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The evolution of NATO and its consequences for WEU

REPORT

submitted on behalf of the Political Committee
by Mr. Baumel, Rapporteur
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1. Adopted in committee by 15 votes to 1 with 0 abstentions.
2. Members of the committee: Mr. Steffen (Chairman); Lord Finsberg, Mr. Roseta (Vice-Chairman); MM. Agnelli, Alegre, Andreotti (Alternate: Gottardo), Benvenuti (Alternate: Caldoro), Bowden, De Hoop Scheffer, Ehrmann, Fabra, Feldmann, Foschi, Goerens, Horns I Ferret, Sir Russell Johnston, Mr. Kasperet, Lord Kirkhill, MM. Kettelmans, Leers, de Lipkowski (Alternate: Baumel), Mülner, Pétraux, Polli (Alternate: Ferrari), de Puig, Reddemann, Rodrigues, Seeuws, Seitlinger, Soell, Vincen, Ward (Alternate: Sir Keith Speed), Wintgens, Zapatero.
N.B. The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.
Draft Recommendation

on the evolution of NATO and its consequences for WEU

The Assembly

(i) Emphasising the importance of the NATO summit meeting reaffirming its attachment to transatlantic links on the basis of a substantial presence of United States forces in Europe and the direct engagement of the North Atlantic allies in the security of Europe;

(ii) Endorsing the partnership for peace programme offered by NATO to the countries taking part in the work of NACC and other interested CSCE countries;

(iii) Noting nevertheless that the Atlantic Alliance has not yet managed to define in a coherent manner the nature of its relations with Russia and the CIS, nor the shape of a security system including the countries of Central Europe that will satisfy the aspirations and appease the concerns of all sides;

(iv) Emphasising consequently the importance of WEU's rôle with a view to helping to maintain stability and security in the East;

(v) Also emphasising the importance of the greater rôle played by WEU in the framework of its co-operation with NATO with regard to peace-keeping and crisis-management missions;

(vi) Strongly welcoming the decision of the heads of state and of government of the Atlantic Alliance to uphold the strengthening of the European pillar of that alliance through WEU and their readiness to make the collective assets of the alliance available to WEU;

(vii) Recalling at the same time that since the entry into force of the Maastricht Treaty WEU has become an integral part of the development of the European Union and is required to work out and implement the decisions of the Union that have defence and security implications;

(viii) Consequently recalling that the Council has to take as a matter of urgency a series of important decisions to make WEU a truly operational organisation and to respond to expectations and the increased responsibilities entrusted to it;

(ix) Convinced nevertheless that the WEU Council now needs special political impetus to overcome its difficulties in reaching the necessary decisions;

(x) Considering that the intention of the ministers to reduce to six months the duration of the Chairmanship-in-Office of WEU in order to facilitate the harmonisation of the presidencies of the European Union and of WEU calls for new measures to ensure the continuity of WEU’s political planning in order to accelerate the process of decision-taking and to ensure a better hearing for WEU’s voice in alliance and European Union bodies;

(xi) Insisting on the need to associate the Assembly to a greater extent in the Council’s thinking before the latter takes decisions or decides not to take them in the absence of the necessary unanimity,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. At its next ministerial meeting, grant simultaneously to all the member countries of the Forum of Consultation an associate status in WEU enabling them to participate to the greatest possible extent in the work of the Council and of its subsidiary bodies without prejudice to the status of associate member accorded to Iceland, Norway and Turkey as members of NATO;

2. Conclude its work on strategic mobility and inform the Assembly of its conclusions;

3. Decide before the end of this year:
   - to establish a European system of space-based observation in accordance with the results of the feasibility study;
   - to move from the feasibility study phase to the conclusion of a contract with European industry for building the European military transport aircraft;
- to create a European air-maritime force reinforced by ground components;
- to agree on the conditions for the use and command of the European corps which is to be placed under the political direction of WEU in conformity with the agreements already concluded with SACEUR;
- to make arrangements for associating with the European corps the other forces answerable to WEU so as to allow a European rapid action force to be created;
- to create a European armaments agency with effective responsibilities and powers in order to achieve true co-operation between member states and their industries on questions of matériel;

4. Increase the means and enlarge the field of action of the Planning Cell by giving it a true rôle of operational co-ordination between WEU and NATO based on overall guidelines, including contingency plans and the planning of joint manoeuvres of forces answerable to WEU;

5. Harmonise with NATO the concept of combined joint task forces (CJTF) with its own concept of forces answerable to WEU (FAWEU);

6. Harmonise its working relationship with the European Union in matters that might have repercussions on its co-operation with NATO;

7. Show greater determination in its relations with the United Nations and the CSCE with a view to possible missions by offering them its operational capabilities in peace-keeping and crisis-management questions;

8. Draw up political guidelines for meetings of chiefs of defence staff and specify forthwith a structure of relations and the sharing of responsibilities between:
   - chiefs of defence staff;
   - military delegates belonging to national delegations;
   - the Planning Cell and
   - the WEU Secretariat-General;

9. Ensure the continuity of its political planning by giving the WEU Secretary-General political powers including:
   - the right of initiative;
   - the right to convene and to chair meetings of the Council of Ministers;
   - primordial responsibility for making WEU's voice heard in alliance and European Union bodies;

10. Ensure in particular the participation of the Secretary-General of WEU in meetings of the common foreign and security policy (CFSP) authorities of the European Union in the same spirit of transparency, complementarity and reciprocity that already exists between WEU and NATO;

11. Ratify the decisions set out in paragraph 3 above and give the political impetus necessary for WEU to take its place as the European defence organisation and as a credible player in its areas of responsibility by convening before the end of the year an extraordinary meeting of heads of state and of government of the member countries.
Explanatory Memorandum
(submitted by Mr. Baumel, Rapporteur)

I. Introduction

1. Considering the results of the NATO summit meeting on 10th and 11th January last, which, as will be recalled, was convened at the initiative of the United States to reaffirm NATO's importance as a political instrument of the United States Government in the eyes of public opinion, it is difficult to discern a coherent concept and a firm direction in which the alliance might be prepared to evolve. Nor is it possible in view of the multiplicity of intentions and programmes referred to in the declaration issued after the meeting of heads of state and of government of the North Atlantic Council in Brussels.

2. It can be clearly deduced, however, that the alliance is pursuing its process of transformation, relegating increasingly to second place the conventional military and political tasks which, since its creation, had allowed it to ensure the security and freedom of Western Europe under the wing of the United States. This long period of time was brought to a close with the end of the East-West confrontation and, starting with the Rome summit meeting, NATO had to work out a new strategy and adapt the allied military posture to the fundamental changes of the international situation in security matters.

3. What is crystal-clear from the very outset is that in Brussels, NATO postponed any decision regarding the possible extension of security guarantees to the East by proposing, in exchange, to the countries of Central Europe which wished to join NATO and also all the countries of Eastern Europe, Russia, Ukraine and the countries of Central Asia, a partnership for peace programme based on individual agreements governing the participation of interested countries in the political and military activities of NATO and particularly peace-keeping operations.

4. Furthermore, NATO has set itself a number of new programmes and tasks, the achievement of which calls for a decisive reinforcement of the role of the European allies. Mention is made in particular of crisis-management and peace-keeping tasks and the introduction of the combined joint task force concept, to be harmonised with the procedure drawn up in WEU regarding the designation by member states of forces answerable to WEU.

5. For the first time in its history, NATO, with the agreement of the United States, confirmed unambiguously its support for the European security and defence identity and stated that it was ready to give WEU increased responsibilities as European pillar of the alliance. In this context, the fact that NATO is "ready to make collective assets of the alliance available ... for WEU operations undertaken by the European allies in pursuit of their common foreign and security policy" is of fundamental importance.

6. Regarding the assessment of new security risks, the summit meeting did nothing about presenting a global and coherent view but preferred to mention a number of problems here and there in its declaration. Thus the heads of state and of government started by noting that "other causes of instability, tension and conflict have emerged", without specifying their origins, background or importance. In another context, they expressed their concern about the situation in the Southern Caucasus and security in the Mediterranean and deplored the continuing conflict in former Yugoslavia. The risks stemming from the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction are mentioned several times and also the threat from acts of terrorism. Finally, NATO confirms the importance it attaches to arms control and disarmament agreements and the extension of the treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, the entry into force of the convention on chemical weapons and the negotiation of a comprehensive test-ban treaty.

7. The multiplicity of the alliance's ambitions must not be allowed, however, to conceal the fundamental absence of an overall concept for a Euro-Atlantic security policy covering Central and Eastern Europe and the Community of Independent States (CIS).

8. Unlike the situation in 1945 when plans were drawn up - mainly by the Americans - for rebuilding Europe and the introduction of a new post-war order, no one was prepared for the major changes of 1989 and subsequent years. Three years after the disbandment of the Soviet Union, the West has still not agreed on a policy to be pursued with regard to Russia, Ukraine and the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, be it in security matters or in assistance to those countries to build up their economic and democratic structures.

9. The new world order advocated by President Bush quickly disappeared into thin air and, as can be seen from the United States' long hesitation about playing an active rôle in the fighting
in Bosnia, the determination to establish American leadership accompanied by commitments in European security matters is less and less visible. The fact that Americans and Europeans finally agreed on the ultimatum against Serbia on 9th February last cannot be considered as a sign that the overall policy of the United States is turning back towards Europe. Furthermore, there is growing evidence of Russia’s return to the international stage - its rôle in the Bosnian affair after NATO’s ultimatum to Serbia is one of the most striking examples but not the only one. This should be even greater encouragement to the United States to deal directly with this new Russia to work out a policy of crisis-management, and to consider questions of global strategy as a matter of primary concern for the two great world powers, thus again linking up with the bilateralism that already existed at the time of the Soviet Union.

10. If there is no longer true American leadership in the Euro-Atlantic framework, Europe must prepare itself to shoulder this task, at least in certain areas, an undertaking which is certainly very ambitious in view of Europe’s loss of credibility after demonstrating its inability to take action in the fighting in former Yugoslavia.

11. If Europe needs new impetus to launch meaningful initiatives in order to take control of its own security and also to define and implement a credible collective security system covering the countries of the East, the NATO summit meeting can provide the basis since it gave Europeans a very clear and very broad mandate.

12. The common foreign and security policy is still being worked out in the framework of the European Union whose structures are not yet operational enough to allow it to take on this rôle. Furthermore, it is not yet finalised and its ability to produce an agreement was seriously called in question during the recent negotiations on the accession of Austria, Finland, Norway and Sweden. Conversely, the only fully operational structure in terms of security policy is the WEU Council. That is the body that will have to handle the definition and implementation of Europe’s security concept which is still awaited. To that end, all its member countries will have to demonstrate the necessary political determination because the tasks are many and there is no time to be lost.

II. Ensuring stability in the East

13. Russia’s return to the international stage is coming at a time when its difficulties in establishing a firm framework for developing lasting democratic institutions are far from having been overcome and it is still struggling in its efforts to convert to a market economy. The fact that Russian leaders feel they are responsible for the security of all the territories of the former Soviet Union and in particular of the 25 million Russians in what Moscow calls its "near abroad", the fact that in the United Nations or the CSCE Russia is claiming priority for peace-keeping action in areas of conflict within the Community of Independent States (CIS), its hesitation to withdraw troops from Estonia, Latvia and Transdnestr and its firm opposition to any extension of NATO towards the East are all matters of great concern to the countries of Central Europe. This attitude is above all a challenge to the West which has still not managed to define in a coherent manner the nature of its relations with Russia and the ways and means for that country to take part in a security architecture which might meet the aspirations and appease the concern of all sides.

14. The alliance’s response to that challenge has been ambiguous: on the one hand, it has affirmed its intention to strengthen security and stability in the whole of Europe and to remain open to other European states by evoking the prospect of enlarging NATO towards the East as an evolving process while avoiding geographical details. On the other hand, it has launched a partnership for peace programme open to the countries of NACC and also other countries of the CSCE. This programme proposes that they take part in the work of the political and military organs of NATO and co-operate with that organisation but in such a manner that most of the obligations are incumbent on the countries invited.

15. This programme must allow NATO to verify transparency in national defence planning and budgeting processes, democratic control of defence forces in the countries concerned and their readiness to contribute to operations under the authority of the United Nations and/or the responsibility of the CSCE.

16. Furthermore, these countries must fund their own participation in partnership activities. In exchange, NATO undertakes to consult with any active participant in the partnership if that partner perceives a direct threat to its territorial integrity, political independence, or security. The latter provision is perhaps the one of greatest interest to the countries invited.

17. The method whereby each state subscribing to the framework document of the programme is to establish with NATO an individual partnership programme allows the formula to be adapted to the various situations of the countries in question without discrimination. While this programme has the advantage of avoiding new divisions in Eastern Europe, its ultimate aims and the limits of its goals compared with those of NACC are still far from clear.
18. Whereas in March twelve countries of the East had already joined the partnership for peace, i.e. the Baltic countries, Hungary, Moldova, Kazakhstan, Poland, Romania and Ukraine, Russia, for its part, has only recently made known its intention of participating in this programme. It would seem, however, that it is not over-enthusiastic about this question and it prefers to continue to count on the development of the activities and responsibilities of NACC and an enlargement of that body which it believes should become totally independent of NATO. Moreover, the Russians feel they were not consulted regarding the preparation of NATO's ultimatum against Serbia which, in their opinion, did nothing to strengthen the credibility of the partnership for peace programme which they considered too technical and not political enough.

19. For WEU, what are the implications of the evolution of NATO's relations with the countries of the East on the basis of the partnership for peace? The enhanced status that the WEU Council is prepared to offer the nine countries of the WEU Forum of Consultation was so far primarily intended to respect a certain parallelism with the evolution of the relations the European Union is establishing with the countries of Central Europe. A consequence of this has already been to limit considerably the number of countries that might benefit from the new status offered by WEU compared with the number of countries invited to take part in the partnership for peace in the framework of NATO.

20. It should also be noted that the WEU Council preceded the Twelve in establishing contacts with Central Europe by inviting nine countries of Central Europe to take part in the Forum, whereas the Twelve concentrated first on six of them, their relations with the Baltic countries not yet having resulted in the conclusion of Europe agreements similar to those signed with the Visegrad group of countries, Bulgaria and Romania.

21. In the meantime, the Twelve have started negotiations with the Baltic countries on free trade agreements which are considered as a means of preparing the ground for subsequently including these countries among those that have concluded Europe agreements. This will allow WEU to include the Baltic countries among those which will benefit from enhanced status on the basis of the Franco-German proposal of 12th November last. This status could be offered simultaneously to the nine countries of the Forum. Any dilatory solution on the pretext that the Baltic countries have not yet reached Europe agreements with the European Union would be dangerous and might convey the wrong message.

22. Regarding the content of the enhanced status that is to be offered to the countries of the Forum of Consultation on 9th May next, one must not forget that there is also a synergy between WEU and NATO and any strengthening of WEU's relations with the countries of the East must automatically be of interest to the alliance and the United States in particular. WEU must therefore hold consultations forthwith on the final aims of its new relations with the countries of the Forum and keep its alliance partners informed.

23. For the time being, it is planned to base WEU's new relations with the countries of the Forum solely on a political document, without juridical implications, which will allow the countries concerned to take part in meetings of the Council without being able to block its decisions, establish links with the Planning Cell, the Institute for Security Studies, the Secretariat-General and the Chairmanship-in-Office, take part in the tasks set out in the Petersberg declaration (humanitarian peace-keeping missions, crisis-management, including operations to restore peace) and to be informed about the activities of working groups with a possibility of being invited to take part, with particular regard to the Council's Working Group. Their participation will therefore be substantial enough for the term status of association to be justified and desirable. That does not prevent procedure being worked out to preserve the associate status of Iceland, Norway and Turkey as members of NATO.

24. There will no doubt be parallelism between certain activities of WEU in the framework of enhanced co-operation with the countries of the Forum, particularly in peace-keeping, and those that NATO will establish with the partnership for peace countries. That is normal if WEU is considered as European pillar of the alliance. However, the aim of the associate status granted to the countries of the Forum in the framework of WEU is to prepare the conditions for the full accession of those countries to the modified Brussels Treaty and the alliance must be as aware of this as the European Union.

25. It is therefore necessary to develop without delay a doctrine to determine to what extent a country that is not a member of NATO can be associated with WEU and whether it can eventually become a full member. The WEU declaration appended to the Maastricht Treaty gives an indication in this respect since it invites Ireland - a member of the Union but not of NATO - to become a full member of WEU (although that country has so far preferred the status of observer), but the case of Ireland cannot be compared automatically with that of countries of Central Europe. A similar problem will arise, moreover, when Austria, Finland and Sweden join the European Union.

26. However WEU must also take a position on the nature of its future relations with Russia, Ukraine and the other CIS countries. Here too it
must take into account its dual function vis-à-vis the Union and NATO. Nothing, moreover, in the latest WEU declaration from Luxembourg or in that issued after the NATO summit meeting gives any indication of the political doctrine to be followed vis-à-vis Russia. It also would appear from a recent speech by the WEU Secretary-General, in which he describes the nature of future relations between WEU and Belarus, Russia and Ukraine, that the essential aim of contacts with these countries will be to inform them of WEU initiatives and that relations will be established on a bilateral basis. These indications are too vague to enable us to define what type of relations or even what sort of partnership could be developed between WEU and these countries. The co-operation that the WEU countries have initiated with Russia on a case-by-case basis, such as the implementation of the Open Skies Treaty for example, could provide the stimulus for a political dialogue between WEU and Russia and other CIS countries.

27. Regarding Russia in particular, the French Defence Minister, Mr. Léotard, put forward some interesting ideas in a speech given at a seminar of the European Movement held in Paris on 3rd March 1994:

“Our ambition for Europe, which is based, in the West, on the original core organisation of European countries, must extend much further eastward. It is also in our interest to make room there for Russia in order to offer it the security framework which would ensure that this major power progresses in the direction we wish to see – namely towards democracy. Once free of the Soviet straight-jacket, Russia’s natural calling in this modern age – the age of communications, information, space and high technologies – must necessarily be to associate itself with the European enterprise. Would it be so unthinkable, if Russia makes good progress down the road to democracy, for the security and defence of the continent of Europe to be organised on the basis of a triangle of forces consisting of the European Union, Russia and North America?”

28. Doubtless these are not the only aspects for consideration in the context of a plan for a partnership between Europe and the CIS countries – a plan which must necessarily envisage among other things a strengthening of stable relations between Russia and Ukraine. And who could be better qualified than the WEU Council to take on the task of developing a coherent policy for Europe in this area?

29. The prospects open to WEU for asserting itself as the European pillar of the alliance in the aftermath of the NATO summit meeting offer it the opportunity of increasing Europe’s weight in the alliance, both in determining the framework for a global strategy and also, as necessary, outside the alliance through direct contacts with the United States. The more Europe can make its voice heard in a credible fashion the more the Americans will be persuaded of their interest in not making fundamental decisions without consulting their European allies and the more Europe will be in a position to exercise a decisive influence on alliance and United States decision-making. It is in this optic that the statement contained in the NATO declaration that “the alliance and the European Union share common strategic interests” should find practical expression.

III. Implementation of a new form of co-operation between WEU and NATO

30. It has been agreed – and this is one of the significant aspects of the declaration following the NATO summit meeting and WEU’s Luxembourg declaration, that the two organisations would from now on consult together in the event of a crisis, as necessary, within the framework of joint meetings of their Permanent Councils. Such joint meetings will certainly be useful in certain situations. However it must be guaranteed that the preparation of WEU ministerial meetings remains the exclusive responsibility of its own Permanent Council, and that the latter is also free to discuss European positions independently in preparing ministerial meetings of the North Atlantic Council.

31. The essential aspect of the new rôle the Council has devolved to WEU concerns its promise to “make the collective assets of the alliance available, on the basis of consultations in the North Atlantic Council, for WEU operations undertaken by the European allies in pursuit of their common foreign and security policy”. The alliance has thus responded to the request formulated by WEU at Luxembourg to be able to use not only the forces and means of the European allies but also the collective assets of the Atlantic Alliance, such as communications systems, means of command and headquarters staffs.

32. Even if the possibility thus created of WEU’s being able to draw on NATO means is not limited to specific operations, it is nevertheless closely linked to the missions for peace-keeping and crisis management on which the efforts of the two organisations are henceforth likely to be concentrated.

33. In this context the alliance has adopted the proposal advanced by the Americans last October
at Trave"m"nde for adopting the combined joint task force concept (CJTF) as a "means to facilitate contingency operations", including operations with participating nations outside the alliance.

34. Although it may be necessary to wait until June 1994, when the NATO Permanent Council will have reported to the ministers, for information on the details of this project, it is nevertheless interesting to note that in a speech delivered at the IHEDN on 21st January 1994, The French Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Alain Juppé, stated:

"In operations where it is clear that the United States for its own reasons does not wish to become heavily involved, this type of task force could not only be made available to Western European Union but also, in such cases, placed under its command rather than under the authority of SACEUR -- and this has been explicitly accepted. The United States has therefore taken an important step forward in agreeing to a modification of the traditional chain of command ..."

35. If this project materialises, these CJTFs could be deployed under WEU command with material support from NATO (for example AWACS). They would function under the orders of the operational commander appointed by WEU under the political authority of the WEU Council. This would constitute a truly revolutionary innovation.

36. Nevertheless the alliance has stated its readiness to loan its means "on the basis of consultations within the North Atlantic Council". The process is therefore not automatic -- which is entirely understandable. However it remains to be seen to what extent NATO and the Americans will agree to waive their right of refusal over a mission decided by Europeans. Moreover decisions have to be taken both as to the composition of the forces making up the CJTFs and who will assign them. Will they include American units and in what proportion?

37. This leads us to the problem of knowing how the alliance concept will fit in with that of "separable but not separate capabilities" and how it can be reconciled with that formulated by the WEU Council at Petersberg, which envisaged the possibility of recourse to "forces answerable to WEU" (FAWEU). Clearly, in the absence of procedure automatically ensuring that the assets of the alliance will be made available to it, WEU must maintain its autonomous military planning capability and develop its own operational capability in order to act independently or at the request of the European Union.²

38. Up to the present the multinational forces under the authority of WEU have consisted of the European corps, the (central) multinational division and the Anglo-Dutch amphibious force. It remains to be determined whether the consent of the whole of the Atlantic Alliance will also be required to enable WEU to use these units -- in other words whether the CJTF and the FAWEU will be integrated concepts. The status of the European corps, whose use by NATO services has been agreed between the relevant chiefs-of-staff but which is to constitute the nucleus of a force placed primarily under WEU command, poses a particular problem.

39. Harmonisation of the concepts of CJTF and FAWEU forces implies that WEU must, from the outset, be fully involved in NATO thinking in order to submit a plan to it that provides, on the one hand, for its making its own operational capabilities available to NATO, while ensuring, on the other hand, that it is possible for it to engage in missions independently or at the request of the European Union.

40. NATO's new rôle in peace-keeping and crisis-management, which is based on a wide interpretation of Article 4 of the Treaty of Washington in order to elicit the necessary consensus in the alliance for "out of area" action, will have important consequences for WEU, which will be called upon to assume the political direction of such operations, and, in this connection, be able to take advantage of the instruments with which it is provided under the modified Brussels Treaty.

41. Strong reinforcement measures will need to be taken by WEU in its political relations with the United Nations and the CSCE, an area where WEU has much ground to recover. However, if the aim is for WEU to become a credible partner in crisis-management and peace-keeping, it will be necessary to accelerate the development of its operational capabilities so as to enable it to fulfil the new tasks assigned to it by the Petersberg declaration. It would be especially desirable to know the broad thinking behind the report that the WEU Chairmanship-in-Office submitted to the ministers in Luxembourg on the general rôle of WEU in peace-keeping and on humanitarian missions.

42. The shortcomings in co-operation between WEU and NATO over management of the conflict on the territory of former Yugoslavia -- despite the success of the joint operation in the Adriatic known as operation Sharp Guard -- and the new situation that has emerged in Bosnia, particularly in Sarajevo, after the expiry of the NATO ultimatum of 21st February, will require a new initiative on the part of WEU. It will be necessary to develop a strategy for the pacification of the country and for securing the implementation of the agreements ultimately reached by the parties.

² See the speech given by Mr. van Eekelen on 27th January 1994.
In military terms this implies burden-sharing between WEU and NATO to guarantee, where necessary, a military presence on the ground of the forces of one or other organisation. In political terms, WEU will need to develop on behalf of the European Union arrangements to guarantee security in the region after the cessation of hostilities.

43. The NATO declaration contains two important paragraphs, one concerning the provision of preventive measures to counter the threat of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery (for example ballistic missiles), the other stressing the importance of achieving progress on the key issues of arms control and disarmament, particularly with regard to the following:

- extension of the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons;
- the entry into force of the convention on chemical weapons and the reinforcement of the biological weapons convention;
- the problem of banning nuclear testing;
- ensuring full compliance with the provisions of the treaty on conventional forces in Europe.

44. The effort to contain proliferation by political and defence means is known to be a priority concern of the European Union and NATO. It is the subject of various proposals, in particular by Mr. Aspin and Mr. Kinkel, while the WEU declaration adopted in Luxembourg on 22nd November last makes no reference to this problem. This silence is the more surprising given first that the WEU Council warmly welcomed the symposium on “An anti-missile defence for Europe” organised by the Assembly in Rome, in March 1993, and second that WEU is in the process of acquiring an independent space-based observation and surveillance system, necessary for organising a defence against the threat of weapons of mass destruction.

45. It is wholly unacceptable for WEU to abdicate from the discussion on the political aspects of proliferation in favour of the European Union and from the “defence” aspects of the issue in favour of NATO. The political dimension of the problem clearly impacts on the defence dimension and there is no fear of duplicating NATO’s work if WEU, as its rôle requires, brings a decisive contribution in the domain of anti-missile protection, taking advantage of progress already achieved and existing European industrial capabilities.

**IV. WEU facing unprecedented challenges**

46. The achievement of the tasks inherent in the dual function of WEU vis-à-vis the Atlantic Alliance and the European Union is proving especially difficult, not simply because WEU is a small organisation, but also because a majority of its senior officials regard it essentially from either a NATO or a European Union perspective, forgetting that it has, by virtue of its founding treaty, special features of its own that qualify it specifically to fulfil its functions. However, for it to be a credible partner it is essential for WEU to have autonomy of action and for its operational capabilities to be developed rapidly and also independently. For this to happen there must first be a political will which must then be expressed through specifically “WEU” initiatives; without this, the organisation will remain in a state of suspense until such time as other organisations such as NATO, the United Nations, the CSCE or the European Union call upon it to act.

47. The importance of WEU’s maintaining and developing a degree of political autonomy in relation to the European Union and of ensuring that it effectively possesses the necessary operational capacities lies in the fact that the organisation is vested (under Article IV of the modified Brussels Treaty) with the responsibility of providing transatlantic links and co-operating with NATO, a position confirmed by the WEU Luxembourg declarations and those following the NATO summit meeting in Brussels reaffirming the political will to develop WEU as the means of reinforcing the European pillar of the alliance and to make the collective assets of the alliance available to it.

48. WEU alone is able to develop the spirit of co-operation and solidarity with NATO by securing its own operational capabilities. This would strengthen the whole alliance, while avoiding rivalry and the political and economic problems that have arisen recently on either side of the Atlantic between the Twelve and the United States affecting transatlantic solidarity in security and defence matters.

49. Title V of the Maastricht Treaty, and specifically Article J.4, paragraphs 4 and 5, tends in an entirely different direction since it lays down conditions and imposes limits to co-operation by its member countries within the framework of the Atlantic Alliance (as in WEU), without giving the slightest indication as to the prospects for co-operation between the Union and the alliance after the so-called “1998 deadline”. The repeal of the modified Brussels Treaty on which the present wording of Title V of the Maastricht Treaty is based would also remove the legal bases on which the European pillar of the alliance rests and its cooperation with the alliance.

50. With a view to preventing such a dangerous development, it is necessary to invite the WEU Council to take the following measures forthwith: determine quickly what its working relations with the European Union are to be – this is the main theme of the report on WEU in the process of European Union, to be submitted by Mr. Ferrari.
WEU must insist, as of now, on the results of its co-operation with the alliance being accepted and its initiatives not being limited or prevented even by the European Union authorities, a situation which is theoretically possible under Article J.4, paragraph 5 of the Maastricht Treaty.

51. Preliminary consultations should be held between WEU and the European Union before the latter requests WEU, in conformity with Article J.4, paragraph 2 of the Treaty of Maastricht, to develop and implement Union decisions with defence implications, if the intention is for WEU to be capable of assisting the Union with its expert knowledge sufficiently quickly and of evaluating the impact of any such request on relations with the Atlantic Alliance.

52. In order to achieve this there must be genuine political planning in WEU such as does not at present exist for various reasons. Neither the Secretary-General, nor his small political section, have the right to take initiatives; it is for the Chairmanship-in-Office, at the behest of the member governments, to take political initiatives, with each member country reserving the right to put forward its own proposals. The work that takes place within the Council's working groups is also dependent on the instructions they receive from the capitals of the member countries. Under such conditions it seems difficult to guarantee the continuity of political will – the more so since the term of the Chairmanship-in-Office has just been reduced to six months in order to bring it into line with that of the European Union presidency. Until now it was possible to count on Franco-German initiatives, or British and Italian, as the case may be, but continuity of political planning is not guaranteed in WEU as it can be in NATO or the European Union. This is a problem that must be tackled, however difficult it may be to find a solution.

53. One of the primary objectives might therefore be to take the decision to strengthen the powers of the Secretary-General by giving him the right to make proposals, to chair the Ministerial Council – as is the case in NATO – and to appoint such staff to his secretariat and acquire such material resources as are necessary to ensure continuity of the political will of WEU as an autonomous organisation.

54. Strengthening the powers of the Secretary-General in this way would also improve the effectiveness of the major organs of WEU – an essential condition for enabling it to fulfil the mandates recently assigned to it – and this should give greater political impetus to the meetings of the Ministerial Council and the Permanent Council. Until now, a great deal of time has invariably elapsed before the Council was able to take concrete decisions. A more flexible procedure must therefore be adopted allowing the Council to be convened whenever there is felt to be a need and not merely twice a year.

55. The defence ministers must play a greater role with a view to accelerating the process of making WEU operational and implementing the tasks assigned to it as a result of the entry into force of the Maastricht Treaty and of the decisions taken at the NATO summit meeting. WEU's decision to convene a meeting of the chiefs of defence staff twice a year prior to the ordinary Ministerial Council meetings, and on an ad hoc basis whenever necessary, is meaningful only if they receive clear political instructions on the objectives of and the programme of work for such meetings.

56. The WEU Luxembourg declaration refers to the "progress achieved by the chiefs of defence staff in developing a WEU exercise policy". However, what are the other objectives of their meetings? In order to guarantee the effectiveness of the military organs recently created in WEU, a definition must quickly be arrived at of the structure of the relationships and division of responsibilities between:

- the chiefs of defence staff;
- the military delegates within the national delegations;
- the Planning Cell;
- the WEU Secretariat-General.

57. The Planning Cell, which should have the staff and the material resources necessary for it to fulfil its tasks – which is not the case at present – is intended to play a real role in co-ordinating operations between WEU and NATO. In particular it must develop with NATO the concept of the formation of the combined joint task forces that will be called upon to carry out operations, possibly with the participation of countries that are not members of the alliance. It should quickly complete its work on the development of forces answerable to WEU (FAWEU), their command, headquarters, logistics, transport and communications systems, their relations with NATO and the procedures for their use in the framework of WEU.

58. It must, in particular, develop operating procedures for the European corps which is to be placed under WEU authority. The Ministers assigned to the Planning Cell the task of developing a plan for setting up European air-maritime forces – is this plan now ready? Also there is an Italian proposal for a multinational land force intended to enhance the operational significance of this initiative – what stage has this now reached?

59. For some time now WEU has been working on a study (initially a Franco-German initiative) intended to enhance strategic mobility. It is unacceptable for such a study to be continued indefinitely without the slightest sign of yielding concrete results in the foreseeable future and without the
Assembly being informed in any way of its aims or progress. In order to advance matters in this context advantage should be taken of the signing in October 1993 of a memorandum of understanding regarding the feasibility study for the European transport aircraft, commissioned from a European industrial consortium (Euroflag). It is essential to move as soon as possible from the study phase to the conclusion of firm contracts.

60. It is a matter of urgency for the Assembly to be informed more closely of the progress of the work of the Western European Armaments Group (WEAG), the transfer of its secretariat from Lisbon to Brussels – which should take place according to the Luxembourg declaration in spring 1994 – the state of advancement of the Euclid research programme, the development of a free market in Europe for defence equipment and, above all, the stage now reached in the studies for a European armaments agency (which is the subject of a report to be tabled by Mr. Borderas on behalf of the Technological and Aerospace Committee). Here too the studies are dragging on and it is time decisions were taken.

61. The initiatives taken by WEU on verification of the CFE Treaty and, to an even greater extent, on implementation of the Open Skies Treaty, for which the WEU countries have formed into a group of states, seem very encouraging, particularly with regard to the project for co-operation with Russia and other CIS countries in this area. What progress has been made here? The WEU Luxembourg declaration offers no answer in this respect.

62. Having established the Torrejón Satellite Centre, officially inaugurated a year ago, the Ministers have announced that they are to consider at their next meeting to be held in May 1994 a progress report on the possibility of implementing a WEU earth observation programme. When will we finally be in a position to take a decision on the creation of WEU’s own space-based surveillance system – a decision which, qualitatively, would be a step of the highest importance, not just in terms of European independence in intelligence matters but for the future of the European space industry?

63. To accelerate the decision-making process on all of these projects, WEU must be truly capable of demonstrating a collective will and determination based on a spirit of European defence, of which it is the concrete expression.

64. However, as Mr. Léotard recently stated: 3

"WEU is still having problems in finding a place between the Atlantic forum and community life. The common European vision of defence matters is slow to take shape. The only missing ingredient is the commitment at the highest political level that alone can give the desired impetus to the wish for a European defence identity. As I understand it, this impetus can come only from the common will of heads of state and of government of the member countries. A WEU summit meeting would serve to demonstrate, both symbolically and in practical terms, the political vitality of this security instrument of the European Union and of the European pillar of the alliance. It would serve also as an illustration of the direct interest of the political authorities in the European countries and confer strong legitimacy on the project the organisation embodies. In all democracies, the heads of state and of government have supreme authority in defence matters and are the leaders of the armed forces".

65. Indeed, this proposal for a WEU summit meeting could give the organisation the necessary weight and political impetus to make progress in achieving the manifold tasks expected of it by both the European Union and the Atlantic Alliance – organisations at times inclined to treat WEU as a secondary authority that might cease to exist in the foreseeable future. However, such a project would require detailed preparation and must be accompanied by a series of concrete proposals whose implementation would be of substantial service to the cause of a European defence organisation.

66. Decisions might concern:

- the creation of European intervention forces developed by a multinational joint services European headquarters, as the French Defence Minister has proposed;
- the creation of a European air-maritime force supported by a multinational ground force, as set out in the Italian proposal;
- priority treatment for projects concerning the pooling of joint intelligence means, equipment and transport units, logistics and, consequently, the release of essential funding to allow WEU:
  (i) to set up a European space-based observation system;
  (ii) to promote a military transport aircraft built by European industry on the basis of the feasibility study;
  (iii) to create a European defence industry and develop standardised interoperable European equipment. This is dependent on a final decision to create a properly structured European armaments agency with real powers and responsibilities.

WEU capabilities, once operational, could be made available to the whole alliance.

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V. Conclusions

67. Rarely in the course of its history has WEU been countenanced to the degree shown in the decision reached by the heads of state and of government of the Atlantic Alliance at the summit meeting in Brussels last January. It was recognised and confirmed in its rôle of European pillar of the alliance and was also granted new responsibilities for which the alliance is prepared to make its collective means available to WEU. If WEU is to rise to the occasion, an extraordinary effort will have to be made to overcome the resulting challenges.

68. If WEU fails to take energetic action here and now to seize the opportunities just offered by the political constellation that led the alliance summit meeting to this result, it may miss a favourable political juncture that may not be encountered again for quite some time. Now is indeed the time for WEU to take its place as the European defence organisation on which one can count as a deciding factor of stability and security and also as a player in the areas of its responsibility.

69. Yet one has to note that the WEU Council, its subsidiary bodies and the Secretariat-General seem to be pursuing all their activities in a routine manner without any true political impetus. Discussions become entangled in innumerable details of minor importance and the necessary decisions cannot be taken or are taken too late. For instance, it does not seem to have been realised that the achievement of important programmes that WEU is certainly studying requires considerable financial backing and, if it is realised, the courage and determination to claim these financial means with all necessary force and persuasion are lacking. The fact is that the WEU authorities are always too concerned about not duplicating the work of other organisations and consider themselves increasingly as merely having to carry out decisions taken elsewhere.

70. The WEU Assembly is prepared to afford political support to any effort that might help WEU to fulfil its increased responsibilities and overcome the obstacles of all kinds — political, structural or financial — which today prevent it from playing the rôle that is expected of it and thus facilitate the necessary decision-taking. To that end, the Council should associate the Assembly to a greater extent in its thinking by providing it with better information on questions of substance. The Council should not underestimate the usefulness and political weight of an Assembly that has already shown several times in the past that it could help in breaking deadlocks. In this context, it would also be in the interest of the Council to demonstrate publicly that after the entry into force of the Maastricht Treaty it continues to count unre­servedly on the importance of the WEU Assembly as the only international assembly with responsibility in security and defence matters. Such a demonstration of confidence on the part of the Council would give the Assembly added weight in its efforts to improve co-operation with the parlia­ments and the foreign affairs and defence commit­tees of the member countries with a view to making them better aware of the common cause that unites the Council and the Assembly.