The Determinants of Migration Under the Freedom of Movement: Lessons from the European Union

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Paper presented at the EUSA Twelfth Biennial International Conference.
Boston, March 3-5, 2011.

Abstract
This paper asks: what determines international migration and how has the EU's free movement of people arrangement impacted this process? I argue that relative factor endowments (of capital and labor) and democracy serve as substitutes when a potential migrant is seeking a receiving country. By contrast, I argue that under the EU's free movement of people regime, intra-EU migration is driven by relative factor endowments. Empirical analysis supports these arguments, and finds that relative factor endowments can compensate for a dearth in democratic governance in the receiving country and that relative factor endowments drive migration within the EU's free movement of people regime.

In 2004 and 2007, following several years – and in some cases a decade – of planning and negotiations, the European Union (EU) welcomed twelve new member states. Having met the Copenhagen Criteria, these Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs) became a part of the world's most integrated regional trade agreement. With membership, these states received open access to Western European markets. Citizens of these new member states were from that point forward privy to the four freedoms enshrined in the Single European Act (SEA) of 1986. Membership for these countries, however, came with a caveat: the free movement of people from the new member states to the existing member states would be restricted for a period of up to seven years following accession. While some member states, including the United Kingdom, chose to waive this caveat, most were relieved that their markets would not immediately be flooded with "Polish plumbers." While there was much *a priori* speculation on the propensity of new member states' citizens to migrate to Western Europe, there was little empirical evidence to show that this fear was warranted.

What determines international migration and how have open borders impacted this process? As was demonstrated in the illustrative example above, the relationship between these questions cannot be understated. Assumptions regarding how international migration works clearly shape public opinion and public policy on immigration, including policies to allow unfettered migration, even if restricted to a limited set of sending countries. Problematically, these important questions have received inadequate scholarly attention. In this paper, I seek to redress this lacuna by offering a generalizable theory of international migration and empirically demonstrate the impact – if any – of the abnegation of immigration controls on migration.

Surprisingly little ink has been spilled on the cross-national determinants of migration. Indeed, the majority of extant literature treats migration as an independent variable by focusing

on the impact of migration on the sending and receiving states (Bearce and Laks 2010; Leblang 2010; Weiner 2004). Of the papers that do treat migration as a dependent variable, none provides a satisfactory understanding of migration patterns (Leblang, Fitzgerald, and Teets 2009). The most developed body of literature that treats migration as a dependent variable comes out of the human security literature and argues that environmental degradation in sub-Saharan Africa drives individuals across borders in order to seek scarce resources (Weiner 2004). After positing the determinants of migration, these authors argue that migration leads to conflict among groups competing for these scarce resources. This argument is clearly inadequate in offering a generalizable theory of migration. The second argument that treats migration as a dependent variable comes out of the political economy literature and uses social network analysis to argue that existing migrant communities decrease information costs associated with migration for individuals coming from their home country (Leblang, Fitzgerald, and Teets 2009). While I will address this argument more thoroughly in a later section of this paper, it is problematic because the causal factors attributed to the social network are more likely a result of democratic governance and, as such, their argument obscures democracy as a significant factor in this process.

Aside from being heretofore unanswered, there are multiple reasons why these questions ought to be answered. The rise of the radical right and the proliferation of anti-immigration platforms in many Western democracies demonstrate the increased salience of immigration issues for public policy. Yet without a clear understanding of the general determinants of migration, it is impossible to understand migrants' motivations and to predict future patterns of migration. It is only through such understanding that we can mitigate the perceived economic

and social dislocation driven by migrants' entry into foreign labor markets and the discontent driven by their entry into a state's social fabric.

Given the preceding concerns, the abnegation of immigration controls seems not only implausible, but also irresponsible. Yet scholars from the liberal tradition of normative theory argue forcefully for open borders by suggesting that given the liberal democratic conception of the moral equality of individuals, there are few justifications for prohibiting migrants from entering into society (Carens 1987; 1999; 2000). Carens (1987; 1999; 2000) suggests that while there are clear obligations for liberal democratic societies to enact relatively open border policies, if we believe in the moral equality of individuals, then liberal democratic governance is the only just form of government and, by extension, all governments ought to be democratic and promote predominantly open migration policies. While the veracity of these claims is outside of the scope of this paper, it is clear that the conclusions drawn are largely incompatible with the realities of the contemporary world. If we take these claims seriously, however, we must first understand the empirical impact of open borders through intensive study of the only current case of such policies – the European Union. The resultant scholarship will help us to ascertain whether 'ought implies can' by illuminating the volume and character of potential migrants and their probable impact on potential receiving societies. My goals for this paper are clearly more modest than the preceding statement implies: I seek to understand how and if migration flows vary under open borders relative to the status quo of restrictive immigration policies. It is my hope that future scholarship will build upon these findings in order to answer the further questions alluded to above.

In this paper, I argue that relative factor endowments (of capital and labor) and democracy serve as substitutes when a potential migrant is seeking a receiving country.

Specifically, significant potential gains in democracy (capital-labor ratio) can compensate for insignificant potential gains in capital-labor ratio (democracy). More concretely, an individual can select a receiving state with a lower level of democracy (capital-labor ratio) than his or her home state, but still find migration beneficial by selecting a receiving country with a capital-labor ratio (level of democracy) compared to his or her home state. Given the high levels of democracy within the EU, I posit that under the EU's free movement of people regime the relative levels in the capital-labor ratio drives migration, regardless of the relative levels of democracy in the sending and receiving states.

The paper proceeds as follows: in the next section, I outline my theoretical expectations for the general determinants and for the variations within the EU's free movement of people regime. In both, I consider the role of demand-side motivations for migration, but posit that the difference between the two lies in 1) the presence or absence of supply-side restrictions to migration and 2) variations in the demand-side motivations driven by economic factors and governance structures. In the following section, I present empirical tests of the hypotheses that follow from my theoretical expectations. As a preview of my results, I find that there is indeed a conditional relationship between the factors driving the demand-side motivations for migration (relative factor endowments and democratic governance), and that in spite of the absence of the supply-side barriers to migration in the EU's free movement of people regime, the same factors motivate migration between participating countries. The final section summarizes my argument and findings, highlights some of the implications of this study, and delineates some avenues for future research.

Determinants of Migration

Factor Endowments and Democracy: Substitutes, Not Complements

In this section, I will outline the theoretical logic and causal mechanisms underpinning my argument that dyadic migration flow is the result of a conditional relationship between disparities in relative factor endowments and governance structure. Theoretically, this argument takes on a similar logic to that of diminishing marginal returns: having reached a certain level of democracy (capital-labor ratio), additional increases in the capital-labor ratio (democracy) will have less of a substantive impact on migration flows than would otherwise be expected. This argument is predicated upon the assertion that individuals seek to augment their well-being by increasing both their security and their wealth, and that migration is one method of attaining these ends. In this sense, the pursuit of security and wealth are the demand-side factors driving migration flows. In more formal terms, I expect a migrant's utility to be a function of both security and potential wealth. To be clear, security and wealth may be attained in the migrant's home state, and all else held equal, migrants would prefer to remain in their home country (Carens 1987). As will be made clear in the section on migration under an open border regime, I postulate that individuals from a sending state where security and wealth are relatively assured will migrate in order to maximize their wealth.

Security and wealth are mutually reinforcing and inextricably linked, a proposition that is well documented in the psychology literature (Maslow 1943). Individual security is the prerequisite to wealth, as individuals cannot hope to attain above what they need if they are fighting for that which they need. Once security is attained, individuals are free to pursue wealth. Wealth, however, gives individuals an increased ability to ensure their own security; with increasing levels of disposable income individuals gain the ability to buy a safer home, hire

security personnel, or leave a volatile situation. Moreover, the security and wealth that motivates international migrants is extended to the family, and does not merely apply to the individual. Where an individual's family does not migrate to the host state, he or she may, for example, be willing to accept horrific conditions in order to maximize his or her wealth so that he or she can send more money home to support his or her family. This dynamic, in part, explains why the interaction between democracy and the capital-labor ratio is important: migrants may be willing to accept a trade-off between security and wealth in order to ultimately maximize both.[1] Moreover, this suggests that migrants accepting wages as a substitute for democracy are more likely to leave their dependents at home and support them via remittances than they are to bring their family with them to a sub-optimal political situation.

The economic portion of this argument relies on factoral models from the international trade literature, which are typically used to explain trade policy preference cleavages (Rogowski 1987). My use of these models outside of both trade and cleavage formation requires brief justification. As outlined in the Heckscher-Ohlin and Stolper-Samuelson theorems, the factoral model holds that owners of abundant factors of production will benefit from, and therefore desire, open markets. Given open markets, factors of production will move to where they are most efficient. This suggests that, at the individual level, laborers living in a labor-abundant state can expect to gain from open markets. In their domestic market, the price for labor (wages) is low relative to those in labor-scarce markets because the supply of labor is higher than the demand for labor. A laborer seeking to maximize his or her wealth, under this model, will move – sectorally, domestically, or internationally – to where labor is in higher demand, thus increasing the economic returns for his or her labor. Trade preference cleavages are therefore

[1] This assumption makes no judgments as to whether migrants seek temporary or permanent homes, as the logic remains the same in either situation.

expected to form along factoral lines, with owners of abundant (scarce) factors of production in favor of (against) free trade.

The factoral model is typically contrasted with the sectoral model, which holds that factors are immobile across sectors and that preference cleavages will form along sectoral lines (Frieden 1991). Specifically, this suggests that export-oriented sectors that will benefit from free trade will prefer open trade whereas import-competing sectors will prefer protection from markets. Hiscox, however, demonstrates that "broad class-based political coalitions are more likely where factor mobility is high, whereas narrow industry-based coalitions are more likely where mobility is low" (Hiscox 2001, 4). This suggests that it is possible to place factors along a spectrum with mobile and immobile serving as the ideal types on either end. Given the differing impact of relative factor mobility, it is important to consider the location of the phenomenon under study on the factor-mobility spectrum in order to ascertain the appropriate theoretical lens through which the phenomenon should be addressed. I contend that migration flows – but not labor in general – are governed by high factor mobility. That is, the subset of the population of labor in a given country that will find migration to be a viable option in obtaining security and wealth consists of those whose specific skill set is transferable either across industries or within industries in different locales.

Additionally, while these theories address trade specifically, the underlying assumption of factor mobility renders these theories applicable to labor migration. Following Mundell (1957), I contend that trade and factor-mobility are substitutes: "Commodity movements are at least to some extent a substitute for factor movements" (Mundell 1957, 321). While the focus of Mundell's article is on the impact of import tariffs on capital mobility, the proffered logic should theoretically extend to labor mobility. Moreover, evidence from the political behavior literature

provides strong support for immigration policy preference cleavages forming along factoral lines, suggesting that laborers perceive migration as detrimental regardless of sectoral affiliation (Scheve and Slaughter 2001; Mayda 2005; O'Rourke and Sinnett 2006). Finally, immigration policies typically follow the logic of reciprocity, as is common in international trade. Given the parallels between trade and migration and Mundell's (1957) theoretical insights into the substitutability of factors and commodities, it is reasonable to extend these models to migration flows.

The causal mechanism by which relative factor endowments drive migration relies on potential market gains. For owners of capital in a capital-abundant, labor-scarce economy, an increase in the labor market serves to increase their earnings by decreasing the supply, and therefore cost, of labor. For potential labor migrants from a capital-scarce, labor-abundant economy, migration to an economy with the opposite factor endowments increases his or her potential earnings because the cost of labor in the receiving country is high relative to that of the sending country. Through migration, both the laborer in the labor-abundant economy and the owner of capital in the capital-abundant economy can realize greater economic gains.[2]

If labor could be treated as merely another economic factor, the first portion of this theory would be sufficient to explain migration flows. As described above, economic considerations certainly drive migration flows, but these are not the only factors impacting migration. As highlighted by Karl Polanyi, it is insufficient to treat labor as merely another factor endowment, divorced from social considerations. "Labor is only another name for a human activity which goes with life itself, which in its turn is not produced for sale but for entirely different reasons,

[2] Taken to its extreme, migration could result in a reversal of a market's relative factor endowments. This situation, however, is unlikely as the demand-side economic factors will change in such a way that migration no longer becomes preferable.

nor can that activity be detached from the rest of life, be stored or mobilized" (Polanyi [1944] 2001, 75).

Theoretically, democracy is a system of governance predicated upon the moral equality of individuals and the resultant obligation to grant individuals freedom; democratic institutions are merely instruments that are intended to obtain and ensure freedom and equality.[3] Above providing individual security, which can be facilitated through wealth in spite of political conditions, democratic governance provides individuals with the freedom to pursue that which does not inhibit the freedom of others. Equality, in this sense, does not mean an economically egalitarian society. Instead, in the Lockean sense, it means that individuals have an equal right to freedom, and that freedom allows individuals to pursue wealth under the justified assumption that their security is reasonably assured (Locke [1764] 1980). In the pursuit of both security and wealth, a migrant can be reasonably assured of his or her natural right to the first and the freedom to pursue the second in a democratic country.

The underlying argument of existing work on the determinants of international migration is congruent with my own: "just as migrants value destinations with maximal economic gains and minimal risks, they also make choices based on their assessment of political risks" (Leblang, Fitzgerald and Teets 2009, 6). Insofar as "economic gains" translates into wealth and "minimal risks" translates into security, these theories are mutually reinforcing. While the connection between "economic gains" and wealth is fairly obvious, the relationship between "minimal risks" and security requires elaboration. Leblang, Fitzgerald and Teets (2009) point to insights from social network analysis, which suggest that co-ethnic expatriot communities provide a form of social capital. Interaction with this group will minimize the migrant's risks by "supply[ing]

[3] Indeed, some scholars argue that there are additional instruments by which freedom and equality can be ensured. See for example Goodhart (2005).

information, minimiz[ing] uncertainty, reduce[ing] transaction costs and generally decreas[ing] the relative importance of traditional economic and social barriers to migration" (Leblang, Fitzgerald and Teets 2009, 6).

What this analysis misses, however, is that democratic governance is a mechanism that facilitates social capital. Where the freedom of association is ensured, co-ethnic expatriots are free to associate and to learn from each other's experiences, something that is not assured in non-democratic countries. My conception of security clearly goes beyond the "minimal risks" envisioned by Leblang, Fitzgerald and Teets, but the freedoms that facilitate expatriot networks are certainly among the conditions that increase security. Moreover, migration is logically prior to co-ethnic expatriot communities. The mutual learning within these communities likely has an impact upon the pursuit of citizenship and naturalization, but is unlikely to account for initial decision to migrate.

The mechanism by which these authors suggest that potential migrants assess "political risks" is inadequate insofar as it rests upon questionable logic that is predicated upon faulty assumptions: all else held equal, migrants will select a receiving state that has liberal naturalization laws because these migrants wish to secure citizenship in order to participate in the political process as a method by which to obtain the rights and protections equal to those of the citizens of the receiving state. First, this logic assumes that migrants desire citizenship. This is clearly not the case given the large number of immigrants eligible to apply for naturalization in the United States (an appropriate example given its relatively liberal naturalization policies) who choose to maintain permanent residence without pursuing naturalization. Naturalization is also logically impossible for individuals who do not wish to give up their current citizenship, but would be required to do so if naturalized in their receiving country. Second, this assumes that

citizenship is the only path to political participation. Even without the right to vote, immigrants may be able to influence the policy-making process through interest group participation (see Fordham and McKeown 2003 for the impact of non-geographic constituencies).

Third, this argument assumes that citizenship is the only path to rights and protection. However, legal protection and liberties can be obtained by merely selecting a democratic state, which by design ensures freedom and equality. Finally, this logic assumes that migrants understand citizenship and naturalization laws. This is problematic in that there are costs associated with obtaining information on citizenship and naturalization laws. The complex nature of such laws accounts for the fact that there is a relative dearth of scholarship on immigration and naturalization regimes outside of legal scholarship.

The preceding discussion yields the following testable hypotheses:

Hypothesis 1: *All else held equal, in dyads in which the receiving state has a high level of the capital-labor ratio relative to the sending state, increasing differences in the level of democratic governance will have a decreasing marginal impact on dyadic migration flows.*

Hypothesis 2: *All else held equal, in dyads in which the receiving state has a high level of democracy relative to the sending state, increasing differences in the capital-labor ratio will have a decreasing marginal impact on dyadic migration flows.*

Open Borders, Factor Endowments, and Democracy: The Case of the European Union

Given the theoretical expectations for the demand-side motivations for migration outlined in the previous section, there is little reason to expect the driving forces of migration to vary substantially under an open border arrangement, *ceteris paribus*. That is, the desire for well-

being, derived through security and wealth, should be relatively normally distributed in populations across the globe. In reality, however, migration controls constitute the supply-side of this phenomenon. While adequate data quantifying immigration control policies does not currently exist, comparative examination of the free movement of people regime within the European Union provides an effective method for comparing the determinants of migration flows in the presence and absence of migration controls.

I do not, however, argue that the EU's experience is generalizable. The European Union is a powerful bloc of developed countries within which democratic governance, high levels of wealth, and market-based economies are the norm. The barrier for entry to the Union, as outlined by the Copenhagen Criteria, is high. Prospective members must be functioning democracies, have market-economies, and protect human and minority rights, not to mention the ability to transpose in excess of 100 thousand pages of supranational law – the *acquis communautaire* – into national law. Given this, we should expect many of the demand-side factors in a cross-national sample to be insignificant in a sample restricted to EU member states. The results of this analysis, however, are still instructive to a wider sample. First, if the theorized demand-side motivations for migration are correct and these motivations continues to drive migration within the EU, it is reasonable to expect that the abnegation of border controls beyond such a group of states will result in an increase in migrants. Second, given that the EU is the only contemporary instance of open borders – and is perhaps the only place where such an arrangement is currently politically viable – its experience provides important information for other groups of countries considering a similar regime.

In light of the significant barriers to accession, it is surprising that many of the member states that had entered before 2004 (hereinafter EU15) were apprehensive about extending the

free movement of people regime to the fifth enlargement states. Moreover, historical experience suggests that concerns over a large influx of migrants following enlargement are unfounded (Goedings 1999). Prior to the second (Greece) and third (Portugal and Spain) enlargements, many of the same concerns were raised: that poor individuals from new democracies would flood the existing member states' labor markets. These fears, however, never materialized and there was little reason to expect the realization of similar concerns following the fifth enlargement (Goedings 1999).

In order to mitigate the concerns of the EU15, the accession treaties for the fifth enlargement states included a provision whereby EU15 member states could impose transitional migration restrictions for a period of up to seven years following accession. There is, however, significant variation in how this provision has been implemented. First, of the 2004 enlargement states,[4] only Cyprus and Malta were entirely exempt from this provision and have been privy to the free movement of people regime throughout their membership. Second, there has been extreme variation in the restrictions imposed by EU15 member states on the eight remaining 2004 enlargement states. Ireland, Sweden, and the United Kingdom, for example, enacted some of the most liberal policies by immediately waiving restrictions for migrants from states participating in the 2004 round of the fifth enlargement. By contrast, France and Germany enacted some of the most restrictive policies for these migrants by choosing to maintain transitional agreements for seven years, the longest period allowed (European Commission 2006). Third, there is variation in the restrictions imposed by individual EU15 member states on 2004 and 2007[5] enlargement states. Finland, for example, enacted strong restrictions against the 2004 enlargement states, but liberalized its policies for the 2007 enlargement states, whereas

[4] Cyprus, Czech Republic, Hungary, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia
[5] Bulgaria and Romania

Britain and Ireland waived restrictions for the 2004 enlargement, but imposed heavy restrictions for individuals from 2007 enlargement states (Drew and Sriskandarajah 2007).

Despite the lack of supply-side constraints on migration among states participating in the EU's free movement of people regime, there is little reason to expect the motivations of migrants to vary under this regime. That is, we should continue to expect migrants to be motivated by potential increases in their well-being through gains in security and wealth. When comparing the EU with the rest of the world, however, we should expect stark variation in the demand-side indicators. Specifically, given the relatively high levels of democracy and the capital-labor ratio in the EU, it is unproblematic to assume that security is reasonably well provided. Given the state of the demand-side indicators in the EU, I argue that potential gains in wealth drive migration flows. This discussion leads to the following testable hypothesis:

> Hypothesis 3: *All else held equal, in dyads in which both states are participants in the EU's free movement of people regime, the difference in the capital-labor ratio will have a positive and significant impact on migration flows.*

Data and Methods

A Generalizable Model of Migration

In this section, I present the results of OLS regression models with robust standard errors, clustered by directed-dyad. The model for hypotheses one and two presented above is as follows:

$$Y_{it}=\beta_0+\beta_1 CLR_{it}+\beta_2 DEM_{it}+B_3 CLR*DEM_{it}+\beta Controls_{it}+e_{it}$$

The unit of analysis for this model is directed-dyad year for the time period from 1988 to 2003. The dependent variable, migration flow, is operationalized as the inflow of foreign population by country of nationality, and data were collected from the Migration Policy Institute (Migration Policy Institute 2010). Unfortunately, there are only a limited number of receiving countries for

which comparable data were available and, within these receiving countries, there were some variations in which sending countries and years were reported. The receiving countries for which comparable data were available were: Austria, Belgium, Canada, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Norway, Russia, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. But, for example, Canada only reported the migration flow for its top-ten sending states. For other countries, specifically France, Russia, and Ireland, the criteria for which sending countries were reported is not made clear and there is no obvious pattern to which countries were reported. Variations in the sending states reported by receiving states are reported in Appendix A. Additionally, given variations in receiving country reporting patterns, not all years in the time-period covered are available for all receiving countries. Variations in the years reported by receiving states are reported in Appendix B. Finally, some of the independent variables were unavailable for particular observations. The dyads included in the individual model specifications are reported in Appendix C. These caveats are unfortunately indicative of the data issues that plague the quantitative resources for immigration research. It is important, therefore, that we continue to develop these data where possible and make clear the limitations of the data used in such studies.

The primary independent variable is the interaction between the difference between the capital-labor ratio in the sending and receiving state and the difference in levels of democracy in the sending and receiving country. Following Friedrich (1982) and Brambor, Clark, and Golder (2006), it is inappropriate to interpret the constitutive terms of a multiplicative interaction term independently. As such, I will calculate linear combinations of estimators in order to determine the marginal impact of the difference in the capital-labor ratio (democracy) at varying levels of the difference in democracy (the capital-labor ratio). If my hypothesis is correct, the linear combinations of estimators should find that increasing differences in levels of democracy (the

capital-labor ratio) result in a decreasing marginal impact of increasing differences in the capital-labor ratio (democracy).

The capital-labor ratio is operationalized as the natural log of the difference in wages and salaries in the sending and receiving countries (in USD) (United Nations Industrial Development Organization 2006). I use the natural log as opposed to the pure value of the difference in wages and salaries because I hold that an increase in $1000, for example, at the lower end of the range for this variable has a greater impact on migration than the same increase at the higher end of this range. Additionally, wages and salaries captures the volume of capital that is returned to labor for the "use" of their factor endowments. I have operationalized democracy using the difference in the sending and receiving countries' scores in the Polity dataset (Marshall, Jaggers, and Gurr 2008).

I also include a series of control variables in order to account for rival hypotheses and other potentially significant variables. I control for the difference in the log of GDP (in USD) (United Nations Development Programme 2009) as well as the difference in population (in thousands) (United Nations Population Division 2008) between the sending and receiving states. I make no particular hypotheses regarding these variables, but given my reliance on factoral models, it is important to control for pure measures of population and capital to demonstrate the amount of variance driven by the factor ratios as opposed to the factors in and of themselves. That said, if variations in migration flows are driven by pure levels of a particular factor then we should expect to see a negative sign on Population Difference, indicating that labor moves to labor-scarce locales regardless of other factor endowments, and a positive sign on GDP Difference, indicating that labor moves to capital-abundant locales regardless of other factor endowments.

I include a dummy variable – EU Free Move – which I coded as a 1 for dyad-years in which both countries were participants in the EU's free movement of people regime. If the abnegation of migration controls results in a significant increase in migration flows, there should be a positive coefficient on this variable. Additionally, the inclusion of this control accounts for the argument that, given my restricted sample of receiving countries, the results are being driven by the EU's common market provisions.

I include measures of distance and shared borders in order to account for the physical barriers to entry imposed by geography, and the costs associated with surmounting these barriers. I obtained data for both of these variables from replication data provided by Goldstein, Rivers and Tomz (2007). Distance is operationalized as the log of the distance (in kilometers) between the centers of the countries in the dyad. If distance has a significant impact on migration flow, we should expect to find a negative coefficient, indicating that as the distance between two countries increases, the volume of migration decreases. Shared borders is a dummy variable operationalized as a 1 if the countries in a dyad share a border and 0 if they do not. If shared borders have an impact on migration, we should expect to find a positive coefficient, indicating that there is a higher level of migration between two countries with a shared border than between those without.

In order to account for cultural explanations of migration, I control for a shared colonial heritage and a shared official language, both of which are operationalized as dummy variables in which a common language or colonial heritage is coded as 1. I obtained these data from the replication data provided by Goldstein, Rivers, and Tomz (2007). The dummy for a shared colonial orbit is included to account for the preferential immigration policies that states often enact for their previous colonial territories. If these policies have a significant impact on

migration flows, we should find a positive coefficient for shared colonial heritage. The dummy variable for shared language is included in order to account for diversionary migration – that is migrants selecting a country with a shared language over another, perhaps rationally preferable receiving country, to facilitate assimilation and integration.

I also control for the log of imports from the sending to the receiving country using the replication data provided by Goldstein, Rivers, and Tomz (2007). This control accounts for dyadic migration that is driven by reciprocal trade. I include a dummy variable for battle site, which takes on a value of 1 if a battle was occurring in the sending state's territory in a given year. The data for this variable was obtained from the PRIO dataset (Gleditsch et al 2002). I finally include dummy variables for the individual receiving countries in order to control for within-country factors not captured by the other variables. I exclude the United Kingdom as the reference category. Table 1 provides a summary of all variables entered into the general model.

[Table 1 about here]

The results of this model can be found in Table 2. As the independent variable of primary interest is the interaction term, I run two sets of linear combinations of estimators to determine the marginal impact of the difference in levels of democracy (wages and salaries) on migration flow at varying levels of the difference in wages and salaries (democracy). The results of these estimators are displayed graphically in Figures 1 and 2, and were generated using the code created and provided by Brambor, Clark and Golder (2006). Figure 1 demonstrates the marginal effect of the difference in democracy on migration flow at varying levels of wages and salaries. The most important feature of this graph is the trajectory and significance of the line, which demonstrates that as the difference in wages and salaries increases, the marginal effect of the difference in Polity scores decreases for most values of the difference in wages and salaries.

More concretely, as disparities in wages and salaries increase, increasing disparities in levels of democracy have a decreasing marginal impact on migration flows. Substantively, when the difference in wages and salaries is set at its minimum value – -3.584 (e.g. the sending states wages and salaries measure is $525 million higher than that of the receiving state), a one-point increase in the difference between the polity scores of the sending and receiving state results in an average of 2433.07 additional migrants. When wages and salaries is set at its mean value of 2.432 (receiving $62 million higher than sending), a one-point increase in the difference between the polity scores results in an average of 44.839 additional migrants. When wages and salaries is set at its maximum value of 12.329 (receiving 2.86 million higher than sending), a one-point increase in the difference between the polity scores results in an average of 2815.274 fewer migrants. This provides strong evidence for my first hypothesis: where there are greater potential monetary gains to be had by migrating, the potential gains in democratic governance have less of an impact on migration, *ceteris paribus*. This suggests that democratic governance can be substituted for by wages, and that higher potential wages and salaries can compensate for a lack of gains in democracy.

[Table 2 about here]

[Figure 1 about here]

Given the evidence in figure two, however, it is unclear that the opposite relationship holds. If the marginal effects for the difference in wages and salaries were significant, it would suggest that higher potential gains in democracy could compensate for lower levels of potential wages and salaries. However, there are no values for the difference in democracy at which the marginal effect of wages and salaries is significantly different from zero. There are two possible explanations for this result, one theoretical and one empirical. Theoretically, this result may be

indicative of the qualitative difference in what wages and salaries, on the one hand, and democracy, on the other hand, can provide. While democracy can provide a reasonable level of individual security through the government, it cannot reasonably guarantee wealth – just the freedom to pursue wealth. Wealth, by contrast, can enhance security through the mechanisms described in the theoretical section above. This is anecdotally demonstrable, as individuals frequently accept positions in non-democratic countries in return for relatively high salaries; this dynamic that serves as the basis for Bearce and Laks's (2010) work on the effects of migrants on democratic governance. Empirically, this result may be driven by the limited variation in the polity scores of the receiving countries.[6] Until sufficient data becomes available we must reject the hypothesis that the impact of wages and salaries is conditional on levels of democracy. As was demonstrated in Figure 1, however, the corollary hypothesis – that the impact of democracy is conditional on levels of wages and salaries – is supported by the data.

[Figure 2 about here]

Some of the control variables attain significant results that should also be discussed here. Dyads in which both countries are members of the EU's free movement of people regime receive 55108.52 more migrants on average from the sending country to the receiving country than dyads in which only one or neither country participates in this regime. This result is unsurprising given the abnegation of supply-side restrictions on migration discussed in the theoretical section above. What is more surprising, however, is that the coefficient for distance is positive and significant. Substantively, this suggests that a one unit increase in the logged distance between two countries results in an average of 1938.885 additional migrants, ceteris paribus. This may be an artifact of the relatively low cost of modern transportation. Where an individual perceives a significant opportunity to increase his or her well-being, he or she may be willing to "invest"

[6] Minimum of 9 and maximum of 10

more in travel in order to migrate to their preferred receiving country rather than his or her second or third preference, despite the higher costs associated with migrating to his or her first-choice destination.

The coefficient for shared language is positive and significant, suggesting that dyads that share a common language experience an average of 5670.999 more migrants than those that do not share a common language. Finally, several of the country dummies attain traditional levels of significance, suggesting that all else held equal, these countries receive migration flows significantly difference to those of the United Kingdom. I expect these differences to be driven by variations in immigration and immigrant policies, data for which are currently unavailable.

Modeling Migration Under Open Borders

In this section, I present the results of OLS regression models with robust standard errors, clustered by directed-dyad. The model for hypothesis three presented above is as follows:

$$Y_{it}=\beta_0+\beta_1 CLR_{it}+\beta_2 DEM_{it}+\beta Controls_{it}+e_{it}$$

As the variables are operationalized in the same manner as those for the generalizable theory of migration, I will not reiterate their operationalization here. One exception to this is the variable for EU Free Move, which becomes a selection variable as opposed to an independent variable. Additionally, the dummy variables for Canada, France, and Finland drop out of the analysis because Canada and Finland are not members of the EU, and there are no observations available in which France was the receiving country for individuals from other countries participating in the EU's free movement of people regime.[7] Summary statistics for the variables included in these models are reported in Table 3.

[Table 3 about here]

[7] As discussed above, there is significant variation in the reporting patterns for each receiving country. The list of which receiving states reported which sending states is reported in Appendix A.

In order to test this hypothesis, I report the results of two OLS regression models. The first model includes unstandardized coefficients with robust standard errors clustered by directed-dyad. The second includes standardized (beta) coefficients with robust standard errors. While the model with the unstandardized coefficients facilitates substantive interpretation of the coefficients and between model comparisons with the general model of migration, the use of standardized coefficients allows us to understand which variables within the model have the greatest impact on migration flow. The results of these models are reported in Table 4.

[Table 4 about here]

In the first model, only the log of the difference in wages and salaries, the log of the difference in GDP, and the dummy variables for Finland and Germany as the receiving country attained traditional levels of significance. The variable of primary interest – the log of the difference in wages and salaries – was signed as expected. Substantively, a one-unit increase in the log of the difference of wages and salaries results in an average of 52380.98 additional migrants. The negative coefficient on the measure of GDP is perplexing: it suggests that a one-unit increase in the logged difference in GDP results in an average of 46905.93 *fewer* migrants. However, as this result is obtained when holding wages and salaries constant, this suggests that higher levels of relative wealth that *do not* translate into wages and salaries serve to divert potential migrants to alternative receiving countries.

Considering the second model in Table 4 allows us to see which factors have the strongest impact on migration flow. The variation in significance levels between the two models is a result of the inability to cluster the standard errors by directed-dyad. I am primarily interested in the more conservative levels of significance estimated in the first model and, as such, will focus my attention upon the variables that attained traditional levels of significance in

the first model. The standardized coefficient for the difference in wages and salaries demonstrates that this variable has the most substantive impact on migration flow, even in comparison to all of the variable that attained significance in the second model: a one standard deviation increase in the difference in wages and salaries (substantively, a $154 million increase in the difference in wages and salaries) results in an average of a 1.178 standard deviation increase in migration flow (110,439.809 additional migrants). The results for wages and salaries in these models provide support for my third hypothesis: *ceteris paribus*, the difference in the capital-labor ratio has the greatest impact on migration flow in dyads in which both countries are participants in the EU's free movement of people regime. Interestingly and counterintuitively, the second greatest substantive impact is that of the difference in GDP, which is again negative.

In order to demonstrate that the interaction effect does not have an impact on migration flows within the EU's free movement of people regime, I re-introduce the interaction term into the model. The results of this model are presented in Table 5. As with the first model, I calculate linear combinations of estimators to determine the marginal impact of the difference in levels of the capital-labor ratio (democracy) on migration flow at varying levels of the difference in levels of democracy (the capital-labor ratio). The results are displayed graphically in Figures 3 and 4, and were generated using the code created and provided by Brambor, Clark and Golder (2006). As the confidence intervals for both sets of marginal effects are not statistically significant, these figures provide additional evidence for my hypothesis that within the EU, migration is determined by potential gains in wealth. This is suggestive that in the absence of migration controls, immigration from sending states with a relatively high level of democracy to receiving states with a relatively high level of democracy will be driven by relative levels of wages and salaries.

[Table 5 about here]

[Figure 3 about here]

[Figure 4 about here]

The evidence presented in this section has demonstrated two things. First, gains in wages and salaries can substitute for gains in democratic governance in determining migration flows, but gains in democratic governance cannot substitute for gains in wages and salaries. Second, given high levels of democracy, in the absence of migration controls wages and salaries are the strongest determinant of migration flows.

Discussion

In this paper, I have addressed two distinct but closely related questions: what determines international migration and how does the abnegation of migration controls impact this process? In terms of the first, I theorized that democracy and the capital-labor ratio served as substitutes, not complements, for immigrants. I found strong support a portion of this argument: a potential gain in wealth is a substitute for a potential gain in democratic governance. The corollary argument that democratic governance is a substitute for wealth did not find empirical support. In contrast with these results, in terms of the second question I argued that relative levels of the capital-labor ratio should have the greatest impact on migration within the European Union's free movement of people regime, owing to the relatively high level of democracy that persists throughout the Union. This hypothesis found empirical support.

There are several normative implications that ought to be addressed here. Perhaps the most obvious is the troubling empirical finding that wealth can substitute for democracy, but the reverse is not true. This is particularly troubling in light of Bearce and Laks's (2010) finding that that higher levels of migration in resource-rich states (that typically have high capital-labor ratios

and low levels of democracy) leads to the so-called "resource curse." According to their logic, migrants increase the returns to authoritarian governments by decreasing the price of labor to harvest natural resources. This increase in returns provides the government with greater resources to appease the selectorate, quelling the demand for democratization. Combining these results, we arrive at the problematic conclusion that individuals are not only willing to accept wages and salaries in place of democratic governance, but that under certain conditions, their presence can have a detrimental impact on the prospects for democratization in the receiving country.

The second normative implication concerns the impact of unfettered migration on individuals in the receiving country. We must be cautious about Carens's (1987; 1999; 2000) calls for liberal democratic states to open their borders. As my findings suggesting that potential earnings have a greater impact on migration flows than democratic governance, we must consider the impact of the liberalization of immigration controls on individuals in the receiving country. Combining the logic of Dani Rodrik (1997) and Karl Polanyi ([1944] 2001), it is clear that if immigration controls are to be liberalized, this process must be managed in a deliberate and tempered manner. Rodrik argues that globalization has resulted in two reinforcing phenomena in the West: "the widening wage premium for skills" and "a significant increase in labor-market instability and insecurity," both of which are driven by trade because trade impacts the demand and supply, and therefore price, of labor (Rodrik 1997, 11). Given Mundell's (1957) insights into the substitutable nature of trade and factor mobility, it is again reasonable to expect unfettered migration – another hallmark of pure globalization[8] – will result in similar patterns of social dislocation. Considering this in light of Polanyi's ([1944] 2001) insights into the need for

[8] Taking Suzanne Berger's definition of globalization: "the emergence of a single world market for labor, capital, goods, and services" (Berger 2006, 9).

governments to manage the rate of change in order to mitigate social dislocation, it is likely that for Carens's goal to be realized while meeting the needs of those already in the receiving country, open borders must be introduced slowly and deliberately. Perhaps even in the way it is being done in the European Union.

There are several avenues for future research that follow from this study. The single most important challenge facing students of immigration is the paucity of data. Very few data sources are available and, where they are, they are rarely comparable to other cases and are typically incomplete (cross-sectionally, temporally, or both). Immigration is an increasingly important policy area, but in order to effectively understand its determinants, scholars must devote considerable resources to bolstering both the quantitative and qualitative data available. Additionally, scholars should seek to understand the determinants of migration policy as well as the impact of migrants on the receiving country. These currently under-theorized phenomena are of great significance to receiving and sending countries and the individuals therein.

Table 1: Summary Statistics for the General Determinants of Migration

Variable	N	Minimum	Mean	Maximum	Standard Deviation
Migration Flow	2672	1	12259.93	619060	47071.58
Democracy Difference	2672	-1	3.926	20	5.704
Wages and Salaries Difference (log)	2672	-3.584	2.4321	12.3297	2.8040
Democracy Difference * Wages and Salaries Difference (log)	2672	-5.317	17.507	173.543	31.229
GDP Difference (log)	2672	-3.737	1.230	6.905	2.052
Population Difference (thousands)	2672	-1.03e+09	-1.37e+07	8.23e+07	1.35e+08
EU Free Movement	2672	0	0.198	1	0.399
Distance (log)	2672	4.772	8.532	9.893	0.942
Shared Border	2672	0	0.048	1	0.214
Shared Language	2672	0	0.113	1	0.317
Shared Colonial Heritage	2672	0	0.002	1	0.047
Imports (from Sending to Receiving)	2672	11.513	15.236	23.561	2.443
Battle Site	2672	0	0.149	1	0.356
Austria	2672	0	0.122	1	0.328
Belgium	2672	0	0.021	1	0.145
Canada	2672	0	0.021	1	0.145
Finland	2672	0	0.064	1	0.245
France	2672	0	0.009	1	0.092
Germany	2672	0	0.262	1	0.439
Ireland	2672	0	0.026	1	0.159
Norway	2672	0	0.079	1	0.269
Spain	2672	0	0.007	1	0.082
Sweden	2672	0	0.289	1	0.454
United Kingdom[9]	2672	0	0.099	1	0.299

[9] The United Kingdom is omitted from the empirical analysis as the reference category.

Table 2: General Determinants of International Migration

Constant	-22136.33* (13463.05)
Democracy Difference	1250.958*** (1800.446)
Wages and Salaries Difference (log)	2378.922* (1800.446)
Democracy Difference * Wages and Salaries Difference (log)	-329.818*** (85.801)
GDP Difference (log)	-3513.111 (3125.607)
Population Difference (thousands)	2.66e-06 (8.34e-06)
EU Free Movement	55108.52*** (13116.9)
Distance (log)	1938.885** (885.438)
Shared Border	1304.686 (2534.294)
Shared Language	5670.999* (3824.638)
Shared Colonial Heritage	-6773.388 (8412.342)
Imports (from Sending to Receiving)	-68.202 (411.245)
Battle Site	-767.516 (2325.302)
Austria	-4432.615 (4917.186)
Belgium	-13524.59** (7013.786)
Canada	15243.37*** (4155.73)
Finland	-14886.02** (7473.454)
France	12086.95*** (3899.659)
Germany	35824.67*** (8539.145)
Ireland	-46032.19*** (15621.81)
Norway	5119.228* (3481.2)
Spain	-45163.78*** (12383.09)

Sweden	-305.956 (3804.27)
R^2	0.355
N	2672

Table reports unstandardized coefficients with robust standard errors, clustered by country in parentheses.
Statistical significance: *<0.10, **<0.05 and ***<0.01 (one-tailed values)

Table 3: Summary Statistics for the Determinants of Migration within the EU's Free Movement of People Regime

Variable	N	Minimum	Mean	Maximum	Standard Deviation
Migration Flow	530	10	54666.66	619060	93751.96
Democracy Difference	530	0	0.053	1	0.224
Wages and Salaries Difference (log)	530	-3.329	0.373	4.271	2.109
Democracy Difference * Wages and Salaries Difference (log)	530	-2.203	-0.053	0.973	0.352
GDP Difference (log)	530	-3.207	0.102	3.384	1.884
Population Difference (thousands)	530	4.772	1.32e+07	7.84e+07	5.10e+07
Distance (log)	530	4.772	8.547	9.835	0.919
Shared Border	530	0	0.047	1	0.212
Shared Language	530	0	0.174	1	0.379
Shared Colonial Heritage	530	0	0.002	1	0.043
Imports (from Sending to Receiving)	530	11.543	14.845	23.561	2.081
Battle Site	530	0	0.011	1	0.106
Austria	530	0	0.102	1	0.303
Belgium	530	0	0.038	1	0.191
Finland	530	0	0.098	1	0.298
Germany	530	0	0.406	1	0.492
Ireland	530	0	0.132	1	0.339
Spain	530	0	0.034	1	0.181
Sweden	530	0	0.115	1	0.319
United Kingdom[10]	530	0	0.076	1	0.264

[10] The United Kingdom is omitted from the empirical analysis as the reference category.

Table 4: The Determinants of Migration within the EU's Free Movement of People Regime, without the conditional relationship between the difference in democracy and the difference in the capital-labor ratio

Model	Unstandardized Coefficients	Standardized (Beta) Coefficients
Constant	46672.47 (87462.53)	
Democracy Difference	-39831.95 (35745.25)	-0.095*** (13310.21)
Wages and Salaries Difference (log)	52380.98* (34161.55)	1.178*** (13184.18)
GDP Difference (log)	-46905.93* (36292.29)	-0.943*** (12890.51)
Population Difference (thousands)	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.716** (0.0006)
Distance (log)	-2150.686 (5144.079)	-0.021 (4390.784)
Shared Border	-4308.859 (10498.79)	-0.009 (11463)
Shared Language	-7752.294 (10554.5)	-0.031 (6093.502)
Shared Colonial Heritage	52642.65 (46441.77)	0.024*** (22759.75)
Imports (from Sending to Receiving)	1.381426 (1866.259)	0.00003 (1521.966)
Battle Site	-10578.82 (13556.32)	-0.012* (7927.615)
Austria	-62681.54 (49642.19)	-0.202*** (18181.74)
Belgium	-43630.44 (39594.96)	-0.089*** (15256.48)
Finland	-73201.84* (53438.6)	-0.233*** (19238.05)
Germany	156220.3*** (53565.92)	0.819*** (19152.53)
Ireland	-66291.06 (63962.08)	-0.239*** (22988.75)
Spain	-4188.436 (20118.59)	-0.008 (9376.044)
Sweden	-57456.22 (45530.15)	-0.196*** (16747.23)
R^2	0.524	0.5242
N	530	530

The first column reports unstandardized coefficients with robust standard errors, clustered by country in parentheses. The second column reports standardized (beta) coefficients with robust standard errors.
Statistical significance: *<0.10, **<0.05 and ***<0.01 (one-tailed values)

Table 5: The Determinants of Migration within the EU's Free Movement of People Regime, with the conditional relationship between the difference in democracy and the difference in the capital-labor ratio

Constant	48643.65
	(88709.74)
Democracy Difference	-54495.6
	(46390.29)
Wages and Salaries Difference (log)	52634.28*
	(34163.19)
Democracy Difference * Wages and Salaries Difference (log)	-14591.03
	(13488.71)
GDP Difference (log)	-45829.32
	(36493.54)
Population Difference (thousands)	-0.001
	(0.002)
Distance (log)	-2254.527
	(5224.392)
Shared Border	-4458.591
	(10660.03)
Shared Language	-8010.093
	(10769.78)
Shared Colonial Heritage	53899.68
	(47212.38)
Imports (from Sending to Receiving)	-18.461
	(1875.249)
Battle Site	-10569.29
	(13814)
Austria	-64932.63
	(51190.9)
Belgium	-45887.75
	(41181.37)
Finland	-75560.42*
	(54932.74)
Germany	157942.1***
	(54961.9)
Ireland	-66354.29
	(64201.75)
Spain	-4831.957
	(20644.78)
Sweden	-59573.7
	(46997.18)
R^2	0.526
N	530

Table reports unstandardized coefficients with robust standard errors, clustered by country in parentheses.

Statistical significance: *<0.10, **<0.05 and ***<0.01 (one-tailed values)

Figure 1: Marginal Effect of the Difference in Polity on Migration Flow as the Difference in Wages and Salaries Changes



Figure 2: Marginal Effect of the Difference in Wages and Salaries on Migration Flow as the Difference in Polity Changes



Figure 3: Marginal Effect of the Difference in Polity on Migration Flow as the Difference in Wages and Salaries Changes, EU Sample



Figure 4: Marginal Effect of the Difference in Wages and Salaries on Migration Flow as the Difference in Polity Changes, EU Sample



Appendix A: Sending States Reported by Receiving States

Receiving	**Sending**
Austria	Afghanistan
	Albania
	Algeria
	Andorra
	Angola
	Antigua and Barbuda
	Argentina
	Armenia
	Australia
	Azerbaijan
	Bahamas
	Bahrain
	Bangladesh
	Barbados
	Belarus
	Belgium
	Belize
	Benin
	Bhutan
	Bolivia
	Bosnia-Herzegovina
	Brazil
	Brunei Darussalam
	Bulgaria
	Burkina Faso
	Burma
	Burundi
	Cambodia
	Cameroon
	Canada
	Cape Verde
	Central African Republic
	Chad
	Chile
	China
	Colombia
	Comoros
	Congo, Republic of
	Congo, Democratic Republic of
	Costa Rica
	Cote d'Ivoire
	Croatia
	Cuba

	Cyprus
	Czech Republic
	Denmark
	Dominica
	Dominican Republic
	Ecuador
	Egypt
	El Salvador
	Equatorial Guinea
	Eritrea
	Estonia
	Ethiopia
	Fiji
	Finland
	France
	Gabon
	Gambia
	Georgia
	Germany
	Ghana
	Greece
	Grenada
	Guatemala
	Guinea Bissau
	Guyana
	Haiti
	Honduras
	Hungary
	Iceland
	India
	Indonesia
	Iran
	Iraq
	Ireland
	Israel
	Italy
	Jamaica
	Japan
	Jordan
	Kazakhstan
	Kenya
	Korea, Democratic People's Republic of
	Korea, Republic of
	Kuwait
	Kyrgyzstan

	Laos
	Latvia
	Lebanon
	Lesotho
	Liberia
	Libya
	Liechtenstein
	Lithuania
	Luxembourg
	Macedonia, Former Yugoslav Republic of
	Madagascar
	Malawi
	Malaysia
	Maldives
	Mali
	Malta
	Mauritania
	Mauritius
	Mexico
	Monaco
	Mongolia
	Morocco
	Mozambique
	Namibia
	Nepal
	Netherlands
	New Zealand
	Nicaragua
	Niger
	Nigeria
	Norway
	Oman
	Pakistan
	Palau
	Panama
	Papua New Guinea
	Paraguay
	Peru
	Philippines
	Poland
	Portugal
	Qatar
	Russia
	Rwanda
	Samoa

	Sao Tome and Principe
	Saudi Arabia
	Senegal
	Seychelles
	Sierra Leone
	Singapore
	Slovakia
	Slovenia
	Somalia
	South Africa
	Spain
	Sri Lanka
	St. Kitts and Nevis
	St. Lucia
	St. Vincent and the Grenadines
	Sudan
	Suriname
	Swaziland
	Sweden
	Switzerland
	Syria
	Taiwan
	Tajikistan
	Tanzania
	Thailand
	Togo
	Trinidad and Tobago
	Tunisia
	Turkey
	Turkmenistan
	Tuvalu
	Uganda
	Ukraine
	United Arab Emirates
	United Kingdom
	United States of America
	Uruguay
	Uzbekistan
	Venezuela
	Vietnam
	Yemen
	Zambia
	Zimbabwe
Belgium	Algeria
	Angola

	Australia
	Austria
	Bangladesh
	Bosnia-Herzegovina
	Brazil
	Bulgaria
	Burundi
	Cameroon
	Canada
	Chile
	China
	Colombia
	Congo, Republic of
	Cote d'Ivoire
	Croatia
	Cyprus
	Czech Republic
	Denmark
	Dominican Republic
	Egypt
	Estonia
	Finland
	France
	Germany
	Ghana
	Greece
	Hungary
	India
	Indonesia
	Iran
	Ireland
	Israel
	Italy
	Japan
	Latvia
	Lebanon
	Lithuania
	Luxembourg
	Macedonia, Former Yugoslav Republic of
	Mauritius
	Morocco
	Netherlands
	Nigeria
	Norway
	Pakistan

	Peru
	Philippines
	Poland
	Portugal
	Romania
	Russia
	Rwanda
	Senegal
	Slovakia
	Slovenia
	South Africa
	Spain
	Sweden
	Switzerland
	Syria
	Thailand
	Tunisia
	Turkey
	United Kingdom
	United States of America
	Vietnam
Canada	Bosnia-Herzegovina
	China
	Colombia
	El Salvador
	India
	Iran
	Korea, Republic of
	Lebanon
	Pakistan
	Philippines
	Poland
	Portugal
	Romania
	Russia
	Sri Lanka
	Taiwan
	United Kingdom
	United States of America
	Vietnam
Finland	Afghanistan
	Algeria
	Angola
	Argentina
	Australia

	Austria
	Bangladesh
	Belarus
	Belgium
	Bosnia-Herzegovina
	Brazil
	Bulgaria
	Burma
	Canada
	Chile
	China
	Colombia
	Congo, Democratic Republic of
	Croatia
	Cuba
	Czech Republic
	Denmark
	Egypt
	Estonia
	Ethiopia
	France
	Gambia
	Georgia
	Germany
	Ghana
	Greece
	Hungary
	Iceland
	India
	Indonesia
	Iran
	Iraq
	Ireland
	Israel
	Italy
	Japan
	Jordan
	Kazakhstan
	Kenya
	Korea, Republic of
	Latvia
	Lebanon
	Lithuania
	Luxembourg
	Macedonia, Former Yugoslav Republic of

	Malaysia
	Moldova
	Morocco
	Nauru
	Nepal
	Netherlands
	New Zealand
	Nigeria
	Norway
	Pakistan
	Peru
	Philippines
	Poland
	Portugal
	Romania
	Russia
	Rwanda
	Slovakia
	Somalia
	South Africa
	Spain
	Sri Lanka
	Sudan
	Sweden
	Switzerland
	Tanzania
	Thailand
	Tunisia
	Turkey
	Ukraine
	United Kingdom
	United States of America
	Uzbekistan
	Vietnam
France	Algeria
	Brazil
	Cameroon
	Canada
	China
	Comoros
	Congo, Republic of
	Congo, Democratic Republic of
	Cote d'Ivoire
	Haiti
	India

	Japan
	Madagascar
	Mali
	Mauritania
	Morocco
	Poland
	Romania
	Russia
	Senegal
	Serbia and Montenegro
	Sri Lanka
	Tunisia
	Turkey
	United States of America
Germany	Afghanistan
	Albania
	Algeria
	Andorra
	Angola
	Antigua and Barbuda
	Argentina
	Armenia
	Australia
	Austria
	Azerbaijan
	Bahamas
	Bahrain
	Bangladesh
	Barbados
	Belarus
	Belgium
	Belize
	Benin
	Bhutan
	Bolivia
	Bosnia-Herzegovina
	Botswana
	Brazil
	Brunei Darussalam
	Bulgaria
	Burkina Faso
	Burma
	Burundi
	Cambodia
	Cameroon

	Canada
	Cape Verde
	Central African Republic
	Chad
	Chile
	China
	Colombia
	Comoros
	Congo, Republic of
	Congo, Democratic Republic of
	Costa Rica
	Cote d'Ivoire
	Croatia
	Cuba
	Cyprus
	Czech Republic
	Denmark
	Djibouti
	Dominica
	Dominican Republic
	East Timor
	Ecuador
	Egypt
	El Salvador
	Equatorial Guinea
	Eritrea
	Estonia
	Ethiopia
	Fiji
	Finland
	France
	Gabon
	Gambia
	Georgia
	Ghana
	Greece
	Grenada
	Guatemala
	Guinea
	Guinea Bissau
	Guyana
	Haiti
	Honduras
	Hungary
	Iceland

	India
	Indonesia
	Iran
	Iraq
	Ireland
	Israel
	Italy
	Jamaica
	Japan
	Jordan
	Kazakhstan
	Kenya
	Kiribati
	Korea, Democratic People's Republic of
	Korea, Republic of
	Kuwait
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	Laos
	Latvia
	Lebanon
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	Liberia
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	Liechtenstein
	Lithuania
	Luxembourg
	Macedonia, Former Yugoslav Republic of
	Madagascar
	Malawi
	Malaysia
	Maldives
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	Malta
	Marshall Islands
	Mauritania
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	Mexico
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	Morocco
	Mozambique
	Namibia
	Nepal

	Netherlands
	New Zealand
	Nicaragua
	Niger
	Nigeria
	Norway
	Oman
	Pakistan
	Palau
	Panama
	Papua New Guinea
	Paraguay
	Peru
	Philippines
	Poland
	Portugal
	Qatar
	Romania
	Russia
	Rwanda
	Samoa
	Sao Tome and Principe
	Saudi Arabia
	Senegal
	Serbia
	Serbia-Montenegro
	Seychelles
	Sierra Leone
	Singapore
	Slovakia
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	Solomon Islands
	Somalia
	South Africa
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	Sri Lanka
	St. Kitts and Nevis
	St. Lucia
	St. Vincent and the Grenadines
	Sudan
	Suriname
	Swaziland
	Sweden
	Switzerland
	Syria

	Taiwan
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	Trinidad and Tobago
	Tunisia
	Turkey
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	Tuvalu
	Uganda
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	United Kingdom
	United States
	Uruguay
	Uzbekistan
	Vanuatu
	Venezuela
	Vietnam
	Yemen
	Zambia
	Zimbabwe
Ireland	United Kingdom
Norway	Afghanistan
	Albania
	Algeria
	Angola
	Antigua and Barbuda
	Argentina
	Armenia
	Australia
	Austria
	Azerbaijan
	Bahrain
	Bangladesh
	Belarus
	Belgium
	Bhutan
	Bolivia
	Bosnia-Herzegovina
	Botswana
	Brazil
	Brunei Darussalam

	Bulgaria
	Burkina Faso
	Burma
	Burundi
	Cambodia
	Cameroon
	Canada
	Cape Verde
	Central African Republic
	Chile
	China
	Colombia
	Congo, Republic of
	Congo, Democratic Republic of
	Costa Rica
	Cote d'Ivoire
	Croatia
	Cuba
	Cyprus
	Czech Republic
	Denmark
	Djibouti
	Dominica
	Dominican Republic
	East Timor
	Ecuador
	Egypt
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	Congo, Democratic Republic of
	Cote d'Ivoire
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	Thailand
	Trinidad and Tobago
	Tunisia
	Turkey
	Uganda
	Ukraine
	United States of America
	Venezuela
	Yemen
	Zambia
	Zimbabwe

Appendix B: Years Reported by Receiving States

Receiving	**Years**
Austria	1996-2001
Belgium	2000-2003
Canada	1990-2004
Finland	1997-2001
France	2000-2004
Germany	1994-2006
Ireland	1988-2005
Norway	1999-2001
Russia	2002-2005
Spain	1998-2008
Sweden	1992-2003
United Kingdom	1991-2006

Appendix C: Dyads Included in Final Models

Receiving	**Sending (General Model)**	**Sending (EU Model)**
Austria	Albania	Belgium
	Argentina	Finland
	Armenia	France
	Australia	Germany
	Azerbaijan	Greece
	Bangladesh	Ireland
	Belgium	Italy
	Bolivia	Netherlands
	Bulgaria	Portugal
	Cameroon	Spain
	Canada	Sweden
	Chile	
	Colombia	
	Costa Rica	
	Cote d'Ivoire	
	Croatia	
	Cyprus	
	Ecuador	
	El Salvador	
	Eritrea	
	Ethiopia	
	Finland	
	France	
	Germany	
	Greece	
	Guatemala	
	Hungary	
	Indonesia	
	Iran	
	Ireland	
	Israel	
	Italy	
	Japan	
	Jordan	
	Kazakhstan	
	Kenya	
	Korea, Republic of	
	Kuwait	
	Kyrgyzstan	
	Latvia	
	Lithuania	
	Malawi	
	Malaysia	

	Mauritius	
	Mexico	
	Morocco	
	Mozambique	
	Netherlands	
	New Zealand	
	Niger	
	Norway	
	Oman	
	Panama	
	Portugal	
	Qatar	
	Russia	
	Senegal	
	Singapore	
	Slovakia	
	Slovenia	
	South Africa	
	Spain	
	Sri Lanka	
	Sudan	
	Sweden	
	Syria	
	Tanzania	
	Tunisia	
	Turkey	
	Ukraine	
	Uruguay	
	Venezuela	
	Vietnam	
	Yemen	
Belgium	Austria	Austria
	Bulgaria	Finland
	Cameroon	France
	Canada	Germany
	Croatia	Ireland
	Cyprus	Italy
	Finland	Netherlands
	France	Portugal
	Germany	Spain
	Hungary	Sweden
	India	
	Indonesia	
	Iran	
	Ireland	

	Israel	
	Italy	
	Japan	
	Latvia	
	Lithuania	
	Morocco	
	Netherlands	
	Norway	
	Portugal	
	Slovenia	
	South Africa	
	Spain	
	Sweden	
	Tunisia	
	Vietnam	
Canada	El Salvador	
	India	
	Iran	
	Korea, Republic of	
	Pakistan	
	Philippines	
	Poland	
	Russia	
	Sri Lanka	
	United Kingdom	
	United States of America	
Finland	Argentina	Austria
	Australia	Belgium
	Austria	France
	Bangladesh	Germany
	Belgium	Greece
	Bulgaria	Ireland
	Canada	Italy
	Colombia	Netherlands
	Croatia	Portugal
	Ethiopia	Spain
	France	Sweden
	Germany	
	Greece	
	Hungary	
	India	
	Indonesia	
	Iran	
	Ireland	
	Israel	

	Italy	
	Japan	
	Jordan	
	Kazakhstan	
	Kenya	
	Korea, Republic of	
	Latvia	
	Lithuania	
	Morocco	
	Netherlands	
	New Zealand	
	Norway	
	Philippines	
	Portugal	
	Russia	
	Slovakia	
	South Africa	
	Spain	
	Sri Lanka	
	Sudan	
	Sweden	
	Tanzania	
	Tunisia	
	Turkey	
	Ukraine	
	Vietnam	
France	Cameroon	
	Canada	
	India	
	Japan	
	Morocco	
	Poland	
	Sri Lanka	
	Tunisia	
Germany	Albania	Austria
	Algeria	Belgium
	Argentina	Finland
	Armenia	France
	Australia	Greece
	Austria	Ireland
	Azerbaijan	Italy
	Bangladesh	Netherlands
	Belgium	Portugal
	Bolivia	Spain
	Botswana	Sweden

	Brazil	United Kingdom
	Bulgaria	
	Cameroon	
	Canada	
	Chile	
	Colombia	
	Costa Rica	
	Cote d'Ivoire	
	Croatia	
	Cyprus	
	Ecuador	
	Egypt	
	El Salvador	
	Eritrea	
	Estonia	
	Ethiopia	
	Finland	
	France	
	Gabon	
	Ghana	
	Greece	
	Guatemala	
	Honduras	
	Hungary	
	India	
	Indonesia	
	Iran	
	Ireland	
	Israel	
	Italy	
	Jamaica	
	Japan	
	Jordan	
	Kazakhstan	
	Kenya	
	Korea, Republic of	
	Kuwait	
	Kyrgyzstan	
	Latvia	
	Lithuania	
	Macedonia, Former Yugoslav Republic of	
	Malawi	
	Malaysia	
	Mexico	
	Moldova	

	Mongolia	
	Morocco	
	Mozambique	
	Nepal	
	Netherlands	
	New Zealand	
	Niger	
	Nigeria	
	Norway	
	Oman	
	Pakistan	
	Panama	
	Peru	
	Philippines	
	Poland	
	Portugal	
	Qatar	
	Romania	
	Russia	
	Senegal	
	Singapore	
	Slovakia	
	Slovenia	
	South Africa	
	Spain	
	Sri Lanka	
	Sudan	
	Sweden	
	Syria	
	Tanzania	
	Thailand	
	Trinidad and Tobago	
	Tunisia	
	Turkey	
	Ukraine	
	United Kingdom	
	United States	
	Uruguay	
	Venezuela	
	Vietnam	
	Yemen	
	Zambia	
	Zimbabwe	
Ireland	United Kingdom	United Kingdom
Norway	Argentina	

	Austria	
	Azerbaijan	
	Belgium	
	Bolivia	
	Botswana	
	Bulgaria	
	Cameroon	
	Canada	
	Chile	
	Colombia	
	Costa Rica	
	Croatia	
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	Ukraine	
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	Germany	Germany
	Italy	Italy
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	Algeria	Belgium
	Argentina	Finland
	Armenia	France
	Australia	Germany
	Austria	Greece
	Azerbaijan	Ireland
	Bahrain	Italy
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	Czech Republic	
	Denmark	
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	Fiji	
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	Venezuela	
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