Proceedings of
Centenary Symposium organized
by the Commission of
the European Communities

JEAN MONNET

Brussels, 10 November 1988

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Jean MONNET

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PREFACE

This symposium is the Commission's way of commemorating the centenary of Jean Monnet's birth.

One of the Commission's key roles is to record the history of European integration. This extends beyond institutional and legal developments to the individuals who have provided inspiration over the years.

In his lifetime Jean Monnet took second place to the institutions he helped to create and subsequently guided. Today it is for those same institutions, in tribute to his memory, to highlight the circumstances in which they came into being and identify the influences which shaped the European venture.

Anyone reading the proceedings of the symposium will be struck by the persistence of those influences. Two recent events, which feature prominently in these pages, are particularly good illustrations of this.

The first is adoption of the Single Act. The Single Act defines the goals of European integration by reference to the Treaty of Rome and overhauls decision-making procedures accordingly. But the

approach harks back to the Treaty of Paris establishing the European Coal and Steel Community, instigated by Jean Monnet.

The second is revival of the Action Committee for Europe, which intends to assume the mantle of Monnet's Action Committee for the United States of Europe. It was this committee that guided and consolidated the Community between 1955 and 1975, going well beyond its strict legal framework to provide vital political impetus.

Both events demonstrate that Jean Monnet is still seen as a model. This symposium, which seeks to assess his varied legacy, is not just a trip down memory lane. On the contrary, its main purpose is to focus discussion on the future.

Jacques DELORS
President of the Commission
of the European Communities

I

PROCEEDINGS OF SYMPOSIUM

OPENING OF SYMPOSIUM BY MR LORENZO NATALI,

Vice-President of the Commission
of the European Communities

Mr President,

Ladies and Gentlemen,

One day last spring I came out of Jacques Delors' office in the Berlaymont. He had just given me the none-too-easy job of opening today's symposium, putting it in a somewhat peremptory way, which might sound rude to those who have yet to realize that a man with his breadth of vision is entitled to be brief. I turned into the long corridor leading to my office feeling more than usually troubled. Torn between pleasure and trepidation at the task facing me, I began to wonder...

How many kilometres have I walked along this corridor in the last 12 years as a professional 'tenant' of the 13th floor? How many people in the Berlaymont or elsewhere appreciate that this star-shaped building is a symbol of the Community, of a Europe embracing the four points of the compass, a Europe moving towards an ideal, a common centre? What would Jean Monnet—Jean Monnet the philosopher—think of those who, at regular

intervals in the history of European integration, react to the apparent difficulty of working towards a common goal—the star image again—by suggesting that it might be easier for everyone to go their own way at their own pace?

How would Monnet—Jean Monnet the man of action—quantify the time and distance separating the ideal Europe from the hard-won Community we know today? But if symbolism is not entirely fortuitous (as we in the warmer Mediterranean climes believe), and if the application of geometry to politics is not merely a formal exercise but a visual reflection of the need for a rational institutional order (an interpretation possibly dearer to the colder traditions of central and northern Europe), why shirk from making allowance for the time and distance represented by the toing and froing, the endless pendulum-like movement—which would remind Umberto Eco of Foucault—of men and ideas along the corridors and four wings of the Berlaymont?

There may have been those—Jean Monnet, the man of values, was not one of them—who imagined that the fact of building Europe from virtually nothing, or from rubble at best, would bridge the philosophical, cultural, idealistic, institutional, political, social and economic gap between north, south, east and west, as quickly as technology can produce a scale reduction, a computer printout or a satellite photograph of ordinary physical distances.

Our generation has been fortunate to have had a man of inspiration like Jean Monnet, who launched Europe on this first shared adventure. But what kind of Community do we want to find the day the scaffolding finally comes down? Only then will we be able to assess our architectural skills, to see whether there really is room for everybody (and for everybody's ideas). Then we can start hoping that the load-bearing structure—the institutions—will withstand the test of time, that it will hold at least as long as it took Europeans to stop insisting on having their own

houses, or taking over their neighbours' houses, and build common institutions as an alternative to waging war.

Do we want a Community rich in human diversity, encompassing different nations, a Community which respects their history, the pace at which they move and their plans for the future? Or do we want an artificial Community, tuned like an engine, blended like a convenience food, marketed like a broad spectrum product (and here you must either accept the rules of competition or bow to the laws of monopoly), a Community imposed by a faceless technocracy on a continent so blinded by current advantages that it ignores the lessons of the past and fails to look beyond the year 2000? In short, if we accept and apply Monnet's empirical yardstick, are we really guilty of Utopianism and crimes against realism *vis-à-vis* Europe and European history? What is the point of complaining about the pace of the Community bureaucracy as if it were a separate, sterile entity rather than the logical outcome of the blending of many systems and approaches, all of them equally plausible since they are all equally European?

On the other hand, the Community process, like the human condition, is permanently caught between past and future, personal and social and some aspects, such as the collective will and collective needs, are gradually being effaced by individual, selfish demands. Was it not Jean Monnet himself—Jean Monnet the philosopher, Jean Monnet the man of action and values—who warned us against losing sight of the interrelation between men, ideas and institutions? This partnership is relatively new and it is in seeking to achieve this three-way balance—through mutual conviction and consensus—that the challenge of a single continental system emerges from the various democratic systems of Europe.

Is this not the real issue which still fuels the transfer of sovereignty debate? Have people forgotten that Jean Monnet himself never spoke of the transfer of sovereignty but rather of the joint exercise of sovereignty? All I know is that we have only just

shaken off the ideological burden, that we are having trouble salvaging politics and political values from the resulting vacuum. Instead of adapting and modernizing Europe's democratic systems to cope with the 21st century, we seem to be hesitating and lagging behind. The pessimists are already predicting—not entirely without reason but their timing is wrong—that only the re-emergence of moral minorities can save Western democracy which, according to these diagnosticians, is suffering from stagnation induced by pragmatic majority rule.

I must admit that despite 12 years on the 13th floor of the Berlaymont, despite the progress I have witnessed or had a hand in, I find it difficult from this privileged if rather remote vantage point to say whether more could have been achieved more quickly.

I am thinking of the 'instruction book' that Jean Monnet left us, of the patience and caution he advocated. I am thinking of Jean Monnet and his method, of the practical, even didactic, approach he chose in writing the new history of Europe commissioned by the founding fathers of our generation. Only Jean Monnet—with his method—could have calculated with any degree of accuracy what chapter we have now reached. Or perhaps he would merely have repeated to those of us who were still undecided that 'resistance is proportional to the scale of the change one seeks to bring about. It is even the surest sign that change is on the way'.

I had not come up with any conclusive answers to these complex issues by the time I finally reached my own office. Fortunately, however, the mental gymnastics I had performed on my way from one end of the Berlaymont to the other had put the worries sparked by Jacques Delors' request to the back of my mind. I had at least decided that the honour of opening today's symposium was mine because of my 'seniority'. I would therefore ask you to accept my years in the service of the Community as evidence of my desire—sincere, practical, modest but also determined—to

adhere faithfully to the code of conduct, the schedule inherited from Monnet. You can, if you like, interpret my 'seniority' as a humble but clear confirmation of the importance of this new task, this ambitious institutional venture which might never have been embarked upon—this is my personal impression—without the intervention of the great man we are honouring today.

On this note I would like to thank all of you for accepting our invitation and being with us today.

* * *

Following this speech of Mr Lorenzo Natali, in his capacity as chairman of the round table on 'Jean Monnet's Method', called in turn on Mr François Duchêne, Mr Etienne Davignon, Mr Karl-Heinz Narjes, Mr Emile Noël and Mr Pierre Uri.

Jean MONNET with Robert SCHUMAN, French Foreign Minister.

/

A. JEAN MONNET'S METHOD

1. REPORT BY MR FRANÇOIS DUCHÊNE
Professor at the University of Sussex

The method, or rather the approach, of Jean Monnet is at the heart of the paradoxes of his reputation.

A minority of people who have followed events closely think of Monnet as one of the great figures of the 20th century. He has the quality enshrined in the epigraph, supposedly from 'Hamlet', which de Gaulle chose for his *Edge of the Sword*: 'To be great is to be identified with a great issue'. It is commonplace to compare and contrast de Gaulle and Monnet. In Paris, Monnet's ashes have been interred in the Panthéon. He is so far the one and only 'honorary citizen' of Europe.

Yet Monnet has been, and is, virtually unknown to the public. He was never elected by any constituency, he was never part of an elected government; one could almost say he never held the reins of power, as they are commonly understood.

He also lacked virtually all the histrionic talents that matter so much in politics. His voice failed to carry. His rhetoric was, to say the least, austere. He studiously avoided all literary effects. He

had no instinct for projecting his personality in public. He was the classicist, the craftsman, who poured himself into his product.

A good civil servant can operate well enough within such limits. To succeed within them as a politician was a *tour de force.*

In any case, like all major historic developments, European integration has been a collective achievement. To limit matters only to the political leaders of the early years, there are at least five characters in search of Europe of whom it can be said that, without their individual contributions, the Community as we know it might never have seen the light. Robert Schuman took the political responsibility, which could have turned against him, of the plan which bears his name. Konrad Adenauer was the rock on which the architects of Europe knew they could safely build. Paul-Henri Spaak, Jan Beyen and Guy Mollet also, at critical moments, played a decisive part. How, then, can Jean Monnet occupy the unique place he does in the Panthéon of contemporary Europe?

The short and simple answer is that he invented the Community approach.

This is true. It is also far too narrow.

Monnet is one of the most fertile sources of political schemes this century. Between 1945 and 1963 (to speak only of these years) the Monnet Plan, the Schuman Plan, the European Army Project, Euratom, as strange as it may seem, the OECD, and finally the equal partnership between Europe and America, all bear in whole or part the marks of his inspiration.

In practice, his impact has been even broader and deeper than this would suggest. Monnet exerted a ubiquitous influence on the spirit and the precepts of European unification; and no less on the strategy and tactics by which the Communities were carried into effect.

Robert Marjolin, in his memoirs, *Le Travail d'une Vie*, has given perhaps the pithiest explanation of this uncommon achievement. He wrote that Monnet 'had a power to persuade people which I have never encountered to the same degree in anybody else'. Monnet, he says, 'was absorbed at any given moment in his life by a single key idea, but it was not a limited idea; it was more often than not a view of the world. It was his exceptional ability to produce ideas that were original, or to which he at least gave the appearance of originality, combined with an extraordinary talent for putting them into practice, which basically explains the fascination Jean Monnet exerted on a substantial number of people coming from the most diverse backgrounds'.

Basic values

In high politics, the moving spirit is vital. If he had not had a vision rooted in universal values, Monnet would never have been able to give his specifically European proposals the power of a major idea, what the French can call an *idée force*.

It has sometimes been said that Monnet was too much of a technocrat, and that his assumption that people could always be made to see reason was profoundly apolitical. This criticism is understandable. Although his goals were always political, Monnet was for a long time above all an organizer. And yet, from 1950 at the latest, this does not really seem to meet the case any more.

Since the war, when people have talked of political values, they have usually meant the ideals springing from the French and Russian Revolutions, conflicts turning around social justice and equality. However, these presuppose well-established States and forms of political debate solidly rooted in law and custom. The international situation is situated a long way upstream from all this. It is much more reminiscent of feudal anarchy before absolute monarchies created the frameworks from which civil

debate gradually emerged. As at that stage in national histories, the international problem today is precisely how to replace chaos and abuse of power by the rule of law. On these questions, Monnet was impassioned, as were many of those who had lived through the wars and horrors of the earlier part of the century.

In all Monnet's pronouncements, the central figure is peace. It is true there was a tactical element in this. It was necessary to parry the propaganda which claimed that European unity was an instrument of cold war. But his conviction went much deeper. It was the fruit of the two wars, and extended far beyond Europe. Monnet's characteristic idea that 'we are not making a coalition of States, we are uniting men' knows no frontiers.

Monnet detested what he called 'the spirit of domination'. In his memoirs, written for him by François Fontaine in a way which makes one think one can actually hear Monnet speaking, Monnet recalls an interview, at the time he was Deputy-Secretary of the League of Nations, with Raymond Poincaré, the French Prime Minister at the time. Monnet and his colleagues had come to ask that limits should be set to the reparations payments which were fuelling German inflation and threatening the economic equilibrium of the whole of Europe. Poincaré, puce with anger, refused categorically. It was precisely by reparations that he proposed to control Germany now and for a long time to come. He had no intention of giving them up. It was on that occasion, Monnet concluded, 'that I learned what the spirit of domination is'.

What Monnet in his memoirs calls the 'method', is concerned above all with the psychological and political means of breaking the nationalist vicious circle of which Poincaré's reaction was typical.

For Monnet, equality was as important between nations as between individuals. For him, it was the basis of mutual confidence, and therefore of community between people.

Naturally this was not automatic, and had to be given a shaping framework. Friendship, according to Monnet, is not the cause but the effect of a common outlook on the problem to be resolved. One must therefore fix a common goal and task, and organize them in such a way that everyone can rely on the system.

The task in 1950 was the common organization of coal and steel, which were still at that time generally thought to be the sinews of war. Such an organization must be based on a global view of the general interest; demands rules which are equal and equitable for all; and implies joint responsibility for the partial losses which this or that member of the group may have to bear for the greater gain of the community as a whole.

It is in order to implement these principles, not for abstract reasons, that there must be institutions with power to take the global view; to see that it really is taken into account in decisions; and to ensure that they are effectively applied.

Monnet's view of the Community method was essentially psychological and political. It was not really constitutional, still less abstract. It did not depend on precedents, and not very much on books either. Monnet was suspicious of precedents and books. They lulled one's sense of the problem immediately under one's nose.

Monnet gave life to the institutions which were set up on these principles by his behaviour as the first President of the High Authority of the first Community for Coal and Steel in Luxembourg from 1952 till 1955. He introduced into the everyday language of the Communities a vocabulary, for instance words such as 'non-discrimination', which have become standard 'European' principles.

During those years, Monnet laid the foundation of the European orthodoxy which still underlies, though sometimes at a considerable depth, the theory and practice of the Community. More than

doctrine, it meant instilling habits of behaviour. It is in large part because Monnet managed to embody such habits in his own person that he became the conscience of European integration.

Strategy

Spirit is vital, but the test of a policy is the ability to bring it down to earth in a strategy.

Because the Communities have taken root, Monnet is often presented as a visionary. Assuredly he was, in the power of his imagination, and his ability to engender plans which exploited the potential in a situation. But what made Monnet special was not his vision as such. He was typical of a wide swathe of opinion after the war in his belief in the need for European unity. Similarly, if he was probably the first during the war, he was certainly not unique after the war, in thinking in general terms of a European approach to steel. Vision in this sense is not a particularly rare talent. What really marked Monnet out was his instinct and art in detecting where, when and how to launch the process and begin to implant the vision in the real world. It was here that he crossed the frontier between the man of vision and that much rarer phenomenon, the statesman.

To know where to begin is the kernel of the Monnet approach. The point of departure is crisis. For Monnet, crises need not be catastrophes. On the contrary, they offer an opportunity, which is exceptional in political life, to generate demand for plans which bear in them the seed of new departures. He even wrote: 'I have always thought that Europe would be built up through crises, and that it would be the sum of the solutions brought to these crises'. A crisis is the dead end for routine. It is the moment when long-term choices impinge on political leaders as urgent dilemmas. In a crisis, politicians become anxious. They realize that routine no longer works. They are on the look-out for solutions. A crisis, then, is just the opportunity for someone who has the

specific imagination to draw from the contradictions of the situation the energy for a policy of change, and who has the daring to think through and accept its implications. At that moment, and no other, a creative reformer can change the whole course of policy. He can, and must, as Monnet said, 'change the context'.

This is the meaning of the Schuman Declaration of 9 May 1950. The post-disaster situation at the time demanded that the long-standing rivalry between France and Germany should be overcome. Both of them had to be committed to the common objective of European unity. But it was not possible to change everything at one step. As the central phrase of the Schuman Declaration put it: "Europe will not be united at a single stroke, nor by a predetermined grand design. It will come through practical achievements creating active bonds of community *(solidarité de fait)*.

This is essentially a dialectical view of politics. A new logic is injected into the traditional system. This first step demands that further ones be taken. Otherwise, the tensions between the new and the old regimes will become unmanageable.

There have been times when one could wonder whether this dynamic was really that strong, but after nearly 40 years, Monnet's Pascalian wager seems to have succeeded. In theory, one could imagine an unwinding of the Community. In fact, this would be very difficult. An attempt to move back would revive old rivalries and tend to pose all the old problems the new policy has helped to overcome. This was clear, for instance after the failure of the European Army project. Further, to the extent that the new policy gathers powerful support, a built-in lobby for the new system is created. It may not at all times be strong enough to force further movement forward. But it nearly always is strong enough to prevent movement back. As a result, it has been possible on a number of occasions to make the new Communities mark time; it has never been possible to eradicate the power of

attraction of 'European options' as the well-judged title of a book by Jacques Van Helmont calls them.

To the extent that the analysis underpinning these European options is well founded, a moment sooner or later comes when the sense of the need to take further steps revives.

The dynamic is therefore concrete and powerful. The only question, and it is still with us today, is to know whether it is as powerful as the forces for change in the outside world. On the other hand, it is precisely those forces which make Europeans move at all. One is beginning to lose count of the *relances* which despite all failures punctuate the unequal—but by the standards of history, still rapid—progress of the European Community. We are today in the middle of one of these phases of progress and hope.

Nobody was more conscious than Monnet himself of the dialectical nature of his strategy. He often used the metaphor, drawn from his long walks in the Alps, of the view which changes as one moves along the mountain path.

For him, Europe obeyed the same principle. The daring, in 1950, only five years after the end of the war, of embarking on Franco-German reconciliation, required a broader Community including Italy and the Benelux countries. 11 years later, once the British were convinced that the Community was here to stay, and was likely to weigh more in world politics than the UK, they made up their minds to join. A European Community extended to include Britain at last had the political resources to become for the United States an 'equal partner'. (Note Monnet's constant preoccupation with equality.)

These were the ideas promoted in 1961 and 1962 in the resolutions of the Action Committee for the United States of Europe, of which Monnet was the president and founder. They were taken

up by President Kennedy in his famous speech proposing a partnership of the United States of America and the uniting States of Europe. The aim was an association to promote the prosperity of the West and the development of the Third World. Monnet and the Action Committee, but not at that time Kennedy, added the goal of establishing stable long-term relations with the Soviet Union. For Monnet, in short, Europe was the 'ferment of change' of world politics.

The Atlantic partnership was natural and logical. It allowed Europe to exploit as much as possible the effective political space it occupied between the two superpowers. Nevertheless, one can detect in it Monnet's basic pragmatism.

There is little or nothing in the partnership idea of the prophet of Community institutions. What is proposed is bilateral relations between two continental entities. It is interdependence which cements the partnership, not institutions. Similarly, within Europe itself, it is striking that Monnet, the supposed functionalist, was always tempted by political union, even when it was less structured than the Communities themselves, and even when it was promoted by de Gaulle. He wanted to commit the governments to the system, and was ready to take risks in order to advance that commitment.

Operations

The pragmatism which typified Monnet's strategy was equally characteristic of his mode of operations from day to day.

Because Monnet's activity was not always visible in public, there was a tendency to think of it as secretive and even Machiavellian. In fact, his approach was mysterious, indeed barely credible, not by deviousness but because of a simplicity which would have disqualified most people. All he did was to go straight to the

persons, known or unknown to the public, who could from near or far influence the decisions in which he was interested. On his way, he paid no attention to hierarchies, rank or appearances and by-passed them all.

Obviously, it is not given to anyone to walk straight into the offices of the great, to persuade them, and to be 'simple' after such a fashion. It is only possible once a man has imposed himself in some way. Monnet managed to do this because for 40 years he had been going straight to the heart of the matter, and had shown the imagination to find the solutions that those around him were merely looking for. He provided an idea, a service, for those who needed it.

Of course, to do that, one had to have the necessary practical imagination. It was one of Monnet's prime talents from the day, in 1914, when, at the age of 26 he persuaded the then French Prime Minister that the French and the British would really do better to get together to raise their war supplies in America and elsewhere, an unheard-of notion at that period.

By the time of the Schuman Plan, he was already 61 years old. He had won his spurs in two wars and at the League of Nations. As Commissioner-General for the Modernization Plan in Paris, he exerted more influence than most of the members of the Government. He had better international contacts, especially in America, than probably any other European. The hidden strength which sustained Monnet's activities was his virtuosity in the politics of the corridors where governments and bureaucracies meet.

To impose himself by the quality of what he did, and not by his official jobs, implied a continuous search for the point at which effective action would determine all other priorities. It implied a capacity to concentrate on that, and on that alone. It also demanded an acute awareness of the relationships between the broad design and the implementing details, and those alone.

Monnet always managed to detach himself enough from the day to day routine to make sure of ordering his priorities. He walked every morning near his country home, and most of his major decisions came after a fortnight in the Alps.

Once the general line had been fixed, a phase of intense discussion opened up. This could draw in people almost haphazardly. Paul Reuter, to whom Monnet first spoke of the Schuman Plan in 1950, was one such visitor. So, at the end of 1954, was the American lawyer, Max Isenbergh, who inspired Monnet with enthusiasm for Euratom. Very soon the discussion would embrace his close associates, his small intellectual family which changed only very gradually. The partners in his process of discussion were chosen for the contribution they could bring, and neither for their official importance nor their age nor their nationality.

The process could last days, sometimes weeks, and at times seemed to go round in circles while the successive versions of a scheme, a pronouncement or a speech were obsessively polished.

This phase, however circuitous, was crucial. It was the guarantee of the quality of the product. Every facet of a problem, and above all the obstacles to be overcome, had to be fully grasped. The force and originality of the Monnet and Schuman Plans, to take only the archetypes, came largely from the way in which they circumvented the pitfalls which could have arisen from the acceptance of conventional wisdom. As in any product of quality, the art of these proposals can only be fully appreciated when they are examined in detail.

In 1950, there were two major orthodoxies in Western Europe (at least in declaratory policies). One of them was planning, in countries where the political climate was more or less pink. The other was the market economy in the supposedly free-trading countries. The art of the Schuman Plan was to borrow from both,

but to avoid being confined by either, and to make it very difficult for outright opposition to mobilize from any angle.

The fact that the ECSC was sectoral made it 'interventionist', but a common market which opened up the frontiers was free trading. The powers of the High Authority at times of crisis were 'interventionist', but the anti-trust rules were free trading. Symptoms of such flexibility pervaded the whole system.

Intense discussion was also needed to distil extremely simple conclusions. In fact, nothing could be more sophisticated than this because, as Pierre Uri has pointed out, 'it's not the problem that must be simplified, but the solution'. Some have indeed accused Monnet of simplifying the problem. But on the whole those who saw him recognized the practical force of the simplicity on which he always insisted.

Well-selected simplicities helped Monnet convince himself, the better to convince those he was trying to enlist. They helped to avoid misunderstanding, and often made it possible to anticipate criticism in advance. Above all, they made it possible for Monnet to speak in the same terms to everyone, politicians, trade unionists, the press, and so on. Nationalism is paranoid almost by definition. To dissolve mistrust, one must be seen to address everyone in the same terms. Monnet succeeded to an extraordinary degree. He himself said that to repeat untiringly ideas that seemed simple at least had the merit of disarming suspicion.

In fact, simplicity really means distilling from confusion the basic priorities, and clearly accepting their implications. That was necessary for convincing governments. Monnet's networks of influence were legendary. Three prime ministers of the French Fourth Republic had previously worked for him, René Pleven as early as 1925, René Mayer in 1940 and in Algiers, Félix Gaillard at the Monnet Plan in 1945. In America, John Foster Dulles had been a friend since the League of Nations; John McCloy, the proconsul in Germany after the war, had been a close associate

since before the war; George Ball worked for Monnet for two decades before becoming Under-Secretary of State. All this without speaking of the numerous friendships in Germany, in Britain, in Italy, in the Benelux countries and in America, created by the European policy itself.

There were also the friendly relations with the close subordinates of the powerful. These people were the artisans of the big decisions, and often people of great influence in their own right. They were first-rate sources of information, before and after the event. They were channels for passing ideas to the great without having to solicit. It was even possible to mobilize them to work in the good cause, a draft here, a conversation there, and so on. Many of these associates bear witness to the insidious charm Monnet could deploy. All these people of influence behind the scenes, as well as many far more junior, played a primary role in his networks and operations.

Then came the phase of implementation. Etienne Hirsch has spoken of Monnet's 'determination to achieve results'. Monnet himself claimed never to have taken part in a meeting without having a paper ready, even if it was necessary to work late into the night. When he was well past 80, he was still astonishingly mobile, ready to travel at a moment's notice to advance his plans by an inch. He was never disheartened. According to André de Staercke, Jean Monnet and Paul-Henri Spaak got together the very day after the traumatic failure of the European Army project in order what should be done to regain the initiative.

For all his dynamism and will-power, Monnet was usually ready to listen. Bernard Clappier and Etienne Hirsch have both underlined the crucial role in the success of the Monnet and Schuman Plans of working lunches where the food was passably spartan, but followed by the family cognac and Havana cigars. Max Kohnstamm has recalled the astonishment of hardened negotiators at the beginning of the negotiations of the Schuman Plan,

when they saw Monnet, head of the French delegation, and his closest associates in open disagreement on the treaty under discussion. Monnet already had a formidable reputation, and they smelt a trap. Once they had realized that it was actually a quite straightforward—but in a negotiation highly unconventional—debate about the best solution, they became partners in common adventure, not to say crusade. The *esprit de corps* created by the Schuman Plan conference was to be of critical importance in European integration later, when most of the people who had been there played leading parts again.

A model?

In short, Monnet by the ideals he gave to the Communities from the outset, by his dialectical and dynamic strategy, and by his networks of influence throughout the West, had an impact the breadth and depth of which explains how he came very rapidly and in a lasting way somehow to embody the European ideal.

When one surveys the most prominent figures of international policy since the war, as distinct from the outstanding national leaders, Monnet alone seems to stand at the fountainhead of a major policy as a real statesman. Not that he was lacking in national roots, Cognac and the rural France of his youth remained vivid in his personality to the end. But his outlook, which was not confined by national frontiers, his tentacular personal networks, his freedom from blinkers in assessing what individuals could contribute and not from where they came—all of these seemed to speak of the new international world that was emerging.

In these circumstances, it is natural to ask whether Jean Monnet, his methods, his modes of operation, have lessons to offer for a present and future where international forces increasingly hold sway.

The question is natural, but is nevertheless very difficult to answer satisfactorily. The idiosyncracies of the man and of his time are too specific. Monnet himself was exceptional. So was the climate of the time. The war had cleared the decks. That is not at all the condition of the contemporary world. Laying the bases of a Community, or proclaiming the Western partnership were one thing. Fulfilling their promise when the very progress of integration touches the vital nerves of society and State is quite another. This is evident in the intellectual reaction of the 1980s against the very idea of controls by governments, singly or together, over the operation of free markets raised almost to a sufficient condition in themselves.

Yet the Community is alive and well as evidence of the force of the Monnet strategy and institutional vision. He would certainly have done everything he could to back the current efforts to complete the Community and give Europe, beyond 1992, new political potential.

One could also look further afield. Take Monnet's favourite idea of the general view.

We have already seen that it was the basis of his reasoning on the Community institutions. Once problems are posed to whole groups of countries, the individual States are powerless to provide the necessary solution. Each State is responsible to its own electors. It cannot be responsible for those of its neighbours. It must define advantage in terms of its own interests.

Of course, when the costs of the resulting fragmentation of collective awareness become too great, the need for collective action may be admitted. But the risk is that action, when it comes, is too little and too late.

In short, once the necessity for collective action is recognized, the need for a coherent response demands that an institution should be set up with the duty and the effective power to propose policies

in the light of the general interest of the members of the group. Today this idea has become familiar inside a uniting Europe. On the other hand, there is no notion of it all beyond the Community.

And yet, as one of the American friends and colleagues of Jean Monnet, Robert Bowie, pointed out yesterday, in the main amphitheatre of the Sorbonne, we are today on the threshold of a new phase in world politics. The cold war is beginning to fade. It is being replaced by the pressures of an interdependent world, which is full both of promise and of what are foreseeably immense problems.

The world economy is more and more intertwined. Any solid system of peace between the West and Soviet regimes must, to be proof against upheaval, acquire structures that provide guarantees and a framework with inherent power to grow and reinforce itself. As for environmental problems, if they become as acute as it may be wise to fear, policy will have to be freed from the anarchic competition of nation States.

As societies become aware of the costs of international cooperation based on nation States which resist a general view, one can expect the pressures to grow for solutions which must indeed be pragmatic but also much more radical than any which have been envisaged so far.

In such a world, the Community method could prove, at least in some of its features, a model for other political solutions to the problems of complex interdependence. It is one of the inner riches of the European idea that it has been, and remains, ambiguous as between the creation of a united Europe for its own sake and the introduction of a new approach to world politics. This is a faithful reflection of Monnet's own attitude, which as his memories amply demonstrate, certainly sought to promote the United States of Europe, but also saw Europe as a 'ferment of change' in the world.

2. ADDRESS BY MR ÉTIENNE DAVIGNON
Vice-President of the Société générale de Belgique

1. I think I owe my presence here today to the organizers' need for someone who did not have the privilege of working with Jean Monnet. I knew him, I met him with Paul-Henri Spaak. The relationship between Spaak and Monnet was clouded by Monnet's frugality. Spaak used to say to me 'We are lunching with Jean Monnet, it'll be sole again'.

2. However, I have been doing a great deal of thinking, which is only natural since the country to which I belong and which I served for some time, and the role I have been privileged to play within the Community, placed me willy-nilly in a situation in which aspirations of power were no more than a dream and could certainly not form a basis for action.

This being the case, how can one see one's deeply-held convictions transformed into reality? It seems to me that the merit of Monnet's method lay in allowing people to judge his beliefs for themselves since they could not be imposed by decree. François Duchêne has described and documented this in his excellent report.

3. But does the Monnet method still hold good today? After all, things have changed considerably since 1950, 1960 and 1970.

For a start, we live in a society in which communication is essential, and the need is to persuade not those who govern but those who have to listen to them. This is something completely new. It places undue emphasis on the short term at the expense of the medium and long term. The constant need for explanation occasionally leads to talking for talking's sake. This makes people extraordinarily sceptical, a view reinforced by all the 'decisive conferences' and 'last chances' which merely contradict each other. Moreover, when it comes to deciding what is needed and taking appropriate action we find that the situation has been exaggerated to such an extent that requirements are more difficult to identify than in the past.

When all is said and done, it is difficult to believe in a crisis that we hear about as we awake each morning, if we can detect no difference when we go to bed that night. So, when it comes to taking action, we no longer have the incentive that would have come from a realization that the situation was critical and that something needed to be done.

It is a little like having a book of, say, luncheon vouchers and simply throwing the vouchers away, despite the investment they represent, without making any attempt to redeem them.

4. International relations have changed radically. I was struck by the fact that François Duchêne's report made no mention of the remarkable boost European integration has received, not from the distant memory of the war, but from the fear of pressure from the East. Spaak always claimed that we should erect a statue to Stalin on Europe's behalf. Stalin is one of the founding fathers of Europe. I do not suppose it was what he had in mind, but it's a fact. What is the external federator today? There is none—we have only ourselves to rely on.

5. Having said that, I feel sure that the Monnet method, or the Community method as it is today, is the only way forward and, what is more, that progress is actually being made at this moment:

(a) In the first place, there is no longer any scope for one European country to dominate another.

(b) In the second place the countries of Europe can no longer argue among themselves in the belief that this will make them better off than before. If we look at the conflicts within the Community over the past 10 years, regardless of who initiated them, we can see that in very few cases did the country which decided to adopt a hard line achieve anything in the long run in terms of respect or the promotion of specific interests. It may well have secured a compromise which worked to its advantage on the specific issue which provoked the crisis but obtained no real benefit in terms of Community policy. A short-term gain was therefore achieved at the expense of an individual country's influence within the Community.

(c) Thirdly, outside pressure today is being exerted, curiously enough, by the business world and market forces. That is another thought that struck me. Who would Monnet speak to today? I think he would talk to the people who, by their actions, are capable of anticipating the legal reality of the Community, that is to say a particular brand of businessmen and industrialists. That's who he would talk to. Not because of the power of money but because present circumstances have given these people an influence over events and the ability to change them. These are the people Monnet would talk to and it is my firm belief that this is how he would identify what needs to be done.

6. The fact of the matter—if I may class myself with these businessmen and industrialists for a moment—is that no government can provide us with the answers we need. We negotiate with

all governments, we invent words for this, methods for that, but at bottom, as Pierre Uri says, governments cannot offer us real solutions to complicated questions. So we look elsewhere. This is the Community's big opportunity, and it is very much to the advantage of the individual States, as François Duchêne was saying, because the Community must maintain a low profile and accept that, while it may have wrought the change, it will be the Member States which enjoy the legacy and reap the benefits.

This is what makes working in Brussels so demanding and stimulating. But it does demand a degree of self-effacement—there are no medals going! And this, I believe, is a vital element of the Monnet theory.

That is all I have to say, Mr Chairman. I will leave time for your other guests to speak, thereby demonstrating that I have no desire to domintate and proving that, at this level at least, I have understood Monnet's method.

A meeting at the ECSC High Authority:
Jean MONNET (centre) with Frans VINCK,
Franz ETZEL, Albert COPPÉ, Pierre URI,
Tony ROLLMANN and Dirk SPIERENBURG.

Jean MONNET with Franz ETZEL

3. MR KARL-HEINZ NARJES
Vice-President of the Commission
of the European Communities

1. After François Duchêne's excellent introduction to the discussion, I feel it is appropriate to begin with two preliminary remarks which are rather typically German.

Jean Monnet was the promoter, indeed the originater of the idea that the Community was the right legal framework for relations between the various countries in the heart of Europe. The particular consequence for Germany was its readmittance on an equal footing into the family of free nations. We owe Monnet a debt of gratitude for that.

It cannot have been easy for him to take such a step. In this context, it might be useful to draw a historical comparison. The Schuman Plan was announced five years—a mere 60 months—after the end of the last world war. The situation five years after 1918 was very different: 1923 saw Franco-German relations reach their lowest ebb in the history of the Weimar Republic, with the occupation of the Ruhr and the emergence of passive resistance. This comparison underlines not only the different situations prevailing after the two wars, but also the political vision of the

men of 9 May 1950. The gap between 1945 and 1950 was very short, in any event shorter than the time we have allowed today between entry into force of the Single Act and completion of the internal market. These figures illustrate perhaps better than anything else how courageous, realistic and constructive Monnet was in his actions and his advice.

2. My second preliminary remark concerns the indirect influence which Monnet had on post-war domestic politics in Germany. This was felt in all three major parties. It was thanks to him that the majority of the SPD, which was originally opposed to European integration—Europeans like Wilhelm Kayser, Max Brauer and Georg Zinn were in a minority—overcame its scepticism. In the CDU and the FDP, there was considerable opposition from the champions of the market economy. First, Ludwig Erhard had to be won over to the idea of integretion. This was made possible not least thanks to Monnet's particular support for, and defence of, the work of three men, Franz Etzel, Hans von der Gröben and Alfred Müller-Armack (to name the most prominent figures). Through his dealings with the German Trade Union Federation too, he helped ensure that social consensus in post-war Germany was not undermined, but rather strengthened, by outside influences.

3. My next point is really a continuation of a remark made by François Duchêne on relations between Europe and the United States. The partnership of equals, and I stress the word 'equals', has been the only constructive and lasting idea to emerge on the future shape of transatlantic relations. I hasten to add that it has so far failed to materialize, because Europe has not been prepared to take on the burdens which are an inevitable part of responsibility. But the Americans too have found it difficult to get used to the idea of Europe as an equal partner. Nevertheless, partnership continues to be the only feasible option, and Europe should look for ways of acting upon this as soon as possible and assuming the responsibilities involved.

But I would also stress the enormous difference between the self-confident America of 1950, with the personalities referred to by François Duchêne, like Dean Acheson, John Foster Dulles and George Ball, but also figures such as David Bruce and Jack McCloy, and today's rather pathetic 'Fortress Europe' campaign.

4. My fourth point concerns the institutions. François Duchêne quite rightly emphasized the strength of Monnet's commitment to developing the Community institutions. With particular reference to my discussions with Walter Hallstein on the subject of Monnet, I would once again stress to what extent the desire for peace in Europe, and the search for instruments which would rule out war in Europe for all time, determined the course of the Treaty negotiations. A basic consideration, and quite rightly so, was the fact that, in the 19th and 20th centuries, all the instruments of international law had been tried by history and found wanting. Instruments such as the German Confederation, the Holy Alliance, the Concerto of Europe or the systems of collective security, had all failed the acid test of preserving peace. This was one of the essential reasons for opting for a Community as an instrument of integration, in order to internalize what had previously been external conflicts, in other words to treat them as domestic issues and attempt to resolve them within an institutional framework. It is precisely because of the need to guarantee peace that it is so important to maintain a clear commitment to the institutional process and not to question it in any conceivable circumstances.

5. An institutional system of this kind, designed to ensure peace, cannot afford to be dominated by one set of interests. This would be incompatible with the notions of democracy and equality, and this in itself is a reason why it would be unthinkable for a European constitution to be based on any form of hegemony. On the contrary, Europe's self-determination should be assured by means of a democratic constitution based on formal agreement.

The decisive test of self-determination is arguably the ability to take action in the world arena in times of crisis. Monnet constantly stressed that, while the Treaties of Rome provided the Community with some very useful pointers to help it on its way, the time comes when the Community must take all its decisions independently, in the light of the circumstances prevailing at the time. Once this stage is reached, the founders of the Community, the authors of the Treaties, can hardly offer any further assistance beyond the aims which they laid down in the Treaties. While individual personalites may set such a process in motion, it is up to the new institutions to ensure that it is sustained.

This implies, in my opinion, that we should not accept any compromises or take any risks where the institutions are concerned, even in the event of enlargement. If it is to strengthen the Community, enlargement cannot be allowed to undermine the institutional system—to think otherwise would be to betray Monnet's concept.

6. In yesterday's *Le Monde*, Paul Delouvrier raised the very interesting question of the extent of the differences between Monnet and de Gaulle. It reminded me of the three conditions which de Gaulle laid down for drafting a constitution: *efficacité, stabilité* and *continuité*. My conclusion is that Monnet's concept of the Community came appreciably closer to meeting those conditions than the concept to which de Gaulle himself adhered in his lifetime in relation to the founding of the Community of Six. This also applies, in the context of the present discussions on the Europe of tomorrow, to all the accusations directed against Europe's 'monstrous regiment', supposedly made up of Eurocrats, technocrats, soulless centralists, bureaucrats, champions of *dirigisme*, interventionists, stateless persons, or whatever. Any concept for a Community constitution must first of all pass the peace test, and then the test as to whether it guarantees Europe's self-determination. None of the more recent critiques I have come across has satisfied both these criteria.

7. I would like to conclude by recalling Walter Hallstein's report of a conversation with Jean Monnet during the negotiations in the early 1950s about the time needed to build a federal Europe. Both men seem to have come to the conclusion that it would probably take a generation. Assuming that a generation is 40 years, we might therefore expect to be reaching the goal in the 1990s. If we take this as our reference, we have fallen somewhat behind schedule. However, it is my opinion that the European democrats in the Community have passed a severe test by contriving, over a period of 40 years, to maintain the continuity of the European idea and of European integration, regardless of domestic political circumstances and of the tendencies and influences of the moment in domestic and foreign policies, and in economic and social policy. Some Member States must have had 30 governments in that time, and not one of them has challenged the basic principle of participation in the process of European integration. This is an achievement which should not be underestimated, one which should give us the courage to pursue our efforts with as much consistency—and, if necessary, stubbornness—as has been displayed in the 38 years since 1950.

8. We are, however, a little behind schedule. So there is no time to lose, if—as somebody mentioned in Paris yesterday—we are to keep pace with worldwide developments. We are on the threshold of a new century, and must prepare ourselves for its political realities and challenges, a century in which the change in power relations will be to the clear disadvantage of the two present superpowers. Henry Kissinger was quite right to describe the shifting trend in the balance of power since the war as irreversible. We must adapt to that fact, and prepare to make a decisive contribution to peace in a world with a population of nine or 10 billion. This is another reason why I believe that the *finalité politique* of European union must become a reality no later than the year 2000. After the internal market in 1992 it is the next big milestone on the road to integration. By then we will have only eight years left.

4. MR ÉMILE NOËL

Principal of the European University Institute and Honorary Secretary-General of the Commission of the European Communities

1. François Duchêne quite rightly spoke about Jean Monnet's approach rather than Jean Monnet's method, recognizing that the use of the term 'method' could give rise to confusion. There is no doubt that what we are talking about is an approach, based on a number of guiding principles which Monnet developed in the long lead-up to his more immediate involvement in European affairs.

2. The Community's new lease of life invites comparisons between recent events and what was achieved in the 1950s, when the Community was launched. What I would like to do is pinpoint some features of the present revival and draw such parallels as may exist between the approach adopted since 1985 and Monnet's approach in the 1950s.

3. I would begin by observing that the impetus for the revival in 1985-86 was provided by the combination of an economic project—creation of a single European market by the end of 1992—

and an institutional project—negotiation of the Single European Act. Let us cast our minds back for a moment to 1984. The Fontainebleau European Council had temporarily patched up the family quarrel but the Community and its institutions emerged from the 1979-84 crisis considerably weakened, lacking overall direction, and facing a profoundly sceptical public.

4. It was against this background that the Delors Commission, which had just taken office, proposed an ambitious medium-term project: creation of a single European market by 1992. The following June the Milan European Council was asked to pronounce on this project and on the proposal to convene an intergovernmental conference to revise the Treaties of Rome and strengthen the role of the institutions.

What are we to make of this new factor in the European equation? The single market is a European programme devised to serve the common interest. It must be implemented in full if it is to bear fruit and bring advantages to all. Negotiation of the Single Act should serve to strengthen the institutions—Parliament and the Commission—which articulate the common interest and make the functioning of the Council more flexible, thereby creating the conditions in which the single market can be discussed from a European viewpoint rather than provoking conflicting national interests.

Surely this combination of initiatives mirrors the approach adopted by Jean Monnet and Robert Schuman in 1950, when they launched the idea of a Coal and Steel Community, and subsequently opened negotiations on what was to become the Treaty of Paris.

The negotiations were to be conducted on the basis of the 9 May declaration. All participants were asked to endorse the principles of that declaration, in other words to adopt a European viewpoint. As François Duchêne recalled just now, the negotiations

were designed to serve the European interest rather than produce a compromise between national positions. The declared objective was of great political importance, namely to set up a common structure for the production of coal and steel—at that time the basis of industrial power—and to open up the longer-term prospect of constructing a federal Europe. Finally, Monnet and Schuman proposed the creation of common institutions, institutions which still exist 40 years on, to represent and defend the European interest.

The need to make proposals, to negotiate, to act solely in the European interest and to enshrine that interest in permanent institutions, was one of Monnet's guiding principles. And it was this same principle that underpinned the first moves towards the current revival in Europe.

5. After the breakthrough in 1985, the movement seemed to lose momentum. The Community's resources were exhausted once again, agricultural production and expenditure were rocketing, and the less-prosperous Community countries wondered whether the commitment to greater economic and social cohesion enshrined in the Single Act would in fact be honoured. To make matters worse, there was open confrontation between the Twelve on all of these issues, so that complete deadlock appeared to have been reached.

Something had to be done. In February 1987, in a memorandum entitled 'Making a Success of the Single Act', the Commission studied the entire range of issues, not individually but in the broader context of honouring the undertakings given in the Single Act, namely to complete the internal market and achieve greater economic and social cohesion, leading to the transformation of the Community into an economic and social area. On this basis a precise, detailed programme was drawn up to achieve the objectives laid down in the Single Act. Following a year of negotiations, this programme was adopted virtually in its entirety by the Brussels European Council in February 1988.

6. One cannot but be struck by the similarities between the present Commission's approach and one of Monnet's guiding principles referred to earlier by François Duchêne, namely the importance of being able to place an apparently insoluble problem in a totally different context and thus bring new elements to bear upon it. This is precisely what Monnet did in 1950 when he made his major contribution to solving the two most serious problems facing post-war Europe: liberation of the German economy, heavy industry in particular, and the German contribution to Western defence.

Although it was important to exploit Germany's potential to contribute to security and prosperity in Europe, there had to be guarantees for Germany's recent victims. And care had to be taken not to repeat the mistakes of the Treaty of Versailles, which had discriminated against Germany. A problem that appeared intractable at bilateral or intergovernmental level was suddenly solved when placed in a European or Community context where the expansion and control of coal and steel production and the organization and training of the armed forces could be based on common rules and placed under the authority of common institutions.

Another of Monnet's guiding principles was to change the context of an issue by adding another dimension. This principle too was successfully applied—with the help of a stubbornness in negotiations similar to that displayed at times by Monnet—during the second phase of the revitalization process, which culminated in the Brussels European Council.

7. This revival, as has been said again and again, is not an end, but a beginning. It has set a process in motion and provided the impetus for further discussion, brilliantly illustrated by the Hanover European Council, which identified economic and monetary union as an objective.

The Single Act, by setting the Community and its Member States the twin goals of creating a single European market and achieving greater economic and social cohesion, had already laid the foundations for progress by establishing a dynamic link between the measures designed to achieve those two objectives. The package deal approach which dominated the Community for 20 years has been replaced by a forward-looking strategy.

8. Does this not echo another of Monnet's guiding principles? Monnet always strove to take a sufficiently important starting point as the basis for action, so that the momentum, once gathered, would be sustained. To ensure the survival of the Coal and Steel Community further progress was necessary. Its very existence engendered a dynamism, what might be termed a dynamic imbalance. This is why the plans for a defence Community and a political Community came into being, perhaps prematurely. This is why, at a later and more timely juncture, these plans were superseded by the Treaties of Rome establishing the European Atomic Energy Community and the European Economic Community.

The processes triggered by the Single Act represent a more advanced, more sophisticated phase in the Community's progress. Today the institutions have more scope to act in the economic and political fields, but the inspiration is the same: implementation of a forward-looking strategy. So here we have another of Monnet's guiding principles which seems set to preside over the third phase of Europe's revival.

9. Given the limited time available, I will simply make these three points to illustrate what to my mind are striking parallels between the ideas which inspired Monnet and the strategy of the new generation of European leaders, parallels which, I believe, highlight the modernity of Monnet's thinking and the continued topicality of his approach.

5. MR PIERRE URI
Winner of the Robert Schuman Prize

After such a wide-ranging speech as the one we have just heard from François Duchêne, and the wealth of comments from others who worked with Jean Monnet, what is there left for me to say? Perhaps I can just betray a few confidences which are no longer covered by the 30-year rule.

When I hear people talking about Jean Monnet's method, I always have a feeling that there is an ambiguity. Does it mean his personal contribution to events? Does it mean the original edifice he constructed, copying nothing from earlier federations, the combination of an independent body and government representatives, the dual executive which makes European integration so special? Or does it mean the hidden ways in which he brought his influence to bear?

Monnet is not as well known as he should be. Some people confuse him with the painter, despite a different Christian name and the extra 'n'. When all is said and done, they were not in the same business. The fact is that Monnet chose to turn his back on fame because he preferred to influence events. There were things which he found intolerable—conflicts of course—but also the

failure of people who should have been on the same team to pull together. Hence his efforts to organize cooperation between France and the United Kingdom as early as the First World War and again during the Second. He used to say to me: 'You know, the reason people listen to me is that they know I don't want to take anybody else's place'. That is why he opted to learn to serve others throught his gift and his taste for persuasion.

People say he was not a media-oriented figure. Do not forget that in his day the media did not play the part they do today. Remember that there were no mini-cassettes and that nothing whatever remains of various turning-point conversations or speeches. I know from my own experience that Monnet was extremely good at using newspaper journalists. He knew perfectly well how to talk to them.

But it was when it came to approaching powerful men that he was truly remarkable. We have heard how, at the age of 26, he sought out Viviani. We know that he was so international that after the defeat of France he turned up as a member of the British delegation in Washington, thereby gaining access to Roosevelt and contributing to the Victory Program. I may well be betraying a confidence when I tell you that he told me that one day Adenauer asked him to attend a meeting of the German Government.

There is another thing I should like Michel Debré to know. When de Gaulle, who had poured scorn on what he called the coal and steel hotch-potch, returned to power, he decided, with some apprehension, to approach Adenauer and realized that an understanding could be reached. With the benefit of hindsight we, of course, can clearly see how the Schuman Plan transformed French and German attitudes. After talking to Adenauer, de Gaulle received Monnet at the Elysée and admitted: 'I underestimated the political importance of what had been achieved'.

Another hallmark of Monnet's method, in the sense of his

personal contribution, was teamwork. Monnet, unlike so many other people, was a man who was never resented by his staff, a man who did not see them as rivals. On the contrary, he knew how to trust them. As I am sure both Paul Delouvrier and François Fontaine would confirm, Monnet used to say to us: 'You know much more about this than I do. You just go ahead and don't even bother to report back to me'. I cannot think of a better way of inspiring boundless devotion and inducing people to work impossible hours. There were no such things as holidays or weekends; you had hardly left the building when you were called back. The same spirit spread to our own people. I remember being sent eight secretaries one Sunday. I remember people working with me who never had a weekend off. I remember, when we were involved in the Spaak report, how hard the secretaries worked until late at night. I once said to Monnet with a laugh: 'You used to exploit us, but no one held it against you'. He also had a way, you see, of taking an interest in the personal problems of the people working with him.

People also talk about Monnet's patience and the time it often takes to effect change. This does not mean that he liked the step-by-step approach—quite the reverse. Things tended to happen in dramatic leaps and bounds. Look at the ECSC, the Schuman Declaration. A mere five years after the end of the worst war and the most appalling period of occupation, people were suddenly saying that the first priority was to bring France and Germany together under a joint high authority open to cooperation by other countries. That dramatic gesture changed everything. The fact that it then took patience to set it all up is another matter. Then there was Euratom. Why did he opt for Euratom? It was because the atom bomb, with its devastating entry onto the world stage, not only fired the imagination of the nations of the world but also marked the beginning of a new industrial revolution.

The notion underlying everything Monnet did was that we need institutions because institutions can be improved and can hand

wisdom down from generation to generation. There are never unsupported edifices, they always have a solid substructure and they have a mission. There were already economic problems when the Coal and Steel Community was set up: the inflexibility of the deep-mine production process in the case of coal and over-sensitivity to economic fluctuations and variations in investment patterns in the case of steel.

Monnet's method was to identify the point at which action was needed, to focus on the essential, the anchoring point—I am always tempted to say the *Ansatzpunkt*, if Karl-Heinz Narjes will bear with me, since this is the best term I can think of to express what Monnet's work amounted to—and the rest would follow of its own accord.

There are people who think that Monnet was only interested in sectoral integration—I was rather shocked when I read this in a newspaper. I telephoned the writer of the article in some annoyance and said to him: 'Have you never read the Schuman Declaration? It talks about federation. Have you never heard of the Action Committee for the United States of Europe?' A distinction has to be made between aims and tactics. The reason Monnet delegated so much to the people who worked with him was that he knew that he had something else to offer—an extraordinary intuition for what would have to be done in the near future, combined with a feel for what might be premature and ought therefore to be held in reserve. If he was hesitant about the common market—extremely European-minded friends like Bernard Clappier used to say to me: 'You must be dreaming, France will never agree to that!'—it may have been because, after the failure of the EDC, Monnet was afraid of overloading the ship, afraid that, by trying to press ahead with plans for Euratom and the common market at one and the same time, we would end up with neither. In the event everything went through, because people's attitudes changed. The conjunction of two tragedies—Suez and Budapest—proved to be the catalyst. The French suddenly realized that even with the United Kingdom they were

not a major force in world affairs and that the only way of counterbalancing the big powers was to create a larger structure.

There was, too, the new way of looking at things referred to earlier. Neither the Plan nor European integration could ignore the market, but there are things which the market cannot solve unaided. Market forces will not direct investment towards the poorer countries with no infrastructure of any kind. We know that state intervention creates distortions which have to be corrected. We know that if we are to win full cooperation from workers, which is probably the best way of achieving the highest level of productivity, we need to shelter them from the hazards of progress. Hence the idea of redevelopment. There has to be a balance between the regions, or to use the current phrase, there has to be economic and social cohesion.

These, then, are the ideas and the methods which enabled us to create something which is not, as malicious tongues would have it, 'an American Europe' but rather a Europe capable of talking to America on equal terms. It seems to me that what we are seeing today is a Western Europe which, thanks to its organization and its policy objectives, is actually beginning to attract the countries of Eastern Europe, who have recognized how efficient our combination of freedom of initiative and policies regulating the activities of individual firms can be.

We are often asked, in the spirit of Monnet, what the Community should be doing today. I know people talk quite a lot about currency. It is not as simple as all that. It is not, I would say in passing, just a matter for the central banks. Currency raises budgetary and fiscal questions and it also implies an incomes policy. Then people talk a lot about technology.

Obviously the part played by coal and steel 40 years ago now devolves on the high-technology industries that will shape our future. And then there is culture, particularly now that it comes

to us through the audio-visual media. These are now at a turning point where they might very well go into a steady decline or, alternatively, turn into a wonderful instrument for communication between the countries of Europe.

I myself would suggest other ambitions. As I said earlier, Monnet could not tolerate conflicts which had embroiled the world in bloodshed or misunderstandings between people whose interests were the same. I think that we should exploit a proven method of negotiation and the role of the European institutions. People must never be allowed to face each other head-on in negotiations; that just leads to mounting misunderstanding and suspicion. We should have wider recourse to mediators or go-betweens, to use Losey's term, people who have the trust of both sides and the imagination to find solutions which are not simply compromises where you take 30% of what one side wants and 40% of what the other side wants and forget about the rest. Synthesis, in the chemical sense of the term, where the end product is different from its components, is quite another matter. Given the speed of change and innovation and the emergence of new technologies all over the world, I feel that this method of negotiation should become standard practice, not only between countries but also inside firms. People must come to understand that command is no longer a matter of handing down orders through a hierarchy. Command is a network of skills, a synthesis, a dialogue with those who are actually doing the job. The method that Monnet introduced into international relations applies equally to company management. Dare I suggest that the first people to understand this were the Japanese?

There is a second guiding principle that can help Europe to carry out its allotted task in the spirit of its founder: in today's troubled world we are not building Europe for Europe alone. Our lesson to others is that the fiercer the ravages of conflict between nations the greater the need for even closer ties in peace. This is what has happened in the case of France and Germany. I do not believe there will be any solution to the Middle East problem until a

community is created there with a federal capital, obviously Jerusalem. The same approach must be used to overcome conflicts in Asia and tribal struggles in Africa. This would be a way of responding to the ideas of the man we are honouring here today. We are not in the business of building Europe so that Europeans can be stronger and happier. We are building Europe so that it can become a decisive factor for democracy and peace.

6. CLOSURE OF THE MORNING SESSION BY MR LORENZO NATALI

Vice-President of the Commission
of the European Communities

I am sure I speak for all of you in thanking François Duchêne, Karl-Heinz Narjes, Etienne Davignon, Emile Noël and Pierre Uri for their contribution to this morning's session. The reports and the round-table discussion served not only to jog our memories, but also to put the public spotlight on the man we are honouring today.

There is one point worth mentioning. Everyone who spoke this morning referred, quite rightly, to the fact that Jean Monnet is relatively unknown. Today's symposium was organized not simply to pay tribute to Monnet's memory, but also to publicize his philosophy. I believe that we must continue to highlight our aims and objectives in all we do. We must never forget why Jean Monnet, in forging a link between an idea, a concept and its practical implementation, succeeded in creating the living reality that we are experiencing today.



Round table, morning session, from left to right:
Emile NOËL, Etienne DAVIGNON, Lorenzo NATALI,
Karl-Heinz NARJES, François DUCHÊNE and Pierre URI.

A section of the audience.



Round table, afternoon session, from left to right:
Max KOHNSTAMM, Karl CARSTENS, David F. WILLIAMSON,
Jacques CHABAN-DELMAS, Pascal FONTAINE and Jacques DELORS.

A section of the audience.



Round table, afternoon session, from left to right:
Karl CARSTENS, David F. WILLIAMSON, Jacques CHABAN-DALMAS,
Pascal FONTAINE and Jacques DELORS.

From left to right:
Franco-Maria MALFATTI
and Lorenzo NATALI.

Jacques DELORS with Jean MONNET's daughter and son-in-law, Mr and Mrs SARRADET-MONNET.

B. ACTION COMMITTEE FOR THE UNITED STATES OF EUROPE

1. OPENING OF THE AFTERNOON SESSION BY MR JACQUES DELORS

President of the Commission
of the European Communities

The fact that this morning's debate went on longer than planned demonstrates the value of François Duchêne's report. You have just seen a film which illustrates Jean Monnet's philosophy exceptionally well. In it you also saw Robert Schuman, Konrad Adenauer, Alcide de Gasperi and a number of others who, we must not forget, took the political responsibility for implementing his ideas.

We can now move on to our second session and give the floor to our young Secretary-General, David Williamson, who is to chair this afternoon's round-table discussion on the past, present and future of the Action Committee for a United States of Europe.

2. MR DAVID F. WILLIAMSON
Secretary-General of the Commission
of the European Communities

I agree with you, Mr President, that we need to discuss all three aspects. We must give some thought to the present and the future. I am very much in favour of that approach, possibly because I still cherish the illusion of being young. But I also believe that the past can teach us something about the future role of the revitalized Action Committee.

Pascal Fontaine has produced a report as a basis for the round-table discussion.

3. REPORT BY MR PASCAL FONTAINE
Professor at the Paris Institute of Political Studies

1. When the French National Assembly rejected the draft European Defence Community treaty on August 1954 Jean Monnet was obviously a disappointed man. But he was not taken unawares, nor was he discouraged. His pragmatism and his active approach prompted him to draw his own conclusions from his setback. In his memoirs he wrote: 'I pondered on how to ensure that political forces everywhere ceased to act as a brake and become instead the motor of European unity'. The lesson Monnet learned from this failure was that all political parties, whether in power or in opposition, would have to be involved in the European venture. His aim was to secure a consensus to ensure that the new European treaties he had set his heart on could count on support that did not rely solely on the ups and downs of national political fortunes.

2. This analysis was consonant with Monnet's method, his belief that history has its key moments and its key forces. The key moments were those where he sensed that a new start was possible and in 1945-55 the key forces were the political parties

and the trade unions. The method was concertation, the formula which had ensured the success of both the Modernization Plan and the Schuman Plan.

Monnet therefore decided to relinquish the presidency of the ECSC High Authority so that he could be free to work once more for European unity. He announced that he would not be seeking renewal of his appointment, which was to expire in February 1955, and he shared as an ordinary European citizen in the upsurge of intellectual and political activity which enlivened 1954 and 1955. He obviously worked closely with Paul-Henri Spaak and Jan Beyen, the authors of the Benelux Memorandum, which led to the relaunching of Europe at Messina.

3. What Monnet really wanted at the same time was to recreate a European dynamic from the success of the Schuman Plan, the tide of support for the European idea and the failure of the European Army project to which he had of course contributed, since it was he who initiated the European Defence Community treaty with René Pleven. There could be no surrender, the European dynamic had to be renewed.

The Action Committee for the United States of Europe was formed on 13 October 1955 and was active until 1975. For 20 years an unofficial organization, virtually unknown to the general public, had a decisive influence on the integration process. For Monnet the Committee served not only as a framework for action but also as the means of advancing the European cause to which he had dedicated himself. The Committee epitomized his method—which we discussed this morning—and his concentration, that is to say, his ability and determination to do one thing at a time, in this case to build the United States of Europe.

4. I propose to examine the Committee in two stages. First I will consider the Committee as a force for European integration

throughout the 1950s and 1960s. Then I will make a brief evaluation of the Committee's record, identifying its successes, its intuitions, its limitations and the lessons we might learn for action today.

5. The Committee as a force for European integration

Let me begin by saying what the Committee was not. It was not a European movement or a 'think-tank'. Nor was it a lobby in the normal sense of the term. It was a unique creation tailored to Monnet's method; it was a pressure group of sorts, embodying power because the basic principle governing its composition was that members were not individuals but representatives of their parties and trade unions.

When the Committee was formed on 13 October 1955, three principles were defined. First, members would not be acting in a personal capacity. They had to be formally appointed by their organizations, which presupposed some internal discussion. The second principle was that the Committee was pledged to realizing the objectives set at Messina. The Messina communiqué had listed a number of objectives, and Monnet was determined that each and every objective should be attained. The third principle was vital: members of the Committee had to endorse and champion the basic principle of delegation of sovereignty. This, no doubt, is why they had agreed to sit on the Action Committee for the United States of Europe in the first place.

A few months after the failure of the European Defence Community and the embryonic political cooperation treaty, the inclusion of the 'United States of Europe' in the title of the Committee was a highly significant and audacious step for both Monnet and its members. In forming the Committee, Monnet was perpetuating his method of working through politicians, influencing them, inspiring them and projecting through them material objectives for European unity.

6. Membership of the Committee included all the political parties of the Community of Six; Social Democrats, Christian Democrats and Liberals, representing two-thirds of the European electorate, were members from the outset, as were all the free and Christian trade unions, representing 10 million workers. Between 1955 and 1975, 130 individuals sat as members. A key factor from the start was the support of the German Social Democrats. They had been hostile to the first European Coal and Steel Community but were converted to the cause by the intercession of DGB trade unionist Walter Freitag. His experience on the ECSC Consultative Committee convinced him of Monnet's intentions and he won Erich Ollenhauer and Herbert Wehner over to the European idea. Winning the SPD's support was undoubtedly the Committee's first major achievement.

Let me mention some of these 130 individuals—and I must apologize for not mentioning them all—who were the backbone of the Committee over the years:

For France I would mention Pflimlin, Pinay, Lecourt, Pleven, Mollet, Maurice Faure, Giscard d'Estaing, Defferre. For Germany, Brandt, Kiesinger, Barzel, Schmidt, Wehner, Scheel. For Italy: La Malfa, Fanfani, Moro, Forlani, Piccoli, Rumor, Malagodi, Nenni, Saragat. For the United Kingdom, Douglas-Home, Heath, Jenkins. For the Benelux countries, Tindemans, Leburton, Lefèvre, Werner, Biesheuvel, den Uyl.

They represented the cream of Europe's political leadership at the time and as members of the Committee were to have frequent dealings with Monnet and become imbued with his philosophy.

7. How did the Committee operate? There were no formal rules, there was no constitution, there was simply an approach. And in describing it, the simile of an iceberg is not altogether inappropriate, the tip of the iceberg corresponding to what was made public.

The Committee held 18 full meetings during its lifetime, roughly one a year. Each meeting was followed by the publication of a resolution or a joint declaration. This represented the common ground, or rather a consensus, between all the members and had, of course, been worked on in advance by Monnet and his team to secure their agreement. Two of these resolutions won spectacular acceptance: the resolutions of January 1956 and June 1967 were submitted for ratification or rather parliamentary endorsement by the parliaments of the six Member States.

The Committee's resolutions were designed not only to set general objectives and focus European aspirations, but also to define specific and immediate targets bearing on intra-Community realities and debates. They also provided an element of reaction to immediate events on occasion. One example of this was de Gaulle's now famous *Volapük* press conference on 15 May 1962, probably one of the most awkward moments of the 1960s, when he launched an attack on supranationality and the Community or, to be more precise, on the Community institutions. This was followed on 26 June by a declaration from the Committee restating the basic principles, the terms of reference and the interest of Community action. To take a more recent example: Mrs Thatcher's Bruges speech on 20 September last could well have prompted a reaction from the Committee restating and explaining the parameters and the ambitions of the Community method.

8. The submerged part of the iceberg corresponded to behind-the-scenes activity by Monnet himself. He considered that it was his duty to concern himself exclusively with the Committee and the European cause, unlike the politicians who had other tasks to perform and other responsibilities to bear. He was a full-time campaigner for Europe and therein lay his strength. Those who knew him know that his work consisted mainly of meeting after meeting, hundreds of telephone calls, constant travelling. He never hesitated to give of himself, to go to Brussels, Bonn or Washington to persuade people.

His offices were in the avenue Foch in Paris. His secretariat was minimal: Max Kohnstamm and Jacques Van Helmont, helped by François Duchêne and Richard Mayne for a number of years. More than this small team, what explains the Committee's capacity for impetus and influence during this time was the fact that other forces gathered around this nucleus in what might be described as concentric circles.

All sorts of people, because of personal contacts, bacause they had known Monnet for a long time, because they had been won over to the cause, endeavoured to make their contribution. The first concentric circle was formed by the 'friends', longstanding colleagues from the Modernization Plan and the ECSC: Etienne Hirsch, Pierre Uri, Robert Marjolin, Paul Delouvrier, Bernard Clappier. Very close to them came the 'acquaintances' and 'allies', those who could be approached, mobilized, asked to produce an urgent memo: first, the Committee members themselves and then the friends, the journalists, the professional men and women, all part of a Monnet network. Many of them are with us here today.

Beyond the network was a circle of 'well-wishers'. From the records and correspondence, I have been able to identify nearly 500 people throughout Europe who were involved in one way or another with what might be termed a creative European force in the 1960s. They helped the Committee to grow from a small, highly-flexible nucleus to become what Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber has called 'a federal authority of the mind'.

In addition to the contributions from individual members, from this creative force the Committee used to commission technical reports on highly specific matters to provide specific answers to difficult problems. Louis Armand, Robert Triffin, Walter Hallstein and Edgard Pisani, were among those who contributed meaty reports on crucial issues such as atomic energy and Euratom, the currency problem and the terms on which the United Kingdom could joint the European Community.

9. **The Committee's record**

I must pick and choose here for the Committee naturally dealt with a mountain of business in 20 years. Everything that had a practical bearing on Community developments was considered in one way or another. But there were priorities. So I will make a choice.

10. Let me begin with the successes. The first, the Committee's initial objective, as the 13 October declaration provided, was implementation of the Messina resolution of 1 June 1955. Monnet and his team contributed to the Benelux Memorandum, so much so that Spaak sent it to him on 6 May 1966 with the message 'Herewith your child'.

From the outset the Committee was keenly aware of the choice to be made between an atomic energy Community and a general common market. It is true that Monnet, under the influence of Louis Armand, was more aware in the early days of the value of a sectoral atomic energy Community. However, he soon saw that the Germans in particular would be more interested in the relaunching exercise if a general common market were included. And what the Committee strived for from the beginning was a parallelism between the two: atomic energy and a general common market.

In the early days the Committee was at pains to ensure that the Treaties on the drawing board incorporated what were truly Community institutions. Monnet's fear was that, after the European Defence Community debacle, governments might opt for some intergovernmental arrangement. For this reason the Committee was very much on its guard to ensure that the institutions were Community institutions and that the balance between the Commission, the Council, the Court of Justice and Parliament was preserved.

The Committee's second success was the part it played in resisting efforts by the United Kingdom to transform the embryonic Community into a huge free-trade area. In October 1956 Harold Macmillan had proposed large-scale negotiations that would bring all the countries of western Europe together in a free-trade area. The threat took on sharper contours when the Maudling Committee was set up within the OECD. The Committee issued a warning to those around the table at the Val Duchesse Conference against the dangers of the new Communities being engulfed rather than merely diluted by a free-trade area.

The third success was, so to speak, the counterpart of the second. Monnet was very firm and vigilant with the British. He knew them better than anyone else and was determinted that they should not jeopardize the very basis of what was a supranationally-minded Community. From as early as 1960, he was a staunch supporter of British membership of the Community, under the same rules and practices. I think that the Committee played a decisive role here, particularly since the British application, and those of the other three candidates, was controversial at the time. Monnet set an example in 1968 by inviting the three British political parties to join the Committee, after de Gaulle's second veto had momentarily slammed the door. He used all his skills to explain to the British that it was in their interest, when they joined the Community, to accept the Treaties and abide by the same rules as everyone else rather than embark on lengthy, complicated negotiations to undermine its foundations.

The fourth success is difficult to explain, but of enormous importance. There had been a number of crises between 1962 and 1969. Let me remind you of them:

— in 1962: the *Volapük* crisis, when de Gaulle fiercely attacked the Community spirit and the Brussels institutions;
— in 1965: the 'empty chair' crisis, when for six months France withdrew from the European institutions and the

principle of majority voting in the Council was called into question;

— 1963 to 1967: the two vetos on British membership, a Franco-European and even a Franco-Atlantic crisis.

What was to be done? As Monnet saw it, the important thing was to preserve the links, to maintain the cohesion between the Six and the forces which sought to defend the Community spirit, to keep the dialogue going at all costs, to hold fast to principles, to support the Commission and the European Parliament, to uphold Community doctrine and to persuade those who were not yet convinced. And he managed to do it. Some of the solutions found could be attributed to the perseverence of the Committee and Monnet himself, to his presence and to cultivation of the Community spirit during a difficult period.

11. This brings one to the intuitions, the bold ideas floated by the Committee which were not acted upon but which sowed the seeds of developments which have already borne fruit or are in the process of doing so.

It is interesting that as early as November 1959, the Committee adopted a resolution calling for a monetary policy based on three principles: the liberalization of capital movements, the coordination of budget and credit policies, and the creation of a European reserve fund. As far back as 1959, we had come up with the blueprint for the European Monetary Cooperation Fund, which saw the light of day in 1973, and a European currency, which is still a burning issue in the 1980s.

The second intuition has been mentioned on a number of occasions this morning. It was the idea of an equal partnership between Europe and the United States. There is a close parallel between the Committee's declaration of 26 June 1962 and John F. Kennedy's Philadelphia speech on 4 July of that year urging that an enlarged Community embracing the United Kingdom should

form a partnership of equals with the United States to create two pillars of the western world. It was a grand design common to Monnet and Kennedy, and it was on that basis that the Committee saw the possibility of a genuine, balanced dialogue, not only with the United States but with the Communist world too.

The third intuition was political union. This was perhaps one of the major misunderstandings of those years. De Gaulle proposed a plan for 'confederation' at a press conference on 5 September 1960. On 22 November Monnet sent a letter to the members of the Committee, which I feel I must quote.

Taking de Gaulle's proposals one by one, he wrote:
'If we followed that course we should soon be faced with two methods: the integration method established by the Treaties for the three existing Communities and the method to be adopted for political, defence and education issues will, on the face of it, be different. But is that any reason for not seeking a measure of unity? I think not. In the circumstances, we must once again adopt an empirical approach. I believe—and I put it to you—that it would be a very good thing to develop different organizations simultaneously within the same European system: a Council of the six Heads of Government: a Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Defence and Education; and the European Communities with their rules, institutions and responsibilities. I believe that a kind of "European confederation" could usefully play this role. As I see it, such a body offers, at this point in time, the best means of advancing towards a more complete form of European unity. I have no doubt that a confederation will one day lead to a federation. But, for the moment, is it possible to go further? I cannot say that it is. Meanwhile the confederation would have the very great advantage of assuring public opinion in our countries that they have joined an entity which is not only economic but political, and that they are therefore part of something bigger than any of their countries alone.'

This 1960 letter is particularly interesting because much of what we have today, notably Article 3 of the Single European Act, is

there. But things did not turn out as they might have done at the time. Events decided otherwise.

12. Although Monnet was prepared to talk with de Gaulle, our partners were perhaps suspicious, somewhat wary, of French intentions. The first Fouchet Plan had been well received but the second, reworked by France in January 1962, had not gone down so well, because it questioned the very independence of the Community institutions and made them subordinate to intergovernmental cooperation. Then came the 15 May 1962 press conference when de Gaulle took issue with the Europe of 'myths, fictions and pageants', making dialogue even more difficult. So de Gaulle and Monnet failed to come together at that time. With hindsight perhaps we can now see that they wanted to achieve the same goal by different routes.

13. This brings me to the Committee's limitations. One may well ask why after the meeting in May 1973 Monnet himself, in consultation with all the members, decided to wind up the Committee and to announce on 9 May 1975, the 25th anniversary of the Schuman Declaration, that it was no more.

Perhaps the European political context had changed, which meant that his 1955 assessment of the key forces had changed and that methods and objectives had to change too.

14. There were in fact two developments. The first was the emergence of the European Council in 1974, and remember that the European Council was largely the fruit of Monnet's efforts. How did he see things? The Paris Summit in October 1972 had drawn up an ambitious programme for the Community which was to be transformed into a European Union by the end of the decade. Monnet wanted the heads of government, who had embarked on this programme, to accept personal responsibility.

He also noted the emergence of new sociological and political phenomena in the 1970s, namely the personalization and concentration of executive power. The men who were responsible, the men with the power, were the heads of government.

He probably realized that the time had come for his source of influence, the political parties as such, to give way in the interests of the cause to the heads of government. So in 1973 he drafted a memorandum entitled 'Constitution and Action of a Provisional European Government'. This memorandum is the blueprint for what the European Council has since become. Monnet took it to the magic triangle of the day, the Franco-German-British triangle of Georges Pompidou, Willy Brandt and Edward Heath, and won them over. And when the three corners of the triangle were replaced in national elections he called on Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, Harold Wilson and Helmut Schmidt in early 1974 and won *them* over. So it was that at the Paris Summit of 1974, Valéry Giscard d'Estaing could proclaim: 'The Summit is dead: long live the European Council.'

15. A second factor was election of the European Parliament by universal suffrage. This institutional innovation, decided upon in 1974, had been suggested by the Committee as far back as 1960. The fact that the political parties were regrouping, were becoming players on the international and European stage, also modified Monnet's assessment of the Committee's role. A new structure which would exert a Europeanist pressure and lobby for a Europeanist policy was in the making. Monnet must therefore have considered that a page had turned and that the Committee no longer matched the new power patterns of the late 1970s.

16. Let me conclude with a few remarks that I would take the liberty of addressing to those who are keen to continue Monnet's work with a committee.

The first point is that you must always involve the political parties because they embody democracy and follow the logic of the electoral see-saw. You must influence not only the parties in power but also those in opposition; they may form a government one day and you must inspire them with the European idea even though they are not yet in charge of the nation's affairs.

The second point is that you must always involve the trade unions, but it seems to me no less essential to involve the world of industry and commerce too, for it will be largely responsible for the success of 1992.

The third point is that you can now no longer do without the media and public opinion. Monnet chose to act through politicians; he never sought publicity, did not care for speaking in public, only rarely appeared on television. Would that be possible today I wonder? It is difficult to say but I do know that the power game has been changed by the eruption of the media into political life.

Fourthly, if I were asked to list themes benefiting the Committee's spirit and lineage, I would suggest four:

— One, the Committee would obviously be concerned with 1992. It would keep a watchful eye, maintain constant pressure to ensure that deadlines are met, that there are no 'special cases', no exceptions, that no one challenges the undertakings given in the Single European Act.

— Two, monetary union. This had been one of the Committee's themes from as early as 1959 and is becoming increasingly important.

— Three, European defence: the Committee born of the failure of the European Defence Community can rise again with the re-emergence of the idea of a European defence policy. For European defence also means redefining Europe's relations

with the West, finally implementing the grand design for partnership with the United States. There is a lot of talk, but we don't yet know how to erect a European pillar. We need to find a structure and at the same time create the conditions of a new dialogue with the East. What is happening in Moscow and elsewhere presents a challenge to us, and to meet it we must have a clear idea of how we see Community Europe and its defence. For Mikhail Gorbachev's 'common European house' is not ours. Let us build our own house first, then we will see whether we can live together with Mikhail Gorbachev.

— Four, the conditions for further enlargement. Monnet was always very concerned about enlargements. He devoted a substantial part of his time to the terms of British, Danish and Irish membership. How would he view potential or actual applications from the EFTA countries, from Turkey, from countries which are perhaps 'the orphans of Europe', countries that have no wish to be the orphans of 1992 and are now involved in what we are doing. How can we ensure that further enlargement does not lead to a dilution of Europe. How do we preserve what we have achieved?

Last but not least, if the Committee wants to be faithful to what Monnet achieved, if it wants to illustrate or simply understand his secret, it must be loyal to his principles. He himself never stopped saying: 'There's no mystery in what I've done. There's a lot of toil and a lot of trouble'.

I like that very much. It implies an enormous personal commitment, instant accessibility and the ability to create trust, to generate trust, to make it common property.

4. MR DAVID F. WILLIAMSON
Secretary-General of the Commission
of the European Communities

I would like to thank Pascal Fontaine for his contribution. I found it extremely useful, as it provides us with topics for our discussion. Let me stress the importance of giving some thought to the present and the future, as Pascal Fontaine did at the end of his report. I believe that the Action Committee for a United States of Europe was both a pressure group and a network of influence, led by a man capable of mobilizing the political parties. The commitment of Europe's leaders was absolutely vital.

A first topic which springs to mind is how Monnet succeeded in winning over the political parties, the trade unions and industry. Are we capable of doing the same today?

A second topic might be the fact that Monnet's Action Committee was born of failure, of a search for a basis for revival. Do the options in the Single Act provide us with the right basis for revival? Were there any alternatives?

A third topic could be the practical attainment of Europe's objectives. Monnet's Action Committee, as Pascal Fontaine quite

rightly said, was not a think-tank. Have we now found the most effective means of achieving our goals? I will therefore declare the discussion open and invite the various speakers to comment on these points.

5. MR MAX KOHNSTAMM
Secretary-General of the Action Committee for Europe

It is a great honour and a great pleasure for me to take part in this round table. Having had the good fortune to share for almost 40 years in the exalting adventure of European integration, I have now asked—as you may know—to be released from my post as Secretary-General of the Action Committee for Europe after the meeting in The Hague on 17 and 18 November.

The role of the Action Committee is to propose and support action which it considers essential for progress towards European Union and which has the support of its members, drawn as they are from all parts of the political spectrum, from the ranks of workers and employers. It is the task of the Secretary-General to help the Committee carry out that mission.

Today I wish to talk to you briefly about what I believe to be the main problem the Community will have to tackle after 1992.

But let me begin with a preliminary remark. In all logic, what the Community has undertaken to do between now and 1992 is

impossible. The creation of a single market raises issues that go to the very heart of politics. There is no Community country in which decisions on social matters, industry, technology, transport and the environment are not preceded by debate and often fierce political battles. At the end of which, the decisions are taken by a government with the backing of a parliamentary majority of its own political hue. This is not to say that the political parties are never in agreement, but this tends to be exceptional and even then rarely extends to points of detail.

But even with the Single Act, the Community's decision-making process still imposes unanimity or, in other words, consensus in many areas.

In these circumstances, it is logically impossible for our governments and the institutions in their present form to attain the 1992 objective that they themselves have set the Community. Happily, I have not forgotten what I heard Jean Monnet tell somebody who was speaking of the French love of logic: 'Logic', he said, 'makes no sense'.

I am convinced that, logic or no logic, the Community will succeed in taking the decisions which are essential for the creation of the single market. It will succeed because the process which the Community has started, or, if you like, the machinery it has set in motion, is so powerful that any difficulties will be overcome.

The Action Committee is obliged by its nature and its composition to seek consensus. Which is why I am not quite sure that the Action Committee can help to produce solutions to certain thorny problems (taxation, for instance). True, it has to press for decisions to be taken on taxation, and in other areas, such as the environment and the social dimension. But it will probably have to confine itself to defining basic principles to guide Community action.

The Action Committee will also take account of the fact that, fortunately, the Single Act has added substantially to the status of

the European Parliament, an institution which is not obliged to produce a consensus, and whose decisions are frequently taken by a majority.

In my opinion the Action Committee can in future be of most service in those areas where it will still be for the national parliaments to take decisions on the next stages of the integration process.

One example here is the monetary field, for which the Single Act stipulates that 'in so far as further development in the field of economic and monetary policy necessitates institutional changes, the provisions of Article 236 shall be applicable'. The same is clearly true of external policy and the entirely new policy on security and defence.

Allow me today to consider only what I personally believe will be the biggest problem facing the Community after 1992: the institutional problem. The solution found will determine the Community's future character! The institutional problem has, as I see it, three interrelated aspects: one, the need to strengthen the institutions so that they will be able to administer the economic and monetary union effectively and democratically; two, the question of the Community's possible enlargement, with the many countries that will be asking to join us; and three—in the longer term—ways and means of overcoming the division of Europe. I am well aware that the European Parliament will have something to say on these issues; but the final decisions will still require the approval of national parliaments.

It is obvious to me that in their present form and with their present methods the institutions will not be able to administer the economic and monetary union, especially if the enlarged Community has 15, 18 or, who knows, even more member countries.

And it would, I feel, be betraying the Community's European

mission simply to say no to the democratic countries of Europe asking to join.

But it would be no less a betrayal of that mission to agree to let the Community slide gradually into a mere free trade area and thus abandon the objective set at the very outset: to make the Community a true European union encompassing not only the economy but foreign, defence and security policy as well.

The Action Committee has frequently stated that there can be no economic and social solidarity in the long term unless this solidarity also extends to matters of security through a common defence policy. Was the Action Committee mistaken? I think not. But there is a contradiction between that statement and opening up the European Community to all the democratic countries of Europe which ask to join, even if they will not or cannot accept the pooling in one form or another of external policy and the efforts of our countries in the area of defence and security.

And what if, perhaps 10 years from now, European countries that are, shall we say, on the way to democracy, want to come closer to the Community in some way that will have to be agreed on? Mikhail Gorbachev has come up with the idea of the common European house as the solution to the division of Europe, that grievous legacy of the last war.

I don't see how we can say no to this idea. Yalta and its aftermath were perhaps inevitable, but our countries and our Community can never accept that the ensuing division will be there for all time.

The Community is the first step towards organizing Europe in a way which, for the first time in the history of our continent, does not rest on hegemony or domination. That is what has given us the right to call it the *European* Community. But because of this name we must, at the same time, produce our architect's design for the common European house.

It is inevitable, I fear, that after 1992 the Community will again be confronted with the institutional problem when ways have to be sought to manage, democratically and effectively, the economic and monetary union which will be the certain consequence of the frontier-free market. We must therefore strengthen our institutions, building on the solid foundations we already have.

However, this stronger institutional set-up must at the same time be flexible enough to accommodate if not actual enlargements of the Community, then at least cooperation arrangements which make it possible to resolve the contradiction I have just mentioned, and thus put the Community in a position to advance towards a true European Union.

But there is something harder and trickier still! Europe cannot provide a common house for all our democratic countries unless its doors are wide open to the West as well as to the East. Its design will be such that the Community will have to adapt its response to circumstances, as and when they change.

That reminds me of a question that Jean Monnet put to me one day 35 years ago when he was President of the High Authority. He had asked me to report on what had happened in the European Coal and Steel Community during his absence in the summer. As we strolled through the Luxembourg countryside I was telling him about workers' housing, scrap, and so on. After a little while, he stopped and interrupted me, saying: 'Yes, that's very important, but what's our attitude towards Washington, and what's our attitude towards Moscow?'

Needless to say no one today has a cut-and-dried answer to that one!

And that is why I am convinced that in the coming years we shall have to consider and discuss in depth the three aspects that together make up the institutional problem. They are: the need to strengthen our institutions so that the Community can manage

the economic and monetary union and can advance towards European Union; a solution—membership or some other formula—for those countries which wish in one way or another to be closer to the Community; and finally, *our* own design for the common European house. It will not be easy to find a consensus in the Community on an institutional arrangement that will cover all three. I hope that the Action Committee will be able to contribute to the discussion and help to ensure that it is without ill will and without favour.

The Community is an economic and political necessity and its progress towards European Union will not now be halted. True, its path will be strewn with obstacles which from time to time will appear to paralyse it. We will often be unable to see the wood for the trees. That is why it is worth bearing in mind what has been the quintessence of the Community since its inception. It was and still is the bearer of hope!

Let me finish with a quotation from a French scientist, François Jacob. It is altogether in the spirit of Jean Monnet. It sums up my experience of sharing in the adventure that we know as the European Community. I quote: 'it is true that science endeavours to describe nature and to distinguish dream from reality. But we must not forget that man probably needs dream as much as reality. It is hope that gives sense to life, and hope is based on the prospect of one day being able to change this world into something that is possible and better'.

6. MR DAVID F. WILLIAMSON

Secretary-General of the Commission
of the European Communities

Our thanks to Max Kohnstamm for defining the Action Committee's present and future tasks, notably as regards institutional reform and the idea of a common European house. He has, I think, provided us with some extremely interesting topics for further discussion.

7. MR JACQUES CHABAN-DELMAS
Former Prime Minister of France and member of the Action Committee for Europe

1. This symposium is an exciting occasion for me. The word is not too strong, because we are here to build the future and it is the future that counts. But an understanding of the past is essential if we are to take the right road, if we are not to repeat the old mistakes.

Pascal Fontaine's introductory address took us all back in time. I myself have been deeply involved in action for Europe since 1949. In 1954, for example, as a convinced but far from mystical European, I found myself on the side of those who torpedoed the European Defence Community. I would like to say that there was a compelling reason on the French side at the time. It has never been mentioned but I can reveal it today and you will all understand. We had established that the Americans were going to allow the Russians to have not only the atomic bomb but also the vectors to carry it over American territory. That meant that, sooner or later, the American atomic umbrella would have a hole in it.

When this came to light in 1952 we decided, with a handful of politicians, scientists and military men, to give France a nuclear

deterrent. And we did it in complete secrecy. We diverted hundreds of millions of old francs (luckily Jacques Delors is here, as he was at the Matignon, to see that the sums are right) without anybody noticing. The money came from the budget of the Ministry of Defence and appropriations for the Atomic Energy Commissariat. Paul Delouvrier over there knows all about it. In mounting this very difficult, very costly operation, with the Americans not only giving us no assistance but actually trying to put us off, it was clear that if the European Defence Community were to come into being the whole project was finished.

A few of us believed that for France and for Europe a nuclear capability was crucial to the future. No one challenges this today and there is no doubt that the British and French nuclear forces (and remember that the French forces are free from any outside interference) are essential, as are conventional weapons, in providing a European defence system. All of this emerges clearly from the records of the Action Committee for Europe. That is why convinced Europeans were forced in the end to oppose a Treaty on which Europe's hopes were pinned in those days.

2. Later I was to discover that Charles de Gaulle too was European through and through, but clearly, as was said just now, with methods that differed from those of Jean Monnet. You will remember how his return to power in 1958 caused panic in European circles, you will remember everyone saying that Europe had had it, that the Treaty of Rome would fall apart. I knew better, but I still had to make sure.

Two days after his investiture, before he left for Algeria, de Gaulle called me in to discuss my personal position. I seized the opportunity to tell him what people were saying. And he replied: 'There is no question of France blocking application of the Treaty of Rome. What is more, we are going to regularize our situation'. France had asked for derogations on 1 January 1959 because she was experiencing difficulties. 'We are not going to seek any

derogations', said de Gaulle, 'we are going to accept the common market in full'. He authorized me to announce this publicly a few days later in Liège at a Congress of the Council of European Municipalities, an organization I helped to found in 1951. I scored the greatest rostrum success of my career, when I told 2 000 convinced Europeans that the common market had nothing to fear, France was going to play by the rules.

3. We did have the *Volapük* affair in 1962, but that was really a French domestic crisis. Then in 1962 and 1967 we had the vetoes on British membership. This was because de Gaulle had established that our British friends wanted to come in, but were not prepared to accept Community rules. This represented a serious threat, especially for the common market. On this de Gaulle agreed completely with Monnet: the United Kingdom would have to comply with Community rules.

In 1969 came de Gaulle's attempt to treat with the British. Some of you will recall the incident with Christopher Soames, who in fact was unfairly attacked. In two gruelling conversations with de Gaulle I had to take up the cudgels in defence of Soames who had given the impression of talking out of turn and wrecking de Gaulle's bid to reopen the dialogue with the United Kingdom. Essentially de Gaulle was all for Europe, though he had a different approach.

4. In the second half of 1958, Monnet came to see me. We knew each other well, and he knew that I too had a pragmatic mind. I am a man of action, but I do take time for reflection before deciding. Having Jacques Delors around facilitates reflection. But with Monnet we were in a situation that called for some serious thinking.

In one hour with Monnet one could review the world situation several times over. He said to me: 'De Gaulle is back, the British

will join before long. There's no point in being stubborn. We can find ways and means later but this is not the moment. We can't leave it like that, glaring defiantly at each other. Do something and get us talking again'.

So I did something, not on my own of course. Paul Delouvrier took a hand too. The end result was de Gaulle's press conference, Monnet's letter on European confederation, and reconciliation between Monnet and de Gaulle. Since then, the British have come in, as have others. And we still have our dual system—the Community and its structures on the one hand and the advance towards economic and monetary union on the other—and at the risk of embarassing him I must say that in this area Jacques Delors' role at the head of the Commission has been decisive. With the Single Act and all that flows from it, we are well and truly on the road to economic and monetary union. But we are still at the cooperation stage when it comes to security, defence and foreign affairs. Max Kohnstamm was quite right when he said that one of the problems in the years ahead will be to enhance the European institutions and then to change them, perhaps first in degree, then later in kind.

5. Today, tomorrow and what about the day after? First let me say that, while Max Kohnstamm has revealed a gift for oratory, we owe the new Committee to Karl Carstens, to whom I would like to express my gratitude. There are some things you cannot say man to man; you can only say them in public. I congratulate him for having had the brilliant idea of relaunching the Action Committee for Europe. Between 1980 and 1984 Europe was wilting, so to speak. It was absolutely essential to revive it and the crucial moment was at hand.

I also thank him for his human touch. To my mind, the human touch counts for more than all the dossiers, the statistics, the things that can be quantified and measured, for it is people that matter. The prime purpose of any political action must be to defend the individual and promote his personal development.

That is what life is about: it means serving others, beginning with those in greatest need; it means respecting the dignity of the individual; it means having the human touch. And I have to say that Karl Carstens is outstanding in that respect. So let me thank him, let us all thank him. Whatever happens there is no question of our doing without his wisdom, his advice, his suggestions, and I have every reason to believe we will go along with them. As for Max Kohnstamm, all I can say is that if he resigns as Secretary-General that is his decision, but he will not be replaced. We will arrange matters in such a way that he too will remain in the centre of things. Look, he is not even protesting!

As for the future—apart from the task of increasing our membership—the Committee, as Max Kohnstamm so rightly said, does have a role to play. He even outlined it for us. We have to predicate our action on guidelines. I have just spoken of institutional problems, economic union, security and defence. But there is another vital area to which I made an oblique reference when I spoke about people: the social area. How can we expect to succeed in making Europe a stable and durable entity, unless our prime, our constant concern is the fate of the millions of men and women who are in difficulty.

I would like to float an idea, an idea for preventive action. We are four years from completion of the single market. In that time more and more fears and anxieties will arise. Because there will be many casualties. When you embark on a project like the single market—based in the last analysis on competition, competitiveness, successive challenges—there are bound to be winners and losers. That's how it is in soccer, rugby and tennis. Employees, trade unions, the professions and many others will become anxious, and we will see the emergence of resistance. Why don't we, each of us in our own country, act to dispel those fears, allay that anxiety. Why don't we take preventive action, urge our governments, here and now, to think about the potential casualties, to do something to cushion the effect when the time comes, and to publicize the fact, now and in the years ahead, that

preventive action is planned. This is grist to the Committee's mill—an area in which action is needed.

Then there is the cultural factor. Last night, during the ceremony at the Panthéon, François Mitterand recalled that at the end of his life Monnet had said 'If I had to do it all over again, I would begin with cultural Europe'.

It is true that culture is life. We cannot ignore cultural Europe, with the prodigious eruption of the media, which can influence not only governments, political parties, politicians, trade unions, industrialists, but public opinion too. And we must always be guided by public opinion if we claim to be democrats, as of course we all do.

Then there is the environment, which Jacques Delors mentioned twice. I myself attach the greatest importance to the environment, since in my time I set up—and it is still there—a Ministry for the Environment and Quality of Life. There are any number of areas in which the Committee can initiate or extend its action. I am very happy indeed to be able to contribute a brick or two. For what we are building is Europe, the Europe of our dreams and desires.

8. MR DAVID F. WILLIAMSON

Secretary-General of the Commission of the European Communities

Thank you very much. You went beyond institutional reform and the idea of a common European house by stressing the human dimension, an extremely important point I feel.

9. MR KARL CARSTENS
Former President of the Federal Republic of Germany

1. First I would like to thank my friend, Jacques Chaban-Delmas most sincerely for his very kind remarks. I am immensely grateful, though I feel they are not deserved. In contrast, I would agree completely with what he said about Max Kohnstamm, who was indeed the moving spirit behind our efforts from the very beginning and has been again in the last few years since we revived the Committee.

2. Jacques Chaban-Delmas' comments have prompted me too to talk a little about the past and say a few words about Konrad Adenauer. Twice during his lifetime, Adenauer was able to make a decisive contribution towards the founding and strengthening of the European Communities. The first was in May 1950, as we saw in the film, with Robert Schuman's declaration on the founding of the European Coal and Steel Community as a step towards European integration, and at the same time as a contribution to Franco-German understanding, cooperation and friendship. Adenauer was involved in this process from the very outset. The second highpoint, in my view, was the conclusion of the Elysée

Treaty with France in 1963, which put Franco-German relations on a new footing, with the declared aim, moreover, of promoting and consolidating the process of European Union.

3. But of course we are here to talk about the future, so I will try to do just that in a rapid survey of the most important issues. As far as the single market is concerned, we all feel now that it can be achieved by the end of 1992. I say 'can', because there are still many obstacles to be overcome, but it is my belief that a considerable breakthrough has been made in recent months. I can only add that all of us who are associated with the European venture should lend every possible support to the Commission, and in particular its President, Jacques Delors, to ensure that the single market does come into being in 1992.

4. The issue of European monetary union is related to this. Unless I am mistaken, this has been under discussion for at least the last 35 years, and the question is always: which comes first, the chicken or the egg? Should monetary union be established first, and then common economic, financial and fiscal policies forged on that basis, or should we coordinate these policies first and then introduce monetary union as the icing on the cake? The debate is pointless. We must be pragmatic, and I believe that this is perfectly possible. As a German, I would ask the permission of the non-Germans present to say a few words about Germany's experience with inflation. That is really the most frightful experience which any country has ever known. Although it is 65 years ago, it is still indelibly imprinted in our memories. For several months, the value of the mark dropped by 100% every day, with the result that the final ratio of the new mark to the old was several billion to one. Most people in Germany had never even heard the word 'billion' before, and were confronted with it for the first time in the context of the currency reform. I am telling you this to try and explain why we in Germany are such fervent advocates of monetary stability. This is of course also related to the question of an independent European central bank.

5. The coordination of security and defence policies has been mentioned by a number of speakers. I believe that we in Europe should coordinate our own ideas on security and defence to a greater extent than hitherto. It may well be that the WEU is the most suitable forum in which to do this, although I am bound to say that this is, I think, the fourth attempt during my lifetime to develop the WEU into a new and powerful institution. The previous attempts were not particularly successful. However, this is a side issue, the main issue being how we see this coordination of European security and defence policy in relation to the United States. This, I think, is the question on which future developments will ultimately hinge, but I have yet to hear clear statements on the matter. The concept of the two pillars evoked by Kennedy and Monnet is undoubtedly a good one, but more needs perhaps to be said about what it means in practice.

6. That brings me to the coordination of foreign policy. This is an area where, in my view, extraordinary progress has been made. Regular consultations are now held between the 12 Foreign Ministers. The ambassadors of the Twelve in non-member countries meet once a month. The Community has succeeded in adopting a common position on important issues in the United Nations, at the CSCE and on disarmament issues. I think we have reason to be satisfied with the progress made. The outstanding achievement, in my opinion, is the fact that, after 30 years of opposition to the Community, the Soviet Union and the member countries of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance recognized the Community a few months ago and declared their willingness to conclude an agreement with it. When we started out, 30 years ago, this was beyond our wildest dreams.

7. We must take the most of the opportunities which events in the Soviet Union might—and will, we hope—bring for all Europeans. However, a note of caution should perhaps be sounded.

Perestroika has not yet achieved its goal, and we can all see the problems still facing Mikhail Gorbachev. They are caused not least by the shortages which continue to beset the Soviet people. But I would reiterate that we should take advantage of the opportunities presented by events in the Soviet Union, and in other countries such as Hungary and Poland.

8. In this context I would like to say a word about Germany. On 28 February 1957, during the negotiations leading to the founding of the common market, the German negotiator at the time, Ambassador Ophüls, made the following statement: 'The Federal Government assumes that it will be possible, in the event of the reunification of Germany, to review the EEC and Euratom Treaties'. The Five accepted this declaration without raising any objections. It is still a part of the Treaties, and the problem of German reunification is still unsolved. Moreover, to be realistic, there is no solution in prospect of the kind we envisaged 30 years ago. But, as I am among friends, I would like to say one thing: it would be wrong to think that Germans will eventually reconcile themselves to the division of their country, to the wall in Berlin or to the frontier fences along the Elbe. This border is contrary to nature and contrary to history, and Germans will constantly seek ways and means to remove it.

As I see it, and I make this clear at every opportunity in Germany, any steps towards removing the border between the two Germanies should be taken in close cooperation with our European partners. I do not believe that a choice must be made between overcoming the division of Germany and German membership of the Community. On the contrary, I regard the Federal Republic's continued membership of the Community as the only real chance of gradually resolving the problems caused by the division of Germany. I would like to stress in this context that Germany as a whole derives benefit from the EEC Treaty, which created a free trade area between the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic.

9. Before concluding, I would like to mention two more points. The question of enlargement is important, and it would be bad policy to slam the door in the face of European countries wishing to join the Community. I feel, however, that we must make it clear to them that, because we are currently engaged in the process of creating the single market, we cannot at the same time conduct negotiations on the accession of new Member States.

10. And, finally, a word on the institutions. In 1984 the European Parliament adopted a resolution on a constitution for the European Union. This, I might say, represents a grand vision, but one which, in the form in which it was adopted by Parliament, is unlikely to be accepted by the 12 national Parliaments, each of which will propose amendments. Parliament's design is still valid as a target to aim at. The Single European Act was adopted in 1986, marking a major step forward on many fronts, including the institutional front, since majority voting has now been extended to a number of areas. But the progress made—and here I am in full agreement with Max Kohnstamm—is not yet sufficient.

The point which I would like to raise as regards institutional matters is the involvement of the European Parliament in the Community's legislative process. By this I mean the regulations, directives, etc. which are currently adopted by the Council, and in which Parliament, in my view, is not sufficiently involved. In each of our 12 democracies it is the people's representatives, the Parliaments, which adopt laws. The present situation, in my view, undermines the democracy of the Community, and I can see no cogent reason why Parliament's approval should not, or cannot, be required for legislative instruments to take effect.

11. Finally, I would like to endorse what was said by my friend Jacques Chaban-Delmas. European culture and the strengthening of cultural ties between our countries are, I believe, of decisive

importance for the future of the Community. We should ensure that every boy and girl learns two Community languages in addition to his or her own, to remove the barriers which continue to hamper closer understanding between our peoples.

10. MR DAVID F. WILLIAMSON
Secretary-General of the Commission of the European Communities

Thank you for drawing our attention to such central issues as progress towards European monetary union, security and defence policy, relations with the Eastern bloc, the accession of other European countries and the balance to be struck between enlargement and strengthening the existing Community, and Parliament's role in the decision-making process. These questions are, in my view, vital to our future.

11. MR FRANCO-MARIA MALFATTI
Former President of the Commission of the European Communities

We are here today to pay tribute to Jean Monnet. I would therefore like to say a few words about the Action Committee for the United States of Europe, which he founded and inspired. It seems to me that the problems facing European integration today, at Community and international level, are such that it is essential for us to mobilize the political parties in our national Parliaments and, through them, both sides of industry and the public at large.

The Action Committee for the United States of Europe was set up for this very purpose. Now that it is getting back to work again we must take advantage of every opportunity to raise public awareness and make Europe's voice heard on the major issues confronting us. We can achieve our goal if, as both François Duchêne and Pascal Fontaine recalled earlier, we follow Monnet's example and adopt a practical, imaginative approach. But we must never lose sight of two fundamental principles: the transfer of sovereignty and the federalist approach.

What are the main political tasks now facing us? The first is to support the Commission. We have an important role to play in what has been termed the 'Commission party'. Attainment of the Community's major objectives—implementation of the Single Act, the 1992 deadline, both of which offer ample scope for progress towards European integration—will depend to a large extent on the support and backing given to the Commission. It is the exponent of the European viewpoint, the impetus and unifying force behind the whole European venture. This is why I tend to be somewhat cautious when it comes to issues—often perfectly legitimate—connected with institutional reform and the constant, laudable flow of new ideas. I feel that this particular aspect—the strengthening of the Commission—must always be taken into account.

I do not propose to go into details or mention the changes which could be brought about by introducing elections for, say, the President of the European Council. I would simply stress that, important though these proposals are, they must never upset the difficult but fine institutional balance which François Duchêne referred to this morning as a highly original 'dual executive'. Nor can they be allowed to jeopardize the special role that the Commission, with its right of initiative, plays as the driving force behind the Community. This being said, the Committee's primary task will be to support implementation of the Single Act with a view to meeting the 1992 deadline.

A secondary task will be to back the President of the Commission in his capacity as Chairman of the *ad hoc* Committee on economic and monetary union. I say economic *and* monetary union advisedly. I do not want to go back as far as Jacques Chaban-Delmas, who, if I am not mistaken, referred to 1959, but I do want to remain consistent with the conclusions on the 1972 Paris Summit which drew up a programme for the newly-enlarged Community, encompassing the United Kingdom, Denmark and Ireland. The target then was to achieve economic and monetary union within 10 years and to crown the European enterprise by

establishing European Union. I consider it very positive that a special section on 'Economic and Monetary Union' was included in the Single Act, although I hasten to add that I find its provisions rather meagre. I am no expert, but I believe that monetary union would provide a solution to the problems Pierre Uri raised this morning. It is in the context of monetary and economic union that the whole issue of economic and social cohesion must be examined. This is one of the major challenges facing the Community, an opportunity for us to demonstrate that European integration, far from being technocratic, is based on openness and solidarity.

I only mention the institutional aspects to suggest that the reference to Article 236 in the economic and monetary union section of the Single Act may have been inserted out of excessive caution, forcing the President of the Council to provide all manner of clarifications. But it does give us an insight into what full economic and monetary union could imply in terms of strengthening the institutions. It could provide an opportunity, at institutional level, giving further impetus to the Community.

A third task will be to tackle the problems which the international situation raises for those in positions of responsibility at national or Community level, for European integration, and for our Committee. We are living in times of great change. We are faced with many problems: overwhelming indebtedness of the third world, a cause of constant concern to which no viable solution has yet been found; the United States' trade and balance of payments deficit and the associated problems of re-establishing a balance through concerted international action; the current GATT negotiations, the Uruguay Round, which are already being marred by protectionist tendencies. Today more than ever these issues require Europe to shoulder its responsibilities and speak with a single voice. But it is the positive development of East-West relations that has highlighted the growing need for Europe, for a single European voice on problems which we used to see as a matter for others.

We could have a lengthy discussion on why the positive step was taken of including Article 30 in the Single Act, why the word 'security' was used rather than 'defence', and why it is linked to the political and economic aspects of security. I find it reassuring that Parliament in its discussion on 'security' also dealt with defence issues, subsequently adopting the paper with which we are all familiar. But such questions pale into insignificance when we consider the vast range of arms reduction talks now under way or about to begin. Following the successful outcome of the intermediate nuclear forces negotiations, thanks to the unity and resolve of the Europeans in support of their American allies, negotiations are now under way for a 50% reduction in strategic nuclear weapons and for the global elimination of chemical weapons. And I hope, as we all do, that we are on the eve of 'conventional stability' negotiations for the reduction of conventional weapons to prevent surprise attack.

These negotiations raise the question of a radical re-think of the strategy of the Atlantic Alliance. The whole issue of the reduction of conventional weapons and the monitoring and verification problem are of immediate concern to the countries of Europe.

I do not wish to dwell on this topic, but I would express the hope that all the points I have raised so far—regarded as somewhat marginal hitherto—will be brought to the fore in the near future and given our full attention. In this way we could demonstrate Europe's political will and make a significant contribution to the European enterprise.

I do not believe that European Union can be seen as an end in itself. The objective of the common defence goal must be pursued at the same time. This obviously is a highly complex matter. We must not forget, as the ill-fated European Defence Community Treaty expressly stated, that European defence can be dealt with only in the context of the Atlantic Alliance. It is no coincidence that the 'Platform' issued at the Western European Union

meeting in The Hague in 1987 stressed the importance of the presence in Europe of US conventional and nuclear forces.

A certain amount of imagination is needed to tackle the European defence issue. Perhaps there is no single solution and yet the problem will be twofold: how to push the interpretation of Article 30 of the Single Act as far as possible and how to advance the discussions begun with the relaunch of the Western European Union.

It seems to me that all these considerations point to one thing—the need to speak with a single voice on foreign policy in general. Political cooperation has achieved a great deal but much of what remains to be done can be tackled by the versatile Action Committee for the United States of Europe. It is a Committee which involves us personally but also as individuals in positions of responsibility in our political parties or parliaments, or in our trade unions and professional associations. Through these we can get the European message across and support the action taken by the Community on the Commission's initiative.

It is quite clear to me that it is for people like us, not for the man in the street, to tackle the problems and tasks that I have described—and I have spoken as a politician, in realistic rather than idealistic terms—and that in doing so we will prove our worth. And this brings me to a natural conclusion—next year's European elections and Parliament's powers. It is true that the Single Act increased Parliament's powers. But because ours is a democratic Community the question of further powers, commensurate with our deeply-held democratic convictions and the major issues which will affect Europe's future, must necessarily remain on our agenda.

12. DAVID F. WILLIAMSON

Secretary-General of the Commission of the European Communities

I would like to thank Franco-Maria Malfatti for having placed our discussion in an international context. This is an extremely important aspect. I think we have now pinpointed a number of important topics and programmes for the revitalized Action Committee. Max Kohnstamm has a busy time ahead. The major themes so far are the strengthening of the institutions, defining our view of the common European house, progress towards European monetary union, security and defence, relations with the Eastern bloc countries with all the attendant issues, the question of striking a balance between further enlargement and strengthening the existing Community, the democratic deficit and Parliament's role in tomorrow's Europe. This is, I feel, a major action programme, which will run in tandem with our efforts to make a success of all aspects of the Single Act. We have already agreed on that. These other elements must now be added. It will entail a lot of work for all of us.

Before doing my duty as a good soldier and handing over to Jacques Delors, I would like to thank everyone who contributed to today's symposium, to the participants in the round tables this

morning and this afternoon, and above all to François Duchêne and Pascal Fontaine for presenting the reports on which we based our discussions. A special word of thanks to the organizers.

While we all agree with Karl Carstens' ideas on language skills, many of us have a long way to go. I would therefore like to thank the interpreters, without whom the symposium would not have been possible.

Finally, I would thank all of you who attended the symposium which, I think, has been genuinely interesting and useful. On this note, I call on Jacques Delors.

From left to right: Jacques DELORS, Pierre URI and Mrs Marianne SARRADET-MONNET.

CLOSURE OF SYMPOSIUM BY MR JACQUES DELORS

President of the Commission
of the European Communities

The European Commission felt that it should do something in its own way to remember Jean Monnet on the centenary of his birth. Side by side with the magnificent ceremonies such as the one held yesterday,[1] and those, more modest but just as moving, which have been taking place throughout the year, I personally felt that the best way of recalling Monnet, of keeping his memory alive, was to look at two aspects of his work. I say two aspects, because we must never forget the others: Monnet's contribution during two world wars, his work at the League of Nations and the highly original step of setting up the Planning Commissariat, which until 1965-66 was an institution without parallel, deserving, in my view, of closer study by specialists in political and administrative science.

We therefore picked two topics for today's gathering: the Monnet method and the Action Committee for Europe.

[1] Jean Monnet's ashes were transferred to the Panthéon on 9 November 1988.

Why the Monnet method? Because we felt that, although Monnet himself was unique, his method could still be an inspiration to us, had indeed inspired a number of us, even though the context has changed in two essential respects.

To begin with, if Monnet were 62 today, the age at which he started to express his views on Europe, and if he were working in a Community institution, he would be faced with an enormous management task. There will certainly be men in the future who will sweep such tasks aside to bring forward new ideas but, for the time being, management of the common policies, the policies on competition, the budget, cooperation and development, is the cornerstone of the European venture. That is one difference between the 1950s and the 1980s.

The second difference, as Étienne Davignon pointed out so aptly this morning, is that if we are to persuade those who govern, we must first persuade those who have to listen to them.

These, I think, are two fairly significant changes. Even so, the method is still valid, and that is what I should like to illustrate to you this evening. Since those bright young sparks Karl Carstens, Jacques Chaban-Delmas and Max Kohnstamm have talked to us only about the future, I cannot confine myself to talking to you merely about the past. I will therefore try to mix past, present and future.

As for the second topic, the Action Committee for Europe, I think I speak for all my colleagues in the Commission when I say that we feel the need of an Action Committee capable, as in the past, of influencing politicians both in opposition and in government. We feel the need of a broad European movement, with new blood at the top, capable of feeding its ideas through to the younger generation, of doing what we are incapable of doing as an institution (perhaps I should say what *I* am incapable of doing, to avoid committing *you*), namely moving on from the Europe of necessity to the Europe of the ideals and the heart. Had I not

been reappointed to head the Commission, I think I would have made that my full-time job. I would have enlisted in the ranks of the Action Committee and taken my orders from General Chaban-Delmas. I would have gone to all the universities, all the top professional training colleges, where the knowledge is already there, not to sow the seeds of a European government but to lay the foundations of a European movement.

I think that the Action Committee would do well to ponder the questions put by Pascal Fontaine. How are you going to get today's politicians involved? How are you going to get the trade unions and the employers to talk to each other, given that ideology—and I mean ideology in the pejorative sense of the term—has once more monopolized the social dialogue, despite the efforts we have been making, despite the efforts I have been making myself? How will you use the media? And, to conclude, Pascal Fontaine gave you a number of major topics to think about.

If we are to build a bridge between the past, the present and the future, I think we must take as our starting point two simple, rather aggressive ideas, two working hypotheses. The first is that we are in a pre-crisis climate. After four years of breathing fresh life into the European venture and of sorting out the marriage contracts, we can sense another crisis looming. The question a lot of people are asking is: should we find a way of averting this crisis? Or should we meet it head on, remembering that Monnet himself used to say that it was in periods of crisis that you broke with routine and could simplify the problem and the solution at one go? There has been a lot of talk since a certain speech was delivered in Bruges. But there are many other factors, believe me, which do nothing to raise the spirits of those whose daily task it is to press for progress in opening up public procurement, aligning tax systems, introducing the European company and stepping up technological cooperation. One has the feeling that the Single Act is forcing governments to adjust their attitudes to such a degree

that they sometimes lose sight of the common interest and are tempted, like condemned men, to ask for more time.

There is another question which is just as serious: what happens after 1992? This is something we should be thinking about today. Even if we manage to head off the crisis, we must think about what is to happen after 1992. Even if we refuse to think about it, others—Austria, Turkey and Morocco—are knocking at the door. And not just for commercial or economic reasons. When you analyse what is going on in some of these countries—let me add some others, Yugoslavia, Hungary and Algeria—you say to yourself: do Europeans have any sense of the universal other than in novels or films, now fewer and fewer in number with the colonization of Europe's television channels by American products? Where they still have an outlet for expressing themselves, they wear us out with talk of their yearning for the universal. And yet the universal is right there, on their own doorstep. Unless they get to grips with this problem by 1995, by the year 2000, something will happen. If there are 100 million people in North Africa, and 80 million in Turkey, if the liberation process in the Eastern-bloc countries runs into serious difficulties, Europe will be in demand. It cannot remain in its cocoon forever.

One last fact to set you thinking: after Reykjavik, the first meeting between Mr Reagan and Mr Gorbachev, I asked, in my capacity as President of the Commission, for a special European Council to talk about East-West relations and how they might develop. The answer I got was that this was not in the Treaty. A wrong answer, I am sorry to say, because the Treaty contains ample justification for convening a European Council on these issues. And where are we 18 months later? I don't want to be pessimistic—although pessimism can be a stimulus—but there is no getting away from the fact that the Twelve have failed to produce a document setting out a common view on East-West relations or put forward a single proposal for making Europe anything other than the stake being gambled for. Obviously, if the diplomats representing our countries at the Vienna Conference on

Security and Cooperation in Europe were here today, they would say that they are working on all kinds of things. But nobody is aware of this; only a tiny circle of people are involved. What it needs is a breath of fresh air, some new ideas. What we can all see is that the Community is not represented. That then is the situation today. Do we want to talk about foreign policy? This is the factual background against which I should like to give you my answer.

First of all—and this would have been the nub of my remarks if the symposium had remained purely academic—though fervour is the midwife of the future—I would have wanted to tell you how impressed I was by the fact that Jean Monnet, during his first experience in the European sphere, working on the Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community, put his finger on the major institutional and political problems which were to dictate Europe's future, and still dictate it today. I think it is very important that we should remember this. And his way of looking at things was not hidebound by dogma. He was proposing something that was quite extraordinary at the time: coal and steel were enormously important symbols. Bear in mind the situation that Germany and France were in.

Jacques Chaban-Delmas will certainly remember the debate that went on within the French Government on reparations, the Ruhr and so forth. Since his League of Nations days, Monnet had had the idea—which he had already tried to sell to Poincaré—that nations are equal. Another way of putting it would be: 'We have to go through the door together, not one in front of the other'. He had seen all that. But he went further. From the idea of equality between nations as the basis for union, he pushed the argument further on two crucial points.

The first was that the executive must be independent of national governments. The Commission of the European Communities, which, I have to say, has fewer powers than the High Authority of the Coal and Steel Community, is in the same spirit. It is a bit

like the Planning Commissariat in its heyday, or like Monnet himself, since the power the Commission has is minimal compared to the power it can acquire through exercising its influence, putting forward proposals of quality and working soberly and seriously. But that said, we do have the independence vital to the executive. The genius, the originality of the thinking of the fathers of the Treaty of Rome—and let us not forget those who took the responsibility of bringing the Treaty into being, be it Adenauer, De Gasperi or Spaak—is that the institutional quadrangle formed by the Assembly, the Court of Justice, the Council and the Commission created a militant, active memory, with powers of initiative, which the ordinary intergovernmental organization does not have.

This explains the difference between the workings of the European Community and those of, for example, the OECD. At the risk of offending some of you, I would say this explains the difference in effectiveness between the Community framework for action on research and Eureka. There are institutions which act as the bearers of memory, which have the power of recall, which can be motivated by considerations of what is right, and which can put forward proposals. This was the inspiring battle waged by Monnet in the ECSC Treaty, along with the battle for equality.

The other crucial notion is that the institutions should work together rather than be subordinate to one another. Working together has generated progress for the future. If the other institutions had been completely subordinate to the Council, the Community would have slipped back into the intergovernmental mould. It is the dialectic between the institutions that makes the system precious. Since nobody can win by a knock-out, as you would say in a boxing match, we have to cooperate. By cooperating, we seek out that concept constantly advocated by Monnet, the common interest. We try to identify it precisely because it is not a matter of some people winning and others losing, of a powerful country vanquishing weaker ones, of a majority triumphing over a minority: it is a matter of finding out what is in

the common interest. The remarkable thing is that the increase in qualified majority voting has not stopped us identifying the common interest. On the contrary, it has helped us pinpoint it more rapidly.

There is a final lesson to be drawn from the ECSC Treaty: it is a sectoral treaty, whereas the EEC Treaty is an outline treaty. I know that there are those among you who have criticized the Single Act, but let me say that one of its great merits is that it has introduced an element of precision into what, in the EEC Treaty, had become too vague and blurred both as regards institutional matters and objectives. As the EEC Treaty was put into effect and as the Community expanded to include countries which had not been involved in the drafting, the objectives became less clear and the working of the institutions more hesitant. The good thing about the Single Act is that it has focused and expanded on the idea of the Community of law, the rules of the game and the aims to be achieved. I think that Monnet himself, in the ECSC Treaty, was well aware of this distinction between a sectoral treaty with a precise, limited objective and an outline treaty.

What was I getting at when I referred just now to cooperation between the institutions and the independence of the excecutive? Firstly, implementation of the Single Act and, secondly, the need to improve the workings of the institutions.

As regards implementation of the Single Act, it is not so much a question of the difficulties this or that State may face in putting a particular action into effect as of the vital interdependence of the objectives pursued. This is what a number of Heads of Government have failed to realize. Six interrelated objectives are enshrined in the Single Act. It is true that one—creation of a single European market—has been the template for revival. But there are six objectives:

— creation of a single European market;

— economic and social cohesion, in other words solidarity between the rich regions and the less well off or less fortunate;

— technological and scientific cooperation. I would say in passing that there are obstacles too. We devote as much money as the United States and Japan to research; we have almost as many researchers as they do; but because of the obstacles we come up against, invisible obstacles ranging from the arrogance of Research Ministers to the tightfistedness of Finance Ministers, we never get round to working together and making the most of our human resources and innovative skills;

— then comes increased monetary cooperation. Incidentally, an important step forward, more important than people think, was taken with the Basle and Nyborg agreements. Since those agreements were reached, the European Monetary System has withstood a fall in the dollar, something which it failed to do in January 1987, leading to the saddest meeting of Finance Ministers I have ever had to attend;

— next we have the social dimension. This simply reflects our concern that the model of society which each country has created within its own borders should not be ignored at European level. The local model is being disputed in Britain at present. No one is stopping the British from discussing this among themselves. But they cannot, in the name of their internal difficulties, compel others to abandon what is regarded as a vital necessity in Europe, the possibility of helping the least fortunate and the most disadvantaged through a system of collective social welfare. There can be no question of that. That is what the social dimension is all about. And it was in danger of falling by the wayside as we embarked on the road of Europe-wide competition, with the risk of social dumping clear for all to see;

— last but not least comes environmental action. We admit that this has been the slowest to take off. It is a tricky one to handle because it is difficult for 12 countries to cooperate and yet we must cooperate as 12.

Contrary to what some people believe, these six objectives are not the brainchild of the Commission, still less of 'Red' Jacques Delors. They are there in the Treaty; they are there in the Single Act. And it is the firm belief of many, particularly the Greeks, Spanish, Portuguese, Italians and Irish, that unless these six objectives are achieved at the same time there will be no single European market with all its promise and potential. That is the fact of the matter.

Implementation of the Single Act highlights the need for this *de facto* interdependence of objectives; it is not wishful thinking or someone's hobby horse or a bee in the Commission's bonnet.

Implementation of the Single Act also demonstrates the need for improvements on the institutional front. I would like to make it quite clear that the concerns I voiced in the European Parliament on the Commission's behalf related to the need for more openness in Community affairs. If the proposals considered by the Community and the decisions it takes are not part and parcel of public life and do not concern national parliaments as much as they should, we are bound to fail.

This is where the first democratic deficit lies. The topics we are discussing here today are only of interest to a select few. There has been a poll which shows that only 7% of Europeans have ever heard of Jean Monnet. My guess would be that not more than 7% of Europeans know what we are talking about in the Community today.

The conclusion is obvious. We must arouse public interest by being open and by getting people talking about European problems. This is even more important than producing a treaty

tomorrow giving new powers to the European Parliament. I am being straight with you when I say that this is the real issue. When a Head of Government or a Minister goes back home flexing his muscles like Rambo and says 'I won at the Council last night', things have come to a pretty pass, because the fact is that the Twelve, even the strongest, will win together or lose together. Politics must be given a European dimension.

The reason I went and talked to the Trades Union Congress is perhaps that I had been saying to them for a year: 'I am not asking you to support my vision of Europe. But can the British trade unions, from a position of relative weakness, afford to disregard the European dimension in what they think and do?'. The answer is no, as they eventually realized.

These, then, are the points that the Single Act throws into relief. It is from this starting point that we must think about what is to happen after 1992 and pass the baton to the Action Committee. I would like to raise two questions in this connection:

— First, if Monnet were here today, what would he think of the theory that selecting a course of action and setting an objective calls for a further action which in turn calls for another objective? Would it still apply? I have only one answer to that question. Supposing that next year, starting from the report to be tabled by the ad hoc Committee, the 12 Governments were to agree on the shape of economic and monetary union and decide to take the first step in 1 July 1990—in other words, when all restrictions on capital movements are to be lifted in eight countries. If they were to do that, I believe there would be, if you will pardon the expression, a second tiger in the tank of European integration. There would be the Single Act, but there would be economic and monetary union too. That would be a considerable step forward.

  What does economic and monetary union mean? It means that there will be an economic decision-making centre to

which the governments will have to transfer part, not of their sovereignty, but of the constraints they impose on themselves, in exchange for a policy of growth against a background of stability. This is something quite new. It means transferring constraints, not reponsibilities. Anything else would be unrealistic. It would be impossible to proclaim tomorrow that we are going to transfer 80% of the national budgets to the economic decision-making centre. Each country, though, could act as its own wisdom dictates, subject to a network of constraints. These constraints must become a common burden; by cooperating with one another, we must convert them into an extra margin for manoeuvre. The economic decision-making centre will deal with this; let's go no further than that for the moment.

There would also be a monetary decision-making centre which would run Europe's central banks; but at a higher level, there would be a central bank for the central banks. What minimal resources would such a central bank need to allow it to regulate the whole structure? Put like that, the problem seems capable of solution. If, on the other hand, we were to say that what is involved is a transfer of sovereignty designed to raze Westminster to the ground or prevent the 12 Finance Ministers dismally chewing over the idiocies of their government colleagues, that would be revolutionary.

— The second point is that the world moves a lot faster than we do, even when things are going well as they are now. This brings me back to the question I raised a moment ago: the choice between enlargement and internal development. Clearly the Commission has given some thought to this problem and has opted for concrete, practical reasons, for internal development. The fact of the matter is that we simply cannot cope with another enlargement. Europe is a little like modern couples. It gets married before getting engaged. That is what we have been doing since 1972, getting married before getting engaged, and we need a bit of time after that to get used to

each other. So what we say is: internal development first, then enlargement!

But history will not wait. What are we to do if sometime in the near future Austria asks to join? I hear talk of a Europe stretching from the Atlantic to the Urals, as we used to in the 1960s. Isn't there a risk here of watering things down? What are we going to do? Although much remains to be done to reach our 1992 deadline, we must take time out to ask ourselves what we are doing about our neighbours, be it the EFTA countries; the countries of Eastern Europe; 'the orphans', the countries which don't belong to any organization, Turkey, Yugoslavia, Cyprus and Malta; or the Maghreb. These are the questions which we must ask ourselves here and now. This is where we cruelly miss a Jean Monnet. I find even listing these problems discouraging, but he, on one of his long country walks, would already have summed them up into a single question and would have tried to find a solution to it. Obviously, as Pierre Uri said, it is the solution that has to be simple.

Our Heads of Government must stop taking this problem lightly. There is a trendy idea around of going beyond the Community of Twelve. It reminds me of Woody Allen saying: 'The answer's yes—what was the question?'. As I see it we must look at the problem from a different angle and ask ourselves:

— how can we fortify the Community so that it goes on being a channel for the common interest, ringed about by attendant rights which emancipate and protect us?

— how at the same time, can we extend a helping hand to others, so that we remain true to the traditions and the culture of Europe?

These are daunting questions because they are simple, the kind of questions Jean Monnet liked.

II

Jean MONNET'S PHILOSOPHY

EXTRACTS FROM HIS WRITINGS

JEAN MONNET'S PHILOSOPHY

Extracts from his writings [1]

To tell the truth, I have never really believed that history repeats itself, and when I have found myself facing a crisis that calls for urgent efforts to achieve unity I have had neither the time nor the need to refer back to what I have done in the past. But, at different times, similar situations have produced in me similar reactions, which are naturally expressed in similar ways: 'Unity of views and actions', 'overall plan', 'the pooling of resources'.

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For a statesman, the permanent long-term aim at any time is to be in government—and to be at its head. This endeavour is bound up with a certain way of presenting things, which often counts as much as, or even more than, the things themselves. In the end, everything revolves around the struggle for power; and the problem to be solved, which is the purpose of power, is forgotten. I have never met a great statesman who was not self-centred, and

[1] See *101 Keys to Action*, published by the Association des Amis de Jean Monnet, 75 avenue Mozart, 75016 Paris.

for very good reason: if he were otherwise, he would not have made his mark. I could not have done it—not that I am modest: simply, that one cannot concentrate on an objective and on oneself at the same time. For me, that objective has always been the same: to persuade men to work together; to show them that beyond their differences of opinion, and despite whatever frontiers divide them, they have a common interest.

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It may not always be wise to tell everything to everyone but it is essential to tell everyone the same thing. That is the only way to win trust; and without trust I have never obtained anything—indeed, I have never tried.

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How to win confidence was not something I learned from my contacts with the Chinese, but I found it very helpful in dealing with them. The secret was simple: act as you speak, so that there is never any contradiction between what you say and what you do. I believe that the same is true in dealing with any people, despite what the artful may say—and China is the last place anyone should try to be artful. Once you have inspired confidence and established good personal relations, which is essential, then everything becomes simple and there are no misunderstandings.

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Anyone's authority is precarious if he wields it only in his own name. People do not willingly follow an individual: even if they are unaware of it, the prestige they respect in him is that of the organized power of legitimate authority for which he stands. Forgetting this, many people have found themselves isolated and powerless.

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Institutions are greater than men. But only men, when they possess the strength, can change and enrich things, which the institutions then hand on to successive generations.

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'Where there is no vision, the people perish.' I have always believed in this saying of Roosevelt's.

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People only accept change when they are faced with necessity, and only recognize necessity when crisis is upon them.

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In 1950, fear was engendering paralysis, and paralysis was leading to disaster. It was vital to break the deadlock. (At the time I wrote:) 'The course of events must be altered. To do this, men's attitudes must be changed. Words are not enough. Only immediate action on an essential point can change the present static situation. This action must be radical, real, immediate, and dramatic; it must change things and make a reality of the hopes which people are on the point of giving up'.

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It is often useless to make a frontal attack on problems, since they have not arisen by themselves, but are the product of circumstances. Only by modifying the circumstances can one disperse the difficulties that they create. So, instead of wearing myself out on the hard core of resistance, I became accustomed to seeking out and trying to change whatever element in its environment was causing the block. Sometimes it was quite a minor point, and very often a matter of psychology.

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Men are essential to change but institutions are vital to see it through.

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The governments of our countries, now as in the past, are called upon to defend a certain conception of the national interest. This conception is the result of a number of influences, among which the most conservative carry the greatest weight. However far-sighted they may be, governments always find it difficult, and very often impossible, to change the existing state of affairs which it is their duty to administer. In their hearts they may wish to do so; but they have to account for their actions to Parliament, and they are held back by their officials, who want to keep everything just so. All this is very natural. If governments and civil services were always ready to change the existing order of things from one moment to the next, the result would be continual revolution and incessant disorder. I know from experience that change can only come from outside, under the pressure of necessity, although not necessarily by violent means.

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Statesmen are concerned to do good, and above all, to extricate themselves from awkward corners; but they do not always have either the taste or the time for using their imagination. They are open to creative ideas, and anyone who knows how to present such ideas has a good chance of having them accepted.

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Men who are placed in new practical circumstances, or subjected to a new set of obligations, adapt their behaviour and become different. If the new context is better, they themselves become better: that is the whole rationale of the European Community, and the process of civilization itself.

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To persuade people to talk together is the most one can do to serve the cause of peace. But for this a number of conditions must be fulfilled, all equally important. One is that the talks be conducted in a spirit of equality, and that no one should come to the table with the desire to score off somebody else. That means

abandoning the supposed privileges of sovereignty and the sharp weapon of the veto. The second condition is that everyone should talk about the same thing; the third, finally, is that everyone should seek the interest which is common to them all. This method does not come naturally to people who meet to deal with problems that have arisen precisely because of the conflicting interests of nation-States. They have to be induced to understand the method and apply it. Experience has taught me that for this purpose goodwill is not enough, and that a certain moral power has to be imposed on everyone—the power of rules laid down by common institutions which are greater than individuals and are respected by States. Those institutions are designed to promote unity—complete unity where there is likeness, and harmony where differences still exist.

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Experience has taught me that no one can claim to understand other people's problems unless he can be sure that they are using the same words in the same sense as himself. For that reason, I have always come back to the same method—getting people to sit round the table together.

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What I sought from my colleagues was fidelity rather than obedience. Whether I myself have ever obeyed anyone, I could not say: I know no other rule than that of being convinced and convincing others. No one has ever succeeded in making me do anything which I did not think desirable and useful, and in this sense I have never served a master—but I in turn have rarely obliged anyone to act against his will. No good ever comes of that: it is better to hand the task over to somebody else, or to perform it oneself.

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I am not proposing recipes: I have none to offer. People act or fail to act, naturally, according to whether they are all of a piece

or a medley of conflicting elements. I am sure to disappoint anyone who is looking for more elaborate lessons in the art of persuasion. I will only add that, when I have failed, it was less often because people were naturally narrow-minded than because their minds were deliberately closed. This was the case with many senior civil servants, handicapped by loyalty to their national system.

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'We are here to undertake a common task—not to negotiate for our own national advantage, but to seek it in the advantage of all.' The 60 delegates present were not to know that for more than 10 months they would go on hearing me repeat this same lesson, which men trained to defend and advance purely national interests find one of the hardest to learn. 'Only if we eliminate from our debates any particularist feelings shall we reach a solution. In so far as we, gathered here, can change our methods, the attitude of all Europeans will likewise gradually change.'

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Without a doubt, the selfishness of men and of nations is most often caused by inadequate understanding of the problem in hand, each tending to see only that aspect of it which affects his immediate interests. But if each interested party in these circumstances, instead of facing another party with opposing interests, is presented with the problem as a whole, there can be no doubt that all parties' points of view will be modified. Together, they will reach a solution that is fair. They will do so all the more readily if they know that the debate is taking place under the eyes of other governments or peoples who will pass judgment on what they do.

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Everything always takes longer than one expects—which is why one must never set time-limits for succeeding. Admittedly, I have often talked in terms of deadlines, and on more than one occasion I have drawn up a timetable for action because, to work toward

the same end and with the right priorities, everyone must know his objective and work at the right pace. But on many occasions, too, I have adapted my plans to changing circumstances.

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There are no limits... to the attention which must be paid to the work in hand if it is to succeed. No one should be surprised, or complain, at having failed in ventures carried on concurrently, with only partial care devoted to any one of them. I have never done well at anything to which I have given divided attention; but I admit that it is not easy to tackle only one thing, or rather only one thing at a time. Politics, in particular, does not lend itself to such an approach; so I have not lent myself to politics.

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When anyone has settled on the objective to be attained, he must act without forming hypotheses about the risks of failure. Until you have tried, you can never tell whether a task is impossible or not.

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Things have their own rhythm, and one can never spend too long on a job if by taking a little more time once can do it better.

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At the Modernization Plan and at the ECSC our team was small—too small, it might seem, to do what was expected of it. In fact, however, it was perfectly suited to its task, which was to persuade innumerable departments to bring out from their files the technical information that was essential to political action. I knew from experience that the information was always somewhere to be found, but that is was shrouded in mystery by its custodians, who used all their ingenuity to make it incomprehensible. Authority alone is never enough to dig out information. Before it can start to circulate, the practical psychological condi-

tions must be established; and the only way to do that is to ensure that those who know and those who decide —those who have all the figures and those who need only round totals—speak the same language. Persuading technical experts to divulge their secrets is so difficult that I can well understand why some men in government give it up as a bad job and act in ignorance of the real situation. This is why so many mistakes are made in perfectly good faith, but in serious situations, where mistakes can be fatal, it is inconceivable to me that action should be thwarted by misunderstandings about a few basic and decisive facts, such as what resources are needed and what may be available. This is the point at which I have often intervened, to propose to men in power a simple method which they generally accept because they are glad to be offered a way out—and to enjoy the benefit.

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Incompleteness is part of nature, and it needs great art, or great wisdom, to know when to lay down the brush, or bring to an end any form of action. We should always avoid perfectionism.

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Nothing is really completed; it takes talent to know at what point further effort will spoil the result.

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The best contribution one can make to civilization is to allow men to develop their potential within communities freely chosen and built. But to achieve this, one must concentrate on the objective and not expect anything of others, except that they may rally round when they see that one's determination is as firm as a rock. With the Coal and Steel Community, this was to be put to the test.

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The greatest danger in Europe is a diminishing of the individual, unable to enhance his daily life, his security, with the resources

that progress would bring because the conditions in which we are living, the conditions in which the countries of Europe are living, stand in the way.

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The people of Europe are no less intelligent, no less inventive, no less industrious, and they have proved it time and time again. But they are hemmed in, they are producing for compartmentalized markets. By contrast, the countries which have progressed by leaps and bounds have big spaces and vast markets.

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Unless they learn to keep pace with the times, the people of Europe will become introspective and incapable, either for their own happiness or for civilization in general, of making the contribution they have made in the past and could make once again.

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It is terrifying to look back at the catastrophes that the people of Europe have brought upon themselves over the last two centuries: simply because everyone pursued his destiny, or what he believed to be his destiny, applying his own rules.

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One of the major causes of weakness in the continental countries is not merely their division but the facility with which they prejudice the functioning of their institutions.

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It is institutions which govern relationships between men; they are the true cornerstones of civilization.

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The creation of a big internal market is essential to enable Europeans to recover their place and to play their part in the progress of the free world.

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Between individual countries, gains are confined to the results of each country's isolated effort, to the marches it steals on its neighbours, to the problems it manages to off-load on to them. In the Community, each country gains from the prosperity of the whole.

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A common market cannot be achieved overnight and measures on trade liberalization or currency convertibility are not enough. The advantages accruing from the common market cannot be fully developed until the market is seen to be permanent. No country can abandon protectionism until it is sure that the others are abandoning protectionism and discrimination too. We need common rules and we need to see to it that they are applied.

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Human nature may not change but human behaviour is dictated by institutions and economic conditions. If the advantages of a large market are to be secured and relations between nations transformed, we need common institutions.

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A united Europe could concentrate on developing its resources. This would enable it to meet the needs of its citizens and shoulder its share of the defence burden without relying on the United States.

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The unification of Europe will bring far more than security and peace. Europe is the mainspring of the progress which has

brought benefits to all of us. Today's Europeans, like previous generations of Europeans, are capable of making a contribution to the development of civilization. But if their creative genius is to blossom again, we need to unite.

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The union of Europe cannot be based on goodwill alone. Rules are needed. The tragic events we have lived through and are still witnessing may have made us wiser. But men pass away; others will take our place. We cannot bequeath them our personal experience. That will die with us. But we can leave them institutions. The life of institutions is longer than that of men: if they are well built, they can accumulate and hand on the wisdom of successive generations.

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Gradually to create among Europeans the broadest common interest, served by common democratic institutions to which the necessary sovereignty has been delegated: this is the dynamic that has never ceased to operate, removing prejudice, doing away with frontiers, enlarging to continental scale, within a few years, the process that took centuries to form our ancient nations.

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The world is facing the same risks of self-destruction by division as the nations of Europe on a smaller scale. But the modern world, like Europe in the past, can find peace and unity by overcoming these divisions. I believe that the pace of progress will gradually prompt other countries to seek unity, so that their people can enjoy the benefits of modern technology.

* * *

Peace is not just a matter of treaties and undertakings. It depends essentially on the creation of conditions, which, although they will never change human nature, give a peaceful direction to human relationships. This is one of the main consequences of that

transformation of Europe which is our Community's aim. By attaining unity, by renewing Europe's vitality, by creating a new and lasting situation, the people of Europe are making a decisive contribution to peace.

* * *

The passing seasons will lead us inevitably towards greater unity; and if we fail to organize it for ourselves, democratically, it will be thrust upon us by blind force. There is no place any more for separate action by our ancient sovereign nations.

* * *

The sovereign nations of the past can no longer solve the problems of the present... And the Community itself is only a stage on the way to the organized world of tomorrow.

ANNEX

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