ASSEMBLY OF WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION

THIRTY-FIFTH ORDINARY SESSION
(First Part)

Development of East-West relations
and Western European security

REPORT
submitted on behalf of the General Affairs Committee
by Mr. Pontillon, Rapporteur
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1. Adopted in committee by 13 votes to 0 with 2 abstentions.
2. Members of the committee: Mr. Ahrens (Chairman); MM. Burger, Martino (Vice-Chairmen); MM. Aarts (Alternate: van der Werff), Beix (Alternate: Bassinet), Caro (Alternate: Pontillon), Coleman, Collart, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, MM. Forni, Foschi (Alternate: Stegagnini), Hill (Alternate: Speed), Hitzchler (Alternate: Zywietz), Koebl, Lord Mackie of Benshie, MM. Mechtersheimer (Alternate: Soeff), Müllner, Natali, Pécriaux, Pieralli, Reddemann, Ruet, van der Sanden, Sarti (Alternate: Scovarricchi), Sir William Shelton, Mrs. Staels-Dompas, Mr. Stoffelen.
N.B. The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.
Draft Recommendation

on the development of East-West relations and Western European security

The Assembly,

(i) Considering that the new policy of reforms started in the Soviet Union four years ago has now created conditions allowing decisive progress to be made towards a negotiated limitation of armaments, the opening and development of a sincere dialogue and a wide spectrum of co-operation between the countries of Eastern and Western Europe;

(ii) Noting that, after the agreement on intermediate-range missiles, the opening of the conference on chemical disarmament and adoption of the mandate of the conference on conventional disarmament offer prospects of a general reduction in the level of armaments in Europe;

(iii) Welcoming the Soviet Union's effort to base armaments reduction negotiations on greater openness by publishing accurate, detailed information on Soviet military strength and to prepare data that are effectively comparable with those provided by the Western countries and also welcoming the first unilateral measures to reduce Soviet troop levels in Eastern Europe;

(iv) Noting with satisfaction that many conflicts in the world calmed down in 1988;

(v) Welcoming the exchanges started between the WEU Assembly and the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union;

(vi) Taking into account the fact that the new Soviet concept of "reasonable sufficiency" has not yet been translated into specific measures and cannot therefore yet be considered irreversible, but hoping the Vienna negotiations on the reduction of conventional armaments will be successful;

(vii) Noting further that the new deployment and reorganisation of Soviet forces are still far from complete and awaiting the implementation of the defensive strategy, the principle of which has been proposed by the Soviet Union;

(viii) Welcoming the participation of the Soviet Union and its allies in all efforts by the international community designed to restore or strengthen peace in areas where it is threatened and to avoid nuclear proliferation,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Follow closely the evolution of the strategy, organisation and deployment of Soviet forces and report to the Assembly on the conclusions it draws from its analysis;

2. Compare the tables of the two alliances' forces and arms published by NATO and the Warsaw Pact to explain existing differences between the figures quoted by the two sides;

3. For each of the negotiations on limiting or banning armaments in which member countries are participating, hold consultations between their delegations so as to co-ordinate their position on the basis of the principles defined in the platform of The Hague;

4. Hold close consultations with its American allies in order to:
   (a) define ways and means of introducing a new security concept which ensures that no part of Europe has its security diminished or made inferior to that of others;
   (b) define a security system based on the maintenance of conventional and nuclear means at the necessary level to avoid deterrence being circumvented;
   (c) conduct a redefinition of burdens and responsibilities within the Atlantic Alliance with a view to a multilateral approach to security;
   (d) determine the requirements for effective verification of the application of agreements on conventional and chemical armaments;
   (e) take no steps contrary to commitments entered into or liable to jeopardise further progress in the negotiations on the limitation of conventional armaments;

5. Urge the earliest possible resumption of the START negotiations;

6. In the framework of the Council of Europe, promote an active dialogue on all matters for which it is responsible with all appropriate Eastern European countries fulfilling the conditions and expressing the desire to take part;

7. In all appropriate forums, promote the development of exchanges of all kinds between Western Europe and the Eastern European countries and a rapprochement between those countries and all organisations seeking to foster the free circulation of ideas, persons, currencies, services and goods.
Explanatory memorandum
(submitted by Mr. Pontillon, Rapporteur)

I. Introduction

1. Since 1947, Western Europe has been facing a major threat from a powerfully-armed Soviet Union which conveys a message radically hostile to pluralist democratic régimes, occupies half of Europe and encourages many subversive movements throughout the world. It pursued its external policy like a strategy designed to win a decisive victory over international capitalism. Periods of relative détente in East-West relations were merely tactical changes, i.e., changes in priorities in the use of various means to ensure this victory, but no one gave serious thought to transforming the ensuing peaceful coexistence into true peace based on each party's freedom to determine its own régime.

2. The existence of this permanent threat was a decisive stimulus to everything concerned with the building of Europe and led directly to the conclusion of the 1949 Washington Treaty, the subsequent establishment of NATO and serious efforts by all the western countries to ensure their security.

3. However, the policy pursued by the Soviet Union since 1986 shows that the shape of threats to Western Europe has changed to such an extent that it might now be wondered whether they still exist. A number of statements by Mr. Gorbachev and the Soviet authorities, including some spectacular measures, are intended to convince the West that the Soviet Union has renounced its previous political objectives, that it has profoundly changed its strategy and that the main aim of its external policy is now to organise lasting peace based on disarmament, the liberalisation of trade and individual freedom. Western Europeans who believe they can discern less disinterested and peaceful aims behind the Soviet attitude, in particular that of stirring up opinion in the West against the governments, Europe against the United States and European countries against each other so as to ruin the structures established in the West since the second world war are finding it increasingly difficult to make themselves heard. It is becoming more difficult to adopt defence budgets in parliament and, since 1986, the proportion of gross national product earmarked for defence has been falling each year in most western countries even before major arms limitation negotiations are concluded or even started.

4. Clearly the West cannot remain indifferent to Soviet initiatives, particularly when they produce results that conform to the aspirations of all and requests often made by the West in the past. Reductions in the level of forces, unilateral disarmament measures, the settlement of many conflicts outside Europe and the evacuation of Afghanistan are undeniable facts. There can be no question of acting as if they have not taken place and should the governments decide to do so they would not secure public support. Nor must the West act as if there is no longer a threat, as if there has been significant disarmament and as if peace has been ensured throughout the world. On the one hand, there are still many ambiguous aspects to Soviet policy and it is, moreover, far from certain that it will last for very long. On the other hand, the Soviet Union is not the only source of threats to Europe's security and world peace.

5. Your Rapporteur will therefore first attempt to assess these threats in their present form. He will then examine what Europe can and should do to counter them, while contributing to peace, disarmament and the establishment of a fairer, more stable international order.

6. Your Rapporteur visited the Soviet Union from 17th to 21st April 1989 with a view to preparing the present report. He was received by the Supreme Soviet and met all the Soviet authorities he had asked to meet. He was able to hold detailed talks with them during which most of his questions were answered very frankly. He wishes to convey his warmest gratitude to everyone in the Soviet Union who helped to arrange and ensure the success of this visit, including officials who received him and who are listed at appendix to the report.

II. Transformations in the Soviet Union

7. Several Soviet authorities whom your Rapporteur met and who were very favourable to Mr. Gorbachev's reform policy stressed that the idea of perestroika was not due to one man but had arisen out of necessity. They believed Mr. Gorbachev to be a striking embodiment, to which they all paid tribute, of a decisive turning point in Soviet history but he was not the inventor of perestroika. It may be noted, moreover, that Mr. Gorbachev himself, in his book "Perestroika", shows himself to be more a bearer of a message for which he is not wholly responsible than the creator of a new régime. If justified, this remark is not without significance since it limits the speculation sometimes reported in the western press about the political risks of Mr. Gorbachev's career. Although risk there may be, it should not call in question many aspects of the reforms that have been started.
8. Nevertheless, it was the appointment of Mikhail Gorbachev as General Secretary of the Soviet Communist Party in March 1985 that allowed the Soviet Union to show a different face to the one the entire world had hitherto known. As soon as he came to power, Mr. Gorbachev presented himself as the man of change who advocated a policy of far-reaching reforms in every aspect of Soviet policy.

9. In both substance and form, there is a Gorbachev style, but it was possible to use and express this style because of particularly favourable circumstances resulting from the conjunction of two factors: the general context of the aging leadership, on the one hand, and the will to remove the Soviet Union from the "pre-crisis" state into which it had been plunged by prolonged, attenuated forms of Stalinism that continued for thirty years after Stalin's death. The belief in the superiority of communism as a system of economic management, the base of Khrushchev's reforms, had disappeared long before. By 1985, the sole aim was to bring the Soviet economy and technology up to the same level as the modern countries. To this end, Mr. Gorbachev hinged his policy on two fundamental principles: perestroika, or restructuring, and glasnost, or openness, considered to be an instrument of restructuring.

10. Perestroika stemmed from realisation of the economic, social and cultural decline of the Soviet Union and the will to reverse this trend. Mr. Gorbachev therefore embarked upon a policy of radical reorganisation of the state machinery and the economy and adaptation of ideology to new circumstances.

11. The main aim of changes in the state machinery was to replace party officials by enlarging and rejuvenating the Politburo and also by replacing officials at every level, in particular in the republics, so that those who were elected were more representative of society and therefore had greater authority.

12. Naturally, this aspect of the reforms directly affects those occupying these posts and seems to be running into difficulties. Mr. Gorbachev seems to have made skilful use of circumstances in order to remove opposition to perestroika in various areas: for instance, the Chernobyl affair, the landing of a light aircraft in Red Square and the decision to reduce conventional forces led to sanctions or to resignations which facilitated the replacement of leaders. But ideological statements are difficult to interpret because they contain elements which seem contradictory to a western observer. On the one hand, there is reference to continuity with the work of Lenin, in itself ambiguous since Lenin, a statesman, spoke in different terms depending on whether revolution was necessary or the war economy had to be ended and economic activity reactivated, but nevertheless his work was set in the context of continuing the process started by the 1917 revolution. On the other hand, principles of a market economy or even pluralist democracy are invoked in order to muster forces in favour of perestroika. The facts themselves are ambiguous. In January 1989, the freeing of prices was deferred. Was this merely because of the many shortages meant that such action involved risks for the currency and social stability? Was it to silence political opposition? Similarly, giving the electorate some degree of choice of candidates at the elections to the Supreme Soviet held in April 1989 may just as well be a first step towards a multi-party system as a manoeuvre to save the single-party principle.

13. On 26th March, elections were held as planned for part of the People's Congress of Deputies. There was a searching public discussion about the candidature of Boris Eltsin, leader of the reformers, the popular choice of Moscow electors, and other progressives who presented themselves in many constituencies. These discussions and the accompanying popular demonstrations showed that a large proportion of Soviet public opinion was in favour of the reform policy. Clearly, therefore, this appeal to the public to face up to the reservations, criticisms or ill will of conservative elements still firmly ensconced in the state and party leadership was wanted and accomplished by Mr. Gorbachev under his responsibility.

14. It is admittedly too early to foresee all the consequences of these elections and to assert that there is a move towards a multi-party system. For the time being, it is merely a relative diversification within a political system based on a single party. However, it may be concluded that Mr. Gorbachev, following the example of western leaders, has consolidated his power by basing his authority on public opinion in order to challenge the conservative elements hostile to perestroika. Moreover, in his speech in London on 7th April, Mr. Gorbachev clearly described his interpretation of the choices of the Soviet people:

"The election of people's deputies of the USSR, which were held in a democratic atmosphere unprecedented in our entire history, has demonstrated that Soviet people are not going to turn off the path chosen four years ago... We launched perestroika with our eyes open... We realised that it would shake up thoroughly our entire society... We are convinced that only through democratisation is it possible to build a well-functioning, healthy and dynamic economy."

However, in the majority of electoral constituencies, there was nevertheless only one candidate, appointed by the local party organs, and the majority of the new Supreme Soviet might
remain under conservative control. There is thus a risk that, after elections showing a preponderance of reformers, the latter would be in a minority in parliament. There might therefore be a government of reform backed by a majority of the public opposite a Supreme Soviet that is, to say the least, reserved about government policy. In short, the very nature of Mr Gorbachev's political planning and the possible effects of his action raise questions involving both internal matters and foreign policy.

15. Where economic changes are concerned, what is new is the depth of Mr Gorbachev's diagnosis of the level of development in the Soviet Union and the way he has dramatised the country's economic setbacks: this was the rôle of glasnost. The purpose was to break with the practice of announcing to the people programmes designed to give them the products and housing they expected, showing off the Soviet Union to world public opinion as a model of economic efficiency but concealing the real statistics, bad management and even accidents, and turning a blind eye to corruption. Accelerated development is therefore now gaining a high degree of political, economic and social significance.

16. To do this, Mr Gorbachev is therefore proposing to mobilise society, modernise the machinery of production and reorganise the system of economic administration. Company law, an essential cog in the new economic machinery, came into force on 1st January 1988 after being approved by the Central Committee in June 1987. This reform, which increases companies' margin for manoeuvre by freeing them from the cumbersome supervision of centralised bureaucracy, should allow purely administrative methods to be replaced by an economic concept of management. This reform also involves the rationalisation of the production cycle, the closure of less profitable firms, the development of small firms, co-operation with western firms abroad, the modernisation of equipment, the rationalisation of working methods and wages policy. Mr Gorbachev's recent review of agricultural policy also revealed a disastrous situation and he expressed the firm wish to put an end to collective farming so as to make Soviet peasants "masters of the land".

17. Glasnost or openness, designed to convince the people of the need for change and then to release the creative potential that everyone has in him, is the keynote of a new information and cultural policy. It is therefore first an instrument of perestroika, but it is in itself a major political tool because it allows Mr Gorbachev to reconcile his régime with intellectual circles which had been the main victims of repression under his predecessors and to make a sweeping appeal to public opinion to mobilise it against all those who are still attached to former practices either because they assimilate them with the communist régime, or because they derive, or believe they derive, personal advantage from them or because they wish to protect themselves against the political risk of the opponents of perestroika returning to power.

18. In fact, perestroika seems to be encountering a multitude of difficulties and delays, the principal one being the abandonment in January 1989, in principle provisionally, of the freeing of prices, an essential part of any progress towards rational economic management. This imposed probably due to the realisation that there was a shortage of goods that would have quickly led to inflation if the law of supply and demand had replaced state law. It is taking a long time for the expected results of perestroika to be felt. The new Soviet leaders obviously hoped that there would be a speedy improvement in the population's standard of living in order to stimulate enthusiasm for reform. In fact, decisions on reforms had to be delayed to allow the government to overcome opposition. Their application is inciting further opposition with resulting obstacles and delays. Results might take a long time to emerge and Soviet economists are now announcing that it will take several decades to improve significantly their living conditions of the people.

19. Conversely, glasnost, after a few incidents which made the authorities force the media to play their rôle, seems to have been imposed irrevocably because it brought immediate advantages for the people which are truly appreciated. Access to new topics of information and public discussion has become a reality. The veils have been lifted from natural disasters and human failings and many afflictions. Alcoholism, drugs, prostitution and corruption are the principal deviations that the state intends to fight. However, mistakes or excesses by the administration or army are reported in the press and on television. For instance, there has been strong criticism of those responsible for the unnecessarily brutal repression of the peaceful demonstrations in Tbilisi in April 1989 and the government has undertaken to take appropriate corrective action. Western Russian-language radio broadcasts are no longer jammed and previously banned works are being published, often in magazines that ensure a wide distribution. The whole cultural spectrum has been opened: there are exhibitions of works of painters such as Chagall, the songs and poetry of Vladimir Vysotskki can be heard and discussed, television programmes are better presented, new programmes are created, the works of Pasternak are published, the orthodox church has access to television and its leaders are consulted about the problems of society.

20. This opening, which acknowledges that intellectuals and artists have a vital rôle to play in arousing social awareness, breaks with a practice that had prevailed since Stalin, i.e. that
anything outside the control of the party and the authorities should not be mentioned in the press which was mainly intended to educate the masses. Glasnost also has to facilitate restructuring as a whole by fostering research and the emergence of solutions to the many problems.

21. Nevertheless, censorship has not been completely abolished. On 1st July 1988, it was confirmed at the nineteenth party conference that openness must not jeopardise the interests of the state, society and individual rights. In military matters, the notion of secrecy is still very extensive and the exact content of the defence budget remains difficult to grasp. The same is true of foreign policy of which there is little critical analysis; the writings of some authors are still not to be found in bookshops. Furthermore, glasnost is not accompanied by any institutional changes: there has been no change in procedure for appointing chief editors of newspapers; procedure for publishing and cultural matters is still under close party control.

22. One of the most significant aspects of this cultural openness, however, is the condemnation of Stalinist excesses. On 2nd November 1987, Mr. Gorbachev announced the formation of a commission of inquiry into Stalin’s victims. Some of Lenin’s companions have been rehabilitated and in June it was decided to erect a monument to the memory of Stalin’s victims. Yet Trotsky has still not been rehabilitated. One way or another, official history is still being corrected but the door does not yet seem fully open for a free and critical historical work about the Soviet Union.

23. This reanimation of intellectual and cultural life is accompanied by a more conciliatory attitude towards dissidence. A number of dissidents have been freed and the existence of prisoners for their opinions has been recognised. The will to terminate such severe measures has been expressed. Emigration is no longer a crime: 8 000 Jews were authorised to leave the Soviet Union in 1987 and 7 600 in the first months of 1988, and, according to Israeli sources, the Soviet Union is believed to have undertaken to authorise hundreds of thousands of Jews to emigrate in the near future. Authorisation to emigrate has also been granted or promised to Germans and Armenians.

24. Certain spectacular actions, such as the press conference by Andrei Sakharov at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs on 3rd June 1988 to emphasise progress achieved and yet to be accomplished in the free movement of persons, were intended to improve the Soviet Union’s image in the world and have indeed effectively done so. Sakharov’s election to the Supreme Soviet by Soviet Academicians confirmed this impression. It is clear that one of Mr. Gorbachev’s main aims is to offer his country new drive in its external policy. The Soviet Union is trying to strengthen and sometimes recover its positions, influence and contacts. In certain cases, it has not hesitated to take the first step, as in the case of Japan after ten years of an almost total break in relations. Mr. Gorbachev’s visits to Poland, Hungary and the German Democratic Republic seem to have been intended to show that the Soviet Union no longer made its relations with those countries dependent on their internal policy. The major short-term priority, however, seems to be East-West relations.

25. In less than four years, this new policy has caused far-reaching changes in international relations and the Soviet Union’s relations with the rest of the world. It will therefore be central to your Rapporteur’s analysis and he will study changes in Soviet defence policy before tackling the more general aspects of the new policy and then drawing conclusions on what Europe can do to adapt itself to the new situation.

III. Soviet defence policy

26. Until recently, the military aspect of the Soviet threat attained disturbing proportions. It involved the deployment of large numbers of troops and tens of thousands of tanks, a fast-expanding fleet, unequalled machinery for intelligence and subversion, strategic parity with the United States, increasingly marked superiority at each level of theatre nuclear weapons and stocks of chemical weapons that had no equivalent. It now seems that, if the perception of the threat is losing its edge among western public opinion, this is primarily due to the publicity campaign that Mr. Gorbachev has been waging since he came to power rather than to actual deployment. His innumerable proposals relating to every aspect of disarmament and the limitation of armaments, the unilateral force and arms reduction measures that he has taken or encouraged his allies to take, the evacuation of Afghanistan, disengagement from most of the conflicts in which the Soviet Union had played a major role and concessions made to ensure that the Vienna conference on security and cooperation in Europe succeeded and the various arms limitation negotiations progressed are all signs of a deep-rooted evolution in Soviet defence policy.

27. The aims of this policy had not changed fundamentally since the 1917 revolution and were determined by the doctrine underlying all Soviet policy. To sum it up briefly, its main element, in the Stalinist era at least, was that, since a communist state had existed, the class struggle had become the leitmotif of international relations which were therefore inevitably dominated by the clash between capitalism and communism. The aim being to lead the entire world towards communism, it was first a question of safeguarding the communist sanc-
tuary, which the capitalist states could but wish to destroy, in order to establish the only true peace, that which would be inaugurated with the victory of the proletariat. Thus the will for peace merged with the will for revolution and its achievement would come only after victory. But it could also be a propaganda weapon since it could be opposed to the antagonism aroused by capitalist competition. The notion of peaceful coexistence during the Khrushchev era took nuclear deterrence into account by indicating that, if true peace was not possible, the struggle between the two sides could take on forms other than armed confrontation. Nevertheless, the Soviet Union had to remain strongly armed in order to be able to resist victoriously any offensive by its natural enemies. It also continued to use conflicts between capitalist countries or colonial wars to weaken the enemy camp.

28. This concept of inter-state relations resulted in the perpetuation of the Soviet Union's obsession of being surrounded that events between 1917 and 1941 and also the proliferation of American bases in the seas surrounding the Soviet Union could but strengthen, leading the instigators of Soviet military thinking to consider using their forces in the context of an offensive strategy. The arms policy pursued by the Soviet Union since 1945 aimed at giving it the means for such a strategy: absolute superiority in tanks, artillery and short-range missiles and the search for naval parity, with little account being taken of the West's deterrent capability. The main aim of Soviet strategy did not seem to be to avoid war but to place the Soviet Union in the best possible position for making Soviet interests prevail when what many considered to be an inevitable conflict broke out.

29. However, in May 1987, the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies announced that they had changed their military doctrine. Henceforth, Soviet strategy would be a defensive one aimed mainly at the prevention of war. According to certain Soviet analysts, this doctrine, based on "the new thinking", involved the rejection of war and recourse to force as the instrument of a policy.

30. Two fundamental concepts underly the Soviet Union's new strategic thinking:
- the concept of "reasonable sufficiency", copied from the West, according to which each country should have armed forces strong enough to repel an attack but not strong enough to conduct offensive operations;
- the concept of "mutual security" according to which the Soviet Union is secure only if the United States is too. This concept of course leads to an obligation to make joint efforts to ensure the success of arms limitation negotiations.

However, the concept of sufficiency is provoking much discussion in the Soviet Union.

31. Three schools of thought have emerged:

(a) That of many in military circles who consider that "sufficiency" is always needed. In this connection, they prefer to use the words "sufficient defence" which should ensure the security of the Soviet Union and at the same time not frighten other countries. According to General Tretjak, Commander of Soviet air defence forces, "the principle of defence sufficiency is unshakable. It is necessary to have as many forces as are needed to ensure the security of the Soviet Union and our allies". According to Mr. Yazov, the new Minister of Defence, "the limits of defence sufficiency are determined by the actions of the United States and NATO", which seems to imply that the Soviet commander would like the government to adopt a more dynamic attitude allowing advantage to be systematically taken of all technological and scientific knowledge derived from research for the purposes of defence against the West. In fact, such a doctrine could justify continued Soviet deployment at the cost of a few semantic sacrifices.

(b) That of the reformists who believe it possible to structure forces so that they are deployed in a defensive posture in accordance with the models of "sufficiency". They follow the Gorbachev military policy according to which strategy must be based on "reasonable sufficiency" and adopt a defensive orientation. Generally speaking, this school of thought includes members of peace committees such as the Committee of Soviet Scientists for Peace.

(c) That of the unilateralists for whom the Soviet Union should take unilateral steps to apply "reasonable sufficiency". According to this school of thought, the Soviet Union should give up the arms race and maintain a small number of forces so as to concentrate its efforts on strengthening the economy. The ensuing improvement in the Soviet economy would not only rectify the internal situation but should also increase Soviet power and prestige. However, this way of thinking is weakened by the Soviet refusal of the notion of "deterrence", which it assimilates to the threat of nuclear weapons, whereas the very reason for maintaining a small number of forces would be deterrence.

32. At present, it is the Gorbachev version of the defensive doctrine which seems in the lead subject to the promise to maintain forces at a level that precludes United States strategic superiority. This doctrine was expressed particularly clearly by General Mikhail Moiseyev, appointed Chief of Staff of the Soviet armed forces and First Deputy Minster of Defence of the Soviet Union in December 1988, in an interview
granted to the Tass Agency on 8th February 1989. According to Tass:

"In the coming years, the Soviet Union is to reduce its military budget by 14.2%, a quite justifiable step at political and strategic level... Until recently, the Soviet Union has followed the following principle: savings can be made everywhere except in defence. But today the military build-up tasks that have to be carried out must be viewed in closer relation with national problems as a whole on the basis of detailed, varied economic calculations. In short, we must now know how to make economies in defence.

At the present time, political approaches are becoming decisive in warring off war but they must be accompanied by measures to strengthen defence since only this mix will allow a policy of peace to be conducted and any attempt to use the language of force with us to be cut short. So we are reducing our armed forces to adapt them to the new tasks and make them clearly defensive, without detriment to their ability to fight, without any delay in order to preclude a possible break in the present balance of armed forces... The announced reduction of 500,000 men in the army and navy will start this year and will affect all components of the Soviet armed forces."

General Moiseyev was expressing the doctrine worked out by the new Soviet leaders whose effects had already been felt for more than a year in Soviet political behaviour and statements but which had been slow to take effect in military terms.

33. Early in 1988, Mr. Carlucci, then United States Secretary of Defence, met Mr. Yazov, Soviet Minister of Defence, in Bern to examine with him the impact of Gorbachev's new thinking on international security. Mr. Carlucci considered there had not yet been any real change in the structure of Soviet forces. He nevertheless proposed following closely the actual implementation of this new strategy, while recalling NATO's policy of deterrence. In spite of their opposition, the two countries announced their desire to increase contacts between members of the two armies. Mr. Carlucci was therefore invited, during summer 1988, to visit Soviet military installations. After his many meetings with Soviet military leaders, he said he was disappointed by the new Soviet defence policy which, he believed, continued to seek military superiority and to maintain offensive options against NATO forces.

34. During these visits, Mr. Carlucci voiced the United States views on the trend in Soviet "new military thinking", in particular when addressing the Military Academy in Moscow on 1st August 1988:

- "The way to advance the Soviet-American dialogue is not to paper over our differences, but to face them squarely, search for common ground and build on it."
- "We must continue to work together to find ways to prevent dangerous military incidents that might spark a confrontation neither of us wants."
- "We recognise that the Soviet Union has legitimate defence needs and we are aware of the suffering your country has endured in the past."
- "No one begrudges you the need for a strong and capable army."

Answering Soviet reproaches, he said, in regard to United States deterrent strategy:

- "From our point of view, and I say this with sincerity, there is no threat to the Soviet Union."
- "Our doctrine is one of deterrence, to dissuade the other side from attacking. It is not a doctrine that threatens the Soviet Union or any other country."

In conclusion, Mr. Carlucci left open all possibilities of understanding, saying he was aware that the changes that had been started might take time to implement. He added:

"We, in the United States, will continue to wait and watch — and will welcome constructive change when we see it manifested in concrete terms."

35. The prolongation of "new thinking" in military matters and loyalty to glasnost led the Soviets, in October 1988, to convene military observers from seventeen countries, including the NATO countries, to observe manoeuvres by Soviet and German Warsaw Pact army units in East Germany in accordance with the convention signed in Stockholm in 1986 laying down conditions in which the signatory countries should be authorised to observe the others' manoeuvres in Europe. Observers from the Soviet Union and the GDR had already attended NATO autumn manoeuvres in the Federal Republic in September 1988. At the same time, Mr. Kuznetsov, Deputy Director of the American Bureau of the Soviet Ministry for Foreign Affairs, announced that a detailed defence budget would be published at the beginning of 1990. Your Rapporteur received confirmation that the Soviet Union was preparing a new presentation of its military budget to allow a valid comparison with that of the United States.
36. In May 1988, a symposium under the joint sponsorship of the NATO Defence College and the Washington National Defence University was held in Rome on “East-West relations three years after Gorbachev’s accession to power: implications for NATO”. Most participants, while expressing optimism about détente, nevertheless expressed some reserves about these prospects of success and their implications for the alliance. General Altenburg, Chairman of the NATO Military Committee, pointed out in his introductory speech that it was clear that the Soviet leader had made a considerable impact on public opinion in all the NATO nations and stressed the permanency of the threat. Other participants expressed very similar views, underlining that arms had in no way been reduced since Mr. Gorbachev came to power. Only Mr. Egon Bahr had a more favourable view of Mr. Gorbachev’s intentions, saying he was convinced that balance, even conventional, at a lower level had become one of his political aims. Mr. Bahr’s views seem to have been confirmed by Soviet proposals and measures decided upon at the end of 1988 and the beginning of 1989.

37. Western reactions are therefore of two kinds. Some consider new military thinking to be the Soviet Union’s realisation of the danger of a military confrontation which might involve the use of nuclear weapons whereas others believe it to be a temporary stage intended to facilitate perestroika by reactivating economic, political and military relations with the West and not precluding the resumption of an offensive policy when the internal situation allows. However, it seems impossible not to note certain changes in military matters. First, Mr. Gorbachev has conducted a major purge at the top of the military hierarchy, which seems to have allowed him to remove the generals who were most opposed to a true disarmament policy. Thus, following the affair of the Cessna aircraft that landed in Red Square on 28th May 1987, he dismissed his Minister of Defence, Mr. Sokolov, who was 76, and replaced him by a younger man, General Yazov. He also removed ten of the sixteen Deputy Ministers of Defence, three of the five heads of department and eight of the sixteen commanders of military divisions. Other military leaders have since been removed and again in January 1989 with the resignations that followed publication of the document on NATO and Warsaw Pact forces.

38. Second, since 1988 a school of thought has emerged to the effect that the Soviet army should be a volunteer force so that some of the present troops may be returned to the civilian sector: a small army of volunteers and professionals at a high technological level would be more appropriate for the new defence policy, which would mean reducing the length of compulsory military service. Some American and British experts are, however, sceptical about the actual implementation of such a reform, particularly as everything indicates that Mr. Gorbachev’s relations with the army have been difficult. He takes decisions that he imposes on the military and some of them seem to disapprove of this encroachment on their powers, which hitherto had rarely been challenged. Even General Moiseyev, appointed Chief of General Staff by Mr. Gorbachev in December 1988, strongly opposed the abolition of compulsory military service in February 1989. However, in March the Soviet authorities, through the intermediary of the Vice-Chairman of the State Education Committee, announced a relaxation of military service for students who will henceforth be able to complete their studies without having to serve their two years’ military service. Military preparation for girls has also been abolished.

39. But 1987 will remain above all the year in which the agreement on intermediate-range nuclear forces was concluded. This agreement allowed Mr. Gorbachev to give a new turn to his country’s foreign policy. The treaty on dismantling intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) and shorter-range nuclear forces (SRINF) was signed in Washington on 8th December 1987 during Mr. Gorbachev’s visit. Concluded after six years of negotiations, it put an end to a dispute that had lasted more than ten years starting with the deployment of Soviet SS-20 missiles in Europe at a time when, in spite of the signing of the SALT I treaty in 1972, the Soviet Union was continuing to strengthen its nuclear potential, causing very sharp East-West tension.

40. Since the SS-20s significantly increased the imbalance of nuclear forces in Europe, NATO reacted to the threat: in December 1979, it decided to deploy 572 new American missiles if the negotiations had proposed holding with the Soviet Union were unsuccessful. The negotiations, which were started in November 1981, soon failed since the Soviet Union refused to compromise and threatened the West with military counter-measures if the American missiles were deployed. The negotiations were suspended by the Kremlin in November 1983 after NATO had started to implement its programme. A section of western public opinion reacted very strongly against the application of NATO’s twofold decision and the Soviet Union did all it could to encourage this reaction.

41. The treaty signed on 8th December 1987 is therefore important from two points of view: for the first time, it imposed no ceilings or reductions but eliminated two categories of nuclear weapons, ground-based intermediate-range missiles (1,000 to 5,000 km) and shorter-range missiles (500 to 1,000 km). The second innovation was the methods of verification: again for the first time, provision was made for on-site inspections, together with observation satellites. First inspections on the territories of the United
States, the Soviet Union and European states in which INF are deployed (the GDR, Czechoslovakia, Belgium, Italy, the Netherlands, the Federal Republic and the United Kingdom) should allow them to be dismantled and eliminated within three years. They are to be completed by other measures over a period of thirteen years in accordance with a detailed timetable and conditions.

42. In order to reach this agreement, Mr. Gorbachev several times had to break with his predecessors and their uncompromising attitudes, in particular by renouncing, in accordance with his unswerving doctrine, the Soviet Union’s radical opposition to on-site inspections. The Soviet Union has since started to train a team of inspectors and says it is prepared to accept the principle of on-site inspection for all disarmament agreements. The INF agreement was followed by the 11th January 1989 declaration closing the Paris conference on banning chemical weapons in which 149 states, including the Soviet Union, renounced the use of these weapons and undertook to seek an agreement banning their production and stockpiling. The Soviet Union, the main holder of chemical weapons, only recently admitted that this was so, but, out of respect for its new image, proposed destroying its stocks forthwith. In view of the difficulty of destroying such weapons and the size of Soviet stocks, one may nevertheless wonder whether it will manage to do so within the ten-year period it had requested at the Geneva negotiations.

43. In wondering why Mr. Gorbachev made these concessions, it should be recalled that, while Mr. Brezhnev’s policy made the Soviet Union a great military power, it did not prevent the United States from deploying new missiles in Europe. Above all, it fostered the revival of military programmes that had been suspended or abandoned and, in 1983, the start of the SDI (strategic defence initiative) programme which reactivated the arms race at too fast a pace for the Soviet Union. By agreeing to sign these agreements, Mr. Gorbachev recognised the failure of Mr. Brezhnev’s action and ended the stalemate: American missiles were withdrawn from Europe, relations with the United States were renewed, Soviet diplomacy gained new impetus and western defence policies might again be contested by the section of public opinion that had opposed the 1979 twofold decision. The INF treaty certainly reduces the two great powers’ nuclear arsenals by only 4%, which does not undermine their power, but it is a new starting point for the disarmament process.

44. In his speeches since 1986, Mr. Gorbachev has advocated a denuclearised world, stressing the dangers of nuclear weapons and the interdependence of states. He asserts that “security can no longer be ensured by military means” and denounces nuclear weapons, “the absolute and most fearful evil”, and deterrence, “which is an obsolete idea” (Pravda, 17th September 1987), which corresponds fairly closely to President Reagan’s words when launching SDI on 23rd March 1983, expressing his will to free the world of the threat of nuclear war and calling deterrence in question.

45. In 1988, the two great powers agreed on the principle of a 50% reduction in their strategic weapons (START negotiations). Differences remain, however, since the two countries do not have the same force structure, making it difficult to achieve accurate definitions of limitations. It was not possible to sign an agreement on this subject at the Soviet-American summit meeting in June 1988, but information received at the end of the year gave the impression that most of the obstacles have now been overcome, including the link established by the Soviet Union between the START agreement and the pursuit of the SDI programme and the problem of the interpretation of the ABM treaty. The Soviet Union now seems less preoccupied with this matter. Perhaps it has confidence in the success of the movement it has started since prospects of disarmament are prompting Congress to cut back on credits for the SDI programme and public opinion to prefer a reduction in intercontinental weapons to the pursuit of SDI.

46. The Warsaw Pact has superiority in conventional weapons. It admitted this when publishing, in January 1989, its own version of the comparison of forces of the two alliances. The problem is that this superiority is a threat to Europe that would increase if nuclear disarmament negotiations were to lead to agreements before a balance of conventional weapons is achieved. It was normal for the Soviet Union to stress nuclear disarmament. It was no less normal for NATO to require parallel progress in the two sets of negotiations. Mr. Gorbachev accepted this point of view in June 1988 as was confirmed by the Warsaw Pact on 16th July.

47. Without waiting for negotiations to be started, the Warsaw Pact decided on 8th December 1988 to withdraw six armoured divisions from Eastern Europe, a decision announced by Mr. Gorbachev in the United Nations at the same time as the decision to reduce Soviet armed forces by 500,000 men. On 22nd December 1988, Major General Yuri Lebedev, Deputy Army Chief of Staff, gave details of the implementation of this reduction which concerned, among others, forces stationed in the Eastern European countries.

48. In 1988, Mr. Vitaliy Shlykov, an economist and commentator on military matters close to the government, published a significant article underlining that the maintenance of a large
number of armoured vehicles in Europe had been a mistake on the part of the former military leaders. Acknowledging Soviet superiority in tanks, he believed this arm, which was both offensive and fragile, hardly met the requirements of Soviet security and that the West had taken advantage of this asymmetry to develop technologically and economically far more useful strategic initiatives, including nuclear, to ensure its military power. In order to reduce this disparity, Mr. Shlykov raised the idea that a zero option for armoured vehicles would be possible and that zones forbidden to armoured vehicles might thus be formed in Europe parallel with the denuclearised zones. However, this idea is apparently encountering serious objections among the military, who are still profoundly loyal to their "armoured vehicle mentality". Nevertheless, it perhaps explains the announcement in December 1988 of the destruction of 5,000 Soviet armoured vehicles.

49. Following the Soviet Union, the GDR, Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria announced reductions in their armed forces. Mr. Honecker, Head of the East German State and Unified Socialist Party, announced on 23rd January that the East German army would be reduced by 100,000 men, 600 tanks and 50 combat aircraft and expenditure on defence cut by 10% before the end of 1990. He said this decision was aimed at making the army even more defensive. He also announced the withdrawal of Soviet forces from German territory and gave details of its implementation. Czechoslovakia did likewise, the reduction involving 15% of military expenditure, 12,000 men, 850 tanks, 51 combat aircraft and 165 armoured vehicles. Bulgaria for its part decided to cut its budget by 12% in 1989 and to reduce its armed forces by 10,000 men, 200 tanks, 20 aircraft and 200 artillery systems before the end of 1990. Poland and Hungary, too, had previously announced similar reductions.

50. On 30th January 1989, for the first time Moscow published a detailed account of forces – men and equipment – stationed in Europe by both sides. This publication is a move towards generalised, tangibly implemented openness, in particular in defence matters where secrecy was a well-established principle. Furthermore, the Warsaw Pact officially admitted its military superiority in three areas: battle tanks, troop carriers and artillery, not counting very short-range missiles. This was a break with previous Warsaw Pact attitudes since, as recently as March 1988, it had, following the NATO summit meeting in Brussels, denounced "the premeditated lies about the assumed superiority of the Soviet Union which could bring troops to the battlefield in Europe more quickly than the United States". NATO should now be gratified since the East is going back on its assertions and openly recognising that there were grounds for most of NATO's assertions, which it had denied for many years. Nevertheless, the Warsaw Pact continues to assert that there is approximate parity between the two sides and that the unilateral reductions announced by some of its countries should be followed by corresponding western unilateral reductions in areas where the West is superior.

51. If these data are compared with those issued by NATO in November 1988, two remarks may be made: on the one hand, there are still differences of assessment in several areas. Generally speaking, each alliance tends to overestimate the other's military potential. On the other hand, the Warsaw Pact has included in its tables figures for naval forces, stressing the superiority of NATO which it says has 499 warships compared with 102 for the Warsaw Pact and nuclear missiles not included in the agenda of the conventional disarmament conference that is to open in Vienna on 6th March 1989.

52. The West considers that the Vienna conference should reveal the disparities between the two blocs and remove them. The Soviet Union accepts this principle but wants to move immediately from parity to reduction. But the West is afraid the Soviets may try to re-establish a link between conventional and tactical nuclear weapons. Through the intermediary of the NATO spokesman, it therefore rejects the notion of parity, instead calling for equal security. Controlling North Atlantic waters is indeed essential for western security, which depends on the arrival of American reinforcements and equipment in Europe whereas those of the Soviet Union do not depend on sea transport, and the United States is vigorously refusing to negotiate any kind of naval parity. Conversely, the Soviet Union, without calling clearly for such parity, is stressing the threat to its territory represented by the many United States aircraft-carriers and the multiplication of United States naval aviation bases round the Soviet Union. Aware of these differences, the Warsaw Pact specified in its communiqué that these figures are not used fully as starting parameters in the negotiations, which shows that it is tackling the negotiations flexibly.

53. The West has been somewhat embarrassed by these Soviet overtures. First, they were made at a time when the United States, in the throes of an election and then of appointing its new administration, in which the Secretary of Defence, Mr. John Tower, was immediately challenged and then replaced by Mr. Cheney, is not in a position to work out, and still less adopt, a new security policy. Soviet declarations have merely provided arguments for the opposition and made it more difficult to work out a disarmament policy in the United States. They have also encouraged, among public opinion in both Europe and the United States, not only those in
favour of immediate, unilateral nuclear disarmament but also all those who want state expenditure to be cut or switched to sectors other than defence. For instance, recent opinion polls in the Federal Republic have shown that a large section of German public opinion considered that the Soviet Union was no longer a threat. Generalisation of such reactions would obviously be a blow to the policy of deterrence pursued by the Atlantic Alliance just when deterrence seems to be attaining what has always been its aim: to put an end to the threat in order to achieve substantial disarmament and allow the restoration of normal East-West relations. Governments may therefore fear pressure from public opinion leading to an unduly sharp reduction in the western defence effort, whereas the measures actually taken by the Soviet Union and its allies are still very limited.

54. This is probably why they are expressing such scepticism about Soviet statements. At their meeting in Brussels in March 1988, the allies confirmed their attachment to their aims in conventional arms limitation negotiations:

- to bring about a stable, secure balance of conventional forces at reduced levels;
- to eliminate disparities detrimental to stability and security;
- to eliminate the possibility of launching a surprise attack or starting a large-scale operation.

The only measure the Atlantic Alliance has been able to take in response to Soviet gestures was to decide to reduce the scale of its 1989 autumn manoeuvres in the Federal Republic. On the one hand, the actual manoeuvres will be reduced and, on the other, fewer troops will be brought to Europe from the United States. Finally, NATO has announced that it is prepared to eliminate a large part of its nuclear arsenal deployed in Europe provided it can modernise its Lance short-range missiles. To this end, on 22nd March the experts of NATO’s high-level group adopted a report on restructuring and modernising short-range nuclear weapons. This report confirms that NATO must restructure the short-range nuclear weapons remaining after the reductions and modernise its SNF missiles. But no compromise has yet been found, since there are still differences between allies, suggesting that no definite decision will be taken before the forthcoming Atlantic summit meeting on 29th and 30th May. Mr. Gorbachev, for his part, confirmed in London in April that he was against modernisation. Increasing the range of Lance missiles seems to be the main problem since an increase to 480 km would bring it close to the lower limit of 500 km provided for in the INF agreements and the Soviet Union claims that, to have these agreements signed, it had to renounce SS-23s with a range of 460 km.

55. Furthermore, in his speech in London on 7th April, Mr. Gorbachev voiced his opposition to NATO maintaining its doctrine of nuclear deterrence, thus contesting the aim intended by the West:

"As for the doctrine of nuclear deterrence, I believe that it is high time that, instead of speaking of how to 'deter' others with nuclear weapons, we spoke of how to deter, to keep in check nuclear weapons themselves."

However, in his talks in the Soviet Union, your Rapporteur was given the impression that it was not believed realistic to consider that strategic nuclear weapons could be dismantled quickly. Great importance was attached to the forthcoming opening of negotiations on all very short-range nuclear weapons: missiles, where the Soviet Union has very great superiority, but also artillery and airborne weapons.

56. Western Europe for its part is ill-prepared to assess the decision on the unilateral reduction of forces announced by Mr. Gorbachev at the United Nations in December 1988. For the time being, it is the United States which, thanks to its satellites, is supplying useful information to its allies in regard to identification and verification by satellite. In December 1988, the Assembly adopted two recommendations on verification, one of which proposed the creation of a European satellite agency to allow Europe to play an active rôle in the negotiations.

57. At the Vienna Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, the participating countries agreed on the text of a final document on 13th January 1989, subject to an agreement still to be concluded on the mandate of the negotiations on conventional armed forces in Europe. Mr. Gorbachev had already advocated a pan-European summit meeting to discuss this matter, which may have implied that the United States and Canada would be excluded, and proposed reducing the number of Soviet aircraft based in Eastern Europe if NATO abandoned the redeployment in Italy of the 72 American F-16 aircraft just withdrawn from Spain.

58. However, these initiatives raise several problems: first, the Soviet Union asked, although the Soviets had superiority, that disparities be rectified by mutual concessions, which is tantamount to asking for a reduction in the American presence in Europe. By asking to include in the negotiations nuclear weapons with a range of less than 500 km, it exploited the differences of views on this matter among the western countries: the Federal Republic was asking for these missiles to be reduced, which the Americans, French and British considered premature. After accepting the separation of the two series of negotiations, the Soviet Union raised the question of the "modernisation" of Lance missiles which is
dividing the members of the Atlantic Alliance. Some members, such as the Federal Republic and Belgium, are asking that this be delayed for several years at least so as not to hold up the progress of disarmament negotiations, whereas the United States wishes this to be done quickly so that NATO will not remain too far behind in very short-range missiles.

59. Examination of Soviet defence policy, as far as can be judged now, therefore means drawing reserved conclusions. It would be absurd to consider Soviet statements merely as the instrument of a tactic designed to divide and weaken the West. Yet it must be noted that they do effectively weaken and divide and this is particularly serious because the West organised its security only in order to meet the Soviet threat. It is also quite clear that the move from words to deeds is slow: withdrawing Soviet divisions from Eastern Europe, reducing troop levels in the Soviet Union and its allied countries, destroying large quantities of military equipment and introducing true openness in the defence effort cannot be done overnight. Conversely, the re-examination of the defence and strategic policy of the past forty years, the appointment to the most senior commands of military staff who support Mr. Gorbachev's policy, the publication of a table of Warsaw Pact and NATO forces which, while not uncontested, nevertheless opens the door to realistic negotiations and recognition of the West's security requirements show a concern to achieve effective disarmament which appears particularly real as it corresponds to the economic and internal policy requirements of the Soviet authorities.

60. Whether or not its leaders so wish, the West will have to give a positive answer to Soviet proposals and deeds. However, it will have to do so without compromising its security and without abandoning, in détente, what it managed to defend during the cold war.

IV. The Soviet Union and Europe

61. Although the major part of Soviet territory is in Asia, the Soviet Union remains primarily a European power. Only in Europe can it find the partners it needs for its economic development and only in Europe can its security be threatened, at least in the foreseeable future. In this respect, Mr. Gorbachev's call for a "common European house" fits the facts. However, in this area as in many others, Soviet policy is hindered considerably by the weight of its past and above all that of the Stalin era. Admittedly, its 1945 annexations at the expense of Finland, the Baltic states, Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia and Romania give rise to no real difficulties for its external policy and provoke only minor problems in its internal affairs. But the establishment by use of force of régimes too favourable to it in countries which find it hard to support them has created a delicate situation. The difficulties encountered by Mr. Khrushchev in several countries had already contributed to his downfall and the abandonment of his liberalisation policy in the Soviet Union itself. Soviet public opinion seems to find it very hard to accept anything that might appear to reduce Soviet influence in Europe, be it ideological, economic or military.

62. There was an obvious contradiction in Mr. Brezhnev's policy which at one and the same time promoted the CSCE and instigated the military occupation of Czechoslovakia when it started to apply the principles to which the Soviet Union was to subscribe in Helsinki. It is difficult to assess how far Mr. Gorbachev has overcome this contradiction and to know how much independent action the Soviet Union is now granting the people's democracies. Nevertheless, it is on this among other things that the contents of the common European house, which has become one of his slogans, will depend, i.e. relations between the Soviet Union and both Western and Eastern Europe.

(a) The Soviet Union and its European allies

63. When Mr. Gorbachev came to power, the Eastern European countries were not at all a homogeneous entity. Their relations with the Soviet Union were not of the same type and their internal situations were very different. Proclamation of perestroika took them by surprise in very different positions and this strongly influenced their reactions. It is therefore worth making a brief reference to the case of each of these countries.

64. (i) Hungary had already had a period of reform in the previous decade and, when Mr. Gorbachev came to power, it was running out of breath in its economic liberalisation which could not go much further without a relaxation of the political bonds which it could not shake off. Mr. Janos Kadar, party General Secretary since 1956, had undertaken a policy of restructuring: important responsibilities entrusted to young people, an atmosphere favourable to certain forms of political pluralism and, above all, development of a large-scale free market supplied by agricultural co-operatives which had extended their activities in many areas. His age and bureaucratic attitude explain his retirement on 23rd June 1987 and his replacement by Mr. Karoly Grosz, a party man accepted by the reformists, who is said to be on excellent terms with Mr. Gorbachev. He therefore surrounded himself with reformers. On 3rd December 1987, he confirmed the government's determination to pursue the far-reaching reforms undertaken "without concessions." On 16th December, it was announced at the opening of the winter
session of the National Assembly that the government would be restructured: greater responsibilities for officials with no political past, merger of several ministries, stabilisation plan and greater freedom of opinion. Finally, on 11th February 1989, the Central Committee of the Hungarian Unified Socialist Party agreed to a reform programme already passed by the National Assembly aimed at restoring a multi-party system subject to new parties “accepting socialism”, obviously ambiguous words. However, these principles are already being applied by the Hungarians.

65. Of all the Eastern European countries, Hungary is certainly the one which has the most wide-ranging relations with non-member countries of the Warsaw Pact and, in particular, with Austria, to which it is linked by a common past. Since 1987, however, it has also developed its relations with the European Community and with the Council of Europe, which would not be opposed to Hungary joining it as an observer. Its Minister for Foreign Affairs addressed the North Atlantic Assembly in autumn 1988 and the President of the WEU Assembly was invited to Budapest in January 1989. This demonstration of interest is obviously worthy of very close attention.

66. (ii) In the case of Poland, General Jaruzelski clearly needs Soviet support and a licence for reform in order to face up to a particularly dynamic opposition. It is not surprising therefore that he heartily supports Mr. Gorbachev’s thinking and action. Condemnation of Stalinism by the Soviet authorities even allowed him to recall, in moderate terms, the injustice caused to the Poles by the signing of the German-Soviet pact in August 1939 and to refer to the dissolution of the Polish Communist Party by Stalin. In April 1987, a joint committee of historians was set up to throw light on the “white spots” which mark the history of relations between the two countries. The Soviet Union now seems prepared to reopen old files of contention and even to tackle that of the massacre of Polish officers at Katyn. A start has also been made with settling the problem of Soviet citizens of Polish origin by opening Polish consulates at Lvov and Vilnius.

67. Poland has also tried to restructure its internal policy: it is the first Warsaw Pact country to have introduced electoral procedure allowing electors some freedom of expression. For several years now, this has been the case for bodies responsible for ensuring social peace in Poland (consultative councils, new trades unions, various commissions and committees close to parliament or the Council of Ministers). Spectacular initiatives such as the trial of the murderers of Father Popieluszko and the general amnesty in 1986 sought to restore the legitimacy of the régime. The referendum of 29th November 1987, although intended to reinforce its legitimacy, was a failure since the authorities found themselves in the minority and had to admit it. This experience, aimed at creating new institutional sectors partly outside party control, came to nothing but, in the long run, the referendum turned against its promoters, who had to face the formation of a composite opposition front against them, ranging from party conservatives to Solidarity contesters.

68. For Poland, it is a matter of opening up, within the system, autonomous areas meeting the desire for democratisation expressed by the population without destabilising the framework itself. For the government, it is rather a matter of containing claims and submitting them to control by the authorities so as to limit the risk of pluralism that is tending to be imposed by facts. The opposition would be tolerated only if incorporated in controlled institutions, as was attempted with the Consultative Council attached to the Presidency of the Republic. Yet the political situation is evolving significantly since the party is renouncing the monopoly of power and has started round-table negotiations with opposition representatives on many matters, in particular the question of trade union pluralism. In spite of certain differences between the negotiators, one cannot gloss over the major step taken by the Polish Government in officially legalising three trade unions, including Solidarity, agreeing to the principle of totally free elections to appoint a new Senate and President of the Republic and accepting the principle of economic reforms, including the indexation of salaries on the rise in the cost of living, up to 80%. But the political, economic and social measures taken by the Polish Government have not yet allowed the serious crisis facing the country to be overcome.

69. Poland’s internal situation is further complicated by old grudges revived by events between 1940 and 1945. Most of the population is suspicious of any Polish Government that relies on the Soviet Union, but no government can take office without Soviet agreement. The present Soviet-Polish rapprochement is certainly beneficial to both parties, but too perfect an association makes the Polish authorities dependent on Gorbachevism in the Soviet Union itself and, vice versa, the failure of Jaruzelski in the November 1987 referendum served as an argument for Mr. Gorbachev’s opponents. Conversely, the Soviet authorities your Rapporteur met spoke with interest and good will of the experiments that have been started in Hungary and Poland.

70. (iii) In Bulgaria, whose government seems to be clinging to a very conservative line, it is obviously the influence of Soviet perestroika that led to a number of changes, probably due more to the leaders’ concern to continue to benefit
from Soviet support than to deep-rooted reforming convictions. The fact that Todor Juikov belongs to a generation progressively removed from power by Mr. Gorbachev has not led to his downfall, in spite of the exceptionally cold relations between the two leaders observed in Sofia in October 1985. Contrary to rumours circulating at the time, Mr. Juikov has remained at the head of both state and party, but at the cost of a spectacular about-turn. In this way, he has managed to keep overall control of the promotion of a new generation of officials to key posts in the party. In April 1986, the twelfth party congress elected a Central Committee, one-third of whose members were under 50. Parallel institutional reforms have been decided and the economic reform reinvigorated. Several ministries and government committees have been dissolved and the number of mandates that a party leader can accumulate is limited to two or, exceptionally, three. A series of laws has been passed by the National Assembly to "speed up renovation of the economy and social life". In fact, the political situation in Bulgaria seems marked by uncertainty. Public opinion seems very reserved about the reforms announced since the authorities do not seem capable of effectively overcoming the economic crisis. Moreover, among certain party members there are many signs of resistance to the democratisation of political life.

71. (iv) In Czechoslovakia, the retirement of Mr. Gustav Husak on 17th December 1987 and his replacement by Mr. Milos Jakes as party General Secretary, followed by a limited reshuffling of the party and state system following the Central Committee plenum in April 1988, did not prove to be the decisive turning point that might have been expected. The new party leader's policy seems much the same as that of his predecessor. Mr. Jakes and other leaders reject any comparison between reforms in Czechoslovakia in 1968 and Soviet perestroika. According to statements by Mr. Jakes about an assessment that might now be made of the Prague spring, it would appear that he is rather embarrassed about talking of the past and its commemoration was again repressed in January 1989. Only limited political changes have been accepted by the present leaders. The rôle of the various components of the National Front must be consolidated and participation by the citizen must remain under the close control of the system which holds the real power.

72. Everything indicates that, after the 1968 experience, which showed what political deflections could result from liberalisation, the most conservative elements in power, with the support of the Nomenklatura, are following Moscow with very bad grace along the road to reform that Czechoslovak public opinion might exploit against the régime. In this connection, moreover, Czechoslovakia stands out from its main allies.

By condemning the playwright Vaclav Havel to nine months in prison for taking part in a demonstration on the twentieth anniversary of the death of Jan Palach, an opponent of the régime, it threw to the winds the provisions of the Vienna final document and interventions by western and some eastern countries to try to have the playwright released.

73. (v) The German Democratic Republic, too, is very reserved about perestroika. Mr. Honecker had already deferred applying Soviet-type reforms in 1986. In 1987, he reaffirmed his positions, while conceding that "the restructuring embarked upon in the Soviet Union is followed with much sympathy and interest in the GDR". He did not condemn the actual principle of reform, but specified that it would be detrimental to the GDR to copy the experiments of others. He believed he had already accomplished the necessary structural reforms. Mr. Gorbachev, for his part, without exercising pressure on the East German leaders, is indirectly encouraging supporters of reforms within the GDR. He has had the support of East German writers who, at their tenth congress in November, voted in favour of the innovations he had introduced in the Soviet Union. However this may be, the régime seems too uncertain of the support of the population, still influenced by the example of the Federal Republic's economic progress, to be able to relax significantly the system of constraint. At most, it has made a few concessions towards those wishing to emigrate.

74. (vi) The case of Romania is clearly very special, since Mr. Ceausescu's Government did not wait for Mr. Gorbachev's reforms before breaking with the Soviet Union and setting up a dictatorship which is moving in a direction diametrically opposed to that which perestroika has, to various degrees, made the other people's democracies adopt. Public opinion and governments in most countries of the world, including the eastern countries, are up in arms at Mr. Ceausescu's régime. Romania is under international pressure: condemned morally by several of its allies, it has been officially blacklisted by the West.

75. These divergent reactions to perestroika by Eastern European countries are due to each one's specific situation. The fact that none of them has held free elections for more than forty years means that no one can foresee the reactions of public opinion and the electorate if they had a real choice. Two of them having organised voting in which electors are left considerable freedom will provide important pointers to the political stake in truly free elections.

76. Their governments were imposed, indirectly at least, by the Soviet Union which provides them with firm support in face of public opinion which is, to say the least, uncertain. The presence of Soviet armed forces on the territory
of four of them is a strong element of pressure on the people, who can still remember 1956 and 1968, and on the governments. At one and the same time, the latter are encouraged to follow the Soviet model and its evolution in order to retain Soviet support and to slow down internal reforms if they feel there is popular pressure which might place them in difficulty. This pressure seems particularly strong in Poland in view of the country's present serious economic crisis. It is latent in the German Democratic Republic, where the population is very sensitive about everything that happens in the Federal Republic. It seems less strong in Hungary, where the Kadar Government, although a result of the 1956 repression, and then that of Mr. Grosz have for a long time been practising a tolerant internal policy, allowing, discreetly and to a limited extent, some degree of economic freedom which has allowed some of its inhabitants to grow wealthy in spite of a disastrous situation at state level. Relations of all kinds with Hungary's Austrian neighbour have also been developed, as have exchanges with Western Europe which they are now asking not to leave them on one side. At the Davos economic symposium in February 1989, Mr. Grosz is even believed to have expressed the wish to expand Hungary's relations with, among others, WEU.

77. But in these countries there is some degree of contradiction between granting greater freedom and internal stability. Without stability, Mr. Gorbachev's whole policy may be called in question, and if opposition is too pronounced, the very results of this policy in the people's democracies will be in doubt. Furthermore, systematic exploitation of the economies of the people's democracies to help to develop the Soviet Union makes it difficult to restore economic freedom in these countries just when the Soviet Union is trying to improve its own economy.

78. The West must not neglect the delicate situation in the Eastern European countries which places it too in an uncomfortable position. Western Europe cannot ignore the hopes of greater freedom which have emerged particularly strikingly in Poland in the last ten years and in Czechoslovakia. Nor, however, can it wish the Eastern European countries to be destabilised as this would endanger Mr. Gorbachev's Government and the policy he has inaugurated. In the long run, the evolution of the Soviet Union is the main historical factor because there can be no real transformations in the other eastern countries if perestroika is not a success in the Soviet Union.

79. This remark implies that the western countries should view with caution the Soviet proposal to build a common European house. It must not be rejected but its future shape must be clearly defined. In this connection, the CSCE has accomplished, in particular during its long session in Vienna which came to an end in January 1989 after more than two years' work, remarkable preparatory work defining realistic elements for a rapprochement between the two halves of Europe in the coming decade.

(b) Relations between Eastern and Western Europe

(i) Economic relations

80. In the last twenty years, the Soviet Union has developed its external trade significantly. Since 1970, it has increased sixfold and at the same time its trading channels and the geographical structure of its external economic relations were diversified. However, the Soviet authorities were far from satisfied with the situation. They now know that the scale, structure and form of the Soviet Union's external trade and economic and technological relations to date were hardly commensurate with the country's requirements and new aims and the machinery of these relations had to be fundamentally restructured to take account of changes throughout the economy. Parallel with other sectors of the economy, the reorganisation of external trade was one of Mr. Gorbachev's first areas of action. To this end, in his speech in London on 7th April, he confirmed his will to integrate the Soviet economy into the world economy:

"Our economic reform presupposes the Soviet Union's closer integration into the world economy and may be conducive to building a truly global market and a new world economic order. In recent years we have seen the emergence of real opportunities to close the last page of post-war history and enter into a new period of peace."

81. In the Soviet Union, changes related first to central bodies responsible for external trade. For instance, a "State Committee for External Economic Relations" was set up in the framework of the Soviet Council of Ministers. External trade activities were also affected by the reorganisation of the Soviet banking system aimed at the diversification and sectoral specialisation of that system. The main purpose of introducing this new machinery was to create a closer link between the domestic economy and the world economic situation.

82. As a result of these changes, the development of the Soviet trading landscape is therefore now in full swing. On 9th June 1988, this led to the establishment of official relations between the EEC and the CMEA after thirty years during which they had ignored each other. This was followed, on 25th June, by a declaration of mutual recognition within the context of the Soviet proposal for a common European
house. This agreement, concluded in spite of disagreement over West Berlin, is important for allowing the East to benefit more from economic co-operation with Western Europe. At this stage, the CMEA countries are mainly seeking to develop co-operation in eight principal areas, i.e. protection of the environment, transport, technical standards, science and technology, energy, nuclear energy, statistics and economic forecasting. In the Soviet Union, the state monopoly of external trade having been seriously called in question, barriers between Soviet producers and the western business world are tending to be lowered.

83. As well as central bodies of the old type, ministries, state committees, firms and production unions, co-operatives, associations, banks, towns and the new joint capital firms have become potential direct partners for western firms. Even more important, all those playing an economic rôle, whether or not they are able to negotiate directly on external markets, now have the right to use fairly freely any convertible currency they have earned from exports. But everything is not yet possible: the non-convertibility of the rouble and the absence of a domestic market are still strong brakes on the development of trade.

84. At the end of 1988, the Soviet Government nevertheless decided to implement a three-stage plan to bring the parity of the rouble down to a more realistic level compared with western currencies. The official rouble used in commercial transactions will be devalued by about 50% on 1st January 1990. Indeed, your Rapporteur noted that the convertibility of the rouble and the external debt were being keenly discussed in the Soviet Union. Some were advocating a shock effect by swift, radical measures to give impetus to the Soviet economy. Others consider it would be wiser to advance by steps allowing for transitional stages. Furthermore, Soviet firms will be able to use up to 10% of their western currency to import goods from the West. They will be able to exchange part of it on a currency market that is to be set up. On 1st January 1991, the present system of coefficients, which are exchange rates specific to each product, is to be abandoned.

85. In Western Europe, the Soviet Union's first partner is the Federal Republic (20% of the Soviet market), followed by Italy (11%) and France (9.4%). To enable these relations to be developed, the emphasis has been placed on joint firms with Soviet and western capital, which was impossible as long as the Soviet Union intended to maintain total state control over economic activity. Several agreements have been concluded in this framework, first with large firms, but files are now being discussed which relate to small and medium-sized firms. To encourage western investment, Moscow has decided to ease many of the constraints: western investors will now be able to have a majority share-holding in these firms, their share having previously been limited to 49%, labour laws will be made more flexible, foreigners will be able to run such firms and customs tariffs on products they have to import will be reduced.

86. Apart from this new type of co-operation, East-West relations are based mainly on a network of bilateral agreements. They started with the conclusion of trade agreements developed with effect from 1959, which were generally signed for a five-year period and completed by annual protocols listing the products to be exchanged. They were quite short, defining the general framework for mutual trade, and almost always included a most-favoured-nation clause. The EEC is empowered to sign or renew trade agreements with a third country on behalf of member states in accordance with the common trade policy. Today, the bilateral framework of East-West relations consists of co-operation agreements whose implementation includes a vast network of institutions. Finally, there are agreements on specific matters: credit agreements, prolonged by banking application protocols, fiscal conventions, etc., and very many framework agreements concluded between large western industrial groups and the relevant administrations in the socialist countries.

87. The development of East-West trade clearly requires decentralisation of decision-taking at the level of firms and the direct use of currencies for the necessary compensation. Conversely, the Soviet Union and its allies complain that too many products are included on Cocom lists of items the West must not export. The development of perestroika alone should remove these two obstacles. Autonomy for firms, a return to a certain amount of price freedom in the Soviet Union itself and an increase in the number of joint firms authorised to purchase equipment directly from western countries should sweep away many economic barriers to the development of trade, and a fall in the proportion of militarily-related research and production in the Soviet Union should encourage the West to cut its Cocom commitments, which apparently are evaded with increasing frequency.

(ii) Vienna Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE)

88. The thirty-five participants (the whole of Europe except Albania, plus the United States and Canada) in the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, which had been meeting in Vienna since 1986, adopted the concluding document of the conference by consensus on 15th January 1989. Provision was made for ten follow-up conferences between now and the fourth review conference that is to be opened in Helsinki on 24th March 1992. Annexed to it is
the mandate for the twenty-three NATO and Warsaw Pact member countries to start, on 6th March 1989, negotiations on the reduction of armed forces in Europe. It contains three chapters or baskets relating to security in Europe, economic, scientific and technological co-operation and, finally, co-operation in humanitarian matters.

89. On the first basket, i.e. security, the NATO and Warsaw Pact countries agreed to start negotiations in Vienna during the week of 6th March aimed at strengthening stability and security in Europe through the establishment at lower levels of a stable, sure balance of conventional armed forces. Dual-capacity nuclear and conventional arm will also be negotiated. Furthermore, talks will be continued on security- and confidence-building measures in Europe for extending what was achieved at the Stockholm disarmament conference which ended in September 1986. These talks will take over from the mutual and balanced force reduction talks (MBFR) between the two alliances which lasted for fifteen years without success. In spite of the absence of results, a joint communiqué by the two blocs affirmed that "these negotiations have helped to maintain a serious dialogue between East and West on security issues... The extent of common ground has proved to be insufficient to enable the participants to agree on a treaty ".

90. The negotiations on conventional armed forces in Europe (CFE) and on confidence- and security-building measures (CSBM) were started in Vienna on 9th March 1989. The first stage of these negotiations ended on 24th March with an agreement on the negotiating mandate.

91. In regard to CFE, the positions of the two alliances are fairly close, although there are still some differences. The first possible remark is that there is a joint will to reduce asymmetries by unequal reductions of the two sides' forces (5 to 10% for the West, 10 to 15% for the East). They also agreed on the need to concentrate their efforts first on forces capable of launching surprise attacks. The third point of agreement is acceptance of the principle of on-site inspections. Points on which they differ relate to:

(i) Zones or corridors. The West has proposed dividing the territory from the Atlantic to the Urals into four concentric zones, while the East prefers demilitarised corridors at the intersection of the two blocs.

(ii) Unlike NATO, the Warsaw Pact wants tactical aircraft and combat helicopters to be included in the negotiations.

(iii) The East wishes to include the reduction of troop levels in the negotiations, which the West considers to be a secondary matter.

(iv) Finally, the figures published by the two allies on levels of troops and the principal armaments differ considerably.

Although it is still too early to judge, it is certain that, for the first time, there is a vast area of agreement between East and West which will facilitate the negotiations and the Soviet authorities told your Rapporteur that they wanted them to succeed. Recognition of asymmetries and assertion of the need to remedy them can open the door to agreement on the step-by-step reduction in the level of forces and arms on both sides, leaving the way open for new relations between the two blocs based on mutual confidence.

92. Where CSBM are concerned, the Warsaw Pact considers the West's proposals to be too modest. The West is proposing the implementation of a random inspection procedure to assess the information supplied, but rejecting Warsaw Pact proposals to introduce constraints in the two sides' military manoeuvres. However, the idea of a dialogue on the two sides' military doctrines has been adopted. For this purpose, on a German-Polish initiative, a seminar is to be held in the Federal Republic from 21st to 24th June.

93. However, Mr. Gorbachev made his positions clear in his speech in London on 7th April. After announcing the shut-down of two reactors producing enriched uranium for military purposes, he did not hesitate to say that the pursuit of the Vienna negotiations might well be affected if NATO continued its tactical nuclear weapons " modernisation " programme. Today, therefore, the West must look closely at the future of the Vienna negotiations in view of the Soviet Union's veiled threat to call in question the détente that has been achieved in East-West relations.

94. The area of application of the new negotiations covers all the territory of the participants in Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals including offshore European territory. The mandate provides for exchanges of information and verification, including on-site inspection.

95. The second basket, on economic co-operation, attracted little attention. Many countries, including the United States, consider that the CSCE is not an appropriate framework for discussing economic matters. However, the protection of the environment was on the agenda: natural and ecological disasters, in particular in the Soviet Union, have revived interest in such matters on which it is planned to hold another conference in Sofia.

96. The third basket, relating mainly to human rights, reflects the new thinking of the eastern countries. In spite of reservations by Romania, which considers that some of the provisions of the concluding document open the way to interference in the internal affairs of other states and the violation of independence and national sovereignty and encourage retrograde activities in opposition to reform, the final doc-
ument shows that considerable progress has been made in this area. The East made major concessions in human rights and the West agreed to a conference on the subject being held in Moscow. Furthermore, out of respect for glasnost, the Soviet leaders announced that the document would be made public in the Soviet Union.

97. The third basket contains a whole series of detailed undertakings relating to religious freedom, the rights of minorities, free movement of persons and the right of prisoners to humane treatment, in particular a ban on psychiatric treatment dispensed for non-medical reasons. The executive committee of the World Psychiatric Association has therefore provisionally readmitted the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria, which had left the association in 1983. Bi- and multilateral controls will be conducted. The states concerned will have to answer requests for information from other states on humanitarian matters. Representatives of the orthodox church also gave your Rapporteur extremely favourable testimonies regarding the practice of religious freedom.

98. Thus, the CSCE, as it developed at the Vienna conference, has become an important part of international order in Europe. It provides the framework for many negotiations on specific subjects such as the fight against pollution, Mediterranean problems and even settlement of the Cyprus conflict, and it has also determined how East and West are to try to settle the major issues that had opposed them in earlier decades. It therefore meets the wish frequently expressed by the Soviet Union and its allies not to be left out of the effort being made by Western Europeans to organise their common destiny. In this way, it forms the foundation of the common house referred to by Mr. Gorbachev. Its evolution and the place it will occupy in the history of Europe will depend primarily on how perestroika is pursued in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.

99. One way or another, the notion of a "common house" is still very vague, even to many Soviet leaders who are wondering about the nature, responsibilities and future of the various international institutions established by Western Europe before defining their position towards them. The West has similar questions in regard to the same matters. It should be relatively easy to associate the eastern countries with the activities of the Council of Europe once they meet its constitutional criteria. Furthermore, the respective positions of WEU and NATO on the one hand and of the Warsaw Pact on the other are clear enough to allow a dialogue between representatives of the two organisations at executive level and at the level of the WEU Assembly and the parliaments of the Warsaw Pact countries, since the Warsaw Pact has no parliamentary assembly. There have also been exchanges between the European Parliament and certain eastern countries. But, in the long run, making them instruments of co-operation or dialogue depends on whether or not the European Council and the European Parliament choose to handle security questions. The Soviet authorities did not conceal from your Rapporteur that they reserved their position on this point.

V. The Soviet Union and the world

100. Détente in Europe would obviously be unthinkable if not accompanied by a far-reaching change in relations between the Soviet Union and the West throughout the world. For geographical and historical reasons, Western Europe certainly depends very largely on its relations with the various parts of the world and, in particular, its maritime trade, while the Soviet Union, a continental power with relatively underdeveloped external trade, is rightly concerned not to have its rare outlets to the open sea closed, although it does not depend to the same degree on its maritime connections. Its claim for equality with the West in naval armaments therefore seems unrealistic. On the other hand, it has, and in recent decades has used, means of disturbing international order and world trade in a manner that interfered considerably with the western economy and above all that of Western Europe, dependent on imports of certain essential products such as oil and exports for its economic development.

101. It would obviously be childish to see "the hand of Moscow" behind all the conflicts that have torn the third world apart since 1945 or even behind all the West's misfortunes. The Soviet Union has never had the means necessary for taking the place of the western countries and in reality has tried to do so in only a small number of cases but it has, by various means, exploited the West's difficulties in the world and armed those who tried to make it lose some of its important positions.

102. A journalist, referring to world events in 1988, spoke of an "epidemic of peace". Many conflicts around the world have calmed down and, even if lasting solutions have not been found, rapprochements and negotiations have started. It would be very exaggerated to attribute this solely to Mr. Gorbachev's policy, but his cautious, realistic, moderate policy has certainly made a valid contribution, if only because those who wished to disturb the peace were unable to rely on Soviet support, thus encouraging them to find compromises.

(a) The Middle East

103. This is a particularly sensitive area for the Soviet Union, a great Moslem power with lengthy frontiers with several Middle East coun-
tries and populations of the same ethnic origins on both sides of those frontiers. As a result, it was not entirely free to exploit a situation which might have been favourable because of the decline of western influence since 1956, the fall of the Shah of Iran and rising Islamic fundamentalism. By supporting nationalist movements and keeping Israel at a distance, the Soviet Union managed to become momentarily reconciled with certain countries in the region, including Egypt in Nasser’s day, Syria and Iraq, and subsequently even Libya. It was unable to gain a firm foothold, however, except, perhaps, in Aden.

104. When Mr. Gorbachev came to power, the Soviet Union had lost most of its credit in the Islamic world because of the war it had been waging in Afghanistan since it invaded the country on 27th December 1979 to try to keep in place a communist government that had seized office in a violent coup d’état in April 1978. The action of the new Soviet leaders seems to have had two aims: to put an end to the Afghan affair which was becoming disastrous and to re-establish Soviet influence in the region on new bases, i.e. to try to terminate the various hostilities splitting the country while ensuring that the Soviet Union had a say in maintaining the peace thus restored.

105. (i) In Afghanistan, as soon as he came to power Mr. Gorbachev distinguished himself from his predecessors by showing clearly that he had no responsibility for this problem. At the twenty-seventh party congress in February and March 1986, he gave an assurance that the Soviet Union wanted to find a political way out of the conflict which would allow it to withdraw its troops. From then on, there was definite progress in the indirect negotiations held in Geneva between Pakistan and Afghanistan through the intermediary of the United Nations. In March 1986, a first time-table for the withdrawal of Soviet forces within forty-eight months was issued in Kabul. In 1987, events speeded up. In January, Mr. Shevardnadze, visiting Kabul, gave an assurance that a political settlement was near. In March, the Geneva negotiators reduced the time-table to twenty-two and then eighteen months and in the spring the Soviet Union seems to have decided to withdraw its forces in 1989.

106. On 8th April 1988, the last obstacles were removed: the agreements were signed in Geneva on 15th April 1988 under the auspices of the United Nations. They consisted of four documents: two bilateral agreements between Afghanistan and Pakistan, a third on international guarantees and a fourth on mutual relations for settling the situation, signed by the four parties and making it binding on the Soviet Union to withdraw its troops within nine months as from 15th May 1988, i.e. by 15th February 1989, which it duly did. However, the texts make no provision for an internal political settlement: on one side there is Mr. Najibullah’s régime established by the Soviet Union and, on the other, the resistance movement which was not involved in the agreements and continues to fight the communist régime in Kabul. In addition, the two great powers are continuing their assistance, to the government in the case of the Soviet Union and to the rebellion in the case of the United States, on the basis of “positive symmetry”. Afghanistan is therefore in an anarchical political situation in which the resistance movement and the authorities are still at blows. The Kremlin’s decision suggests that the Soviet Union had no solution other than to recognize the failure of the Brezhnev initiative. The Soviet Union has gone back on one of its fundamental principles: the irreversibility of régimes in countries where communism has been established. It has abandoned a member of the “socialist community” and has not managed to control this small underdeveloped country. It was a humiliating setback for the Soviet Union to the detriment of the prestige of the army, which was ill-prepared for guerrilla warfare. Soviet losses, believed to number 13 310 killed, 35 478 wounded and 311 missing, according to official figures, were not tolerable for the Soviet population and Mr. Gorbachev showed he was capable of taking reasonable decisions and enforcing them in spite of opposition from the military leaders.

107. (ii) In the war between Iran and Iraq, Mr. Gorbachev tried to show the Soviet Union to be a responsible state capable of promoting the settlement of problems. Hitherto closely allied with Iraq, its position has evolved since 1987 and there was a noticeable improvement in its relations with Iran, inter alia on the occasion of the meeting between Mr. Shevardnadze and Imam Khomeini in Tehran on 26th February, when the two said they were prepared to establish a strong relationship vis-à-vis the western countries. Although the Soviet Union refused, in spite of United States pressure, to associate itself with possible sanctions against Iran, in July 1987 it voted for Security Council Resolution 598 calling for an immediate cease-fire and, in its meetings with the two belligerent countries, constantly affirmed its support for United Nations efforts.

108. (iii) In the Lebanese conflict, the Soviet Union now has a policy that is no longer limited to support for Syria. On 14th January 1986, the new Soviet Ambassador in Beirut met President Gemayel when the latter had just rejected the Damascus Agreement between the militias in the region. But, above all, on 18th April 1986, Moscow decided to help to finance UNIFIL: this was a turning point in Soviet policy since the Kremlin had hitherto always refused to endorse the deployment of United Nations forces in countries at war. Finally, in April 1989, the
Soviet Union accepted the principle of a mission of conciliation between the parties involved that was assigned to the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

109. (iv) In the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Mr. Gorbachev was also anxious to show that he did not wish Soviet policy to be dictated by either of the parties involved. The fact that the Soviet Union has so far refused to allow about two million Soviet Jews to emigrate gives it a strong means of exercising pressure on the antagonists. He seems to be using this to promote a settlement of the Middle East crisis. On the one hand, the Soviet Union is categorically opposed to the policy of force and annexation pursued by Israel in the occupied territories and, on the other, it is offering Israel a resumption of normal diplomatic relations on certain conditions. Thus, Mr. Gorbachev has stated that an international conference on the restoration of peace in the Middle East was the only way of ending the deadlock and recalled that, for Moscow, settlement of the crisis required Israel to return the annexed Arab territories and recognise the legitimate rights of Palestinians. Early in 1988, the Soviet Union adjusted its position since, for the first time since 1967, an Israeli delegation was invited to the Soviet Union. Moreover, the number of visas granted to Jewish emigrants has increased significantly, thus heralding a slow thaw in Israeli-Soviet relations.

110. The Soviet Union's return to the Middle East stage was demonstrated by Mr. Shevardnadze's ten-day tour of the region. He met Mr. Arens, Israeli Foreign Minister, and Mr. Arafat, Leader of the PLO. In spite of talks that were described as constructive and the prospect of further meetings, the contacts between Mr. Shevardnadze and Mr. Arens did not remove the obstacles to the opening of negotiations on a settlement in the Middle East, Israel still being opposed to the idea of an international conference on the subject. A big step had nevertheless been taken since a meeting had been held between two countries which had had no diplomatic relations for twenty years.

111. At the same time, however, links with the PLO were tightened: Yasser Arafat paid an official visit to the Soviet Union in April 1988 for the first time in five years. During his visit, Mr. Gorbachev exhorted him to be realistic and to recognise Israel's "security interests", which was certainly not without influence on the PLO's proposals implying recognition of Israel.

112. (v) Diplomatic action in regard to Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Jordan has also been important, marked in particular by the visit to Moscow in January 1988 of the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Saudi Arabia, representing the Gulf Co-operation Council, and the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Egypt in May 1988, no such visits at this level having taken place since the 1976 estrangement. The importance of links between the Soviet Union and Jordan was underlined when King Hussein was received in the Soviet Union in December 1987 and his Prime Minister in March 1988. It can thus be seen that in the Middle East the Soviet Union is trying to regain a foothold in that area of the world from which it had been absent for some time. Its approach has now changed and there are definite signs of the Soviet Union's wish to be seen as a promoter of peace.

(b) The Far East

113. It was quite normal for the Soviet Union to register the considerable economic development of the countries along the western shores of the Pacific. This induced it to build up a strong naval presence in the area and to become closely associated with Vietnam, which granted it a naval base at Cam Ranh. On the other hand, the deterioration of relations between the Soviet Union and China placed a limit on its ambitions and made it deploy large numbers of land, air and nuclear forces in Central and Eastern Asia.

114. Mr. Gorbachev's Government seems to have realised both the extent of Soviet interests in the area and the need to change its policy. It did this in a spectacular manner by choosing Vladivostok to announce one of its most important disarmament proposals. A principal aim was to restore normal relations with the People's Republic of China, which was probably facilitated by the fact that Deng Xiaoping had, since his return to power, started a trend which bears some relation to what was to be perestroika in the Soviet Union. However, China set three conditions for reconciliation with Moscow: the evacuation of Afghanistan, a significant reduction in Soviet forces along Chinese frontiers and the restoration of an independent Cambodia. Everything indicates that it has obtained satisfaction in these three areas and that a forthcoming visit by Mr. Gorbachev to Beijing should mark the start of a new stage in Sino-Soviet relations.

115. In regard to Cambodia, the two meetings held in Paris in December 1987 and January 1988 between Prince Sihanouk, leader of the resistance against Vietnam, composed of the Khmer Rouge, the FNLPK and supporters of Sihanouk, and Hun Sen, Prime Minister in the Cambodian Government – recognised only by the Soviet Union and its allies – were perhaps the first hint of a settlement. The two men agreed on recognising the need for national reconciliation which would allow Cambodia to become independent again. Vietnam subsequently confirmed its intention to withdraw its troops from Cambodia in 1990 and, in May 1988, announced that it would withdraw 500 000 men at the end.
of the year. The first meeting between representatives of the three factions: resistance movement, Cambodian Government and Vietnam, was held in Indonesia on 25th July 1988.

116. Thus, after thirty years of crisis, China and the Soviet Union have at last normalised their relations. In the night of 5th to 6th February 1989, Beijing announced an official visit by Mr. Gorbachev from 15th to 18th May. Just before the official announcement of this visit, China and the Soviet Union had issued a joint communiqué on Cambodia specifying that China was in favour of establishing a provisional coalition government led by Prince Sihanouk and with four-party representation, whereas the Soviet Union rejected the word “government” and preferred “provisional body under the authority of Sihanouk”, although this body would not be dependent on any foreign party. The Soviet Union and China thus took note of the difference between them in regard to the form of provisional administration to be set up prior to elections and after the withdrawal of Vietnamese troops. In spite of everything, Moscow and Beijing agreed on the main issue: they wish to avoid any dangerous situation which might lead to civil war after the withdrawal of Vietnam.

117. To this end, mutual concessions were made by both the parties involved. Beijing undertook not to support the Khmer Rouge if they returned to power and Moscow undertook to reduce its troops along the Chinese frontier: 260 000 men will be evacuated from the Soviet frontier sectors and three-quarters of Soviet forces in Outer Mongolia, the remaining units being redeployed in a defensive posture. To make implementation of the rapprochement more effective, China and the Soviet Union considered setting up joint bodies to reduce frontier tension and accepted the need for international control procedure, possibly under United Nations auspices.

118. In these matters, Mr. Gorbachev saw that the Brezhnev policy had cost the Soviet Union a great deal diplomatically and economically: the factions which had seized power in Cambodia with its support failed to retain control and settlement of that conflict would allow the Soviet Union to reactivate its policy in the third world on new bases. Moreover, to this end it is pursuing a more open policy towards the ASEAN countries and India and Japan.

(c) The western hemisphere

119. In Latin America, the Soviet Union has constantly supported governments or armed movements opposing the excessive influence of the United States in that vast area. However, fully aware that it did not have the necessary naval and logistic means, it has always avoided a direct clash since the Cuban affair faced it with an impossible choice. No fundamental change is yet discernible in Soviet policy since Mr. Gorbachev came to power, but there are already signs of a change.

120. Cuba is still the Soviet Union’s principal ally in the region but Fidel Castro is apparently sceptical about the perestroika experiment and is wary of any concessions Moscow might make. Cuba has always tried to behave as an independent power and not just a Soviet satellite. This was probably the case when Fidel Castro sent troops to Angola in 1975 without apparently referring to Moscow.

121. In reaction to the reformist policy of the Soviet leader, Fidel Castro put an end to the timid attempts at opening the Cuban system started ten years ago. It was in 1968, following the missile crisis, that Cuba started to draw closer to the Soviet Union. In 1970 a Soviet-Cuban intergovernmental commission for economic, scientific and technical co-operation was set up and then, two years later, Cuba acceded to the CMEA. Between 1960 and 1980, the Soviet Union is estimated to have spent the equivalent of $20 000 million to support the Cuban economy, assistance in the second half of the eighties being $5 000 million per year.

122. Nevertheless, the Cuban economy is in a permanent state of crisis. The cut in oil prices decided by OPEC and the falling dollar have reduced its income from the re-exportation of Soviet oil, this being one of the last economic advantages the Soviet Union accorded to Cuba. The Cubans sometimes criticise Soviet aid, which they consider to be often unsuitable and harmful to their economy, and would like to increase exchanges with western countries, particularly as the last agreement signed by the Soviet Union and Cuba for the period 1986-90 is less advantageous than earlier ones (in particular for sugar, which represents 93% of Soviet imports from Cuba). It would appear, however, that the two countries have decided to continue to co-operate.

123. Mr. Gorbachev therefore made an official visit to Cuba, starting on 2nd April 1989. While denying having a military eye on South America, he said he was in favour of developing economic, political, cultural and technical exchanges with the entire area. In spite of differences of views, in particular on perestroika, the visit showed that Soviet-Cuban relations were still satisfactory. The Soviet leader made no statement opposing Mr. Castro’s policy. On the contrary, Mr. Gorbachev endorsed Havana’s support for Managua, thereby condemning United States assistance to the Nicaraguan Contras, in spite of Washington’s request to Moscow to approach Cuba to help to find a peaceful settlement in Nic-
aragua. Mr. Gorbachev even refrained from saying anything about the fate of Cuban dissidents, two of whose principal leaders were arrested during a peaceful demonstration in front of the Soviet Embassy in Cuba. The two allies also signed a treaty of friendship and co-operation. Finally, by stating his opposition "to the export of the revolution or counter-revolution", to the gratification of the West, and asserting that conflicts in Central America should be solved by political means in a Latin American framework, Mr. Gorbachev presented himself as a potential partner in Latin American affairs.

124. The Soviet Union is still present elsewhere in the West Indies in spite of the American invasion of the island of Grenada in 1983, which Moscow criticised very sharply. Although not having taken part in Haitian politics since the fall of the Duvalier family in 1986, the Soviet Union is making overtures to Jamaica, a parliamentary delegation having visited that country in May 1988 for the first time in the history of Soviet diplomacy. According to Soviet leaders, this visit was intended to establish contacts with Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago.

125. On 18th September 1979, the Soviet Union and Nicaragua established diplomatic relations. Yet the Kremlin is hesitant about becoming more involved in the civil war and supports the Sandinist Government but Soviet assistance to Nicaragua is still conditional and limited: $330 million in 1985, mainly in the form of oil, and $300 million in 1987.

126. For the Soviet Union, El Salvador is not a problem and it hesitates to become involved in the civil war. Its support for the guerrillas is in fact merely verbal.

127. Tours by Mr. Shevardnadze, Soviet Minister for Foreign Affairs, of Brazil, Argentina and Uruguay in September and October 1987, after a visit to Mexico the previous year which attracted much attention, revived speculation about Moscow's renewed interest in the American continent. Soviet penetration is possible, however, only because of the growing independence of the Latin American countries vis-à-vis the United States.

128. The need for friendly relations between the Soviet Union and Argentina is due mainly to the latter's strategic importance in the South Atlantic. Argentina's main aim is to ensure that the Soviet market continues to be an outlet for its agricultural produce. In 1982, the Soviet Union had supported Argentina in the Falklands crisis. In 1987, Moscow signed an agreement with Buenos Aires on fishing in the Falklands area, i.e. in waters the United Kingdom considers is its own. Soviet support for Argentine diplomacy allows it to ensure a presence in the South Atlantic, an area of strategic importance.

129. In Brazil, economic co-operation with the Soviet Union has been growing since the seventies. Starting in 1974, the Soviet Union encouraged a move by the Brazilian military, who broke off their military agreements with the United States in 1977. In 1981, co-operation between the two countries entered a new stage with the Brazilian Planning Minister's visit to Moscow accompanied by 150 businessmen. In 1987-88, agreements were signed between the two countries relating to major infrastructure projects. When the Brazilian head of state visited Moscow in October 1988, Mr. Gorbachev expressed his wish to see bilateral relations develop.

130. The Soviet Union developed its relations with Peru while the latter had a military government: military equipment, conditions favourable to the Soviet Union for reimbursing the Peruvian foreign debt. The same is true of Bolivia with which mining and hydroelectric projects are being established.

(d) Africa

131. The African continent has never been one of the Soviet Union's main concerns but, as elsewhere, it has supported nationalist movements hostile to colonisation, just as it now supports states and movements opposing South Africa while avoiding direct military involvement. Nevertheless, there is now an improvement in relations between the Soviet Union and South Africa, due in particular to South Africa's new attitude towards the Namibian question. There is an increasing number of meetings and contacts between Moscow and Pretoria, which allows each party's intentions to be better understood. Moscow considers this to be a means of playing a constructive role in the region, in particular to facilitate a return to peace in Mozambique. Its attempts to take over from the West as an economic partner of recently-independent countries have not been successful for lack of means and experience. Its most effective action seems to have been the training of African students in its universities.

132. The situation evolved in 1975. The change started with the independence of Angola, Mozambique and Guinea Bissau, for only the Soviet Union and the states of the "socialist community" remained loyal to African nationalists by giving them arms, training and material assistance. These countries had privileged diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. In 1977, Mozambique signed a twenty-year treaty of friendship and co-operation with the Soviet Union. Although Africa is of necessity turning mainly to the West, the Soviet Union nevertheless tries to keep a foot on the continent and improve its prestige there. For this purpose, it has resumed relations with Somalia, encouraged its Ethiopian ally to find a political
solution to its conflict with the Eritrean rebels and re-established diplomatic relations with the Central African Republic.

133. The scene of its main activities is still Angola, however. Since 1975, there has been a civil war between the Luanda Government, supported by the Soviet Union and Cuba, and UNITA, assisted by the United States and South Africa. Steps taken by the United States Government since 1983 to put an end to this war brought a successful conclusion on 2nd May 1988. The talks which were then started in London between Angola, Cuba and South Africa and which were continued in Brazzaville, Cairo and then New York led, on 13th July, to an agreement of principle providing for the withdrawal of Cuban troops (45 000 men) from Angola and the independence of Namibia whose decolonisation is still meeting with opposition. There are still many problems to be solved such as the time-table for the withdrawal of Cuban troops and UNITA’s place. But this agreement, which should be followed by a cease-fire, marks the start of a peace process which has every chance of progressing if supported by the two great powers. In any event, it shows the Soviet Union will not allow itself to become involved in a conflict with no way out. If it is settled, this will perhaps allow the Soviet Union to reactivate its policy in Africa on new bases.

(e) The United States and the Soviet Union

134. Two summit meetings in the space of six months, in Washington in December 1987 and then during Mr. Reagan’s visit to the Soviet Union in June 1988, the first for fourteen years apart from those held in Geneva and Reykjavik in 1985-86, confirmed the rapprochement between the two great powers. Apart from negotiations on military matters, this dialogue is leading to a revival of bilateral co-operation. A number of agreements have been signed relating inter alia to oceanographic research, culture and conducting joint nuclear tests. Trade, on the contrary, does not seem to be developing, probably because of the Soviet Union’s lack of foreign currency. The Soviet Union has taken advantage of this atmosphere of détente to ask for the repeal of the Jackson Amendment which links the granting by the United States of a most-favoured-nation clause to freedom of emigration and the possibility of acquiring advanced technology. Under European pressure, the Americans even agreed in January 1988 to Cocom lists being shortened. They also proposed that a standing conference of American and Soviet parliamentarians study human rights.

135. Rather than economic questions, it is the attitude shown by Mr. Gorbachev towards disarmament and the settlement of most world problems directly or indirectly bringing the United States and the Soviet Union into opposition which prompted a far-reaching change in the views of American public opinion about the Soviet Union in general and Mr. Gorbachev in particular. For the first time, the principal Soviet leader is really popular in the United States, and this is confirmed by all the opinion polls.

136. This is an important fact that Europe must not ignore, because it means that, whatever the intentions of the new American administration, it will have to take this into account. It will no longer be able to use the persistence of the threat as an argument for obtaining the funds it needs for its defence policy. It will be facing strong pressure to withdraw at least some of the American forces stationed in Europe and to complete negotiations on the various aspects of disarmament. However, speaking in Washington on 6th March, President Bush rejected the proposal made by certain Congressmen to withdraw 25 000 American troops from Europe.

137. The new United States Secretary of State, Mr. Baker, is to visit Moscow on 10th and 11th May 1989. He is to be received by Mr. Shevardnadze and the meeting will allow them to review the main matters of concern to the two great powers. The development of a friendly relationship with the United States is doubtless one of Mr. Gorbachev’s principal aims because it is necessary for the consolidation of peace and the success of disarmament and because it would support his position in the Soviet Union itself, where public opinion reacts to these prospects. The Western European countries have to realise that the two great powers very rightly attribute vital importance to the search for agreement between themselves and that the truly European aspects of international relations are secondary, in politico-military matters at least.

VI. Conclusions

138. Mr. Gorbachev’s action has clearly brought about a far-reaching change in international relations as a whole. The very fact that it will take a long time for perestroika to achieve significant economic results seems to be encouraging the Soviet leaders to seek the support they need in successes of a more political nature. Apart from internal liberalisation, an important part of their message is to discard the concept that war is inevitable and to endorse universal values in foreign policy. It can now be seen that the new Soviet policy is coherent, breaks deliberately with the past and really helps to establish a new international order.

139. Since the revolution in 1917, the problem of collective security had been seen in terms of confrontation which made all attempts to organise stable peaceful coexistence quite haz-
ardous. Mr. Gorbachev's new policy seems to wish to set joint European security on quite different foundations according to which arms limitation would no longer be considered as a stage in a test of force but as a means of ensuring stability with the security of all concerned being guaranteed. If the renunciation of offensive strategy and of the possibility of a first strike is confirmed, these measures should allow a return to confidence no longer based on illusion. His words must now be translated into deeds more clearly than has been the case so far and the continuity of external policy must be effectively ensured.

140. This is the context in which now essential thought should be given to the nature and vocation of the Atlantic Alliance. Designed as the instrument of collective defence in a time of antagonism, it must be adapted to new circumstances and develop the wherewithal to become the organisation for western participation in this collective security system. When it was necessary, it managed to organise sufficient deployment to give its members' armaments their full deterrent value. It was also sufficiently defensive for the Soviet Union to see, at the appropriate time, that it was not a real threat. It must now find a way of retaining enough deterrence to discourage any new Soviet change of tack while associating all its members with the arms limitation process with a view to achieving a new, reciprocal and shared security system that conforms to the joint interests of eastern and western countries. Whereas the Soviet Union is now showing coherence in its strategy, external policy and logic, the West does not yet seem to have made the necessary effort, as Mr. Pierre Harmel urged it to do in his paper at the Florence colloquy, to reach a consensus on the principles which should underly its military deployment, political action and language. One of WEU's main tasks should be to help to find the necessary cohesion of the alliance in the new situation.

141. It is with these two prospects in mind that the United States is starting to tackle the question of modernising its strategic arms, for instance in the context of the report on “Deterring through the turn of the century” just issued by a group of members of Congress from both parties led by Senator Sam Nunn and Representative Les Aspin, Chairmen of the Armed Services Committees of the two houses. The conclusions of this report advocate a reduction in the number of ground-launched strategic missiles, the search for an agreement banning multi-warhead missiles and the development of missiles on mobile launchers with cruise missiles installed on surface craft and MX missiles that can be moved throughout the United States road network. The report also proposes modernising very short-range Lance missiles and suggests slowing down the SDI programme. This corresponds to the intentions already announced by the new Secretary of Defence, Mr. Richard Cheney, who is proposing a considerable reduction in the budget for this programme over the next few years. Finally, a probably essential factor is that the United States leaders now seem to have grasped the dimensions of the transformations effected in the Soviet Union and to be considering the possibility of more general agreement with the Soviet Union on organising and consolidating international peace.

142. For Western Europe, however, the Soviet Union will remain a powerful, strongly-armed neighbour for many more years. Even if disarmament conferences achieve the sought-after results relatively quickly, it will still take time for the disarmament measures decided upon to be effectively applied. For instance, the Soviet Union says it will take ten years to destroy its stocks of chemical weapons. During this long period, Western Europe cannot be satisfied with agreements and fine words as a basis for its security. It will have to keep its deterrent capability intact, with the participation of the United States, as long as possible. This is particularly necessary since none of the negotiations now being held is likely to lead to a real reduction in the strength of the two great powers in terms of strategic missiles since the 50% reduction envisaged in the START talks will not affect their first and second strike capability. Rather than the number of missiles each of the great powers will retain, it is their global policy and the development of the East-West dialogue that can be the starting point for true disarmament.

143. Europeans will, however, have first to concentrate on non-deterrent arms in order to reach early agreements on banning the production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons and on substantial, duly-verified reductions in conventional weapons so as to establish a balance between the capability of each side and then to reduce the level of that capability by stages. At the present juncture, short-range nuclear weapons are part of the deterrent because they prevent any dangerous calculation being made on the basis of Soviet conventional superiority. The day that superiority disappears, the need for this deterrence would be eclipsed and it would become possible for such weapons to be reduced or even eliminated. It seems desirable here and now to examine in what conditions NATO might be able to renounce the modernisation of Lance missiles without too much risk.

144. Furthermore, if Western Europe wishes to retain its deterrent power, it will have to move more briskly than hitherto towards a combined defensive potential which can be kept at a credible level only insofar as it is collective. No western government will be able to convince public opinion in its own country that détente does not allow military expenditure to be
reduced. Co-operation is therefore required more than ever if the necessary effort is to be made at the least cost. Reactivated WEU is the natural framework for the governments to consider this matter, the IEPG being that in which co-operation can be usefully carried out, but these means must be used effectively, which hardly seems to have been the case so far. With this in mind, Mr. Chevènement, French Minister of Defence, addressing the first European session on armaments on 19th April 1989, proposed adopting the following guidelines for such co-operation: co-ordinated planning of long-term military requirements, co-ordination of research and co-operation between armaments industries. These correspond to the conclusions which the Assembly drew from its colloquy on European co-operation in armaments research and development held in London on 7th and 8th March 1988.

145. If Europe wishes to avoid decisions on these matters, which concern the deterrent will and capability of the United States, and hence of the alliance, being taken without it being consulted, it would seem urgent for it to reflect and express its views on what it expects of the alliance during the period ahead in which arms limitation is becoming the major element of a joint security policy. It is in this area first that the WEU Council should be asked to play an important rôle in the coming months and it is regrettable that it has not yet tackled the matter in a more clear-cut manner.

146. It is obvious that the new Soviet policy will mean the Western European countries redefining their entire policy towards Eastern Europe, which will involve at one and the same time the activities of the Council of Europe, with particular regard to human rights and the free movement of persons and ideas, and the economic responsibilities of the European Community since it is here that the Soviet Union and its allies have made the most specific demands.

147. Referring to the lines to be followed in the context of the development of the movement towards European union, Mr. Scholz, then Federal German Minister of Defence, gave his views during a lecture to the Fondation du futur in Paris on 9th February 1989, as follows:

"... We must not hide the fact that the road to a European security union is strewn with difficulties, starting with the question whether the European Community should be the basis for a European security union. The question arises mainly for the very reason that the European Community is starting, in its economic achievements and economic integration action, to be increasingly attractive to neutral European states and also – as I have already mentioned – to Eastern Euro-
aftermath of the second world war seems about to rise and the organisation of a freer, more open society is taking shape round the CSCE.

150. As matters now stand, it is probably an advantage that Western Europe has institutions with separate responsibilities, procedures and membership, because they allow it to tackle the problems raised by Mr. Gorbachev, when he refers to a common house, through appropriate channels and to avoid being faced with the impossible choice between structuring peace in Europe, security requirements and the need to unite its forces.

151. Your Rapporteur believes that, in present circumstances, there are three possible aspects to the common European house. The first is the pursuit and extension of arms limitation agreements. The Soviet Union and the West seem to share the essential aim of attaining a "reasonable sufficiency" on each side to allow a subsequent concomitant reduction ensuring security for both sides. Disagreement on the need for deterrence is perhaps more semantic than real since the precise aim of Soviet defence policy is to deter a potential aggressor. In any case, it is not liable to prevent agreement on the first stages of disarmament. The main discussion will be about the appropriate time to tackle the question of short-range nuclear weapons, and this is probably an area in which compromises are possible.

152. The second factor is the dialogue that is essential for the restoration of mutual confidence. A dialogue without effective disarmament would admittedly be illusory but disarmament without dialogue would be of little significance. It is clear that Eastern Europe has a very great desire to develop a dialogue that has already been simmering for several years at various levels. Glasnost and the progress of public freedom, inter alia for elections, foster this type of exchange and the West must henceforth prove materially and intellectually prepared to support it. This applies in particular to our Assembly and the exchanges it now conducts with the Supreme Soviet.

153. The third factor is co-operation. This is still limited because of remaining uncertainty about the achievement of perestroika. The re-emergence of confidence is certainly a necessary adjunct to co-operation but it is for the eastern countries to decide to what extent they accept increased exchanges, the free circulation of currencies, indebtedness and many other aspects of international economic activity which they have long refused and to which they are now having difficulty in adapting themselves.

154. However, co-operation is not limited to the economy. Some aspects are already to be seen in peace action in the United Nations. Probably others will quickly emerge, for instance in the fight against calamities the world over, be they natural disasters, pollution of the land or sea environment or, as the Chairman of the committee stressed, the fight against terrorism.

155. It would seem that the door is now open for rapid developments in these three areas if the Soviet Union's intentions are confirmed and the still vague concept of a common house can take shape, if not with immediate building work, at least with the preparation of an architect's plan and the digging of foundations. It is to this that the present report aims to contribute.
APPENDIX

Persons whom the Rapporteur met in Moscow

Supreme Soviet

Marshal Serge AKHROMEYEV

Ministry for Foreign Affairs

Mr. Victor KARPOV, Deputy Minister, Head of the Arms Limitation and Disarmament Department

Ministry of Defence

General Nicolas TCHERVOV, Head of the Headquarters Department for Disarmament and Security Questions

Institute of Europe, Academy of Sciences of the USSR

Professor Vitaly V. ZHURKIN, Director
Professor Vladimir N. SHENAEV, Deputy Director
Dr. Natalia DUBININA, Senior Research Fellow

Institute of the United States and Canada, Academy of Sciences of the USSR

Professor Georgy ARBATOV, Director
Professor Radimir G. BOGDANOV, Deputy Director
Professor Henry A. TROFIMENKO, Head of the Foreign Policy Department

Institute of World Economy and International Relations, Academy of Sciences of the USSR

Professor Vladimir BARANOFSKI, Head of the Western Europe Department
Professor Alexander KISLOV, Deputy Director
Professor Andrei KOUVRAZEV, Research Director (French Affairs)