An operational organisation for WEU: naval and maritime co-operation

REPORT

submitted on behalf of the Defence Committee
by Sir Keith Speed, Rapporteur
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I. Composition of WEU navies
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1. Adopted unanimously by the committee.
2. Members of the committee: Mr. Baumel (Chairman); MM. De Decker, de Puig (Vice-Chairmen); Mr. Alloncle, Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman, MM. Borderas (Alternate: Cucio), Briane, Brito, Cox, De Carolis, Dees, Dumont, Fernandes Marques, Ferrarini, Hardy (Alternate: Thompson), Irner, Jacquat (Alternate: Masserey), Kelchtermans, Leccisi (Alternate: Caccia), Mrs. Lentz-Cornette, MM. van der Linden, Lopez Valdivieso (Alternate: Lopez Henares), Mannino, Marten, Lord Newall, MM. Pecchioli, Pécriaux, Reis Leite (Alternate: Mrs. Aguiar), Scheer, Sir Dudley Smith, Sir Keith Speed, MM. Steiner, Vazquez, Zierer.
N.B. The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.
Draft Recommendation

on an operational organisation for WEU: naval and maritime co-operation

The Assembly,

(i) Convinced of the importance of a WEU capacity to carry out naval and maritime operations, given the fragile nature of international relations in many parts of the world where European interests may be at stake;

(ii) Pleased that, as forecast, the NATO summit meeting on 10th January 1994 confirmed WEU's position as the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance and formally recognised the European defence identity;

(iii) Regretting therefore that the North Atlantic Council should choose now to downgrade the single major NATO commander's post occupied by a European and effectively abolish the Channel Command which, created by the Western Union, antedates NATO;

(iv) Welcoming the willingness of the WEU Council to establish pragmatic arrangements for current naval, maritime and riverine operations;

(v) Recalling previous recommendations of the WEU Assembly to:

- "...create a European standing naval force with organic naval aviation including air defence, airborne early warning, attack, anti-submarine and heliborne assault assets for deployment under single command and unified control to areas outside the NATO theatre where Western Europe's security interests are at stake in emergency or war;" (1988);
- "...give practical expression to the European pillar of defence:
  (a) encourage more multinational units such as the United Kingdom-Netherlands landing force and the Franco-German brigade;
  (b) take specific action to allow at an individual level the exchange of military personnel between countries to enhance their awareness of European co-operation, give them greater opportunity for travel and a more interesting work environment, and serve as a useful recruiting incentive at a time when the demographic levels are making recruiting most difficult;" (1989);
- "...examine for the longer term the idea of creating a WEU naval on-call force for external operations, together with a possible pooling of appropriate national air mobile assets into a European rapid action force;" (1990);
- "Establish in co-operation with the United Nations and especially with the relevant Gulf states, a WEU maritime presence in the Gulf area in accordance with Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty with as many member countries as possible contributing assets at least on an occasional basis, to help maintain peace and stability in the region and support diplomatic efforts directed towards the same ends;" (1991);
- "Design a symbol of specific European identity to represent WEU and urge member countries to use it to distinguish their military forces - ships, aircraft, vehicles and personnel - taking part in WEU operations. Personnel serving in the planning cell should be among the first recipients of such a badge." (1992);
- "Re-examine the respective tasks and rôles of the United States and its European allies in the maintenance of peace and security on the European continent and take the appropriate measures to ensure that under no circumstances will it be possible for a security vacuum to develop for lack of appropriate preparation, co-operation and co-ordination;" (1993),

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Actively encourage member states to maintain and develop naval and maritime assets, co-ordinating national capabilities in line with a defined WEU naval and maritime policy and ensuring compatibility with NATO's naval doctrine wherever possible;
2. Establish a working relationship on maritime matters with the European Commission’s Directorate for Maritime Transport and develop links with appropriate international maritime agencies such as the International Maritime Organisation and the International Hydrographic Organisation as well as with maritime-orientated non-member countries in strategic areas;

3. Consult the North Atlantic Council to review the abolition of the Channel Command so that the European dimension in the new NATO command structure is not neglected – establishing WEU liaison teams with NATO major and major subordinate commanders is a possible initial solution;

4. Consider the expansion of the Channel Committee to include all WEU full and associate members from the Atlantic seaboard and also the establishment of a “Mediterranean Committee” to encompass all Mediterranean full and associate members;

5. Give, via the WEU Chiefs of Defence Staff Committee, the Heads of European Navies forum a formal status and a specific mandate to contribute to the development of a WEU naval and maritime policy in conjunction with the Planning Cell;

6. Staff the Planning Cell with adequate numbers and levels of naval personnel, including marines and representatives of the other maritime services as required to develop forthwith co-operation in the following areas:
   - joint task force planning;
   - command and control for naval operations (including naval intelligence gathering);
   - logistics (including transport by sea);
   - merchant ship construction and specialist requirements for both numbers and types of merchant ship as well as safeguards for recruiting and training appropriate crews;
   - policy for the effective employment of both naval and merchant marine reserves;
   - a coherent naval exercise policy and programme;

7. Give priority to practical aspects of aero-maritime and amphibious co-operation such as the need to co-ordinate the operational availability of at least one carrier amongst appropriate member nations and to maintaining and furthering amphibious capabilities as a component part of a European rapid action force;

8. Encourage the co-ordination of operations, using existing naval assets, especially in the Caribbean and notably with the United States authorities, to combat the drug trafficking which undermines European security;

9. Seek to develop co-operation in the domain of naval procurement – hulls as well as systems – through the Western European Armaments Group and emphasise the naval and maritime dimension of satellite observation when developing WEU’s Torrejón Satellite Centre and the WEU Earth Observation Satellite programme;

10. Create and award, in conjunction with national authorities, a WEU campaign medal to those who participate in operations under the aegis of WEU.
Explanatory Memorandum

(submitted by Sir Keith Speed, Rapporteur)

I. WEU experience of naval and maritime co-operation

1. Those who have been following developments in Western European Union during the last six years will have been struck by the fact that much of the co-operation has been naval- and maritime-based. Even before the "official end" of the cold war the focus of interest was shifting from the balance of forces on the central front which had occupied the attention of the previous generation. With the first WEU modified Brussels Treaty "Article VIII" operations during the Iran-Iraq conflict a new era was born as the European allies began to recognise the possibilities for concerted action beyond traditional areas.

2. An examination of a series of reports emanating from the WEU Assembly’s Defence Committee during the period bears witness to the evolution:

- Naval aviation, Document 1139, 9th May 1988, Rapporteur: Mr. Wilkinson;
- State of European security – intervention forces and reinforcement for the centre and the north, Document 1183, 26th April 1989, Rapporteur: Mr. Speed;
- Consequences of the invasion of Kuwait: operations in the Gulf, Document 1243, 20th October 1990, Rapporteur: Mr. De Hoop Scheffer;
- Consequences of the invasion of Kuwait: continuing operations in the Gulf region, Document 1248, 7th November 1990, Rapporteur: Mr. De Hoop Scheffer;
- Operational arrangements for WEU – the Yugoslav crisis, Document 1294, 27th November 1991, Rapporteur: Mr. De Hoop Scheffer;
- WEU and the situation in former Yugoslavia, Document 1329, 3rd September 1992, Rapporteur: Mr. Marten;
- WEU’s operational organisation and the Yugoslav crisis, Document 1337, 5th November 1992, Rapporteur: Mr. Marten;
- WED’s operational organisation and the Yugoslav conflict, Document 1395, 9th November 1993, Rapporteur: Sir Russell Johnston;

3. The introduction to this last report read:

"In the course of their fact-finding in preparation for the presentation of the report on an operational organisation for WEU – naval co-operation, your Rapporteurs have discovered such ramifications to the subject, with many more fundamental principles at stake than were initially apparent, that they have decided to present the report in two parts rather than seek to postpone discussion to a future session.

Certain aspects of the specific naval operations in the Adriatic require immediate attention and therefore this first part deals with the maritime task in hand. Part Two will deal with the wider issues involved and elaborate further on the structures and links required for the future conduct by WEU of naval operations in general."

The present report is indeed the "Part Two" mentioned above but your Rapporteur has proposed the following title for it which more accurately preconises the content: an operational organisation for WEU: naval and maritime co-operation.
4. The subject is of particular relevance of course at the moment, given operations under way and there has been much outside interest in what WEU is doing. Recently the current situation regarding WEU was admirably outlined in the remarks on “Naval co-operation in WEU” prepared for delivery by the Secretary-General at the Greenwich Forum Twentieth Anniversary Conference at the Royal Naval College Greenwich on 9th February 1994:

“In global geopolitics, the seas and oceans play a decisive rôle given that they cover 71% of the world’s surface. This explains the unique rôle of navies in crisis management, monitoring maritime traffic and the environment, checking the implementation of the United Nations resolutions and even peace-keeping.

Compared with armies and air forces, navies provide those states which have them with a considerable deterrent, attack and retaliation capability, which, in the case of the great powers, may extend to the entire planet if they are able to provide a minimum number of shore-based maintenance and support facilities.

Whereas the end of the cold war may well bring a reduction in sea-based deterrent weapons (nuclear submarines equipped with inter-continental missiles), it is probable that greater attention will be paid to air maritime forces for these offer the most flexible and most effective means of intervention in regional conflicts. This is one of the lessons to be drawn from the Gulf war. Not only has naval warfare become air- and sea-based, but by using aircraft from aircraft carriers, it is possible to penetrate both land and sea areas which, centuries ago, represented almost entirely separate theatres of operation.

That said, for the medium-sized powers and to some extent for the major ones, the cut in military spending has made it impossible to maintain both a modern and effective coastal and ocean-going conventional fleet and the increasingly debatable major prestige programmes. No longer able to equip themselves with the full range of assets befitting a major maritime power, these countries are tending to integrate themselves into western strategic systems under American command in which they are no more than “subcontractors” offering on an ad hoc basis one or other particular key asset which less well-equipped countries do not possess.

This development demonstrates the importance of strengthening European co-opera-

tion on defence. Taken individually, WEU member states no longer have the financial capability to acquire all the necessary assets for deterrence within the European continent or for force projection outside Europe. The urgent need for co-operation – the only way of coping with the steady shrinkage in national defence budgets – is already apparent in the fields of space, strategic air and maritime transport, logistics outside Europe and telecommunications.

There are three areas where WEU is furthering co-operation with an impact on maritime defence and on successful missions already carried out by WEU maritime assets:

- WEU maritime action in two Gulf wars;
- the WEU/NATO operation in the Adriatic (Sharp Guard);
- the WEU maritime operation plan for the use of maritime forces answerable to WEU (codenamed Combined Endeavour).


WEU has particular responsibilities under the modified Brussels Treaty for the defence of its member states’ interests throughout the world.

Article VIII, paragraph 3 of the treaty does not restrict WEU’s competence outside Europe:

“At the request of any of the high contracting parties the Council shall be immediately convened in order to permit them to consult with regard to any situation which may constitute a threat to peace, in whatever area this threat should arise, or a danger to economic stability.”

There is no such thing as a “WEU area” although Article V guarantees a military response in the event of an “armed attack in Europe”; the term “out-of-Europe” is appropriate for WEU, since the term “out-of-area” does not have the same meaning as when it is used in the context of the North Atlantic Treaty.

In 1987, the laying of mines in the Gulf waters as a result of the Iran-Iraq war, led WEU member states to react to the threat it posed to freedom of navigation.

Italy and the Netherlands, followed by Belgium, decided therefore to contribute to strengthening the naval presence that
France and the United Kingdom were already providing in the region by dispatching minesweepers.

Operations ended with a mine-clearance action codenamed Cleansweep, which helped to complete clearance of a 300-mile sea lane from the Strait of Hormuz in 1988. European countries deployed most of the forces assigned to the protection of the sea lanes, a practical illustration of "burden-sharing" that was fully appreciated by the United States. The experience gained from these activities in the Gulf strengthened Europe's potential for concerted action in the future. The undeniable success of the operations in the Gulf heightened Europeans' awareness of their capability for joint action.

Three years later, Iraq's overnight invasion of Kuwait had the effect of throwing new light on the conceptual debate on the organisation of European security and of putting to the test its member states' reaction capability and the organisation's operational potential on the basis of the reactivation and extension of the co-ordination mechanisms approved by the WEU Nine during the first Gulf crisis.

From the outset, the United States showed great interest in co-ordinating naval deployments in the Middle East in co-operation with WEU, the basis for which was the success of the 1987-1988 WEU operations.

Meeting in Paris on 21st August 1990, WEU Ministers decided to co-ordinate their operations in the area with the aim of implementing and enforcing Resolution 661 of the United Nations Security Council, as well as any further measures the Security Council might adopt. Ministers emphasised that co-ordination within WEU should also facilitate co-operation with other countries' forces in the region, including those of the United States.

The crisis was the occasion for offers of mutual support but, in the absence of a WEU staff headquarters, or an experienced planning unit, few practical decisions emerged. WEU's action evolved step by step, and the dénouement of the crisis came too quickly to allow time to explore or put into practice a division of labour that might serve as the foundation for institutionalised multinational co-operation. The requirement for speed in reacting to events - a need highlighted by the Gulf crisis - is, however, a strong argument in favour of appropriate permanent structures.

The Gulf crisis provided a timely incentive for WEU member states to develop joint planning and consider establishing joint capabilities. With the pressure of dwindling defence budgets, a genuine division of labour among Europeans is the only way to combine greater effectiveness and interoperability with the economies of scale and cost made possible by standardisation.

**Sharp Guard**

A second major WEU maritime operation, stemming from a WEU initiative taken in the margins of the 1992 Helsinki CSCE meeting, was launched in July 1992: forces operating under WEU and NATO and working in strict co-ordination, began monitoring the compliance of resolutions of the United Nations Security Council against former Yugoslavia in the Adriatic (Operations Maritime Monitor and Sharp Vigilance). On 22nd November 1992 both operations were amplified in scope to include the enforcement of relevant United Nations resolutions and became operations Maritime Guard and Sharp Fence.

On 8th June 1993, the Councils of WEU and NATO met to approve a combined concept of operations for the implementation of Security Council Resolution 820. This agreement established a unified command under the codename Sharp Guard, over which the WEU and NATO Councils exert joint political control. Their guidelines are translated into military instructions through the appropriate bodies of the two organisations, co-operating within a joint ad hoc headquarters, MILCOM ADRIATIC. The concern for the effectiveness and flexibility of procedures should reassure all those who complained of duplication between the alliance and its European pillar.

The combined operation began on 15th June 1993 with the mission to conduct operations to monitor and enforce compliance with United Nations sanctions in accordance with United Nations Security Council Resolutions (UNSCR) 713, 757, 787 and 820. The overall operational control was delegated to an Italian Admiral, whose mission was to prevent all unauthorised shipping from entering the territorial waters of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro).

At present 12 nations are contributing forces: 19 vessels are participating and up to 12 000 sailors are at sea or on shore in the area.
In practical terms the WEU naval element has been absorbed into the COMNAV-SOUTH process for decision-making, planning, etc., and there can be no quarrel with the result: an efficient, well-conducted embargo operation which to date has dealt with nearly 19,000 merchant marine vessels. Since the United Nations Security Council strengthened the sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro with Resolution 820 in April 1993, no ship has been able to break the embargo.

Special tribute should be paid to the individual efforts of the particular officers concerned with command of operations in the zone, Commander-in-Chief Allied Forces Southern Europe (CINCSOUTH) and Commander-in-Chief Allied Naval Forces Southern Europe (COMNAVSOUTH). Their patient pragmatism in working out command and control arrangements with the assistance of WEU officers is admirable.

Combined Endeavour

Because of their international commitments and interests, WEU member states have maintained their conventional maritime forces at a level at which they are capable of operating in any sea in the world as needed.

Most of the maritime forces of WEU nations are based in Europe and normally operate in the North Atlantic, the Mediterranean, the North Sea and the Baltic Sea. Some nations maintain standing forces in more distant locations including the Indian Ocean, the Pacific Ocean and the Caribbean and/or regularly deploy forces worldwide.

In the light of the evolution of the international situation, the development of the European pillar of the alliance and to be able to deploy maritime forces suited to foreseeable needs, WEU member states have agreed to develop a maritime operation plan for the use of maritime forces answerable to WEU that provides a mechanism for generating and exercising WEU maritime forces on a mission-oriented basis, as stated in the Petersberg declaration.

These countries may reach a common decision, based on the provisions of an appropriate framework, in particular Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty or a United Nations or CSCE mandate, to pool some of their resources under WEU auspices in order to create multinational maritime forces, under the Council's authority, with diversified capabilities enabling them to participate in the execution of new missions such as to:

- carry out humanitarian and rescue missions;
- take part in peace-keeping missions;
- participate on a permanent basis in military crisis management, including peace-making operations, whilst maintaining their contribution to common defence at the appropriate level.

The WEU Planning Cell, which was created on 1st October 1992 and is under the Council's authority, has the task of preparing contingency plans for the employment of forces under WEU auspices, as well as recommendations for command, control and communication arrangements, including standing operating procedures for the headquarters that might be selected. It will also be the Planning Cell's responsibility to keep an updated list of units and combinations of units which might be made available to WEU for specific operations.

The Planning Cell was tasked to examine the possibility of promoting forms of air-maritime co-operation among WEU member countries. The Planning Cell produced an operation plan to fulfil the aerial mandate to promote European maritime cooperation.

Its aim is to organise the initial deployment of maritime forces and to identify maritime force packages for certain given tasks. Furthermore, it can also be used as the starting mechanism for, and the initial phase of, any maritime exercise.

In the spirit of the Petersberg declaration of 19th June 1992, the objectives of the Combined Endeavour Plan are to:

- evaluate predominantly maritime forces answerable to WEU which the organisation is capable of constituting in response to any mission it is assigned by the Council;
- specify information procedures whereby the WEU Planning Cell can monitor the ability of WEU member states' armed forces to meet these needs;
- specify where necessary the activation procedures and conditions for the use of these forces.

The following maritime roles derived from the mission areas described in the Petersberg declaration are being studied for WEU maritime forces:
(a) **Humanitarian assistance and disaster relief**: this rôle includes missions conducted to relieve human suffering, including relief operations in response to natural and manmade disasters, search and rescue, and assistance in the management of refugees.

(b) **Conflict-prevention**: which includes different maritime activities, in particular under Chapter VI of the United Nations Charter, ranging from diplomatic initiatives to preventive deployment of maritime units intended to prevent disputes from escalating into armed conflicts or from spreading.

(c) **Peace-making**: consists of diplomatic actions conducted after the outbreak of conflict with the aim of establishing a peaceful settlement. They can include such actions as diplomatic isolation and sanctions, which could be supported by WEU maritime forces.

(d) **Peace-keeping**: narrowly defined, is the containment, moderation and/or termination of hostilities between or within states, using international and impartial military forces and civilians to complement the political process of conflict resolution and to restore and maintain peace. WEU maritime forces may be included within the military forces encompassed in this rôle.

(e) **Peace-enforcement**: consists of action under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter using military means including maritime forces to restore peace in an area of conflict. It is in tasks under this rôle that WEU maritime forces will require war fighting and limited power projection capabilities.

(f) **Peace-building**: is post conflict action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify a political settlement in order to avoid a return to conflict. Maritime forces have various capabilities to support this rôle.

Since WEU has no standing or on-call forces, the format of forces will be tailored to the needs of the current situation, and contributions by member states will be on a voluntary basis. The WEU Council will retain political control over all WEU operations.

5. The Secretary-General concludes:

“This is only a beginning and a fairly limited one. However the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty is a new step in the evolution of WEU and the implementation of its work programme as stated by the Defence and Foreign Affairs Ministers of its member countries at Petersberg in June 1992. WEU offers the European Union a wide range of co-operative activities in the field of defence as well as a real operational potential. What comes next will largely depend on the political will of the European Union countries. Shortcomings only demonstrate one thing: the need to shorten the deadlines as much as possible in order to accelerate the rate at which a European defence is constructed. That need is particularly obvious and imperative in the field of maritime security, i.e. the protection of our shores and sea routes, all vital for the prosperity and survival of European societies.”

6. While agreeing with the Secretary-General in principle, your Rapporteur would argue that the WEU Council is taking too narrow a view of its responsibilities at present. Over the years WEU’s attributes have gradually been amputated – given away to other instances such as the Council of Europe or the then EEC. This may have been done from the best of motives but we have now reached the stage when it would appear that the Council is abandoning the concept of “security” which is going to European Union (and implicitly to the European Parliament) and is holding on (somewhat tenuously some would say) only to its “defence” remit under the modified Brussels Treaty.

7. However, “security” and “defence” are inextricably linked - increasingly so, in fact, as our continent moves from the “black and white” relationship of the cold war era to the “greyness” of the risks and dangers we are now experiencing.

8. National “defence” policies and programmes are intended to support what might be described as national “security” policies although the latter is usually a rather nebulous concept – does a nation’s foreign policy encompass its security policy, or vice versa?

9. In a recent article published in the International Institute for Strategic Studies publication “Survival”, Sherard Cowper-Coles addresses the problem in the following terms:

“Security is itself an elastic notion, whose meaning has been stretched in recent years to extend far beyond military security against aggression to include freedom from economic and environmental threats to the
state. Security often comes to denote little more than its root meaning of "freedom from care" or generalised stability and well-being. Used in that broad sense, in which the distinction between overseas and security policy is all but invisible, the word is hardly a helpful tool for defence policymakers.

The term "security policy" is also misleading. It implies a coherent subset of foreign policy, within which nestles defence policy, as one Russian doll within another. In fact, all overseas policies and programmes share the objectives of promoting the security and prosperity of the United Kingdom and the stability of the international system to which it belongs. States maintain standing forces for the ultimate purpose of defending the state against external attack or internal subversion. But, in the absence of such immediate or obvious threats, armed forces are again what they always were: an important, perhaps the most important, subset of the larger set of tools which states use to protect and promote their interests overseas. Many of those interests are only remotely related to war-fighting: promoting defence sales, countering drug-smuggling, conducting humanitarian operations, or goodwill exchanges of all kinds intended primarily to extend national influence."

10. The arguments above cover the whole range of traditional forces – armies, navies and air forces – but increasingly also the para-military forces such as the gendarmerie and even (with reference to WEU operations on the Danube, for example) the customs and police services.

11. WEU is already in the business of planning and carrying out operations which involve such varied agencies as those mentioned above. It is obvious therefore that professionals in these various fields should be appointed to augment the Planning Cell in Brussels when required.

12. It is also obvious that WEU's present and future rôle includes a major maritime dimension and that Europe's security continues to depend to a large extent on Europe's maritime capabilities. Hence your Rapporteur's intention to highlight a number of different facets of the subject in the present report.

II. General aspects of European naval and maritime co-operation

13. Co-operation between naval forces, consisting of ships, submarines and amphibious forces, and other maritime forces such as shore-based maritime air, has been very widespread in Western Europe for the last 50 years.

14. Provided there is political agreement, it is a straightforward matter for co-operation to be arranged between naval forces in peacetime and for low-intensity operations. At the very simplest level all users of the high seas expect to co-operate in such matters as search and rescue and other emergencies when the only requirement for co-operation to be established is some internationally-accepted means of communication, of which there are several. The passage exercise (Passex), in which forces of different navies meet for mutual training when their programmes take them through the same area, is a regular feature of most naval deployments. Indeed European navies have met for passage training since the earliest days of the Western Union in the late 1940s and early 1950s. To exercise together, naval forces need a common communications plan and some mutually understood procedures both of which can be as simple or as complicated as the exercise programme demands. •

15. Western European navies almost invariably use NATO procedures which have continuously been developed and refined to be available for any situation. This vast body of doctrine is also frequently used outside the Washington Treaty area. The United Kingdom, for example, has specific exercise agreements with some non-NATO nations, which involve the use of NATO procedures. With Australia and New Zealand, the United Kingdom, United States and Canada have a combined exercise agreement, and with Malaysia, Singapore, Australia and New Zealand the United Kingdom has a five-power defence arrangement which is heavily influenced by the NATO way of doing business. France also has a spread of bilateral agreements worldwide and often uses standard NATO operating procedures.

16. Just as it is easy for navies to meet for ad hoc exercises, it is a fairly simple matter for naval forces to co-operate at short notice for low-level military operations. Naval forces are inherently highly mobile, possess organic tactical logistics and the command and control of naval forces is flexible. On this last point it is a feature of all naval operations that units will change controlling authorities several times during an operation and the force packages for particular tasks are in a constant state of movement.

17. It is not surprising, therefore, that the first military initiatives of the revitalised Western European Union involved co-operation between naval forces, first during the Iran-Iraq war and subsequently during the Gulf conflict as already mentioned. It also explains the ease and speed with which WEU managed to field a force for embargo operations in the Adriatic. A political decision was soon followed by forces in theatre without the need for the very detailed planning process required for the mounting, deployment and support of a ground operation.
18. It follows that naval forces can be used in an exemplary or experimental way in establishing or building military co-operation, especially during peacetime and for low-intensity operations. For high-intensity operations it is as important for multinational maritime forces as for land-air forces that formations contain a properly balanced range of integrated capabilities, that they are fully worked up and exercised and that they are controlled by practised staffs. The NATO experience has been that the major maritime formations designed for high-intensity warfare such as the Atlantic Striking Fleet and Mediterranean Striking Force South have been predominantly United States formations to which other nations have contributed units and subordinate formations. The staffs for these multiple carrier battle forces have been United States national staffs augmented by personnel from other contributing NATO nations. While the new NATO reaction force concept recently adopted is designed to allow multinational maritime forces to be assembled at short notice to meet a complete range of contingencies, for high-intensity combat these forces will still need to have as their core fully-integrated and worked up balanced battlegroups predominantly drawn from a single nation and augmented by units and subordinate formations from other nations. Similarly, the command and staffs of these major formations are likely to be created by the augmentation of national staffs.

19. During the recent Gulf operation a very large number of nations contributed maritime forces and many were under a WEU “flag”. Nonetheless very few nations actually participated in the forward battle area where it was necessary for maritime forces to be fully integrated. Only those nations equipped for and practised at full integration with United States naval forces were able to contribute where there was a requirement to carry out high-intensity tasks such as sea control and power projection.

20. European naval forces have an important part to play in the range of tasks envisaged in the Petersberg declaration, as outlined in the Secretary-General’s article for the Greenwich Forum meeting. Naval forces would be major contributors to humanitarian tasks, to operations in support of the peace process, and to crisis management generally. The ease with which multinational naval forces can be assembled, deployed and controlled makes them particularly useful in the early stages of crisis management and in any operation where the sea provides an avenue for access, naval forces will have a crucial role. The vast majority of European naval forces are assigned in principle to NATO and these forces would be available to WEU. In addition, the United Kingdom has declared that one of the four star national joint headquarters, at Northwood, is also available for augmentation as a WEU afloat headquarters.

21. As the Petersberg declaration makes clear, it is not WEU policy to create new permanent force structures separate from those of NATO. However a number of European nations participate in permanent bi- or multi-national European forces which are presently assigned to NATO but could be made available to WEU. The United Kingdom and the Netherlands have for many years operated a fully-integrated combined amphibious force which has at its core a brigade of British and Dutch marines. This force took part most successfully in Operation Haven, protecting the Kurds in Northern Iraq. All WEU member states are currently in the process of declaring naval forces which will be available to WEU. The WEU Planning Cell, in consultation with all WEU member states, has prepared a naval contingency force generation plan (Combined Endeavour as mentioned above) together with proposals for exercises.

22. The naval force generation plan is a useful first step and in principle should provide a basis for the smooth generation of WEU maritime forces from those declared by nations as available to WEU for the tasks envisaged under the Petersberg declaration. The plan should however be developed and make use of NATO doctrine and procedures wherever these are relevant and useful. Where WEU has specific requirements that differ from NATO, particularly in command and control of forces, the plan will probably need to develop special arrangements. The Planning Cell should also draw up specific mission-oriented plans for naval contingencies such as embargo operations or disengagement of forces. Some such plans already exist for current Adriatic operations but largely only on a national and unco-ordinated basis.

23. An important aspect of European maritime co-operation is in training and exercising. A WEU exercise policy is currently being developed and is examined in a parallel report for the Assembly’s Defence Committee, “The WEU Planning Cell — reply to the thirty-ninth annual report of the Council” (Rapporteur: Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman). Several European navies, notably Germany, the Netherlands and Portugal, use the United Kingdom’s operational sea training facility. Other navies, notably Italy and Spain, use the French Fleet Training Centre in Toulon. The Belgian Navy hosts the Mine Warfare School at Ostend where all WEU navies are welcomed and where many joint tactics and procedures are developed. Similarly, several European navies take part in the United Kingdom Royal Navy/Royal Air Force
French and British navies have a long history of expeditionary operations and this experience is particularly useful in the present strategic environment. Experience of the requirements of large-scale and high-intensity maritime operations is of course the capacity which in the last resort underpins all effective crisis management and gives credibility to the diplomatic use of naval force. Hence the theme of the next chapter.

III. A specific nucleus for European naval co-operation

28. The two most complete navies in Europe belong to France and the United Kingdom and it is these two navies which therefore form a nucleus for European co-operation for the future. Both France and the United Kingdom possess the three core capabilities which together provide an attractive option for crisis response and risk management: amphibious ships, carriers and nuclear attack submarines.

The three core capabilities

29. A naval force’s political attraction is the range of policy options it affords: it is a highly effective means of achieving the government’s aims in the face of resistance. It is a versatile and politically flexible tool which is particularly effective at the outset of an operation and throughout its duration.

30. A naval force can throw a long maritime punch, first by deploying as a symbol of resolve, then by controlling the sea, and finally by intervening and supporting a land battle. But to achieve this, the naval force must be able to project leverage or power.

31. In this context amphibious ships have never been more relevant to the strategic and operational environment. They offer a combination of strategic reach, logistic independence and operational mobility. Amphibious forces can sail early, and with orchestrated publicity, to demonstrate will and capability; or they can be despatched without demonstration if political understatement is required. They may take passage through international waters without infringement of territorial boundaries. They could poise at sea, raid or land on a potentially hostile coast at a time and place of the commander’s choice and independent of shore infrastructure. Ashore, they can conduct independent operations or create the preconditions for the landing or withdrawal of heavier forces.

32. In 1993 the United Kingdom decided to contract for the design and construction of an assault carrier (in technical terms a landing platform helicopter – LPH). Such an LPH will be able to play a key rôle in future amphibious operations. It will be capable of putting ashore up to
800 marines in a single assault wave and, together with assault ships and landing ships logistic (LSLs), it will provide the British Royal Marines with the specialised shipping necessary to fulfil their role well into the next century. Complementary developments in the Netherlands will also ensure a continuing role for the United Kingdom/Netherlands landing force. As it happens, the first major amphibious exercise to be conducted by the United Kingdom Royal Marines for seven years culminated in an assault on the island of Lewis in Scotland's Outer Hebrides in February 1994. Elements of 3 Commando Brigade, including 45 Commando Group and supporting artillery and combat engineers, were joined by 1 Battalion Royal Netherlands Marine Corps and a company from the French Army's Force d’Action Rapide. For the first time four Griffon light air cushion vehicles were used to carry commandos ashore. Much experimentation has been carried out with hovercraft over the years but only now are they becoming fully operational. The Assembly's Defence Committee visited the USS Tortuga, a landing ship dock which carries such craft, in July 1993 in Norfolk, Virginia.

33. Aircraft carriers are the second of the three core capabilities. They can provide a whole range of capabilities ranging from command and control to direct support of operations ashore, to anti-surface and submarine warfare and air defence for an amphibious group, or on the sea lines of communication to an intervention area. Some believe that this could be done perfectly well by shore-based aircraft, but experience teaches differently: in three of the four high-intensity conflicts since 1945 (Korea, Suez and the Falklands) the vast majority of all air support was carrier-based. The deployment and sustaining of aircraft in a theatre of operations, independent of host nation support, offers a considerable range of options to government and is an excellent example of significant intervention capability.

34. Last of the three core capabilities: nuclear attack submarines — SSNs. Capable of sustained high speed — they can cover 600 nautical miles per day with no need to refuel — they may be the first on the scene, where they are then available for insertion of special forces, for example, early denial of sea control or to procure critical intelligence. They could also remain at sea, operating overtly or covertly and independently of outside support, for up to 90 days.

35. The United States Navy’s SSNs have the capability to launch cruise missiles: this was demonstrated to devastating effect during the Gulf conflict, and in the two subsequent raids against Iraq. Cruise missiles, 90% of which were fired from sea during the Gulf conflict, formed the first waves of attack at the outbreak of hostilities: they combined a surgical degree of accuracy with none of the risk of aircrew losses which is associated with fixed wing operations. Possible procurement of submarine-launched cruise missiles has been studied by both France and the United Kingdom.

36. In the spring of 1979 a window of opportunity existed for a short period when the United Kingdom and France might have decided to develop a submarine-launched ballistic missile together but then Britain was given the opportunity again of buying “off the American shell” and the occasion passed by.

37. Today with both countries engaged on divergent paths in terms of technology there is little chance of a common ballistic missile procurement programme in the foreseeable future.

38. However, there is still room for some “common sense” co-operation: what is sometimes known as “water management”. Through co-ordination of maintenance cycles, “time alongside”, etc., both countries could ensure that their SSBN assets are employed to best advantage without any encroachment on the hitherto taboo subject of targeting and all the implications. A parallel report from the Defence Committee — the rôle and future of nuclear weapons (Rapporteur: Mr. De Decker) — will be presented to the Assembly at the next plenary session.

39. A maritime task force is ideally structured and equipped for joint operations. Almost any operation today is of a joint nature, and units which are able to contribute to the air, land and sea battle will have obvious merits. An amphibious force has a clear joint capability, since it is designed to achieve local sea control, establish a bridgehead in order to create the conditions for the landing of heavier forces and then provide air support for friendly forces ashore. This capability is at the heart of the combined joint task force concept announced at the January 1994 NATO summit and which is currently being elaborated by NATO and WEU.

40. In addition to the three core capabilities, some of which are shared by other European navies (notably Italy and Spain with the Garibaldi and Principe des Asturias carriers and the Netherlands with amphibious assets as mentioned above), the destroyers and frigates, mine-countermeasure vessels and afloat support ships also play key rôles. Destroyers and frigates are essential assets in any maritime conflict and are crucial to the sea denial task upon which all reinforcement and amphibious operations depend. The Gulf conflict demonstrated the critical importance of a highly capable mine counter-measures force, and replenishment and logistic ships are obviously indispensable as both the Falklands and the Gulf conflicts demonstrated. Increasingly for the types of operation WEU may have to carry out in
the future, an adequate European Merchant Marine is a vital asset – an important aspect which is addressed in Chapter V.

IV. WEU navies and the United Nations

41. In the wake of the end of East-West confrontation the international community is again looking to an expanded rôle for the United Nations in maintaining international peace and security and ameliorating human suffering. More United Nations peace-keeping operations have been authorised since 1988 than in the previous 40 years, and the number of active United Nations operations has more than doubled since January 1991. Moreover, the size and complexity of the operations have increased, and the scope of United Nations missions has expanded greatly. Recent events in former Yugoslavia and Somalia suggest that more – and more complex – operations are on the way. In short, the prominent global security rôle that the founders imagined for the United Nations is about to be tested.

42. Little international attention has been devoted to United Nations naval co-operation issues. Most of the current proposals, in fact, fail to consider naval forces, except perhaps in connection with the need for sealift. Yet most of the United Nations operations recently authorised have naval components of some kind. Further, the areas where expansion of United Nations involvement is possible, such as international enforcement of United Nations agreements, are particularly suited for a maritime context.

Status of United Nations military co-operation

43. Anticipating a resurgent rôle of the United Nations, the first United Nations Security Council Heads of State and Government summit in January 1992 asked the Secretary-General to report on ways of “strengthening and making more efficient the capacity of the United Nations for preventive diplomacy, peace-making and peace-keeping”. In his “An Agenda for Peace” submitted to the Security Council in June 1992, the Secretary-General called for activation and strengthening of the provisions of the United Nations Charter to maintain or restore international peace and security. In particular, he called for preventive diplomacy to avoid the breakdown of peaceful conditions, mutually reinforcing efforts at peace-keeping and peace-making when conflict breaks out, and post-conflict peace-building to prevent a recurrence of conflict by attacking its causes.

United Nations naval missions and supporting tasks

44. Only a handful of United Nations naval operations have taken place. As a result, most formal and informal discussions of prospective United Nations military action avoid consideration of naval missions, or missions performed by naval forces. United Nations naval mission areas and their supporting tasks could include: provide humanitarian assistance, intervene for humanitarian purposes, interdict sea and air traffic, conduct maritime peace-keeping, respond to aggression, control armaments/conduct demilitarisation, enforce maritime agreements, make a show of force, and protect sea and air traffic. The last three offer new areas for multinational naval co-operation in a United Nations context, whereas some United Nations precedent exists for the other missions.

45. Removal of political constraints and the experience of the Gulf war have added greater elasticity to plausible United Nations naval rôles, though the arrangements for military effectiveness have not kept pace. The missions discussed above fall into all four areas for United Nations action identified in the Secretary-General’s “An Agenda for Peace”, though the focus is on those mission areas that involve some element of peace-keeping. The level of military force involved can range from zero (as in humanitarian assistance) to moderate (as in humanitarian intervention) to quite considerable (as in responding to aggression). Further, many prospective United Nations naval mission areas are not likely to be conducted with full local consent. Thus, they may require greater levels of force and entail possibly greater levels of risk to the forces than the majority of United Nations-sponsored operations in the past (excepting Korea, the Congo and the Gulf war).

Organising options and analysis

46. Possible options for organising multinational naval co-operation in the United Nations context are plentiful. Four different options exist:

- United Nations authorisation, as in the Gulf war;
- United Nations designation, as in the Korean war;
- United Nations direction of on-call national forces (as called for in the United Nations Charter and proposed by the Military Staff Committee in 1947) or peace-keeping units; and
- for United Nations standing forces, as articulated in a 1918 proposal for a League of Nations Navy.

47. These problems have been examined in two recent reports of the Assembly: United Nations operations – interaction with WEU, Document 1366, 19th May 1993, Rapporteur: Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman; Political relations between the United Nations and their consequences for the development of WEU, Document 1389, 8th November 1993, Rapporteur: Mr. Soell.
48. The naval aspects have been addressed in three recent studies which have all taken account of WEU's position:

- "Multinational maritime forces: a break-out from traditional peace-keeping?". Michael C. Pugh (Southampton Papers in International Policy – Mountbatten Centre for International Studies, University of Southampton);
- "Blue Hulls: Multinational naval co-operation and the United Nations". Jeffrey I. Sands (Center for Naval Analyses, Alexandria, Virginia);
- "The employment of maritime forces in support of United Nations resolutions" (Center for Naval Warfare Studies, Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island).

49. Suffice it to say that WEU has been in the van in implementing a whole range of operations which have been carried out more or less under United Nations auspices. Certain grey areas would need quite considerable clarification if they were to become the norm but the main lesson drawn has been the willingness not only of the WEU nations to become involved in such operations over past years but also for other countries, non-member nations, to seek to associate themselves with WEU activity either in the Gulf or in the Adriatic.

50. Of course much of the good co-operation has resulted from a common usage of standard NATO procedures, although not where all countries are concerned. In addition, NATO itself has had to evolve quickly, especially, for example, in the realm of logistics.

51. For example, NATO and WEU naval forces enforcing the United Nations blockade against Serbia are now being sustained by a new joint logistics system. A forward logistic site (FLS) was set up at the Italian Naval Air Station, Grottaglie, in December 1993 to streamline logistic support for ships of the twelve allied navies participating in Operation Sharp Guard in the Adriatic Sea off the coast of former Yugoslavia.

52. Previously, logistic support for military units taking part in NATO operations or exercises had been a national responsibility. The almost permanent nature of the blockade in the Adriatic forced NATO and the participating countries to look at ways to streamline logistic support for the mission.

53. The FLS co-ordinates all essential operational logistic requirements for Sharp Guard ships; arranges the delivery of mail, cargo and personnel to and from all ships taking part in the operation, and arranges for maintenance support at local harbours and medical evacuation of afloat personnel.

54. The FLS concept ensures the most efficient use of scarce helicopter assets. Each nation with a ship at sea would have to send its own helicopter ashore to collect or deliver priority items or personnel. With FLS co-ordination, either a shore-based helicopter or one of the helicopters from any of the afloat ships can collect and deliver to any of the ships in the joint NATO/WEU task force. This ensures that the ships are not deprived of one of their essential operational assets for long periods of time on logistic tasks.

55. This type of development is obviously very useful to all concerned and has a direct influence on United Nations capabilities. Again WEU must establish a working relationship with the appropriate United Nations authorities and ensure an efficient liaison.

V. Maritime transport and European security

56. For some years Europe has been going through a difficult period in terms of its economy and trade. The world recession is having a more devastating effect in Europe than in other parts of the world. Europe is working hard to address the challenges of today and tomorrow. The European Union is clearly trying to find an appropriate answer from within, by completing its internal market as well as, in its relations with the rest of the world, by making sure that it does not become a Fortress Europe.

57. The first answer of the twelve member states of the European Union to the structural problems characterising the European economies since the eighties has been the creation of the internal market which came formally into force on 1st January 1993. With the ratification and the entering into force of the Treaty of Maastricht on 1st November 1993, a further crucial milestone was reached on the way to European integration. On 1st January 1994, the European Economic Area, which creates close economic links between the European Union and six other West European countries, became reality. The economic potential of this production and consumer market of almost 380 million people should certainly not be underestimated.

58. In the last two decades the global economic and trade pattern has undergone drastic modification. Most striking is the economic development of the Far East; some even speak about the Asian miracle. Traditional long-standing economic and trade structures have to be adapted to these changes in order to make sure that nations can remain active in world trade.

59. As far as the external face of the European Union is concerned, Brussels played a decisive rôle in the successful conclusion of the Uruguay round. This will without any doubt lead to a revi-
val of foreign trade. Europe is not closing its eyes to economic integration processes taking place in other parts of the world. Traditional trade patterns will be influenced by the successful implementation of the NAFTA Agreement between the United States, Canada and Mexico, as well as by the concept of closer economic ties in the Pacific region with the creation of APEC (Asian Pacific Economic Co-operation) in which, at present, eleven countries of the region participate.

60. All these global developments and changes in world trade patterns will have direct or indirect effects on maritime transport. It is clear, for example, that maritime transport within as well as to and from the Far East in the largest sense of the word will grow progressively over the years and decades to come. The global view is important for a clear understanding of the maritime transport policy of the European Union. The added implication is that where Europe's merchant ships are present, Europe may have to deploy its warships to protect them.

Rôle of maritime transport in the European Union

61. Maritime transport has historically been of great economic, social, strategic and political importance for Europe. At present more than 90% of the Community's total external trade is carried out by maritime transport; less than 10% by all other modes of transport together. Of the total trade volume between the twelve member states of the European Union, almost 35% is taken by coastal or short sea shipping (SS). These figures explain why the shipping industry of the Community has invested a total of 60 BECU (bil­lion ECU) in mobile assets.

62. Notwithstanding these figures, European shipping is going through difficult times. The percentage of the world's merchant fleet sailing under the flag of an EC member state has fallen from 45% in 1960 to 30% in 1980 and has since then further decreased to 13% at present. Flagging out is not just a problem for the European Union. Recent statistics show that no less than 45% of the world merchant fleet has flagged out. The fleet of the European Union, however, has been affected more than others as almost 55% of the total EC fleet is estimated to have flagged out and the curve is still rising rather than falling. One might say that it is not so much the flag that counts but much more the ownership of a vessel. A correct assumption, but here too one has to face the fact that the proportion of vessels owned or effectively controlled by EC companies has fallen from 36% in 1980 to less than 25% at present. A logical consequence of all this is that employment for European seafarers has decreased too. In 1992 there were in total some 135 000 seafarers which is almost 60% less than in 1980.

63. The main reason for this decline is to a large extent to be found in the unfair or unequal competition our shipowners face from ships sailing under cheap flags or open registers and, not least, from substandard ships where internationally agreed safety standards are not so strictly applied. Where European shipping is strong and is strengthening its efforts further, is in the quality of the vessels and services offered.

The importance of the shipping industry

64. Despite the recession in the West and the convulsive events in Eastern and Central Europe, world trade has burgeoned and will go on burgeoning, particularly in the context of the recent GATT agreement.

65. As in the past, shipping will always be an international operation requiring international rules to direct its operations and requiring responsible flag and port state enforcement to protect the marine environment, to ensure increasing standards of safety and to safeguard civilised crewing conditions.

66. Merchant shipping is a significant European Union asset and critical in terms of the Union's overall transport policy. As a major international activity, Europe, in the largest trading block in the world, will ignore or fail to nourish this industry at its peril.

67. Dependence on others to transport Europeans and their cargoes would be an extremely dangerous situation for the 340 million people of the Union. A fleet is needed to serve those people. Europe needs to have a voice in international shipping affairs, to exemplify high standards of seafaring and safety and to show respect for the maritime environment. Not least Europe needs an effective merchant fleet to sustain its defence strategy as it is developed.

European shipping policy

68. Over the last decade the overriding purpose of the European Commission's shipping policy has been "to maintain and develop an efficient and competitive shipping industry and to secure competitive sea transport services in the interests of community trade".

69. There has been a dramatic decline of the European fleet since 1980. The causes of that decline have been attributed to lower taxation, lower social security and lower wage costs which, together with a rather more permissive attitude about international regulations, have been the prime attractions of flagging out. There has been a serious reduction in employment of European Union seafarers and a general ageing of the fleet. The situation confronting virtually all European merchant fleets is urgent.
70. One of the issues which has bedeviled European shipping has been the increasingly geriatric nature of the fleets of the member states. Replacement is critical yet shipyard capacity is inadequate in order to cope with the problem.

71. This problem in turn is compounded by the inadequate numbers of European trained crews, since inadequate training stands in direct proportion to the use of more dubious registries by shipowners, where the emphasis lies in employing the cheapest crews with scant regard for safety, training or the maritime environment. It seems that only when a disaster occurs that, for a relatively brief period, anxieties are raised, enquiries undertaken and promises of action given fairly freely, with the inevitably slow follow-up.

72. What is particularly welcome about the approach of the European Commission has been its attempts to frame a strategy to stem the decline of the Union’s maritime industries, as well as sharpening their competitive edge. What is further required now is an awareness of the defence and security aspects of European shipping.

The interdependence of the maritime industries

73. For far too long too many of the member states have allowed the various maritime industries to be dealt with in a somewhat insular way, failing or refusing to recognise their interdependence. The various industries have adopted their own individual defensive positions, often thereby hampering decisive action which could have been utilised to hone their international competitiveness. In turn this would have been of greater value to the wider economy.

74. It must be evident that a growing European Union fleet would provide a more viable internal market for shipbuilding and repair yards as well as for suppliers of essential components. This is especially true of naval construction as well as in the civilian sector.

75. Seldom has a country developed its maritime industries without relying on its national shipping sector as its main customer. Equally, European shipping needs to draw on a wide range of highly-skilled financial, insurance, legal and brokerage services and, working together, all these should constitute an asset with critical advantages for other land-based and port activities.

76. Indifference – even hostility – towards the notion of dealing with the maritime industries in this way, has led directly to a reduction in competitiveness of shipping and shipbuilding, not simply within the European Union but in the wider international field.

Shipbuilding and competition policy

77. There is a definite need for a viable European Union shipbuilding industry. A great deal of restructuring has been undertaken over the last decade and a half. Substantial productivity gains and greater concentration of shipbuilding with a high technological content has taken place, yet European shipyards are still incapable of surviving on the market without adequate public support and this is bound to continue until the main competitors, notably industries in the Pacific rim, dismantle their aid systems.

78. A European approach should be based on stopping the fragmentation of European Union shipyards and ancillary activities and on looking for the economies of scale which are so attractive as far as Europe’s Asian competitors are concerned. It is therefore increasingly important to maximise co-operation between European Union undertakings, particularly in the field of research and development, design, purchasing, environmental protection and marine engine manufacture. This is particularly true of co-operation for naval procurement which must be developed beyond the realms of the Tripartite minehunter (even though one of its very successful forebears, the Ton-class minesweeper, was the result of early co-operation in the Western Union). Signs for optimism are perhaps valid with the Anglo-French-Italian frigate project and Dutch-Spanish co-operation. Your Rapporteur hopes that before long the Western European Armaments Group will turn its attention to this domain.

Defence

79. Europe is more ambitious now about achieving a concerted defence policy than ever before. Yet this is certainly not a viable objective without adequate marine industries, merchant ships and those to crew them. Your Rapporteur has been given assurances by those responsible in the WEU Planning Cell that Europe has adequate shipping for essential defence purposes. The Greek Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Georgios Papandreou, has pointed out the advantages of the Greek merchant fleet becoming available for WEU operations with Greek membership of the organisation, but even so an urgent analysis of the current WEU assets, properly conducted and kept up to date, is vital before Europe enters into any conflict commitment requiring considerable sea-borne logistic support.

VI. Co-operation with the International Maritime Organisation and the International Hydrographic Organisation

80. WEU countries are members of two particular bodies with which WEU itself should consider co-operating in certain domains impacting on European security: the International Maritime Organisation (IMO) and the International
Hydographic Organisation (IHO). The work of the organisations is described below.

(a) The International Maritime Organisation

81. When the establishment of a specialised agency of the United Nations dealing with maritime affairs was first proposed, the main concern was to evolve international machinery to improve safety at sea.

82. Because of the international nature of the shipping industry, it had long been recognised that action to improve safety in maritime operations would be more effective if carried out at an international level rather than by individual countries acting unilaterally and without co-ordination with others. Although a number of important international agreements had already been adopted, many states believed that there was a need for a permanent body which would be able to co-ordinate and promote further measures on a more regular basis.

83. It was against this background that a conference held by the United Nations in 1948 adopted a convention establishing the International Maritime Organisation (IMO) as the first every body devoted exclusively to maritime matters.

84. In the ten-year period between the adoption of the Convention and its entry into force in 1958, other problems related to safety but requiring slightly different emphasis had attracted international attention. One of the most important of these was the threat of marine pollution from ships, particularly pollution by oil carried in tankers. An international convention on this subject was actually adopted in 1954, four years before IMO came into existence, and responsibility for administering and promoting it was assumed by IMO in January 1959. From the very beginning, the improvement of maritime safety and the prevention of marine pollution have been IMO’s most important objectives.

85. The organisation is based at 4 Albert Embankment, London, and is the only United Nations specialised agency to have its headquarters in the United Kingdom. Its governing body is the Assembly, which meets once every two years. It consists of all 137 member states and two associate members. Between sessions of the Assembly a Council, consisting of 32 member governments elected by the Assembly, acts as IMO’s governing body.

The committees

86. IMO is a technical organisation and most of its work is carried out in a number of committees and sub-committees.

87. The Maritime Safety Committee (MSC) is the most senior of the committees that carry out the organisation’s technical work. It has a number of sub-committees whose titles indicate the subjects they deal with: safety of navigation; radio-communications; life saving, search and rescue; training and watchkeeping; carriage of dangerous goods; ship design and equipment; fire protection; stability and load lines and fishing vessel safety; containers and cargoes; and bulk chemicals.

88. The Marine Environment Protection Committee (MEPC) was established by the Assembly in November 1973. It is responsible for co-ordinating the organisation’s activities in the prevention and control of pollution of the marine environment from ships. The Sub-Committee on Bulk Chemicals is also a sub-committee of the MEPC as far as pollution is concerned.

89. The Legal Committee was originally established to deal with the legal problems arising from the Torrey Canyon accident of 1967, but it was subsequently made a permanent committee. It is responsible for considering any legal matters within the scope of the organisation.

90. The Technical Co-operation Committee is responsible for co-ordinating the work of the organisation in the provision of technical assistance in the maritime field, in particular to the developing countries. The importance of technical assistance in IMO’s work is shown by the fact that it is the first organisation in the United Nations system formally to recognise a Technical Co-operation Committee in its Convention.

91. The Facilitation Committee is responsible for IMO’s activities and functions relating to the facilitation of international maritime traffic. These are aimed at reducing the formalities and simplifying the documentation required of ships when entering or leaving ports or other terminals.

92. All the committees of IMO are open to participation by all member governments on an equal basis.

The secretariat

93. The secretariat is headed by the Secretary-General, who is assisted by a staff of some 300 international civil servants. The Secretary-General is appointed by the Council, with the approval of the Assembly.

94. In order to achieve its objectives, IMO has, in the last 30 years, promoted the adoption of some 30 conventions and protocols and adopted well over 700 codes and recommendations concerning maritime safety, the prevention of pollution and related matters. The “related matters” include work on a number of subjects which come under the heading of “security” and are thus of interest to WEU navies. Piracy and armed robbery at sea are increasing threats, as is drug traf-
fickling (discussed in the explanatory memorandum). The concerted action proposed should be carried out in full consultation with the IMO.

Technical assistance

95. While the adoption of conventions, codes and recommendations has in the past been IMO's most important function, in recent years the organisation has devoted increasing attention to securing the effective implementation of these measures throughout the world.

96. As a result, the organisation's technical assistance activities have become more and more important and in 1977 IMO took steps to institutionalise its Technical Co-operation Committee — the first United Nations body to do so.

97. The purpose of the technical assistance programme is to help states, many of them developing countries, to ratify IMO conventions and to reach the standards contained in the SOLAS Convention and other instruments. As part of this programme, a number of advisers and consultants are employed by IMO — in the field as well as at headquarters — to give advice to governments on such matters as deck and engineering personnel and the prevention of pollution.

98. Each year the organisation arranges or participates in numerous seminars, workshops and other events which are designed to assist in the implementation of IMO measures. Some are held at IMO headquarters or in developed countries, others in the developing countries themselves.

99. In the field of environmental protection, IMO has actively co-operated with the Regional Seas Programme of the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) in the development of regional anti-pollution arrangements. IMO is currently involved with programme development in all of the eleven seas covered by UNEP action plans. A particularly interesting outcome of this co-operation is the Regional Marine Pollution Emergency Centre for the Mediterranean Sea (REMPEC) which was established by IMO in conjunction with UNEP in 1976.

100. But the most important subject of all is training. IMO measures can only be implemented effectively if those responsible are fully trained, and IMO has helped to develop or improve maritime training academies in many countries around the world. Some of them cater purely for national needs. Others have been developed to deal with the requirements of a region — a very useful approach where the demand for trained personnel in individual countries is not sufficient to justify the considerable financial outlay needed to establish such institutions. IMO has also developed a series of model courses for use in training academies.

101. While IMO supplies the expertise for these projects, the finance comes from various sources. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) is the most important of these, with other international bodies such as UNEP contributing in some cases. Individual countries also provide generous funds or help in other ways — for example, by providing training opportunities for cadets and other personnel from developing countries. This has enabled IMO to build up a successful fellowship programme which, over the years, has helped to train many thousands of people.

102. The most ambitious and exciting of all IMO's technical assistance projects is the World Maritime University at Malmö, Sweden, which opened in 1983. Its objective is to provide high-level training facilities for personnel from developing countries who have already reached a relatively high standard in their own countries but who would benefit from further intensive training. Many of those currently at the University have served as captains or chief engineers at sea and have moved into administrative positions ashore. Others are teachers at maritime academies, examiners or surveyors, technical port managers, and so on. The University can train about 200 students at a time on two-year courses. The University is necessary because training of the specialised type provided at Malmö is not available in developing countries — or indeed anywhere else in the world. It has proved to be so successful that since 1985 a limited number of places have been made available to students from developed maritime nations.

103. IMO works through a number of specialist committees and sub-committees. All these bodies are composed of representatives of member states who discharge their functions with the assistance and advice of appropriate bodies of the United Nations or the specialised agencies, as well as international governmental and non-governmental organisations with which formal relationships have been established. Formal arrangements for co-operation have been established with 33 intergovernmental organisations, while 49 non-governmental international organisations have been granted consultative status to participate in the work of various bodies in an observer capacity. If WEU is to engage fully in the realm of maritime co-operation, it must establish a working relationship with the IMO.

(b) The International Hydrographic Organisation

104. The International Hydrographic Organisation is another intergovernmental consultative and technical organisation. The object of the organisation is to bring about:

(a) the co-ordination of the activities of national hydrographic offices;
(b) the greatest possible uniformity in nautical charts and documents;
(c) the adoption of reliable and efficient methods of carrying out and exploiting hydrographic surveys;

(d) the development of the sciences in the field of hydrography and the techniques employed in descriptive oceanography.

105. Hydrography is the science of measuring and depicting those parameters necessary to describe the precise nature and configuration of the seabed, its geographical relationship to the landmass, and the characteristics and dynamics of the sea. These parameters include bathymetry, tides, currents, waves, physical properties of seawater, geology and geophysics.

106. The primary use of the data collected is to compile marine charts and other graphic documents to facilitate and ensure safety of navigation for mariners in all the seas of the world, and for use by others concerned with the marine environment such as ocean engineers, oceanographers, marine biologists and environmental scientists. Among the most important applications of hydrographic knowledge is its use in the planning of exploration and exploitation of marine resources, the determination of seaward limits of national jurisdiction, and the delimitation of maritime boundaries.

107. International co-operation in the field of hydrography began with a conference held in Washington in 1899 and two others in Saint Petersburg in 1908 and 1912. In 1919, 24 nations met in London for a Hydrographic Conference during which it was decided that a permanent body should be created. The resulting International Hydrographic Bureau began its activity in 1921 with 19 member states and with headquarters in the Principality of Monaco, to which the Bureau had been invited by H.S.H. Prince Albert I of Monaco.

108. In 1970, an intergovernmental convention entered into force which changed the organisation’s name and legal status, creating the International Hydrographic Organisation (IHO), with its headquarters (the IHB) permanently established in Monaco. The organisation currently has a membership of 58 maritime states although a number of applications are pending.

109. The official representative of each member government within the IHO is normally the national Hydrographer, or Director of Hydrography, and these persons, together with their technical staff, meet at five-yearly intervals in Monaco for an International Hydrographic Conference. The conference reviews the progress achieved by the organisation and adopts the programmes to be pursued during the ensuing five-year period. A Directing Committee of three senior hydrographers is elected to guide the work of the Bureau during that time.

110. This Directing Committee, together with a small international staff of technical experts in hydrography and nautical cartography, co-ordinates the technical programmes and provides advice and assistance to member states. All member states have an equal voice in arriving at agreed solutions to problems of standardisation and in programming the work of the Bureau, whilst any member may initiate new proposals for IHO consideration and adoption. Between conferences such matters are normally accomplished by correspondence.

111. The advent of the very large crude carrier with its exceptionally deep draught, the recognition of the need to protect the marine environment, the changing maritime trade patterns, the growing importance of seabed resources, and the United Nations Law of the Sea Convention affecting areas of national jurisdiction have all served to highlight the inadequacies of the survey data available to produce the existing nautical charts and publications. Charts which served well just a few years ago now require recompilation to incorporate new data and these data must be gathered by hydrographic survey operations. The deficiency is not limited to sparsely surveyed waters of developing nations, but also exists in the coastal waters of major industrial states. Fortunately, technology has advanced to a point where new instruments and techniques greatly facilitate the conduct of the precise and extensive surveys required. Further, co-operation among the various national charting agencies can serve to greatly enhance the effectiveness of chart production and navigational warning activities.

112. The IHB has played a particular rôle during the Yugoslav crisis providing charts of special interest for WEU/NATO operations in the Adriatic in support of the United Nations embargo.

VII. Navies and space

113. Satellites are proving an increasingly important asset for naval forces – as well of course as posing a potential threat.

114. In the first place the use of satellites for meteorological purposes has led to a considerable improvement in forecasting techniques – vital for naval operations, especially aeromaritime. The METEOSAT is probably the best-known system but oceanographic satellites such as Topex-Poseidon (a France-United States venture) not only enhance standard weather forecasts, but are also opening new possibilities in the realm of anti-submarine warfare (sound-propagation, determination of sonar techniques, etc.). Submarine detection possibilities are somewhat increased,
forcing submarines themselves to become more discreet but the seas are still far from being transparent.

115. Navigation satellite networks such as Navstar together with communication satellites such as Skynet have also altered the pattern of command at sea. The political authority as well as the fleet commander has a much more complete and accurate idea of the tactical picture, with obvious implications for exercising strict control.

116. Optical observation satellites and those designed for gathering electronic or signal intelligence (Elint and Sigint) are not yet specially optimised for naval tactical uses but with the development of the radar satellite and with increasing coverage and enhanced resolution space is bringing similar advantages to naval operations as on land.

117. WEU's own Satellite Centre at Torrejón has a particular potential role to play in developing many of the new capabilities which will have an impact on naval operations. In addition the procurement of the observation satellite system currently envisaged as a result of the WEU feasibility study should help enhance the scope for European action in the naval domain.

VIII. WEU initiatives for maritime co-operation

(a) Aero-maritime necessities

118. At the origin the Franco-Spanish-Italian proposal of 7th September 1992 to constitute an aero-maritime force capable of fulfilling missions under the auspices of WEU was a comparatively simple affair. The guiding principle was a desire to co-ordinate aero-maritime forces so that a maximum number of assets between the three countries were available at any one time.

119. With only two fixed wing carriers (France) and two short take-off and landing (STOL) carriers (one each to date for Italy and Spain) available to WEU's three Mediterranean members it was obviously important to ensure that long maintenance periods were staggered so that ship-availability was optimised. From that beginning it was a short step to the planning of what would amount to an on-call force to be constituted on an ad hoc basis for a given operation.

120. The idea was germinating however just as France and Germany were on the throes of trying to work out the modalities for using the joint European Corps and were facing considerable criticism from the alliance before eventually agreeing a modus vivendi with SACEUR.

121. In an effort to avoid similar sniping over the aero-maritime proposal, the idea was placed very firmly on the WEU "table" and led in part to the Combined Endeavour solution which has been examined above. It must be admitted however that Combined Endeavour is a somewhat anodyne solution – a palliative which does little to advance the original idea and lets those nations which have no intention of participating, for whatever motives, off the hook.

122. While the proposal has been long in gestation in a Planning Cell which many believe has its power for initiative too circumscribed by too timid a Permanent Council, the world has moved on. Or rather, United States ideas on maritime strategy have had to shrink to match a reducing defence budget. This phenomenon and its potential effect on European imperatives has not been sufficiently taken into account in the WEU study.

123. Secretary Aspin's 1993 "bottom-up review" stated that "the United States Navy will continue to patrol the Mediterranean Sea and other waters surrounding Europe". The disguised intention however was to accept long periods in which the United States Navy would not have a carrier in the Mediterranean at all. There would also be considerable cuts in the numbers of ships the United States would deploy in the Mediterranean, North Atlantic and European waters generally, and in the number and duration of exercises.

124. The review did state that the United States would try to make up for gaps in carrier coverage by deploying either a "small" amphibious task force (including AV-8B Harriers, Cobra attack helicopters and a 2000-strong Marine Expeditionary Brigade), or a task force based on a Tomahawk missile-equipped Aegis destroyer together with attack submarines and P-3 Orion land-based maritime patrol aircraft. This was referred to in the review as the strategy of "adaptive joint force packages" for future maritime deployments.

125. Immediately after the "bottom-up review" came the January 1994 NATO summit which recognised the legitimacy of the European defence identity, seen by some as the start of a serious United States disengagement from Europe, or at best the return of the burden-sharing debate of the mid-1980s, seen by others as the point to begin flexing European muscles which had all but atrophied through lack of use...

126. For the countries which had originally proposed the aero-maritime initiative the consideration given it by WEU's Planning Cell is not the response expected. Italy is already now suggesting a ground element to complement the naval and air components. The new idea has all the makings of the European rapid action force the Assembly has recommended for at least the last three years or indeed the "European standing
naval force with organic naval aviation including air defence, airborne early warning, attack, anti-submarine and heliborne assault assets for deployment under single command and unified control to areas outside the NATO theatre where Western Europe’s security interests are at stake” (Naval aviation, Document 1139, submitted on behalf of the Defence Committee by Mr. Wilkinson, Rapporteur, on 9th May 1988). Later reports made specific recommendations on the European rapid action force (State of European security – intervention forces and reinforcement for the centre and the North, Document 1183, 26th April 1989, Rapporteur: Mr. Speed, and WEU: the operational organisation, Document 1307, 13th May 1992, Rapporteur: Sir Dudley Smith).

127. The French force d’action rapide became operational ten years ago, in 1984; Italy has very up-to-date experience of quick reaction for United Nations service in Mozambique and Somalia; Spain in the Gulf and Adriatic and is developing a rapid action capability which with that of its Mediterranean neighbours would probably be of greater use than making a fourth hand for the European corps in Strasbourg. In addition, it would be particularly disappointing if the United Kingdom, with its naval experience and its three STOL carriers, were not to be associated with the elaboration of these ideas.

128. In passing, it is worthy of note that the French Defence Minister no less, Mr. François Léotard, has recently wondered aloud whether it would not be a more attractive option to “create European intervention forces, commanded by a European General Staff and which would be both multinational and have integrated (air, land and sea) forces”. Mr. Léotard was speaking in Paris on 3rd March 1994 and linked the new plan to the existing one for the creation of an air and naval force made up of French, Spanish and Italian units.

129. Your Rapporteur believes that it is only a matter of time before such a force becomes a reality and urges the WEU Permanent Council to charge the Planning Cell to examine more imaginative options as a matter of priority.

(b) Countering drug trafficking

130. While the European nations are slowly tackling the problem of drug trafficking, trying to prevent the plague hitting European shores, United States officials running the Pentagon’s portion of the “drug war” are shifting their attention almost exclusively to combating cocaine at the source in Latin America, rather than trying to interdict the flow of illegal drugs across air and sea routes into the United States or towards Europe. The shift is due to a variety of factors, including the relatively low volume of drugs seized in transit, United States budgetary constraints and a variety of organisational and force structure changes that emerged from the Pentagon’s recently completed “bottom-up review”.

131. The Pentagon’s counternarcotics office participated in a six-month government-wide counternarcotics policy review earlier this year and recently published a report detailing revisions to the Department of Defense’s counternarcotics programme. According to the review, although the United States military will continue to be involved in the detection and monitoring of the drug-smuggling aircraft and boats in the so-called transit zones – areas between the borders of the narcotics source countries and those of the United States – the equipment currently deployed will be partially replaced by hardware that is less expensive to operate and maintain.

132. For example, instead of monitoring air traffic with United States Air Force E-3 airborne warning and control system (AWACS) and Navy E-2C Hawkeye airborne early warning aircraft, the Pentagon will rely more on the relocatable over-the-horizon radar (ROTHR) system. ROTH was originally developed by Raytheon for early detection of incoming Soviet bombers and ships, but was curtailed after the cold war ended.

133. The 1988 Vienna Convention on the illicit traffic in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances requires police co-operation, and permits boarding and seizure outside territorial waters with prior permission of countries whose flag suspected traffickers are flying (Articles 11 and 17). Enforcement will require co-operation between police, customs, coast guards and navies, with the latter particularly important for maritime and aerial surveillance. A host of maritime co-operation activities are now under way, including cooperation among European states on maritime and aerial surveillance, co-operation between the United States, Britain, and occasionally others in the Caribbean, and several specific tailored cases of co-operation elsewhere involving military aid to civil ministries.

134. This may well provide an opportunity for WEU itself to lend a hand to United States efforts. When the Defence Committee visited the United States in the summer of 1990 at the invitation of the then Secretary Cheney, your Rapporteur discussed European co-operation with the United States in the Caribbean. The idea would be to build on the assets which France, Britain and the Netherlands maintain in that part of the world: frigates or corvettes based in the West Indies (some of which were instrumental in helping the United States apply the United Nations embargo on Haiti last year). The danger from drug trafficking is an obvious threat for European security and WEU
with experience gained from its Danube operations would be well placed to take initiatives in this domain.

135. Given reduced United States funding for national measures as described above, Washington's present administration would certainly welcome a WEU proposal to help co-ordinate a European effort in the Caribbean. In 1990 the response was very warm from the Assistant Secretary for Defense responsible in the Pentagon for combating drug trafficking, but less so from the European side. Your Rapporteur has reason to believe that the climate for WEU co-ordination may well be changing and urges the Permanent Council to address the suggestion as a matter of urgency.

IX. Command and control of WEU naval and maritime operations

(a) A little history

136. When the Brussels Treaty was signed in 1948 and the Western Union came into being there was of course an operational dimension to the organisation which continued until NATO itself was given the operational side completely, in the mid-1950s. The original operations took the form of mainly naval exercises which helped the allied European navies maintain the co-operation which had been born during the rigours of the second world war. The Korean conflict also displayed a considerable maritime aspect.

137. With the advent of NATO the Western Union command structures were superseded - the bulk of the forces stationed in Europe came from the United States and the two major commands created - Allied Command Europe and Allied Command Atlantic Ocean - were very firmly placed in the American orbit.

138. There was a particular anomaly in this arrangement however in that the sea areas closest to Europe (the Channel and the southern North Sea) were left to the Europeans to command and organise. From the beginning the Western Union Chiefs of Staff had assumed responsibility for these sea areas, delegating authority to the respective Chiefs of Naval Service from Belgium, France, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, who formed the Channel Committee and created the Channel Command.

139. The reasoning behind the various decisions taken then makes very interesting reading in the modern context. On 6th December 1950, the British Joint Planning Staff were reporting to the Chiefs of Staff Committee on "Naval/Air Command in the Channel and southern North Sea area" in the following terms:

"The sea areas of the Channel and southern North Sea under present plans, are not included in the area of responsibility of SHAPE or the Atlantic Ocean Command, but are the responsibility of the Western Union Chiefs of Staff.

As a result of the decisions which have been taken to establish SHAPE and SACAO, the command in the Channel and Southern North Sea Area requires review to bring it under NATO control, since Holland, Belgium and France will no longer be able to represent their views through the Western Union Chiefs of Staff.

In this connection the Dutch have recently raised the question of whether the United Kingdom to Holland convoys which are at present the joint responsibility of the United Kingdom/Dutch naval authorities, should not now come under the Standing Group since with the establishment of SHAPE this area is not under any NATO body.

They have further suggested that, in order to effect this, the area should be included in the NAOR.

In anticipation of instructions we have re-examined the organisation of the Naval/Air Command in the Channel and southern North Sea area with a view to associating the area with NATO. Our report is at Annex, its conclusions are as follows:

(a) The Channel and southern North Sea area should be a separate command area under NATO authority.

(b) The British Chiefs of Staff should become the NATO authority responsible for the area, acting as agents of the Standing Group.

(c) The British Chiefs of Staff should exercise control through the Naval Commander-in-Chief Home Station who would be the responsible naval authority, and through the Air Commander-in-Chief Eastern Atlantic who would be the responsible air authority.

(d) The views of the continental national authorities will be represented at Chiefs of Staff

2. This and the following declassified document was kindly made available by the Chief of the SHAPE Historical Office.
level through accredited representatives who should be the Naval Attachés. At the level of Commander-in-Chief Home Station the views of the continental countries will be represented by an integrated staff of Dutch, Belgian and French officers.

(e) The views of SHAPE will be represented at the Headquarters of Commander-in-Chief Home Station by a representative of FOWE appointed to the integrated staff.

(f) The Headquarters of Commander-in-Chief Home Station should remain at Portsmouth where the Air Commander-in-Chief will be represented by a liaison staff.

(g) The Command organisation for the Channel and southern North Sea area should be established in peacetime.

(h) Some of the existing staff of the Naval Advisory Committee should be absorbed into the staff of the Commander-in-Chief Home Station for planning purposes.

The following appendices are attached:

(a) Appendix A: diagram showing command structure with the British Chiefs-of-Staff responsible for the Channel southern North Sea area acting as agents of the Standing Group.

(b) Appendix B: map showing boundaries of the British Home Station command and Channel southern North Sea area.

Recommendation

We recommend that, if the Chiefs of Staff approve our report, they should forward it to the British representative on the Western European Regional Planning Group for use as a brief in discussions with the Dutch, Belgian and French authorities with a view to drawing up an agreed paper for presentation to the Standing Group.”

140. By 14th November 1951 decisions were ready but the Europeans were having to resist a United States “takeover”:

“Proposals for a NATO Channel Command

The Channel and southern North Sea is an area which was originally covered by the plans of the Western European Regional Planning Group. On the dissolution of the WERFG this area was not allocated either to the NAO or to SHAPE and was therefore within any NATO Command. Since the area is of vital importance to the European countries bordering it, these countries would not accept any command organisation for this area which did not give them representation in matters directly concerning this area. Hence the Channel Committee on which these nations would be represented was set up to act as agents of the Standing Group.

A proposed Command organisation based largely on United Kingdom draft proposals was therefore submitted to the Standing Group by the Western Region Naval Advisory Committee. Except for minor amendments this proposed organisation has been incorporated in the Standing Group paper. All amendments have been discussed fully and agreed to by the Chiefs of Staff.

Terms of Reference for Allied Commander-in-Chief Channel

The Chiefs of Staff approved the draft terms of reference before they were considered by the Channel Committee who in turn approved and forwarded the report to the Standing Group. The final draft submitted by the Standing Group to the Military Representatives met our requirements and was acceptable.

Last minute amendments have, however, been submitted by the United States. Some of these are of a minor nature and have been included in the report. On the other hand the United States have also proposed two major amendments which, although not in the present report, they will probably submit to the Military Committee. These are:

(a) that SACLANT will as a matter of principle retain operational control of his forces when they enter the Channel area.

(b) that Commander-in-Chief Channel should communicate direct with the Standing Group on operational matters.

We are prepared to accept (b) if necessary but we think it unlikely that it will be accepted by the French and Dutch.

We are not prepared to accept (a) above and consider that it should be strongly resisted since the Allied Commander-in-Chief Channel must have overriding authority in the Channel area.”
(b) A particular paradox

141. The Europeans achieved their aim in 1951 and Allied Command Channel was duly established (at first in Portsmouth, subsequently at Northwood, near London), with a British Commander-in-Chief on equal terms with the other two major NATO Commanders (MNC). The situation has continued from that day to this but the particular paradox is that the Channel Command is about to be abolished (at the end of June 1994!).

142. This is taking place at the very moment that the European defence identity is recognised by NATO, and especially the United States, as legitimate. The decision to downgrade the single European MNC was perhaps taken from the best of motives, in an attempt to save costs and rationalise NATO command structures. Nevertheless the effect is very unfortunate at best, if not decidedly negative.

143. The only plus factors in this saga are the decisions of the members of the Channel Committee not to abandon their independent role and to continue to meet and ensure the continuity of European interest in this important area.

144. In addition the British Secretary of State for Defence has declared that the joint headquarters at Northwood (where Commander-in-Chief Channel is currently established) would be made available as an HQ for WEU operations if required. It is worth considering, as a matter of urgency, whether the Channel Command should not rather purely and simply revert to its original European dimension with Western European Union taking over a similar responsibility to that originally assumed by the Western Union.

(c) WEU Maritime Headquarters

145. The precedent for now proposing the establishment of a “WEU Element” at Northwood, to work alongside what will continue to be the NATO Eastern Atlantic Command, is of course the “WEU Element” already established with another NATO sub-command: CINC SOUTH/COMNAVSOUTH in Naples. This latter organisation has been very successful in running NATO/WEU operations in the Adriatic. It could perhaps be developed to form the nucleus of a “WEU Maritime Headquarters (Mediterranean)” in Naples to match the “WEU Maritime Headquarters (Atlantic/Channel)” at Northwood.

146. The move would be logical in the sense of giving credence to the combined joint task force concept by providing a ready-made liaison element in two important maritime regions. Similar arrangements could be envisaged for land and air headquarters.

147. Nations would provide staff on a regional basis also: French, British, German, Dutch, Portuguese and Belgian officers already serve on the Northwood staff, as do French, British, Italian, Spanish, German and Greek officers in Naples. Staff might be “double-hatted” NATO/WEU to prevent duplication of numbers.

148. Such regional headquarters would liaise closely with the WEU Planning Cell in Brussels and provide a much-needed operational link to ensure a more practical input into the Planning Cell’s sometimes theoretical studies. NATO would also gain from the arrangement through the increased transparency with WEU which would result. It would also be of particular advantage for making the NATO infrastructure available for WEU, as decided at the January summit.

149. If the WEU and North Atlantic Councils decide to pursue this idea they should do so with some alacrity. The Commander-in-Chief Channel will haul down his flag at Northwood on 30th June this year. With full analysis of the proposal and prompt decision-making it might even be possible to raise the WEU flag at Northwood before NATO’s Commander-in-Chief Channel has put his own flag into a museum...

150. France’s rôle is pivotal in these considerations with a sea board on both the Atlantic and Mediterranean and a tradition of worldwide maritime presence. French goodwill and support for these ideas is essential if they are to be adopted and developed. French participation at the highest level recently in the Channel Committee and a lasting and robust commitment (much more so than other supposedly more “NATO-minded” nations) to United Nations and WEU operations augurs well.

151. Another initiative for the WEU Mediterranean members would be for them to form a “Mediterranean Committee” along the lines of the present Channel Committee which would expand slightly to include Germany and perhaps Norway and Denmark. Ideally such committees would turn their attention to the wider maritime issues in their regions and in turn liaise with each other to build up the WEU-wide naval and maritime picture.

(d) The Heads of European Navies

152. In fact this latter body already exists, although in very informal fashion. For over five years now the Heads of European Navies have been meeting on a regular basis to “exchange ideas”. Such a grouping has no “legal entity” at present and is not subject either to political guidance or parliamentary control. For the future it could well be developed along the same lines as the WEU Chiefs of Defence Staff (CHODS)
Committee which meets on a regular basis and especially prior to WEU Ministerial Council meetings.

153. It is to be hoped that once WEU policy has been agreed by ministers on a maritime issue elaborated in the Planning Cell, it is passed for implementation via the CHODS to the service responsible. Consultation between the single service chiefs on a WEU-wide basis is therefore to be encouraged and the Heads of European Navies forum might well be replicated by both WEU armies and air forces, just as the Heads of WEU Defence Procurement Organisations meet in the Western European Armaments Group.

X. The way forward

(a) Dialogue with the Council

154. While much of the tenor of the present report is designed to encourage the WEU Ministerial Council, the Permanent Council and the various instruments of WEU to take greater initiatives towards a reinforcing of co-operation in security and defence in Europe, it would be very remiss not to pay a particular tribute for what has already been achieved. In the six and a half years your Rapporteur has had the honour to be a member of the WEU Assembly, the organisation has undergone a step change in terms of both theory and practice, as well as in the development of an efficient pragmatism.

155. Of course the member governments of WEU must take credit for giving their support and successive Chairmen-in-Office have given added impetus to progress over the past few years. But in addition the small number of individuals who serve the various instances of WEU – Assembly, Secretariat General, Planning Cell, Satellite Centre, Institute for Security Studies, WEAG Secretariat – do so with much “devotion to duty”. Their small numbers – circa 100 until just 18 months ago when, with the creation of the Planning Cell and the Satellite Centre, numbers of permanent staff doubled to 200 – and the low budget of the whole organisation bear witness to the cost efficiency of WEU in relation to most other international bodies.

156. As essentially an intergovernmental organisation WEU relies a great deal on those who come from national ministries to contribute to the various committees, although with the move to Brussels many are now beginning to serve in national permanent delegations. The uniformed services also are being exposed increasingly to WEU and what it stands for as they take part in operations under WEU auspices.

157. In passing and in this context your Rapporteur should draw attention to the fact that the Council has recently accepted the Assembly’s proposal that those serving under the WEU flag (which now does exist, again thanks to the Assembly’s prompting!) should wear a distinguishing badge. Thus, individuals on the Danube (in Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania), in the Adriatic and in Naples wear the WEU insignia; ships in the Adriatic and patrol craft on the Danube fly the flag. It therefore would now be appropriate to take a further step: why not award a WEU “campaign medal” to all those (servicemen and women, police, customs officials, etc.) who have served in WEU operations for a specific period? The Assembly has shown the way with the presentation of its medallion to Admirals Bonnot and Mariani for their conduct respectively of WEU operations in the Gulf and Adriatic.

158. Just as the Council has seen fit to accept an increasing number of specific recommendations emanating from the Assembly over recent years, it has also now begun to heed requests for more detailed information both in the annual report and in replies to written questions. In particular the reporting on the various operations currently under way on the Danube and in the Adriatic has been explicit (c.f. the answer to Written Question 323 put by Mr. De Decker:

Question:
On 6th October 1993, the French weekly information letter, TTU, gave the following information:

“Six Romanian barges transporting oil violated the international embargo on Serbia under the nose of WEU observers in Calafat (Romanian-Serb frontier).

Officially destined for the Romanian port of Turnu-Severin, 80 km upstream on the Danube, the barges transporting 4 415 tonnes of petrol and 1 334 tonnes of fuel oil were unloaded at the port of Prahovo, on the Serbian bank, near the Iron Gates lock. Similar violations had already occurred last January when barges from Ukraine repelled by Serb vessels had unloaded at Prahovo”.

1. Can the Council confirm the truth of this violation of the embargo? Can it confirm the Romanian nationality of the barges?

2. If so, why was the WEU unit on the Danube not able to prevent this violation?

3. Why does the Council continue to refuse to publish the list of violations noted on the Danube and in the Adriatic whereas, in the absence of coercive means, such publication would be the only democratic means of pressure to deter these violations?
1. The Council did indeed receive information to the effect that a convoy of six barges which, in early September, were heading for the Romanian port of Turnu-Severin, did not arrive at their destination. This was a Romanian convoy known as Giurgiu belonging to the Navrom company.

2. The WEU Danube mission is carried out on the basis of memoranda of understanding concluded between WEU and each of the three riparian states concerned. The memoranda are based on the relevant resolutions of the United Nations Security Council. They set out the mandate for the mission and the tasks needed to accomplish it. The memoranda are substantially the same, the one concluded with Romania being the most significant as regards the incident referred to by the reference question. It contains the following stipulations:

"Article 1

3. (...) In fulfilling their tasks, WEU personnel will act under the general authority of Romania, which has the main responsibility for ensuring strict implementation of the relevant United Nations Security Council Resolutions, and on a basis of mutual agreement.

4. The support given to Romania by WEU member states will consist of patrol boats, appropriate personnel and the necessary equipment (...).

Article III

3. A control area will be established on the territory of Romania at Calafat, and an additional checking point will be established in Galati (...)."

The memorandum indicates that WEU is providing technical assistance to Romania in the form of personnel and equipment and that its mission is being carried out on the Danube downstream of Calafat. The checks carried out are designed to deter and, if necessary, to detect or even thwart any attempt at violation on this section of the Danube. On the section upstream of Calafat, which is much shorter than the downstream section, there is a certain amount of cabotage traffic. WEU has no authority over this traffic since it is not covered by the relevant resolutions.”

3. Only the United Nations is competent to publish information on the violation of an embargo imposed on the basis of United Nations resolutions.

159. Your Rapporteur's previous report, prepared jointly with Mr. Günter Marten, on "An operational organisation for WEU: naval co-operation - Part One: Adriatic Operations", prompted a positive and reasonably rapid response from the Council. The following comments in particular are germane:

"1. At the meeting of the Council of Ministers in Luxembourg on 22nd November 1993, Ministers agreed that the relevant statements in Part I of their declaration were intended as a European contribution to the alliance summit. The NATO summit gave its full support to the development of the European security and defence identity which, as envisaged in the Maastricht Treaty, in the longer term perspective of a common defence policy within the European Union, might in time lead to a common defence, compatible with that of the Atlantic Alliance. Accordingly, the European allies will take greater responsibility for their common security and defence.

2. The NATO summit made clear that the Sixteen stood ready to make collective assets of the alliance available to WEU, on the basis of consultations in the North Atlantic Council, for operations undertaken by the European allies within the framework of joint actions under the common foreign and security policy of the European Union. Better European co-ordination and planning will strengthen the European pillar and the alliance itself.

Translated into military terms, this will mean in particular the setting-up of combined joint task forces (CJTF) able to serve under both WEU and NATO commands for specific peace-keeping operations for example, including operations with countries outside the alliance such as the countries of the WEU Forum of Consultation or the countries signatory to the partnership for peace.

The WEU Council is considering the practical arrangements for the use of these combined joint task forces as part of its own operations, and also the procedure under which they might be made available."
3. An appropriate working budget for the two WEU staff elements working with COMNAVSOUTH staff in Naples and for the COMWEUMARFOR in the Adriatic is under consideration.

... 

5. The Council confirms that WEU member states support the Adriatic operations with all the means at their disposal. The Council pursues an active public information policy to ensure the transparency of the combined NATO and WEU operations, thereby contributing to a better understanding of WEU’s action.

... 

7. The Council has placed on its agenda consideration of the possibility of using the naval assets of the member states of the WEU Forum of Consultation as part of the operations in the Adriatic. Such participation is to be seen in the context of the enhanced status which the Council plans to propose to the consultation partners. Cooperation of this kind between WEU and its consultation partners is among the measures currently being studied as part of the work on the enhanced status, soon to be proposed to the consultation partner countries.”

160. In addition the Council paid tribute to the men and women involved in the Adriatic operations and joined the President of the Assembly in sending a Christmas message to express “great appreciation to WEU personnel engaged in the Danube and Sharp Guard operations for their dedication and achievement”.

161. Elsewhere the Council responded quickly to the President of the Assembly’s message relating to the first official ship visit by the WEU Flotilla and the need to maintain WEU assets:

“The President of the Western European Union Assembly, Sir Dudley Smith, MP, welcomed the news of a first official visit by WEU’s Contingency Maritime Force to Taranto from 5th to 9th March.

The three frigates: Zeffiro (Italy), Cassard (France) and Cataluna (Spain), are participating in the embargo operations in the Adriatic, flying the WEU flag. The WEU force comprises five ships at present, under the command of Rear Admiral Bolongaro (Italy) and is fully integrated into the combined NATO/WEU Operation Sharp Guard which was established in the Adriatic on 14th June 1993.

The three frigates rejoined the operational zone on 10th March.

The President of the Assembly expressed the hope that the WEU Permanent Council and member governments would ensure that the necessary material and human resources are made available to maintain the effectiveness of the Adriatic operations.”

162. The Council has “charged WEU military delegates with monitoring the rotation of WEU personnel”; your Rapporteur trusts that given the recommendations expressed elsewhere that such monitoring will prove effective. The use of the military delegates as a WEU “military committee” is a welcome initiative as is the news in the annual report that the rules of engagement for Adriatic operations have been approved jointly with the NATO Council.

163. The beginning of a relationship with European Union is also evident in the annual report, especially with regard to the situation in former Yugoslavia:

“The Belgian Representative, on behalf of the Presidency of the Twelve, regularly briefed the Permanent Council on the activities and démarches of the European Community aimed at reaching a peaceful solution to the conflict in former Yugoslavia.

The Permanent Council has closely monitored developments on the ground, its discussions focusing on the implementation of the Danube embargo, participation of naval forces of WEU member states in the Adriatic embargo, and the possible involvement of WEU in the EC’s administration of the Mostar district. The activities of the Experts’ Groups and the Mostar Working Group, in co-operation with the Planning Cell, dealt mainly with this possibility.

The Presidency has regularly briefed the Council on developments in the WEU Danube operation. The Council has for example discussed the various measures taken to ensure effective co-ordination between the WEU and SAM teams and it has also discussed the funding of the operations. These discussions have enabled the Council to gauge problems which may recur in similar operations. The Presidency has regularly taken part in the Vienna meetings of the Sanctions Liaison Group.”

164. Much remains to be done however, ideally along the lines detailed throughout the present report and in the draft recommendations.

(b) Relations with the wider world

165. Your Rapporteur has urged a variety of wider contacts and co-operation in the naval and
maritime domain in an effort to improve WEU's operational organisation.

166. Suggestions range from co-operation with the United Nation's burgeoning military organisation and United Nation's maritime subdivisions in particular through to naval links with those maritime nations amongst the WEU Forum of Consultation member countries. In addition, the naval and maritime assets of some of the new members of the European Union are not negligible.

167. Last but not least your Rapporteur would like to highlight six countries with which WEU would be wise to establish relations in the near to mid-term.

168. In the Mediterranean Malta and Cyprus represent not only a traditional interest strategically but also specific maritime advantages. Both countries are developing special links with European Union and may well soon be in a position to request a statute vis-a-vis WEU. Malta hosts the United Nation's Law of the Sea Institute which is taking students from all over the world. Malta also possesses an excellent infrastructure of naval facilities hard to match in the Mediterranean area which are somewhat under-utilised. Cyprus is developing the use of its flag for a growing merchant marine which has already proved invaluable for replenishment operations during the Gulf conflict.

169. Amongst the states of the southern hemisphere both Argentina and Australia have shown a particular willingness to co-operate in a wider naval arena and both countries took part alongside WEU in embargo operations in the Gulf or Red Sea in 1991/92. Both are strategically placed in their respective parts of the world as is South Africa between the Atlantic and the Indian Ocean. The Simonstown naval base has had a particular importance in days gone by and might well have again in the future. South Africa's new democracy will allow a greater participation on the international maritime scene. The growing importance of the Cape route heralds a much-needed development of the Naval Control of Shipping Organisation which was designed originally by the western allies to monitor and control merchant marine routes and convoys and whose representatives South Africa has continued to host over the years.

170. In the Pacific, Japan's naval and maritime assets are developing considerably. Japan (as well as Germany, of course) sent mine-hunting vessels out of traditional areas to co-operate with WEU in mine-sweeping operations in the Gulf at the end of the conflict in 1991/92.

171. Overall there is no escaping the fact which permeates the whole of the present report: naval and maritime co-operation is generally much easier than any other. WEU nations individually and the organisation as a whole should be ready to co-operate whenever possible with all states which seek naval and/or maritime links: it is very difficult to predict when such links may prove vital for future WEU operations. Europe's naval and maritime interests are worldwide -- WEU's should be also, with a naval and maritime operational structure to match.

172. Your Rapporteur has tried to demonstrate in the present report that WEU naval and maritime operational co-operation is already "alive and well" but that there is room for improvement and greater efficiency. A number of recommendations are designed to widen the naval and maritime remit of WEU in general and the Planning Cell in particular. Without a coherent strategy for naval and maritime affairs WEU is likely to be slow to react, either as the European pillar of NATO or as the operational arm of European Union. Recent history has proved the efficacy of action at sea in a series of conflicts where WEU has been very much to the fore. Let us ensure that our operational organisation is properly equipped and ready to meet similar naval and maritime challenges in the future.
APPENDIX I

Composition of WEU navies

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Key

B = Belgium  
F = France  
D = Germany  
I = Italy  
NL = Netherlands  
P = Portugal  
E = Spain  
UK = United Kingdom  
SS = submarine(s) (tactical)  
SSBN = nuclear-fuelled ballistic-missile submarine(s)  
SSN = nuclear-fuelled submarine(s) (tactical)  
CV = aircraft carrier(s)  
CC = cruiser(s)  
DD = destroyer(s)  
FF = frigate(s)  
ac = combat aircraft  
hel = helicopter(s)  
LCA = landing craft, assault  
LCU = landing craft, utility  
LCM = landing craft, mechanised  
LSD = landing ship, dock  
LPD = landing platform, dock  
LST = landing ship, tank  
LCT = landing craft, tank

Source: IISS Military Balance 1993-94 (modified and updated)
APPENDIX II

**WEU/NATO Operation Sharp Guard**

**Mission**

To conduct operations to monitor and enforce compliance with United Nations sanctions in accordance with United Nations Security Council Resolutions (UNSCR) 713, 757, 787 and 820. Combined Task Force 440, in particular, prevents all unauthorised shipping from entering the territorial waters of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro).

**Achievements**

During Operation Sharp Guard, over 19,000 merchant vessels have been challenged. Of them, over 1,850 have been halted and inspected, or diverted to a port for inspection. As a result of the co-ordinated efforts of the forces which have operated under NATO and WEU, 1,032 merchant vessels were halted and boarded – or diverted to a port for inspection – from 22nd November 1992 to 15th June 1993, when Operation Sharp Guard began. During the same period 12,367 merchant vessels were challenged. Therefore, an overall total of over 31,000 ships have been challenged so far, with over 3,000 inspected or diverted. These results have been possible thanks to over 5,400 ship days spent at sea, over 3,500 sorties by MPA aircraft and over 2,500 sorties by NATO airborne early warning aircraft.

After the United Nations Security Council strengthened the embargo against Serbia and Montenegro with Resolution 820 in April 1993, no ship has been able to break the embargo.

**History**

In July 1992, forces operating under NATO and WEU, working in strict co-ordination, began monitoring in the Adriatic Sea the compliance of resolutions of the United Nations Security Council against former Yugoslavia (Operations Maritime Monitor and Sharp Vigilance). On 22nd November 1992 both operations were amplified in scope to include the enforcement of relevant United Nations resolutions (Operations Maritime Guard and Sharp Fence).

On 8th June 1993 the Councils of NATO and WEU, at a joint session, reviewed the embargo operations and approved a combined concept of operations for the implementation of United Nations Resolution 820, which strengthened the existing embargos against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro). This concept included a single command and control arrangement for the combined Operation Sharp Guard under the authority of the Councils of both organisations. The operation began on 15th June 1993.

**Nations contributing forces**

Nations contributing forces at the moment are: Canada, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States.

**Organisation**

The overall operational control is delegated to General Mario Angeli, Italian Navy, as Commander, Combined Task Force 440 (CCTF 440). He is assisted by Rear Admiral Gianfranco Coviello, Italian Navy, as Deputy CCTF 440. Admiral Angeli is the Commander of Allied Naval Forces Southern Europe. As CCTF 440, his staff has been complemented by a WEU staff element.

Surface ships operate under two operational combined task groups (CTG) at sea to conduct operations in the Adriatic Sea. A third task group has responsibility for ships conducting training or port visits. Operational responsibilities rotate among the task group commanders. Currently, the two operational CTG commanders are Commodore Alastair Ross, UKN, and Rear Admiral Elio Bolongaro, Italian Navy, who is also Commander of WEU's "Contingency Maritime Force". The third task group is commanded by Rear Admiral James R. Stark, United States Navy.

Maritime Patrol Aircraft operate under operational control of CCTF 440 through the Commander of Combined Task Force 431, Rear Admiral John Coleman, United States Navy.

**Participating forces**

Surface ships:

- HMCS Halifax (F 330), frigate (Canada);
- HMCS Preserver (D 280), support ship (Canada);
- HMD Peter Tordenskiold (F 356), frigate (Denmark);
- FS Premier Maitre L'Her (F 792), frigate (France);
APPENDIX II

FS Georges Leygues (D 640), destroyer (France);
FGS Augsburg (F 213), frigate (Germany);
HS Kimon (D 218), destroyer (Greece);
ITS Aliseo (F 574), frigate (Italy);
ITS Chimera (F 556), corvette (Italy);
ITS Lupo (F 564), frigate (Italy);
HNLMS van Kinsbergen (F 809), frigate (The Netherlands);
HNMLS Jacob v. Heemskerk (F 812), frigate (The Netherlands);
HNOMS Narvik (F 304), frigate (Norway);
NRP Corte Real (F 332), frigate (Portugal);
SPS Cataluna (F 73), frigate (Spain);
SPS Santa Maria (F 81), frigate (Spain);
TCG Turgutreis (D 241), destroyer (Turkey);
HMS Birmingham (D 86), frigate (United Kingdom);
HMS Chatham (F 87), frigate (United Kingdom);
USS Comte De Grasse (DD 974), destroyer (United States);
USS Bainbridge (CGN 25), cruiser (United States).

CTF 440 is also supported by the United States AEGIS cruiser USS Philippine Sea (CG 58).

Fighter aircraft

Eight Italian Air Force Tornado aircraft are available to support Operation Sharp Guard from their home base at Gioia del Colle. These aircraft can contribute to the defence of ships from attacks from surface ships. Other aircraft from allied forces operating in the area also contribute to this support.

Maritime patrol aircraft

Continuous maritime air patrol support to the naval forces of CTF 440 is provided with assets from nine NATO and WEU nations: Canada (CP-140 Aurora), France (Atlantique), Germany (Atlantique), Italy (Atlantique), the Netherlands (P-3C), Portugal (P-3P), Spain (P-3B), United Kingdom (Nimrod), United States (P-3C). The above aircraft operate from the air bases at Sigonella (Sicily) and Elmas (Sardinia), in Italy.

NATO airborne early warning

Eight E-3A and two E-3D from NATO's Airborne Early Warning Force (NAEWF) are supporting Operation Sharp Guard, as well as NATO Operation Deny Flight. The E-3A aircraft are flown, from their home bases at Geilenkirchen, Germany, and forward operating bases at Aviano and Trapani, Italy, and Preveza, Greece, by multinational crews provided by eleven NATO nations (Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Turkey and the United States). The E-3D aircraft from the United Kingdom's Number 8 Squadron operate from their home base at Royal Air Force Station Waddington, United Kingdom, as well as Aviano and Trapani, Italy. French E-3F aircraft operating from the French air base in Avord and Italian air base at Trapani under the auspices of WEU are also participating.