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(Second Part)

A European defence policy

REPORT

submitted on behalf of the Defence Committee
by Mr. Baumel, Chairman and Rapporteur

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1. Adopted unanimously by the committee.

2. Members of the committee: Mr. *Baumel* (Chairman); Mr. De Decker, Mrs. *Baarveld-Schlaman* (Vice-Chairmen); MM. Alloncle, Bianchi, *Borderas*, Briane, Brito, *Cox*, Dees, Dolazza, Dumont, *Fernandes Marques*, *Hardy*, Irmer, Jacquat, Kelchtermans, La Russa, Mrs. Lentz-Cornette, Mr. Marten, Lord Newall, MM. Parisi, Pécriaux, Petruccioli, Reis Leite, Scheer, Sir Dudley Smith, Mr. Sole Tura (Alternate: *Cuco*), Mrs. Soutendijk van Appeldoorn, *Sir Keith Speed*, MM. Steiner, Lopez Valdivielso (Alternate: *Lopez Henares*), Vazquez (Alternate: *Bolinaga*), Zierer.

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

Draft Recommendation
on a European defence policy

The Assembly,

- (i) Welcoming the Council's initiative in starting to formulate a common European defence policy as announced in the declaration on Western European Union attached to the Maastricht Treaty;
- (ii) Having taken note of both the Noordwijk declaration and the preliminary conclusions on the formulation of a common European defence policy of 14th November 1994;
- (iii) Noting that WEU's inability to react quickly to crisis situations as in Bosnia or Rwanda is due not only to a lack of political will, but also to the fact that joint European interests have not yet been identified clearly enough and that mechanisms for making and implementing decisions rapidly have not yet been developed;
- (iv) Stressing that the operational rôle of WEU urgently needs to be strengthened in order to match the ambitions set out in the Maastricht Treaty and repeatedly expressed by the Council, while recognising that the lack of progress in developing WEU's operational rôle is due partly to the lack of political guidance from a common European defence policy on which it should be based;
- (v) Stressing that the transformation of NATO, and especially the implementation of decisions taken at NATO's 1994 Brussels summit meeting, is of vital importance for the reinforcement of WEU;
- (vi) Recognising that WEU's reinforcement must be founded partly in NATO and not replace a failing NATO;
- (vii) Surprised that the reinforcement of the European pillar of NATO is accompanied by a reduction in WEU member states' share of defence expenditures in the Atlantic Alliance;
- (viii) Recalling that the possibility of making NATO's collective assets available to WEU cannot relieve European states of their obligation to make a specific effort in those key defence areas where the alliance has no collective assets while being dependent on the national assets of the United States, specifically in the area of satellite intelligence and logistic capacity;
- (ix) Recalling that the massive airlift capacity now available in the United States armed forces inventory may considerably diminish in size by the turn of this century, making it necessary for European armed forces to assume their own responsibility in this field;
- (x) Recognising that European armed forces are increasingly called upon to perform humanitarian and peace-keeping tasks while at the same time defence budgets are being reduced in most European states, perhaps even in some cases below a level compatible with the maintenance of credible armed forces;
- (xi) Insisting that co-operation between European national armed forces must be intensified, also through the formation of multinational forces, in order to make the most effective use of diminishing defence budgets and smaller armed forces;
- (xii) Noting that the status of associate partner has provided significant opportunities for the countries concerned to help shape a future European defence policy and to co-operate closely with WEU in possible future WEU operations of all kinds;
- (xiii) Welcoming the first meetings of WEU's Mediterranean Group with government experts from Algeria, Egypt, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia, but at the same time stressing that WEU should pay closer attention to the situation in the southern Mediterranean extending beyond the present diplomatic dialogue;
- (xiv) Recognising that the situation in the former republics of the Soviet Union, in particular Russia, should be continuously followed by WEU, inter alia through regular contacts at both political and military level with the objective of fostering mutual confidence and understanding;
- (xv) Considering that lifting the arms embargo against Bosnia would be an incentive for the parties concerned to escalate the conflict, further endanger the civilian population and cause unacceptable risks for the United Nations forces on the ground;

(xvi) Regretting the decision of the United States Government, taken unilaterally and without appropriate prior consultation with the other states participating in the combined WEU/NATO operation Sharp Guard in the Adriatic, to stop policing the United Nations arms embargo against Bosnia;

(xvii) Stressing that the October 1994 crisis in Iraq and the decision of the United States to stop policing the arms embargo against Bosnia in the framework of operation Sharp Guard have provided compelling evidence that Europe needs to have its own independent intelligence policy, including a fully-fledged satellite system,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Strengthen the rôle of the Secretary-General, while at the same time defining clearly WEU's responsibilities compared with those of the European Union and NATO;
2. Reinforce the operational rôle of the Planning Cell, duly enlarging its staff and providing it with the appropriate equipment and technical resources for data processing and communications;
3. Give liaison officers from associate partners a more active rôle in the Planning Cell, in particular by drafting a list of forces of associate partners available to WEU and by including units from these countries in force packages for contingency plans;
4. Actively support the creation of a multinational African peace-keeping force which should be able to act rapidly under a United Nations mandate, by encouraging WEU member states to preposition equipment on the African continent and to take responsibility to train African units for such tasks;
5. Help in creating a readily available multinational European humanitarian intervention force to be included among the forces answerable to WEU;
6. Give further thought to a common security and defence policy, leading subsequently to the drafting of a white paper on European security as proposed by the French Prime Minister specifying the rôle, tasks, joint command structures and political/military interface procedures of WEU for approval at a summit meeting of heads of state and of government of WEU member states in 1996 at the latest;
7. Accelerate the creation of a European armaments agency to manage multinational co-operative programmes, drawing on experience gained from the Franco-German armaments agency now being established;
8. Continue to pursue actively the establishment of a European satellite system which will be a vital part of Europe's defence identity;
9. Notwithstanding the United States unilateral decision to end enforcement of the United Nations arms embargo against Bosnia, maintain its determination to continue to implement fully the enforcement of all existing embargoes against the different parts of former Yugoslavia, including the arms embargo against Bosnia.

Explanatory Memorandum

(submitted by Mr. Baumel, Rapporteur)

I. Introduction

1. In the Kirchberg declaration of 24th May 1994, the WEU Council tasked the Permanent Council "to begin work on the formulation of a common European defence policy with a view to presenting preliminary conclusions at their next ministerial meeting in the Netherlands".
2. The Assembly greatly welcomed this initiative and expressed its wish to play an active rôle in the formation of this common European defence policy. It is recalled here that in Article J4 of the Treaty on European Union the Union requested WEU, as an integral part of the development of the Union, "to elaborate and implement decisions and actions of the Union which have defence implications".
3. In the declaration on Western European Union which is attached to the Treaty on European Union, the WEU member states agreed "to strengthen the rôle of WEU in the longer term perspective of a common defence policy within the European Union which might in time lead to a common defence, compatible with that of the Atlantic Alliance". They also stated that WEU would "formulate a common European defence policy and carry forward its concrete implementation through the further development of its own operational rôle".
4. According to the last paragraph of the abovementioned Article J4, the provisions of this article "may be revised (...) on the basis of a report to be presented in 1996 by the Council to the European Council, which shall include an evaluation of the progress made and the experience gained until then".
5. After the signing of the Maastricht Treaty in February 1992, WEU started to implement the abovementioned declaration on WEU and an important first step was made with the Petersberg declaration of 19th June 1992, which in particular laid the foundations for the strengthening of WEU's operational rôle. It appears, however, that the member states were far more reluctant to formulate a common European defence policy which logically should have preceded the future development of WEU's operational rôle. The timely initiative of the Council to start work on this issue is therefore fully endorsed by the Assembly and in the present report an effort is made to discuss a number of issues which are bound to play a rôle in Europe's common defence policy.
6. The transformation of NATO, set in motion after the fall of the Berlin wall, is considered to be of vital importance. In addition to providing more flexible forces for many new and different tasks, it also envisages including the states of Central and Eastern Europe in a process of building security in an area which extends far beyond that covered by the terms of the North Atlantic Treaty. Moreover, it is emphasised that, without the transformation of NATO, WEU will not be able to play a significant operational rôle. Prospects for the CSCE as an all-encompassing European security forum are reviewed. For a discussion of the issues related to the enlargement of NATO and WEU, reference is made to a parallel report of the Assembly's Political Committee¹.
7. The present state of affairs in Russia, in particular as related to defence issues and the specific position of the Baltic states, is discussed succinctly. Then follows the inevitable inventory of major risks and threats to European security.
8. Finally, an account is given of developments in WEU and its member states.

II. The transformation of NATO

(a) The early phase

9. After the collapse of the Berlin wall, the Atlantic Alliance understood that it had to transform itself from a purely defensive organisation, created to protect its members against a massive attack from the East, into something quite different.
10. The foundations for this transformation were formulated in the London declaration of 5th and 6th July 1990. While maintaining the original objective of providing common defence, it was thought that the alliance should also help build structures of a more united European continent, "supporting security and stability with the strength of our shared faith in democracy, the right of the individual, and the peaceful resolution of disputes"².
11. Reaffirming that security and stability do not lie solely in the military dimension, it sought

1. A European security policy – report submitted by Mr. Soell, Rapporteur, Document 1439.

2. NATO's London declaration, 5th and 6th July 1990, paragraph 2.

to enhance the political component of the alliance as provided for by Article 2 of the North Atlantic Treaty. It recognised that: "The move within the European Community towards political union, including the development of a European identity in the domain of security, will also contribute to Atlantic solidarity and to the establishment of a just and lasting order of peace throughout the whole of Europe³".

12. It was decided that NATO should build new partnerships with all the nations of Europe and extend the hand of friendship to the countries of the East which were its adversaries.

13. Arms control agreements were considered essential and, with their implementation, the alliance's integrated force structure and its strategy would change fundamentally to include the following elements:⁴

- "NATO will field smaller and restructured active forces. These forces will be highly mobile and versatile so that allied leaders will have maximum flexibility in deciding how to respond to a crisis. It will rely increasingly on multinational corps made up of national units.
- NATO will scale back the readiness of its active units, reducing training requirements and the number of exercises.
- NATO will rely more heavily on the ability to build up large forces if and when they might be needed."

14. Important decisions were also taken to reduce the alliance's reliance on nuclear weapons⁴.

15. Finally, it was stated that the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) should become more prominent in Europe. A number of recommendations regarding the rôle and institutionalisation of the CSCE were made, which were formalised at the CSCE summit meeting in Paris, in November 1990.

16. A new allied military strategy would be prepared "moving away from forward defence, where appropriate, towards a reduced forward presence and modifying flexible response to reflect a reduced reliance on nuclear weapons"⁶.

3. NATO's London declaration, 5th and 6th July 1990, paragraph 3.

4. NATO's London declaration, 5th and 6th July 1990, paragraph 14.

5. This subject has been dealt with in a recent Assembly report: The rôle and future of nuclear weapons, Rapporteur Mr. De Decker, Document 1420.

6. NATO's London declaration, 5th and 6th July 1990, paragraph 20.

Copenhagen meeting, June 1991

17. One year later, the North Atlantic Council met in Copenhagen on 6th and 7th June 1991 providing an opportunity for a first evaluation of a changed security environment in Europe. Although the general feeling could still be called optimistic, it was clear that the first lines of division in the "Europe whole and free" of the London declaration became visible. Certain Central European states were seeking to establish a close relationship with, if not membership of, NATO. These states were still feeling uncomfortable with the Soviet Union at their eastern frontiers and were trying to obtain formal security guarantees from the alliance. For a number of reasons, the alliance was reluctant to provide NATO membership or security guarantees and in Copenhagen it could only state that "our own security is inseparably linked to that of all other states in Europe."

18. It further stated that: "The consolidation and preservation throughout the continent of democratic societies and their freedom from any form of coercion or intimidation are therefore of direct and material concern to us, as they are to all other CSCE states under the commitments of the Helsinki Final Act and the Charter of Paris."

19. Common security, it said, could best be safeguarded through "the further development of a network of interlocking institutions and relationships, constituting a comprehensive architecture in which the alliance, the process of European integration and the CSCE are key elements."

20. Furthermore, it stated that it did not "wish to isolate any country, nor to see a new division of the continent. Our objective is to help create a Europe whole and free"⁷.

21. The alliance strongly emphasised the central rôle of the CSCE "in expanding the network of co-operative relationships across Europe". In particular, it would try "to reinforce the CSCE's potential for conflict-prevention, crisis-management and the peaceful settlement of disputes by appropriate means".

22. Further steps were also taken to develop a security partnership with the Soviet Union and the other Central and Eastern European states.

23. As regards the emerging common European foreign and security policy and defence rôle, the final communiqué of the North Atlantic Council in Copenhagen stated that the alliance would "develop practical arrangements to ensure the necessary transparency and complementarity between the European security and defence identity as it emerges in the Twelve and WEU, and the alliance. There will be a need, in particular, to establish

7. Statement issued by the North Atlantic Council on 6th and 7th June 1991, paragraph 3.

appropriate links and consultation procedures between them in order to ensure that the allies that are not currently participating in the development of a European identity in foreign and security policy and defence should be adequately involved in decisions that may affect their security”⁸.

24. In fact, this paragraph reflects the clear determination of the Bush administration to maintain its influence on new developments in the establishment of a European defence identity.

Rome declaration, November 1991

25. In the Rome declaration, issued by the heads of state and of government on 7th and 8th November 1991, the concept of a framework of interlocking institutions tying together the countries of Europe and North America in order to prevent instability and divisions was confirmed. A new strategic concept was published along the lines set out in the London declaration and it was stated that the alliance’s security was “based on three mutually reinforcing elements: dialogue, co-operation, and the maintenance of a collective defence capability”⁹.

26. The declaration stated that “the development of a European security identity and defence rôle, reflected in the further strengthening of the European pillar within the alliance, will reinforce the integrity and effectiveness of the Atlantic Alliance”¹⁰.

27. The enhancement of the rôle and responsibilities of the European members was called “an important basis for the transformation of the alliance”. On the other hand, it was stated that the alliance was “the essential forum for consultation among its members”.

28. Further, it was stated that the alliance’s new strategic concept “should facilitate the necessary complementarity between the alliance and the emerging defence component of the European integration process”¹¹.

29. As a next step in the alliance’s relations with the Soviet Union and the other countries of Central and Eastern Europe, the alliance announced the establishment of a more institutional relationship of consultation and co-operation on political and security issues in the framework of a North Atlantic Co-operation Council.

8. Final communiqué of the North Atlantic Council, 6th and 7th June 1991, paragraph 3.

9. Rome declaration, 7th and 8th November 1991, paragraph 4.

10. Rome declaration, 7th and 8th November 1991, paragraph 6.

11. Rome declaration, 7th and 8th November 1991, paragraph 7.

30. Finally, the alliance was said to remain deeply committed to strengthening the CSCE process “which has a vital rôle to play in promoting stability and democracy in Europe”¹². It made many suggestions to enhance the CSCE’s rôle.

(b) NATO’s cooperation programmes: NACC, PFP and the issue of enlargement

31. Implementing NATO’s November 1991 summit meeting in Rome, the North Atlantic Co-operation Council (NACC) was created in December 1991 assembling the NATO member states, the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the now independent republics of the former Soviet Union. NACC, with its annual work plans, provides the allies with an excellent opportunity to give support for reforms through practical assistance in a broad range of activities while building confidence through increased contacts. The annual work plans include consultations on security-related matters and extensive military contacts.

32. Very soon, however, experience showed that these activities had given rise to a dynamic process which obliged NATO to move faster than initially thought. There was also a need for more flexibility in the co-operation process which would enable programmes to be set up that were adapted to the individual needs and wishes of the different participants without giving up NACC’s general co-operation programme.

33. The Brussels summit meeting of January 1994 therefore created the partnership for peace (PFP) with significantly different scope and intensity, while remaining within the overall framework of NACC.

34. According to its framework document, the objectives of the PFP are:

- (i) to facilitate transparency in national defence planning and budgeting processes;
- (ii) to ensure democratic control of defence forces;
- (iii) to maintain the capability and readiness to contribute, subject to constitutional considerations, to operations under the authority of the United Nations and/or the responsibility of the CSCE;
- (iv) to develop co-operative military relations with NATO, for the purpose of joint planning, training, and exercises¹³

12. Rome declaration, 7th and 8th November 1991, paragraph 13.

13. The first exercises of this kind have meanwhile been held in Poland and the Netherlands.

in order to strengthen their ability to undertake missions in the fields of peace-keeping, search and rescue, humanitarian operations, and others as may subsequently be agreed; and

- (v) to develop, over the longer term, forces that are better able to operate with those of the members of the North Atlantic Alliance.

35. Slightly different from the NACC, the PFP has been designed to provide the partners with an opportunity to develop progressively closer relations with the alliance on the basis of their own interest and actual performance.

36. It is also noted that, although the PFP does not provide the formal security guarantee of Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, the framework document contains an article similar to Article 4 providing for a commitment to consult with any active participant if a partner perceives a threat to its territorial integrity, political independence or security.

37. In order to carry out the military co-ordination and planning needed for the implementation of PFP programmes, a Co-ordination Cell has been established at Mons, near SHAPE, where representatives of the participating countries are now taking office. Liaison offices for NACC/PFP partners are being established in permanent facilities at NATO's headquarters in Brussels.

38. The framework document, which is a public text, common to all partners and setting out the objectives of the programme, has at present (October 1994) been signed by 23 countries. Of these, 14 partners have submitted their presentation document which addresses the political and military aspects of the partnership, provides an indication of the co-operative activities and indicates military forces and other assets available for PFP activities. With four partners, an individual partnership programme has been developed.

39. A Political Military Steering Committee (PMSC) has been established to facilitate the implementation and, if need be, co-ordination of the different individual programmes.

40. The PFP could eventually lead to membership for some partner states although it is emphasised that this is not an automatic consequence of a country's decision to participate. Implementation of the PFP has only just begun and NATO and its partners should allow time to bring it to fruition. While emphasising that a future enlargement of the organisation to include Central and Eastern European countries is not excluded, most NATO member states think that it would be premature to set a timetable for this process. Enlargement, it is said, will have to be co-ordinated with Russia and it should be done only if it improved stability in

Europe. It is also noted that at present any decision to enlarge would, for a number of reasons, involve a choice to include some nations, excluding others. Ratification of a limited enlargement by the 16 member states might not be a smooth and swift process and there might even be divisions between members over the fundamental issues at stake. A premature discussion of enlargement issues might also lead to divisive debates over the rôle of Russia and its thoughts and ambitions and jeopardise a difficult but very important and precious process of co-operation with Russia.

(c) Combined joint task forces and the transformation of NATO

41. A major step forward on the road towards the creation of operational capabilities for WEU was taken at the NATO summit meeting in Brussels on 10th-11th January 1994.

42. At this summit meeting, it was decided that the alliance's organisation and resources would be adjusted so as to facilitate the development of WEU as the defence component of the European Union. It was also stated that the alliance stood ready to make collective assets available, on the basis of consultations in the North Atlantic Council, for WEU operations.

43. In their declaration, the heads of state and of government further said: " We also will need to strengthen the European pillar of the alliance by facilitating the use of our military capabilities for NATO and European/WEU operations... " To improve, among other things co-operation with WEU and to reflect the emerging European security and defence identity, they endorsed " the concept of combined joint task forces as a means to facilitate contingency operations, including operations with participating nations outside the alliance ".

44. The North Atlantic Council, with the advice of the NATO military authorities, was directed to develop this concept and establish the necessary capabilities. In co-ordination with WEU, it would work on implementation in a manner that would provide " separable but not separate " military capabilities that could be employed by NATO or WEU.

45. The CJTF plan calls upon the Supreme Allied Commander Europe and Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic to designate a notional general officer and headquarters staff that could be drawn out of the NATO integrated structure. NATO " would then deploy them to a theatre of operations for the purpose of conducting the command and control of a contingency. "

46. In an early working definition, military authorities at NATO defined a CJTF headquarters as a deployable, multinational, multiservice head-

quarters of variable size, formed to command joint forces of NATO and, possibly, non-NATO nations, for the purpose of conducting peace operations outside the territory of NATO. A NATO CJTF headquarters could also be detached for European-led (WEU) operations. It is assumed that, for the composition of a CJTF headquarters, elements will be drawn from CINCENT, AFSOUTH and AFNORTHWEST.

47. In the Kirchberg declaration of 9th May 1994, the WEU Council stated that:

“ They welcomed the summit’s endorsement of the principle that collective assets and capabilities of the alliance can be made available for WEU operations in order to strengthen WEU as the defence component of the European Union and as the means to strengthen the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance. They underlined that the modalities for making these available should preserve WEU’s own planning procedures and capabilities.

Ministers stressed the importance of work under way in WEU on the WEU-related aspects of the adaptation of the alliance structures. In order to enhance WEU’s ability to carry out the tasks defined in the Petersberg declaration, Ministers endorsed the approach to identify the assets and capabilities required to perform the necessary military functions.

Ministers underlined the importance of co-ordination with the alliance on the implementation of the CJTF concept and the definition of separable but not separate military capabilities so as to ensure their effective use where appropriate by WEU, and in that case under its command.

While recalling their commitment to strengthen the operational capabilities of WEU, they also agreed that WEU would benefit from careful management of resources as well as existing standardised procedures.

Ministers requested the Permanent Council to take discussions on these matters forward as fast as possible with a view to the timely presentation of joint positions into the process of consultation in the alliance.”

48. The final communiqué of the North Atlantic Council at Istanbul, 9th June 1994, made it clear that little progress had been made on this subject:

“ Close co-operation and co-ordination between NATO and WEU will continue to be developed in accordance with principles of complementarity and transparency. The summit decisions have set the course for

our co-operation, including the readiness of the alliance to make its collective assets available, on the basis of consultations in the North Atlantic Council, for WEU operations undertaken by the European allies in pursuit of their common foreign and security policy.”

49. After thorough preparation by a specific CJTF political-military working group, on 29th June 1994, WEU tabled a document with its guiding principles for the implementation of the CJTF concept. Since then, little progress has been made and no decisions regarding this subject were taken at the Seville meeting of NATO’s defence ministers on 28th-30th September 1994.

50. Initially, it was hoped that final conclusions on the CJTF concept could be presented to NATO’s defence ministers by the end of 1994, but in view of the slow progress being made, only an interim report will be presented. Final decisions are now expected to be taken in late spring 1995.

51. It was pointed out in an earlier Assembly report¹⁴ that CJTF will make little sense for WEU if the organisation fails to create the appropriate political-military infrastructure to deal with it effectively. Even if some progress has been made, existing infrastructure is still largely ad hoc.

52. For command and control of operations as envisaged in the CJTF concept, a strategic interface is required between political and military structures, an element still missing in WEU. The prevailing command and control regulations in WEU operations have been agreed on an ad hoc basis, lacking universality.

53. While CJTFs were originally conceived as mechanisms for providing command and control for non-Article 5, out-of-area operations, there is a growing feeling in NATO that non-Article 5 operations may easily develop into Article 5 operations. Most NATO authorities are therefore in favour of robust CJTFs, which could also provide complete command and control for a large-scale alliance operation. This idea is running counter to the original idea of having adaptable structures and flexible procedures conceived to be used in relatively minor but possibly complicated and autonomous, multinational operations.

54. NATO’s SACEUR, General Joulwan, has stated that he wants specific authority to approve any operational requirements for a CJTF, but it should be noted that this would leave any European operation without participation of the transatlantic allies still completely dependent on the decision of a United States commander. It really seems illogical to have an American general as

14. The WEU Planning Cell, report submitted on behalf of the Defence Committee by Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman, Rapporteur, Document 1421.