FORTIETH ORDINARY SESSION

(Third part)

New trends in North American countries’ foreign policy and their implications for transatlantic co-operation in security and defence matters, with particular reference to the United States

REPORT

submitted on behalf of the Political Committee by Lord Finsberg, Rapporteur
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TABLE OF CONTENTS

DRAFT RECOMMENDATION

on new trends in North American countries' foreign policy and their implications for transatlantic co-operation in security and defence matters, with particular reference to the United States

EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM

submitted by Lord Finsberg, Rapporteur

I. Introduction

II. Evolution of United States foreign, security and defence policy since the NATO summit meeting in January 1994

III. American and European perceptions of transatlantic relations

IV. Lessons for WEU

V. Conclusions

1. Adopted unanimously by the committee.

2. Members of the committee: Mr. de Puig (Chairman); Lord Finsberg, Mr. Roseta (Vice-Chairmen); MM. Alegre (Alternate: Mrs. Aguiar), Antretter, Sir Andrew Bowden, MM. Bühler, Caballero, Capsis (Alternate: Pavlides), Cioni, Ehrmann, Fassino (Alternate: Benvenuti), Irmer, Sir Russell Johnston, MM. Kaspereit (Alternate: Baumel), Lord Kirkhill (Alternate: Marshall), MM. Koschyk, Lijap, van der Linden, de Lipkowski, Maass, Mrs. Papandreou, MM. Pécriaux, Pozzo (Alternate: Arata), Mrs. Prestigiacomo (Alternate: Bianchi), MM. Puche Rodriguez, Recoder, Rodeghiero, Rodrigues, Seeuws, Seitlinger, Sir Keith Speed (Alternate: Sir Peter Fry), MM. Vinçon, Wintgens (Alternate: Kelchtermans), Woltjer, Zijlstra, N...

Associate members: MM. Bjørnestad, Godal.

N.B. The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.
Draft Recommendation

on new trends in North American countries' foreign policy and their implications for transatlantic co-operation in security and defence matters, with particular reference to the United States

The Assembly,

(i) Recalling that the collapse of the Soviet Union and the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact left the United States the primary superpower in the world;

(ii) Considering that the Democratic President of the United States, President Clinton, has proclaimed his first priority in his political objectives to be the settling of America’s urgent internal problems in the field of necessary reforms in the social health, educational and budgetary system as well as in the fight against criminality and terrorism;

(iii) Recalling also that the new United States priorities in foreign and security policy are concentrated on the creation of a new kind of Asian-Pacific community, containing nuclear proliferation in countries such as North Korea, China and Russia and reducing the American anti-missile defence programme following a strict interpretation of the ABM Treaty;

(iv) Observing however that the freedom of action of the United States President has been considerably curtailed by the sweeping victory of the Republican Party in the congressional elections on 8th November 1994 which appeared to weaken the policy of a bipartisan approach;

(v) Noting that the new Congress, which is still working out its policy direction, has started trying to impose restrictions on the American executive regarding, in particular, its foreign, security and defence policy, by drafting new legislation such as the “Peace Power Act” and the “National Security Revitalisation Act”;

(vi) Noting with satisfaction that United States foreign policy has been successful in finalising the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) with the support of the Canadian Parliament, revitalising Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation (APEC) and co-operating in the ASEAN Regional Security Forum, thus contributing to enhancing economic and security stability in the regions concerned;

(vii) Noting uneasily, however, that the various signals emanating from the United States Government and Congress and the steps they are taking regarding relations with Europe, the future of the Atlantic Alliance and its enlargement to Central and Eastern European countries, relations with Russia and the rôle of the United Nations are not always consistent, nor does the United States consult on these questions sufficiently with its European allies and partners;

(viii) Worried about the serious differences between the United States and most of its European allies over the ways of settling the conflict in former Yugoslavia;

(ix) Further angered that the decisions reached at the NATO summit meeting in January 1994 to make collective assets of the alliance available for WEU operations are still not being carried into effect, because of remaining Euro-American differences over the procedure to follow;

(x) Having a strong impression that the question of whether and how Euro-American relations should be renewed and founded on a new and enlarged contractual basis are being discussed far more by European than by American politicians;

(xi) Deploring the incredible difficulties in establishing a regular parliamentary dialogue between the Assembly of Western European Union and the Congress of the United States;

(xii) Reiterating the importance of making full use of Article IV of the modified Brussels Treaty for establishing closer links with the United States Government through WEU’s co-operation with NATO,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Translate into active policy its intention voiced in its Noordwijk declaration “to continue to work together in close association with the North American allies. The security of the alliance and of Europe as a whole is indivisible. The transatlantic partnership rests on a shared foundation of values and interests. Just as the commitment of the North American democracies is vital to Europe’s security, a free, independent and increasingly more united Europe will contribute to the security of North America.”
2. Devote a special chapter to the future rôle of the United States in regard to European security and the question of reforming transatlantic relations in the white paper now being prepared on European security;

3. Transform the working group on Transatlantic Publicity Activities into a true political forum with which ministers of WEU member countries can establish an enhanced dialogue with United States politicians in order to strengthen their interest in and knowledge of WEU’s work in the European and transatlantic framework and ensure that members of the Assembly can participate in this dialogue or in a new North American/European Parliamentary Assembly based on the WEU and North Atlantic Assemblies.
I. Introduction

1. In the period between the Political Committee’s visit to the United States and Canada in February 1992 which led to Recommendation 522 on new Euro-American relations and the committee’s visit to the two countries between 1st and 8th March 1995, the internal political landscape of the United States has changed fundamentally: since 20th January 1993, the only remaining world superpower has been governed by one of the youngest Presidents so far, the Democrat Bill Clinton, whose first priority – as he had promised during the electoral campaign – was, from the very start of his presidency, to concentrate on settling America’s urgent internal problems such as budget consolidation, reform of the social health and educational system and also the fight against criminality.

2. The first outline of Clinton’s foreign policy seemed to be focused on efforts to create a sort of new Pacific Community on the basis of a CSCE-like organisation in the Asian area called the “Asia Regional Security Forum” in which China and Russia should also participate. Regarding Europe and in particular the conflict in the Balkans, the lack of a clear concept in the American administration led to early difficulties and differences in the Euro-Atlantic partnership which also affected the North Atlantic Alliance.

3. The result of the congressional elections on 8th November 1994, providing a clear Republican majority in both chambers of the Congress (230 to 204 in the House and 53 to 47 in the Senate), led to a situation in which the new majority in Congress, which started work on 4th January 1995, tried to impose on the Clinton administration a new policy direction which had not however been clearly defined. The first draft bill drawn up by Congress, the so-called “National Security Revitalisation Act”, passed in February 1995 by the House but not yet by the Senate, embodies the defence priorities outlined in the Republican “Contract with America", thus restricting United States participation in United Nations peace-keeping operations and, conversely, advocating strengthening anti-missile defence and including specific Central European countries, such as Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia in NATO.

4. Regarding United States’ policy towards NATO, the bill affirms among other things:

“4) Although new threats are more geographically and functionally diverse and less predictable, they still imperil shared interests of the United States and its NATO allies.

(5) Western interests must be protected on a co-operative basis without an undue burden falling upon the United States.

(6) NATO is the only multilateral organisation that is capable of conducting effective military operations to protect western interests.

(7) The valuable experience gained from on-going military co-operation within NATO was critical to the success of joint military operations in the 1991 liberation of Kuwait.

(8) NATO is an important diplomatic forum for discussion of issues of concern to its member states and for the peaceful resolution of disputes.

... It should be the policy of the United States:

(1) to continue the nation’s commitment to an active leadership rôle in NATO;

(2) to join with the nation’s NATO allies to redefine the rôle of the alliance in the post-cold war world, taking into account:

(a) the fundamentally changed security environment of Central and Eastern Europe;

(b) the need to assure all countries of the defensive nature of the alliance and the desire of its members to work co-operatively with all former adversaries;

(c) the emerging security threats posed by the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction and the means to deliver them;

(d) the continuing challenges to the interests of all NATO member countries posed by unstable and undemocratic régimes harbouring hostile intentions; and
(e) the dependence of the global economy on a stable energy supply and the free flow of commerce;

(3) to affirm that NATO military planning should include joint military operations beyond the geographic bounds of the alliance under Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty when the shared interests of the United States and other member countries require such action to defend vital interests;

(4) to expeditiously pursue joint co-operation agreements for the acquisition of essential systems to significantly increase the crisis-management capability of NATO."

5. Apart from specific items such as anti-missile defence, command of United States forces and limiting the outlay of United States funds for American forces placed under United Nations control, conditions required by Congress regarding United States contributions for United Nations peace-keeping activities and expansion of NATO, the bill does not discuss the problems of future Euro-Atlantic relations. In a joint article published in February 1995 in The New York Times, both the United States Foreign Secretary, Warren Christopher, and Defence Secretary, William J. Perry, said the draft bill was "deeply flawed":

"The bill's first flaw is that it would return the United States to a crash-schedule deployment of a national missile defence designed to protect the country from missile attacks. That deployment is not justified by any existing threat to our nation's security."

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Second, the bill unilaterally and permanently designates certain European states for NATO membership...

Third, the bill would effectively abrogate our treaty obligations to pay our share of the cost of the United Nations peace-keeping operations that we have supported in the Security Council... Under current circumstances, it would end United Nations peace-keeping overnight."

6. The abovementioned example of differences between Congress and government in the United States demonstrates the start of a power struggle between these two main political bodies and hence the question of who in the United States directs foreign policy. The answer to this question is crucial for a future European approach to redefining United States/European relations.

7. This problem has been further aggravated by the drafting in the United States Senate of a new bill devoted to clarifying the war powers of Congress and the President in the post-cold war period under the title "Peace Powers Act of 1995". According to this draft, the President "shall consult with Congress before introducing United States armed forces into hostilities or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated". Furthermore, the draft bill envisages strong limitations on the freedom of action of the President regarding the placing of United States armed forces under foreign command for United Nations peace-keeping activities.

8. But also within the administration itself it is not easy to identify valid concepts regarding United States priorities in foreign and security policy which take into account the radical changes in the international political landscape since the end of the East-West confrontation. It was therefore the main purpose of the Political Committee's visit to the United States and Canada to learn more about future United States foreign policy and its implications for transatlantic co-operation in security and defence matters and, in particular, for the future development of WEU as defence component of the European Union and European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance.

II. Evolution of United States foreign, security and defence policy since the NATO summit meeting in January 1994

9. When the committee started its visit to the United States, its knowledge depended on formal decisions reached or official speeches published by leading American politicians since the democratic administration assumed responsibility for United States foreign and security policy. One of the major decisions endorsed by the United States President was the readiness proclaimed at the NATO summit meeting, on 10th and 11th January 1994 in Brussels "to make collective assets of the alliance available, on the basis of consultations in the North Atlantic Council, for WEU operations undertaken by the European allies in pursuit of their common foreign and security policy".

10. According to information provided by the United Kingdom Government to the House of Lords in January 1995, NATO collective assets include communications, command and control, as well as airborne early-warning and other facilities, but not intelligence unilaterally obtained by the United States from space. On the question of whether non-European members of NATO would be in a position to veto the use of the "collective assets", the United Kingdom government recalled that "all decisions taken by the North Atlantic Council are by consensus".

11. During the committee's visit to Washington Mr. Peter Tarnoff, Under-Secretary for Political

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Affairs at the State Department, categorically denied the question about the United States blocking the outcome of the current discussion between WEU and NATO on the ways and means of making NATO's assets available to WEU, underlining that there was now more encouragement in the United States for a European defence identity. However, he added that the idea of totally independent action by WEU was undesirable because this would undermine the close co-operation between NATO and WEU. At the Pentagon, Mr. Walter Slocombe, Under-Secretary of Defence for Policy, said, in the context of the question of combined joint task forces (CJTF), that according to the American concept, providing WEU with NATO assets should be conducted under NATO command, even if the relevant NATO staff in such cases had to follow instructions from the WEU Council.

12. On the basis of the work of the new politico-military working group created by the WEU Council in June 1994, WEU presented to NATO a proposal on "Criteria and modalities for effective use by WEU of the combined joint task forces (CJTF). It is still waiting for an answer. In the second part of its fourth annual report to the Assembly, the Council states that the strengthening of WEU's operational rôle depends on NATO's elaboration of the CJTF concept and that the results will be a test case both for WEU/NATO relations and for the operational potential of WEU. Unfortunately, the Council did not use this question to examine how it fits into the framework of the broader problem of future Euro-American co-operation in security and defence matters.

13. Even after the numerous talks the committee was able to hold with the relevant governmental, parliamentary and research institutions during its visit to Washington, it remains difficult to fit NATO's decision of January 1994 into a broader concept of a new United States foreign and security policy. Was this decision an indication that the United States would more and more renounce its leadership rôle in transatlantic relations by giving Europe more responsibilities in matters where the Americans would not take a prominent rôle?

14. The answer is difficult to find. However even if President Clinton, in his State of the Union address to the new Congress on 25th January 1995, did not mention Europe in a single sentence, he emphasised that

"our security depends upon our continued world leadership for peace, freedom and democracy. We cannot be strong at home without being strong abroad.

.......

From my first day in office I have pledged that our nation would maintain the best equipped, best trained and best prepared fighting force on earth. We have – and they are. They have managed the dramatic down-sizing of our forces since the cold war with remarkable skill and spirit. To make sure our military is ready for action – and to provide the pay and quality of life that the military and their families deserve – I am asking this Congress to add 25 000 million more in defence spending over the next six years. Tonight I repeat that request. We ask much of our armed forces. They are called to service in many ways – and we must give them and their families what the time demands and they deserve."

15. But where are the priorities of United States foreign policy needing such highly qualified armed forces as requested by the United States President? According to his Foreign Secretary, Warren Christopher, developing key principles for a United States foreign policy in a speech on 26th January 1995 at the John F. Kennedy School of Government:

"first, America must continue to engage and lead. Second, we must seek to maintain and strengthen co-operative relationships with the world’s most powerful nations. Third, it is essential that we adapt and build institutions that will promote economic and security co-operation. Fourth, we support democracy and human rights because it serves our ideals and our interests."

16. Explaining in a more detailed way the question of leadership, the United States Foreign Secretary underlined that:

"American leadership requires that we be ready to back diplomacy with the credible threat of force. Towards this end, President Clinton is determined that the United States military will remain the most powerful and effective fighting force in the world.

When our vital interests are at stake, we must be prepared to act alone. Our willingness to do so is often the key to effective joint action. But the recent debate between the proponents of unilateral and multilateral action assumes a false choice. Multilateralism is a means, not an end. Sometimes, by mobilising the support of other nations, by leveraging our power and leading through alliances and institutions, we will achieve better results at lower cost in human life and national treasure. That is a sensible bargain I know the American people support."

17. The remarks are interesting in two respects. Firstly in the context that the draft budget for the Pentagon for 1996 is reduced by 6.6% in comparison with the fiscal year 1995 and the number of

military forces should consequently be reduced to 1.6 million troops (1987: 2.2 million). Secondly, the Foreign Secretary gives a reply on the question discussed in several circles about whether the United States is moving towards some sort of neo-isolationism.

18. In an article by William Safire\(^5\) to which Ambassador Kornblum made reference during his briefing of the Political Committee in Washington, it was stated that:

"the essential conflict taking place in United States foreign policy today is not between isolationists and interventionists (who prefer to be called internationalists). Global heavy thinkers are not arguing about withdrawing from America's duty to help keep the world in order. The real battle is about the way to go about it.

One school says America should pick its spots and assert its leadership, inspiring and pressuring and expecting allies to follow. These unilateralists, as the foreign policy elite likes to call them, are opposed by multilateralists, who believe the United States should act mainly in concert with international organisations like the United Nations and NATO.

Mr. Clinton is an unabashed multilateralist. 'The new isolationists both on the left and the right', he charged, would 'eliminate any meaningful role for the United Nations' and 'deny resources to our peacekeepers'.

The opposite unilateralist policy was expressed by Mr. Nixon long ago to the cadets: 'I say that America has a vital national interest in world stability, and no other nation can uphold that interest for us.'"

19. Regarding the second principle, Mr. Warren Christopher underlined that:

"our strategy is the central importance of constructive relations with the world’s most powerful nations: our Western European allies, Japan, China and Russia. These nations possess the political, economic or military capability to affect the well-being of every American. The relatively co-operative relations that these countries now have with each other are unprecedented in this century, but not irreversible.

Our strategy toward the great powers begins with Western Europe and Japan. We must revitalise our alliances with this democratic core. We must also seize the opportunities that now exist to build constructive relations with China and Russia, countries that once were our fiercest adversaries. Both are undergoing momentous, though very different, transformations that will directly affect American interests."

20. It becomes very clear from this approach that relations with Europe are described in a global context together with relations with Japan, China and Russia, then demonstrating that, for America, as Mr. Kornblum said, "Europe is not the world". Whereas problems of relations with Europe are not further developed, Mr. Christopher elaborates in more depth the importance of relationships with Japan, China and Russia.

21. The United States’ relationship with Russia also played an important rôle in the Political Committee's discussions in both Washington and Ottawa. Whereas Canadian foreign ministry representatives recognised that Russia remains a major concern for the security preoccupations of other countries, while Canada’s relations with it are in general without major problems, Washington spokesmen gave various interpretations regarding the present state of United States-Russian relations and United States policy followed in this respect.

22. In Mr. Christopher’s words, the United States’ relationship with Russia is central to America's security.

"The United States has an enormous stake in the outcome of Russia's continuing transformation ... that is why the Clinton administration has been unwavering in our support for Russian reform."

However, members of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington expressed major doubts as to whether there existed a coherent United States policy towards Russia, since there was always a contradiction between a strong pro-Yeltsin approach and efforts to enlarge NATO. The United States had also overestimated its ability to influence the political situation in Russia. All questions regarding NATO enlargement were considered in Russia in a very emotional, not rational way. Summing up, there is now a major crisis in United States/Russian relations and it would be easy for Congress to blackmail the administration in this area.

23. The assessment by representatives of the State Department focused on uncertainties in Russia’s future internal evolution. Whereas Yeltsin is making major efforts to strengthen state power, a new kind of power struggle between pressure groups such as the banking, oil and gas lobbies can be seen. Moscow’s central power seems to be growing weaker and local authorities are strengthening ties with local military authorities. United States policy tries to convince Russia that enlargement by NATO is not meant to isolate it but to contribute to stabilising the situation. Moscow’s

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difficulties in Central Asia would strengthen its desire to improve relations with the West.

24. Regarding Russia's handling of the Chechnya conflict, the official United States position expressed by its Foreign Secretary is that:

"the way in which Russia has used military force has been excessive and threats to have a corrosive effect on the future of Russian democracy. As I told Foreign Minister Kosyrev, the war must end and a process of reconciliation must begin. What we do not want to see is a Russia in a military quagmire that erodes reform and tends to isolate it in the international community."

25. In the State Department, it was affirmed that the United States had made known to the Russians that their action in Chechnya was not consistent with recognised international norms. But vigorous criticism was expressed, particularly in the Heritage Foundation regarding the reluctance of the United States Government to protest more vigorously against Russian warfare in Chechnya and that there was no United States support for European politicians when they tried to call for a more rigorous attitude vis-à-vis Russia. There was also strong criticism from leading republicans when President Clinton recently decided to accept President Yeltsin's invitation to participate in the celebration in Moscow of the fiftieth anniversary of the end of the second world war.

26. In the framework of the preparation of the summit meeting between President Clinton and President Yeltsin in Moscow, there were signs of new irritation between the United States and some of the European allies in NATO over the way the United States President intended to present to the Russian Government the question of NATO's enlargement. According to reports appearing in the German press particularly, the American President, in a letter addressed to President Yeltsin, had even not excluded a full membership of NATO for Russia, but this was categorically denied by the American authorities. In any case, all questions relating to NATO enlargement are controversial between the allies and Russia and there are also important differences between the United States and its European allies on this question which is of great significance for the enlargement of Western European Union. Furthermore, leading Republicans have severely criticised the results of the American-Russian summit meeting in Moscow, in particular with respect to the war in Chechnya and Mr. Clinton's unsuccessful efforts to dissuade Russia from concluding a nuclear deal with Iran, thus threatening to stop any congressional support for further financial aid to Russia.

27. Regarding the American concept of its future relations with Europe, it could be consider-
red as some confirmation of the relevant approach in the abovementioned speech by Mr. Warren Christopher, when a member of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace stated that Europe was not a major issue in the United States; otherwise (according to this expert) there would be calls in the United States for it to withdraw its remaining troops from Europe. American interest in European affairs was far more concerned with economic issues.

28. The fact that there are several subjects over which fundamental differences exist between Americans and Europeans, or where important problems of elaborating a joint transatlantic strategy are to be solved, seems to bother Americans to a lesser extent than Europeans. The first example is the problem of the conflict in former Yugoslavia. The official version published by Mr. Warren Christopher on 20th January 1995 underlines:

"The tragic war in Bosnia underscores the importance of building an effective new architecture for conflict-prevention and resolution. Together with our partners in the contact group, we are seeking a negotiated solution because only a negotiated solution has any chance of lasting and preventing a wider war. What we must not do is to make the situation worse by unilaterally lifting the arms embargo. We have always believed that the embargo is unfair. But going it alone would lead to the withdrawal of UNPROFOR and an escalation of violence. It would americanise the conflict and lead others to abandon the sanctions on Serbia. It would undermine the authority of all United Nations Security Council resolutions including sanctions on Iraq and Libya."

29. Nevertheless, the United States decided not to participate any more in the enforcement of the arms embargo in the Adriatic. This American decision was an unusual step and, for the first time since the creation of the Atlantic Alliance the WEU Council, in its Noordwijk declaration, criticised in public a decision of its most powerful and important ally. Whereas the North Atlantic Council's final communiqué published on 3rd December 1994 avoided open criticism of the United States, Frederick Bonnart, editor of NATO's Sixteen Nations, made a very sharp comment in the press on 14th November 1994, when he said that the American order shows complete disregard for the aims and constraints of friends and allies, as well as those of Russia "the impression of a United States Congress determined to bulldoze through its decisions regardless of America's allies was reinforced by the way the information reached NATO. A leaked newspaper story arrived before any official notification... The danger is
great... A leaked report from one of the NATO ambassadors stated that 'cracks are appearing in the alliance' 

30. It is obvious that the United States position regarding the conflict in former Yugoslavia was one of the major subjects of discussion during the committee's recent visit to Washington. There were no signs from the American side that the United States was considering deploying peace-keeping troops in the area, like other United Nations member countries and, in particular, France and Britain. In the State Department, Mr. Kornblum said that even if, according to the Helsinki Charter, borders were not to be changed other than by peaceful agreement, there was no internationally agreed border guarantee, obliging United States troops to intervene in every given case. Affirming that the United States was present with about 16,000 people in the area, he stated that the United Nations approach employed so far in Bosnia and Croatia had led to a situation in which UNPROFOR had not contributed to a solution but had become part of the problem. But he admitted that, if the embargo on Bosnia was lifted, there would be an increased danger of a new violent war in the area. Mr. Alexander Vershbow, Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for European Affairs in the United States National Security Council, said that the United States ground forces would not be engaged in the area except to protect a possible withdrawal of the United Nations forces.

31. In the event of a United Nations withdrawal, the United States was still inclined to support Bosnia with arms, because Bosnians were the victims. But the United States would not act unilaterally. Mr. Vershbow categorically denied press reports according to which Americans were already supplying Bosnia with arms. It was very important to strengthen the Federation between Bosnia and Croatia, which still had problems to deal with. On the question of imposing possible economic sanctions on Croatia in order to force Mr. Tudjman to renounce his request for a withdrawal of United Nations troops from Croatia, Mr. Vershbow said that during Mr. Holbrooke's last visit to Croatia, the United States side had adopted a very firm attitude towards Croatia. But one had to be careful in order to avoid Croatia eventually entering into an unholy alliance with Mr. Milosevic.

32. During the talks in the House of Representatives, one of the Congressmen acknowledged that, in his opinion, it would be a mistake to lift the embargo unilaterally and any measures should be decided in close consultation with the European allies. There was general frustration regarding the impossibility of ending hostilities in the Balkans, but Congress had insufficient knowledge of the historical grounds of the conflict.

33. During the committee's visit to Washington it was regrettably not possible to meet the relevant committees of the United States Senate, which had cancelled the planned meeting at short notice. Nevertheless, your Rapporteur did have the opportunity of meeting Admiral Nonsense, Chief-of-Staff to Senator Helms, the Foreign Relations Chairman. He confirmed that NATO would be supported more strongly by the new Congress and said that if the United States lifted the Bosnian arms embargo, he was sure that United States military would be available to cover any withdrawal of United Nations troops. He thought that NATO enlargement might proceed in stages, the first being attendance and participation in all meetings. When these countries had got their forces to a stage compatible with NATO and had also the financial resources to sustain full membership, then full membership would follow, with all that it entailed. Of course the final policy decisions are taken by the Senate and Congress but it was most reassuring to know the tenor of advice being offered to members.

34. The second example is the question of the enlargement of NATO. The American approach seems to have in mind, first and foremost, the interests of Russia, second the future character of NATO but not to any great extent the interests of the European Union and Western European Union. As already mentioned in Mrs. Aguiar's report, the Americans made very clear what had already been said by Mr. Slocombe during the last North Atlantic Assembly session:

"The question about WEU and NATO, let me only say that I think the United States Government would view with considerable concern a situation in which countries were full members of WEU and were not also members of the alliance, if only for the formal reason that the WEU security guarantee is, if anything, firmer and more automatic than the NATO guarantee, and it would create for the United States and for any other non-member of WEU that is in the alliance the awkward situation in which some members of the alliance were absolutely obligated to the security of countries which were not in the alliance ... while I take the point entirely about the fact that we must not forget in our consideration of expansion the issue of the states which were neutral during the cold war and are now in the process of joining the European Union, there are problems about seeing WEU as some kind of a way station in this sense."

35. Reverting to the third principle of United States strategy described by Mr. Warren Christopher, he observed that the United States "must adapt and revitalise the institution of global and regional co-operation... Our challenge now is to revitalise those institutions - NATO, the United Nations, the International Monetary Fund and the
World Bank, the OECD, among others". Several very different problems are thus summarised in one phrase.

36. Regarding NATO and relations with Europe, it was said simply that "NATO remains the author of American engagement in Europe and the linchpin of transatlantic security. NATO has always been far more than a transitory guarantor of European democracy and a force for European stability". There is no indication whether and in what way the American Government deems it necessary to reform the Atlantic Alliance or to adapt the whole range of transatlantic relationships on a new and broader basis.

37. The question of continuity of United States foreign policy was addressed by Mr. Christopher as follows:

"The recent elections changed the balance of power between the parties. But they did not change, indeed they enhanced, our responsibility to co-operate on a bipartisan basis in foreign affairs. The election was not a licence to lose sight of our nation’s global interests or to walk away from our commitments in the world. Leaders of both parties understand that well.

Bipartisan co-operation has always been grounded in the conviction that our nation’s enduring interests do not vary with the times. President Harry Truman had it right 40 years ago: ‘Circumstances change’, he said, ‘but the great issues remain the same – prosperity, welfare, human rights, effective democracy, and above all peace.’

With the cold war behind us, the United States has a chance to build a more secure and integrated world of open societies and open markets. We are the world’s largest military and economic power. Our nation’s founding principles still inspire people all over the world. We are blessed with great resources and resolve. We still continue to use them with wisdom, with strength, and with the backing of the American people’.

38. The Political Committee obviously used its stay in Washington and Ottawa to discuss also the position of the two countries regarding worldwide crisis-management, peace-keeping, reform of the Charter and the Security Council of the United Nations, the role of regional organisations and in particular that of the OSCE, and questions of worldwide arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation. As these matters are dealt with principally in the framework of the report to be presented by Mr. Marshall, your Rapporteur will concentrate here mainly on the consequences of United States policy on transatlantic relations.

III. American and European perceptions of transatlantic relations

39. In this context it is interesting to note an article on the findings of a recent survey of American public opinion in the area of foreign affairs, published recently in the German press under the headline ‘America not contaminated by neo-isolationist virus’.

‘Two thirds of Americans and 98% of the ‘ruling’ elite expressly state they are in favour of the United States being actively involved in foreign policy. They think America has a more important part to play today than ten years ago. This stance in favour of a world rôle for the United States became clear from the most recent survey of the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations which every four years ‘takes the temperature’ of American public opinion on foreign affairs and compares it with the position of leading figures in the world of politics, the economy and science.

The spectacular changes which have occurred over the last five years have, it is true, led to a sharp focus of attention on national interests. The study highlights the ‘pragmatic internationalism’ of the American people.

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Even the defence of America’s traditional allies is no longer regarded as important in the eyes of the American public, whose interests are now concentrated exclusively on their own well-being: the fight against drug addiction, protecting American jobs, controlling illegal immigration, guaranteeing energy supplies and reducing America’s external deficit. The only universal subjects of interest constituting major foreign policy objectives are prevention of nuclear armaments proliferation and environmental protection.

Despite being inward-looking, public opinion surprisingly comes out in favour of strengthening the United Nations and contributing to multilateral peace-keeping operations. Opinion is divided on whether United States troops can be subordinated to United Nations command, while leaders accept this idea.

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Public opinion and leaders have very different opinions on whether United States foreign policy should in future give priority to Europe or Asia. Public opinion is in

favour of Europe by an overwhelming majority, while economists tend to favour both equally, the government has a clear preference for Asia and Congress is split down the middle between Asia and Europe. Public opinion and the élite are, however, in agreement on one point: unification of Europe is a good thing for the United States ..."

40. Regarding the future of transatlantic ties, it seems that in general Europeans are more concerned than Americans about the need to give serious thought to ways and means of reorganising Euro-American relations and co-operation to take into account the changing international political landscape. In an article published in the International Herald Tribune on 30th March 1995, Mr. Kinkel, German Minister for Foreign Affairs, advocated an enlarged transatlantic partnership including not only the security, but also the economic, cultural, scientific and human relation dimensions. A similar approach was suggested by the German Defence Minister, Volker Ruehe, whereas the out-going French Prime Minister, Edouard Balladur, preferred to limit the reform of transatlantic ties to security issues alone. Both the German Foreign and Defence Ministers had already stressed at the Munich Conference in February 1995 that NATO was no longer sufficient as the only basis for transatlantic relations.

41. Mr. van Mierlo, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands raised similar questions in an article published in the March 1995 edition of the NATO Review in which he asked whether a new contract should be limited to transatlantic security relations only. His point of view is very close to the German position. Last but not least, Mr. Malcolm Rifkind, Secretary of State for Defence of the United Kingdom, also in the March 1995 edition of the NATO Review, stressed the need to build a new Atlantic Community on four pillars: "The first pillar is our shared belief in the rule of law and parliamentary democracy. The second is liberal capitalism and free trade which has given all our people unprecedented prosperity. The third is the shared European cultural heritage emanating from classical Greece and Rome through the Renaissance to the shared values, beliefs and civilisations of our own century. The fourth pillar must be defence and security as represented by the NATO alliance."

42. But the Euro-American discussions on these issues are not a one-way European street. Important American voices are also heard. The former United States Minister Henry A. Kissinger has proposed that the Atlantic Community be set in the context of a new global world order*. Furthermore, the American Secretary of State for Defence, Mr. William J. Perry, made an important contribution at the Munich Conference on Security Policy on 5th February 1995, in which he underlined that times have changed, that the basis for NATO has changed and "as we adapt Europe (NATO) for the next century, we must deal with the tough questions and issues raised by our new relationship". But this intervention was founded on a strong belief in the validity of the key grounds of the Atlantic Alliance as the main bedrock of Euro-American co-operation.

43. A much more pessimistic view was expressed by Stephen Cambone, member of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, when he addressed the Political Committee on 8th March 1995. He stressed that both NATO and the European Union are at the moment in turmoil caused by domestic difficulties and procedural problems. Both organisations were also under external pressure. Since NATO and the European Union were different and not complementary, the notion of "pillars" was not appropriate any more. Both sides had to start again in order to define where their common interests lay. Otherwise it would not be possible to allocate the different tasks between NATO and WEU. If the intergovernmental conference on the revision of the Maastricht Treaty did not lead to success the United States could lose hope in a United Europe. Account of the fact should also be taken that substantial economic and trade problems between the United States and Europe had to be settled. Europe should develop a clear and open concept from which the United States should not be excluded. The United States should be regarded as a European power. NATO should continue to play the main role in defence whereas WEU's role should be more political, focusing on creating a system of collective security. On this basis one might begin talking about expansion.

44. Finally, a report by the Transatlantic Policy Network, a group of political leaders and multinational companies, recommends three steps to strengthen links between the United States and Europe:

- The transformation of the present Transatlantic Declaration into an economic and political treaty between the European Union and the United States aimed at creating a 'North Atlantic free trade area' which would cover regulatory co-operation, mutual recognition of product approvals, standardisation and certification, and treatment of foreign investment.
- Reforming NATO around a partnership between the United States and a European defence pillar. Though the authors

suggest further integrating defence and military procurement in Europe, they found 'no firm foundation' for a coherent European approach on security matters.

45. It is obvious that any thoughts in this direction, which has substantial support in several European countries, have reached only a preliminary stage. It will not only be interesting to know how the United States envisages transforming Atlantic relations into a community of real equal partners, but also Canada's position in this context. The Canadians have stressed that they still consider NATO the bedrock of joint transatlantic security in which they are prepared to participate even though their practical contribution has diminished. However, unofficially, fears were expressed that Canada risked being totally marginalised if the United States and a United Europe developed into a community of truly equal partners.

IV. Lessons for WEU

46. It was perhaps typical that one of the last questions put by Mr. Gilman, Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House of Representatives during the meeting with the Political Committee in March 1995 should have been the following: why do we need WEU? This shows that notwithstanding the decision reached at the NATO summit meeting in January 1994 when the United States recognised Western European Union as the nucleus of the emerging European defence identity, the rôle and function of WEU remain largely unknown even among American politicians.

47. It is therefore necessary to repeat again that WEU must do far more to explain its functions to relevant American authorities and also the press. The rôle of WEU in the framework of the future shaping of transatlantic relations should be one of the main items on the agenda of the WEU Council. It is therefore regrettable that, whereas the Noordwijk declaration includes a declaration of intention on this problem, the second part of the fortieth annual report says nothing about future Euro-American relations.

50. Considering that the United States is the only remaining global power, that its borders and security are protected by two oceans and that it is no longer directly threatened by any other opposing superpower, it is difficult to foresee which direction its foreign policy will take. The United States can afford to follow a policy which it considers to be in its interest and consequently also to change its policy in specific matters without taking too much account of other countries, or even its allies. American policy regarding the conflict in former Yugoslavia has for instance changed radically since 1992.

51. Perhaps one of the committee members was right, when he stated during the talks at the Heritage Foundation in Washington, that the United States was the only country still able to follow a "Realpolitik" which would never be totally coherent. But regardless of whether the American presidency is weak or strong, one can count on one permanent and constant factor: the will for leadership is in no way lessened even if it appears in somewhat different forms.

V. Conclusions

48. The Council has various means for strengthening its relationship with the American authorities in Brussels in the framework of its co-operation with NATO and by establishing direct contacts with representatives of the United States.

49. Furthermore, the preparation of a white paper on European security should be taken as an opportunity to include an important chapter on future transatlantic relations and the rôle of WEU in this context. Finally, the new working group on Transatlantic Publicity Activities should be strongly activated and transformed into a high-level political forum to allow an enhanced dialogue with North American politicians in Canada, the United States and in Europe.