WEU: a European instrument for crisis management – reply to the annual report of the Council

REPORT

submitted on behalf of the Defence Committee
by Mrs Calleja, Rapporteur
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1 Adopted in Committee by 9 votes to 0 with 2 abstentions.
2 Members of the Committee: Mr De Decker (Chairman); MM Zierer, Schloten (Vice-Chairmen); Mr Baumel (Alternate: Branger), MM Beaufays, Blaauw, Mrs Calleja, MM Cioni, Contestabile, Cox (Alternate: Lord Judd), MM Davis, Dhaille, Díaz de Mera (Alternate: Martínez), MM Dreyfus-Schmidt, Goulet, Irmer, Leers, Lemoine, Mrs Lentz-Cornette, MM Magginas, Mardones Sevilla (Alternate: González de Txabarri), MM McNamara, Neumann, Medeiros Ferreira, Micheloyiannis, Mota Amaral, Pereira Coelho, Polenta, Robles Fraga, Lord Russell-Johnston, MM Selva, Siebert, Speroni, Valk, Valkeniers, Verivakis, Wilshire.

Associate member: Mr Godal.

N.B. The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.
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The operation of WEU bodies in conjunction with the EU and NATO for crisis management
Draft Recommendation

on WEU: a European instrument for crisis management – reply to the annual report of the Council

The Assembly,

(i) Considering that since 1992 WEU’s principal role has been to provide a capability for conducting the Petersberg missions with a view to managing crises which may arise in Europe;

(ii) Welcoming the major organisational efforts made by WEU in the field of crisis management with a view to:
   - developing the structures that are necessary for the preparation of Council decisions;
   - fully developing all the procedures required to manage relations between the numerous players involved;
   - managing the process of consultation with the relevant international organisations (EU, NATO, OSCE, UN, Council of Europe etc);

(iii) Deeply perplexed therefore by the fact that the European Union has not called on WEU during the current crisis in Kosovo, inter alia for elaborating and implementing plans in the humanitarian field in FYROM and Albania;

(iv) Deploiring in addition the considerable time required to organise relations between WEU and the EU in the event of a crisis and the difficulties, particularly of a financial nature, that are encountered;

(v) Considering that under the present WEU structure, in the event of a crisis:
   - the Military Staff is responsible for elaborating strategic options;
   - the Military Delegates Committee examines those options and advises the Council on them;
   - the Politico-Military Group is responsible for finalising the options and submitting them to the Council;

(vi) Aware of the need to harmonise political and military positions at the highest level before the strategic options are submitted to the Council;

(vii) Aware of the fact that there is no hierarchical link between the Secretariat-General, Military Staff and Satellite Centre, all of which are directly answerable to the Council;

(viii) Taking the view that the existence of a genuinely autonomous capability for elaborating strategic options depends on the expertise of the Military Staff;

(ix) Noting the shortcomings of WEU’s intelligence policy, despite the crucial importance of a good intelligence policy for preparing relevant strategic options;

(x) Considering that the Situation Centre does not currently have the resources it needs to present situation reports to the Council in the right conditions;

(xi) Considering that for the preparation and conduct of a WEU-led military operation, combined headquarters on three separate levels are required:
   - the WEU Military Staff, responsible for preparing strategic options;
   - the “Operation Commander’s” headquarters, located on a strategic level and responsible for providing an interface between the political authorities and the forces on the ground;
   - the “Force Commander’s” headquarters, located on an operational level and deployed, under normal circumstances, in the theatre of operations:
(xii) Noting the lack of a permanent European headquarters on the second and third levels, notwithstanding the organisation on a case-by-case basis of headquarters around a core provided by a "framework nation" or by a European multinational force headquarters;

(xiii) Noting that the system of organising European headquarters on a case-by-case basis causes delays and poses the political problem of choosing a "framework nation":

(xiv) Noting the fact that the headquarters of European multinational forces at the level of "Force Commander" – in other words, of the CJTF-type suitable for projection – are not, in fact, combined headquarters;

(xv) Noting, nevertheless, that while the ESDI which is currently being developed within the Alliance is very useful, it does not give the European Union a "capacity for autonomous action" (Saint Malo Franco-British Declaration) under all circumstances;

(xvi) Noting that even after the Washington Summit, the ESDI within the Alliance means that the United States can leave Europe to take action on the ground while retaining political control of crisis management through the North Atlantic Council;

(xvii) Emphasising the real difficulties involved in defining a European chain of command within NATO;

(xviii) Noting that the negotiations between NATO and WEU on making NATO assets and capabilities available to WEU led to the adoption at the Washington Summit of no more than a very general framework for an agreement which has to be renegotiated on a case-by-case basis;

(xix) Noting that WEU has a sufficient number of forces answerable to WEU (FAWEU) at its disposal for conducting Petersberg missions, but that these multinational forces must better coordinate their activities;

(xx) Emphasising the crucial importance of strengthening European capabilities and therefore welcoming the initiative taken by the German Presidency to organise an audit of capabilities available in WEU member countries for European military operations;

(xxi) Noting the shortcomings of European forces with regard to high-technology equipment, particularly in the field of long-range precision missiles;

(xxii) Noting the long response times required to assemble European multinational forces on a case-by-case basis,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Seek, pending the decisions to be taken with regard to the integration of WEU in the European Union, to improve relations between the EU and WEU in the event of a crisis, particularly from the financial point of view when WEU is tasked with conducting a mission on behalf of the EU;

2. Work actively, in the light of the Washington Summit and the Bremen Declaration, on the gradual integration of WEU in the EU, ensuring that the involvement of the WEU associate members and associate partners in European defence policy is maintained, while preserving the parliamentary scrutiny hitherto exercised by the Assembly of WEU;

3. Create a high-level politico-military coordinating body chaired by the Secretary-General, to avoid any divergence of political and military opinions before strategic options are submitted to the Council;

4. Secure better use of the Torrejón Satellite Centre during a crisis, by placing it under the operational command of the WEU Military Staff;

5. Formally place the Military Staff under the authority of the Secretary-General in order to provide Europe with a quick-response and effective defence instrument;
6. Reinforce the Military Staff, particularly in the areas of intelligence and planning, in order to provide WEU with a good capacity for preparing strategic options;

7. Increase the resources of the Situation Centre beyond their present level in order to turn it into a proper crisis-management centre complete with the requisite communications and visual display equipment;

8. See to it that Europe acquires an autonomous chain of operational command independent of any decision taken outside the European framework, and to this end:
   - create a permanent, multinational and combined “Operation Commander’s” core headquarters;
   - set up a joint “Force Commander’s” headquarters to be a real European CJTF headquarters, which could be based on an existing European multinational force such as the European Corps;

9. Continue to develop NATO-WEU relations, particularly as regards making NATO assets and capabilities available to WEU;

10. Request that SHAPE appoint an officer at the rank of general responsible in normal times for running the European pillar of the Alliance and designating officers for a dedicated headquarters;

11. Make sure that it is possible to set up a European chain of command within NATO in the event of a WEU-led operation, avoiding the designation of Deputy SACEUR as “Operation Commander”;

12. Develop a very active WEU exercise policy providing frequent training opportunities for all the players involved in the decision-making process in the event of a crisis;

13. Inform the Assembly of the results of the audit carried out with a view to evaluating the real capabilities of the forces answerable to WEU (FAWEU);

14. Participate in coordinating the training of European multinational forces;

15. Urge EU governments to make the budgetary effort required to supply their forces with modern high-performance equipment, giving priority to all European cooperative efforts in the defence industry sector, and striving in particular to remedy deficiencies in the fields of intelligence, strategic mobility and long-range high-precision weaponry;

16. Call on governments to set up, within the framework of the current FAWEU concept, a proper European Intervention Force, placed permanently under the orders of a European Chief-of-Staff and which would constitute a “pool” of forces for rapid intervention.
Explanatory Memorandum
submitted by Mrs Calleja, Rapporteur

I. Introduction

1. Since 1992, Ministers of the member states of WEU have agreed that the Organisation should carry out peace-support missions of the so-called Petersberg type. Since 1991, there has been provision in the Maastricht Treaty, reaffirmed by Article J.7 of the Amsterdam Treaty, for the European Union to avail itself of WEU for activities calling for the use of military assets. Thus WEU must develop its organisation and stand in readiness for crisis-management operations under the authority of the Council of WEU.

2. As recalled by the French Defence Minister, Mr Richard, in his address to the Assembly of WEU, and in accordance with the decisions taken by the WEU Council of Ministers:

“Defence Europe must learn to stand on its own two feet, in other words, make progress both within the Atlantic Alliance and independently; for the effect of the second of those developments, far from running counter to the first, can only help to further it. This is precisely what the wording of the Saint Malo document implies.”

3. Lending force to the Saint Malo Declaration, the British Prime Minister, Mr Blair, in a speech delivered at the Royal United Services Institute on 8 March 1999, referred to Europe’s military capabilities and sought to strengthen political resolve for giving greater credibility to Europe’s CFSP:

“Europe’s military capabilities at this stage are modest. Too modest. To strengthen NATO and to make European defence a reality, we Europeans need to restructure our defence capabilities so that we can project force, can deploy our troops, ships and planes beyond their home bases and sustain them there, equipped to deal with whatever level of conflict they may face... The declaration (...) at Saint Malo was the first step to defining the new approach. We decided to go beyond the Berlin arrangements agreed by NATO in 1996 to give Europe a genuine capacity to act, and act quickly, in cases where the Alliance as a whole is not militarily engaged.”

4. WEU has often been a target for criticism concerning both its capabilities and decision-making process. We must therefore take stock of what exists – procedures, structures within the Secretariat-General, headquarters and forces – in order to propose the improvements needed to provide us with an efficient European instrument for crisis management.

II. Operation during crises
of WEU bodies in conjunction with other international organisations

5. Since the Ministerial Council in Petersberg in June 1992, the Council of WEU has approved numerous documents on the operation of WEU during crises, WEU’s operational development, the measures to be taken in the event of humanitarian intervention, etc.

6. However, crisis-management mechanisms and procedures evolve over time according to ministerial decisions, developments in other international organisations and the experience gathered from previous operations and exercises. We are describing here the situation as presented to your Rapporteur at the beginning of 1999, but it must be borne in mind that the texts defining the role and mandate of the different WEU bodies are continually being updated.

I. General observations on the development of crises

7. The Council of WEU, the Organisation’s decision-making body, can easily be convened in Brussels at the level of the Permanent Representatives of member countries. It is with the Council that the responsibility lies in an emerging crisis for monitoring and assessing the situation and possibly taking the decision to act in a WEU framework, although the decision to actually participate in operations is a matter for the member or associate countries.

8. For Petersberg missions, WEU has a choice between two modes of operation: either a mission using national and multinational headquarters provided by WEU nations, or one which
uses NATO assets and capabilities. Generally speaking, the WEU Operation HQ will be a combined and joint structure.

9. Crisis management by WEU calls first and foremost for numerous exchanges of information, followed by consultations among WEU member countries and the various WEU organs involved in the crisis-management process. In parallel, a consultation process is established among the relevant international organisations (EU, UN, NATO, WEU, Council of Europe), with the aim of providing the Council with the means to define its policy.

10. The Council must then choose the means for implementing that policy by defining the mission, command structures and forces composition.

11. Once the formal decision to take action in a WEU framework has been taken, the Council will assume the political control and strategic direction of the operation.

12. All these decisions will be taken as part of a process of information exchange and consultation during the course of the crisis, which can be divided into four phases:
   - crisis build-up phase;
   - preparation of the choice of strategic option;
   - decision-making phase: choice of the mode of action and the political and military chain of command for the conduct of operations;
   - political control and conduct of operations.

2. Crisis build-up phase

13. As the crisis escalates it is the Council which decides whether to address the crisis situation. This initial phase includes crisis monitoring and assessment, and involves the participation of associate partners, unless decided otherwise by the Council. In examining a crisis situation, the Council defines its political objectives and assesses the possible role of WEU.

14. In order to assess the crisis situation, the Council requests the Politico-Military Group, with the support of the Secretariat-General, the Military Staff and the Satellite Centre, as required, to monitor developments and report back to the Council. If the Satellite Centre has not previously been tasked to carry out general surveillance of the emerging crisis, it may be issued by the Council with the necessary directives to do so. On request, the Military Committee, consisting of the Chiefs of Defence Staff (CHODs), and the Military Delegates Committee (MDC), may be convened to study and advise on the military and operational aspects of the crisis.

15. Separate from this early stage of independent WEU monitoring, various European Union bodies will have been assessing and reporting on the emergent crisis situation to the EU Council. In particular, the work of the EU Political Committee (as provided for in Article J.15 of the Treaty on European Union), which is to monitor the international situation in the areas covered by the common foreign and security policy (CFSP) and to deliver policy definitions and opinions to the Council, shall be instrumental in initiating first contact with WEU. On the basis of the Political Committee's recommendation, the EU Council may request WEU to assess the situation in more detail and consider the possibilities of an operation. The European Commission, the Presidency and the member states may also be fully associated in the early stages of monitoring and the interaction between the EU and WEU.

16. Further to this, the Final Act of the Amsterdam Treaty made provision for an EU Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit to be established in the General Secretariat of the EU Council, under the authority of its Secretary-General, also designated High Representative for the CFSP. This unit, with its personnel drawn from the EU General Secretariat and Commission, on the one hand, and WEU on the other, will enhance inter-institutional monitoring capabilities and improve the efficiency of information exchange.

17. The independent monitoring work of WEU is reinforced by information exchange between WEU and NATO. Each informs the other, through the respective secretariats and in close coordination with the WEU Presidency, about the results of its examinations, and either organisation may request a joint Council meeting. Information exchange may also take place on a number of other levels, at joint meetings between the relevant bodies. The range of inter-institutional
contacts between WEU and NATO is broad and comprehensive:

- at the Chiefs of Defence Staff level;
- between the Council Working Group (WEU) and the Political Committee (NATO);
- between the Politico-Military Group (WEU) and the Policy Coordination Group (PCG/NATO);
- between the Military Delegates Committee (WEU) and the Military Committee in permanent session (NATO);
- between the WEU Military Staff (WEU MS) and the NATO International Military Staff (IMS);
- and between the WEU Military Staff and the NATO Combined Joint Planning Staff (CPJS).

18. The next procedure is the drawing up by the Military Staff of generic plans appropriate to the situation. Here, the Situation Centre and the Intelligence Section of the WEU MS keep the Council informed of the latest developments. On the basis of the Director of the Military Staff’s requirements, the Council decides whether or not to reinforce the Situation Centre with national military experts. Additional intelligence about the crisis may also be requested from nations and international organisations. This supply of intelligence and strategic information to the WEU Military Staff is organised in accordance with the guidelines drawn up by the Politico-Military Group.

19. Other options and facilities are available to the Council for assessing the situation and updating intelligence. Firstly, the Council may decide to send a fact-finding mission, consisting of diplomatic and military elements, or in the case of a humanitarian or rescue operation, to establish a needs assessment team. Secondly, the Satellite Centre is available to the Council for updated information. And finally, the Council may activate the planning process of the Logistics and Movements Section of the Planning Cell. The work of this section comprises the planning for logistic and medical support and for strategic mobility and transportation, and is carried out with support from the Western European Logistics Group (working at 13), with access to NATO’s deployment and movement system (ADAMS), in cooperation with SHAPE and NATO’s new communications agency (NC3A), and in close contact with organisations such as the UN’s Department of Humanitarian Affairs and the European Commission Humanitarian Office.

20. Once it has drawn together the situation monitoring and preliminary planning results, the Politico-Military Group, after having sought the advice of the Military Delegates Committee and with the support of both the Secretariat and the Military Staff, presents to the Council its political and military options.

21. At the end of this first phase, after both internal and joint consultations have taken place, if a WEU-led operation using NATO assets and capabilities is envisaged, the WEU Council will request NATO to pursue this option. Such a request will be a general one only, without specifying the concrete needs for assets and capabilities. In reply, the North Atlantic Council will give its assent in principle.

3. Preparation of strategic options

22. Following the presentation of political and military options to the Council by the Politico-Military Group, the second phase of crisis management deals with examining the potential courses of action for WEU and arriving at an agreed contingency plan. This second phase is set in motion if the Council, on the basis of its preliminary work and consultations with nations and international organisations, decides to consider possible WEU involvement in the crisis situation. As with the initial crisis build-up phase, associate partners may be involved in the preparation and planning of a mission, unless the Council decides otherwise.

23. The impetus for initiating the second phase of crisis management may also come from the EU Council. The EU Council, deciding on an EU joint action or common position (in accordance with the voting provisions of Article J.13 of the Amsterdam Treaty) may avail itself of WEU (under Article J.7 of the same) to elaborate and implement its decisions.

24. In either event, the WEU Council proceeds by issuing an initial planning directive for the Military Staff to evaluate the selected options.
25. In the cases where a WEU-led operation using NATO assets and capabilities has been envisaged, the WEU Council may request that NATO coordinate the production of a WEU contingency plan. In this event, D/SACEUR will direct the work of the Combined Joint Planning Staff in conjunction with the International Military Staff/Capabilities Coordination Cell and the Major NATO Commands on the NATO side, and with the Military Staff on the WEU side. The exchange of liaison officers between the two sides will also be helpful at this point.

26. The initial planning directive dictates the remit of the contingency planning work, and the contingency plans, adapted from the generic plans of the crisis build-up phase, will cover the following points:

- the mission of the force and the forces required to implement the different options, taking into account the various forces answerable to WEU (FAWEU);
- the arrangements for the command and control of the mission, including proposals for the selection of operation headquarters and of the nation which is to provide this;
- the principles guiding the rules of engagement (ROEs);
- the necessity for any additional assets and capabilities in the light of possible shortfalls;
- the initial forecasts for logistic support, movement, transportation, medical support, civilian-military cooperation (CIMIC), and the financial and legal implications of the operation;
- the contributions, as deemed appropriate, of participating observer states in reinforcing the Planning Cell.

27. Given the amount and complexity of the Military Staff’s work at this stage, it can establish and direct planning support from the WEU Mobility Coordination Group (WMCG) and the WEU Logistics Coordination Group (WLCG). The function of these groups is threefold:

- to initiate and coordinate the preparation of deployment and logistic support options;
- to assist in drafting the movements and transportation logistic elements for the final contingency plan;
- to analyse national responses to an eventual Declaration of Intent Request (DIR) message, in light of the logistics requirements of the contingency options.

28. The contingency plan is drawn up by the Military Staff, in liaison with national headquarters and those of multinational forces, and will incorporate the selected options set out in the initial planning directive. The submissions by nations of their own planning work, with reference to the FAWEU list, will also ensure, in principle, that the necessary military means can be assembled in the required time-frames. NATO procedures will apply in identifying the required NATO assets and capabilities. Attached to the contingency plan will be an Intelligence Annex, also drawn up by the Military Staff under the guidelines set out by the Politico-Military Group. The intelligence support of national headquarters will also take into account the needs formulated by the Politico-Military Group and the advice of the Military Delegates Committee.

29. This plan is submitted to the Chiefs of Defence Staff or their military delegates for comment. It is also examined by the Military Delegates Committee and by the Politico-Military Group. The Director of the Military Staff then presents the finalised contingency plan to the WEU Council, highlighting the advantages and disadvantages of each option in terms of feasibility, risks and costs. Where NATO assets and capabilities are required, the plan also goes before the NATO Council.

30. It is also sent to capitals, together with the Declaration of Intent Request (DIR) message. This procedure aims to provide the Military Staff with a more formal and concrete indication of the possible participation of each nation, because in response to the DIR message, nations are expected to indicate the nature and scale of their contemplated contributions, using specific references to the FAWEU list of units, and stating any planned contribution of additional forces.

31. On receipt of the responses to the DIR message, the Military Staff is able to assess the extent to which its requirements (as set out for
each contingency option) may be met. By identifying possible shortfalls, the Military Staff is able to adjust its military analyses regarding the potential of forces available. In addition, the Military Staff considers the capabilities of available headquarters and makes the appropriate recommendations to the Council. If there is a need for a combined, multinational joint headquarters, the Military Staff will also take account of the need for reinforcements.

32. After advising the Military Delegates Committee and the Politico-Military Group on these force contributions and the feasibility of each option, the Military Staff proposes the following elements of a military operation to the Council:

- the mission and composition of the force;
- the arrangements for operational command and control;
- the principles guiding the rules of engagement (ROEs);
- the available assets and capabilities;
- and the arrangements for implementation.

The Military Delegates Committee and Politico-Military Group also submit political and military advice on the proposed options to the Council.

4. Formal decision to take action:
choice of the mode of action and of the political and military chain of command

33. There are three possible courses of action that the Council may take once the different options have been submitted to it together with the necessary information and advice it needs to take a decision. It may:

- select an option and decide on action by WEU;
- continue to monitor the development of the situation while ensuring that the different options are kept up to date and fleshed out, which means postponing the decision;
- decide against action by WEU.

34. If the first course of action is taken, the Council must instruct the Military Staff to draw up, on the basis of the chosen option, a directive for the command of the designated operation, defining the nature of the mission, the organisation of the operation command structures, the forces that have been allocated and the arrangements for conducting the mission, as well as specifying the rules of engagement.

35. In cases where it has been decided to call on NATO assets and capabilities, the chosen option must be submitted to the North Atlantic Council. If the Alliance decides to support this WEU-led operation, the directive for the designated Operation Commander, who may, in this instance, be D/SACEUR, will be drawn up in close cooperation with SHAPE and/or the CIPS.

36. At this juncture, the Council must formally designate the Operation Commander and Headquarters and appoint a Force Commander to direct operations on the ground. In cases where WEU avails itself of NATO assets and capabilities, this choice must be made in close cooperation with the North Atlantic Council.

37. The draft directive for the Operation Commander drawn up by the Military Staff will then be submitted to the Military Delegates Committee (MDC) for approval, before being conveyed to the Politico-Military Group (PMG) for submission to the Council. After approval by the Council it will be conveyed to the Operation Commander.

38. On the basis of this directive, the Operation Commander will prepare an Operation Plan in close cooperation with D/SACEUR and the relevant NATO staffs, in cases where Alliance assets and capabilities are being used. During this phase it is necessary for a group of officers from the Military Staff to liaise with the Operation HQ in order to guarantee some degree of continuity, particularly with regard to the principles applied to the chosen option. Particular care will be given to elaborating the rules of engagement.

39. At this stage of the process and on the basis of the draft Operation Plan, the Military Staff will ask the participating countries to designate forces for the operation. This in turn will allow the WEU bodies in charge of coordinating mobility and logistics to help the Operation Commander complete the military support, mobility and logistics parts of the Operation Plan. During this phase there is a close dialogue between the
Operation Commander, the Military Staff and the national representatives in order to streamline requirements and the various national contributions, with particular attention being given to interoperability aspects.

40. The Operation Plan is then submitted to the WEU Council for approval, and possibly also to the North Atlantic Council for comment, in cases where use is being made of NATO assets and capabilities. Once approval has been given, the Operation Commander will proceed with assembling forces. Associate partner countries contributing forces will at this stage be incorporated into the Council’s decision-making process.

41. In cases where the EU Council has availed itself of WEU to elaborate and implement its decisions, the EU Council is briefed and receives written information on the WEU Operation Plan. In turn, the WEU Council is briefed and receives written information on the parallel complementary action being taken under other EU pillars.

5. Political control and conduct of operations

42. The WEU Council exercises political control over the conduct of the operation. It will involve in its deliberations the associate partner countries participating in it. The Council, assisted by the politico-military bodies of the Secretariat-General and by the Military Staff, will monitor the situation, examine requests from the Operation Commander and on that basis regularly draw up politico-military directives.

43. The Operation Commander, or, if he is unavailable, the Director of the Military Staff, must personally report to the Council on the military situation.

44. In practice, it is the Politico-Military Group, in close cooperation with the Military Staff and on the advice of the Military Delegates Committee, which presents an analysis of the situation and prepares “political” opinions for the Council. This Group provides an interface with other bodies and organisations, as well as with the countries participating in the operation. It also finalises the drafting of the politico-military directives for the Council.

45. The function of “point of contact” (POC), is normally fulfilled by the Director of the WEU Military Staff, who has many responsibilities during the conduct of the operation. His first task is to provide an interface between the relevant WEU bodies and authorities (the Council, Politico-Military Group, Military Delegates Committee etc.) and the Operation Commander, with the support of the Situation Centre. He must also follow up the requests of the Operation Commander and see to it that the replies are conveyed back to him. In emergencies he organises meetings of the relevant WEU bodies.

46. In the case of operations using NATO assets, the WEU Council will keep the North Atlantic Council informed about the conduct of operations and use of NATO assets, in accordance with the procedures defined in the NATO/WEU framework agreement. Joint meetings may be organised as called for by the circumstances.

47. Where an EU Council decision has been implemented by WEU, coordinated meetings take place between the relevant bodies of each organisation. Although it is the WEU Council which exercises political control and gives strategic direction throughout the operation, the EU Council maintains responsibility for overall policy and considers the political follow-up of the operation.

48. When the WEU Council decides to terminate an operation, a directive explaining the withdrawal strategy is conveyed to the Operation Commander.

III. Analysis of WEU capabilities

1. Politico-military bodies: preparation of Council decisions

(f) Politico-Military Group

49. The Politico-Military Group (PMG) is responsible for monitoring the development of crises on behalf of the Council and reporting back to it. This Group is composed of delegations of all member countries and is chaired by the Political Director of the Secretariat-General. It may meet at 21 or 28. Normally, each national delegation will be composed of both diplomatic and military representatives.

50. The PMG commences its task of monitoring a crisis when instructed to do so by the Council. It uses for this purpose the situation assessment provided by the Military Staff as well as the more frequent information coming from the Situation Centre.
51. During the phase of decision-making by the Council, the PMG prepares strategic options based on advice given by the Military Committee, to which it adds a "political" point of view. As soon as the crisis begins to build up, the Council tasks the PMG with liaising with other international organisations:

- in the case of NATO, its liaison partner will normally be the Policy Coordinating Group (PCG);
- in the case of the EU, it will be COSEC (Committee on Security).

52. Once the Amsterdam Treaty is implemented, the High Representative for the CFSP will have the EU Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit at his/her disposal. This body will then be responsible for liaising with WEU’s Politico-Military Group.

(ii) Military Committee/Military Delegates Committee

53. The WEU Military Committee (MC) is composed of the Chiefs of Defence Staff (CHODs) of member countries. It meets twice a year, or on an ad hoc basis during a crisis, under the Chairmanship of the CHOD of the country holding the Presidency of WEU.

54. Its day-to-day work in WEU is conducted at the level of the Military Delegates Committee (MDC), which can easily be convened at the level of the Permanent Representatives of the CHODs in Brussels. It is chaired by the Director of the WEU Military Staff. In the event of a crisis, the MDC examines the strategic options proposed by the Military Staff before advising the Council of the option it considers the most appropriate.

55. The Director of the Military Staff, as the permanent Chairman of the MDC, has contacts with NATO. He may attend certain meetings of NATO’s Military Committee in accordance with the agreed procedures. In turn, the Chairman of the NATO Military Committee may be invited to meetings of the WEU Military Committee.

2. Military Staff: preparation of strategic options

56. In the field of crisis management, the main task, under normal circumstances, of the WEU Military Staff is to monitor potential crisis areas.

57. In an emerging crisis, the Military Staff is the driving force behind WEU’s strategic evaluation. Its task is to gather and analyse intelligence in order to keep its assessment up to date, participate in the politico-military analysis of the situation in close liaison with the Military Delegates Committee and the Politico-Military Group and propose strategic options (strategic planning).

58. During this decision-making process, it remains in close contact with the other international organisations involved in the crisis and is able to second small liaison teams to them.

59. The Military Staff is composed of 45 officers, of which only six are in the Intelligence Section. Progress has been made in the area of intelligence and relations with the Satellite Centre have developed considerably, but according to the Director of the Military Staff, they have yet to reach a stage, desirable in his view, in which he would be entitled to set tasks for the Satellite Centre. As regards electronic data interchange, the installation of a NATO BICES system terminal will make for considerable improvement, in that it will allow exchanges of data in real time with most WEU states.

60. Finally, the Director of the Military Staff considers that the quality of the strategic options proposed by his Staff depends on the experience and level of its officers, which means that there must be a sufficient number of them to reflect a broad range of military expertise and experience.

3. Conduct of operations

61. As mentioned earlier in the chapter on the operation of WEU in the event of a crisis, combined military headquarters at three separate levels are required for the preparation and conduct of military operations:

- the WEU Military Staff is in charge of preparing strategic options for a decision by the Council;
- the Operation Commander’s headquarters, located at strategic level in a European country, is in charge of military planning and then, during the operation itself, of providing an interface between the political authority, in this instance the WEU Council, and the forces on the ground;
the combined services headquarters of the Force Commander, located at operational level, can be projected and deployed under normal circumstances in or close to the theatre of operations. It is the equivalent of NATO’s CJTF HQ concept. In practice, for SFOR and IFOR in Bosnia, this function was fulfilled by the CINCSOUTH HQ in Naples, a real combined headquarters. For small-scale operations, the Force and Operation Commander levels can be combined.

62. Finally, the HQ on the ground will often be a land-based element to which a multi-service component that can be added as required to provide the necessary liaison between the different branches of the armed forces. In the case of SFOR/IFOR, this role was played in Sarajevo by a single-service HQ, the NATO Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC), for what was initially a 30,000-strong force.

(i) Role of the WEU Military Staff

63. The WEU MS, by definition, is not involved in conducting the operation itself, because it is a strategic planning body. It is the headquarters of the Operation Commander designated by the Council which is responsible for drawing up the operation plan (operational planning). However, in the initial operational planning phase, the WEU MS sends a liaison element to the Operation Commander in order to inform him about the strategic option adopted by the Council and convey to him all the information that the WEU MS has on the crisis situation.

64. Furthermore, the WEU MS Director will normally act as the “point of contact” between the whole Secretariat-General and Military Staff on the one hand, and the Operation Commander on the other, which means that he must have a permanent system for monitoring developments. This is provided by the Situation Centre, which is responsible for monitoring the WEU operation as it unfolds in order to keep the Politico-Military Group supplied with the information it needs to prepare Council decisions. For this purpose it remains in close contact with the Operation Commander and conveys the requisite information documents and situation assessments to all relevant WEU bodies and to the delegations of the Permanent Representatives. To perform these tasks, the Situation Centre must have close contacts with the Satellite Centre, the defence staffs of all WEU nations and all international organisations involved in the crisis: NATO, the EU and possibly also the UN, OSCE and various NGOs.

(ii) Chain of command with NATO involvement

65. At the moment of choice of the strategic option, the Council may decide to submit a formal request to NATO for the use of its assets and capabilities in a WEU-led operation. For the Alliance, this entails implementing the procedures agreed with WEU subsequent to the NATO Ministers’ June 1996 Berlin Declaration, in which they referred to the development of the European Security and Defence Identity within NATO:

“This identity will (...) permit the creation of militarily coherent and effective forces capable of operating under the political control and strategic direction of WEU”.

Furthermore, this Declaration lays down three guiding principles for the implementation of the ESDI:

- prior identification of the NATO assets and capabilities – in particular the headquarters, HQ elements and support capabilities – that would be made available to Europeans;
- elaboration of European command arrangements for conducting WEU-led operations. This principle implies designating and training appropriate personnel (the European elements within the HQs) who would perform a dual – Atlantic and European – function (“double-hatting”);
- peacetime planning and training in respect of the different assets and capabilities in order to ensure that they function effectively as a coherent military whole.

66. We note that good progress has been made within the Alliance in this area. The preparations for exercises to implement the CJTF (Combined Joint Task Forces) concept, as well as Crisis-type exercises, have served to draw up a list of those NATO assets which could be made available to WEU. These consist essentially of:
American heavy assets: logistic transport aircraft, observation satellites (although Europe has access to Helios images through the Torrejón Satellite Centre);

specific NATO assets, which are rare: AWACS (although some WEU countries also have such aircraft);

NATO command assets, communication equipment, HQ or HQ-support elements, including CJTF (Combined Joint Task Forces) HQs.

67. In order to have combined joint headquarters deployable in the theatre of operations and ready to be made available to WEU, on the basis of a decision by the North Atlantic Council, the Alliance has decided to designate in its “parent headquarters” a core staff which could be strengthened on request with elements supplied by other NATO or national bodies. Such a CJTF HQ concept allows a flexible, multinational approach which could, if required, be extended to include countries which are not full members of WEU. This was the principle used for the IFOR/SFOR HQ in Bosnia.

68. The WEU CJTF HQs would be set up in the same way as those of NATO and placed under the orders of an Operation Commander who, in turn, would come under the political control of the WEU Council. As the operation continued, replacement of personnel would allow the CJTF HQ to reflect those nations taking part in that particular WEU-led operation. However, NATO nations have already agreed, in principle, that these designated NATO CJTF HQs will in fact be provided regardless of the national contribution.

69. As regards the European chain of command within NATO, the June 1996 Berlin Declaration is quite clear and the question is whether the intentions expressed at that time have been followed by deeds. Indeed, this Declaration refers to the: "elaboration of appropriate multinational European command arrangements within NATO, consistent with and taking full advantage of the CJTF concept, able to prepare, support, command and conduct the WEU-led operations. This implies double-hatting appropriate personnel within the NATO command structure to perform these functions. Such European command arrangements should be identifiable (…)”.

70. According to your Rapporteur’s information, the two organisations are trying to reach agreement on the principle of the European General appointed Deputy SACEUR at SHAPE (Mons) playing a specifically European role, considering him, in particular, as an ideal candidate for the post of Operation Commander for a WEU-led operation. If he was not chosen for that job, D/SACEUR would remain in charge of coordinating the NATO support provided to WEU.

71. If D/SACEUR were indeed to assume that function, the headquarters of the Operation Commander would be the SHAPE headquarters from which the “double-hatted” officers would be chosen.

(iii) Independent chain of command

72. According to the decisions taken by the WEU Council, operations conducted “under the political control and strategic direction of WEU” can be organised in one of two ways:

- an autonomous operation based on national or multinational headquarters provided by WEU states;
- or an operation using NATO assets and capabilities, and in particular its command assets, as described above.

73. Furthermore, it should be recalled that the Council may decide to give support to an operation carried out by one or several WEU states, without exercising politico-military control over that operation.

74. We have established the need for headquarters at three different levels:

- one level for the preparation, in an autonomous European capacity, of strategic options (WEU Military Staff);
- the levels of Operation Commander (OPCDR) and of Force Commander, with a headquarters, possibly of the CJTF HQ type, which can be projected and deployed in the theatre of operations, pose a problem in the absence of a permanent WEU command structure.
75. This is why WEU has adopted a flexible concept making use of available capabilities, with the core and infrastructure needed to build headquarters being made available either by one nation – the “framework nation” concept – or by several nations, drawing on an existing multinational headquarters.

76. At Operation Commander level, WEU member countries have proposed eight national combined headquarters. An evaluation is currently being made of their actual capabilities, taking into account the ease with which they can be turned into multinational headquarters, as well as various other criteria which are currently being defined.

77. At Force Commander level, several countries have prepared core headquarters which could be made multinational, with the necessary projectable equipment. Furthermore, studies are under way on existing European multinational headquarters. There are seven or eight potential candidates, but all are composed of single-service, generally land-based, elements.

4. Forces

78. The forces answerable to WEU (FAWEU), a well-established concept since 1993, provide a diverse set of military capabilities for a wide range of operational needs. The multinational FAWEU, which at present number seven, constitute a large pool of forces for WEU to draw upon. These multinational military units, together with their headquarters, are: the European Corps, the Anglo-Dutch Amphibious force, the Multinational Division Centre, Eurofor (the Rapid Deployment Euroforce), Euromarfor, the Spanish-Italian Amphibious Force and the 1st German-Netherlands Corps.

79. The European Corps (Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg and Spain) was designated a FAWEU in May 1993, and is composed of the 1st Belgian Mechanised Division, the Franco-German Brigade, the 1st French Armoured Division, the 10th German Armoured Division, the 10th Spanish Mechanised Infantry Brigade, and a reconnaissance company from Luxembourg. The European Corps at full strength is composed of some 80 000 troops.

80. The Anglo-Dutch Amphibious Force, designated a FAWEU in May 1993, is made up of four Infantry Battalions (three British, one Dutch), one Anglo-Dutch Artillery Battalion and two Boats Companies. This force constitutes a rapidly deployable landing force of some 6 500 troops.

81. The Multinational Division Centre (Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom) was designated a FAWEU in November 1993. It consists of a Belgian Airborne Brigade, the 31st German Airborne Brigade, the 11th Dutch Airmobile Brigade, the 24th British Airmobile Brigade and five Battalions of Division Troops. In total, this constitutes a force of some 20 000 troops.

82. Eurofor (the Rapid Deployment Euroforce with units from France, Italy, Portugal and Spain) became a FAWEU in November 1995. It consists of three units – a 1 000-strong battalion-level unit, a 3 000-strong brigade-level unit and a 10 000-strong division-level unit, and has a total strength of about 14 000 troops.

83. Euromarfor (France, Italy, Portugal and Spain) was also designated a FAWEU in November 1995. It is a non-standing, pre-structured maritime force with both maritime and amphibious capabilities, composed of operational elements ready to be brought together at short notice. A typical composition would include one aircraft carrier, four to six escort units, a landing force of maximum brigade size, amphibious vessels of the landing force and one combat resupply vessel.

84. The Spanish-Italian Amphibious Force, designated a FAWEU in October 1997, is another non-permanent, pre-structured force. In the event of its deployment, its national amphibious components would retain their own operational chains of command. The naval component of the force is formed from the 3rd Italian Naval Division and the Delta Group of the Spanish Fleet. Other naval assets are also available, as required for an operation. The landing force component would be generated and assembled on a commonly agreed structure, which would mean that either nation could provide the basic command structure and units, and have them supplemented by additional staff and units from the other nation. The force would be of brigade size, of roughly 4 000 troops. Overall command responsibility is rotated every two years between the two nations. Only a small number of officers form the force’s permanent element.
85. The 1st German-Netherlands Corps, made a FAWEU in November 1997, comprises a German Armoured Division, a Dutch Mechanised Division and a Support Group. The Corps, with its HQ in Munster, can provide planning support to WEU missions as well as some 40,000 troops.

86. In addition to the multinational forces answerable to WEU, there are several national FAWEU. These are military units or headquarters which have been designated by states to be made available to the authority of WEU on a case-by-case basis. As well as the units designated by WEU's ten member states, Norway, Turkey, Austria, Finland and Sweden and each of the associate partners have specified units which could carry out WEU missions. Furthermore, on 30 June 1997, a cooperation agreement signed with Ukraine made provision for the use of Ukraine's long-haul air transport assets in support of the Petersberg tasks.

87. It should be noted that each of these FAWEU may be engaged under the control of either WEU or NATO for missions of common defence or Petersberg tasks. Eurofor and Euromarfor are constituted to carry out missions under the auspices of both organisations with priority being given to WEU. Thus, this complement of multinational and of several national forces and facilities serves to enhance Europe's own capacity for CFSP action as well as the ESDI within the Transatlantic Alliance.

88. Of the FAWEU, the Anglo-Dutch Amphibious Force, first formed in 1973, has a long record of exercises and operability. Both Eurofor and Euromarfor have carried out a series of exercises since their creation in 1995 and are fully operational. The European Corps has been the only FAWEU to be engaged, with a representation of 150 officers serving at SFOR Headquarters in Sarajevo under the command of NATO since June of last year.

89. Relations between the European Corps Commander and the WEU Military Staff are governed by a special directive submitted by the participating states and approved by the WEU Council in June 1996. The directive fixes the degree of mutual aid to be provided for planning work on both sides and outlines the information that the Corps must convey to WEU concerning its operational capabilities.

90. Those concerned with restructuring European defence capabilities to be more effective can look to the European Corps as an example of a multinational force with a modular structure and flexible employment to respond to its different missions. The Corps can field:

- a Light Immediate Force (LIF) of brigade strength (3,000 to 5,000 troops) for basically humanitarian and low-intensity operations;
- a Mechanised Immediate Force (MIF) of division strength (15,000 to 20,000 troops) for peacekeeping or peacemaking operations;
- and itself at full strength for missions of common defence.

The challenge faced by the European Corps, and indeed other FAWEU, according to Lieutenant General Leo van den Bosch, Commander of the European Corps, is to make understood the capabilities of these forces to those who would use them.

IV. Possible improvements

1. Preparation of the crisis-management tool

(i) Organisation of WEU

91. In the current WEU structure, the three executive bodies - the Secretariat-General, Military Staff and Satellite Centre - each answer directly to the Council and have no hierarchical link with each other. There are historical reasons for this: at the time of the creation of the Torrejón Satellite Centre, the Military Staff did not yet exist and some WEU members did not agree with the idea of this Centre producing intelligence files on crisis zones, although this has since become its main function. Since this intelligence is destined for the Intelligence Section of the Military Staff, it would make sense for the Satellite Centre to come under the authority of the Military Staff's Operation Commander, who could then direct the Centre's activities in accordance with Council directives and be responsible for collating intelligence and checking the security of data.

92. Similarly, the Secretary-General does not have direct authority over the Military Staff and so he is not able to manage a crisis situation swiftly and efficiently. The desire to provide the
European Union in the future with an effective instrument for defence could lead to the Military Staff being formally placed under the authority of the Secretary-General, thus avoiding a two-headed structure answering directly to the Council. The NATO example, whereby the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) was to be heard making political statements at the beginning of the air strikes in Serbia, is not to be followed.

93. Furthermore, when the Politico-Military Group, whose job is to prepare the Council’s decision and hence to express an opinion, presents the strategic options to the Council, there must be an opportunity for the Military Committee, possibly at the level of the Military Delegates, to express an opinion to the Council.

94. Under the present system, the options proposed by the Military Committee are conveyed simultaneously to the Council and the Politico-Military Group. The latter gives a detailed opinion and may propose alternative options. There is thus a risk that these new options, which may have military implications, will be submitted to the Council without first having been evaluated by the Military Committee. The procedure should be for a joint politico-military meeting at Council Working Group level to be held before the options are presented to the Council, to ensure that the final proposals have been vetted by the Military Delegates before their submission to the Council.

(ii) Capacities of the Military Staff

95. The Military Staff has essentially two tasks:

- to frame all military aspects of European defence policy (an “organisational” function);
- to monitor potential crises and provide strategic evaluations to the Council in the event of a crisis, in the form of contingency plans.

96. The Military Staff, with its complement of 45 officers, does not have sufficient manning strength to deal properly with both tasks. Should there be a transfer to the EU, the opportunity should be seized to draw up an inventory of the Military Staff’s functions and to match its resources to the requirements of its role.

97. Presentations made to your Rapporteur in Brussels revealed a number of deficiencies in connection with intelligence, the Situation Centre and the strategic planning capability, which need to be remedied as quickly as possible.

98. The Intelligence Section must be a genuinely “analytical” body which has close ties with NATO member countries’ intelligence services and is equipped with the requisite data exchange and processing facilities for exploiting that intelligence. Moreover, given that the work done by this group of experts will provide the basis for decisions taken at European level, the figure of some 20 officers – rather than the current figure of six – has been put forward as a reasonable estimate of the manning strength required if this Section is to acquire a real assessment capability.

99. The current mission of the Situation Centre is to participate, using non-confidential sources, in the monitoring of crisis areas designated by the Council and in providing the Politico-Military Group with the information required to prepare the Council for its crisis-management decisions and political control over WEU operations. This mission calls for close contacts with the Intelligence Section and the Torrejón Satellite Centre, as well as with the Operation and Force Commanders’ headquarters in the event of a crisis.

100. In practice, the Centre should be able to draft situation reports and present its findings to the various WEU bodies, including the Council. The Situation Centre therefore needs to be upgraded and transformed into a genuine crisis-management centre complete with modern data display equipment and premises that could be used in times of crisis for the Council’s information and decision-making meetings.

101. As regards the strategic planning capability in the preparatory phase prior to the submission, first of all to the Military Delegates Committee, of the strategic options, recent studies carried out in connection with the reflection process on a possible WEU-EU merger have demonstrated that this is the crucial capability of the Military Staff. The Operations Section can only provide the necessary expertise in this area if it is composed of a large number of officers with a very broad range of skills and experience. At the moment it comprises only seven officers.
102. Finally, it is the Military Staff’s job, once the Council has made its choice among the strategic options presented in the contingency plan, to conduct preliminary operational planning, pending the start-up of the headquarters of the designated Operation Commander. As we have already pointed out, teams of officers with expertise in the different areas must conduct operational planning and pass on that information to the Operation Commander’s headquarters as soon as possible, so as to avoid any time being wasted in the period following the Council’s decision and the appointment of the Operation Commander.

103. All the information collected by your Rapporteur, as well as a very cautious comparison with NATO’s International Military Staff which, backed up by the NATO Combined Joint Planning Staff (CJPS) in Mons, has a staff complement of some 350 officers, indicates that WEU’s Military Staff needs a minimum of about 100 officers in order to do its job.

104. Your Rapporteur insists on the importance of strengthening the Military Staff and underlines that this does not mean unnecessary duplication, but necessary plurality. Indeed, Europe’s capacity to autonomously elaborate strategic options depends to a very large extent on the quality of that Military Staff.

(iii) The question of intelligence

105. The quality of the intelligence assessments produced by the Military Staff is crucial for the quality of the strategic options it puts forward in an emerging crisis and directly determines the relevance of the Council’s crisis-management decisions. The deficiencies of WEU’s intelligence policy have already been highlighted in previous Assembly reports.1

106. The first measure that needs to be taken, as emphasised by the Director of the Military Staff, is to reinforce the Intelligence Section, which, using NATO’s International Military Staff and the national staffs of member states as a yardstick, should have a complement of some 20 officers.

107. Furthermore, the Assembly has recommended that each member state be asked to second a member of its national intelligence services to the Military Staff in order to enhance the latter’s capability, which would give it the full benefit of the analyses performed by the various member countries.

108. This has not been done, as far as your Rapporteur is aware. It must be admitted however, that now that a terminal of NATO’s intelligence transmission system BICES has been installed, the quality of the information collected by the Intelligence Section both from NATO and member states will be considerably improved, particularly as regards its date. What still remains to be done, however, is for member states to designate points of contact within their own departments to keep WEU informed of developments during a crisis.

109. Finally, the Director of the Military Staff should have the authority, once he has the approval of the Secretary-General and without waiting for a formal Council decision, to task the Intelligence Section with assessments or the Satellite Centre with the monitoring of new emerging crisis areas. This would enable events to be anticipated and the Council to be informed at the earliest possible moment and would save valuable time during a fast-moving crisis situation.

(iv) WEU’s exercise policy

110. It can be seen from the description of the process of decision-making by the Council, and that of the planning and execution of military operations under the political control and strategic direction of WEU, that this is a complex process, due to the involvement of so many different players and the need for international consensus that is inherent in this type of organisation.

111. To improve the functioning of WEU bodies during a crisis in conjunction with the other international organisations, these many different players need to be trained, using exercise scenarios which are as close as possible to real-life situations. Moreover, the lack of permanent military command structures within WEU presents a problem that must be alleviated by a sustained exercise policy.

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1 See the report on WEU’s operational role submitted on 13 May 1997 by Mr Urbain, Assembly Document 1567.
112. This policy is organised within WEU on the basis of decisions taken by the Ministerial Council. The Organisation's official documents refer to three levels at which exercises are required:

- the politico-military and strategic level, involving the Secretariat-General, Military Staff, national authorities and the Operation Commander's HQ;
- the level of the Force Commander's HQ;
- possibly also the level of the forces themselves, but that is the responsibility of individual states.

A WEU five-year exercise programme is annually updated at the WEU exercises conference held at 28 at the beginning of every year.

113. During the drafting of this report, the Military Staff and Secretariat-General impressed upon us the importance of the lessons learned from the latest exercises, in particular Crisex 98, as well as from the on-going preparations for the joint WEU/NATO CMX/Crisex 2000 exercise, which started with a kick-off seminar in early February 1999, and for which the planning conferences cycle has already begun.

114. The Assembly, which is aware of the crucial role of exercises for enhancing WEU's crisis-management capability, would wish to be invited as an observer on the occasion of such major exercises.

2. Crisis build-up and decision-making phases

115. The process of analysing an escalating crisis and preparing operational options described at the start of this report, as conducted in WEU, in fact involves a functional analysis of all the steps that are necessary in any international organisation involved in a crisis, whether it be NATO, WEU or, in the future, the EU. The slowness of the decision-making procedures for which WEU is reproached is due essentially to the reluctance of some countries to take action in a crisis, due to a lack of political resolve. This is not specific to WEU. In fact, the larger the number of full members in an organisation, the more marked the phenomenon is likely to be: as a reminder, there are 10 full members in WEU, 15 in the EU and now 19 in NATO.

116. An effort must be made to improve contacts among the international organisations involved in this phase. While the consultation procedures are well developed between WEU and NATO, implementation of Article 17 of the Treaty on European Union is lagging somewhat behind, as could be seen in the case of the EU decision to task WEU with training for demining operations in Croatia.

117. The main function of the Organisation as a whole, and of its Military Staff in particular, during this phase in the run-up to the decision by the Council, is to prepare strategic options in the form of a contingency plan. Careful consideration must be given to that function in order to enhance the quality of the options and analyses submitted to the Council.

118. What is involved here is sometimes referred to as a “strategic evaluation” which may be broken down into three elements:

- an assessment of the situation, based on intelligence, for which a number of improvements have been proposed above;
- a politico-military analysis, which is the responsibility of the Politico-Military Group and is founded on the more forward-looking situation assessments and analyses of the Military Staff. It should lead to the definition of possible political objectives. The Council must choose a political objective and convey it to the Military Staff in the form of a strategic planning directive, known in WEU jargon as an “initial planning directive”;
- the Military Staff can then conduct strategic planning, in the form of a contingency plan setting out various strategic options according to the criteria which are given priority. Given the shortage of personnel in the Military Staff, this phase requires active support from a number of national staffs for independent operations, or from NATO for operations using Alliance assets and capabilities. It must be underlined that to guarantee the quality of the strategic options proposed, staff numbers in the
Operations Section of the Military Staff must be considerably increased.

119. Once these strategic options have been examined, amended and commented on by the Military Delegates Committee and the Politico-Military Group, they are submitted to the Council for a decision. That decision must specify the chain of command for the operational planning and conduct of the operation.

120. A review of these functions shows that this necessarily complex structure requires a process of constant iteration between the bodies responsible for the three functions: assessment of the situation, politico-military analysis and strategic planning. At the present time, symbiosis between the political and military functions during this process is assured by the presence of representatives of the Military Delegates in the Politico-Military Group. Such an approach needs to be consolidated by formally setting up a joint politico-military coordinating body chaired at the highest level, in other words, by the Secretary-General, and tasked, in particular, with preparing the strategic options to be submitted to the Council.

3. Conduct of operation phase

(i) Using NATO assets

Framework agreement

121. Problems over procedures for transferring NATO assets for a WEU-led operation have not yet been settled. The framework agreement, the prototype for the agreement to be signed by WEU and NATO at the onset of an operation, is still in the process of being negotiated.

122. That framework agreement must safeguard WEU's independent decision-making capability and unity of chain of command by defining a procedure agreed by both Organisations for monitoring use of NATO assets and their return or possible recall before the end of the WEU operation.

123. The various decision-making procedures in this area were considered during a joint WEU/NATO seminar at ambassador-level in February 1999. The seminar consisted of examining a hypothetical crisis scenario where NATO assets and its chain of command were transferred to WEU for preventive deployment of 10,000 troops on an imaginary island in the eastern Atlantic.

124. As an article appearing in Defense News² points out, there is no agreement between the various countries as to how NATO will make assets such as intelligence-gathering means, logistic support and airlift capability available to WEU:

“One participant said after the seminar that the participants were faced with at least four competing visions of how decisions ought to be carried out, with Britain, France, Turkey and the United States each expressing a different view.

US officials held fast to a so-called single strategic process concept whereby NATO must first assert its authority through decisions of the North Atlantic Council.

The Council would govern each key step of the hand-over process, from sharing intelligence information to planning the final decision, giving operational control to WEU. Turkey also argued for a strong Alliance role, but said that WEU should also have its own planning unit separate from NATO's.

In contrast, Britain and France argued for more European autonomy, with the British leaning toward a case-by-case approach. This represents a moderate move away from London's traditional insistence that NATO, and NATO alone, have ultimate control over such operations”.

125. We note, therefore, on the part of non-European allies, a desire to control the use of assets loaned to WEU, through the requirement that the North Atlantic Council approve the planning by NATO military staffs, which would considerably impinge on the autonomy of an operation conducted “under the political control and strategic direction of WEU” (Berlin Declaration 1996).

CJTF HQs

126. The main “parent headquarters” have been selected (AFCENT, AFOUTH, etc.), but according to NATO officials, a number of practical

problems remain to be resolved before a CJTF HQ can be swiftly and efficiently set up in a crisis: designation and training of staff, taking into account the need for staff rotation, their deployment, their maintenance over long periods, communications equipment etc.

127. The relevant NATO military staffs, in particular the International Military Staff (IMS) and the Combined Joint Planning Staff (CJPS) are working on all these questions in close cooperation with the WEU Military Staff. From the European perspective, a sufficient number of exercises now needs to be organised in order to demonstrate the possibility of “separating” and then deploying those CJTF for operations under WEU’s “political control and strategic direction”.

Choice of the Operation Commander – role of D/SACEUR

128. A recent visit by the Assembly’s Political and Defence Committees to SHAPE (Mons) confirmed doubts which exist as to whether NATO really intends to let Deputy SACEUR (D/SACEUR) be designated WEU Operation Commander. It was clear to the members of our Assembly that D/SACEUR considered this to be a secondary role and that preparing to assume it was not a priority for him. Moreover, he himself pointed out that during an emerging crisis he would have a part to play in SHAPE which he could probably not abandon, even for an operation conducted in the WEU framework.

129. Thus the problem of Operation Commander for WEU operations needs to be solved, since it cannot be D/SACEUR. Moreover, steps must be taken to see to it that a “second D/SACEUR”, in other words a European general other than D/SACEUR, is designated to be in charge of the organisation and operation of the European military pillar of the Alliance.

130. It would appear that no follow-up has, as yet, been given to the plan for setting up within SHAPE and the CJPS a chain of European officers under D/SACEUR’s command in order to perform the tasks set out in the Berlin Declaration, and that the role of D/SACEUR himself has not yet been finalised. All this is essential for establishing a genuinely European chain of command.

(ii) Using independent European assets

131. As is stated in official WEU documents, and indeed recalled in the Saint Malo Franco-British Declaration, Europe has two options for managing a crisis:

- autonomous WEU operations using national or international headquarters provided by WEU nations;
- WEU-led operations using NATO assets and capabilities.

132. Having developed the ESDI within the Alliance since 1996, WEU must now focus its efforts on improving implementation of the “framework nation” concept, particularly with regard to headquarters.

133. The Organisation’s weak point at the present time is its lack of a permanent intermediate-level headquarters, that of the Operation Commander. It is therefore important to take stock of all the headquarters proposed by member nations and to assess their real capacity on the basis of a number of criteria, to be defined, such as their capacity for becoming combined joint structures, their communication systems and available space. Indeed, an audit is currently under way at the instigation of the current German Presidency.

134. Some countries, in keeping with the framework concept, have set up a core headquarters on the basis of the CJTF headquarters principle. This involves a permanent core staff of officers which can be reinforced as necessary by adding pre-designated elements to provide the capacity necessary for an Operation Commander’s HQ. Such headquarters have been organised and tested during a number of exercises, such as Crisex 96 and Eole 98.

135. In fact, the solution based on core headquarters to which multinational elements can be added has two drawbacks: it causes delays, due to the time needed to activate a core headquarters which is not multinational all the time, and it may give rise to political problems in connection with the choice of the “framework nation”, which may further delay decisions. Hence it is necessary to set up a permanent, multinational Operation Commander’s headquarters ready to be reinforced as required by pre-designated national elements made available by the various countries, on the principle of allocating reinforcement of-
yers and expert modules (communications, support logistics, mobility, medical support etc.). This core must be permanently linked with the WEU Military Staff and supported by the same administrative services.

136. The problem of finding European headquarters which could form the core of a Force Commander's headquarters is more easily resolved, because there are more headquarters available at this level than at that of Operation Commander. Moreover, a number of permanent European joint headquarters already exist. WEU nations should focus their efforts on adapting these multinational headquarters for commanding a combined force and on setting up a permanent CJTF core, for example within an enlarged and combined European Corps. At the moment, under normal circumstances, these HQs — ARRC, European Corps, Eurofor etc. — are single-service rather than combined structures.

137. In addition, countries must be encouraged to develop core headquarters at Force Commander level. France, for example, is introducing the concept of combined HQs which can be made multinational in the framework of the Combined Joint Planning Staff, using once again the idea of a permanent core which can be reinforced using pre-designated staff from other headquarters. Furthermore, provision has to be made for all the equipment necessary for the HQ to be projected into the theatre of operations, in particular the communications and data processing equipment required for the command of an operation.

138. As far as forces are concerned, there is no problem, in principle, with the use of forces answerable to WEU (FAWEU), which indeed are the same as those which European countries would make available to NATO for peacekeeping operations, since such forces are trained and equipped by individual nations. It is, of course, necessary to check their ability to work together by means of frequent exercises, paying particular attention to the interoperability of their communications equipment.

139. While European capabilities in terms of the forces required for Petersberg tasks are judged by NATO's International Military Staff to be sufficient overall, we should not lose sight of the well-known shortcomings of European armed forces in the field of satellite capabilities, strategic mobility and command and communications systems. Moreover, the air strikes against Serbia during the Kosovo crisis have highlighted how ill-equipped European forces are in the field of long-range precision weaponry, since only the UK has some cruise missiles carried on nuclear submarines. This makes Europe highly dependent on the United States and only by stepping up its efforts in the field of defence budgets and European cooperation will it be able, in the long term, to acquire such equipment.

140. Furthermore, priority should be given to using the multinational forces answerable to WEU (FAWEU). These forces have multinational headquarters, they have, by definition, solved the problem of interoperability between their national components and are particularly well-trained for action in a multinational framework, such as Petersberg missions.

141. This capacity for multinational action at short notice is extremely important and must be continually enhanced. Indeed, the events in Kosovo have highlighted the crucial nature of response time in humanitarian disasters.

142. The Military Staff, under the German Presidency's programme, is organising an audit of these forces, with a view to identifying Europe's capabilities in the field of the so-called Petersberg missions.

143. In fact, the only way to drastically shorten response time, given the time it takes to organise forces on an ad hoc basis, is to set up a European standing force answerable to WEU, which could be called the EIF (European Intervention Force). This is not a new idea. Indeed, the Assembly report of 1 December 1997 on The WEU Military Committee recommended that the Council should "establish an immediate WEU reaction force consisting of a multinational light infantry division supported by an air and naval component, available at very short notice (...)".

144. Indeed, the abovementioned report showed that Operation Alba owed its success to the rapid reaction of a force that was limited in size, but which was deployed before the crisis got out of hand.

3 Report submitted on behalf of the Defence Committee by Mr Giannattasio, Rapporteur, Assembly Document 1591.
145. For such a force to be effective, it would need to be composed of units made available by individual states for a substantial period of time and placed from the outset under the authority of a European Chief-of-Staff, who would execute orders from the WEU Council in the event of a crisis. Thus this force would have a permanent multinational headquarters, which would solve the problem of the absence of a permanent European headquarters at Force Commander level in the theatre of operations. This multinational headquarters would be supported by a European General Staff which would develop out of the present WEU Military Staff and which would exercise at European level the same organisational and operational functions as a general staff at national level.

146. With such a European intervention force, WEU member countries would have at their disposal a pool of forces which they could call on immediately. The level of participation of the different countries would have to be calculated on the basis of objective and generally accepted criteria, and enable this force to be some 30 000 strong and have at its disposal a pre-designated support and transport capability. Its funding would be shared equitably among the member countries.

147. This type of “pre-organised” force has often been criticised on the grounds that if one country decides not to participate this may upset its whole organisation at the last minute. This is why such a force must be designed for redundancy of the key elements in order to provide functional modules (comprising infantry, signals, headquarters support, mechanised units, attack or support helicopters etc.) of different nationalities so that it cannot be disrupted by the non-participation of some member countries.

V. Conclusions

148. During the preparation of this report we became aware of the efforts that WEU has made to prepare itself for crisis-management operations. The requisite structures and procedures are by now well developed within the Organisation. The Military Staff was restructured a year ago and the Military Committee has been established.

149. Relations with the other international organisations involved in this field have developed considerably:

- the procedures for NATO-WEU consultation and for possible WEU recourse to NATO assets and capabilities have almost been finalised. Major efforts have been undertaken to define a European chain of command within NATO, both at the level of SHAPE and the CJTF HQs;

- WEU-EU relations are being developed. The impending appointment of the High Representative for the CFSP and setting up of the EU Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit should improve the procedures for consultations between the two organisations during a crisis.

150. However, there is still room for considerable improvement to further enhance the performance of this instrument. Indeed, Europe must be given a genuinely autonomous chain of political and military command for operations both within and outside the NATO framework. This means a degree of necessary plurality to guarantee Europe’s autonomy, not unnecessary duplication.

151. We must at all costs resolve the issue of the lack of a permanent European multinational headquarters at Operation Commander level and ensure that our European multinational force headquarters can be used for combined and joint operations at Force Commander level.

152. On the issue of forces, we must continue training European multinational units, because this accustoms the component national forces to working in a European framework. Above all, however, we need the necessary military equipment to conduct Petersberg missions autonomously. The corresponding financial effort must be equitably shared among WEU member countries. Convergence criteria may be useful in this respect.

153. Furthermore, the response times of the European forces answerable to WEU must be improved. The only solution is to set up a European Intervention Force, to be placed permanently, both in normal times and during crises, under the orders of a European Chief-of-Staff, in order to provide a pool of forces available at short notice.
154. The WEU Council's crisis-management instrument, while we must continue our efforts to improve it, does function. But there must also be political will on the part of member countries to use it more actively. Moreover, the WEU Council's decision-making procedures must be adapted to prevent any decision to use it from being blocked by one or two member states.
The operation of WEU bodies in conjunction with the EU and NATO for crisis management

The above diagram shows in detail the operation of WEU bodies during the four phases of crisis management and corresponds to Chapter II of the Explanatory Memorandum. The WEU decision-making process, where independent and where overlapping with NATO procedures, is denoted by grey shading.