European security: crisis-prevention
and management

REPORT
submitted on behalf of the Political Committee
by Mr. de Puig, Rapporteur
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Joint statement by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and the Defence Ministry of the Russian Federation

1. Adopted unanimously by the committee.

2. Members of the committee: Mr. Stoffelen (Chairman); Lord Finsberg, Mr. Roseta (Vice-Chairmen); MM. Agnelli, Alegre, Andreotti, Benvenuti, Bowden, De Hoop Scheffer, Ehrmann, Fabra, Feldmann, Foschi (Alternate: Ferrarini), Goerens, Hons I Perret, Sir Russell Johnston, Mr. Kaspereit, Lord Kirkhill, MM. Kittelmann, Leers, de Lipkowski, Müller, Périaux, Polli (Alternate: Ferrari), de Puig, Reddemann, Rodrigues, Seeuws, Seitelinger, Soell, Vinçon, Ward, Wintgens, Zapatero.

N.B. The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.
Draft Recommendation

on European security: crisis-prevention and management

The Assembly,

(i) Deploring the powerlessness of the European institutions to avoid the outbreak of a bloody war between the components of former Yugoslavia and their inability to find joint ways and means of bringing it to an end;

(ii) Stressing the urgency of implementing co-ordinated operational mechanisms between the United Nations, the CSCE, NATO, the European Union and WEU capable of preventing conflicts and managing future crises constituting a threat to peace and security;

(iii) Stressing that any measures to maintain and re-establish peace in any region where it is threatened must be authorised by the United Nations;

(iv) Stressing also that reliance should be placed on the crisis-prevention mechanisms of the CSCE;

(v) Welcoming paragraph 1 of the reply of the Council to Recommendation 549 and paragraph 6 of its reply to Recommendation 548 recognising the need to develop joint assessment of risks and threats;

(vi) Recalling nevertheless that the Assembly does not make "suggestions" to the Council but recommendations that have been formally adopted;

(vii) Noting with interest the work of the Council on:
   - WEU's rôle in peace-keeping;
   - anti-missile defence;
   - intelligence policy;
   - missions by WEU forces in humanitarian aid, peace-keeping and restoring peace;
   - WEU policy on exercises;
   - the implementation of the Open Skies Treaty;
   - progress in the feasibility study for a WEU space-based observation system;
   - air and naval co-operation in WEU;

(viii) Wishing sincerely that these studies will rapidly lead to actions that will make WEU truly operational in crisis-prevention and management;

(ix) Perturbed nevertheless by information received from the Council to the effect that most of the WEU member countries have responded negatively to the request to make troops available to protect the safe areas in former Yugoslavia;

(x) Consequently recalling the wide-ranging obligations placed on all the member countries under the modified Brussels Treaty to preserve peace and security;

(xi) Believing that a fully operational WEU will be capable in future of preventing the development of a conflict such as that in former Yugoslavia,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Make a regular assessment of risks and threats in the world liable to affect peace and security and draw the consequences therefrom for Europe;

2. Take an initiative in the context of the common foreign and security policy to define a crisis-prevention and management policy taking account of the lessons drawn from the crisis in former Yugoslavia;

3. Inform the Assembly of the results of the work on "mutually reinforcing institutions" carried out by the CFSP working group on security and of the Council's own contribution to this study;

4. Play an active part in the conference on the pact for stability in Europe, by offering its good offices, in the framework of this conference, to the associate partners of WEU and future associate partners, insisting in particular on the principle of the inviolability of present frontiers;
5. Establish a permanent dialogue with Russia and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) on crisis-prevention and management;

6. Complete the development of the measures referred to in paragraphs 4 and 9 of Recommendation 556 necessary for WEU to become fully operational in the framework of crisis-management and relating to:
   - the space-based observation system;
   - strategic means of transport;
   - the European corps and the European air and naval force and other forces answerable to WEU so as to enable a European rapid action force to be created;
   - armaments co-operation;
   - interaction between the chiefs of defence staffs, military representatives, the Planning Cell and the WEU Secretariat-General;

7. Co-ordinate with NATO the means available and the sharing of responsibilities in crisis-management, particularly in the area of restoring peace;

8. Establish direct co-ordination with the United Nations and the CSCE with a view to permanent representation in these two organisations;

9. Take the necessary steps to ensure that, in the event of a given crisis, member states increase their efforts to seek the necessary political consensus;

10. Pursue its dialogue with the Maghreb countries and with Egypt and keep the Assembly informed;

11. Establish a dialogue with the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN);

12. Contribute to the repatriation of foreigners obliged to leave Yemen on account of the civil war.
Explanatory Memorandum
(submitted by Mr. de Puig, Rapporteur)

I. Introduction

1. Paradoxically, all who fervently hoped that, with the end of East-West confrontation and the (conventional and nuclear) arms race between the two alliances led by the United States and the Soviet Union, a lasting peace would emerge under the rule of law and a new world order were mistaken. On the contrary, innumerable disputes, conflicts and tensions have arisen in many parts of the world, but also in Europe itself. The situation is such that people are already referring to world disorder and the notion of peace-keeping has already become a far more topical term than was the case during the cold war period.

2. The ambitions of Western European countries to see Europe become a prime factor of stability, security and peace in the world, capable, if necessary, of "exporting" security to other regions of the world, have practically collapsed in the light of the total failure resulting from their incapacity to reach agreement on a policy for avoiding the bloody conflict that has raged in the past three years among the peoples of former Yugoslavia and subsequently putting an end to continuing hostilities in the immediate vicinity.

3. Preventing crises, assuring international peace and security, opposing all policies of aggression, defending basic human rights, democratic principles, civil and individual liberties and the rule of law: such were the principles on which the countries of Western Europe were founded almost forty years ago as a result of their concluding a treaty of legitimate collective defence which bound them not only to accept responsibilities for security and peace in Europe itself, but also to react to any situation that might constitute a threat to peace in whichever part of the world this might arise. In the present situation the question must therefore be asked as to how and by what means Western European Union and its member countries are fulfilling their wide-ranging obligations under the treaty which attributes heavy responsibilities to all the member states in the WEU Council.

II. The activities of the WEU Council

4. With the exception of an allusion to the situation in former Yugoslavia, a study of the declaration of the WEU Council of Ministers issued in Luxembourg on 22nd November last reveals no specific mention of the existence of dangers or conflicts in the world likely to affect the security of Europe. On the subject of the crisis in the Balkans the WEU Council merely refers to the conclusions already reached by the Council of Ministers of the Twelve, which met immediately prior to the WEU Council and to which meeting the WEU Secretary-General was not even invited. Moreover the Ministers hailed the progress of democracy in the countries of the former Soviet Union, stressing the importance of the parliamentary elections in Russia and Ukraine. In conclusion the declaration contained a brief reference to the Council's contacts with the Maghreb countries.

5. The declaration issued after the NATO summit meeting on 10th January 1994 on the other hand identifies certain causes of instability, tension and conflict by referring specifically to the dangers arising from the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery which, according to NATO, constitute not simply a risk, but a "threat to international security". It mentions also, as giving cause for concern: international terrorism, the denuclearisation of Ukraine, the situation in the southern Caucasus and that in Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia. Although it certainly does not provide a complete and systematic assessment of the risks and threats that could affect world security and particularly security in Europe, the NATO summit meeting declaration at least has the merit of drawing the attention of public opinion to several specific problems and risks.

6. The last WEU ministerial meeting in Luxembourg was given over in large part to examining WEU's role after the entry into force of the Maastricht Treaty and its contribution to the NATO summit meeting, but with the aim of persuading public opinion of the essential nature of the projects WEU was striving to achieve, in particular in the areas of peace-keeping and crisis-management. WEU's Luxembourg declaration would certainly have been much more convincing, however, if it had included a general assessment of the dangers to peace and security in Europe, which, under the organisation's treaty, it is WEU's primary task to safeguard. In the absence of such an assessment, the impression is increasingly conveyed that WEU has indeed abandoned the exercise of its basic responsibilities to the authorities of the Atlantic Alliance or the European Union.
7. Certain signs however seem to indicate that the Council and its subsidiary organs are taking a considerable number of initiatives on which it is reluctant to provide information if not expressly requested to do so. Thus it emerges from the Council’s reply to Recommendation 549 on political relations between the United Nations and WEU and their consequences for the development of WEU:

"... that the Chiefs of Defence Staff, basing themselves on an initial report by the Defence Representatives Group on the European security implications of military changes in the former Soviet Union, have proposed that the scope of this study be extended.

The DRG has had an exchange of views on a French contribution entitled "Study of crisis areas on Europe’s periphery", the main conclusions being that to take into account those factors of more specific concern to the security of Europe – and in particular the role of WEU – WEU must now analyse in detail:

- the risks of a crisis in the area of the member countries of the Forum of Consultation;
- the instability and risks existing in the countries bordering the member, associate or observer states;
- the overall problem of security in the Mediterranean.

The practicalities and appropriate methodology for this work is on the DRG’s agenda."

It is clear that the Assembly is very interested to know the outcome of these discussions.

8. Moreover, in its reply to Recommendation 548 on WEU’s relations with Central and Eastern European countries by which it invited the Forum of Consultation inter alia to undertake "the joint elaboration of risk and threat assessment" the Council undertook a commitment vis-à-vis the Assembly and reserved the option of placing "the joint elaboration of risk and threat assessment" on the agenda of the Counsellors’ Group of the Forum of Consultation.

9. As to the conflict in former Yugoslavia, WEU had developed contingency plans in particular with regard to the possible creation of safe areas; these plans had been transmitted to the United Nations and the CSCE but without any practical action being taken upon them. WEU’s current role in this area is confined to continued operations in relation to the embargo on the Danube, Operation Sharp Guard in the Adriatic and to lending support, at the request of the ministers of the European Union, to the administration of Mostar with a view to organising a police force and improving certain essential logistic functions, especially in the medical field. However, it appears that WEU’s contribution in this connection is still in its study phase.

10. The second part of the Council’s thirty-ninth annual report to the Assembly states that the Planning Cell has undertaken various work and studies in crisis-management which are worthy of note. These consist specifically of:

"Studies on possible WEU participation in former Yugoslavia: at the Council meeting on 6th July 1993, the Planning Cell was tasked to study the possibility of participation of the WEU member countries in the protection of safe areas. For that, a questionnaire was submitted to nations in order to find out which forces nations might be willing to provide. Most of the answers received were negative."

11. In point of fact, such a result requires several urgent clarifications: if the majority of member countries are not ready to make forces available for the protection of safe areas in former Yugoslavia, it should come as no suprise that WEU and the whole of Western Europe are being increasingly marginalised in the management of this crisis.

12. What use is served therefore by the research into the role of WEU in peace-keeping that the Special Working Group has undertaken on the basis of a study document initiated by the Italian Delegation? It emerges from the last annual report of the Council that a document on this subject was submitted as a report from the Chairmanship-in-Office to the ministers of WEU who took note. But what was the outcome?

13. The last annual report of the Council also reveals that a major study is in progress on "missions for WEU forces in the areas of humanitarian, peace-keeping and peace-making operations." If, as the annual report states, the Planning Cell has already prepared preliminary projects for the first two types of mission, it is imperative to ensure that everything is done to develop them to the full and that the Assembly is informed of this.

14. The document on intelligence policy prepared by the Group of Representatives of the Defence Ministers with the assistance of the Planning Cell should also be noted, given that intelligence is an essential tool in crisis-prevention. Similarly, it is most welcome to learn that the work of the Open Skies Group has progressed substantially. According to the annual report of the Council, approaches have been made to third parties with a view to their accession to an initial series of operational rules for a cluster of joint observation

systems within the framework of WEU. It is to be hoped that work on the feasibility of the WEU European space-based observation system will yield definitive results this year.

15. In particular the fact should be welcomed that the annual report refers to in-depth consideration of European thinking on anti-missile defence in the framework of the activities of the Special Working Group of the Council. It was, in part, the symposium organised by the Assembly in Rome in March 1993 which led to the Council's taking the following decision:

"Given the change of direction in American government policy, it was decided to stop using the term "GPS" in SWG documents and to take over the term "anti-missile defence" used by the Assembly. The group agreed that WEU should concentrate on the defence aspects, having regard to the work carried out in other bodies on non-proliferation. The group decided initially to recommend to the Council that a meeting of experts be held to prepare a risk analysis. The resulting document would then be submitted to the Special Working Group."

16. In point of fact, the area of proliferation was where the competent organisations ought to show the greatest vigilance with a view to taking appropriate measures to prevent risks arising from the activities of certain countries in this connection becoming a threat.

III. Real and potential risks to European security

(a) The dangers of proliferation

17. The dangers arising from the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery and from the nuclear programmes of certain countries which have not signed the non-proliferation treaty or are not ready to submit their programmes to the scrutiny of the IAEA stem mainly from activities of China and North Korea as exporters of nuclear technology and ballistic missiles to the countries of the third world, among which India and Pakistan in particular are in the process of developing ambitious programmes for acquiring nuclear capability. Neither of the latter has as yet signed the nuclear non-proliferation treaty.

18. Tension in the Korean peninsula remains high as a result of uncertainties over North Korea's intentions about seeking to acquire a nuclear capability, refusing to allow inspection of its installations by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and threatening finally to withdraw from the nuclear non-proliferation treaty and from the Joint Amnesty Committee. For a time North Korea was even on maximum alert. To strengthen protection of South Korea, American Patriot anti-missile missiles have been deployed in South Korea. Efforts to find a way forward out of a major crisis will depend not only on the evolution of domestic policy in North Korea but also on China's policy within the United Nations Security Council. However this is also primarily a diplomatic problem for the United States which North Korea still regards as its principal adversary. Furthermore North Korea is one of the countries making major efforts to acquire ballistic missile capabilities and to export them.

19. Régimes apparently hostile to the West, such as Iran, Iraq or Libya, are also customers for non-conventional technology from China, North Korea or Russia. To illustrate the justifications put forward by certain countries to explain their activities in nuclear weaponry, suffice it to recall that in India, the former chief of staff of the armed forces declared himself in favour of "minimum deterrence", based on missiles and nuclear arms, in order to discourage "American intimidation" and prevent "possible racist aggression" from the West. Europe's vulnerability in the face of risks from ballistic weapons acquired by "hostile" countries could be increased by the development of very low-altitude "poor man's cruise missiles", which are extremely difficult to detect. Iraq, Iran, North Korea, Indonesia and Pakistan are among the countries seeking to acquire such capabilities.

20. More specifically as regards Iran, where the régime is considered to be unstable, the country has recently been suspected of supporting certain terrorist groups such as the IRA and of having supplied them with armaments – an allegation which the Iranian authorities have nonetheless categorically denied. Rumour also has it that the Iranian authorities have financed Islamic terrorist groups in Sudan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, Israel and in the Maghreb countries.

21. Alongside these dangers is also that of clandestine proliferation of the nuclear technology and technical know-how of the former Soviet Union, even after the signature, on 14th January 1994, of the trilateral agreement between the United States, Russia and Ukraine on the denuclearisation of the latter and the transfer of the Ukrainian nuclear warheads to Russia for destruction. This agreement opens the way for Ukraine to become a signatory of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty, although this has yet to happen.

22. The NATO summit took the decision to "intensify and expand NATO's political and defence efforts against proliferation": the first based inter alia on a ten-point plan put forward on
15th December last by the German Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Kinkel, and the second on a proposal by the American Defence Secretary, Mr. Aspin. The Kinkel plan is founded mainly on preventive measures and proposes that all countries sign the non-proliferation treaty and the convention on chemical and biological weapons, which still has to be supplemented by verification measures.

23. It further provides for:

- renewal, in 1995, of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty for an indefinite term;
- a strategy for the avoidance of nuclear contamination by regional confidence measures similar to those of the CSCE;
- transplantation of the CSCE model to four other regions of the world where regional security forums should be created;
- establishing international co-operation in controlling the exportation of armaments;
- increasing financial resources available for eliminating weapons of mass destruction;
- creation of a system of control for plutonium;
- conclusion of a comprehensive test ban treaty;
- limitation of the measures of military coercion provided for under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter solely to cases of serious threat to international peace and security.

24. Mr. Aspin's proposals tended rather more in the direction of a "counter proliferation" initiative, the first aim of which was to guarantee protection against the risk of attack from weapons of mass destruction, either by maintaining small nuclear arsenals and a system of protection against chemical and biological weapons or by acquiring the means to detect missile deployment, possibly by creating a tactical anti-missile system compatible with the provisions of the ABM treaty, and by strengthening the means of intelligence.

25. It is clear that the two approaches - political and military - in the struggle against the dangers of proliferation fall squarely within WEU's areas of responsibility and expertise, and the Council cannot dissociate itself from them by leaving the essential part of the discussion and preparation of decisions to the authorities of the alliance or the European Union. It is therefore necessary to strengthen the position of the WEU Secretary-General who has recalled that Europe (and WEU) have experience and know-how appropriate to the creation of an early-warning and surveillance system and the development of appropriate defences. WEU should therefore, logically, consider the development of an ABM defence system as a continuation of its own space programme. However it should also make a major contribution to the political aspects of the issue. This relates particularly to armaments exports where common rules can be found only in a forum able to harmonise the defence interests of the various member countries. This forum is WEU, not the European Union.

26. For one should not neglect the risks of a return to a conventional arms race in certain regions of the world. While the Twelve have so far been unable to agree on common rules on the exportation of dual-use equipment and armaments, there has been a perceptible increase in exports from Russia, particularly to countries such as China, India, Iran, the United Arab Emirates and Syria, and also to Turkey. With a view to restricting unauthorised exports, Russia has strengthened control over its sale of armaments abroad in order to offset the sharp fall in exports that followed the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Moreover, it intends to offer much more advantageous terms for the sale of arms to all CIS countries ready to join it in an economic union. More recently Russia signed a military co-operation agreement with Syria, opening up the possibility of resuming armaments sales to that country. In the past the Soviet Union was the principal supplier of arms to Syria.

(b) Regional tension and conflicts

27. It should first be noted in the context of an assessment of the various loci of instability and conflict that have developed in the world since the end of the cold war that there are at least two conflicts in which NATO member countries are directly involved: one concerns Turkey (soon to become an associate member of WEU) and its Kurdish problem and the other Greece (member of the European Union and soon to be a full member of WEU) and its quarrel over the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. Also it must not be forgotten that Turkey and Greece are still opposed to one another in bilateral disputes, such as that over Cyprus, for which a final settlement has never been reached. So far, it has been possible for the WEU "family" to keep away from

5. NZZ, 22nd February 1994.
domestic conflict and retain the unity essential to its rôle as a major factor of stability in Europe and the world; no effort should therefore be spared in avoiding bilateral conflicts between members and third countries that might jeopardise that unity. The example of the dispute between Greece and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia clearly demonstrates how difficult this may prove, as members of the Presidential Committee were able to ascertain during their recent visit to Athens.

28. With particular regard to Turkey, it should be recalled that the in-depth report submitted by Mr. Moya on behalf of the Political Committee on 30th November 1992 7 did not fail to address the Kurdish question and the Turkish occupation of Northern Cyprus. On this latter issue it should be recalled that a joint communiqué was issued by the Turkish and Greek Prime Ministers in Davos, on 1st February 1992, according to which both parties stated their common objective of quickly reaching a fair and lasting negotiated settlement on Cyprus. Also one should not forget the extremely useful rôle of the Council of Europe which uses its influence and every means to ensure that Turkey conforms to the principles recognised by the European democratic community of which it intends to remain a member.

29. In the case of Greece it is more specifically through the mechanisms of the European Union that disputes such as those between Greece and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) can be resolved by diplomatic means rather than by force.

30. The conflict in Bosnia and recent events in the town of Gorazde are again swelling the toll of victims – already numbering hundreds of thousands – of the slaughter and violence, with no political or military solution yet in sight. There is a constant danger that the conflict may spread to neighbouring regions where the situation continues to be sensitive. In this context several new factors in the conflict should be borne in mind. Firstly Russia's increased involvement in this matter which has led to a heavy bilateral weighting in the management of the crisis in favour of the United States and Russia and the marginalisation not only of the United Nations but also the European institutions. Another factor is the Muslim dimension of the conflict which threatens to cause a deterioration in relations between the Islamic world and the West.

31. Such a development could have extremely negative repercussions for crises and flashpoints in several regions of the Islamic world: in Kashmir, India, the border between Pakistan and Afghanistan and inside Egypt and Algeria. It is therefore increasingly important for the European Union and WEU to continue and intensify their dialogue with the Maghreb countries, indispensable for security in the Mediterranean and also for the whole of Europe.

32. With the prospect of links being strengthened between the Central European countries, the European Union and WEU in the near future, it should not be forgotten that bilateral differences persist between some of these countries – namely Hungary's dispute with Romania and Slovakia over their Hungarian minorities and also certain problems over minorities between Poland and Lithuania, which nevertheless seem to have been resolved recently, and between Romania and Ukraine. In the Baltic countries, there is still tension between Estonia and Russia both as regards the withdrawal of Russian troops and also the rights of the Russian-speaking populations and the borders to the north and east of the town of Narva, as a result of differing interpretations by the two countries of the Tartu peace treaty signed in 1920.

33. A large part of the problems between Latvia and Russia have been settled recently, in particular the complete withdrawal of the Russian troops which had been stationed in the country by 31st August 1994. The two countries have agreed that Russia will maintain the anti-missile warning station at Skrunda for four years and on an arrangement for granting retired Russian soldiers the right to remain in Latvia. However Latvia is raising the issue of the interpretation of the Treaty of Riga on its borders with Russia signed in 1920.

34. The differences between Lithuania and Russia principally relate to the problem of the major concentration of Russian troops in the Kaliningrad region. Russia still has the 14th army stationed in the Dnestr region in Moldova, despite efforts within the CSCE to encourage negotiations for the complete withdrawal of the Russian troops. However Russia, which considers the presence of the 14th army as a stabilising factor in the region, seems in no hurry to move in this direction.

35. In the context of the many conflicts raging in the territory of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) – in particular, the southern Caucasus region, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Nagorno-Karabakh; also the problems in Tajikistan – Russia continues to demand priority in the settlement of these conflicts (for example it has demanded five military bases in the southern Caucasus, three in Georgia, one in Armenia and one in Azerbaijan 8. This should lead the United Nations

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and the CSCE, in particular, to insist that peacekeeping and crisis-management missions should be carried out in these regions under the authority of these organisations and in accordance with the rules they have established.

36. If Russia does not wish the notion of "near abroad", which includes the whole of the territory of the former Soviet Union, including that of the Baltic states, to be regarded as a new Brezhnev doctrine, it must clarify what it means exactly. This notion is worrying a number of the countries concerned, in particular Ukraine whose independence has still not yet won universal acceptance. In this connection it should not be forgotten that some 25 million Russians live on "near abroad" territory and that Russian troops are stationed in Ukraine, Belarus, Estonia, Latvia, Moldova, the Caucasus, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Kirgizstan.

37. Moreover, the dispute between Russia and Ukraine on the division of the Black Sea Fleet is still not settled in spite of preliminary agreements reached in Moscow on 15th April 1994 between Presidents Yeltsin and Kravchuk which allocated 80 to 85% of the fleet to Russia.

38. On the settlement of conflicts on the territory of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), it should be noted that Russia, in a declaration issued in Moscow on 29th March 1994, bearing the joint signatures of the Russian Foreign and Defence Ministers, said that it would inform the United Nations and the CSCE of any peacekeeping operations it undertook within the CIS but that it had no need of their permission. Neither the United Nations nor the CSCE nor the major western political leaders approved this attitude. The French Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Juppe, among others, stated that Russia should not undertake such operations without a formal decision by those international bodies, such as the United Nations or the CSCE, which have the competence and rôle to pronounce on such issues.

39. Furthermore one has to ask what is the significance of the new Russian military doctrine which states that "Russia will not use its armed forces or its other troops against any state whatsoever except in individual or collective self-defence, in the event of armed attack against the Russian Federation, its citizens, its territory, its armed forces, its other troops or its allies"?

40. Similarly one can only wonder about Russia's intentions when it declares it reserves the right, under its military doctrine, to use nuclear weapons "in the event of joint action by a non-nuclear state and one in possession of nuclear weapons, which ... commit an act of aggression against ... its armed forces and its other troops, or against its allies". There are therefore several reasons for wishing to maintain a permanent dialogue with Russia and to involve it in participating in the building of a collective security system so as to convince it that the outside world does not represent a danger to its security or legitimate interests; and also that a doctrine defending what were formerly known as "vital interests" can no longer have pride of place in modern international relations. A firm decision by Russia on participation in the NATO partnership for peace programme would be an important step towards reassuring the world that the fears recently expressed that Russia's rôle in security policy was becoming less and less predictable are without foundation.

41. The south-east Asia region is developing at an extremely rapid rate while much of its vast population remains in a state of dire poverty, thus giving rise to risks of conflict and dangers to peace which cannot be overlooked. A permanent dialogue between the European and Atlantic institutions with responsibility in security matters and the countries of south-east Asia, and in particular with the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN), would therefore be most desirable, as this group has always been a factor of stability in the region. Such a dialogue, in which WEU should participate, could help to remind this group of states of the collective responsibility it must assume for maintaining peace and for non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and also to strengthen a reciprocal exchange of information about all matters relating to security and defence policy.

IV. Instruments for crisis-prevention and management

42. The lessons of the war on the territory of former Yugoslavia have resulted in the common foreign and security policy bodies, at the initiative of France, taking an important measure in terms of preventive diplomacy, which therefore does not concern the countries engaged in open conflict. Thus, on a proposal by the French Prime Minister, Mr. Balladur, the European Union's common foreign and security policy authorities called a conference in Paris on 26th and 27th May 1994 in order to conclude a stability pact in Europe, a specific aim of which is to settle the problem of minorities and strengthen the inviolability of frontiers. This initiative is therefore initially addressed to the countries of Central Europe and the Baltic countries hoping in future to become members of the European Union and with which the Union

9. See full text of the declaration attached as an appendix.
has concluded or negotiated agreements. The aim of the project is to facilitate rapprochement and co-operation by the aforementioned states with the Union by helping them to comply with the conditions of membership.

43. The Union intends to invite to the "launch conference" the countries principally concerned by the initiative, the immediate neighbour countries of those countries, states likely to make a specific contribution to the development of the initiative, countries with an interest in the stability of Europe by virtue of their defence commitments and countries having association agreements with the Union (Albania, Austria, Belarus, Bulgaria, Canada, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, the Holy See, Hungary, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Moldova, Norway, Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine and the United States), also representatives of the international organisations concerned by the initiative (CSCE, Council of Europe, WEU, NATO and the United Nations). Other states participating in the CSCE in agreement with this concept and these procedures are also to be invited as observers.

44. The aim of this conference justifies the fact that it should be called at the initiative of the European Union. However, WEU should take an active part in it. It is to be hoped that a lasting solution will also be found to a number of conflicts between neighbours such as those referred to in paragraphs 32 to 34 above. Once ratified, these agreements will be transmitted to the CSCE in their entirety for safe keeping.

45. Indeed, the CSCE should be offered firm support because of its major functions in the area of preventive diplomacy and crisis-prevention. Clearly, the economic aspect of international cooperation plays a highly significant role in crisis-prevention and is an essential factor in encouraging certain countries to participate in disarmament, armaments control and non-proliferation agreements and in agreements limiting armaments exports and also if one wishes them to be involved in various confidence-building measures.

46. In this context the CSCE model has shown itself to be successful, since it has invariably taken economic aspects of security into account. The CSCE's activities in the area of preventive diplomacy have proved increasingly useful and effective in the various regions where its representatives have been active, although public opinion has hardly been aware of this. The Political Committee's meeting in Vienna with the Secretary-General of the CSCE has made a considerable contribution to improving its knowledge of the current missions of that organisation, particularly in the Baltic countries, former Yugoslavia and in the CIS countries.

47. However the CSCE can act only within the geographic limits of its fifty-three member states and it has no means of coercion. It cannot therefore exercise any influence on China or North Korea.

48. The United Nations is the only organisation with such means of coercion, but, as several crisis situations have demonstrated, it is, on the one hand, required to operate in too many parts of the globe and, on the other, it lacks the military resources for crisis-management. The use of troops made available by member states raises difficulties with regard to areas of responsibility and command structures. Moreover, there is insufficient agreement between member countries of the United Nations and especially within the Security Council on the legal bases and conditions for using force to restore peace.

49. Moreover, it is becoming urgent to define more clearly the responsibilities and competencies assigned to the military units deployed in a given region of crisis on the basis of a precise political objective determined by common agreement among all the countries participating in the operation. In this context, it is extremely interesting to note that, according to the report presented by the German Government to the Bundestag on the evolution of European integration between 1st July and 31st December 1993, the CFSP Working Group on Security drafted a document on the basis of German proposals on "mutually reinforcing institutions" which defines the criteria for better co-ordination between the United Nations, the CSCE, WEU, NATO and the Council of Europe as regards conflict-prevention and crisis-management. This document is to be revised in early 1994 before being submitted to the Council of Ministers.

50. It would be desirable not only to be informed of the result of this work but also to know to what extent WEU is taking part in it and what is its contribution.

51. One way or another, it will prove increasingly useful to draw on the means of military organisations such as NATO and, shortly, WEU, which are ready to act as necessary either at the request of the United Nations or at that of the CSCE. WEU in particular must speed up its implementation of the decisions taken at Petersberg, namely the establishment of units ready to participate in humanitarian and peace-keeping missions and also combat forces for crisis-management and operations to restore peace.

52. This is the essential condition for WEU's help being requested by the United Nations or the CSCE. According the Secretary-General of WEU, the latter might become involved in four types of peace-keeping operations:

WEU member countries might alone be invited to undertake operations in the event of their being better placed to do so than a wider European-Atlantic grouping;

- WEU could undertake operations in close co-ordination with another organisation (eg. operation Sharp Guard with NATO);
- it might constitute the operational command and control centre for missions in which non-member countries would also participate;
- it might take on the task of harmonising contributions from its member states to a United Nations operation, which was unfortunately not the case for the Somalia operation in which forces from several WEU member countries participated without any co-ordination being provided within the framework of WEU.

53. Still in the view of the Secretary-General of WEU, NATO would be the main player in the settlement of regional crises in Europe to which the United States was prepared to make a contribution. In other cases, in the absence of substantial United States participation, WEU might play a leading rôle in the area of peace-keeping and crisis-management, always within the framework of a United Nations mandate or in conformity with the Charter of that organisation.

54. However all of this will remain purely hypothetical if WEU does not quickly establish and bring into operational service the forces it terms forces answerable to WEU (FAWEU). WEU must move from the study stage to that of decision-taking in order to achieve all the plans being prepared which were described in Chapter II, with particular regard to strategic mobility, intelligence work, verification, space-based observation of the earth; in short, it must become truly operational if it is not to be just as powerless in the event of another challenge like the Yugo­slav one.

V. Conclusions

55. Up till now, when WEU has been the subject of discussion in political circles, in the media or in public opinion, reference has invariably been to its future rôle because its achievements, undeniable as they are, in certain specific areas are not yet substantial enough for politicians and public opinion to appreciate their full impact. Crisis-pre­vention, and even more so crisis-management, are areas which are absolutely central to WEU competency. However, WEU can play a credible and effective rôle in this area only if all the governments give a decisive political impetus to the achievement of the various projects to which the Council and its subsidiary organs are committed. While it is true that a major success is invariably essential to boost a feeling of self-worth, setbacks such as that Europe has suffered in the case of the conflict in former Yugoslavia can equally be effective in encouraging people to pull together and unite in a supreme effort.
The main argument of the advocates of such a vision of the Russian peace-making activities in neighbouring states is a thesis of supposedly "one-sided" assignment by Russia of her troops to unstable regions. Based on that thesis is a conclusion that the involvement of the world community in peace-keeping efforts aimed at unblocking conflicts in the territory of the former USSR should include monitoring the activities of Russia.

We do not want to exaggerate the significance of this policy in certain political and public circles both in the West and in the East. The leaders of the majority of countries demonstrate a responsible and sensible approach recognising the realistic and positive role of Russia in containing and settling crisis situations. As to peace-making operations in the CIS countries, Russia favours a real establishment of a truer and more solid partnership based on equality, mutual trust and respect, not stopping at mere declarations of intent.

For these reasons we consider it timely to draw attention to a number of political, international and legal aspects of principle of Russia's participation in peace-making activities in the CIS countries.

Russia's actions are directed only at stopping armed conflicts in a number of independent states, stabilising the situation there and creating conditions for lasting and durable settlement. We are proud that the presence of Russian peace-making forces in "hot zones" prevented even more numerous victims among innocent civilians.

Our efforts are being taken in the context of a dramatically serious economic and financial situation in Russia itself; diverting considerable resources for peace-making purposes over the last ten months alone amounted to 26 billion roubles (though it is difficult to make an accurate calculation and one should take into account inadequate provision of our "peace-making forces" as compared with the United Nations Blue Helmets). More than 15,000 Russian servicemen are stationed in hot spots in the CIS member states.

Peace-making as such in the CIS countries is not "a purely Russian initiative". In all cases without exception our actions are carried out at the request and with the consent of the relevant states and conflicting sides. Peace-making troops are sent on the basis of bilateral and multilateral agreements which comply with the rules of international law. This completely agrees with the provisions of the United Nations Charter, according to which a possibility of dealing with matters of peace-making on the basis of agreements of the states concerned not only is accepted but welcomed (Article 52 of the United Nations Charter). The only exceptions are enforcement actions, which, according to Article 53 of the United Nations Charter, should be taken under the Security Council's authority. But all current peace-making operations on the territory of the former USSR do not fall under this provision, because they do not involve enforcement and are taken with the consent of all conflicting sides. The United Nations and the CSCE are informed on these operations on a regular basis.

Russia is consistently favouring the widest involvement of the United Nations and the CSCE in the settlement of conflicts in the CIS countries. There is no need, however, for any "permission" on the part of the United Nations and the CSCE to conduct peace-making operations in accordance with the abovementioned criteria, in which Russia and its neighbours take part. The operations are carried out on the basis of the sovereign rights of respective states enshrined in the United Nations Charter and do not require additional legitimisation. It is true, however, that the co-operation with the United Nations and the CSCE and their active and substantive support of Russia's and its neighbours' peace-making efforts could really facilitate more effective and faster settlement of conflicts. This is what we stand for when we suggest that the United Nations and the CSCE should interact with the peace-making operations in the CIS countries in different forms, including sending of missions, observers, advisers, etc. Russia will be
ready to participate also in peace-making operations by the United Nations and the CSCE in the territory of the former USSR if the parties to any conflict ask those organisations to start such operations and if a decision on their carrying out is taken.

Meanwhile, it has to be noted that the repeated appeals of the CIS countries for support from the United Nations and the CSCE (in particular in connection with conflicts in Abkhazia and Tajikistan) are still awaiting the appropriate reaction. Therefore, the agreements between Russia and its neighbours as well as mechanisms created within the CIS remain major peace-making instruments in this region. It is thanks to them that the tasks of maintaining there international peace and security that constitute an integral part of the global process of ensuring global stability are being solved. The international community must acknowledge this objective reality and proceed to a closer interaction with Russia and its neighbours. This, by the way, would help all "those in doubt" see the "transparency" of the peace-making operations and the groundlessness of suspicions in this respect.

Being consistent in its efforts to ensure peace and stability around its frontiers and within the CIS, Russia does not intend to put obstacles in the way of others. We do not demand a special status or an exclusive rôle for ourselves, nor do we elude our responsibility for the situation in this region of key importance to Russia. We are ready to co-operate meaningfully in those questions with the United Nations, the CSCE and the international community at large.