The WEU Planning Cell

REPORT

submitted on behalf of the Defence Committee
by Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman, Rapporteur
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1. Adopted unanimously by the committee.
2. Members of the committee: Mr. Baudel (Chairman); MM. De Decker, de Puig (Vice-Chairmen); Mr. Alloncle, Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman, MM. Borderas, Briane, Brito, Chevalier, Cox, De Carolis, Dees, Dumont, Fernandes Marques, Ferrarini, Hardy, Irmer, Jacquat, Kelchtermans, Lecceis, Mrs. Lentz-Cornette, MM. van der Linden, Mannino, Marten, Lord Newall, MM. Pecchioli, Reis Leite, Scheer, Sir Dudley Smith, Sir Keith Speed, MM. Steiner, Lopez Valdivielso (Alternate: Lopez Henares), Vazquez, Zierer. N.B. The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.
Preface

In preparing the present report, your Rapporteur has been extremely fortunate to receive much kind help and assistance from all the authorities consulted and she would like to take this opportunity publicly to thank all concerned for their co-operation.

The Rapporteur met or received evidence from the following:

3rd February 1994 – WEU, Brussels

Mr. Willem van Eekelen, Secretary-General of WEU;
Lieutenant-General Marcello Caltabiano, Director of the WEU Planning Cell;
Brigadier-General Roux, Deputy Director of the WEU Planning Cell;
Group Captain Rimmer, Co-ordination section, WEU Planning Cell;
Colonel De Jaeger, Executive Officer;

and the heads of the different sections of the Planning Cell:
Captain Figueiredo;
Colonel Oliver;
Captain Poesze;
Colonel Wolters;

4th February 1994 – SHAPE, Mons

General Waters, United Kingdom Army, Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe (DSACEUR);
Ambassador Vernon D. Penner, Minister-Counsellor, International Affairs Advisor to SACEUR;
Vice Admiral Spinozzi, Italian Navy, Deputy Chief of Staff;
Major General Kehoe, United States Airforce, Assistant Chief of Staff, Operations and Logistics Division;
Brigadier General Schott, German Army, Chief Policy Branch;
Brigadier General Lange, Danish Army, Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff, Allied Command Europe Resources;
Mr. Harry Brown, Special Assistant for Politico-Military affairs;

25th March 1994 – The Hague

Mr. Bert Kwast, Ministry of Defence;
Mr. Pieter de Savornin Lohman, Ministry for Foreign Affairs;

5th May 1994 – Brussels

Mr. Julian Miller, United Kingdom permanent representation at NATO;
Group Captain Rimmer, Co-ordination section, WEU Planning Cell;
Colonel Wolters, Chief of section, Logistics, Movement and Finance Section, WEU Planning Cell.
Draft Recommendation
on the WEU Planning Cell

The Assembly,

(i) Considering Article J.4 of the Maastricht Treaty and the decision contained in the declaration of the member states of WEU at Maastricht on 10th December 1991 to develop WEU as the defence component of the European Union and as the means to strengthen the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance;

(ii) Considering the Petersberg declaration of 19th June 1992 on strengthening WEU’s operational rôle through the establishment of a Planning Cell with a number of operational tasks;

(iii) Welcoming the fact that, in the Kirchberg declaration of 9th May 1994, the Council of Ministers of WEU has confirmed the importance which it attaches to the continued operational development of WEU;

(iv) Welcoming the decisions taken at the NATO summit meeting in Brussels on 10th-11th January 1994 giving full support to the development of a European security and defence identity and to the strengthening of the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance through Western European Union as the defence component of the European Union;

(v) Welcoming the NATO summit meeting’s decision to endorse the concept of combined joint task forces (CJTF) which will provide separable but not separate military capabilities that could be employed by NATO or WEU;

(vi) Considering that the abovementioned decisions will make sense only if the Council attaches the highest priority to strengthening WEU’s operational rôle;

(vii) Noting, however, that a clear definition of WEU’s requirements for the implementation of the CJTF concept will have to be accompanied by the establishment of a clear command and control structure providing the indispensable political-military interface for WEU operations in view of the vital importance of the CJTF concept for the relevance and effectiveness of future WEU activities and operations;

(viii) Considering that in order to be able to operate in a satisfactory way, WEU will have to benefit from NATO and national intelligence;

(ix) Stressing that the Planning Cell should have appropriate infrastructure and communication links with NATO which would allow WEU to perform its tasks as stated in the final communiqué of NATO’s January 1994 Brussels summit meeting;

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Attach the highest priority to the formulation of a common European defence policy in order to provide a clear reference framework for the activities of the Planning Cell and all other organs of WEU;

2. For the time being, allow the Planning Cell to concentrate on the three main tasks as formulated in the Petersberg declaration:
   - keeping an updated list of units and combination of units which would be allocated to WEU for specific operations;
   - preparing contingency plans for employment of forces under WEU auspices;
   - preparing recommendations for the necessary command, control and communication arrangements, including standing operating procedures for headquarters which might be selected;
while ensuring that it can fully participate in, and furthermore work on, the implementation process of the CJTF concept which is vital for WEU’s operational rôle;

3. Ensure that national capitals provide full co-operation with the Planning Cell and urgently settle the remaining shortcomings in relations between the Planning Cell and NATO in order to help the Planning Cell implement its basic tasks;

4. Further promote the extension of existing contacts and exchanges of information between WEU and the United Nations and, in particular, between the WEU Planning Cell and the United Nations Secretary-General’s Military Adviser in New York;
5. For the planning and possible implementation of peace support operations, adopt the terminology employed in the United Nations Agenda for Peace;

6. Avoid the multiplication of mandates given to the Planning Cell, if this is not accompanied by a corresponding enlargement of its staff;

7. After assessing the Planning Cell’s activities and its internal organisation by 1st October 1994, make the basic choice between maintaining the present military liaison group with limited capability or establishing a military planning centre which should be able to carry out the numerous planning tasks and other activities which the Council may have in mind;

8. Ensure that the rotation of Planning Cell personnel will be achieved with a minimum of discontinuity;

9. Promote the internal coherence of the Planning Cell by ensuring that all staff members are remunerated in accordance with standards similar to those used for all other WEU staff.
Explanatory Memorandum
(submitted by Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman, Rapporteur)

I. Introduction

1. It is about a year ago now that the Planning Cell was officially granted its full operational capability. According to the Secretary-General’s initial timetable, a full review of the internal organisation and activities of the Planning Cell should be made by 1st October 1994.

2. In the past year, the Assembly, which has welcomed and supported the establishment of a Planning Cell as a valuable contribution to WEU’s operational capability, has closely followed its activities.

3. At this juncture, it seems useful to present a first succinct evaluation of the Planning Cell’s activities as seen by the Assembly and to offer some indications and recommendations for the way ahead. The present report does not, and cannot, claim to be exhaustive. It is therefore focused on a number of issues which are considered to be of primordial importance for the development of WEU’s operational capabilities and the proper functioning of the Planning Cell in that framework.

II. Establishment and tasks

4. On 19th June 1992, the Council of WEU meeting in Petersberg decided that on 1st October of that same year, a planning cell would be established under the authority of the Council.

5. According to the Petersberg declaration, the Planning Cell would be responsible for:
   - preparing contingency plans for the employment of forces under WEU auspices;
   - preparing recommendations for the necessary command, control and communication arrangements, including standing operating procedures for headquarters which might be selected;
   - keeping an updated list of units and combinations of units which would be allocated to WEU for specific operations.

6. In the terms of reference for the Planning Cell, the following additional tasks and responsibilities are mentioned:
   - compile an inventory of rules of engagement;
   - prepare standard operating procedures for the selected headquarters;
   - prepare exercise plans and evaluate the results of exercises for future planning;
   - contribute its expertise to wider reflections on the development of a military capability for WEU.

7. In an emergency crisis, it would further have to:
   - provide advice to the WEU authorities on the practicability and nature of any WEU involvement;
   - co-ordinate the preparation of deployment of forces under WEU auspices until this function is assumed by a nominated joint headquarters.

8. The Planning Cell is responsible to the Council which, in peacetime, will issue overall directives on planning options and priorities to the Planning Cell. The Director reports to the Council following prior examination of the work by the WEU Chiefs of Defence staff or by the representatives of member countries’ military authorities.

9. According to its terms of reference, the Planning Cell needs to ensure, through liaison with the appropriate authorities, that it is able to monitor the situation in potential trouble-spots and follow its development.

10. Since the Planning Cell was considered to be the focus for contingency planning involving WEU forces, it would have to ensure that it had satisfactory contacts and communications with nations and national headquarters staffs, headquarters nominated for military operations under WEU auspices, as well as with other international bodies and organisations which might have a rôle in possible contingencies.

11. The Planning Cell would also have to liaise as necessary with the Secretariat-General, the Defence Representatives Group and other appropriate sub-groups of the Council and with the WEU Satellite Centre.

12. The work of the Planning Cell was distributed among the following five sections, each of which has a number of main tasks:

(i) Co-ordination section

   Responsible for the internal co-ordination, as well as the external co-ordination of military matters with nations, the European Union, NATO and other international organisations and conferences.
(ii) Planning section

The main tasks of this section are:
- to develop operational concepts for the employment of military forces answerable to WEU;
- to prepare and update broad operational plans for contingencies which may be undertaken by forces under WEU;
- to maintain details of forces which nations may be prepared to make available for WEU operations on a case-by-case basis;
- to develop forces packages which will relate available forces to planned contingencies;
- to contribute its expertise to wider reflections on the development of a military capability for WEU;
- to prepare in crises, the directive to the chosen commander of WEU forces, for approval by the WEU Council.

(iii) Operations and exercises section

This section must develop the more detailed application of the broad operational plans for contingencies prepared by the planning section.

It also formulates WEU exercise requirements and co-ordinates multinational exercise plans and schedules, as necessary, to meet possible WEU contingencies.

Finally, it is expected to consult with respective NATO bodies and member nations in monitoring areas of possible crisis or conflict and in the formulation of intelligence and information requirements which need to be met for each specific contingency.

(iv) Logistics and movements section

This section is supposed to contribute to all contingency plans for "forces answerable to WEU" and define appropriate arrangements on manpower, supplies, movements, medical support and financial aspects.

It has to develop logistics plans for ensuring an adequate logistics posture of forces answerable to WEU and at the same time to monitor developments in the fields of strategic transport for deployment and resupply.

Furthermore, it has to hold consultations on logistics and movement with respective NATO bodies and facilities of member nations and formulate the requirements which need to be met for each specific contingency.

(v) Communications section

It must contribute to all contingency plans for "forces answerable to WEU", define appropriate arrangements for command, control, information systems, interoperability and requirements for communication and electronics for respective contingency plans.

As well as this, it is supposed to consider developments in communications within the alliance and nations to ensure the best possible awareness of available installations and formations, consult with respective national and NATO bodies to co-ordinate the defined requirements for contingency plans and support the Planning Cell in all matters of computer security and long lines (PTT) leasing policy and practices.

13. For this rather ambitious programme of tasks, a total number of 40 staff members was allocated to the Planning Cell.

14. In October 1992, the Director, with a limited number of staff members, started to prepare the work of the Planning Cell in a temporary location. While full operational capability was initially envisaged for 1st April 1993, the Planning Cell moved to its final location within the WEU headquarters on 22nd June 1993, where certain material and other working conditions have not yet been introduced.

15. Meanwhile, it should be noted that, at its Luxembourg meeting on 9th May 1994, the Council decided that the new Central European associate partners of WEU may have a liaison arrangement with the Planning Cell.

16. At the same time, it was made known that the associate members of Iceland, Norway and Turkey "may nominate officers to the Planning Cell in order to increase WEU's planning capabilities and to enable WEU to draw more easily on the associate members' expertise and resources for the tasks identified in the Petersberg declaration".

III. An early vision of Planning Cell activities

17. The description of the Planning Cell's main tasks as set out in the Petersberg declaration had necessarily been rather general, but the newly-appointed Director, Lieutenant-General Marcello Caltabiano, when taking up his responsibilities in October 1992, had to concentrate on reality and work out what should be the initial priority tasks.

18. At the invitation of the WEU Assembly's Defence Committee, the Director of the Planning Cell addressed the committee for the first time at its meeting on 25th January 1993, providing his
first opinion on what could be done and how. General Caltabiano thought it was difficult to define precisely WEU’s geographical area of interest, but he assumed that it would primarily be in areas fairly close to Europe.

19. Interaction of the Planning Cell with equivalent structures such as NATO and the United Nations would be paramount for achieving military efficiency and all possible steps should be taken to establish clear relationships and to coordinate with such bodies to avoid duplication.

20. He emphasised that the Planning Cell’s first task should focus on the creation and maintenance of an updated list of units and combinations of units which nations might, on an ad hoc basis, make available for operations under the aegis of WEU.

21. The second task would be to prepare recommendations for the necessary command and control arrangements required for any WEU operation.

22. Another priority was the preparation of rules of engagement for use in military operations which should have commonality with NATO rules of engagement in order to avoid the dangers of ambiguity and unnecessary duplication of effort. On the other hand, further work was required in order to ensure that WEU rules of engagement would be sufficiently flexible to take account of possible specific WEU missions.

23. An exercise policy would have to be formulated in the longer term, given the need for extensive consultation between nations and the need for co-ordination with existing national and multinational exercises. The Director’s aim was to mount a modest command-post exercise by the beginning of 1994 and full field training exercises by the middle of the 1990s.

24. At that moment, the Director found it difficult to foresee full operational capability for the Planning Cell by 1st April 1994. He also saw problems in the field of budgetary calculations since it was virtually impossible to see what the costs would be.

25. He finally stressed that the Planning Cell would include representatives from all armies which should allow it to respond to any request for military advice, but he also pointed out that the military needed political guidelines which he hoped would be forthcoming. A first necessity for WEU might be to define a “common intervention policy” to serve “common European interests”.

26. In the conclusions to this report, an assessment will be made of the implementation of these priority tasks.

IV. Forces answerable to WEU (FAWEU)

27. When Europeans started to talk seriously about WEU as a European defence organisation, the ultimate argument of the opponents time and again was that WEU did not have a military organisation or an integrated military structure and that it had no troops.

28. It is no surprise, therefore, that after the signature of the Maastricht Treaty with Article J.4 on the development of a common foreign and security policy “including the eventual framing of a common defence policy, which might in time lead to a common defence”, the Council of Ministers had to take a closer look at this flaw.

29. The first steps were taken in the Petersberg declaration of 19th June 1992 which set the general framework for military units answerable to WEU in order to strengthen its operational rôle in the following paragraphs from Chapter II of the declaration:

"2. WEU member states declare that they are prepared to make available military units from the whole spectrum of their conventional armed forces for military tasks conducted under the authority of WEU.

3. Decisions to use military units answerable to WEU will be taken by the WEU Council in accordance with the provisions of the United Nations Charter. Participation in specific operations will remain a sovereign decision of member states in accordance with national constitutions.

4. Apart from contributing to the common defence in accordance with Article 5 of the Washington Treaty and Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty respectively, military units of WEU member states, acting under the authority of WEU, could be employed for:
   — humanitarian and rescue tasks;
   — peace-keeping tasks;
   — tasks of combat forces in crisis-management, including peace-making.

5. The planning and execution of these tasks will be fully compatible with the military dispositions necessary to ensure the collective defence of all allies.

6. Military units will be drawn from the forces of WEU member states, including forces with NATO missions – in this case after consultation with NATO – and will be organised on a multinational and multi-service basis.

7. All WEU member states will soon designate which of their military units and
headquarters they would be willing to make available to WEU for its various possible tasks. Where multinational formations drawn from the forces of WEU nations already exist or are planned, these units could be made available for use under the authority of WEU, with agreement of all participating nations.

8. WEU member states intend to develop and exercise the appropriate capabilities to enable the deployment of WEU military units by land, sea or air to accomplish these tasks.”

30. In fact, however, the designation of such forces answerable to WEU appeared to be more complicated than was thought initially. At its meeting in Rome on 19th May 1993 the WEU Council of Ministers “took note of the report of the Defence Representatives Group and mandated the Permanent Council to reach timely conclusions and to present a progress report to the next ministerial meeting on the forces answerable to WEU, in particular for the conduct of humanitarian and peace-keeping operations.”

31. The third task of such forces as mentioned in the Petersberg declaration – to act as combat forces in crisis-management, including peace-making – was no longer mentioned in the mandate for the Permanent Council because the new mandate was understood to connect with the dynamic concept of peace-keeping as used in the United Nations Agenda for Peace.

32. As is known, the United Nations Agenda for Peace makes a distinction between the following different activities in United Nations sponsored peace-support operations: peace-making, peace-building, peace-enforcement and peace-keeping. In this concept, peace-making is a political and diplomatic process which does not imply the projection of military force. Peace-building is defined as an “action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict”. A following phase, peace-keeping, includes “the deployment of a United Nations presence in the field, hitherto with the consent of all the parties concerned, normally involving United Nations military and/or police personnel and frequently civilians as well”.

33. It is recommended here that organisations such as WEU, which might take action under the aegis of a United Nations mandate, adopt the terminology of the United Nations Agenda for Peace for the various peace support operations to prevent misunderstandings as regards the different possible activities.

34. In this framework of relations between WEU and the United Nations, Recommendation 542 is recalled, in which the WEU Assembly asked the Council to instruct the Planning Cell to offer advice for the United Nations Secretary-General’s Military Adviser in New York, especially with a view to facilitating the creation of a similar Planning Cell for the United Nations.

35. In its reply to this recommendation, the Council recognised the importance of increased contacts and exchanges of information between the United Nations and WEU. It recognised that WEU contributions in the field of planning and periodic contacts between the Planning Cell representatives and the responsible United Nations staff could be of real value. In a letter addressed to his United Nations counterpart, dated 25th June 1993, the WEU Secretary-General proposed to step up contacts and exchanges of information between both organisations.

36. Since the Council’s reply of 14th October 1993, no further details have been made known officially, and it seems that contacts between the WEU Planning Cell and relevant United Nations staff are more ad hoc than periodic.

37. At the ministerial meeting of 22nd November 1993, it was made clear that the European corps, the multinational division (central) and the Anglo-Dutch amphibious force had already been declared as multinational forces answerable to WEU (FAWEU).

38. As regards national forces which could be put under the authority of WEU, there were problems which had not yet been solved.

39. At that same meeting, ministers endorsed the “joint declaration stating the conditions for the use of the European corps in the framework of Western European Union” which had earlier been adopted by the three states participating in the European corps (Belgium, France and Germany). Recently, similar joint declarations have been adopted setting the conditions for the use of the Belgian/German/Netherlands/United Kingdom multinational division (central) and the United Kingdom/ Netherlands amphibious force in the framework of WEU and the understandings regarding these matters.

40. In the joint declaration regarding the European corps, a prominent rôle is given to the WEU Planning Cell, which should formulate plans for the use of the European corps within WEU. The rôle of the Planning Cell is specified in a number of paragraphs creating the impression of an extremely narrow co-operation with the European corps. It should be noted, however, that a number of clarifications given by the military delegates of the three countries participating in the European corps providing an interpretation of the declaration to which they are attached severely limit the active involvement of WEU and its Planning Cell.
41. The joint declaration stipulates that the Commander of the European corps will keep the Planning Cell regularly informed on such issues as manpower, equipment and weapons of the corps units which may act in WEU operations, the assets and infrastructure to be used for logistic support, training objectives and exercise programmes and operational capability. It is further stipulated that the Planning Cell Director will inform the states participating in the European corps of his assessments and proposals regarding the training of units, preparation and conduct of exercises, organisation of communications and logistic support and interoperability.

42. The Planning Cell’s planning in this framework should take the practical form of generic plans and contingency plans. These ambitious objectives are far less impressive if it is known that, according to the interpretation attached to the declaration, the Director of the Planning Cell will provide his assessments and proposals "on the basis of the current terms of reference and resources of the Planning Cell" which, as is well known and also admitted by the Planning Cell itself, are not sufficient by far for performing these tasks. The same attached interpretation stipulates that for the purpose of generic planning, no direct links are necessary between the Planning Cell and the European corps.

43. While the joint declaration states that the European corps, in order to maintain relations between WEU and the corps, will be in permanent liaison with the WEU Planning Cell, the definition of and arrangements for this permanent liaison, to be approved by the Council, still remain to be agreed more than six months after the adoption of the joint declaration.

44. One may wonder whether such working methods actually contribute to efficiency. Was the establishment of the European corps really intended to be the first step towards a European army or just another public relations exercise without intrinsic value? It is noted here that the mere addition of the prefix "Euro" or attributable "European" is not enough to make armed units an integral part of a European defence identity.

45. On the other hand, it can be well understood that member states are reluctant to transfer full command over their armed units to an organisation which does not have a proper general staff.

46. Also on 22nd November 1993, the WEU Council approved a report on relations between forces answerable to WEU (FAWEU). It was established that two different categories of FAWEU could be distinguished:

- national FAWEU, military units and headquarters designated by states which can be made available to carry out tasks conducted under the authority of WEU;
- multinational FAWEU, established multinational military units and headquarters, existing and future, jointly designated for the same purpose by the participating states.

47. For the use of FAWEU, three categories of plans should be developed: generic plans, contingency plans and operation plans. In this planning process, an important role was attributed to the Planning Cell.

48. The Planning Cell is to develop generic plans for possible operations where some of the planning factors have not yet been fully identified or cannot be assumed. In this framework, illustrative force packages should be identified. For this kind of planning, direct links with units were not thought to be necessary.

49. The Council can ask the Planning Cell to develop contingency plans for possible operations where the planning factors have been identified or can be assumed. These plans are more detailed and include the forces needed and options for deployment. At this stage of the planning process, those nations interested may provide details regarding their possible or intended contributions. Logically, it is thought that while developing contingency plans, the Planning Cell will have to be able to communicate directly with those units earmarked for possible deployment.

50. When the Council has decided to mount a specific operation, it will designate an Operation Commander, who is responsible for drawing up an operation plan normally based on earlier generic and contingency plans. Once the Council has approved the operation plan, contributing member states will transfer their designated military units under command of the Operation Commander.

51. As regards the command and control of WEU operations, it has been established that the overall political control will rest with the WEU Council, while the full command of a WEU force deployed in an operation is retained by the nations to whom the forces belong.

52. It should be noted here that, in accordance with the abovementioned arrangements, FAWEU are forces available to WEU rather than forces answerable to WEU, which is the misleading terminology used by the Council.

53. While, in general, the Planning Cell should have contact with FAWEU through the national capitals, it can, subject to the agreement of the relevant nations, consult national staffs and the staffs of FAWEU in preparing plans. It has also been decided that, when developing contingency plans, the Planning Cell can be supported by national and multinational headquarters.

54. One of the Planning Cell’s important resources for generic planning, contingency plan-
ning and the identification of force packages is the
defence planning questionnaire, a document
which is periodically updated by all NATO mem-
ber states and which is supposed to provide a
reliable and detailed survey of each nation's
armed forces.

55. It was therefore agreed that each member
state should present its list of FAWEU as replies
to the defence planning questionnaire (DPQ) or, if
need be, as replies to a specific questionnaire for-
mulated by the Planning Cell. The Planning Cell
should then make its assessment of the informa-
tion gathered, collect further information if nee-
ded and then produce the list of FAWEU. The list
of FAWEU should then be the basis for the deve-
lopment of force packages.

56. At present, most of the preparatory work
has been completed, an initial list has been pro-
duced and it is expected that the complete list of
FAWEU will be presented to the Ministerial Coun-
cil at the end of 1994.

57. There has been criticism that, twelve
months after the mandate given in Rome, a list of
FAWEU is still not available. It has indeed taken a
long time, but at least part of the criticism of the
Planning Cell is unfair for a number of reasons.

58. Initially, member states replied in different
ways to the Planning Cell's questions. Some said
that all conventional forces were potentially avail-
able while others preferred to provide a list with spe-
cific units. There were questions as to whether spe-
cific units and their equipment should be made avai-
lable at a given time. On the other hand, nations
which were prepared to provide units were hesita-
ting to be too specific because they wanted to retain
a certain flexibility in case units would be needed for
other tasks. France, not participating in NATO's
military structures, took longer to provide the
replies. Furthermore, there were differing opinions
on the question whether forces especially suited for
humanitarian operations could be distinguished
from others while the activity called "peace-keep-
ing" turned out to be subject to change due to recent
experiences all over the world. Meanwhile, the Plan-
ing Cell itself had only just started its work. Its staff
had to settle into the new environment, and – need-
less to say – there was also some infighting in struc-
tures which were accustomed to work only with
NATO as the co-ordinating organisation.

V. Combined joint task forces (CJTF)

59. A major step forward on the road towards
the creation of operational capabilities for WEU
was taken at the NATO summit meeting in Brus-

60. At this summit meeting, it was decided that
the alliance's organisation and resources would be
adjusted so as to facilitate the development of
WEU as the defence component of the European
Union. It was also stated that the alliance stood
ready to make collective assets available, on the
basis of consultations in the North Atlantic Coun-
cil, for WEU operations.

61. In their declaration, the heads of state and
government further said: "We also will need to
strengthen the European pillar of the alliance by
facilitating the use of our military capabilities for
NATO and European/WEU operations …" To
improve, among other things, co-operation with
WEU and to reflect the emerging European secu-
ity and defence identity, they endorsed "the
concept of combined joint task forces as a means
to facilitate contingency operations, including
operations with participating nations outside the
alliance".

62. The North Atlantic Council, with the
advise of the NATO military authorities, was
directed to develop this concept and establish the
necessary capabilities. In co-ordination with
WEU, it would work on implementation in a man-
er that would provide "separable but not separate"
military capabilities that could be employed by
NATO or WEU.

63. Work on the implementation of the CJTF
concept started immediately after the summit
meeting. As could have been expected, there was
no immediate agreement over the interpretation of
the wording in the summit declaration. In an early
working definition, however, military authorities
at NATO defined a CJTF headquarters as a
deployable, multinational, multiservice headquar-
ters of variable size, formed to command joint
forces of NATO and, possibly, non-NATO
nations, for the purpose of conducting peace ope-
rations outside the territory of NATO. A NATO
CJTF headquarters could also be detached for
European-led (WEU) operations. It is assumed
that for the composition of a CJTF headquarters,
elements will be drawn from CINCENT,
AFSOUTH and AFNORTHWEST. At the
moment, work on the CJTF concept is continuing
and it is hoped that the final conclusions can be
presented in December 1994.

64. Implementation of the CJTF concept will
enable WEU to mount out-of-area operations in
circumstances where the United States prefers not
to deploy its armed forces and will finally do
away with the argument that WEU does not have
a proper military command structure.

65. At WEU, it is emphasised that in such pos-
sible WEU operations, a CJTF headquarters can
only be effective if essential collective alliance
assets such as satellite intelligence and AWACS
are available at the same time.

66. Evidently, the Planning Cell has an impor-
tant rôle to play in the CJTF implementation pro-
cess. Upon request from the WEU Council, it made a preliminary analysis of the consequences of CJTF on the WEU operational concept which was submitted to it a few weeks after the NATO summit meeting. The Council then established a specific CJTF political-military working group to prepare the WEU response to the NATO summit meeting and authorised the Planning Cell to take part in the working group’s meetings and support its work.

67. At the same time, the Planning Cell was authorised to be an observer in the NATO military transitional issues working group which is now making an assessment of the military aspects of the last NATO summit’s decision to adapt the alliance’s structures and procedures.

68. It should be noted that the military authorities of NATO at SHAPE headquarters, working at the implementation of the CJTF concept, have been doing this until now without any support or guidance from NATO’s political structures. Seemingly, one nation, notably in favour of the development of a European defence identity, is blocking positive progress on the CJTF issue in the political structure.

69. It should be emphasised here that CJTF will make little sense for WEU if it does not create the appropriate political–military infrastructure to deal with it effectively. Even if some progress has been made, the existing infrastructure is still largely ad hoc.

70. For command and control of operations as envisaged in the CJTF concept, a strategic interface is required between political and military structures, an element still missing in WEU. The prevailing command and control regulations in WEU operations have been agreed on an ad hoc basis, lacking universality.

71. The Planning Cell has now produced a first analysis of command and control of WEU operations for discussion by the relevant WEU bodies. It seems that this subject needs high priority attention if WEU takes its rôle seriously.

**VI. WEU strategic mobility study**

72. After the Gulf war, in Recommendation 501, the WEU Assembly having established that there were important shortcomings in Western European strategic transport capabilities, had asked the Council to study the possibility of setting up a European strategic airlift command equipped with a military version of the Airbus A 340 and operating in a WEU framework. In its reply, the Council made it known that the Defence Representatives Group in liaison with the Special Working Group would spell out and assess, as it was said: “proposals to make co-operation more ope-

rational both in the politico-military field as well as in the military field proper, covering among other things tasks and the requirements for coordination and planning structures. In this framework, the structures and the lessons of the Gulf war will be considered.”

73. In Recommendation 515, the Assembly then recommended that the Council: “Urge the Defence Representatives Group to proceed energetically with its study of a European sea- and airlift capability and include in this study the possibility of establishing a European strategic airlift command in the WEU framework.”

74. The Council replied on 26th March 1992: “The desirability and feasibility of setting up new bodies in the WEU framework, such as a European strategic airlift command, will have to be examined taking into account the discussion by the DRG of the conclusions of a bilateral study undertaken by France and Germany in the framework of the appraisal of the lessons to be drawn from the Gulf conflict.”

75. This Franco-German study on European requirements for strategic mobility initially remained without follow-up. The establishment of the Planning Cell apparently opened new perspectives to examine problems of this nature and after a proposal of the Chiefs of Defence Staffs (CHODs), the Council decided on 27th April 1993 that under the aegis of the Planning Cell, a WEU strategic mobility study (WSMS) should be initiated. For this study, the Planning Cell would be assisted by national movements experts of the member states while the Franco-German study was used for further analysis.

76. It should be acknowledged that here also in the beginning little progress was made due to a number of reasons. Since there were no WEU operational guidelines nor contingency plans available, the Planning Cell had the feeling that there was no sound basis for a strategic mobility concept in a WEU framework. Some member states on the other hand argued that the original working hypotheses, partly based on the Franco-German study, were far too ambitious in that they put too much emphasis on massive air transport of heavy equipment.

77. A convergence of ideas has now taken place, which has resulted in a more realistic approach. The study will now be conducted in two different phases. Phase 1, to be concluded at the end of 1994, will provide an evaluation of the existing strategic mobility capabilities in WEU through simulation of the deployment of force packages up to the size of a division over short, medium and long range. Here, one of the problems faced by the Planning Cell experts was that, due to national restrictions, not all national experts were able to provide estimates of the avai-
lability of military and civil sea and air transport assets to support WEU force deployments.

78. Phase 2, to be concluded in 1995, will provide a WEU strategic mobility concept. In this framework, an analysis will be given of co-ordination measures and procedures for the pooling of national transport assets and for circumstances where WEU would have to make an appeal to the civil transport market, in particular to protect competitive bidding. With the support of Euroflag, an additional analysis will be given based on the assumption that the future large aircraft (FLA) would be available for WEU deployments. The possible acquisition of dedicated strategic transport assets will also be subject to analysis.

79. In order to ensure that the WEU strategic mobility capability will be complementary to and compatible with that of NATO, the work of the Planning Cell on WSMS will have to be co-ordinated with NATO's movement, transportation and mobility management advisory group.

80. With most probably the final result of WSMS to be expected by the end of 1995, it will indeed have taken a long time. On the other hand, it should be admitted that here again, as mentioned above, many different factors have contributed to a slow start.

VII. Other aspects of planning activities

(a) Maritime co-operation: Combined Endeavour

81. Based on an initiative of France, Italy and Spain to examine the possibility of promoting forms of aero-maritime co-operation among WEU member countries, the Planning Cell was tasked to pursue this idea in October 1992. This was implemented by developing an operational plan, providing a mechanism for the generation and initial deployment of maritime forces, including maritime air forces in close co-operation and consultation with the Military Delegates and the Defence Representatives Group. These activities now have resulted in WEU operational plan Combined Endeavour. At its meeting on 9th May 1994, the WEU Council approved this operational plan and agreed that such an initiative should be developed further in accordance with the initial mandate. Combined Endeavour enables WEU to generate and initially deploy maritime forces and to identify maritime force packages for certain tasks.

82. It can also be used in combination with any other plan for which maritime forces would be required and as the starting mechanism for and the initial phase of a maritime exercise involving the WEU crisis-management organisation and maritime forces.

(b) Humanitarian missions including generic evacuation planning

83. At its meeting in Luxembourg on 22nd November 1993, the Council tasked the Planning Cell “in completing the list of FAWEU incorporating national inputs, to identify forces especially suited for humanitarian tasks”. In parallel with its work on the list of FAWEU, it is now developing a data base for contingency planning in the field of humanitarian missions. In this framework, links are being developed with the United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs (UNDHA) and with the European Community Humanitarian Organisation (ECHO).

84. In the specific field of generic evacuation planning, a report has now been drafted in order to examine whether and how WEU can make a contribution to work already being done elsewhere, in particular within the European Union. A generic plan for WEU evacuation operations has been drafted. Moreover, a study is being made of lessons learned from the recent evacuation operations in Rwanda.

85. More recently, the Permanent Council discussed the possibility of a WEU contribution to the evacuation of citizens who might be forced to leave Yemen because of the civil war. The Planning Cell has contacted the authorities of the countries concerned.

(c) Peace-keeping missions

86. A document on WEU involvement in peace-keeping missions is now almost completed. This document includes a description of basic principles, the conditions for any WEU involvement, the missions and tasks of peace-keeping forces, generic planning considerations and the characteristics and composition of forces.

(d) Exercise activity

87. The Planning Cell has been in close liaison with United Kingdom planning authorities for the command post exercise Purple Nova 1994 on evacuation, which is the first exercise of this kind to be planned and conducted within a WEU framework. Among the Planning Cell's objectives for this exercise are the rehearsal of WEU crisis-management procedures, and the provision of experience for its staff in planning, co-ordinating and conducting command post exercises within the context of WEU.

88. The Planning Cell is also involved in preparations for the tri-national (Italy, France and Spain) major exercise Tramontana, with Spain as the host nation, and the possible participation of other WEU member states.

89. At the Planning Cell, it is hoped that both exercises will help to analyse command, control and communications structures for WEU evacua-
tion operations and also to study standard operating procedures and rules of engagement.

VIII. Contingency planning

90. On some occasions, the Planning Cell has been involved in contingency planning for specific operations.

(a) Safe areas in Bosnia-Herzegovina

91. In July 1993, the Planning Cell was asked to examine the possibility for WEU member states to participate in the protection of safe areas in Bosnia-Herzegovina designated by the United Nations Security Council. The Planning Cell’s questions as to which forces could be provided by member states mostly met with negative replies and further planning had to be given up.

(b) Administration of the Mostar district and other activities regarding the former Republic of Yugoslavia

92. Upon request by the Council in September 1993, the Planning Cell prepared a study on the problems which the European Union might face in a possible administration rôle in the Mostar district. This study was made in close contact with NATO, the United Nations, the European Community monitoring mission and other organisations involved in activities in the Mostar district. After submission of a detailed report, the Planning Cell was asked to develop a general plan for any support from WEU in the medical field for the possible European Community administration in the Mostar district. This general plan was submitted to the Council in December 1993, but will have to be updated as the situation changes. Recently, after a fact-finding mission, the Planning Cell made an assessment of the security environment for the possible European Union administration.

93. The staff of the Planning Cell remained involved in WEU’s commitment to operation Sharp Guard in the Adriatic. Moreover, the Planning Cell presents a weekly written report to the Permanent Council with the aim of informing the Council about developments in the situation in the former republic of Yugoslavia and current operations such as Deny Flight, Sharp Guard and the embargo enforcement on the Danube.

(c) Multinational formations

94. In the framework of the planning for protection of safe areas, the Planning Cell was also asked to prepare a study on the possibility for the establishment of multinational formations. Member states provided widely diverging replies on the Planning Cell’s questions regarding this subject. After the NATO summit’s decision to develop the CJTF concept, it was decided to stop work on this issue for the time being.

IX. Operational capability and infrastructure

95. Although it is admitted that progress has been made since the Planning Cell first started its work in temporary premises in Brussels, several issues of vital importance for the work of the Planning Cell and even for WEU as an organisation in general, have not yet been solved.

96. Firstly, there is still no satisfactory solution for the communication links. The WEUCOM system, developed some years ago for communications between the WEU Secretariat-General and the national capitals of the member states, is considered to be too slow and its performance insufficient. For its secure links with the capitals, the Planning Cell has now a secure telephone link borrowed from Italy and a secure fax borrowed from France.

97. One year after its official establishment, the Planning Cell does not yet have the possibility to use NATO’s Initial Voice Switch Network and Telegraphic Automatic Relay Equipment, while the completion of internal security standards compatible with those of NATO is still pending. Indeed, the secretariats of both WEU and NATO are working on memoranda of understanding in these areas, but it seems that the main hurdle is the funding problem. With the essential CJTF concept now having to be implemented in coordination between NATO and WEU, a solution for these communication problems can no longer be delayed.

98. Secondly, the Planning Cell needs to have access to NATO and national intelligence including secret material if its work is to be taken seriously. An intelligence agreement between WEU and NATO is urgently needed, and it is thought that discussions to prepare its conclusion should start without delay. Meanwhile, it seems that work has started already on a separate agreement between the two organisations regarding the exchange of information on a day-by-day basis.

X. The Kirchberg declaration and the Planning Cell

99. Time and again, the Assembly wonders how seriously the WEU Council takes its rôle of strengthening the European security and defence identity and, in particular, WEU’s operational capabilities. In fact, it cannot get away from the impression that the Council is indulging in solemn declarations without paying due attention to their follow-up.

100. The Council’s Kirchberg declaration is a point in case, to be considered here as related to the Planning Cell’s activities.
101. In the Kirchberg declaration, the Council stated among other things:

“They welcomed the [January 1994 Atlantic Alliance] summit’s endorsement of the principle that collective assets and capabilities of the alliance can be made available for WEU operations in order to strengthen WEU as the defence component of the European Union and as the means to strengthen the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance. They underlined that the modalities for making these available should preserve WEU’s own planning procedures and capabilities.

Ministers stressed the importance of work under way in WEU on the WEU-related aspects of the adaptation of the alliance structures. In order to enhance WEU’s ability to carry out the tasks defined in the Petersberg declaration, Ministers endorsed the approach to identify the assets and capabilities required to perform the necessary military functions.”

102. These statements should be welcomed, but the Council may have ignored the fact that they may result in additional work for a WEU Planning Cell which in its present limited size has considerable problems in implementing its basic tasks.

103. Ministers further said that they “underlined the importance of co-ordination with the alliance on the implementation of the CJTF concept and the definition of separable but not separate military capabilities so as to ensure their effective use where appropriate by WEU, and in that case under its command.”

104. If the Council justly considers the implementation of the CJTF concept in co-ordination with the alliance to be of such great importance, why then are the problems of secure communication links between the Planning Cell and NATO, NATO-compatible internal security standards for the Planning Cell and an intelligence agreement between NATO and WEU still pending?

105. As regards relations with the European Union, the Ministers:

“...welcomed the fact that working relations with the European Union were now being developed. They also recalled their endorsement at their last meeting of the measures to ensure close co-operation between the European Union and WEU contained in the conclusions of the General Affairs Council of 26th October 1993 and approved by the European Council on 29th October 1993. Ministers emphasised in this context the need to improve co-operation, particularly in the management of crises, and looked forward to close co-operation between the two organisations in order to respond rapidly and efficiently in the event of crises. In this context, Ministers welcomed the request by the European Union to make a contribution to a future European Union administration of Mostar and confirmed that WEU was ready to offer its support. This constituted a promising example of the close co-operation between WEU and the European Union foreseen by the Maastricht Treaty.”

106. The Assembly fully agrees with the Ministers’ opinion that co-operation between the European Union and WEU needs to be improved, particularly in crisis-management.

107. It does not understand, however, the Ministers’ enthusiasm over WEU’s possible contribution to a future European Union administration of Mostar. After an internal discussion, the Council, due to some member states’ reluctance to act, could not offer more than “support that WEU might provide in the medical field”. After submission of a general plan to this end, the Planning Cell has now made an assessment of the security environment. There is no reason to blame the Planning Cell, which did what it was asked to do, but in view of the situation in former Yugoslavia, the Council could have considered more substantial contributions.

108. In the Kirchberg declaration “Ministers recalled the importance they attached to the continued operational development of WEU, as the defence component of the European Union and as the means to strengthen the European pillar of the alliance”. In view of the astonishing lack of material support and political guidance which has until now characterised the relation between the Council and the Planning Cell, this can only be called an excellent example of cynicism.

109. As mentioned earlier in the present report, the Council decided at its Kirchberg meeting that the Central European associate partners may have a liaison arrangement with the Planning Cell, while the associate members may nominate officers to the Planning Cell. The Assembly welcomes this development, since it is an inherent recognition of the important role of the Planning Cell in the WEU structure. On the other hand, it remains to be seen what the consequences of the practical arrangements made in implementation of the Council’s decision will be for the work of the Planning Cell

XI. Conclusions

110. What can be concluded after one year of Planning Cell activities?

111. Starting on the positive side, some achievements should be pointed out.
112. First, it should be noted that, with the Planning Cell, WEU now has a military staff and expertise at its disposal which enables the Council and its Secretariat-General to have an appropriate or quick response to questions regarding basic military aspects of issues within its purview.

113. Second, with the Planning Cell, WEU has a permanent and organic structure which can provide short-, medium- and long-term planning for the many different areas of possible WEU activities.

114. Third, the Planning Cell can provide close professional links with national military authorities and international military organisations such as NATO headquarters and the international military staff at NATO and SHAPE.

115. On the other hand, to the Assembly’s regret, there is some disappointment due to expectations not being met.

116. The name Planning Cell is slightly misleading and may have created expectations too great for such a small group of experts. In fact, it is more of a military liaison group which can work only in close permanent contact with the appropriate authorities in military planning and other areas of military interest in the national capitals. Moreover, the word “planning” does not cover the many other activities in which the Planning Cell is involved according to its terms of reference.

117. With its 40 staff members, the Planning Cell should in no way be compared to the huge 950 military staff at NATO. The Planning Cell’s just over 20 staff members involved in planning and related activities cannot be expected to perform miracles as the Council erroneously seems to believe.

118. As mentioned in Chapter IX, one year after reaching operational capability, the question of secure communications with capitals and NATO has not yet been solved in a satisfactory manner, a situation which is seriously hampering the Planning Cell’s work. An intelligence agreement between WEU and NATO and, in particular, for the exchange of information and documents between the two organisations is also badly needed.

119. A problem, mostly of a practical nature, is also that the limits, as defined in the financial regulations of the Secretariat-General, provide no flexibility for the Planning Cell’s Director in managing his budget.

120. Even more alarming is the lack of basic decisions creating well-defined references for the Planning Cell’s activities. At present the Planning Cell is therefore working in a political vacuum, lacking clear political guidelines and instructions which are specific enough to work efficiently. Until now, the Council has not formulated a common European defence policy, which is the ultimate framework of the Planning Cell’s activities. The Maastricht declaration offers a first perspective on the future work on this issue, but it could apparently still take time before final conclusions are reached. The Assembly thinks that the highest priority should be attached to the formulation of a common European defence policy. It is looking forward to the results of the Council’s work in this area.

121. The Planning Cell is positively determined to perform the tasks set out in its terms of reference, but it should be noted that the multiplication of mandates given by the Council, combined with the lack of clear political guidelines and a clear political framework does not allow it to concentrate on the main tasks formulated in the Maastricht declaration and the corresponding priorities indicated by its Director at the beginning of 1993.

122. One might reproach the Planning Cell’s leadership for not exerting enough control over progress in implementing the priority tasks, but at the same time it should be admitted that it had to navigate between the Scylla of concentrating on priority tasks and the Charybdis of meeting all the new and urgent demands of the Council.

123. It is advocated here that the original main tasks, in particular the completion of the list of FAWEU, are essential. Without this list, the Planning Cell cannot develop appropriate force packages for use in future planning.

124. It is also thought that the important WEU strategic mobility study (WSMS) should be completed in the near future so as to provide the Council with a sound basis for decisions on this essential issue.

125. As explained in a parallel Defence Committee report¹, the Planning Cell lacks appropriate means in naval matters. This may become increasingly important for Europe in view of developments in the southern Mediterranean.

126. Relations with NATO are developing satisfactorily, but, as mentioned earlier, a number of shortcomings need to be settled urgently. Considerable progress can still be made in relations with other organisations such as the United Nations and, in particular, with the European Union and with multinational units which have been declared FAWEU.
