External Triggers and Identity Formation

Cold War Crossroads in the Evolution of European foreign policy

By

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Abstract
This article identifies an identity/policy nexus in the literature on EC/EU foreign policy and criticizes the essentialism of existing treatments of this relationship between the internal and external planes. Using a historically grounded approach, we analyze three critical episodes in the emergence and operation of this nexus: debates about the accession of Spain and Greece to the EC, the inception of EPC and its role in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. We argue that three factors conditioned this process: external catalysts, the role of political contestation and a blend of instrumental and ideational dynamics. The inductive analysis of these factors is meant to serve as a pointer for future research and as a first step towards a theoretical model of the identity/policy nexus.

Introduction[1]

Since at least the 1970s, and with renewed vigor after the Cold War, scholars have been seeking to understand the nature of the European Community (EC)/European Union (EU)[2] as an actor in international politics. One of the central insights of the resulting literature is that the Community is a 'unique' type of international actor due to its own domestic constitution or identity. More specifically, the particular character of the EC/EU as a regional economic organization, which is based on a set of political values, has had important repercussions for the objectives, means and content of its foreign policy (Duchêne 1973). This important insight is reflected in the proliferation of terms to describe Europe's international power such as 'civilian', 'normative' etc, all of which aim to capture different aspects of this distinctiveness.

This article builds upon and seeks to advance this literature by exploring the factors that condition the internal-external linkage in EC/EU foreign policy. While we agree that this linkage constitutes one of its central characteristics, we argue that the literature on the topic has had a tendency to essentialise it, thereby leaving many important questions regarding its specific nature and contingency unexplored. In rendering this critique, we introduce the concept of the 'identity/policy nexus', defined broadly as the interrelationship between domestic identity and external policy in EC/EU foreign policy, as a much-needed conceptual focus to the debate. Drawing on three important but understudied historical episodes, we demonstrate the salience of three factors – external catalysts, political contestation and the blend of instrumental and ideational dynamics – as a first step towards a more systematic understanding of the identity/policy nexus.

The article proceeds in four parts. We start by reviewing the literature on EC/EU foreign policy and demonstrating essentializing tendencies in arguments about the central connection between domestic identity and foreign policy. We then

[2] We use the terms 'European Community'/'Community' for the period preceding the Maastricht Treaty, and 'European Union'/'Union' for the time afterwards. For the sake of brevity and the Cold War division of the continent notwithstanding, 'Europe' refers to *Western* Europe and 'European foreign policy' serves as a blanket term for the external policies of EC/EU member states and/or the EC institutions.

examine three important historical episodes in the evolution of European foreign policy, each illustrating a central conceptual problem of arguments drawing on the idea of an identity/policy nexus. Section two deals with debates about the Community's internal political identity in the 1960s, which were sparked by interaction with authoritarian neighbours Spain and Greece. The issue at stake here is: What is the EC's domestic identity in the first place? Section three analyzes how this (incipient) internal identity was increasingly linked to the Community's emerging external action capacities in the process surrounding the Copenhagen Declaration. Here, the question is: What elements of the EU's internal identity ought to inform its foreign policy given its complex nature and multiple 'domestic identities'? Section four examines the problem of how to externalize domestic identity in concrete instances once the previous questions have been answered by looking at the role of European Political Cooperation (EPC) during the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE).

I. The EC/EU as an International Actor: The Identity/Policy Nexus

There is widespread agreement in research on the EC/EU as an international actor that "identity is […] of great importance to actorness" (Bretherton and Vogler 2006, 27). The manifold characterizations of the EC/EU as a 'civilian', 'normative' or 'post-modern power'[3] essentially all rest on the (ideational) liberal insight of an interrelationship connection between domestic identity and external policy (see Moravcsik 1997) – a linkage that we subsequently refer to as the 'identity/policy nexus'.[4] Europe's foreign policy, so the argument goes, is rooted in important ways in the Community's unique domestic experience of a specific type of inter-state economic and political cooperation, which exerts an ideational influence on foreign policy that is irreducible to factors emphasized by Realists, such as the respective geopolitical context or strategic situation the Union finds itself in (for a counterargument, see Hyde-Price 2006). Nicolaïdis and Howse capture this idea succinctly, arguing that the link between internal and external 'rests on the synergies between the EC's *being*, its political essence, and its *doing*, its external actions'

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[3] Burckhardt (2004, 6) lists a series of characterizations.
[4] We understand identity broadly as the norms and values, as well as their institutional embodiment, that constitute the Community internally.

(Nicolaïdis and Howse 2002, 771, italics in original). In this line of thinking, the identity/policy nexus is crucial to understanding European foreign policy.

The specific character of these 'synergies', however, often remains unclear and, we argue, is still poorly understood. What exactly is the nature of the nexus between internal identity and external policy? How does it operate? What are the factors that shape it and under which conditions does it hold? Given the broad consensus in the literature that the identity/policy nexus matters for our understanding of EU foreign policy, it is surely important to explore these questions more systematically. Unfortunately, few scholars have hitherto done so (a noteworthy exception is Meunier 2005); instead, the debate has largely focused on how to characterize the EU as an international actor, how effective it has been in its external actions, and – more recently – what functions EU foreign policy serves (good overviews are Sjursen 2006 and Bickerton 2010).

Given these foci of the debate, arguments concerning the identity/policy nexus have often remained at the level of general claims based on vague assumptions. These might appear intuitively correct yet remain understudied, lacking a firm theoretical or empirical base. In the early 1990s, for example, Regelsberger's (1990, 9) seminal contribution interpreted the EC's group-to-group relations as "the result of the EC/Twelve's 'internal logic'", which, however, remained conspicuously under-explicated and under-theorized. Similarly, Allen and Smith (1990, 34) claimed around the same time that "the EC's ability to mobilize its potential [for external action]… is limited by the nature of the Community itself", but left largely unanswered what 'nature' they specifically referred to, and how it connects back to the potential for mobilization. More recently, Bretherton and Vogler (1999, 249) have argued in a widely cited book that the EU has a – seemingly 'natural' – "tendency to reproduce itself" and asserted that EU development policy "is attributable to the character of the EU itself; and its emerging identity as a singular actor" (Bretherton and Vogler 2006, 112, italics in original). Petiteville (2003, 131) contends in related fashion that "EU diplomacy is inspired by common values rooted in the political culture of its member states". And K. Smith, in another important contribution, depicted the EU's support for regionalism as a "form of narcissism" and identified the EU's uniqueness in international affairs as flowing from its policy means, which in turn are derived directly "from the special nature of the EU itself" (Smith 2003, 70 and 199, respectively). All of these valuable works explain aspects of European foreign policy

by reference to internal characteristics, but do not specify in what ways the EU's 'special nature' relates to its foreign policy.

To be clear, we do not per se disagree with these liberally minded claims regarding the identity/policy nexus – in fact, rather the opposite is the case. Yet we argue that the causal logics underlying these assertions and their scope conditions need systematic exploration along with the factors that shape the operation of the nexus in concrete instances. The failure to do so has led to a problematic tendency to essentialise the identity/policy nexus. The most extreme case of essentialism is Manners (2002, 242, our italics), who famously claimed that the EU "exists as being different to pre-existing political forms, and that this particular difference *pre-disposes* it to act in a normative way."[5] But Bicchi's (2006, 287, italics in original) argument, even though much more solidly grounded theoretically than Manners', shares his essentialist flavor: "My understanding is that much of the EU's [external] action can be characterized as an unreflexive attempt to promote its own model *because institutions tend to export institutional isomorphism as a default option*." Once again, we do not argue that these and other essentialist claims regarding the identity/policy nexus are wrong, but merely that they are underspecified and hence cannot account for the instances when the EU fails to act as a normative/civilian power. The ongoing militarization of European Security and Defence Policy (Smith, 2000), for example, and other instances in which the EU pursues classical Realpolitik (see, for example, Zimmermann, 2007) are hard to reconcile with ideas of an in-built preference for norm-driven foreign policy. By definition, essentialist accounts of the nexus cannot explain cases in which the EC/EU acts against its allegedly 'natural pre-disposition'. Instead of explaining these instances away as mere anomalies, they should stimulate further research into the factors and causal mechanisms governing the identity/policy nexus and the scope conditions under which it operates.

As a first step towards these goals, we subsequently examine the identity/policy nexus and its operation in three historical case studies. We focus specifically on the evolution of the nexus between *political* identity, understood as the values – human rights and democracy – that policymakers and officials deem

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[5] Manners (2010, 68) seems to have softened this 'categorical' stance somewhat recently, describing several 'different accounts of how the internal dimension of European integration connects to EU external actions.' However, he makes this statement in relation to a set of European myths advanced by policymakers rather than to analytical categories.

constitutive of the EC/EU[6], and its external action. We chose each case because it marks an important juncture in the development of this linkage. The first shows how Spain's application for associate member status catalysed the process of constituting a democratic and human rights identity inside the EC. The second case represents an early attempt to link this emerging identity to an incipient foreign policy in the form of EPC. The final case shows how the EC externalized this identity during the CSCE. We argue that these episodes demonstrate the (historical) contingency of the identity/policy nexus and highlight three central factors that shaped it: external catalysts, political contestation and the blend of normative and instrumental dynamics.

II. The Contested Origins of Western European Political Identity

A Western European political identity emerged gradually as the result of a heated political debate several years after the founding of the EC in 1957. This process was triggered by two external events: in 1962, authoritarian Spain under General Franco applied to become an associate member, and in 1967 a coup in Greece turned a country which had been associated with the Community into a dictatorship. Ensuing political discussions between those who saw the Community as a mere trade 'bloc' and others who wanted it to be a true *Wertegemeinschaft* (value community) led to the elevation of democracy and human rights into constitutive elements of an emerging European identity.

Contestation over this question may seem surprising. After all, the founding members were parliamentary democracies and members of the Council of Europe. One might therefore have expected the EC to 'naturally' reflect the 'democratic image of its creators' (Mancini 2000, 31). Furthermore, democracy formed a central tenet of the European integration narrative from the beginning. According to this narrative, the EC helped to lock-in the rejection of Europe's authoritarian past, which had plunged the continent into two devastating world wars (Smismans 2010; Quinn 2001, 854-56).

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[6] We thereby exclude from our analysis two other internal-external linkages. First, the connection between the Community's *economic* make-up as a customs union/internal market and its external trade policy. This link is driven by functional necessity because a customs union simply requires a common external trade policy. Second, the connection between the EC's *institutional* make-up as a unique international organization with supranational elements and its foreign policy.

Except for a fleeting reference to 'liberty' in the preamble, the Treaty of Rome did not contain any stipulations on democracy and human rights as constitutive principles of the emerging EC.[7] In this vein, early enlargement was tied exclusively to economic criteria. Concretizing the vague geographic reference in the Rome Treaty, which noted that '[a]ny *European* state' may apply to become a member, Hallstein, the first president of the European Commission, asserted in 1958 that the only conditions for membership pertained to economic and regulatory structures that had to be compatible with the goal of constructing a common market (Stirk and Weigall 1999, 149). This view was reaffirmed when the Council of Ministers met in 1960 to discuss the Community's response to applications for association or membership. The foreign ministers agreed on the geographic and economic conditions for the approval of such requests, but no one even raised the possibility that political requirements such as respect for democracy and human rights could feature among them (Thomas 2006, 1195). In the early days, therefore, the Community 'saw itself as pioneering a historically unique experiment of cross-border economic integration – an experiment that was not obviously or visibly based on high principles such as human rights' (Quinn 2001, 851).

This 'apolitical' dogma of dominant actors in the early EC started to be questioned following Spain's application for membership in 1962. Seeking to mitigate the negative externalities of the EC's internal market, on 9 February 1962 General Franco requested an association with a view towards full integration (Guirao 1997, 104). Even though his economic logic fitted well with the EC's apolitical dogma, Franco's bid triggered a process of fierce contestation over the desired *political* identity of the Community.

The ensuing debate pitched a supportive Germany and France against a more reluctant Benelux block. While the 'big two' favoured Franco's request for economic as well as historical reasons, members of the European Parliament (EP)[8], supported by trade unionists across the EC, campaigned against it because of the non-democratic and rights-abusive character of the Spanish regime (Aschmann 2001, 40). During this time, the EP published the Birkelbach Report, which stated unequivocally that 'the

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[7] The European Court of Justice's (ECJ) incipient case law confirmed this 'apolitical' character of the early EC, rejecting the idea that fundamental rights constituted part of the Community's legal order (Smismans 2010, 47-49). It has to be noted, however, that all member states were signatories to the European Convention on Human Rights of 1950.
[8] The name EP emerged on 30 March 1962. Before, the body was referred to as the European Parliamentary Assembly (EPA).

guaranteed existence of a democratic state form, in the sense of a liberal political organization, is a condition for accession' (EPA 1962, 4, our translation). This statement was embedded in a wider argument about the importance for association and accession states to adhere to *political* standards, besides the economic and geographic ones, in order not to constitute an 'alien body' in the Community (EPA 1962, 4, our translation). We interpret the Report as the first formal expression of an emerging EC political identity, formulated by a rather marginal actor within the EC. This identity was the response to an external challenge rather than the reflection of a pre-existing normative consensus on democratic values and human rights.

This mobilization effort by relatively weak actors opposed to dominant member states' preferences succeeded in tipping the internal balance of opinion towards rejecting Franco's request. They had managed to 'frame the resulting debate with norms that the governments of the member states would be reluctant to disavow, regardless of their preferences on the issue at hand' (Thomas 2006, 1198). As a result, the EC concluded a mere trade agreement with Spain in 1963 and a limited commercial accord in 1970, but would not consider the country for either association or accession until its democratic transition in 1978.

After these initial moves towards defining a political identity, the Community was under pressure to act following the military coup in Athens in 1967. Greece had been associated with the EC under article 238 of the Treaty of Rome since the signing of the Athens Agreement in July 1961. The first of its kind, this purely commercial and economic accord aimed at forming a customs union and preparing the ground for Greece's eventual membership of the Community. It was of unlimited duration and did not contain any political conditions on the basis of which the agreement could have been suspended. However, following the precedent set by the Spanish case, the situation fundamentally changed following the imposition of military rule in April 1967.

It was once again the EP that mobilized in favour of suspending an agreement with an authoritarian regime. Parliamentarians faced an uphill struggle: they clashed with the two superpowers, which accepted the new rulers in Athens, as well as with some member states interested in normalizing relations with the colonels and continuing to supply them with arms (Siotis 1983, 58-59). The EP passed a resolution shortly after the coup expressing concern over the suspension of democratic life in Greece and stating unmistakably that the association could not continue unless

democratic institutions and civil liberties were restored (Coufoudakis 1977, 117). This resolution and subsequent activism by EP members put the Commission and the Council of Ministers under constant pressure to justify their positions.

By the summer of 1968, a consensus had emerged between the Council and the Commission on two points: that the constitutional structure of membership candidates is of concern to the Commission; and that the political situation in Greece might compromise the development of the association. In late 1968, the Commission announced its position that the EC should stick to its commitments in those areas where it had concrete obligations, but suspend the association agreement on other issues which required further negotiation or where the EC was not bound by specific legal obligations. Crucially, the Commission justified its stance by arguing that the agreement had an important political dimension as it would eventually lead to membership (Coufoudakis 1977, 117-8).

This marks a decisive shift away from the Commission's original view of the association agreement as a purely commercial and economic one. As with the Birkelbach Report, the EC institutions thus deliberately chose a *political* frame in their dealings with an authoritarian neighbour. This discursive move shifted the terms of the debate and helped the EP and the Commission to pressure reluctant member states to agree to 'freeze' the agreement 'until the democratic and parliamentary structures are restored' (European Commission 1978, 3). Throughout the time of the dictatorship, the EC formed 'a particularly eloquent exception' to the stance of the superpowers in that the military regime 'was never accepted as a "respectable" European government' (Siotis 1983, 59).

In conclusion, it had taken the Community more than ten years since its creation and fierce political battles forced upon it by *external* stimuli to find consensus on the values that formed a European *political* identity; there was clearly nothing 'natural' in this development. The externalization of this emerging identity, however, was once again far from immediate and straightforward.

III. Linking Domestic Identity and External Policy

Into the late 1960s, then, struggles over the political identity of the Community were an exclusively 'internal' affair pertaining to questions of conditionality for association and admission. Although triggered by external stimuli, these debates had no

implications for external policy more generally. This started to change when a new generation of leaders, including Willy Brandt and Georges Pompidou, resolved to overcome the EC crises and stalemates of the 1960s (see Ludlow 2006). An important element of their 'relaunch of Europe' was the definition of an explicit connection between Europe's internal identity and its role in the world, expressed most clearly in the 1969 Hague Summit and the EPC's subsequent role in preparing for the CSCE.

The 1969 Hague Summit

At the Hague Summit of December 1969 the Heads of State instructed their foreign ministers to produce a plan for widening and deepening political integration, including proposals for coordinating external policy. The elaborately phrased aim was to create a 'united Europe capable of assuming its responsibilities in the world of tomorrow and of making a contribution commensurate with its tradition and mission'. The Heads of State specified this 'tradition and mission' as 'a common heritage of respect for the liberty and rights of man' and the ambition 'to bring together democratic States with freely elected parliaments'. Brandt's Hague speech argued the visionary case for turning the EC into 'an exemplary scheme' that would become an element of a pan-European structure of peace. Interestingly, the German chancellor justified such an externalization of the European identity not only by reference to the universality of European values, but by the instrumental need to hold Europe's own against the superpowers and to preserve its identity amidst the Cold War struggle (Möckli 2008, 26). Brandt's grand design and the initiative of the Heads of State more generally indicate that the consensus on the internal identity of the EC had gradually diffused into attempts at coordinated external action in the Cold War context and, potentially, beyond it. Contrary to what essentialist takes on the evolution of the identity/policy nexus might expect, however, these developments were anything but straightforward. Contingency was a factor that influenced the attempts to externalize the EC's emerging political identity in that these efforts were conditional upon the preceding debates inside the Community.

Following the instructions issued at the Hague, the foreign ministers tabled the Davignon Report in October 1970, which led to the creation of a new institution to enhance the EC's capacity for coordinated external action: European Political Cooperation (Council of Ministers 1970). Only one month later, EC member states charged the political directors from each of the six foreign ministries comprising the

body with the daunting task of identifying common positions for the upcoming Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe. The choice of the CSCE as a focal point of early consultations was 'both obvious and surprising' (Möckli 2008, 40). It was obvious because the pan-European talks would directly affect the interests of each EC member state and potentially impair West European integration. The idea of a security conference had been a long-standing Soviet proposal since 1954. Officially proclaimed as enhancing détente, Moscow used the Conference to portray itself as a force for peace and a champion of European unity and cooperation across the divides of trade blocs and military alliances. More specifically, the Kremlin sought multilateral recognition of the territorial and political status quo and increased economic exchanges across the continent (Savranskaya 2008).

The CSCE mandate also came as a surprise, however, given that the traditional forum of Western consultation – NATO – had been discussing the potential dangers of the proposed Conference for years.[9] Some member states worried, not without reason, that the decision to create a separate West European forum for CSCE preparation might irritate NATO and especially the US (Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amts, B-40, Vol. 189, 'Sachstand. Thema: KSE', 16 February 1971). Nonetheless, the general interest among the Six to get the consultation machinery underway prevailed and, after initial difficulties (Yamamoto 2007, 216-20), EPC's role during the Conference turned out to become the first success story of Western European foreign policy.

Preparing the CSCE: A United Western European Grouping within NATO
The CSCE marked the highpoint of multilateral European détente. While traditional Cold War historiography, with its excessive focus on the superpowers, has highlighted the Conference's importance (or lack thereof) in terms of US-Soviet relations (Garthoff 1994, 526-33; Leffler 2007, 248-52, 294), we will focus on one remarkable development in intra-Western relations associated with the Helsinki talks: outperforming NATO, EPC emerged as the leading forum of Western consultation and became the single most important grouping at the Conference. This success in

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[9] For an overview, see Memorandum on East/West Relations: European Security and the Possibility of a Conference, 19 January 1970, Canadian National Archives, RG-25, Vol. 9054, File 20-4-CSCE, Vol. 5; see also Yamamoto 2007, 40-256.

harmonizing EC views and defending human rights principles in a Cold War setting marks the first significant attempt at projecting an emerging West European identity.

Between the autumn of 1970 and October 1972, EPC managed to harmonize the policies of the Six and the three candidate countries on all major topics of the far-reaching CSCE agenda. Most importantly, the political directors hammered out a strategy for countering the imminent Warsaw Pact efforts to gain multilateral endorsement of the territorial and political status quo by *inter alia* pushing for detailed commitments to increase the 'freer movement of people, ideas, and information.' Anticipating Soviet eagerness to publicly sell the outcome of the negotiations as an international stamp of approval on Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe, including the Brezhnev doctrine, the Six were determined that 'the Russians should be made to pay a price for the West agreeing to hold the Conference at all' (DBPO 1997, No. 11, para. 3b). Afraid that international public opinion would judge the mere convening of the CSCE as a Soviet victory, the Western Europeans would counter-attack by raising human rights. By highlighting the Warsaw Pact's narrow definition of East-West cooperation and the repressive nature of its societies, liberalisation items such as those subsumed under the heading of 'freer movement', would be instrumentalized to 'squeeze the Russian lemon very hard to demonstrate to public opinion how little juice there is in détente à la russe' (DBPO 1997, No. 31, para. 3).

Although Western states saw the propaganda potential of proposals endorsing civil liberties, NATO failed to reach a consensus on these items, not least because the Alliance had authoritarian regimes like Spain, Greece and Portugal in its midst and *Realpolitiker* like Nixon and Kissinger at its helm (Thomas 2001, 39, 49-52; Yamamoto 2007, 220-21). The resulting heavy-handedness of the military grouping in dealing with human rights issues thus represents one of the main reasons for the 'surprising' decision to charge the political directors of the EC member states with the task of CSCE consultation (Möckli 2008, 43; Interview with British CSCE delegate Sir Brian Fall, London, UK, 15 March 2010).

This consultation process culminated during the NATO ministerial meeting of October 1972 when, for the first time in the history of the Alliance, the EC member states presented their positions as a united front. Covering all major items of the upcoming CSCE preparatory talks, the Western European position included the 'freer movement' items on which NATO continued to disagree. Even foreign ministries not

particularly known for pro-Europeanism, such as the British Foreign Office, praised the 'growing political consensus among the members of the enlarged Community, born of a natural feeling of shared interest and coming alive in the workings of the Davignon Committee' (UK National Archives, Record of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office [FCO], Western Organisations Department [WOD], FCO 41/1036, letter from Tickell to Butler, 27 March 1972, para. 2a; Interview with the head of WOD, Sir Crispin Tickell, Ablington, UK, 27 February 2007).

Successful coordination within EPC contributed to efforts, then underway, to deepen integration and give the Community a voice in international affairs. This process culminated in the Copenhagen Declaration of December 1973 that explicitly linked identity and foreign policy (European Summit 1973). As the defining characteristics of European identity the document stipulated the 'diversity of cultures within the framework of a common European civilization, the attachment to common values and principles, the increasing convergence of attitudes of life, [and] the awareness of having specific interests in common.' The nine member states[10] stressed that external policy in general and the collective negotiation with other countries in particular would 'enable the distinct character of the European entity to be respected'. Even more strongly, the Nine pledged 'to undertake the definition of their identity in relation to other countries or groups of countries'. The Copenhagen Declaration therefore serves as evidence of an increasingly direct identity/policy nexus: EC member states and institutions now widely accepted that an emerging European identity was not only relevant for the internal dealings of the Community, but should also serve as a guiding element in its external relations. Western European diplomacy during the CSCE, analyzed in the next section, is significant in this context because it illustrates how the ideational developments we have seen in the Community's stand on Spain and Greece as well as the Copenhagen Declaration were actively externalized for the first time in a coherent external negotiation strategy.

IV. Externalizing Identity: Western European Diplomacy at the CSCE

The defence of common values during the CSCE represents the first successful externalization of the developing Western European identity. The success story

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[10] The UK, Ireland, and Denmark had joined the EC on 1 January 1973.

unfolded in various steps, each one reinforcing mutual trust among the Nine and raising hopes about the potential of further foreign policy cooperation.

Having jointly presented their views within the West for the first time at the NATO summit of October 1972, EC member states took the equally unprecedented step of acting as a united grouping on the international stage during the CSCE preparatory meeting in Dipoli (November 1972-June 1973). During this meeting and the protracted main negotiating stage at Geneva (September 1973-July 1975), the Nine became 'a key driving force in making the Soviet Union subscribe to an expanding notion of security, with Moscow eventually acknowledging human rights as a principle of international relations' (Möckli 2008, 69; Thomas 2001, 55-88). The Helsinki Final Act not only defined human rights as an integral part of European security, but signatories also made specific pledges, e.g. to 'respect human rights and fundamental freedoms, including freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief' (Principle 7 in Basket I) and to 'facilitate freer movement and contacts' across the Iron Curtain (Basket III). While the extent of Western success at the CSCE is still subject to debate (Davy 1992, 236-68; Davy 2009; Suri 2008), recently uncovered primary sources from Warsaw Pact states document that the East was forced to make an unforeseeable number of painful concessions and that it was well aware of the potentially subversive nature of these bargains (Savranskaya 2008; Zubok 2007, 237; Interview with head of East Germany's CSCE delegation, Siegfried Bock, Berlin, Germany, 11 June 2008; see also Dobrynin 1995, 346).

This extraordinary success is all the more noteworthy since the Nine not only withstood the mixture of bullying and stonewalling tactics from the well-staffed delegation of the Soviet Union, but also fended off simultaneous pressure from Washington. Sceptical from the outset, Henry Kissinger became particularly impatient, deriding the Conference as an example of 'multilateral diplomacy run amok' where self-referential diplomats behaved like 'cloistered medieval monks elaborating sacred texts' (Kissinger 1999, 642; see also Hanhimäki 2003). Sometimes colluding with the USSR to further superpower bilateralism, the White House tried repeatedly to push the Western Europeans to water down their demands so as to make them more readily acceptable to Moscow (Hebel 2007, 54-62, 66-71). Although EPC states retained their calm, responding with constructive initiatives that deflected the American drive to wrap up the negotiations, Western European diplomats did not

mince words when reporting their frustration to their capitals. For example, the head of the UK delegation to the Geneva-based negotiating stage lamented:

> It sometimes seems that Dr. Kissinger misunderstands the significance of the CSCE to the West. He often gives the impression that détente is primarily a matter of inter-governmental accommodation and that the human aspect is secondary. Painful discussions in Geneva about increasing the number of kiosks at which foreign newspapers will be sold in the Soviet Union are no doubt insignificant by comparison with the issues of the strategic balance. But there is more to it than that. One thing the Conference has already achieved: to get it accepted for the first time by the Communist states that relations between peoples – and therefore the attitudes of Governments towards their own citizens – should be the subject of multilateral discussion (DBPO, No. 94, para. 18).

Western European criticism of Kissinger reflects the divide between Washington's and EC member states' goals at the CSCE (Hamilton 1999, 17), while also revealing more fundamental disagreement about the conception of multilateral détente, including its instrumental aims and normative content. West Europeans, having become progressively more optimistic about the CSCE, rejected American attempts to use the Conference solely to further superpower bilateralism. EPC states opposed a policy that would, in their view, have the morally repugnant effect of legitimizing Soviet hegemony without providing for potential openings in the status quo.

EPC's steadfast insistence on the inclusion of human rights and civil liberties into the Final Act was based upon the normative consensus that had gradually emerged in the previous decade, and this ideational dimension shaped foreign policy in the negotiations. EC member states' attempt to project a Western definition of human rights onto the pan-European plane was regarded as 'a *fair* test of the sincerity of the Russians in pursuing a policy of détente *as we understand it*' (DBPO, No. 46, para. 21, our italics). This is evident in the harsh criticism of the Warsaw Pact as well as of Kissinger's approach that leading diplomats uttered behind closed doors. For example, Crispin Tickell, the FCO official principally in charge of handling the CSCE, maintained that Kissinger did not understand the 'genuinely idealistic element in the European approach, but rather, like his hero Metternich, wants stability and détente (in the Russian sense of the word) for their own sakes' (DBPO, No. 94, fn. 19; Interview Tickell).

The timing and strategy of externalizing the normative consensus of the Nine was conditioned by the instrumental logic of fighting a diplomatic propaganda war. EC states intended to use these provisions to put the Warsaw Pact countries on the defensive while appealing to public opinion in the West. Internal documents show that the West Europeans sought to exploit the CSCE as a forum for demonstrating that the East was holding up détente and that military deterrence remained imperative as long as a genuine relaxation of tension remained elusive (e.g. DBPO, No. 8, especially para. 11). The Warsaw Pact's negative stance concerning any proposal to increase civil liberties and to incorporate human rights into a widened notion of (human) security provided ammunition for Western European propaganda skirmishes.

Despite the pressure from East and West, the EC member states, often aided by the neutral and non-aligned states (see Fischer 2009), held out and succeeded in placing an explicit commitment to human rights as a principle of inter-state relations in Basket I as well as civil liberties and specific commitments to increasing human contacts in Basket III. This insistence reflected the normative consensus that had emerged internally and the continued 'genuinely idealistic' drive (DBPO, No. 94, fn. 19), while also being influenced by the instrumentalities of Cold War politics. EC diplomacy thus made a crucial contribution to turning the CSCE into an extension of *Ostpolitik*, a multilateral version of the 'change through rapprochement' dialectic, as opposed to a mere appendix of status quo-oriented superpower détente. By using human rights to fight the Cold War, Western European diplomacy externalized and in turn further enhanced the liberal identity of the EC that had been constructed in internal debates following the Spanish request for association in 1962 and the Greek military coup of 1967.

The CSCE Experience as a Catalyst for the EC as an International Actor
The Helsinki experience had a significant impact on subsequent Western European foreign policy. EPC officials at the time saw the Helsinki talks 'both as a major development in East/West relations and … a test case for the development of foreign policy co-ordination among the Nine' (DBPO, No. 46, para. 19). Recent archival research has validated earlier assessments of the markedly positive impact of the CSCE exercise (Möckli 2008). Their resolute defence of jointly pre-negotiated positions turned EC member states into a decisive force that exercised leadership in

the Western camp and gained the respect of Warsaw Pact delegations (Interview Bock).

Conducting the negotiations with a hard-headed yet non-polemical demeanour, the Western Europeans were able to use the CSCE as a 'continuation of [the] Cold War by other, more subtle means' (DBPO, No. 37, fn. 3). Strengthened internal cohesion, enhanced international prestige, and the successful realization of jointly defined national interests based on collectively held beliefs were outcomes of the CSCE experience, whose effects resonated widely within the Community. As the first example of the potential of close West European collaboration in foreign affairs it strengthened morale and reinforced the growing trust which a new set of leaders, including Brandt, Pompidou, and Edward Heath, as well as a younger generation of officials, had been developing since the late 1960s. It is therefore no exaggeration to say that the mammoth conference acted as a 'major catalyst for the rise of the Nine as an international actor with a distinct foreign and security policy' (Möckli 2008, 71, 97-98).

Conclusion

This article has highlighted the widespread liberal assumption in the literature on the EU as an international actor that its foreign policy is influenced in important ways by its domestic identity – a conceptual linkage for which we introduced the idea of an 'identity/policy nexus'. We argued that existing treatments of this nexus share essentializing tendencies in that they suggest an almost 'natural', or at least rather unproblematic, connection between the internal and external planes. Drawing on three important but understudied historical episodes, namely debates about the accession of Spain and Greece to the EC, the inception of EPC and its role in the CSCE, we demonstrated that this internal-external linkage is much more contingent than prevailing arguments suggest. We emphasized three factors, in particular, that shaped its evolution in important ways. First, external events, rather than a pre-existing ideational disposition, catalyzed the process of internal identity formation and externalization. Second, far from being 'natural' or unproblematic, these processes were highly politically contested and in which seemingly 'weak' actors yielded disproportionate influence. Third, ideational dynamics, highlighted by much of the literature, intimately blended with instrumental dynamics associated with the wider

geopolitical and more specifically strategic context within which EC foreign policy had to operate.

An important, and potentially fruitful, avenue for further research would be to analyse the identity/policy nexus in EU foreign policy more systematically. While the historical case studies have merit in their own right as they deal with hitherto understudied episodes of the European Integration process and thereby served to highlight the contingencies inherent in the historical evolution of this nexus, the results we derived from them form promising starting points for a more general understanding of the dynamics affecting it. In fact, we believe that the three factors we identified could serve as foundations for a coherent and generalizable model of the nexus. In different contexts, and largely in a disjointed fashion, various scholars have started to analyse the role of external catalysts, political contestation, and the blend of ideational and instrumental dynamics for EU foreign policy (see Schimmelfennig 2001; Youngs 2004). The challenge would then be to theorize and operationalize each of the three factors, see how they relate to each other and identify the conditions under which these relationships hold, and thereby lead to a 'political constellation' in which domestic identity has an independent ideational influence on EU foreign policy.

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