



TOGETHER IN EUROPE



EC NEWSLETTER FOR CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE

RELATIONS WITH THE EUROPEAN UNION

INTERGOVERNMENTAL CONFERENCE AND ENLARGEMENT

The EU Heads of State, who will hold an informal meeting on 22-23 September in Majorca, will have the Interim Report (see also pp. 9-11) on progress in discussions within the Reflection Group which is preparing the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference (IGC), at their disposal. It was prepared by the Group's chairman Mr. Carlos Westendorp, the Spanish Secretary of State for European Affairs. The Heads of State are not expected to draw any conclusions, but their discussion could influence the second phase of Reflection Group meetings which started in Brussels on 4 September and will finish on 14 November.

The report underlines, for the attention of the Heads of State, the importance of "Context and Timetable". This could result in a changed approach to the IGC, and consequently may substantially influence the attitude towards the timing, and possibly the terms of the next enlargement to the East. It will only be the EU formal summit in Madrid in December, which will take a position on the IGC. However, should our reading of Mr. Westendorp's progress report be correct (together with our understanding of hints suggested by him since 5 September), it could be possible that Member States may attempt to conclude the IGC rapidly and limit the IGC only to the revision of the EU Treaty. The aim of the IGC would be to allow a rapid start to the enlargement negotiations.

This could facilitate the possible beginning of the enlargement negotiations to as early as late 1997/beginning of 1998, although perhaps this may be too optimistic. It is conditioned by the possibility of reaching an agreement among the member countries that the bulk of the EU reforms (except the institutional system and the decision making process) would have to be negotiated among the member countries only after the IGC, and in conjunction with the already initiated enlargement negotiations. On the other hand, old hands in Brussels probably already feel in their bones the Community's typical inclination to such a type of decision. It appears that Westendorp's Group already agrees that the necessary reform of the key policies (CAP, structural funds etc) does not require a change of the legal base ie of the EU Treaty, and that it would be preferable, that it is handled separately from the IGC.

(continued on page 2)

CONTENTS

RELATIONS WITH THE EUROPEAN UNION

<i>IGC AND ENLARGEMENT</i>	1
<i>STRUCTURAL DIALOGUE IN AGRICULTURE</i>	3
<i>BRITANN ON ENLARGEMENT</i>	4
<i>EU RELATIONS WITH MACEDONIA</i>	5
<i>EU/POLAND CALL FOR ACCESSION TIMETABLE</i>	6
<i>JOINT PARLIAMENTARY COMMITTEE IN SOFIA</i>	6
<i>GONZALEZ ON ADJUSTMENT TO UNION</i>	7
<i>ESC DISCUSSES ALBANIA</i>	7
<i>HAENSCH PROPOSES BALTIC SUMMIT</i>	8
<i>POLISH COMMITTEE MEETS ESC</i>	8
<i>HUMANITARIAN AID TO CROATIA</i>	8

DEVELOPMENTS WITHIN THE EU

<i>PROGRESS REPORT ON THE IGC</i>	9
<i>GERMAN VIEW OF ESC TREATY</i>	11
<i>DIRECTIVE ON CROSS-BORDER PAYMENTS</i>	12

15 1.2.95

(see page 1)

This leader tries to argue the possibility that the EU Heads of State could begin to consider the need to conclude the IGC as early as possible to avoid a) its cumulation with other important issues, and b) limit the reform of principal policies to only the correction of certain policies to allow enlargement. Thus the aim of the IGC would be to approve the necessary institutional reform. This can no longer be postponed because the major challenge of the future enlargement will be in the area of institutions. This implies the reform of the decision making system together with the allocation of the number of votes to individual member countries; the reform of the rotation of the EU Presidency; the change in the number of commissioners etc. This itself is an enormous task, but the IGC could avoid dragging out heated discussions on the reforms of the EU policies for several years: **from 1997 the EU Timetable would become too complicated.** The Agenda considerably surpasses the perceived common good will for tough solutions, and there is a likelihood of consecutive political crises damaging the EU internally and postponing the enlargement for many years. One of Westendorp's conclusions from the work of the Reflection Group is that the next enlargement represents both a moral imperative and a major opportunity for Europe. Thus enlargement must take place and must take place successfully. To avoid the enlargement or damage it, would create a serious crisis not only in the applicant countries but also in the present Union. The Interim Report points that most of the Reflection Group considers that it is **necessary to separate the IGC from the discussion over the reform of individual policies. Otherwise the IGC would not conclude before the Agenda gets over-complicated.** It seems that the Reflection Group agrees that the respect of the "acquis communautaire" is accepted by both the current EU and candidate countries, together with the principle of "deepening and widening". The Group seems to agree that for example Article 46 of the Treaty is the legal base for the CAP (it provides for qualified majority decisions), CAP reform thus does not require prior revision of the EU Treaty. The impact of the enlargement on common policies would not be immediate, but gradually spread over a number of years. In addition, the possibility to set up transition periods would weaken the impact of enlargement and allow the Fifteen defence against the negative consequences. But the main conclusion seems to be that to mix the enlargement with the reform of the EU would be politically extremely sensitive. Discussions with Carlos Westendorp since the beginning of September singularly underline the importance the Reflection

Group is putting on the "**Broader Context and Timetable**": the IGC forms part of the broader context whose individual elements are inevitably linked to the reform of the Union. The Heads of State must consider the **relationship** between the elements and on this basis, in December, they would set the goals for the IGC. The key elements and timetable are: **1. Enlargement** - major challenge and a moral imperative; **2. Transition to the third stage of EMU** - IGC shall avoid opening the issue of Economic and Monetary Union. EMU must be realised along the timetable in the Maastricht Treaty and under its provisions (full respect of criteria etc); **3. Renegotiation of the EU's own resources and the financial perspective for 1999 and beyond** - Compromise on the Delors II Package (financial perspective for 1994-1998) allowed the signature of the Maastricht Treaty. To link the renegotiation of the EU's own resources with considerations of the **costs of enlargement** and its impact on common policies is politically explosive and could postpone the enlargement for a number of years. Thus it may be politically more acceptable to start renegotiations on resources and financial perspectives only after the IGC and after the beginning of the enlargement negotiations; **4. Analysis of the impact of enlargement on policies and resources** - to bring this analysis into the IGC could cause indefinite prolongation. Overall discussion would get over-complicated and linked to all possible issues and interests; **5. Debate on a future Common Defence Policy, and on WEU in connection with 1998 deadline;** **6. Elections due in Member States in 1997 and 1998:** This in particular refers to the issue of the 1997 UK elections, but overall it seems that to link IGC with the elections could be a recipe for disaster. On the other hand, the population would have to accept the revised Treaty anyway.

Should this reading of the progress in the discussion within the Reflection Group prove to be right, the associated countries may start to reconsider their ideas on the beginning and the context of the enlargement negotiations. The need to participate in some way in the IGC (observer status etc) would be less strong. On the other hand, a limited IGC while allowing the early commencement of the accession negotiations with **all** candidate countries, could favour those who will be economically and politically most fit to accept the *acquis communautaire* together with EMU (with transition periods). Negotiations with the other candidate countries could go on for a number of years with the Union adopting the reform of the policies and candidate countries increasing their readiness for membership. (JZ) ■

STRUCTURAL DIALOGUE IN AGRICULTURE

Ministers of agriculture of the associated countries of central and eastern Europe will have their first "structured dialogue" meeting with the EU on the margins of the EU Agricultural Council in Brussels on 25-26 September. Agriculture will be the key issue in the future accession negotiations, but the forthcoming meeting is still not expected to concentrate on the likely difficulties in extending the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) to the future member countries. This meeting will not deal with agricultural policy changes facilitating the integration of the associated countries into the CAP. The European Commission is still working on the "agricultural version of the White Paper" and this report is unlikely to be finalized before mid-October.

Thus the Brussels meeting offers the opportunity for the associated countries to present their current and medium term agricultural policy. The Commissioner in charge of Agriculture and the Presidency of the Council will certainly profit from the meeting to outline the scope of the on-going reform of CAP, the results achieved already and the medium term outlook.

It will be recalled that during the Essen Summit the Commission was requested to present a report on the reasons why only a few agricultural quotas opened by the Union under the Europe Agreements are fully used. The European Commission completed this report in late June and transferred the report on the "Tariff Quota Utilisation by Central European Countries under the Europe Agreements" also to the CEEC Authorities. We discussed this report in No 73, pp.4-5.

The next step was presentation of the new report on the "Agricultural Situation and Prospects in the Central and Eastern European Countries". This report was released in late July, and in a certain way it will serve as the basis for the discussion during the forthcoming first joint meeting of agricultural ministers, in spite of the fact that it will be officially handed over

only on 27 September.

This report does not give any policy recommendation, but its importance is in the fact that this is the first working report on CEEC agriculture officially presented by DG VI of the European Commission (Directorate-General for Agriculture). Thus it follows relatively closely the reasoning and the type of background analysis which the Commission would be using when considering the problems and the terms of the accession.

The report does not deal with the costs of the future extension of the CAP to new member countries. However, its main importance is that it implies that the costs are likely to be considerably lower than the astronomical costs expressed in other similar earlier studies. It dispels the fear that in future, eastern European agricultural produce could flood the EU market. The report also seems to support DG-VI's position that considerations of enlargement are not directly linked with the new and more substantial reform of CAP. This is partly because of the crisis in central and eastern European agriculture. Agricultural production there is expected to grow in coming years, albeit at a slow rate. The associated countries would have difficulties in realising their agricultural potential because of a lack of capital, farm

structural problems and especially because of downstream structural problems.

Thus the main conclusion is that the associated countries of central and eastern Europe would be less in need of a high level of price and income support for their farmers, than targeted assistance for the restructuring, modernisation and diversification of their productive capacity in agriculture and the downstream sectors and for improvement of their rural infrastructure.

Mr. Franz Fischler, Commissioner for Agriculture said on 25 July that the report suggests, that accession of the central and eastern European countries to the EU will not be made without difficulties, but that the key conclusion to be drawn from the report is that the main problems are not in agriculture itself, but that the current agricultural problems in central and eastern Europe are closely linked to other sectors of the economy. Thus according to Franz Fischer "a solution to the problems in agriculture in CEEC depends on the substantial change in the economy as such".

The report itself (some 35 pages) is a summary report based on 10 country reports covering the nine associated countries of central and eastern Europe and Slovenia which is in the process of being associated. The individual country reports deal with the same topics with some minor exceptions. Thus for example, the Polish country report goes into some details concerning the evolution of farm income, while for example Czech or Slovak country reports do not touch upon this rather key issue.

(continued on page 4)

(see page 3)

Major conclusions

1. The difficult post 1989/90 adjustment effort brought a fall in output in both the economy as such and agriculture. It will take decades before the average income per capita in CEEC would reach 75% of the EU's average. But there are substantial differences between individual countries. For example Slovenia and the Czech Republic are already at a level coming close to that of Greece in terms of PPP (purchasing power parity).

2. There was a substantial decline in agricultural production and a decline in livestock was more significant than for crops. Some bright spots start to appear.

3. Overall growth should bring rise for food products and thus have a positive impact on CEEC agriculture. However higher incomes consumer requirements tend to favour the export of western food and agricultural products. This is documented by the success of the EU food industry in CEEC. Domestic CEEC industry is not really in a position to meet growing demand regarding quality, variety and in particular marketing of products. The situation in individual countries differs, however.

4. Adjustment in agriculture is far from completed, but there is a trend towards stabilization and the re-introduction of border protection and support measures, which contributed to a rise in market prices for agricultural products. Overall agricultural prices are still well below EU levels.

5. Agricultural production is likely to increase over future years, albeit at a slow rate. There is a significant production potential, which would not be easily realised due to a:

- **lack of capital:** the self-financing capacity of most enterprises is weak and there are problems in the credit sector. No functioning market for land exists and administrative regulations make it difficult for investors to invest in agriculture;

- **farm structural problems:** farming structures (small farms) as they started to be developed in many CEEC would, in the longer term, be viable as an additional source of income, but will complicate the task of modernizing agriculture. In other countries over-dimensioned structures continue to exist, which in the longer run would not seem to be economically viable;

- **downstream structural problems:** it seems that the report finds that the biggest problem is in the privatization, reorganization and modernization of the food industry. Overall, downstream sectors closest to agriculture show the biggest deficiencies in transformation and lack international competitiveness. It has been estimated that even in those countries which made the most important progress, the necessary structural change in downstream sectors will take at least another 5 to 10 years.

6. Agricultural prices should rise in CEEC in the coming years and have been rising since 1992-93. But lower prices are often related

to products of considerably lower quality than western European standards. There are limits to price rises. Because of the high share of food in household expenditures, and because of relatively high levels of inflation, a rapid increase in agricultural and food prices would be economically and socially dangerous. The price gap between the CEEC and the EU can therefore be expected to continue to exist, even if it will decrease more or less, depending on the products.

The key part of the report are projections of output, consumption, and foreign trade balances for year 2000 for both the CEEC-10 and EU 15. In a way the size of CEEC exportable surplus in individual commodities and its impact on the EU self-sufficiency would be the key elements in the membership negotiations. Projections generally show "unthreatening" balances, and even in the case of cereals the CEEC-10 exportable balance has been estimated for 2000 at some 6m tons (and only 3.3m tons for CEFTA countries). It is expected that overall in crops and oil seeds, the exportable surplus of CEEC would not grow between now and 2000, and would not surpass that of pre-1990. In the dairy sector the recovery would be less marked and the net export potential of CEEC would be significantly lower than in the pre-transition period. The meat supply would be more balanced and at lower level than in the pre-transition period. ■

COMMISSIONER BRITTAN SPEAKS ON "NEXT ENLARGEMENT"

Commissioner Sir Leon Brittan in his speech to Europapolitischer Kongress (organised by CDU/CSU Group in the European Parliament, in Berlin on September 11) argued in favour of both, giving the membership candidate countries "observer status" during the EU Intergovernmental Conference, and setting up a date for accession negotiations immediately after the IGC without waiting for the results of ratification.

These views (and in particular the participation of associated countries as observers at the IGC) are not officially shared by the European Commission. On 12 September the spokesman for the President of the

European Commission pointed out that Sir Leon was speaking in Berlin purely on the personal basis and not on behalf of the Commission, which in turn has no say over the arrangements for the IGC, as this is an exclusive competency of the EU Council and of its Presidency. The Spokesman said that a number of the members of the European Commission have "personal" views diametrically opposed to those expressed by Commissioner Brittan in Berlin and this number includes Commission President Jacques Santer.

Sir Leon considers that "the main aim of the IGC should be to prepare the EU for enlargement. The enlargement to the East has a political, strategic and economic importance equal only to that presented by the creation of the EC itself". Sir Leon admits that the change of the EU Treaty is an internal matter, but at the same time feels that to take an "all or nothing" attitude on this question could be short sighted. So far the EU has offered the central and eastern European countries informal briefings, but he feels that they could be offered "a non-voting role as observers at the IGC".

The Commissioner said that the other big issue which needs to be considered is the Budgetary Costs of Enlargement. Here the principal problem is agriculture. His argument is that if the EU continues to keep prices high and the associated countries are unable to finance similar levels, agriculture would cause serious problems during the negotiations. The long transition periods would probably not resolve the problem. The candidate countries may accept that the CAP is not extended to new members, in order to speed up accession, but once they are in, this would mean maintaining borders inside the EU and operating two systems of supports. This would result in an unsatisfactory situation, but perhaps this may be the only way forward as "it might be better to accept a long transitional period rather than to attempt a draconian reform of the CAP and delay unduly the accession of the CEEC".

The Commissioner took a similar attitude on Structural Funds. In 1999 the financing of the EU is to be re-considered and structural funds could be adapted in the light of enlargement. The eastern European countries may also consider whether it is better to join earlier, without full Structural Fund assistance, or wait "until their development renders the cost of applying the normal rules less prohibitive".

However, to Commissioner Brittan it is time not only to think in terms of the costs of enlargement, but also in terms of benefits. He feels the need to assess the benefits of expanding the Internal market to a further 106 million people. His idea is that unless the EU is prepared to research and publicise the benefits of enlargement, there is a difficulty that the problems which enlargement certainly pose will receive exclusive attention. Sir Leon recalled the Cecchini Report on the Single market and suggested that an independent group is commissioned to assess the overall dynamic effect of enlargement on the EU economy in terms of growth and jobs. ■

BETTER OUTLOOK FOR EU RELATIONS WITH MACEDONIA

The prospect of strengthening relations between the EU and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (Fyrom) have substantially improved since Greece and Fyrom announced, on 5 September, their intention of resuming their discussions. Fyrom's President, Mr. Gligorov, told Commissioner Hans van den Broek on 6 September that an initial agreement with Athens would be signed in New York by the Foreign Ministers of the two countries. It seems, however, that this initial agreement will still not cover the whole dispute as it would, for the moment, leave aside the delicate question of the use of the name "Macedonia"; the agreement will, on the other hand, settle the Constitutional problem and that of the flag.

If this partial agreement is effectively signed, the Commission could envisage several initiatives regarding Fyrom, notably:

- i) examining the possibility of establishing diplomatic relations between the EU and Skopje and placing all relations in a new contractual framework;
- ii) the granting of economic assistance;
- iii) the extension of existing cooperation with Fyrom within the framework of the Phare programme (which, at the present time, is limited to humanitarian aid projects). Regarding the follow-up that is reserved to action introduced by the Commission at the Court of Justice against the Greek unilateral decision to impose an economic embargo on Fyrom, the Commission will, when the time comes, assess the situation and draw the appropriate conclusions, said a spokesman. In any event, the Commission considers that by fulfilling its "legal duty" under the Treaty, that is, by introducing action at the Court against Greece's unilateral decision to introduce the economic embargo, the "Commission has helped to establish the conditions for an agreement", said the spokesman. ■

EU/POLAND JOINT PARLIAMENTARY CALLS FOR ACCESSION TIMETABLE

The third meeting of the EU/Poland Joint Committee, on September 6, co-chaired by W.G. Van Velzen (N. PES) and the Polish MP Jan Borkowski, allowed for an "open and frank debate" according to Mr. van Velzen.

The Committee discussed the work of the Association Council, the functioning of the "structured dialogue", the interpretation and implementation of the White Paper on integration into the EU's internal market. There was debate on the appropriateness of already setting a timetable for opening and the unfolding of accession negotiations, the preparation of the 1996 IGC, the development of the Phare programme, etc. At the end of discussions (which, as Mr. Borkowski said, were at times controversial and "stormy"), the Parliamentary Joint Committee adopted, through a consensus, a series of recommendations to be submitted to the EU/Poland Association Council:

i) the EU has to ensure that, through its White Paper on the internal market, it does not impose on future Member States stricter requirements than those fulfilled by the current Member States, especially regarding environmental, social and competition standards. Mr. Borkowski recalled that Poland attached great importance to the White Paper's not being considered as a legal instrument creating new obligations, but that it was a question of a "guide" aimed at helping the Polish government in aligning its legislation on

that of the EU. Mr. Van Velzen said that discussions in the Parliamentary Joint Committee had shown that it was still too soon to discuss all the legislative details or a possible transition period which could be granted; all these issues will have to be dealt with during negotiations themselves.

ii) a precise timetable for accession may only be set once the 1996 IGC is over. Mr. Van Velzen accepted that this recommendation goes clearly against what the Polish Government has been demanding for several months, ie already setting a detailed timetable now for the opening and unfolding of accession negotiations. "We understand why Poland wants to obtain, even now, a precise date for the opening of negotiations. It sees in this, and rightly so, an important source of motivation for the country as a whole. But we consider that we should refrain from selling them a date that is not based on reality. This is why Poland has first to perform its duties, just like the European Union has first to perform its own." Nothing prevents Poland from setting out and pursuing its own timetable as regards legislation alignment.

Another recommendation by the Parliamentary Joint Committee, moreover, urges the EU to fully respect the priorities and timetable set by the Polish authorities for implementing its internal strategy for preparing accession;

iii) the current bilateral cooperation procedures need to be

improved, especially the way ministerial meetings under the "structured dialogue" are run, as well as the Association Council and the implementation of projects in the framework of the Phare programme. For the "structural dialogue" it was felt that it is possible to avoid long introductory political declarations (distribute the written texts instead of making long speeches) and to pass immediately to the heart of the real problems.

Another important subject debated by the Parliamentary Joint Committee was preparing the 1996 IGC. Mr. Elmar Brok (one of the two EP members of Mr. Westendorp's Reflection Group) spoke of the state of the Group's work. Mr. Borkowski stressed the importance that Poland attached to direct and regular contacts with the bodies and people responsible for preparing the IGC and to the exchange of written texts. Mr. Elmar Brok invited the Polish side to formulate their own position (especially on the majority voting and on the EU second and third pillar) and to submit a text to the Reflection Group.

The Parliamentary Joint Committee also spoke of the imbalance in trade between the EU and Poland, as well as efforts being made by the Polish Government lately in the field of environmental protection. The debate on these two subjects (and others) will be continued and deepened at the next meeting to take place early 1996 (most probably in January). ■

RESULTS OF FIRST MEETING OF JOINT PARLIAMENTARY COMMITTEE IN SOFIA

The session of the joint EU/Bulgaria parliamentary committee which convened for the first time in Sofia on 6-8 September under the co-chairmanship of Greek MEP Mr Papakyriazis (PSE) and the Bulgarian deputy Mr Kamov, was essentially marked by an exchange of views with Bulgaria's President Mr Zhelev, Bulgaria's Prime Minister Mr Videnov, and the President of the Bulgarian Assembly, Mr Sendov. They all recognized the extent of the challenge that Bulgaria will have to meet to succeed its integration in the EU.

Even if there exists a broad convergence of views between the Bulgarian political forces on the objective to be achieved (ie membership in the EU), differences nonetheless remain on the national strategy to be followed to achieve this. Once the different political parties agree to a national action plan, Bulgaria will formally present its membership application to the EU, he noted.

The debate within the joint parliamentary committee focused on the political, economic and social situation in Bulgaria, the state of trade relations with the EU and the practical implementation of the White Paper on integration in the EU's internal market.

The existing obligation to hold a visa for Bulgarian citizens wanting to come to the EU was also discussed; the Parliamentary Committee spoke of its hope that the practice of having to hold a visa with Bulgaria (and Romania) would be rapidly aligned to that of other Central and Eastern European States; it also asked that the EP should deal with this at coming plenary sessions.

The economic implications of the war in former Yugoslavia for Bulgaria were also the subject of a brief exchange of views; it was, moreover, observed that due to the good relation which existed with its neighbouring countries and the Balkan regions, Bulgaria would no doubt have an important role to play in the framework of the future economic and political reconstruction of the countries affected by the war.

At the end of the discussions, the Parliamentary Committee adopted, through a consensus, a series of recommendations to be submitted to the EU/Bulgaria Association Council, as well as to the EU institutions and the Bulgarian Parliament. The next meeting of the Parliamentary Joint Committee will take place in the spring of 1996. ■

ADJUSTMENT TO UNION WILL BE DIFFICULT, SAYS FELIPE GONZALEZ

Spanish Prime Minister and President-in-Office of the European Council Felipe Gonzalez, on an official visit to Bulgaria, stated that the Union had the duty to extend itself to the East and that Bulgaria had the right to become a member. However, he stressed that adapting to an economy at EU level, with open frontiers, would be "difficult and complicated". Bulgarian Prime Minister Zhan Videnov pointed out, for his part, that, according to a number of experts, his country should adopt about 2,000 new laws in order to conform with Community norms. In addition, if it is difficult for the Spanish Government to fight against annual inflation of 4%, then imagine how difficult the task would be to fight against a predicted rate of 40%, concluded Mr Videnov. ■

ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE DISCUSSES ALBANIA

Albania deserves special attention from the European Union which must result in stronger relations with this country. That is the firm belief of the EU's Economic and Social Committee (ESC), which it expressed in an own-initiative opinion on relations (rapp.: Mr Massucci, Workers, Italy) which was adopted by the majority (one vote against, 2 abstentions) in a plenary session before the summer recess. The drafting of this voluminous opinion (36 pages) was preceded by a visit from the rapporteur accompanied by experts in Albania.

The Committee listed the reasons for its point of view and made recommendations for the institutions. Among the reasons for beefing up relations between the EU and Albania, the ESC mentions: the geographical location of this country and its importance for the balance in the Balkans; the structural weakness of its economy that threatens the

democratisation process engaged with success these past three years; the risks of conflicts of ethnic and religious origins, worsened by the weakness of Albanian democracy; the observation that the move to the market economy by a policy of privatization does not necessarily lead to a transition to economic democracy; Albania's growing needs in terms of foreign aid, particularly financial, that confers on this country the characteristics of a Mediterranean non-member country (MNC) in addition to its membership among the family of Central and East European countries (CEEC).

As a consequence, the Committee recommends: a) financial assistance based on economic restructuring and sectorial development, infrastructures, job creation, the development of human resources, decentralized cooperation and private

(continued on page 8)