Cornelius;
Major O. Kruger;
Major T.E. Vimmerslev;
Colonel S. Schriver.

Stevnsfortet

Major-General H. Havning;
Commander (SG) P. Garde.

Iceland

20th June 1988

NATO base, Keflavik

Rear Admiral Eric McVadon, USN, Commandant of the Iceland Defence Force;
Colonel L. Aikman, Operations Officer;
Lieutenant-Colonel R. St. Laurent, Logistics Officer.

21st June 1988

Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Reykjavik

Mr. Helgi Agustsson, Deputy Permanent Under-Secretary;
Mr. Stula Sigurjonsson, First Secretary of the Defence Department.

Althingi (Icelandic Parliament)

Mr. Johann Einvarðsson (Progressive Party), Vice-President of the United Althingi;
Mr. Kjartan Johannsson (Social Democrat), Deputy Chairman of the Committee for Foreign Affairs;
Mr. Pall Petursson (Progressive Party);
Mr. Ingi Bjorn Albertsson (Citizens Party).

Pingholt

Mr. Hannes Hafstein, Permanent Under-Secretary, Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

United Kingdom

3rd November 1988, London

The Hon. Archie Hamilton, MP, United Kingdom Minister of State for the Armed Forces.

4th November 1988, HQ RAF Strike Command, High Wycombe

Air Chief Marshal Sir Patrick Hine, KCB, FRAeS RAF, Air Officer Commanding in Chief;
Air Vice Marshal Anthony Woodford, Chief-of-Staff.

France

6th February 1989, Paris

Mr. Jean-Pierre Chevènement, French Minister of Defence.

Federal Republic of Germany

25th and 26th April 1989, Bonn

Mr. Helmut Schäfer, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs;
Mr. Alfred Biehle, Chairman of the Parliamentary Defence Committee;
Mr. Willy Wimmer, Parliamentary State Secretary.

The committee and the Rapporteur wish to express their special thanks to all the ministers, officials and senior officers who briefed the Rapporteur or the committee and replied to questions, and also in particular, to the Secretary of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, Mr. C.R.K. Cameron.

Draft Recommendation

*on the state of European security –
intervention forces and reinforcement for the centre and the north*

The Assembly,

- (i) Welcoming the improved relations between NATO and Warsaw Pact countries, the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan and the arms reduction agreements that have been achieved or are being negotiated;
- (ii) Noting nevertheless that the USSR and its allies are still maintaining a high level of arms production and that the present disarmament agreements have been reached by NATO maintaining its own high level of security and unity of purpose;
- (iii) Recognising that it will be politically difficult to maintain western defence budgets in real terms, let alone increase them;
- (iv) Underlining therefore the increased urgency of making as cost effective as possible existing procurement, personnel, and command, control and communication systems;
- (v) Stressing the key strategic importance to NATO of reinforcement and resupply from North America to Europe, which itself can act as a deterrent in time of tension, and increases the importance of the northern flank,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

Urge member governments to recommend to NATO:

1. That the highest priority be given to improving command, control and communication systems:
 - (a) firstly, aircraft “ identification friend or foe ” (IFF) systems, to achieve a high-grade common standard in NATO air operations which is now long overdue;
 - (b) secondly, in interoperability of tactical radio equipment between multinational units;
 - (c) thirdly, in communication, tactics and doctrine, for better control of the land/air battle;
2. That France be encouraged to join the United Kingdom in taking part with its four Boeing E-3 AWACS *ab initio* in the training and development of the teams destined for the alliance air defence system aircraft;
3. That in view of the importance of the northern flank in securing maritime and air superiority for transatlantic reinforcement and resupply, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands should reach an early decision on new amphibious ships;
4. That in view of the withdrawal of Canadian forces from the northern flank, apart from their replacement by other allies, consideration should be given to the skilled elements of the force d’action rapide being assigned to Norway;
5. That still greater efforts be made on weapon and ammunition standardisation, interoperability of equipment and more cost-effective joint procurement ventures;
6. That through the member countries of WEU the following steps should be taken to give practical expression to the European pillar of defence:
 - (a) encourage more multinational units such as the United Kingdom-Netherlands landing force and the Franco-German brigade;
 - (b) take specific action to allow at an individual level the exchange of military personnel between countries to enhance their awareness of European co-operation, give them greater opportunity for travel and a more interesting work environment, and serve as a useful recruiting incentive at a time when the demographic levels are making recruiting most difficult;
7. That proper recognition and understanding be given to greater concepts of speed and flexibility in European forces to meet the changing situation in Europe. The doctrines and equipment which underly the force d’action rapide and 24 Airmobile Brigade are good examples that could be emulated and enhanced throughout the alliance (although dedicated helicopter lift capacity for 24 Brigade is an essential priority).

Explanatory Memorandum

(submitted by Mr. Speed, Rapporteur)

I. Introduction

1.1. In recent years, the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments has produced a range of reports concerning various aspects of European security:

- "The state of European security", November 1982, Rapporteur: Mr. Blaauw (Document 936), looked at maritime surveillance, certain national contributions to allied defence and conventional weapons and NATO strategy;
- "European security and burden-sharing in the alliance", November 1983, Rapporteur: Mr. Wilkinson (Document 959), dealt with a perennial subject under the headings of: the concept of allied defence, measuring and comparing the defence effort, the transatlantic debate, the European pillar and defence production;
- "The state of European security", May 1984, Rapporteur: Sir Dudley Smith (Document 971), considered the implications of membership of NATO, the status of individual countries and intermediate-range nuclear forces;
- "The state of European security - the central region", May 1985, Rapporteur: Dr. Miller (Document 1018), reviewed levels of forces in the central region and the rôle of allied forces on the central front.

Other reports have provided regular updating of the situation in the Mediterranean (the southern flank) (the latest being Document 1073, October 1986, Rapporteur: Mr. Kittelmann), and further afield.

1.2. The aim of this present report is:

- (a) to examine aspects of allied reinforcement for the central region and the north, in the light of current ideas regarding intervention forces generally and bi- and multilateral co-operation in particular;
- (b) to highlight various problem areas and propose possible solutions.

1.3. Producing such a report as this in the context of today's rapidly evolving political situation is no easy matter. Initiatives and proposals abound, for example, as East and West manoeuvre on the arms control scene. There are

indications that we may be about to enter a state of "super-détente" in Europe and nobody hopes that this may be so more fervently than your Rapporteur.

1.4. However, whatever one's hopes for the future, there is no escaping today's realities which remain major preoccupations for we Western Europeans, especially where our defence is concerned. We all trust that the present spirit of good-will and openness will prevail and be translated into genuine acts to reduce and eventually remove any perceived threat. That "trust" will be eroded, however, if capabilities are not modified to match recently-declared intentions. In another report ("Current aspects of arms control", Rapporteur: Mr. de Beer), being prepared in parallel with this one, these changing dimensions and relationships are examined in detail and recommendations made which should help achieve "super-détente" even more quickly, if implemented by the Council.

1.5. Meanwhile, the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments has also to consider the present setting, where in the context of reducing working populations, sometimes faltering national economies and changing public attitudes towards defence, the governments of member countries and other NATO allies have to make important decisions in order to secure the best use of diminishing resources.

1.6. In 1988, the committee was invited by the governments and parliaments of Denmark, Iceland and Norway to make a fact-finding visit to those countries to see some of the problems of the "northern" areas at first hand and for exchanges of views on the state of European security. Although none of the countries concerned is a member of Western European Union, it is worthy of note that the visit took place in the run-up to Portugal and Spain's membership of the organisation and that a great deal of interest was shown in Denmark and Norway, by both parliamentarians and the media, in the conditions for WEU membership. This subject is considered further in a current report being prepared by the General Affairs Committee on "The future of European security", Rapporteur: Mr. van der Sanden.

II. Geography

2.1. Alliance interests in the northern flank area centre on NATO's Northern European Command which is one of the major subordinate commands of Allied Command Europe. This is a

region of contrasts. From Kirkenes on the Barents Sea to the River Elbe, the command stretches for 2 800 km and comprises Norway, Denmark and Schleswig-Holstein and Hamburg north of the Elbe in the Federal Republic of Germany. In the north it borders the Soviet Union and Finland; to the east is neutral Sweden and the Baltic Sea, while the south-east boundary is the inner German border. The Norwegian archipelago of Svalbard, the island of Jan Mayen and the Danish territories of Greenland and the Farøes are all under the responsibility of the Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic (SACLANT) and so is the major part of the Norwegian economic zone. Iceland also has a key geographical position and rôle in alliance defence.

2.2. The coastline of Norway runs for thousands of kilometres with its hundreds of large and small fjords and inlets. The land area of the country presents a rugged picture with innumerable hills, valleys and mountains and, for both geographical and economic reasons, rail and road communications are limited. On the whole the area is very narrow with many fjords and south of Narvik, for example, Norway is no more than 7 km wide. Denmark and Schleswig-Holstein on the other hand present a contrast with flat plains and only a few natural defence barriers. Compared with Norway their rail and road communications are good.

2.3. The Commandant General of Britain's Royal Marines, Lieutenant General Sir Martin Garrod, in an interview for NATO's Sixteen Nations, sums up the situation in the north:

“ The problems that we face in arctic operations are those out of our control. Firstly climate, which means that all our men have to be trained and equipped to fight in the Norwegian winter. It is not so much the cold which is the problem but rather the variation in conditions caused by the effect of the Gulf Stream. In North Norway in January and February, for example, the temperature may be -30°C or lower, or it may be $+5^{\circ}\text{C}$ and raining. A cold dry man can fight indefinitely, a cold wet man will rapidly become a casualty. The terrain, particularly in the north, is rugged. This makes cross-country movement difficult and tends to canalise vehicles and tracks along valleys, which of course favours the defender. Inland communications, road and rail, are tenuous. The main trunk road, the E6, running from Finmark to Oslo is in places tortuous and vulnerable, and the single track railway running north from Oslo terminates at Bodo, some two-thirds of the way up Norway. The coastline is vast, some 13 000 km long, indented by innumerable fjords and scattered with some 150 000 islands. This coast does however give us

an infinite number of landing areas, protection from the elements and the enemy, and allows us a waterborne means of tactical and logistic movement. ”

2.4. Norway (323 886 sq. km) has a population of just over 4 million, Denmark (43 069 sq. km) has a population of 5 million and Schleswig-Holstein and Hamburg (16 400 sq. km) together have a population of 4.5 million. Thus, the population of the whole area amounts to about 14 million compared to the more than 100 million inhabitants in both the central and southern regions of NATO in Europe.

2.5. The Northern European Command would be of crucial importance in a war between the Warsaw Pact and NATO. It stretches across a third of the European NATO area, dominates the sea routes from the Baltic in the south and in the north from the Barents Sea into the Atlantic. It also sits astride the direct air routes from Central Russia to the North American continent. It provides important early-warning facilities and would constitute an important base for allied counter-offensive operations.

III. Defence forces in the area

(a) Norwegian forces

3.1. In Norway military training of soldiers and partly also of non-commissioned officers is based on general conscription. A certain percentage of regulars is recruited for special units and tasks. The national service period is 12 months (plus four call-ups for refresher-training) for the army and 15 months for the navy and the air force.

3.2. The Norwegian land forces will amount to some 225 000 men on mobilisation. The standing land forces are, however, limited to North Norway. These forces are well-trained and -equipped and the brigade in North Norway (Troms) is supported by medium tanks and medium artillery. In South Norway the standing units consist of His Majesty the King's guard battalion, one medium tank squadron and some other minor units. On mobilisation, an additional 12 brigades will be called up. The local defence forces mobilised in battalion or company groups comprise another 100 000 men. To this should be added some 85 000 men of the home guard.

3.3. Types of aircraft at present in use in the Royal Norwegian Air Force are the F-16, F-5, P-3B Orion (maritime patrol), C-130H transport and the UH-1B Sea King (SAR) and Lynx helicopters. At present the air force has five squadrons of combat aircraft. In addition, there are one squadron of helicopters for army support and one transport squadron. Norway is participating in NATO's airborne early-warning project

and has a forward-operating facility for the force of 18 aircraft at Oerland air base at Trondelag (Mid-Norway). A number of airfields have been built in Norway, financed nationally and under the NATO infrastructure programme. Others have been and are being extended and modernised.

3.4. The main operational area for the Royal Norwegian Navy is North Norway. The Norwegian naval forces consist of five frigates, two corvettes, 14 submarines, 46 fast patrol boats (missile and torpedo/gun boats) two mine-layers, nine mine-sweepers and one mine-hunter, seven landing craft and a support ship. Naval manning in peacetime is at 70%. The main naval base is at Haakonsværn in Bergen on the west coast (South Norway). In North Norway there are smaller bases at Ramsund and near Tromsø (Olavsværn) and a substantial number of coastal artillery fortresses. The coastguard has its main base at Sortland in North Norway. Five coastguard ships, three of them carrying a helicopter, are manned by military personnel.

(b) Danish forces

3.5. In Denmark one-third of the peacetime army are volunteers, whereas the augmentation force and the mobilisation force consist of conscripts with a training of nine to 12 months. Conscripts can be called up for refresher-training for a total of 60 days during the first nine years after their initial training period. Beyond this, they can be called up for short-time musters. The Danish Defence Act of 1985 provides for a personnel peacetime strength of the army of 13 000 men, 7 000 of whom form the standing force consisting of volunteers only. The 6 000 soldiers of the augmentation force are in a high state of readiness and can be called up at very short notice without implementing any alert or mobilisation measures. In a time of tension, the standing force, reinforced by the augmentation force, will form the covering force of about 13 000 men. The total strength of the wartime army, after mobilisation of the field army reserve and the local defence forces, is about 72 000 officers and men and a home guard of approximately 78 000 – or all in all 150 000 men.

3.6. The peacetime standing force is organised in five armoured infantry brigades – the three in Jutland forming a division, two battalions and the Bornholm combat group. These are partly manned but they possess all their operational equipment. The requisite fire-power and heavy equipment is thereby maintained at a high state of readiness and the integration of mobilisation forces is consequently made easier. After mobilisation, these forces would be built up to full wartime strength. Two brigades would be formed – three regimental combat teams and seven regions with from one to four infantry battalions

all supported by artillery, engineers and anti-tank units. Their equipment totals 200 medium tanks, 48 light tanks, 650 armoured personnel carriers, 72 self-propelled howitzers and a number of helicopters.

3.7. For the Danish navy the following minimum force objectives are established: two destroyers, three corvettes, five fishery-protection ships with helicopters, 16 fast patrol boats, three submarines, seven mine-layers, three mine-sweepers, eight small submarine-hunting vessels, 26 other vessels and light helicopters (although not all ships are in commission continuously). A new construction programme to meet these objectives is now in progress. Naval shore establishments include three naval bases, fortresses, coastal and mobile radars and combat divers. Wartime personnel strength is about 10 000 to which should be added some 4 300 navy home guard men and women.

3.8. Royal Danish Air Force units are available in a high state of preparedness in peacetime. There are now 89 fighters in four squadrons of F-16 and two squadrons of F-35 Draken. Additionally, the air force maintains eight I-Hawk missile squadrons and a number of transport and inspection planes and rescue helicopters. The air force's activities are supported by a modern control and warning system and the Danish air defence system operates within the framework of NATO's air defence ground environment (NADGE) system. NADGE operates 24 hours a day in a high state of readiness and consists, in addition to the planes and missiles, of a control and warning system which includes a number of radar stations, for example, one on Bornholm well to the east. Denmark also participates in the NATO airborne early-warning project in which long-range surveillance and early warning is made possible by airborne radar coverage.

(c) German forces (northern Germany)

3.9. The military forces of the Federal Republic of Germany stationed in Schleswig-Holstein and Hamburg, north of the River Elbe, consist of forces of all three services (half of them are conscripts with a service period at present of 15 months, increasing shortly to 18 months). The army is primarily represented by the Sixth Armoured Infantry Division (headquarters at Neumünster) with about 24 000 men (peace- and wartime strength) which is the largest in the Bundeswehr. This division consists of two armoured infantry brigades, one armoured brigade and the Home Defence Brigade 51 (the latter due for disbandment under the "army 2000" project). Besides conventional artillery battalions, the artillery regiment of the Sixth Armoured Infantry Division includes a Lance battalion. An air defence regiment forms also part of the divisional troops.

3.10. Air forces in Schleswig-Holstein assigned to Northern Europe Command include two light fighter bomber squadrons at Husum and two all-weather reconnaissance squadrons at Leck. Types of aircraft at present in use are the AlphaJet and the RF-4E. The German naval forces consist of seven destroyers, nine frigates, six of them with helicopters, five smaller anti-submarine patrol boats, 40 fast patrol boats, 57 mine-sweepers/hunters, 19 landing craft and 24 submarines. In addition, the German naval air arm has three attack squadrons and a reconnaissance squadron equipped with the sophisticated Tornado aircraft and two reconnaissance squadrons of Breguet-Atlantic maritime patrol aircraft. Additionally, the naval air arm operates 22 Sea King helicopters in the search and rescue rôle, 19 Dornier-28 liaison aircraft and 12 Sea Lynx helicopters which operate from the six frigates. The naval wartime personnel strength is 62 500.

3.11. In order to relieve NATO land forces of certain tasks, units of the territorial army which in peace and war are under national command and control are formed in Schleswig-Holstein with a wartime strength of about 20 000 men. Their rôle will be considered further on in this report when the Franco-German brigade is mentioned.

(d) Iceland

3.12. As Iceland has no military forces of its own, a defence agreement was concluded with the United States in 1951 under which the United States undertakes the defence of Iceland on behalf of NATO. The Iceland Defence Force is established at Keflavik, outside Reykjavik, the capital of Iceland. This force comprises a squadron of 18 F-15 Eagle interceptors and a squadron of two E-3A Sentry AWACS aircraft (airborne early warning). For maritime surveillance and anti-submarine operations, the force also operates a squadron of nine P-3C Orion maritime surveillance aircraft. In addition, there are three HH-3 search-and-rescue helicopters and two C-130 for search operations, as well as a KC-135 tanker. A special unit is responsible for defence of the airfield until the arrival of designated reinforcements from the United States. A unit of the United States army reserve has been trained and prepared to move to Iceland in times of crisis or in war. In the defence force there is a total of about 3 100 men. In addition, some 1 100 Icelanders are employed by the force.

3.13. So as to counter the growing Soviet threat in the Norwegian Sea over the past years, Iceland has approved SACLANT's plan for improvement of maritime surveillance, radar coverage and air defence of Iceland. These improvements include modernisation of existing radar stations on the southern coast of Iceland and the building

of two new stations on the north coast, as well as shelter hangars for fighter aircraft and protective facilities for the command and control functions at the headquarters. The new measures also include Dutch P-3C maritime surveillance aircraft with crews and maintenance personnel stationed at Keflavik on a rotation basis and also a number of allied staff officers who are integrated into the staff of the defence force. There are currently Americans, Canadians, Danes, Dutchmen, Norwegians, and now a British officer, working in the Iceland Defence Force headquarters.

3.14. The NATO base at Keflavik, including the defence force, plays a vital rôle as far as air defence, maritime surveillance and early warning for the whole Norwegian Sea area are concerned. In an emergency, the base would be of decisive importance for maintaining communication across the Atlantic and for bringing forward reinforcements to Norway and to Denmark.

IV. Assistance from the allies

4.1. The defence forces of the Northern European Command are limited in number and it is appreciated that they would need assistance from the outside to resist a powerful and determined aggressor.

4.2. The strategically important area of north Norway has little by way of permanent infrastructure, such as roads, ports, or hospitals, to support either a large permanent garrison or a large influx of reinforcements. In addition, although Norway's standing forces are by proportion of population as large of those of the United States, the country cannot be adequately defended without intensive mobilisation and strong reinforcement from outside. In the area of the Baltic approaches the infrastructure is admittedly much more developed, but the total population is still small and an adequate defence can only be achieved by the timely arrival of suitable reinforcements.

4.3. Firstly, mention should be made of NATO deterrent forces which might be deployed to the area early in a period of tension. These are:

- (a) the Allied Command Europe Mobile Force (air and land);
- (b) the Standing Naval Force Atlantic (STANAVFORLANT).

Both these forces have a primary deterrent rôle in demonstrating NATO's solidarity and making it quite clear that an attack against one member is an attack against all.

4.4. SACEUR's rapid reinforcement plan allocates priorities for the arrival of reinforcements in Europe and the following forces from outside the command area might be expected in time of tension:

- from the United Kingdom an army brigade (United Kingdom mobile force) for operations in the Baltic approaches;
- from the United Kingdom and the Netherlands together an amphibious force consisting of up to four marine infantry battalions with their own combat and logistic support. This force is trained and equipped for cold weather operations and exercises in Norway annually during the winter months;
- from the United States a strong marine expeditionary force which might consist of up to 50 000 men with 160 fighters (including air national guard squadrons), and ground attack aircraft, 50 attack and 180 transport helicopters, 70 tanks, 100 artillery pieces and a powerful anti-tank and anti-air capability. It is hoped that strong air support from the North Atlantic Carrier Battle Group would also be available;
- from Canada an air-sea transportable brigade group fully Arctic-trained and -equipped (some 5 000 men). However, as announced in the Canadian white paper in 1987, it is intended to withdraw this commitment to north Norway later this year and instead increase Canadian presence in southern Germany. The hope is to replace the CAST brigade with a NATO composite force of four battalions (two artillery, two infantry), plus a helicopter squadron. These forces would be sent from Canada, the Federal Republic, the United Kingdom and the United States, and should result in a slightly increased overall capability, although co-ordination will be more of a problem.

4.5. The northern flank is the potential "Achilles Heel" of the alliance, unless adequate forces are forthcoming to support the Northern European Command. Elements of the NATO airborne early-warning force, as well as the United States strategic air command aircraft from adjacent commands, are essential. Thus, to an aggressor, these forces represent a joint NATO defence organisation and not just the limited national defence assets of Denmark, Norway and the northern part of the Federal Republic of Germany.

V. The Nordic balance

5.1. In this northern region, the Scandinavian dimension or Nordic balance must also be examined. The relationship between the NATO countries of Iceland, Denmark and Norway with Finland, and especially Sweden, cannot be ignored. It is based on long-standing historical

and cultural links. The "non-nuclear" and "non-basing nuclear" policies of Norway and Denmark receive considerable comment, but in reality they reflect an agreement which was made as far back as 1949, accepted then by all parties, and in part served to show the consideration that Norway and Denmark feel is owed to their Nordic neighbours.

5.2. In military terms it is important to remember the effect on the defence of the northern region of developments in Sweden and Finland. At present the Soviets probably stand to lose more than they would gain by any incursion by land or air into Swedish territory. However, continued cuts in the defence budget have resulted in a considerable weakening of the Swedish forces over the past two decades. The cost of "armed neutrality" is high and it remains to be seen whether current and planned expenditure will be sufficient to provide the form of guarantee that the Swedes have hitherto relied on.

5.3. In Finland last year a 10% increase in the defence budget was announced. This is particularly unusual at a time when most other nations are finding difficulty in maintaining even present levels of defence expenditure.

5.4. In spite of their respective positions, both the Finns and the Swedes must present an unknown quantity to a potential aggressor. The routes through and over Sweden and Finland to the northern region present an attractive proposition perhaps, but the possible hazards of any incursion would be difficult for the Soviets to quantify and, in reality, they add yet another unknown for their military planners. It is true, however, that the possibility of a major assault on southern Norway during the early stages of a conflict might well be increased as Swedish defences weaken.

5.5. Commander-in-Chief Allied Forces Northern Europe considers that his forces are outnumbered by the Soviet and Warsaw Pact arsenal which with increasing sophistication and technical advances has caught up with the West in most areas. In the northern area the Soviet aims are assessed as being firstly to safeguard their strategic submarine force and its bases on the Kola peninsula and then to contest NATO's vital sea-line of communication across the North Atlantic. It is felt that they would want at the very least to control the vital airfields and port installations in north Norway.

5.6. The allied concept of defence is firmly based on the defence and denial of these areas which are seen as crucial to probable Soviet objectives. In the Baltic area, the Warsaw Pact initial aims would surely be to gain control of the straits, firstly through air superiority and eventually to drive a wedge between the north and central regions of Allied Command Europe, thus

giving access to the reinforcement and resupply bases in the United Kingdom and rear areas.

5.7. In the Baltic approaches the allied concept is full forward defence, both on the land where the forward areas offer the best positions for defence and at sea in the Baltic itself. South Norway is the Commander-in-Chief's base, providing a secure area in which to receive reinforcements and supplies for redeployment to either north or south of the area, as necessary.

5.8. The Commander-in-Chief Allied Forces Northern Europe (General Sir Geoffrey Howlett), in an article for "NATO's Sixteen Nations", has recently summed up his main preoccupations under the heading "Future considerations":

"The viability of the allied defence of the northern flank will, as with the rest of Europe, depend to a major extent on the outcome of current and future changes in East-West relationships. For the past 40 years our security has been based on a firm defensive posture, based very strongly on the ultimate deterrent of nuclear weapons. In the past few months, the basic tenet of our defence has been questioned. The withdrawal of intermediate-range nuclear forces from Europe has had little direct effect on the northern region, since none were positioned on our territory. However, within weeks of the signing of the INF treaty, the strategic picture did change, and we saw a new deployment of Yankee-class Soviet submarines, in the north Norwegian and Barents Seas, newly converted to fire sea-launched cruise missiles.

The concepts of 'glasnost' and 'perestroika' should be welcomed as an indication that the Soviets at last recognise values which western society has long upheld, or, more likely, respect our 40 years of reasonable solidarity. The suddenness of the change has, however, been disarming, figuratively if not yet literally. It is only natural that the western public should want to see an elimination of the means of their destruction.

Our main task in the immediate future is to maintain a positive effort in the field of public information in order to avoid misconceptions about NATO strategy, to disprove myths, such as those concerning the rôle of nuclear weapons or nuclear-free zones.

Budgetary constraints are not new within NATO as a whole or the northern region in particular. We have always had to make economies and take difficult decisions, but, with a public perception of a diminishing threat, this will become even more difficult.

Pressures on training, particularly low-level flying training, will no doubt

increase. In this respect, we are more fortunate than our partners in the central region – we have considerably more room to fly in than they do. Nevertheless, there are real concerns over environmental issues, especially in north Norway, Zealand and Schleswig-Holstein. The requirement for realistic training by all our reinforcing nations puts a great strain, not only on the local area and population, but also on the relatively small staffs and forces of the local commanders.

The declining figures of available manpower will put greater pressures on the armed services of all our nations. Germany has had to increase the period of service of her conscripts to maintain adequate force levels and, once again, these sort of measures are only likely to be acceptable to the public for as long as they can be convinced of the necessity, which means the threat.

During what will be a politically and militarily uncertain period, the strategic importance of the northern flank will be undiminished. In the face of the certainty of a continued decline in resources and assets, we must strive to improve our capability rather than expect increases in numbers. The basic defence concept will not change, but we must ensure that our forces are manned, trained, equipped and supplied to enable us to sustain operations over a lengthy period. Perhaps we may need to place a greater emphasis on mobile and flexible forces, such as marines or heliborne troops, and if we are to make the best use of support from external maritime and air forces, we must ensure that we have the appropriate command and control arrangements ready and in being.

Above all, there remains the need to inform public opinion in the northern region of a continued requirement for substantial investment in defence. They must be convinced that the threat has in no way diminished, and that until it has done so, any lessening of allied determination and resolve could prove fatal."

Your Rapporteur can but strongly echo General Howlett's sentiments, especially concerning mobile and flexible forces and appropriate command and control arrangements. What might some of the possibilities be to try and improve the situation?

VI. Reinforcements

6.1. The vast area and the small indigenous population mean that the northern region is forced to rely heavily on reinforcements to create

a credible and capable defence. These reinforcements are not only necessary militarily, but especially politically, as they provide essential extra defensive assets and, more particularly, a demonstration of the alliance's intention to defend its territory.

6.2. Several changes in reinforcement planning have taken place in the past two years. In north Norway, while only one brigade and a strong garrison force are available as "ready" forces, Norwegian ground forces can be quickly mobilised and deployed. In terms of pure numbers, they are reasonably strong and, while extra land forces would be important, especially from a political viewpoint, the real necessity is for sophisticated weaponry and, more particularly, air-power. SACEUR's rapid reinforcement plan should produce a fourfold increase in available air assets in a short time. If, in addition, SACLAN's striking fleet could cross the Atlantic and operate as planned from close to the Norwegian coast, the original assets could well be increased by a factor of eight. For the land battle, after the withdrawal of the Canadian air/sea-transported brigade - Norway's only dedicated land reinforcements - plans are now in hand to form a new "NATO composite force" with units from several nations (see Chapter IV). This will provide the necessary indications of multinational dedication to the alliance and support for Norway. However, reception arrangements for potential reinforcements, such as the United States Marine Corps Fourth Marine Expeditionary Brigade and the United Kingdom-Netherlands amphibious force, still show some deficiencies. In particular, the ability to conduct the mine counter-measure operations and anti-submarine warfare escort duties necessary to ensure their safe arrival, must be considerably improved. Unfortunately these are deficiencies which are equally apparent in other areas of the alliance.

6.3. In Denmark and Schleswig-Holstein there are similar overall requirements. Maritime resources here, coupled with the powerful German naval air arm, are probably strong enough to give a good account of themselves in the Baltic. The main problem concerns the vital land battle in Schleswig-Holstein. Even if the Jutland Division and the United Kingdom mobile force could reach the defence area in time to support the strong Sixth German Division the alliance's ability to hold the overwhelmingly superior strength of the Warsaw Pact conventional forces for any length of time must be questioned. The Ninth United States Infantry Division is supposed to reinforce this particular area, but even with that the Commander Baltic Approaches will probably still need a further manoeuvre force, preferably an armoured one, if a cohesive defence is to be maintained.

VII. Command and control - northern region

7.1. Command and control arrangements are probably more complicated in the North European Command than in any other region of Allied Command Europe. Whilst Headquarters Baltic Approaches in Jutland is a fully established allied headquarters in peacetime, in Norway the two commands will remain under national control until transfer of authority occurs during transition to war. The present arrangements seem to work well during exercises, but the system, although workable, is not ideal. It is important that the command structure within the region is seen to be a reliable organisation, particularly when it might affect the confidence of the reinforcing nations. The system is further complicated by the number and nature of adjacent commands. To the south there is AFCENT with an overlapping tactical air force boundary. At sea, close liaison must be kept with CINCHAN and CINCEASTLANT. In the air, CINCUKAIR's area is adjacent and, when the striking and amphibious fleets arrive in the areas, the command and control arrangements, particularly air space management, become very complex. Even the necessary physical means of communication and transmission of information to overcome the potential difficulties and make the best use of these various assets is still lacking. A great deal of work has been done, such as the development of a co-ordinated concept of operations between AFNORTH and the striking fleet and, through an improved command structure, for land forces in northern Norway, but a great deal remains to be done.

7.2. The same problems from the northern region are found throughout the alliance. Most of the time there is a sincere willingness among the people concerned to co-operate (this was particularly true of the Dutch sponsored exercise Free Lion, to which your Rapporteur was invited as an observer in September 1988) and it is increasingly important that the exchanges of personnel take place between allies to prepare that co-operation (see Appendix).

7.3. There are many technological developments, some of which are being brought into service faster occasionally than they may be assimilated (the report by the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions on "New technologies and their implications for European defence", Rapporteur: Mr. van der Werff, refers), but there is a desperate need for progress in particular areas of command and control (especially communications and "identification friend or foe" (IFF) systems), if concepts such as close air support or air-mobility of forces are not to become dismal failures of misunderstanding. These are real preoccupations which affect all levels, from supreme allied commanders to private soldiers... The technological aspects of this vital problem area are being given

timely consideration in another report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions on "Developments in command, control, communications and intelligence", Rapporteur: Mr. Hill.

VIII. Specific forces

(a) British concepts of air mobility)¹

8.1. Your Rapporteur is the first to wish Mr. Gorbachev well in his efforts to restructure and reorientate his military doctrine for a more defensive posture, but at present the Warsaw Pact relies heavily on the concentration of massive force to overwhelm an opponent's defences and achieve a breakthrough. A concept to counter this threat is obviously essential, therefore, and the more flexible the defence, the better.

8.2. A key element of alliance defence is the ability to stop enemy forces, particularly their armoured divisions, should they penetrate the front line, using mobile reserves with a powerful anti-tank component.

8.3. Helicopter-borne forces are ideal for this purpose. The axis of an enemy advance would not be known until very shortly before his attack began. Until then the defending forces would be faced with several possible lines of attack; and the task of identifying the main axis of advance would be made more difficult by the enemy's use of feints and deception to disguise his intentions. To be effective, allied armoured reserves would have to be committed early to the battle, possibly before the enemy's intention was clear, whereas airmobile forces could be held back and moved swiftly into position when required.

8.4. In 1984, 6 Brigade of 1(BR) Corps, based at Soest, was tasked with conducting trials of a doctrine for airmobile operations in close co-operation with the RAF. The doctrine, as developed, involved the use of RAF Puma and Chinook helicopters to move men and equipment into concealed positions behind the NATO front line at the point where an imminent enemy breakthrough had been identified. The infantry is armed with Milan – the army's medium-range man-portable anti-tank system. They are supported with TOW – the longer-range wire-guided anti-tank missile. The considerable anti-tank power of these combined forces would be brought to bear on the enemy as the allied front line was breached. The aim would be to disrupt and halt the armoured advance, allowing time for allied tanks to move in and complete the destruction of enemy formations or force a retreat.

1. See United Kingdom statement on the defence estimates 1988.

8.5. The success of this trial over the past four years has produced a doctrine for airmobile operations, and identified procedures and equipment, which will allow these operations to be developed into the next century. 24 Brigade has now begun conversion to the airmobile rôle in place of 6 Brigade; it will include an Army Air Corps regiment equipped with both anti-tank and utility Lynx helicopters supported by the RAF's troop-carrying and heavy-lift helicopters. The EH-101 is intended to succeed the Puma in these rôles in the 1990s, provided it fulfils the necessary criteria.

8.6. As yet, unlike the French force d'action rapide, 24 Brigade's helicopter assets are not dedicated solely to its needs; which is not the most satisfactory situation, given the range of battle-field imperatives which are already apparent. Reaction time is paramount for successful action and any airmobile unit's ability to block an attack or strike quickly.

8.7. British and German Ministries of Defence are presently considering ways and means towards greater bilateral co-operation and one such avenue with good potential may be the formation of an Anglo-German airmobile division (the beginning of Chancellor Kohl's "European Division"?). Such a possibility, based on the German Army's "Bundeswehr 2000" concept and the ideas being developed in Britain's 24 Brigade, would not only result in a more coherent use of scarce resources (both human and material), but might have very far-reaching consequences which would be of particular interest to us in Western European Union.

(b) The French force d'action rapide

8.8. Created in 1985, some 46 000-strong and including the 4th Airmobile Division, the force d'action rapide (FAR), or "rapid action force", is steadily becoming the outward and visible sign of French commitment to her allies.

8.9. The FAR musters the following equipment:

- 240 helicopters (Pumas and Gazelles, including 90 Gazelles mounting the Hot missile);
- 820 armoured vehicles (210 with guns);
- 110 Hot missile launchers mounted on armoured vehicles;
- 500 Milan anti-tank missile systems;
- 230 artillery (155 mm) and mortar (120 mm) pieces;
- 4 000 APILAS anti-tank rocket systems.

8.10. As well as a headquarters element, the FAR includes communication and command units, a logistic brigade and a total of five divisions:

- the 4th Airmobile Division;
- the 6th Light Armoured Division;

- the 9th Marine Infantry Division;
- the 11th Parachute Division;
- the 27th Alpine Division.

The headquarters are at Maisons-Laffitte and the divisions are based at Nancy, Nîmes, Nantes, Toulouse and Grenoble.

8.11. The French Government sees the FAR as reinforcing European security and demonstrating French willingness to support her allies. The essential plus factor of the FAR is its potential capacity to intervene quickly, thanks to its own integrated helicopter lift and essential mobility. The necessary logistic support to give the FAR "longer legs" and increased sustainability now must follow if the force is really to take its place alongside the allies.

8.12. This vital consideration of "just where (and when) the FAR might fit in" in alliance terms is crucial, but probably remains unsolvable politically for the present. Joint exercises involving elements of the FAR have taken place in co-operation with Germany (especially Kecker Spatz in the autumn of 1987) and are projected with British forces also (although not where such co-operation would be most useful, in NORTHAG). Increased Franco-British co-operation in the airmobile domain, given present ideas on both sides, would be logical and feasible and might produce a spin-off into other realms, such as equipment procurement as well.

8.13. One particular area where some elements of the FAR have been involved on a bilateral basis concerns alpine troops. Both last year and again in 1989, detachments of the 7th battalion of the Alpine Division have exchanged combat sections with their Norwegian opposite numbers. Given also the historical association of the French with Narvik, this type of initiative is to be strongly encouraged, even if not developed formally. The presence of French forces in northern areas (and including eventually naval and air force elements) would be very welcome from every point of view.

(c) The United Kingdom-Netherlands landing force

8.14. The force is the first permanent form of bi-national co-operation between the amphibious forces of two NATO/WEU member nations. In 1972 a memorandum of understanding was signed between the British and Dutch Governments and Royal Netherlands Marine Corps forces were assigned to the United Kingdom-Netherlands landing force for NATO operations. Co-operation and integration between the two corps have developed to such an extent since 1972 that organisation, equipment and training are basically identical.

8.15. During times of conflict or war, the United Kingdom-Netherlands landing force (roughly a brigade-size unit) is under the command of the

Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic when at sea. By its amphibious nature, it is a mobile force and, thereby, not dedicated to a single deployment area, for example, northern Norway, even if this is where the force exercises most frequently. Plans to withdraw the Canadian air-sea transportable brigade from Norway have renewed political interest in the issue of force dedication, although dedication to one deployment area is not always desirable from a military point of view. However much it can demonstrate political commitment, it could deprive an amphibious force of its flexibility and make its deployment too predictable.

(i) The British contribution

8.16. The British Royal Marines are some 7 000-strong (all regulars) split into two formations: "commando forces" and "training, reserve and special forces" (which also controls nearly 1 200 Royal Marines reservists). The bulk of the operational units serve with the 3rd Commando Brigade and consist of three Royal Marine Commandos plus a RM Air Squadron (Gazelle helicopters) and a Royal Artillery commando regiment, as well as the usual support elements. The prime rôle of these "sea-soldiers" is to project maritime power ashore and to this end regular exercises are undertaken with many other NATO allies (including Norwegians, Danes, Germans, Americans, Canadians and the French), but particularly the Dutch through the United Kingdom-Netherlands landing force.

(ii) The Dutch contribution

8.17. The Royal Netherlands Marine Corps has a current strength of roughly 3 000 officers and enlisted men; about 85% of the corps consists of regular personnel and 15% are conscripted national servicemen. Nearly all officers and non-commissioned officers are regulars with initial terms of service of seven years and four years respectively. This high percentage of well-trained personnel enables the corps to expand its ranks quickly by calling up approximately 4 000 reserves when necessary. The corps is augmented by men from the fleet - medical, dental, logistic, religious and administrative personnel.

8.18. The largest unit in the RNLMC is an amphibious combat group (ACG). An ACG is a battalion-size light amphibious infantry unit with light supporting arms. The ACG is not vehicle-dependent for it has no tanks, helicopters, or armoured amphibious vehicles. Small landing craft usually support amphibious operations. In mountainous terrain, the group operates on foot or on skis and snow-shoes. In peacetime, two ACGs are operational; in wartime, a third would be mobilised.

8.19. Within the United Kingdom-Netherlands landing force, the RNLMC elements are:

- (a) the first amphibious combat group, trained for operations in mountainous and Arctic regions;
- (b) the Whiskey Company from 45 Commando (the "cold weather company"), small but parachute-capable;
- (c) the special boat section, trained in amphibious reconnaissance and underwater demolition in Arctic waters in winter;
- (d) the landing craft detachment, trained to support amphibious operations with their assault landing craft.

(iii) Equipment

8.20. Equipment policy focuses on improving standardisation and interoperability. Whenever possible, the RNLMC procures British Royal Marines equipment, but some equipment differences do remain. For example, the RNLMC is equipped with the Dragon anti-tank system, the Stinger anti-air missile, the 120 mm mortar and the FN-762 mm rifle, but the British Royal Marines use the Milan anti-tank system, the Javelin air defence missile, the 105 mm light gun and the new SAR-80 5.56 mm assault rifle. The mountain and Arctic equipment (e.g. windproof and wetproof clothing, cookers, tents), most radio equipment, Arctic rations and over-snow vehicles, however, are identical.

8.21. Although the perennial alliance problem of standardisation/interoperability is solved to a large extent by simply adopting one's partner's equipment, occasional hiccups remain and one such concerns the vital area of communications, so important for command and control, as mentioned earlier. The Dutch were careful to adopt the British "Clansman" radio system some time ago, and may have difficulty in procuring its successor "Ptarmigan" as quickly as they might wish: your Rapporteur hopes that a satisfactory arrangement will be forthcoming which will permit the excellent co-operation of past years to continue as effectively in the future...

(iv) Training

8.22. The assumption that a unit able to operate under the physical and mental demands of Arctic conditions in northern Norway could operate in any other part of the world proved to be true in 1982, during the Falklands conflict. Mountain and Arctic-trained RNLMC units deploy each autumn to northern Scotland for mountain and cold-/wet-weather operations. In winter, they deploy for three months to northern Norway for Arctic operations and ski-training.

8.23. There is an arrangement by which Dutch and British Royal Marines and United States Marines are able to serve in postings to their

"sister corps" and this is a model of its kind which fully satisfies the suggestions in the motion for a recommendation proposed by a number of colleagues in the Assembly (see Appendix). This is an excellent means of improving alliance relationships in an eminently practical way.

(v) Amphibious shipping issue

8.24. The 1972 memorandum of understanding agreed that the United Kingdom would provide shipping for the United Kingdom-Netherlands landing force. The replacement of the two British helicopter carriers – HMS Hermes and HMS Bulwark – by the Invincible-class ASW carriers may have produced, in theory, greater lift for amphibious forces. However, these ships are unlikely to do more in a time of tension than quickly land a force and then revert to their main ASW rôle. This would leave the landing force coast-bound without the means to redeploy by sea. In addition, Great Britain's assault ships – HMS Fearless and HMS Intrepid – are ageing and need drastic updating, if not replacement, in the 1990s.

8.25. Feasibility studies concerning extending the service life of the two ships, as against constructing a new design ship, are under-way and parallel studies are examining helicopter lift and the aviation support ship concepts. Amphibious ships require extensive command, control and communication facilities to co-ordinate the air and surface aspects of this specialised type of warfare. Consequently, they are too valuable to carry the bulk of war supplies. Merchant ships taken up from trade (STUFT) are more suitable for this purpose (although with obvious drawbacks when it comes to a beach landing). They are hired in peacetime and would be commandeered in wartime. Within the United Kingdom-Netherlands landing force, one-third of the amphibious task force are ships taken up from trade.

8.26. Amphibious shipping is a matter of great concern in both Britain and the Netherlands at present. The Dutch navy has developed a concept for a landing-ship dock (LSD)-type ship. This new ship would be able to transport an ACG for longer periods at sea and would have docking and flight deck capabilities. As with plans for replacing British LPDs and in addition commissioning two aviation-support ships², nothing yet appears to have been decided.

(d) The Franco-German brigade

8.27. The creation of the Franco-German brigade should be seen in the context of enhanced co-operation between the two coun-

2. See "Naval aviation", Document 1139, 9th May 1988, Rapporteur: Mr. Wilkinson.

tries in security and defence matters. The brigade will be stationed in the Böblingen area south of Stuttgart. The first general to command this regular army brigade is French and his successors will be German and French in turn. His second-in-command, presently a German officer, will also alternate German/French every two years.

8.28. The brigade will be configured to conduct combined operations and therefore includes infantry, artillery, armoured and engineering units. Its 4 200 soldiers will be stationed in the following garrisons:

- joint brigade headquarters in Böblingen
joint headquarters company as from October 1989
- German infantry battalion in Böblingen
as from October 1989
- French reconnaissance squadron in Böblingen
as from October 1990
- French infantry regiment in Donaueschingen
as from October 1989
- French light armoured regiment in Donaueschingen
as from October 1990
- German engineer company in Donaueschingen
as from October 1989
- French logistic company of the joint logistic battalion in Donaueschingen
as from October 1989
- German artillery battalion in Horb am Neckar
as from October 1989
- joint logistic battalion in Stetten
(except one French logistic company) as from October 1989
- German anti-tank company in Stetten
as from October 1989
- French training unit in Stetten
as from October 1990

8.29 France will deploy two further regiments in the Federal Republic so as to set up this brigade. Because of the timescale, a regiment of the French forces in Germany will be placed under the authority of the brigade. As from 1991, a French regiment will be transferred from France to a garrison in the south-west of the Federal Republic. With the transfer of these two regiments, the brigade will receive additional conventional combat forces for joint defence purposes. (These two regiments will be seconded from the force d'action rapide.)

8.30 The German units in the brigade will be stationed mainly in Böblingen as they come from the 55 Territorial Brigade, which would have been disbanded under the Federal Republic's "Army 2000" plan. (The territorial brigades were set up originally to guard key points and, as such, are part of the very few forces the Federal Republic does not commit to NATO.) In peacetime, the brigade's training programme will be drawn up by the Franco-German military co-operation group and the general commanding the brigade will be in charge of implementation. The brigade, an experimental formation, will study and test options for tactical, operational

and logistic co-operation and interoperability in the Centre Europe sector and principles applicable to the training of formations composed of units of different nationalities. It will also be given specific tasks including operations in the joint defence context (in the area of NATO's Central Army Group and Landsouth).

8.31 At present, the headquarters element is in place in Böblingen and consists of only 50 officers and men. Their task is to work out the various modalities of making a political gesture into military reality. Discipline, working routines, pay and allowances, uniform, etc., have to be compatible – equipment also, beginning with the different types of radio systems in service in the French and German armies.

8.32 The particular advantage of this political gesture is that it is having practical military consequences and may succeed in making progress in areas where the NATO Standardisation Committee has had only meagre results. The idea of forming similarly bilateral brigades has also been formulated by a number of other countries, and the various stages of the Franco-German experience (brigade constituted by October 1990, first manoeuvres at the beginning of 1991) will be watched with great interest.

(e) The NATO airborne early-warning force

8.33 In the early 1970s, studies directed by NATO's major military commanders showed that an airborne early-warning (AEW) radar system would significantly enhance the alliance's air defence capability. In December 1978, the Defence Planning Committee signed a memorandum of understanding to buy and operate a NATO-owned AEW system. By this decision the member nations embarked on NATO's largest commonly-funded acquisition programme.

8.34 The force was established in January 1980 and granted full NATO command headquarters status by NATO's Defence Planning Committee on 17th October 1980. Force Command Headquarters is collocated with Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) in Mons, Belgium. While the force supports all three major NATO commands – Allied Command Atlantic (ACLANT), Allied Command Europe (ACE) and Allied Command Channel (ACCHAN) – SHAPE exercises administrative control of the force.

8.35 The NATO E-3A component of the command includes 18 Boeing NATO E-3A aircraft. In addition, the British Government is acquiring seven Boeing E-3D Sentry Mk I. The Royal Air Force will form a second component in the early 90s which will be manned by British Royal Air Force personnel. The NATO E-3A squadrons are manned by integrated international crews from 11 nations (Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Nether-

lands, Norway, Portugal, Turkey and the United States). Some 2 500 military and civilian personnel are now serving with the force. The E-3As have been operating from the main operating base (MOB) at Geilenkirchen, Germany, since February 1982. Forward Operating Bases (FOBs) are located at Trapani, Italy; Preveza, Greece; Konya, Turkey, and a forward operating location (FOL) at Oerland, Norway. When the unit becomes operational, the main operating base (MOB) for the British component will be RAF Waddington in Lincolnshire, United Kingdom.

8.36 France is also buying four of its own AWACS and already has a liaison officer at Geilenkirchen who has flown numerous missions with the integrated crews. It is understood, however, that the first French teams are to be trained in the United States which seems an unnecessary step, especially as they will then have to be cross-trained for the European theatre where they will operate. Much better that both aircraft and crews should take part from the start in the alliance air defence system (as France has done hitherto in the ground-based system). Fortunately, there are signs that such a step may be being considered at the highest level (the French Minister of Defence, Mr. Jean-Pierre Chevènement, speaking in Paris recently has stated:

“ France, which in any event intends to retain its freedom of decision, does not belong to the integrated military structures and does not intend to return to them, although it wishes to improve co-operation with its allies, for instance in regard to surveillance of airspace.”)

8.37. Given the success of the tri-nation (United Kingdom, Federal Republic of Germany and Italy) Tornado training unit at RAF Cottesmore in the United Kingdom, and the four-nation (Federal Republic of Germany, Netherlands, Denmark and Canada) Lynx helicopter simulator training establishment in the Netherlands, a similar joint training initiative where AWACS is concerned would be a positive step.

8.38. Italy is reported to be considering investing also in AWACS and, should this be the case, the AEW force in Europe will be second-to-none in its potential, not only for standard radar surveillance, but also as an alliance contribution towards successful confidence-building methods (even some aspects of verification could be covered by the system).

8.39. When operating at an altitude of 30 000 feet (9 000 metres) a single aircraft can continuously scan more than 312 000 square km (194 000 square miles) of Earth's surface. Operating well within western airspace, such aircraft will provide early warning about low-flying intruders into the NATO area, as well as high-altitude coverage extending deep into Warsaw Pact territory. While the force's principal rôle is

air surveillance, it provides economical communications support for air operations, including counter-air, close air support, rescue, reconnaissance and airlift as well as surveillance and control. Aircrews can exchange information with ground- and sea-based commanders, since the E-3A uses maritime mode radar to detect and monitor enemy shipping.

8.40. The AEW radar is able to “ look down ” and separate moving targets from the stationary ground clutter that confuses other radars. It adds the ability to detect and track enemy aircraft operating at low altitudes over all terrain, and to identify and give directions to friendly aircraft operating in the same area. In addition, its mobility allows it to be deployed rapidly where it is most needed, and makes it far less vulnerable to attack than ground-based radar.

IX. Conclusion

9.1. The committee's principal conclusions are set forth in the draft recommendations which reflect the changing political, defence and economic scene against which decisions are taken by member governments. This report has as its title “ State of European security – intervention forces and reinforcement for the centre and the north ”, and it is obvious that the centre-north of the European NATO area still occupies the important place in alliance planning discerned by previous rapporteurs of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments. What is changing, however, is the emphasis now on co-operation, not only in the realm of armaments (where some 53 current projects involve three or more allied nations), but more especially in terms of people: men and women working together, between nations, to ensure a joint defence in the most cost-effective way.

9.2. The process should be encouraged and amplified. This is the type of practical initiative which the WEU Council might initiate in an attempt to improve at least one aspect of the “ European pillar's ” efficiency and effectiveness in contributing to the alliance as a whole. As a start, the now-regular meetings of deputy chiefs of defence staffs should examine the recommendations on the exchange of armed forces personnel between the national units of the individual member nations (see Appendix) and report to the Council on the ways and means for implementation, as well as proposing the various steps necessary and a timescale to suit.

9.3. In parallel, those member nations which still use a system of national service should look at the practicalities of doing such “ national service ” in another member country, or at least a proportion of that service, to inculcate a sense of European co-operation and responsibility in the defence field amongst those young people on whom the future of our continent will soon depend.

APPENDIX

*Exchange of armed forces personnel between the national units
of the individual member nations*

MOTION FOR A RECOMMENDATION

*tabled by Dr. Hitschler and others under Rule 28 of the Rules of Procedure
(7th December 1988, Document 1171)*

The Assembly,

- (i) Believing that additional measures must be adopted to promote partnership relations between the individual member nations of WEU;
- (ii) Expressing its satisfaction at the creation of a joint Franco-German brigade which was initiated by the formal decision on 13th November 1987 (formalised by an exchange of letters, dated 22nd January 1988) by the heads of government of the two nations;
- (iii) Regretting the absence of similar arrangements on the same scale between the other member nations;
- (iv) Asking for efforts to be undertaken aiming at enhancing co-operation between the units of the other member nations, in order to strengthen and consolidate partnership relations, in particular to improve mutual understanding through daily co-operation and the dismantling of language barriers, in order to thus achieve an intermeshing of forces not only through liaison officers,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

Take the initiative for the creation of exchange opportunities beyond the framework of integrated headquarters and other available opportunities, in order for a great number of officers, non-commissioned officers and other ranks to have the chance of doing duty for a limited period of their service in units of allied armed forces.

Signed: Hitschler, Pfuhl, Unland, Martino, Steiner, Kittelmann, Müller, Niegel, Klejdzinski, Pack, Seitlinger, Scheer, Reddemann.

IMPRIMERIE  ALENÇONNAISE
Rue Édouard-Belin : 2^e trimestre 1989
N^o d'ordre : 11034

PRINTED IN FRANCE

