Too many presidents ‘spoil the broth’? –

What role for the European Commission in global climate change politics?

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Author Contact Details,

Pamela M. Barnes,
Jean Monnet Chair ‘ad personam’ in European Political Integration,

Visiting Professor,
Centre for European Integration,
ESSCA,
Angers,
France.

Visiting Fellow,
Faculty of Health, Life and Social Sciences,
University of Lincoln,
Lincoln. LN67TS.

Email pambarnes11@hotmail.co.uk
Tel +441522543816

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Danger – work in progress
Too many presidents ‘spoil the broth’?
– what role for the European Commission in global climate change politics?

ABSTRACT

The European Union is the only supranational organisation to have both implemented ‘domestic’ climate change policy and provided leadership for the international community on adaptation and mitigation measures. Although the competence for action in climate change is shared between the national governments and the supranational level of the European Union, on behalf of the EU the European Commission has played a prominent role in international climate change negotiations. The Lisbon Treaty (in force December 2009) brought a number of changes to the institutional framework of the European Union, most significantly to the European Council and the external role of the EU. These changes appear to have added to the complexity which surrounds issues of the external representation of the EU and not simplified them – are there too many ‘Presidents’ of these institutions vying for a role? This paper questions the extent to which these changes will impact on the Commission headed by Jose Manuel Barroso, Barroso II Commission (2009-2014), particularly on Barroso’s ability to provide leadership on ‘domestic’ climate change policy and hence direction to the approach which the EU takes in global climate change politics.
Introduction

The European Union is the only supranational organisation to have both implemented ‘domestic’ climate change policy and provided leadership for the international community on adaptation and mitigation measures. The competence for action in climate change is shared between the national governments and the supranational level of the European Union. On behalf of the EU the European Commission has played a prominent role in international climate change negotiations, acting on an agreed mandate from the national governments in the negotiations. Although the approach adopted by the EU in global climate change is the responsibility of the European Council/Council of Ministers the EU’s domestic policy is the outcome of the deliberations and negotiations between the European Commission, the European Parliament and the Council of Ministers. It is this domestic policy which is then used by EU’s Member States to fulfil its commitments in global agreements. The leadership which the President of the Commission gives to the Commission in the development of climate change policy is of importance to overall position which the Member States of EU are able to achieve in international climate change politics.

Agreement amongst the EU’s Member States had been difficult to achieve prior to the opening of the UN Copenhagen Summit negotiations. A combination of more active support from Barroso for the ideas of the Environment Commissioner Stavros Dimas, a conjunction of energy concerns with the climate change agenda and Barroso’s ability to reach consensus between the Member States enabled the EU to put forward an offer to cut emissions. However it was evident that the EU was unable to influence the outcomes of the UN Copenhagen Summit in 2009. Verhofstadt, leader of the Liberal group in the European Parliament commenting that “Copenhagen may well have had a different outcome had Europe been represented by a single person, instead of eight (the Danes who organised the summit, Barroso and the Commission representation, Reinfeld, representing the incumbent Swedish EU presidency, Zapatero, representing the future Spanish presidency, Ashton, the HRCFSP, Brown, UK Prime Minister, Sarkozy, French President and Merkel, German Chancellor. (EURACTIV, 2010:9) The consequence was that the EU was unable to secure support for its proposed unconditional 20% reduction target for carbon emissions with a conditional 30% also being offered. Nevertheless within the EU the arena of climate change action was considered to be one of the more successful aspects of the Commission under the leadership of President Jose Manuel Barroso particularly between 2007-2009 (Barroso I

1 Shared competence means that the Member States have the powers to legislate and adopt legally binding acts in so far as the Union has not exercised nor decided to stop exercising its competences.
Commission 2004-2009). This paper considers the leadership on climate change which is being given by Barroso as re-elected President to the Commission (Barroso II, 2010-2014).

The Lisbon Treaty (in force December 2009) brought a number of changes to the institutional framework of the European Union, most significantly to the European Council and the external role of the EU. These changes appear to have added to the complexity which surrounds issues of the external representation of the EU and not simplified them – are there too many ‘Presidents’ of these institutions vying for a role? The paper questions the extent to which these changes will impact on the Barroso II Commission (2009-2014), particularly on Barroso’s ability to provide leadership on ‘domestic’ climate change policy and hence influence and provide political direction to the approach which the EU takes in global climate change politics.

This paper begins by analysing the leadership style given to the Commission by President Barroso during his first Presidency (2004-2009) before considering the changes to the institutions particularly to the European Council and the Council of Ministers as a result of the Lisbon Treaty. The short period of time since the Lisbon Treaty came into force is acknowledged in this paper but it is argued that the potential for undermining what had been an evolving coherence in the approach of the EU to global climate change politics is already apparent. If the EU is to regain its position as a leader of global climate change action then there a number of complex issues which must be addressed and managed in order to ensure the coherence needed to give effectiveness to the EU’s action in the global climate change debates.
Barroso and climate change policy 2004-2009

Within the European Union (EU) the climate change policy agenda both drives and is driven by the ambition of the EU to demonstrate its global leadership in those international agreements which have been negotiated under the auspices of the United Nations. Internal climate change policy and the approach adopted by the EU in global climate change politics are inextricably linked. As a leader dependent on *soft power* the ability to demonstrate that transnational action on climate change is possible is the primary weapon of the EU. Environmental policy which included climate change policy during Barroso I Commission was an area of shared competence between the supranational level of the European Community and the national governments. The Commission is responsible for the initiation of internal climate change policy and as a consequence has much potential to determine the direction of the approach which the EU will adopt and has adopted in global developments. Despite some criticisms of the Barroso I Commission’s overall performance on environmental protection the arena of climate change action was one of the more successful aspects of the period of his first Presidency (2004-2009), the climate and energy package being perhaps the Commission’s greatest uncontested success. (Kaczynski et al, 2009.)

The role of the Commission, as outlined in the founding Treaties of the 1950s, was to be that of a small-scale de-politicized functionalist bureaucracy charged with taking the integration agenda forward. Decisions about policy and measures were to be taken within the College of Commissioners. (c.f. Box 1. Powers of the Commission, after Coombs.)


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The powers of the Commission may be summarised as:-</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Agenda setting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Formal right to initiate legislation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Consensus-building between the national governments, the EP and other interested parties and stake-holders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Management of Commission programmes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Representation of the EU in external (economic) relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Provides oversight and enforcement of European law</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Representation of the general interest of the EU</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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2 The adoption of the United Nation Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) (1992), the Protocol signed in Kyoto in December 1997 and the preparations for successor to the Kyoto Protocol which was due to be adopted at the Copenhagen Summit in December 2009.
However as a consequence of changes to the Treaties, successive phases of EU enlargement and increased responsibilities as the process of integration amongst the Member States has progressed different patterns of policy and decision-making have come to characterise differing policy areas. Whilst the Commission continues as a bureaucracy it has become a more politicized bureaucracy which is required to respond to an increasing number of challenges (Peterson and Birdsall, 2008). Since the Santer Commission (1994-1999) and the adoption of the Amsterdam Treaty (in force 1999) the powers conferred on the Commission President have altered. The President of the Commission provides the political orientation for the Commission. Decision-making within the College of Commissioners is on the basis of a simple majority of its members, including the President. The principle of the Commission President as *primus inter pares* within the College of Commissioners remains but the practice has become somewhat different. The Lisbon Treaty has further distanced the President from the rest of the College of Commissioners.

At the same time, and as a consequence of the national concerns about the role of the Commission, the Commission’s power in relation to the other institutions, particularly to the European Parliament (EP), appears to have diminished. As a result Hayward (2008) concluded that the Commission had ‘retreated’ from that aspect of the institution’s role of the as path-finder for ever-closer integration and more emphasis has been placed on that of consensus mediator and manager of specific projects. This analysis seemingly undervalues the evolution of the role of the Commission overall and the Commission President in particular in the enlarged EU 27. It appears to suggest that the Commission and its President will no longer act as a promoter of integrative action, providing direction and hence leadership within the EU. But is that the case? The evidence suggests that the answer is highly nuanced and complex.

**Box 2. Factors affecting the capacity of the Commission President to exert political influence/leadership on the climate change policy agenda include**

- Powers conferred in the Treaties of the EU on the Commission and the President of the Commission.
- Acceptance of role for the Commission by the international community.
- Style of leadership of the Commission President.
- Level of cohesion which may be achieved between the Commissioners with responsibility for the relevant portfolios.
- Element of ‘capture’ of the leadership role in global climate change politics by the European Council/Council of Ministers.
- Impact of changes to the powers and role of the European Parliament.
The competences which have been conferred on the Commission and its President in the Treaties determine the overall parameters within which the institution operates. The effectiveness of the contribution made by the Commission relies on the way in which these competences are exercised, particularly the formal right of initiation of policy. If this formal right, ‘jealously guarded’ by the Commission, is not exercised then no policy proposals will be forthcoming. In turn the agreements made by the national governments in the global negotiations become a pillar of the internal policy as the Commission seeks the measures to fulfil those agreement commitments.

Barroso’s style of leadership was described variously as pragmatic or technocratic in the early period of his first Presidency, apparently consistent with Hayward’s conclusion of a retreat by the Commission from a proactive role in integration to that of managing specific projects. (Hayward 2008) Barroso appeared to favour incremental action, departing little from existing policies. He was initially criticised by environmental organisations for giving economic development priority and not promoting the objectives of climate change politics. A view which Barroso appeared to reinforce at the beginning of his first Presidency in 2005 when he commented, ‘Let me say this. It is as if I have three children – the economy, our social agenda, and the environment. Like any modern father – if one of my children is sick, I am ready to drop everything and focus on him until he is back to health. …But that does not mean I love the others any less! We must deliver jobs and growth…’ (thus seeming to ignore the environment and social agendas in favour of the economy). (Barroso 2005)

The approach to leadership adopted by any individual is of its nature difficult to identify and within the EU constrained by the competences which have been assigned in the Treaties. Hayward variously describes the leadership style of the Commission President as a more dynamic *heroic* style and a more

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3 *Heroic leadership* - ‘...sets explicit long term objectives to be pursued by maximum co-ordination of public policies and by an ambitious assertion of political will...’
incremental and *humdrum* approach. (Hayward 2008:6/7). Cini (2008) has emphasised the difficulty of determining whether the approach to leadership of the EU adopted by Commission and its President is that of political influence or leadership, concluding that the answer is nuanced. In this paper it is argued that a ‘sea change’ in Barroso’s approach came in 2007 when the issue of energy security was linked with climate change and gained increased prominence on the political agendas of the national governments. From 2007 Barroso had more opportunity to exert political influence and arguably leadership on the decision-making process. As President of the European Commission his style of leadership became more presidential (Peterson and Birdsall, 2008, Missiroli, 2009) as he was prepared to give much clearer direction to the domestic climate change policy agenda.

In his analysis of the style of leadership of the Secretary-General of the United Nations Kille identifies a number of personality characteristics associated with the different leadership styles, Amongst these he highlighted the importance of the individual’s belief *in their ability to influence decisions* (Kille, 2006:20) He linked this with activism on the part of those leaders he identified as visionaries or strategists, whilst those who have a low degree of belief in their ability to influence decisions he concluded are most likely to evidence a managerial style of leadership. (c.f Table 2).

Kille’s analysis offers a nuanced model of the leadership which identifies a midway position between a visionary heroic leader and a humdrum technocratic manager – ie a strategist. He highlights a number of characteristics which a strategist as leader would demonstrate, primarily concentrating on the belief the individual has that they are able to influence policy decisions, sensitivity to the context in which the decisions are made, desire to maintain good relationships and a strong attachment to the supranational organisation (cf. Table 3). For Barroso his belief in his opportunity to exert influence on the development of climate change policy came from a co-incidence of a number of issues. Climate change policy provided an issue arena with clearly identified objectives where the Commission President could provide that executive leadership described by Burns as indispensable and effective at accomplishing specific and limited goals (Burns 1978:396).

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4 *Humdrum leadership* – this style does not ‘...have an explicit overriding long term objective and action is incremental, departing only slightly from existing policies as circumstances require’
Table 1 Characteristics of leadership styles, after Kille.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Characteristic</th>
<th>Managerial</th>
<th>Strategic</th>
<th>Visionary</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Responsivity</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belief that can influence</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Need for recognition</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Need for relationships</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supranationalism</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Problem-solving emphasis</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source Kille (2006:20)

Table 2 Personal characteristics, after Kille

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Characteristic</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Responsivity</td>
<td>Sensitivity to context and analytical capability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belief that can influence</td>
<td>Perceive self as capable of influencing events</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Need for recognition</td>
<td>Unwilling to relinquish control and work behind the scenes without credit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Need for relationships for</td>
<td>Desire to maintain good personal relationships</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supranationalism</td>
<td>Strong attachment to and desire to defend the *European Union and the organization’s values</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Problem-solving emphasis</td>
<td>Emphasize completing tasks over interpersonal concerns</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source Kille (2006:17) * as applied to the European Union

Table 3. Style of leadership demonstrated by Presidents of the Commission, post 1989.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date of Commission</th>
<th>Commission President</th>
<th>Style of Presidency, after Hayward</th>
<th>Style of President, after Kille</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1985-1988 Delors I</td>
<td>Jacques Delors</td>
<td>Heroic/Strategic Innovator</td>
<td>Visionary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989-1992 Delors II</td>
<td>Jacques Delors</td>
<td>Heroic/Strategic Innovator</td>
<td>Visionary</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Barroso demonstrated characteristics of Kille’s strategic leader between 2007-2009. In short he demonstrated more responsiveness to contextual factors, displaying greater recognition of his ability to influence decisions. Policy changes were dependent on Barroso’s ability to build relationships amongst the national leaders but these became easier as the prominence of energy security concerns were raised within the EU and linked to the climate change agenda. Increased activism was possible because of the coincidence of the factors which encouraged Barroso’s belief in his ability to provide greater political direction to the debate about climate change policy. His approach became less managerial, but it was not that of a visionary

Barroso was not a ‘strategic innovator’, a style of leadership which Hayward considered to have characterised the Commission Presidencies of Jacques Delors. (Jacques Delors was considered by many to be the exemplar of a proactive leader of the European Commission.) Hayward’s conclusion is not unexpected as not only were the individuals, Delors and Barroso, different personalities whose views were determined by their political backgrounds and experiences, but the political environment and conditions which formed the context for the Barroso I Commission were considerably different from those in which the Delors Commissions operated. For Barroso the search was for
consensus in an enlarged EU of 27 member states. The number of national governments had increased since 2004/07 and at the same time the policy options which the Commission could propose and achieve that consensus had fallen. As Barroso commented in late 2008, following the adoption of the EU’s package of climate and energy measures, ‘...we would have preferred our initial proposals. But the suggestion that this is a watered down ambition is non-sense. We had to accept changes. That’s the price to pay for unity in the end and it’s a fair price’. (Grice 2008)

It is argued in this paper that Barroso did not show evidence of political leadership on the climate change agenda. But as a result of a co-incidence of events in 2007-2009 he demonstrated increased belief in his ability to influence the EU’s approach to be adopted internally and hence form the basis of the EU’s stance in global climate change negotiations. Barroso did not however step outside nor try to ‘push the boundaries’ of the competences of the Commission presidency, but used them more effectively to influence the decisions of the national governments, particularly in the development of energy and climate change measures in 2007 and 2008.  

Any political influence of the Commission will come from the effectiveness and acceptability of the internal policy proposals and the support from the national governments with which they are received. The competences conferred on the institution mean that role of the Commission is clearer in the development of the minutiae of agreements and policy instruments and not in terms of developing the broad strategic negotiating position of the EU that is the remit of the national governments. The national governments take the lead in global climate change politics but there is recognition both within the EU and the international community of the scientific expertise on which the Commission may rely and the input that the institution may make to the development of the range of instruments adopted by the international community.

*The legal framework for climate change action*

The Treaties of the 1950s did not contain any reference to action on climate change (it had not emerged on the political agendas of national governments at

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5 In January 2008 a package of climate change and energy measures was proposed by the Commission to meet the EU’s targets (CEC 2008). These proposals were approved in December 2009 for implementation from 2011. In addition to a non-legislative Communication (COM (2008) 30), the package of measures included:

the time). The basis for the EU’s climate change policy has developed from environmental policy, an arena of supranational action which was not included in the founding Treaties of the EU until the Single European Act of 1987. Nonetheless environmental policy is considered to be one of the more proactive areas of EU action. The first Treaty reference provided for shared competence for the **Community to contribute to the conservation and improvement of the environment of the member states.** The role for the Commission was subject to application of the principle of subsidiarity i.e. ‘...the EU takes measures only if and insofar that the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the member states and may be better achieved by the Community’...Article 5 TEC.

In external climate change negotiations the member states and the Commission, representing the EU, are signatories and parties to international agreements on the basis of **TEC article 174 ex 130r (1) subset 4** - promoting measures at international level to deal with regional or worldwide environmental problems. TEC article 174 (4), ‘Within their respective spheres of competence the Community and the Member States shall co-operate with third countries and with the competent international organisations. The arrangements for Community co-operation may be the subject of agreements between the Community and the third parties concerned, which shall be negotiated and concluded in accordance with article 300 (and) Article 300 TEC, Where this Treaty provides for the conclusion of agreements between the Community and one or more States or international organisation the Commission shall make recommendations to the Council which shall authorise the Commission to open the necessary negotiations. The Commission shall conduct these negotiations ...within the framework of such directives as the Council may issue.’

Despite these Treaty references and those introduced in the Amsterdam Treaty (1999) and the environmental activity of Commission there was no clear articulation of a legal framework for comprehensive EU action on climate change measures. The EU institutions could adopt environmental legislation on the basis of qualified majority vote apart from provisions which are primarily of a fiscal nature and measures significantly affecting choice between different energy sources and the general structure of its energy supply. As the use of fossil fuels has been identified as the primary source of the greenhouse gas emissions which contribute to climate change this formed a considerable barrier to the development of an effective and holistic climate change policy for the EU.

The Lisbon Treaty however included in Article 191 (1) ex 174 TEC subset 4 a commitment to ‘...promoting measures at international level to deal with regional or worldwide environmental problems and in **particular combating**...
climate change ...’ But Article 192 Lisbon Treaty (2) para c ex 175 TEC continues the affirmation of the national competence for measures significantly affecting Member States choice between different energy resources and the general structure of energy supply – an indicator of the strength of support to protect national interests which continues amongst the Member States. It is also a protection which may prove difficult to work with in the development of future energy policy designed to be competitive, sustainable and improve security of supply.

The competence for the Commission, as a non-state actor, to be a signatory of the UNFCCC (1992) and the Kyoto Protocol (1997) was established on the basis of Article 24(2) UNFCCC which contains the provision that regional economic integration organisations may become parties to the Convention jointly with their member states as long as those states are already parties (a ‘mixed’ agreement under EU law). The member states and the organisation are required to identify their respective responsibilities and are not entitled to exercise concurrent responsibilities. The role of the Commission as a signatory to the UNFCCC is not to assume the leadership on behalf of the EU – that remains with the Council of Ministers/ European Council, but rather to exercise its competences to provide support and complementary actions. 6

Table 4 Competence for action in selected international environmental organisations and conventions, post Lisbon Treaty.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>International Organisations/Conventions</th>
<th>Environmental Status</th>
<th>Status of European Union (EU) and Member States</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United Nations (UN) Framework Convention on Climate Change</td>
<td>Environmental Status</td>
<td>European Union and Member States as members</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kyoto Protocol</td>
<td>Environmental Status</td>
<td>European Union and Member States as members</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN Environmental Programme</td>
<td>Environmental Status</td>
<td>EU Observer Status, Some Member States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN Conference on Environment and Development</td>
<td>Environmental Status</td>
<td>EU and Member States as full participants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN Convention on Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)</td>
<td>Environmental Status</td>
<td>EU and Member States as members</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Tribunal of the Law of the Sea</td>
<td>Environmental Status</td>
<td>EU and Member States as members</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Seabed Authority</td>
<td>Environmental Status</td>
<td>EU and Member States as members</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protection of the Marine Environment of the North Atlantic</td>
<td>Environmental Status</td>
<td>EU and 12 Member States as members</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protection of the Danube River</td>
<td>Environmental Status</td>
<td>EU and 6 Member States as members</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Adapted from Emerson and Kaczynski (2010:4)

6 Other groupings of states have emerged in the debates about global climate change politics (e.g. the AOSIS - Alliance of Small Island States, JUSSCANNZ - comprising Japan, United States, Switzerland, Canada, Australia, Norway, New Zealand, CARICOM - the Caribbean Community, the Alliance of African states). These groups do not have the legal status of regional economic organisations and so are not signatories to the UNFCCC. Their membership is not stable across phases of negotiations. As a result they are not able to present the collective position of a stable transnational group with its own legal and constitutional frameworks in place to support that position.
Within the EU competences are shared between the supranational Union and the Member States for environmental policy and since the Lisbon Treaty shared competence has also been conferred on climate change policy in a new article. On shared competence “The Union shall share competence with the Member States where the Treaties confer on it a competence which does not relate to the areas (of exclusive competence and supporting competence) ...” Article 4 TFEU. Further explanation of what this means was set out in a Protocol to the Lisbon Treaty on the exercise of shared competence. On climate change policy the commitment of the EU in the chapter on the environment is to promoting measures at international level to deal with regional or worldwide environmental problems, and in particular combating climate change.

### Table 5 Role of EU institutions in climate change negotiations (internal and international) pre-Lisbon

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institution</th>
<th>Role in international climate change talks</th>
<th>Personnel involved</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Domestic Climate change policy, exported to international level</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commission</td>
<td>Initiation and monitoring domestic climate change measures.</td>
<td>Environment Commissioner, Stavros Dimas (04/09)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Facilitating consensus amongst national governments on climate change measures</td>
<td>Commission President, Jose Manuel Barroso (04/09)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Council of Ministers</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>European Parliament</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>International negotiations - preparations</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Council of Ministers</td>
<td>Mandate for international negotiations managed within the Council</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COREPER 1, Environment Council</td>
<td>Working parties prepare draft proposals</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Council</td>
<td>Complex issues referred for final decision (eg Copenhagen, 2009 negotiations)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>International negotiations – Copenhagen Summit, 2009</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU represented in 2009 Copenhagen summit by</td>
<td>‘troika’ consisting of:- incumbent rotating presidency, in-coming presidency, Spain. and the Commission.</td>
<td>Swedish Environment Minister, Spanish Environment Minister, Stavros Dimas plus 250</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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7 PROTOCOL ON THE EXERCISE OF SHARED COMPETENCE -
THE HIGH CONTRACTING PARTIES HAVE AGREED UPON the following provisions, which shall be annexed to the Treaty on European Union and to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union:

*Sole Article* With reference to Article 2 A of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union on shared competence, when the Union has taken action in a certain area, the scope of this exercise of competence only covers those elements governed by the Union act in question and therefore does not cover the whole area.
Increasing securitisation of the issue of climate change and the blurring of the competences of the EU’s institutions

The challenges posed by climate change were elevated to the plane of high politics in the 1990s primarily because of the high level representation of the US in the negotiations for the Kyoto Protocol, followed by their equally high level opposition to its ratification and implementation (van Shaik and van Hecke, 2008:11) Since the early 2000s issues of energy security and the linkage of concerns about the destabilising impact of the consequences of climate change in a number of regions, particularly in the developing world, have become important external drivers in global climate change politics. For the EU developing its external face the traditional tools and weapons of foreign policy are not available. The EU has and continues to use ‘soft power’ as the basis of its external relations.

The rhetoric of climate change debate has however begun to use the rhetoric of the debates surrounding conflict, identifying dangers potentially extending to regional and global conflict. 8 The European Security Strategy produced by Solana in 2003 acknowledged that most of the conflicts of recent decades have been within states but that “Competition for natural resources ...will be aggravated by global warming ...(and) is likely to create further turbulence and migratory movements in various regions”. (Solana 20003:5). In presenting the Climate Change and International Security paper of 2008 Javier Solana issued a stark warning that “Climate change is best viewed as a multiplier threat which exacerbates existing trends, tensions and instability” (High Representative and Commission, 2008:2). As such it is deemed to be in the interests of the EU to address the security implications of climate change with measures drawing on all the tools and weapons available to the EU at EU level, in bilateral relations and at the multilateral level.

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8 “….as the scientific evidence accumulates it is clear that the fight against climate change is much more than a battle. It is a world war that will last for many years...”
Stavros Dimas, Environment Commissioner, 2007

“…today being a credible foreign minister means being serious about climate change…” Margaret Beckett, 2007, then UK Foreign Minister
The Lisbon Treaty has arguably emphasised the distinction between what is regarded as within the remit of Common Foreign and Security Policy and the role of the Commission, European Parliament and European Council in these issues. The attention is given to external action rather than as in the past to external relations (ie trade and development) and foreign and security policy. But as the boundaries between what is traditional military strategic policy and issues such as climate change and others including financial regulation, border and migration control and international justice are blurring and have gained in prominence globally, the role of the Commission President has been broadened. The result is that the external dimension of internal climate change policy and the issue of where climate change policy should reside within the institutional structures of the EU are more complicated. The potential for turf fighting between the institutions appears to have increased and the opportunity for more radical and innovative approaches to meet the challenges that it presents decreased.
The Commission is the institution which has the responsibility to ensure that internal climate change policy is formulated on the basis of the best available scientific evidence. It is in the development of the EU’s internal actions on climate change that the Commission is most influential as it is these actions which are then exported to the international arena. Oversight of regulatory measures agreed by the member states in an international agreement, are not within the remit of the Commission. But once adopted as policy the responsibility of the Commission is to ensure that international commitments are implemented within the EU. Internal policy and measures to comply with international climate change commitments are inextricably linked. The national domestic climate change policies and the EU’s mechanisms for harmonisation of these policies exert a direct influence on the position of the EU in global climate change politics. What is implemented to meet external commitments is not separate from internal climate change policy, but becomes a pillar of that policy.

Post the Lisbon Treaty those areas of shared competence which have traditionally been exercised by the Commission will continue. But this is a somewhat vague notion with regard to the ‘traditional’ input of the institutions. The institutional frameworks which have been put into place as a result of the Lisbon Treaty are directed to the external face of the EU particularly the development of mechanisms for foreign and security policy which remain the subject of exclusive competence and intergovernmental action. It is argued in this paper that instead of simplifying the notion of an external face for the EU the Treaty has made the situation more complex and increased the difficulties for Barroso as President of the Commission to influence the direction of climate change policy. What the Lisbon Treaty changes have done is to emphasise the importance of collaboration between the institutions of the EU and the individuals who are in post as Presidents of those institutions. (cf Figures 1 and 2).
Figure 1 The Institutional Triangle – Pre-Lisbon

The institutional triangle
Pre – Lisbon Treaty

The Council of Ministers
Rotating presidency, held by a national government for six months

European Council, President, HoG/S holding rotating Presidency

European Commission
President in post for 5 year renewable terms

European Parliament
President chosen by MEPs, in post for 2 1/2 years
Arguably by conferring legal status as an institution of the European Union on the European Council (the Heads of State and Government of the Member States of the EU) prominence has been given to the national leaders in the EU’s decision-making process at the expense of the power of the Council of Ministers. A new post of President of the European Council (PotEC) (Article 15 (5) TEU) was created by the Lisbon Treaty in addition to an enhanced post for the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HRFSP). The first incumbent of the post of PotEC appointed in 2010 was the former Belgian Prime Minister Herman von Rompuy, a controversial appointment, as was that of Baroness Catherine Ashton to the post of HRFSP. The legislative power and role of the Council of Ministers was also been subject to change as the powers of the European Parliament have been reinforced through the increase of the areas to which the co-decision procedures apply.
The creation of the post of PotEC was contested but the pre-existing procedures which had been adopted by the national leaders for the European Council were subject to significant pressures following the 2004/07 enlargement. Practices had evolved over time for the president of the country holding the rotating presidency. Amongst the most time consuming was the practice of contacting and possible visits from the HoG/HoS of the incumbent presidency to the national capitals prior to major European Council summits to achieve prior agreement. In an EU of 27 states this had become particularly difficult for national leaders of the larger states or for all states during presidencies which occurred at the same time as national elections were held. To have an individual as a permanent PotEC was seen as a way of achieving efficiency and to expedite the consensus building process amongst the national governments.

Equally the role of mediator and conciliator amongst the national interests did not always sit comfortably with that of a national leader when national interests proved to be controversial at the time of the rotating presidency. For example for the UK holding the rotating presidency, and therefore the UK prime minister acting as the president of the European Council, when budgetary or agricultural matters were on the EU’s political agenda.

The individual appointed to the PotEC post is responsible for:-

- Preparing the meetings of the European Council
- Conducting the debates of the European Council
- Drawing conclusions following meetings
- Following up on these conclusions
- Representing the EU in external relations at his/her level

Specifically the President of the European Council “... shall ensure the preparation and continuity of the work of the European Council in co-operation with the President of the Commission and on the basis of the work of the General Affairs Council (Article 15 TEU (6b). The General Affairs Council ...shall prepare and ensure the follow-up to meetings of the European Council in liaison with the President of the European Council and the Commission “ (Article 16 (6) TEU).

The European Council does not exercise a legislative function but continues to provide the general political directions and priorities for the Union (a minor amendment of the Treaty of Nice where the work of the European Council is described as providing the necessary impetus for the development of the Union, ____________________________

9 Both matters are frequently the subject of much controversy in the somewhat Euro-sceptic UK
defining the general political guidelines for action). The decisions of the European Council are made on the basis of consensus and this practice was not altered by the Lisbon Treaty. But as an institution of the EU the European Council has become bound by all the Treaty references to the institutions including the requirements to:

- Respect subsidiarity and proportionality (Article 5 TEU).
- Give equal attention to all citizens (Article 9 TEU)
- Give citizens and their representative associations the opportunity to exchange their views on union action (Article 11 TEU)
- Keep national parliaments informed (Article 12 TEU)
- Practise mutual sincere co-operation (Article 13 TEU)
- Conduct its work as openly as possible (Article 15 TFEU)
- Respect the rules regarding the processing of personal data (Article 16 TFEU).

The European Council, as a formally recognised institution of the EU, is now subject to the supervision of the Court of Justice of the European Union.

At the same time as the posts of PotEC and HRCFSP were established and enhanced the system of rotation of the presidency of the Council of Ministers by a national government for six monthly periods was maintained. The Heads of State and Government of the Member States continue to exercise a presidency role and seek to use the six monthly presidency to gain increased influence on the EU’s decision making process and the presidency to enhance their profile domestically (the response of the Hungarian government during the presidency, January-June 2011, to the reaction of the rest of the EU to the introduction of their national media law). Arguably by distancing the role of the rotating presidency from the high level position on behalf of the EU the result has been to increase the opportunity for the rotating presidency to act as ‘broker’ of deals on legislation, thus undermining the role of the Commission.

Hannay highlighted the damage done by ‘turf fighting’ in the EU criticising the manner in which the EU has turned ‘...turf fighting into an art form. In no sector more damaging than in the formulation and implementation of the Union’s external policies ...turf fighting between the different institutions, between the Council, the Commission and the Parliament...within each of these institutions and most extensively and most damagingly within the Commission.’ (Hannay 2010)
Whilst it is evident that a number of factors do constrain the leadership provided by the President of the Commission to the EU as a whole they do not undermine the more nuanced extent of influence the Commission President is able to exert. In turn this will have an impact on the extent of ‘turf fighting’ which takes place. Arguably if there is a ‘policy space’ over which there is little or no competition an individual or institution is able to occupy that space and increase their influence. Barroso assumed greater control of the internal climate change policy agenda during his first presidency following increased concerns amongst the national governments about energy policy and linkage of energy security and climate change. As a result the Commission was mandated to provide a strategy which would enable the EU to reconcile the goals of climate change and energy security. The strategy was introduced in January 2008 and accepted by the EP and the Council of Ministers in December 2008 and entered into the environmental acquis in June 2009.

Barroso commented in late 2008 following the adoption of the EU’s package of climate and energy measures, ‘...we would have preferred our initial proposals. But the suggestion that this is a watered down ambition is non-sense. We had to accept changes. That’s the price to pay for unity in the end and it’s a fair price’. (Grice 2008) Although the package of measures was not as radical as original proposals Barroso was able to achieve consensus on the package of measures and this demonstrated his own greater ability to influence the approach of the EU in the preparations for the the global policy negotiations which were to be held in Copenhagen in 2009. He has continued to regard the issue of climate change as a policy arena in which he is able to exert influence. But he has not used that influence to push innovative policy developments during his second Presidency, rather he is using the changes brought about by the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty to enhance the role of the Commission Presidency.

The institutional changes post Lisbon have the potential to increase the possibilities of more turf fighting amongst the institutions and to further constrain the actions of the Commission and its President. The EU now has two institutions (the European Council and the Commission) whose Presidents have the role of seeking to achieve and facilitate consensus amongst the national governments and represent the EU in external climate change negotiations – ie the European Council and the Commission. The Council of Ministers remains as a rotating presidency amongst the national governments. Although no longer representing the EU in external affairs the national leaders during the rotating presidencies continue to seek prominence at these times. The role of external representation for the EU is now the responsibility of the High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy (HRCFSP). According to Article 17 the Commission is to ensure the Union’s external representation apart from in the areas of Common Foreign and Security Policy. There is however an
increasing securitisation of the climate change agenda which blurs the relative competences of the institutions for external action.

The roles of the PotEC and the HRCFSP have been outlined in a very general manner in the Treaty Article 15. A ‘vagueness’ to the role which has been seen as ‘flexibility’ and an opportunity to shape the post by the first incumbent, Von Rompuy. Controversy surrounded the development of the role of the PotEC. Questions were raised about whether the appointee be a ‘Chair’ or a ‘President’. Kaczynski et al conclude that Von Rompuy has taken an intermediate approach highlighting the political effects of globalization and their impacts on the EU, looking for his own role on the diplomatic scene, in particular at summit meetings and attempting to spur the Members States into discussing the EU’s relationship with the major global players, for example with US President Barack Obama. (Kaczynski et al, 2010:141/142).

**November 20th 2010**

“We, the leaders of the European Union and the United States, met today in Lisbon to reaffirm our close partnership”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Thinks - OK now that’s over whose hand do I shake first?</th>
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<td>I know I’ll wave at the camera instead!</td>
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Von Rompuy       Barack Obama       Jose Manuel Barroso
Further adding to the complexity is the role assigned to the HRCFSP who is also a Vice-President of the Commission. The post crosses institutional frameworks. It combines the role of High Representative for CFSP, which was held when it was first introduced by Javier Solana (1999-2009), with that of Vice President of the Commission responsible for external relations and the role which was performed by the Foreign Minister of the rotating presidency, which included chairing the Foreign Affairs Council. The Foreign Ministers of the Member States pre-Lisbon were members of the European Council. However following the Lisbon Treaty this will no longer be the case but the HRCFSP will be a member of the European Council but not with the same standing as the Commission President, who is a full member of the European Council. Other responsibilities for the HRCFSP include the chairing of agencies various agencies including the European Defence Agency.

Amongst one of the more controversial issues for the HRCFSP has been the development of the European External Action Service (EEAS), Article 27 TEU. The objective of the EEAS is to support the HR and to represent the EU overseas bringing greater coherence to the Commission’s management of the external actions of the EU as it draws on expertise from within the Commission and the Council of Ministers. The Treaty provision stated that the EEAS would work in co-operation with the diplomatic services of the Member States and comprise officials from the relevant departments of the General Secretariat of the Council and the Commission with staff seconded from the national diplomatic services of the Member States. The EEAS was to be established by the Council on a proposal from the HR after consultation with the European Parliament and obtaining the consent of the Commission. Although establishing the EEAS was an important innovation of the Lisbon Treaty the details of the structure and functioning of the service were left to be determined by the European Council acting on the basis of unanimity once the Lisbon Treaty came into force.

In the event the EEAS did not come into place until early 2011. Deep divisions emerged between the European Parliament and the HRCFSP during the summer of 2010 with regard to the budget for the EEAS. The personnel for the Service were drawn from units the Commission, the Secretariat of the Council and seconded officials from the national governments. In addition to those officials of the Service based in Brussels the 130 delegations maintained worldwide brought the number of personnel in the Service to approximately 3,720 from within the Commission and the Council Secretariat plus a further third from the diplomatic services of the member states.
Barroro II Commission and climate change?

How has Barroso reacted in the first period of his second presidency? What type of leader is he proving to be? Overall the style of leadership of Barroso appears increasingly presidential, taking the opportunities to accrue more power for the position of the Commission President. Barroso is not a visionary or strategic innovator pushing new climate change strategies and policies forward. Partly this may be explained by divisions which are evident between the Member States of the EU and that facilitating consensus is difficult. Also two issues have dominated 2010 and early 2011 and affected his approach. The first the problematic economic situation which the eurozone states, indeed all the EU, states are facing in the light of the global economic crisis. Secondly Barroso has shown an increased interest in developing his own role in external relations. Partly this may be a reaction to the creation of another potential ‘power base’ within the domain of the Commission, one which is dealing directly with external action. The HR is responsible for the management of CFSP (Article 18 TEU) with the President of the European Council who represents the EU on issues concerning CFSP. The HR is also a Vice-President of the Commission responsible for ensuring the coherence of the EU’s external action with the Commission President who is responsible for the EU’s external representation over non-CFSP issues (Article 17 TEU).

At the beginning of his first presidency of the Commission in 2004 Barroso declared that he would be a more hands-on president that his predecessor Romano Prodi had been. Certainly post 2007, following his realisation of his ability to exert more influence on the climate policy agenda, Barroso began to live up to his assertion. Barroso as President of an enlarged EU 27 used the practice of forming groups or clusters of Commissioners to deal with specific issues which had cross sectoral dimensions. Initially in 2004 five were identified (the Lisbon agenda, competitiveness, external relations, anti-discrimination and equal opportunities and communication and programming). These groups were not decision-making on behalf of the whole Commission but to provide the policy input and guidance required in a Commission of 27 Commissioners. Climate change and energy were added to the Barroso I groups later in his Presidency and provided opportunities for him to exercise clearer leadership and a more hands on approach through his chairing of the groups.

Barroso showed his commitment to the climate change agenda in making the changes to the structure of the European Commission during his second presidency. A Commissioner for Climate Action was identified and a new Directorate-General established (DG CLIM). But this was not an example of Barroso adopting the role of a strategic innovator of policy. Rather it appeared to have been a measure designed to ensure that Barroso retained climate change and many of the external aspects of the policy within the Commission. Creating
a separate climate action portfolio was a controversial measure as it involved moving units relating to climate change from DG Enterprise and Industry (DG ENTR) units responsible for climate action from DG Environment (DG ENVIRON) and the activities relating to international negotiations on climate change from DG External Relations (DG RELEX).

On April 16th 2010 the Barroso approved the creation of Groups of Commissioners. The Commissioner for Climate Action Connie Hedegaard led a group of Commissioners including Kallas (Transport), Tajani (Industry and Entrepreneurship) Potocnik (Environment), Damanaki (Maritime Affairs and Fisheries), Oettinger (Trade) and Rehn (Economic and Monetary Affairs). The Commissioner groups were not established to take decisions on behalf of the Commission but to adopt a horizontal and global approach to specific issues with regular weekly meetings to prepare briefs for discussion by the whole College of Commissioners. As each group works to a mandate provided by Barroso then he is able to exercise considerable control over the deliberations of the groups. If present then the expectation is that Barroso will chair the group meetings instead of the lead Commissioner.

The Group of Commissioners established to deal with external relations was to be chaired by Baroness Ashton, HRCFSP and Vice President of the Commission, (VP). It included Piebalgs (Development), Fule (Enlargement), Georgieva (International Co-operation, Humanitarian Aid and Crisis Response), de Gucht (Trade) and Rehn (Economic and Monetary Affairs). Ashton is one of seven Vice-Presidents of the European Commission but de facto by virtue of her role as HRCFSP must be considered to be the most senior of the VPs. Barroso has undermined that position by making the changes to the structure of the Director-Generals of the Commission and removing responsibilities for climate change which might have come within the remit the VP for external relations.

Moving units from DG RELEX also ensured that they were not included the remit of the European External Action Service when it was established in January 2011 and subject to reporting to Baroness Ashton as the HR. Again this appears to have undermined the role of the HR. In her presentation to the European Council in September on the approach the EU should adopt to deal with relations with the it’s ‘strategic partners’ ie with the US, Russia, China and India, Ashton identified climate action as one of the areas for discussion. Addressing the European Council in December 2010 Ashton emphasised the need to ensure that the EU’s foreign and security policy should be better integrated with other policies such as climate action, energy, trade, and

10 Other groups of Commissioners were established to deal with specific subjects including Innovation, Internal Market, Industrial Policy, Digital Agenda, Budget, Pensions, Innovative Financial Instruments.
migration. She has also linked energy security to broad development issues including the development of mechanisms of good governance and the potential of such developments to strengthen state structures.

Following the Copenhagen Accord an International Climate Change Policy to reinvigorate global action on climate change was introduced by the Commission. In this communication a stronger role for the Commission was advocated on the basis that this would help to ensure that the EU speaks with one voice was highlighted in the Communication. The Commission highlighted the importance for the EU to adopt a unilateral approach to cutting greenhouse gas emissions by 30% if other developed countries also agreed. This was not however a new commitment. The European Council had affirmed it during the European Council, 10th-11th December 2009. It continued to be the approach taken to the climate change negotiations throughout 2010 in the preparations for the UN Climate Conference in Cancun (Conference of the Parties, CoP 16) 29th November to December 10th 2010. In proposing mechanisms to re-invigorate international negotiations the strategy also included outreach activities to third countries and key partners stating that “...the Commission, supported by the EU delegations of the European External Action Service, will actively engage in...” these activities (Commission, 2010:5)

By creating the new portfolio it appeared as if there was support from Barroso for the newly appointed Climate Action Commissioner Connie Hedegaard during 2010. But agreement was difficult to achieve on the proposal to proceed to unilaterally move to the 30% target which Hedegaard supported arguing that doing so would achieve green economic growth and create jobs. Whilst some Member States (including the UK, Denmark, the Netherlands and Sweden) supported such a move others including the Eastern European states led by Poland and Italy and Finland disagreed. Within the Commission opposition to the 30% target came from the Energy Commissioner Oettinger, arguing that to support this target would lead to industry relocating away from the EU. The result of the lack of agreement both between the national governments and within the Commission lead to a lack of cohesion on the part of the EU during the negotiations.

Barroso’s attention was focussed during the preparations for the Cancun climate change summit, not on reconciling these differences. He appeared to put the emphasis on the economy and developing his own political position as President of the European Commission. Barroso was not present at the Cancun negotiations which were led by Hedegaard and Schauvliege (Flemish Minister

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11 The proviso was that the reduction would be 30% by 2020 compared to 1990 levels if other developed countries committed themselves to comparable emission reductions and also that the developing countries contribute according to their responsibilities and respective capabilities.
for Environment, Nature and Culture) representing the Belgian rotating Presidency. He did put forward a high profile joint statement with the Connie Hedegaard (Climate Action) following the Cancun Summit but overall he had acted in a more managerial manner with regard to direction and leadership in the preparations and negotiation surrounding the Cancun Summit. In February 2011 a survey of the first year of activities of the European Commission carried out by Burson-Marsteller concluded that the “...Barroso-II team rated as average or below in its first year...”. Specifically the survey showed that Barroso had put his own leadership of the Commission and economic issues before that of action on climate change. (Burson-Marseller 2011).

At the same time the external face of the EU was not represented by either Von Rompuy nor Baroness Ashton during the Cancun negotiations despite the views expressed by Baroness Ashton about the importance of climate change. However Barroso and Ashton were both present with President von Rompuy 12 at EU-Russia Summit (7th December 2010) and EU-India summit (10th December 2010) held in Brussels. On the agenda of both these summits was discussion of how to operationalise any agreement which was the result of the Cancun negotiations.

Conclusions

Climate change is a multi-faceted problem. The impact of climate change has the potential for regional conflict and is increasingly discussed in that context within international environmental politics. The EU has been considered to be a leader international climate change politics in the past by default – the US, Russia, China not appearing to want the role. In the recent debates in Copenhagen, 2009, and Cancun, 2010, there were fewer opportunities for the EU to exert that leadership. However as a regional organisation comprising 27 states of the developed world the impact of action advocated by the EU cannot be ignored. The model of political leadership in global climate change politics which the EU adopts is not determined by the European Commission. Climate change action is an arena of shared competence for the EU. As a result the Commission’s role in internal EU policy-making makes it a crucial actor in the development of the model of action exported by the EU to the rest of the world.

12 Von Rompuy had been criticised for not attending the Copenhagen Summit in 2009. Amongst the Wikileaks documents released in December 2010 was one in which von Rompuy was described as meeting with the US Ambassador to Belgium, Howard Gutman, and presenting an angry assessment of the Copenhagen summit as a “disaster in which Europe was excluded and mistreated” further advocating a bilateral approach rather than multilateral international agreements on climate change with the EU approaching the US first and then China. On the criticism of his own absence from the summit Von Rompuy expressed the view that had he been present his Presidency would have been over before it began. (CNN December 11, 2010)
During his first term as President of the Commission the arena of climate change policy gained in prominence as a result of the linkage of the issue with that of energy security. The context for the Barroso I Commission was provided by the legal and constitutional constraints of the Treaty competences for action. At the same time the impact of enlargement increased the size of the College of Commissioners and the difficulties associated with renewing the Treaty on European Union required the Commission President to concentrate on mediating amongst the national governments in order to make progress on policy proposals. Increased support for, and increased interest in the climate change agenda by Barroso also reflect a recognition on his part that the Commission had an opportunity to be more effective in the development of this arena of policy. In other arenas of policy, especially those related to the financial and economic downturn of 2008 the Commission had less opportunity to find a ‘policy space’ to occupy in those areas where the national governments retained greater competences. Climate change also provided an arena of action in which the Commission could demonstrate the effectiveness of its role as an institution to the citizens of the EU, 67% of whom regard climate change as a very serious problem (Eurobarometer 2009).

The early period of his first presidency was characterised by pragmatism and a technocratic approach and this continued throughout the period until its close in 2009. Although recognising an increased ability for influence of the climate change agenda Barroso did not however demonstrate assertive political leadership of the type which Hayward ascribes to a heroic leader, rather he remained closer to Hayward’s model of humdrum leadership. For Kille this would not be a surprising development as his analysis shows that a managerial leadership style may move towards a mid-way strategic position but that the individual will not shift to the opposite pole of the visionary style of leadership.

In the analysis presented in this paper the competences of the Commission were initially outlined. The climate change policy agenda has been strengthened as a result of the inclusion of a specific reference in the Lisbon Treaty. The legal basis for action continues as one of shared competence for action between the Commission and the national governments with the Commission taking a lead role in international negotiations. Other institutional changes included in the Lisbon Treaty have an impact on how the Commission and the President of the Commission exercise their competence and this in turn affects the extent to which the Commission President is able to act as a leader in the presentation of climate change initiatives.

In order to initiate effective climate change policy long term innovative political leadership is required. The Commission has the potential to provide the long term innovative leadership as it is not dependent on changes of policy content and orientation associated with changes to the other institutions as the
result of national and European elections. The work of the Commission has become increasingly politicised as a result of successive phases of enlargement and increased number of actors in the EU’s policy making. The Commission in the role of management of the arrangements and oversight of the work of the EU in the context of the new institutional arrangements has become more complex. However the importance of the Commission as an institution able to act as a consensus builder between the national governments, with the EP and the range of stakeholders involved in climate change policy has grown as has the role of ensuring effective implementation of legislation is essential if the policy is to have impact.

Specifically three developments have been considered in this paper:-

1. The development of the position of permanent President for the European Council which includes the responsibility to mediate between the national governments and achieve consensus. (This was the role of the head of state of the rotating presidency but by including as a specific responsibility of the permanent President of the European Council it is elevated to a new prominence and as such has the potential to undermine the mediator role of the Commission President).

2. The appointment of the High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy, responsible for the European External Action Service, who is also a Vice-President of the European Commission.

3. Increased power for the President of the European Commission vis-a vis the rest of the Commission which has undermined the notion of the President as *primus inter pares* and Barroso to adopt a more presidential style during his second term as President of the Commission.

The consequence of the Lisbon Treaty has been to increase the power of the President of the European Commission vis-a vis the rest of the Commission and eroding the notion of the President as *primus inter pares*. The national governments retain the right to elect the President of the Commission and nominate the Commissioners. But the EP has increased power with regard to the election of the Commission President and increased supervisory power over the choice and the work of the Commission.

The result of the evidence to date since appears to be an increased potential for what Hannay described as ‘turf fighting’ as the new roles with responsibility for representing the external face of the EU are evolving. Further complicating the picture of where the direction may be found for the EU’s international climate change policy is the increasing securitisation of the issue and the blurring of what the implications of the impact of climate change may be. Does it come within the compass of military/security issues? Certainly it is not a
military/security issue in the traditional sense but the outcome of climate change may indeed result in conflict requiring a military/security response putting it into the arena of the burgeoning EU foreign and defence policy.

In this evolving and new context Barroso as the President of the Commission has continued in a pragmatic manner in his approach to leadership of the Commission. His style has become more ‘presidential’ by his centralisation of power into the post of the Commission President and oversight of the development by the College of Commissioners of their individual portfolios. The role of the Commission President was significantly enhanced by the new prerogative conferred in the Lisbon Treaty for the President to have the power to dismiss a member of the College of Commissioners. The decision to re-structure some of the units of the various Directorates-General of the Commission has ensured that aspects of the international climate change policy remains outside the remit of the work of the High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy although the incumbent of this post is also a Vice-President of the Commission. Barroso’s opportunity to act in a strategic or innovative style to push forward radical climate change strategy has been constrained by the economic and financial crises of 2010/2011. Enlargement of the EU and the failure to make changes to the size of the College of Commissioners puts more emphasis on the role of the Commission President to achieve consensus on decision-making.

It would have been highly unlikely that Barroso would have become a more strategic and visionary leader of the Commission with enhanced ability to exert significant influence on the outcome of the EU’s international climate change policy at the beginning of his second term as Commission President. However the evidence to date suggests that he has been more concerned to establish the position of the Commission President in the new institutional structures of the EU. He has focussed his attention on the economic and financial problems of the EU and also enhanced his own representation in high level political and diplomatic negotiations potentially undermining the longer term objectives and support for climate change action. The climate change agenda is one which requires a great deal of co-operation and collaboration across many policy areas if an effective and proactive response is to come from the EU in global climate change politics.
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