

The Securitization of Development Policy or the Developmentalization of Security Policy?: Legitimacy, Public Opinion, and the EU External Action Service (EAS)

By

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Abstract: The EU has strained to find its identity as a security and defense power. The EU, historically, has more experience and credibility in the area of its development policy. Given the EU's history of development promotion and recent efforts to expand and clarify its foreign policy objectives, it should not be surprising that development and security goals often resemble each other. This paper argues that the conflation of traditional security concerns with the overall development policy of the EU indicates an expansion of and an effort to legitimize the EU's foreign and security policy. However, the lack of a clear distinction between security and development strategies acts as both a hindrance, in terms of operational clarity, and an asset, in terms of justification, to the formulation of a more coherent EU foreign policy, especially after the passage of the Lisbon Treaty.

The Lisbon Treaty allows for the creation of the European External Action Service (EEAS), which brings together European Commission (EC) officials, member state diplomats, and the Council Secretariat into one agency responsible for representing the EU abroad in all areas relating to EU external action. Recently, however, European development non-governmental organizations (NGOs) issued a legal warning concerning plans for the EEAS to take over development policy, claiming “that the new set-up will make development a mere pawn of foreign and security policy and that this is illegal under the Lisbon Treaty.”¹ The Commission traditionally exercised sole authority over development policy, but the current plan for EU external action gives the new diplomatic service authority over development and even the humanitarian DG’s, raising fears that development cooperation and efficiency will decrease. One *EUobserver* headline says it all: “EU aid chief: merger with foreign policy 'over my dead body.'”² Dutch Socialist MEP Thijs Berman stated “I don't know where the idea came from or how developed it is. It may be a wrongly interpreted idea of efficiency or part of the inter-institutional power politics currently going on.”³

This paper argues that the idea came from the people. Several recent articles discuss the phenomenon of the securitization of development policy in the EU and the world.⁴ Indeed, most studies take the two tacks Berman states, explaining the original rationale for coordinating different tools of foreign policy including aid to foster stability and therefore security in foreign countries, and/or the questions of inter-institutional rivalry and funding. This paper takes a different approach explaining how the incorporation of development into the EEAS is used to legitimize the CFSP in the eyes of EU citizenry. Despite the (im)practicalities involved, the politicians designed the EEAS to reflect the desires of the people that the EU be an independent *Friedensmacht*, (peacepower)

¹ Leigh Phillips, “Development NGOs issue legal warning over new EU foreign service,” *EUobserver*, 27 April 2010, <http://EUobserver.com/24/29953>.

² Andrew Willis, “EU aid chief: merger with foreign policy 'over my dead body,’” *EUobserver*, 18 February 2011, <http://euobserver.com/9/31831/?rk=1>.

³ Andrew Willis, “Outcry at EU plan to mix aid and foreign policy”, *EUobserver*, 10 February 2011, <http://euobserver.com/?aid=31786>.

⁴ See Amelia Hadfield, “Janus Advances? An Analysis of EC Development Policy and the 2005 Amended Cotonou Partnership Agreement,” *European Foreign Affairs Review* 12, 1 (2007): 39-66; Jörg Faust and Dirk Messner, “Europe's New Security Strategy: Challenges for Development Policy,” *European Journal of Development Research* 17, 3 (2005): 423-436; Wil Hout, “Between Development and Security: The European Union, Governance, and Fragile States,” Working Paper 153. Asia Research Centre, Murdoch University, February 2009; Richard Youngs, “Fusing Security and Development: Just Another Euro-platitude?” *Journal of European Integration* 30, 3 (2008): 419-437; Marie V Gibert, “The Securitisation of the EU’s Development Agenda in Africa: Insights from Guinea-Bissau” *Perspectives on European Politics and Society* 10:4 (2009): 621-637; and Marie V Gibert, “The European Union in Africa: The linkage between security, governance and development from an institutional perspective,” *Journal of Development Studies* 45:5 (2009): 789-814.

or “civilian power with teeth”. Polls show that the people believe EU member states are more effective as a collective force, desire an independent security and defense policy, distinct from that of the US, to be a “force for good”, and to foster the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). At the same time, they want the EU to deal with non-military threats such as terrorism and immigration, before they find their way on to European soil. A coordinated external action service promises all that, but may have several unintended consequences such as negative press from NGOs and ineffective one-size-fits-all policies.

The NGO Rebellion against Securitizing and Politicizing Aid

One of the claims made in academic literature and by the EU itself is that the EU is “unique among international organizations in its capacity to contribute to all three aspects of post-conflict stabilization: security (military and policing), economic and humanitarian, and political and institutional.”⁵ While the strength of and necessity for an EU military capable of projecting force outside of Europe is debatable, the strength of the EU as a civilian, or “soft”, power is reflected through its experience with development policies and its role in the world as one of the top providers of foreign aid. This wide focus allows the EU to operate in countries and regions where non-security aid is essential and as a counter to US influence and power. It has also allowed the EU to redefine its security and defense goals to include, among others, development policy outcomes.

However, a main source for the EU’s success as a donor was its apolitical nature. Despite the fact that the Commission will retain control of its €6 billion a year development aid budget, and that the aid, development, energy and enlargement commissioners will take the lead in decision-making in their portfolios,⁶ many NGOs worry that politics will compromise the aid. For example, High Representative Catherine Ashton promised the European Parliament, “I will give a high priority to the promotion of human rights and good governance around the world, to make sure that this is a silver thread that runs through everything we do.”⁷ In other words, aid will have strings attached.

In April 2010, Concord, the umbrella group of all European development groups together with CIDSE, the alliance of European Catholic development charities, Aprodev, its Protestant counterpart, and Eurostep, the secular aid coalition, threatened to sue. Consulting White & Case, a UK law firm, they

⁵ Anand Menon, “Empowering paradise? The ESDP at ten,” *International Affairs* 85, 2 (2009): 228; also see Christopher J. Bickerton, “The Perils of Performance: EU Foreign Policy and the Problem of Legitimization,” *Perspectives: Central European Review of International Affairs* 28 (2007): 24-42; Richard G. Whitman, “Foreign, Security and Defence Policy and the Lisbon Treaty: significant or cosmetic reforms?” *Global Europe Papers*, 2008/1, <http://www.swern.co.uk/esml/research/security/pdf/whitman.pdf>.

⁶ Andrew Rettman, “EU takes ‘historic’ step on new diplomatic service” *EUobserver*, 8 July 2010, <http://euobserver.com/?aid=30448>.

⁷ *Ibid.*.

argued, "Development co-operation is outside the scope of the CFSP and therefore the EAS has no capacity in respect of it."⁸

Elise Ford, head of Oxfam International's EU office stated "Ashton's desire to set the direction of how EU development money is spent is potentially bad news. ... Her proposal on the EU's first ever diplomatic service risks making poverty objectives hostage to foreign policy goals. It is now up to EU member states and the European Parliament to rectify Ashton's misconception about what effective development policy is."⁹ In a report by Oxfam titled "Whose Aid Is It Anyway? Politicizing Aid in Conflicts and Crises", the NGO warned that

Aid organizations likewise need to ensure that their activities do not exacerbate or provide resources for conflict. They should implement standards and guidelines to ensure that humanitarian aid 'does no harm', and that development aid is sensitive to conflict. They should refuse any donor funding which is conditional on them cooperating with military forces or providing information to them, or which requires them to distribute aid or allocate development resources based on the political or military cooperation of recipients.¹⁰

Indeed, being seen as partial or as political instruments could put aid workers in jeopardy while doing their jobs.

In an interview, Ross Mountain, the UN secretary-general's deputy special representative to the Democratic Republic of Congo and director-general of Development Assistance Research Associates Governments, argued that "aid is being increasingly driven by donors' political, economic or military objectives rather than prioritising the needs of its recipients." He explained:

Governments sometimes withhold aid in countries governed by people they don't like. But from a political perspective, we want to bring them back into the global community. What is the interest in withholding aid from their populations, if they are then of ill health and poorly educated when they finally do come in? They would then suffer twice, having lived under governments that are less than friendly and then be denied international assistance. It wouldn't be fair.¹¹

He commended the Commission as a multilateral aid giver; Mountain said that the "politicisation" of aid was "far more a phenomena of bilateral policies" than

⁸ Phillips, "Development NGOs issue legal warning over new EU foreign service," *EUobserver*, 27 April 2010.

⁹ "The EU's New Diplomatic Service," *EurActiv*, published: 09 March 2010, updated: 08 February 2011, <http://www.euractiv.com/en/future-eu/eus-new-diplomatic-service-linksdossier-309484>.

¹⁰ Synopsis of "Whose Aid Is It Anyway? Politicizing Aid in Conflicts and Crises", Oxfam International, 10 February 2011, <http://www.oxfam.org/en/policy/whose-aid-it-anyway>.

¹¹ "UN official: Political interests are increasingly driving aid policy" *EurActiv*, 10 December 2010.

that of the multilateral EU, the world's largest aid donor.¹² Usually bi-lateral donors, such as the US and France, have strings attached.

However, Europe has started to attach strings, especially in its African policy and ACP aid policy overall as well:

Aid or trade agreements have thus been exchanged against an African state's readiness to accept the repatriation of citizens who had entered Europe illegally. Conditionality can also be used to secure special agreements, whereby the African partner state agrees to a breach of its territorial sovereignty by allowing the EU to intervene directly on its territory.¹³

The purpose is security. Gibert explained: "Promoting development and good governance is in the interest of the international community as a whole since it will help prevent local conflicts and insecurity from spilling over."¹⁴

Explaining the Connection: Why 'Securitize' Development and Aid?

Securitization as a general concept can be defined as the movement of a policy considered part of "low politics" to the realm of "high politics," otherwise known as security. "Low" politics covers areas such as domestic economic, agricultural, and social policies. For the purposes of this paper, securitization of development refers to "the conscious injection of security concepts as part of the broader policy package dealing with the perceived security risks inherent in underdevelopment."¹⁵ Perhaps the most explicit example of this "conscious injection" of security concepts is in the amended Cotonou Agreement. The most contentious portion regards clauses that encourage and incentivize the African, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) member states to cooperate on the issues of terrorism and non-proliferation and join the International Criminal Court (ICC). As will be discussed later in the paper, such demands seem to be superfluous within the context of an economic and development cooperation agreement; however, it is reflective of the aims of the EU with regard to the conflation of development and security strategies.

The European Security Strategy (ESS) begins by stating, "Europe has never been so prosperous, so secure nor so free."¹⁶ The Council acknowledges from the onset that recent EU experiences in the Balkans highlight the need for a security strategy that will address the issues directly related to the European

¹² "Report denounces humanitarian aid 'politicisation', lauds EU" *EurActiv*, 10 December 2010.

¹³ Gibert, "The Securitisation of the EU's Development Agenda in Africa: Insights from Guinea-Bissau," 625.

¹⁴ *Ibid*, 623.

¹⁵ Hadfield, "Janus Advances?" 54.

¹⁶ Council of the European Union, *A Secure Europe in A Better World: European Security Strategy*, Brussels, 12 December 2003: 1, accessed 31 March 2010, <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf>.

neighborhood, but attention quickly shifts to areas beyond Europe. The Council asserts that because the EU has become more of a “credible and effective actor” in global affairs it must “share in the responsibility for global security and in building a better world.”¹⁷ Global security, at least in the context of this document, encompasses a wide range of issues from food and human security to failed states. The ESS argues that the implementation of its security policy requires multiple instruments, “ranging from military force to diplomatic engagement, trade relations, development aid and humanitarian assistance.”¹⁸ In essence, the Council espouses the need for a comprehensive security strategy by including all its available resources.

Perhaps the most important point the document makes is that “security is a precondition for development.”¹⁹ At this point, the distinction between development and security starts to disappear. While the document explicitly states that security is a *precondition* for development, the strategy claims that issues such as poverty and disease give rise to “pressing security concerns,” especially in developing countries.²⁰ The ESS, by nature, clearly has more of a focus on the importance of establishing security in developing and post-conflict states, but the insertion of language that attempts to place sufficient emphasis on the need for development, emergency, and humanitarian assistance effectively blurs the distinction between the two seemingly separate areas of development and security.

The document highlights another crucially important goal: the focus on the promotion of good governance and institution building. The strategy envisions a stronger international order through “spreading good governance, supporting social and political reform, dealing with corruption and abuse of power, establishing the rule of law and protecting human rights.”²¹ Drawing on the success of the European integration process as evidenced through the EU’s history and evolution, the ESS sets the foundation for exporting the EU model of governance, or at the very least the exportation of European values. Whether or not this strategy is effective or even desired by the countries in which the EU operates is beyond the scope of this paper; however, the focus on good governance, social reform, and development assistance in the ESS seems to have a significant impact on the role of development policy.

If foreign policy, in general, and the EU’s, in particular, are “consciously designed to aggregately define the values and deploy the interests of a given actor in a comprehensive, coherent policy palette,”²² then the ESS can be viewed

¹⁷ Ibid, 1.

¹⁸ Hout “Between Development and Security,” 8.

¹⁹ Council, *European Security Strategy*, 2.

²⁰ Ibid, 2.

²¹ Ibid, 10.

²² Hadfield, “Janus Advances?” 47.

as an articulation of European values and interests. One of the glaring criticisms of the ESS is that it does not offer any input on how to make the security strategy comprehensive. While it includes language that incorporates a focus on development and humanitarian assistance, institution building in failed and fragile states, and the new security threats of terrorism and non-proliferation, it does not offer any sort of guidance on how to deal with the complex linkages between the issues.²³ EU development policy, on the other hand, offers a clearer way to deal with the linkages, although the circular nature of causality in the development/security relationship proves too complex, as will be shown in the following section.

EU Development Policy: Security, Cotonou, and Harmonization

EC officials began formulating revisions and amendments to the Cotonou Agreement shortly after the publications of the ESS. Cotonou went into effect in 2000 with the understanding that the signatories could make necessary revisions in 2005 and every five years as needed. The agreement, which codifies EU assistance to ACP countries through the EC, replaced the previous Yaoundé and Lomé convention agreements. The new agreement emphasizes, “politicized and securitized *reform-focused* goals” and represents a “paradigm shift from the original *assistance-focused* development that typified the Yaoundé and Lomé accords” by attaching political conditionality in the areas of democracy, good governance, and human rights to aid guarantees.²⁴ By stressing political conditionality through the Cotonou agreement, the EU attempted to formalize its new, comprehensive approach to security through development.

An analysis of the Cotonou agreement is appropriate for a number of reasons. First off, its ratification occurred during the debate within in the EU over what form the new security strategy should take. Similarly, during this time, the EU sought to harmonize, and is still in the process of harmonizing, development policy between Brussels and the member states within the framework of the ESS. The EU has a number of regional economic and trade cooperation agreements, notably with South America, but the focus on the ACP region is logical because the EU is most actively involved in these member states; most CSDP missions take place in Africa.

The Council argues that the EU must utilize all its tools to tackle the pressing security concerns associated with developing countries. Most important is the mention of the need to incorporate all its assistance programs: “The challenge now is to bring together the different instruments and capabilities: European assistance programmes and the European Development Fund, military and civilian capabilities from Member States and other instruments. All of these

²³ Faust et al., “Europe’s New Security Strategy,” 427.

²⁴ Hadfield, “Janus Advances?” 41, 43.

can have an impact on our security and on that of third countries.”²⁵ Funding for ACP development comes from the European Development Fund (EDF). Explicit mention of the EDF in the security strategy and the linkages between such programs and the security of the EU and its member states reinforces the argument that securitization of development is a crucial aspect of promoting global security. In essence, the Council equates EU security with security in third countries.

Far from maintaining a narrow approach to poverty reduction and economic and trade cooperation, the Cotonou Agreement incorporates political cooperation and dialogue into its goals. In the introduction to the revised 2005 agreement, European Commissioner for Development and Humanitarian Aid Louis Michel lauds the agreement as a more constructive way to approach the issue of poverty and meet the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs):

The key objective of developing a more strategic common approach to poverty reduction must continue to be steadily promoted. The social, economic, political, cultural and environmental aspects of sustainable development are integrated throughout the Agreement, reflecting the relevant international commitments taken by EU and ACP partners.... The amendments place greater emphasis on an effective and results-orientated dialogue rendering the provisions on good governance, human rights, democratic principles and the rule of law more constructive and operational.²⁶

The amendments largely focus on the political dimension of economic and development assistance. Little from the original agreement regarding trade and economic cooperation changed, suggesting that the strategic outlook of the Commission changed between 2000 and 2005.

The Preamble of the agreement acknowledges the key areas of cooperation between the EU and the ACP states. Reinforcing the notion of cooperation, especially in the new areas identified by the ESS, it states, “a political environment guaranteeing peace, security and stability, respect for human rights, democratic principles and the rule of law, and good governance is part and parcel of long term development.”²⁷ Again, good governance is a crucial element for both security and development. Both the ESS and Cotonou agreement focus on the importance of good governance and respect for democracy, which reflects the criteria established for determining aid allocation.

As a result, the most contentious aspect of the Cotonou Agreement

²⁵ Council, *European Security Strategy*, 13.

²⁶ European Commission, *Partnership Agreement: ACP-EC*, Directorate-General for Development and Relations with African, Caribbean, and Pacific States, signed 23 June 2000, revised 25 June 2005: 5, accessed 23 March 2010, http://ec.europa.eu/development/icenter/repository/Cotonou_EN_2006_en.pdf.

²⁷ Commission, *Partnership Agreement: ACP-EC*, Preamble.

revisions in 2005 is the inclusion of security-related provisions as part of the political conditionality of EC-provided development aid. Article 11 dictates that ACP states must cooperate in the areas of the prevention of mercenary and terrorist activities, WMD proliferation, and human rights abuses through participation in various international agreements, including ICC membership.²⁸ Much of the debate centered on the ICC and WMD provisions, but ultimately the ACP states agreed to the revisions. This instance typifies EU security objectives as they relate to development: security is a precondition for development. Essentially the EU forces ACP members to address the threats of terrorism, mercenaries, and the spread of nuclear weapons (albeit with some EU assistance) coupled with measures to ensure accountability.

An important aspect of the Cotonou Agreement with regard to the securitization and politicization of the development agreement concerns the structure of decision-making process within the framework of the agreement. Article 15 explicitly states that the Council of Ministers, the body with the responsibility to foster political dialogue and implement decisions, will consist of members from the EC, the Council, EU member states, and representatives from the ACP member states.²⁹ Since the EC maintains sole competence with regard to development policy and controls the distribution of EDF aid, it seems puzzling that the Council and EU member states would need to be intimately involved in policy implementation; however, the focus on the need for continuing political dialogue in conjunction with a more comprehensive approach as laid out in the ESS suggests that such increased involvement at the EU-level is inevitable.

With regard to political dialogue as defined in the Cotonou Agreement, the document clearly emphasizes the need to formulate a comprehensive set of EC and ACP policies. In order to succeed in the mutual goals, the agreement states the need for parties to pursue policies “to promote peace and to prevent, manage and resolve violent conflicts...” and that “take full account of the objective of peace and democratic stability in the definition of priority areas of cooperation.”³⁰ Again, this reflects the notion that security must come before any serious development progress can be made and underscores the EC’s attention on the development and security issues inherent in failing, fragile, and developing states.

The Cotonou Agreement mandates that fragile states will receive prioritized funds to improve institutional capacity. Article 10.3 states that “[G]ood governance shall underpin the domestic and international policies of the Parties and constitute a fundamental element of this agreement.”³¹ However, some critics have observed that when the EU does include governance and

²⁸ Ibid, Article 11.

²⁹ Ibid, Article 15.

³⁰ Ibid, Article 8.

³¹ Ibid, Article 10.3.

institution-building measures into its overall strategy, they tend to be highly technocratic in nature at the expense of other equally important objectives.³² Similarly, civil and political society actors within the fragile states often “criticize the EU’s governance assistance for being heavily orientated towards government and state institutions.”³³ While Article 7 singles out the importance of civil society involvement, in practice the EDF allocates more funding for institution-building objectives in fragile states. This makes sense in light of the objectives of the Cotonou Agreement and the Consensus.

At the heart of this focus on failing states, and thus the adoption of preventative policies, is the understanding that insecurity is both the cause and effect of poverty and lack of development. Conceptual ambiguity is evident throughout the Cotonou Agreement and the Consensus on Development. The EP, Council, and the EC, in their attempt to formulate a coherent development policy and harmonize the efforts of the EU and its member states, fail to distinguish security and development goals. In outlining policy toward failing states and its role in post-crisis situations, the Consensus states its actions “will be guided by integrated transition strategies, aiming at rebuilding institutional capacities, essential infrastructure and social services, increasing food security and providing sustainable solutions for refugees, displaced persons and the general security of citizens.”³⁴ General security remains undefined, although presumably addressed through institution-building efforts and security sector assistance. In short, development tools and good governance can best deal with issues that arise in post-crisis situations.

As a document outlining development objectives, it is not surprising that a considerable amount of attention is devoted to the subjects of humanitarian assistance, social and economic reforms, and the need for “good governance.” The Consensus suffers from the same issues as the ESS in that it attempts to include language that acknowledges the need for security while simultaneously providing no clear distinction or definition as to when to prioritize development or security actions. Instead of providing a clear distinction between objectives, it is assumed that the objectives of both policies are separate yet complementary: “Within their respective actions, they contribute to creating a secure environment and breaking the vicious cycle of poverty, war, environmental degradation and failing economic, social and political structures.”³⁵ The conceptual ambiguity stems from the inability of the policy-makers to identify whether insecurity causes or is the consequence of underdevelopment. EC officials had to reformulate development policy objectives, incorporating a “securitized” element to address the inherent security challenges associated with both the

³² Hout, “Between Development and Security,” 4.

³³ Youngs, “Fusing Security and Development,” 433

³⁴ European Parliament, Council and Commission, “The European Consensus on Development,” *Official Journal of the European Union*, 24 February 2006, C46: 1-19.

³⁵ *Ibid*, 7.

“origins and outcomes of poverty.”³⁶

Critiques of Securitizing of Aid

The inclusion of political conditionality reflects the shift to reform-focused goals, but the question remains as to whether or not this shift will actually help recipient countries, especially those with ACP membership, maintain an acceptable level of security, stability, and legitimacy. The EU’s foreign policy objectives, as argued previously, reflect its own values and interests, yet there is considerable criticism of the concept of political conditionality of aid which suggests that it could possibly lead to governments in target states that merely pay lip service to the notion of free, democratic states.³⁷ In other words, does the increased threat of withheld funding really help the EU in its development and security aims? One Wikileaks document suggests not: The US embassy in London reported in October 2009 that UK Foreign Office West Africa team leader Paul Welsch was very concerned about human rights in The Gambia. Welsch reported that The Gambia is “‘not taking seriously’ the EU Article 8 consultations [of Cotonou]. No ministers have participated in the dialogue thus far. Welsch said the UK is not expecting much from the next meeting at the end of November when the EU Presidency will send a representative to Banjul.”³⁸

Another criticism is the lack of distinction between security and development policy creates an impression that “EU still has no clearly thought-out vision of the balance or direction of causality between these two policy goals, but rather an *ad hoc* approach”³⁹ devoid of structure. The ESS, the Consensus on Development and the Cotonou Agreement all contain traditional development- and security-related language with no synthesis or clear justification behind the reasoning for the inclusion.

Gibert wonders whether such a “one-size-fits-all” policy really works in Africa, the second-largest continent, but often referred to by Westerners as a single entity. For example, Gibert explained:

The EU’s resort to the UK to lead the SSR preparatory missions in Guinea-Bissau on the basis of its experience in Sierra Leone points to a ready-made technical agenda rather than an understanding of the country’s history and politics, which are extremely different from Sierra Leone’s. Making a locally owned agenda out of an externally-induced approach is notoriously difficult and requires a solid understanding of local politics so

³⁶ Hadfield, “Janus Advances?” 54.

³⁷ Stephen R. Hurt, “Co-operation and coercion? The Cotonou Agreement between the European Union and ACP states and the end of the Lomé Convention,” *Third World Quarterly* 24, 1 (2003): 171.

³⁸ Wikileaks, “Viewing cable 09LONDON2333, The Gambia: UK concerned about human rights, no progress on EU article 8 process REF: Banjul 235,” US State Department cable from US embassy in London, 13 October 2009.

³⁹ Youngs, “Fusing Development and Security,” 420.

that universal rules of democracy and state efficiency can be implemented in a manner that is respectful of local needs. This, in turn, demands a long-term approach and a substantial commitment on the part of the international community – a need that can be at odds with the international community’s own, immediate interests.⁴⁰

Gibert also sees many of many of the CSDP missions as either band-aid measures or feel good missions that will have no long-term effect. For example, EUNAVFOR that combats piracy off the Horn of Africa is a bit like swatting flies: Although one may hit or miss one’s target, the source of the pirates, Somalia, will keep producing pirates until the EU gets involved in the formation of a political solution rather than a military, naval approach or a developmentally focused one.⁴¹

EU Public Opinion and the Credibility of EU Foreign Policy

Why has the securitization of EU development policy occurred? The natural linkage between security and development concerns has played a role in the process, but it seems that there must be some other factor. Bickerton observes that, “Conjoining the term legitimacy with both the EU and foreign policy may appear quixotic: the EU is beset with a series of legitimacy problems that go under the title ‘democratic deficit,’ and foreign policy is traditionally a prerogative power of the executive, thus limiting its need for legitimacy.”⁴² By including development policy within the confines of the CFSP, and now the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP), the EU is justifying the expansion of its foreign policy to the public and the world.

The first goal mentioned in the Treaty on European Union for the CFSP is “to safeguard the common values, fundamental interests, independence and integrity of the Union in conformity with the principles of the United Nations Charter.”⁴³ This goal raises a couple of questions. First, why is safeguarding “values” the primary objective of the CFSP? Second, if these values are in conformity with the principles of the United Nations, and all the EU member states have already promised to support them – and do – in the UN, why do these values need to be reiterated in the Treaty on European Union?

Javier Solana answered these questions; he recognized that defining European values creates a vital link with the EU citizen:

the defense and promotion of the values [...] are at the heart of European history and civilisation. We believe in the value of tolerance, democracy

⁴⁰ Gibert (2009), 632.

⁴¹ Gibert (2009), 626.

⁴² Bickerton, “The Perils of Performance: EU Foreign Policy and the Problem of Legitimization,” 25.

⁴³ Treaty on European Union, Title V, article 11.

and respect for human rights. This must be an integral part of our policy-making process. Because values are our crucial link with the people of the street, who want to understand why we take this or that decision, and whose support we need at all times [sic].⁴⁴

Solana understood, that, properly cultivated, foreign policy based on common values can create a link with and among the people.

William Bloom explained that foreign policy is a powerful tool for identity-building whether consciously understood by decision-makers or not. Foreign policy can create a situation in which the mass of people can perceive a threat to their communal identity, or an opportunity to protect and enhance it.⁴⁵ As a result, "the opportunity is always present for a government deliberately to use foreign policy as a method of mobilizing the mass national public sentiment away from internal political dissension, and achieving political integration."⁴⁶

A key component of identity-building is creating legitimacy for the governing institutions. Prizel explained, "Most modern polities rely on a legitimizing mythology. The conduct of foreign policy, by extension, is one means of affirming that mythology and thereby legitimizing a governing elite."⁴⁷ The French and Dutch rejections of the Constitutional Treaty were the equivalent of the EU governing elite losing a vote of confidence from the people. To regain the people's trust, EU politicians emphasized the practicality of a European foreign and security policy. Benita Ferrero-Waldner, European Commissioner for External Relations, said that the EU had taken advantage of the pause after the constitutional failure

to reconnect with our citizens' most important concerns -- security, stability, prosperity and a stronger EU in the world. We recognize that what our citizens want is results. So we are concentrating on concrete achievements to show that the EU is part of the solution and not part of the problem. And to show that rather than an "old continent", unable to respond today's challenges we've become a relevant dynamic power.⁴⁸

Presumably, Solana understood the concept when he called for "legitimacy through action" and "result oriented" pragmatism to gain the citizens'

⁴⁴ Speech by Javier Solana at *The Forschungsinstitut Der Deutschen Gesellschaft Fuer Auswaertige Politik*, "Where Does The EU Stand on Common Foreign and Security Policy?", Berlin, 14 November 2000, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/cms3_applications/applications/solana/details.asp?cmsid=246&BID=107&DocID=63975&insite=1.

⁴⁵ Bloom, 81.

⁴⁶ Ibid, 82.

⁴⁷ Prizel, 20.

⁴⁸ Benita Ferrero-Waldner, European Commissioner for external relations, "the European Union: a global power?" George Bush presidential Library foundation and Texas A&M University EU Center of excellence, College Station Texas, 25 September 2006.

confidence.⁴⁹ Chris Patten, former Commissioner for External Relations concurred: “the EU’s credibility will be greatly enhanced if it can demonstrate its contribution to the safety and security of its citizens.”⁵⁰ He continued, “I am confident this debate will be one of the most appealing to European citizens, one which will make them feel more and more ‘euro-activists’.”⁵¹

As Solana explained, the CFSP is “also part of a specific project, to know the ambition to promote a model of integration and cooperation.”⁵² In its White Paper on European governance, the Commission explained how international action could be translated into citizen support:

The objectives of peace, growth, employment and social justice pursued within the Union must also be promoted outside for them to be effectively attained at both European and global level. This responds to citizens' expectations for a powerful Union on a world stage. Successful international action reinforces European identity and the importance of shared values within the Union.⁵³

The Member States in the European Council agreed in the Laeken Presidency conclusions:

Within the Union, the European institutions must be brought closer to its citizens. Citizens undoubtedly support the union's broad aims, but they do not always see a connection between those goals and the Union's everyday action. ... Now that the Cold War is over and we are living in a globalised, yet also highly fragmented world, Europe needs to shoulder its responsibilities in the governance of globalisation. *The role it has to play is that of a power resolutely doing battle against all violence, all terror, and all fanaticism, but which also does not turn a blind eye to the world's heartrending injustices.* In short, a power wanted to change the course of world affairs in such a way as to benefit not just the rich countries but also the poorest. A power seeking to set globalization within a moral framework, in other words to anchor it in solidarity and sustainable development. ... The

⁴⁹ Delegation of the European Commission to Bulgaria, News, “EU leaders seek legitimacy through action at 'elitist' event” 30 January 2006, <http://www.evropa.bg/en/del/info-pad/news.html?newsid=1761>.

⁵⁰ Patten, “A Security Strategy for Europe,” 15.

⁵¹ *Ibid*, 16.

⁵² “Mais, [la PESC] fait aussi partie d’un projet spécifique, à savoir l’ambition de promouvoir un modèle d’intégration et de coopération.” Javier Solana, “CFSP: The State of the Union”, Annual Conference of the EU Institute for Security Studies, Paris, 1 July 2002. Translation is my own.

⁵³ European Commission, “European Governance: A White Paper” DOC/01/10 25 July 2001, <http://europa.eu.int/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=DOC/01/10&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en>.

image of a democratic and globally engaged Europe admirably matches citizens' wishes [emphasis added].⁵⁴

Indeed, the EEAS does match the citizens' wishes. Although 82 percent of Europeans want a European foreign policy independent of that of the United States,⁵⁵ and 76 percent want the European Union to exert strong leadership in world affairs, 79 percent believe the European Union should concentrate on its economic power and not rely on its military power when dealing with international problems outside Europe.⁵⁶ Only 46 percent believe the European Union should strengthen its military power in order to play a larger role in the world. Furthermore, 87 percent of Europeans agree with the statement "economic power is more important in world affairs than military power."⁵⁷ The Europeans want to be a strong force in the world, but a *civilian* force. In *Das Parlament*, the EU was dubbed a *Friedensmacht* or "peace-power".⁵⁸ The Schroeder government deemed it "A Civilian Power with Teeth".⁵⁹ As Pace argues, the EU's wishes to describe itself as a "force for good".⁶⁰

In 2006, the EC conducted a qualitative survey over the course of several months. The survey sought to determine European citizens' perceptions about the future role of Europe in the world. While previous *Eurobarometer* polls asked similar questions, this survey discovered a more nuanced understanding of the public's perceptions, most notably regarding the EU's role in foreign policy. In 2001, 71 percent of EU citizens felt that EU foreign policy should be decided at both the national and EU levels, reflecting the common feeling that the EU should function on more of an intergovernmental basis.⁶¹ However, the qualitative study reflects some of the common and contradictory views, namely that the EU is largely ineffective in implementing its foreign policy due to a lack of cooperation between the EU and member states, yet citizens, on the whole,

⁵⁴ European Council Presidency Conclusions, Laeken, 14-15 December 2001, Annex I, emphasis added.

⁵⁵ WEU assembly seminar on the role of parliaments in shaping public opinion on European security and defence: parliamentarian should lead public opinion, WEU Assembly press release, Paris, 28 April 2006.

⁵⁶ The German Marshall Fund, "Transatlantic Trends: Topline Report 2006", 4 and 10.

⁵⁷ *Ibid*, 59.

⁵⁸ Hans-George Ehrhart, "Europa in neuer Rolle: als 'Friedensmacht'" *Das Parlament*, 2 May 2005, 16.

⁵⁹ Deutscher Bundestag, 15. Wahlperiode, "Antwort der Bundesregierung auf die Kleine Anfrage der Abgeordneten Dr. Friedbert Pflüger, Christian Schmidt (Fürth), Ulrich Adam, weiterer Abgeordneter und der Fraktion der CDU/CSU, 15/3181, 21 May 2004.

⁶⁰ M. Pace, "The EU as a Force for Good in Border Conflict Cases?" in T. Diez, M. Albert, and T. Stetter (eds.), *The EU and Border Conflicts: The Power of Integration and Conflicts*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008): 203-219.

⁶¹ European Commission, *Eurobarometer 56.2*, Directorate-General Communications, November 2001, accessed 15 April 2010, http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/index_en.htm.

tend to be suspicious of any action that would infringe upon their national sovereignty.

When asked to identify any significant achievements of the EU, the 2006 study found that respondents frequently signaled out EU aid to developing countries, often in conjunction with the acknowledgement that the EU has been able to provide tangible benefits such as infrastructure development and other restoration works within the EU itself.⁶² When pressed further, respondents, especially in older member states as well as newer ones, cited the benefits of cohesion policies that they experienced. In 2010, despite the global economic recession and euro financial crisis, European citizens, 89 percent, demonstrated resolute support for continuing foreign development aid. Moreover, 66 percent believed that the EU should honor, or even improve, on its promises to increase development aid to 0.7 percent of GNI by 2015, the deadline for achieving the Millennium Development Goal. In this context, 76 percent of Europeans believe that there is added value in EU countries working together, thereby avoiding duplication and ensuring aid effectiveness.⁶³ Regardless of country or region, a significant majority attributed failure to “the lack of unity between the States, the lack of collective spirit, the prevalence of ‘selfish’ interests” especially in the area of external policy, commonly characterized as weak due to lack of “European” influence and initiative.⁶⁴

The public largely views the EU as ineffective, at least with regard to its external policy. Respondents showed little specific knowledge about the external affairs of the EU, but a majority across borders felt that EU action in external matters is not as effective as possible. It is interesting to note that a vast majority of respondents indicated that action on the European level is inherently more effective than on the individual member state level in guaranteeing both individual and collective security.⁶⁵ Security cooperation represents one of the major areas of unmet expectations and simultaneously, hopeful expectation. The survey indicates that despite the perception that EU action in external affairs amounts to little more than a cacophony of voices and interests, EU citizens feel that effective action is possible.

The problem is that member states are perceived as utterly unable to present any sort of common, united position on the international scene, “in particular vis-à-vis the United States.”⁶⁶ While some respondents feared loss of

⁶² European Commission, *The European Citizens and the Future of Europe*, Eurobarometer Qualitative Study, Directorate-General Communication, May 2006, accessed 16 April 2010, http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/index_en.htm: 19, 30.

⁶³ Europeans, development aid and the Millennium Development Goals, Special Eurobarometer 352, September 2010.

⁶⁴ *Ibid*, 31-32.

⁶⁵ *Ibid*, 52.

⁶⁶ *Ibid*, 53.

national sovereignty due to involvement in some conflict in opposition to their personal values or political views, notably in Ireland and Greece, most felt that if the EU was able to form consensus to defend its economic and political interests it would be able to be a more effective and responsive international actor.⁶⁷ The European Consensus on Development explicitly addresses these expectations and failures, stating, “the EU will strengthen policy coherence for development procedures, instruments and mechanisms at all levels.”⁶⁸

What could increase the visibility of the EU on the international scene? Again, the survey offers an answer for EU policymakers. Expectations for Europe in the future are listed in descending order from the highest to the lowest as they pertain to EU actions: economic development (guaranteeing everyone, countries and individuals alike, a higher standard of living), standardized and generous social policies, support to and harmonization of educational systems, an efficient security policy capable of fighting terrorism, protection of the environment, and a common external policy.⁶⁹ It is logical that EU policymakers would like to include development policy within the framework of the EEAS as it has more visibility internally and more tangible, wide-ranging effects externally.

The Developmentalization of Security Policy?

Thus far, this paper has argued that the EU has securitized development policy although the rampant conceptual ambiguity in official policy pronouncements and actions adds to the confusion surrounding the actual identity of EU foreign policy. This confusion suggests a plausible argument that the EU has developmentalized security policy. The creation of the so-called rapid reaction force remains hypothetical as the EU focuses on the smaller and more politically feasible small battle groups initiative.⁷⁰ The previously mentioned limits of the ESDP, now CSDP, help to reinforce the perception of the EU as primarily a civilian power. The overwhelming majority of CSDP missions are civilian in nature. If the EU is unable to form its own defensive force due to its basic institutional structure and competing national interests and expectations, then developmentalizing the security and defense policy by the inclusion of preventative policies, including development in terms of policy and practice makes imminent sense. From a security and defense standpoint, adding development strategies is a politically inexpensive way to increase both stature and visibility without having to commit to any sort of serious defense or military

⁶⁷ Ibid, 53.

⁶⁸ European Parliament, Council and Commission, “The European Consensus on Development,” 6; see also European Commission, *Governance in the European Consensus on Development: Towards a Harmonised Approach within the European Union*, Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, COM (2006) 421 final, 30 August 2006, 9.

⁶⁹ Commission, *Governance in the European Consensus of Development*, 54.

⁷⁰ Nick Whitney, “Re-energising Europe’s Security and Defence Policy,” *European Council on Foreign Relations* policy paper, July 2008: 5.

build-up.

If the purpose of European defense is conflict prevention and intervention in crises if necessary, then it makes sense that the EU should pursue a more integrated approach to provide security for its citizens and promote its values throughout the world.⁷¹ The further encroachment of the EU, specifically the Council Secretariat and member state diplomatic corps, obviously represents a threat to the development community, but it also represents an opportunity for the EU through the EEAS to expand and justify its foreign policy objectives. Securitization fears dominate the debate about the future of the EU's external policy, at least within the development community. However, with the EU becoming more involved in development policy horizontally (that is, allowing member states and the Council Secretariat more influence), it is logical to assume that the EU is developmentalizing its security policy at least to an extent.

The ESS and Consensus on Development both stress the need for increased cooperation in the areas of security and development, respectively. Since the EU is a major provider of development aid and simultaneously handles the political implications of its development policy, giving the EEAS competency in the EU's foreign policy makes sense, at least in terms of streamlining inter-institutional dialogue.⁷² The intricate nexus between security and development also suggest that such an arrangement is desirable from the standpoint of the EU as a major international actor.⁷³ For the EU to appear as and act like an effective actor, it needs to assume responsibility in a wide number of areas traditionally left up to its member states, from development to security and defense to diplomacy.

The legal warning issued to the EU over the role of the EEAS in development and humanitarian policy rests on the perception that the EC will lose control over it, giving too much authority to the HR and subsequently member state governments. Essentially, the EC delegations will serve as the basis for the new EU diplomatic service and will even be staffed by EC officials at least in part. From a practical standpoint, it is illogical to assume that EC officials in charge of development in third countries will lose a significant amount of influence over the implementation of development policy. In a leaked US State Department cable, Glenys Kinnock, UK Africa Minister stated that the UK was actively working within the EU to ensure that the Development and Humanitarian commissioners would keep control of their own budgets to minimize politicization.⁷⁴

⁷¹ Ibid, 9, 39.

⁷² Ibid, 10.

⁷³ Duke, "Providing for European-Level Diplomacy after Lisbon," 229.

⁷⁴ Wikileaks cable "09LONDON2729, Africa: New Africa Minister Focus on Traditional", created on 4 December 2009 by the US embassy in London, released 4 February 2011, listed as confidential.

An EU official close to the HR, as quoted in the *EUobserver* article concerning the legal warning, claimed, “development policy yesterday, today and tomorrow will be based on the [main] instrument adopted on development policy,” namely the EDF, and that rules governing the use of EDF money will not change with the establishment of the EEAS.⁷⁵ Fears about the politicization of EU foreign aid are justified, but the process of politicizing, or securitizing, development policy in the EU has continued for years, at the very least since the formulation of the ESS in 2003. Efforts to coordinate and consolidate development policy between the member states and the EU are ongoing processes. If the previous experience with formulating and carrying out European-level diplomacy serves as a clear example, then the role of development within the context of the EU’s external policy is likely to remain unclear or unchanged.

Conclusion

The EU has struggled to create its identity as a credible actor on the international scene since the inception of the CFSP in 1993. It has received much criticism from within and outside its borders for being unable to act quickly and decisively on the European level; however, as security and development goals increasingly converged through official policy and pronouncements and actions, EU foreign policy has gained more credibility internally and externally, at least in terms of cementing its reputation as primarily a civilian power. The EU will continue to operate internationally through ESDP missions, but now the EU faces the challenge of meeting expectations that it will assert itself more aggressively on the international level, predominantly through effective utilization of development strategy as part of its overall security and defense strategies.

The previous analysis of the ESS, Consensus on Development and the revised 2005 Cotonou Agreement highlights some of the issues that the EEAS still faces. The circular nature of causality in the security/development link ensures that, regardless of how comprehensive the structural changes made through the Lisbon Treaty are, prioritizing certain approaches remains one of the most important challenges for the EU. The lack of a clear distinction between security and development policies remains. Uncertainty over the legality of placing development or humanitarian policy under the control of the EEAS on both the side of the public and the EU merely highlights the issues that the Consensus and ESS failed to adequately address.

The structural limitations of the EU, namely its largely intergovernmental approach to most issues with regard to external action, have hindered much meaningful progress over the past several years. There is still no clear timeline for the creation of the rapid reaction force, and the EU suffers from criticism that

⁷⁵ Phillips, “Development NGOs issue legal warning over new EU foreign service,” *EUobserver*, 27 April 2010.

it has no clear guidelines for participating in crisis management operations. The creation of the EEAS is one step in the process of justifying the need for an EU foreign policy, and it seems that incorporating development will enhance its effectiveness, although it remains to be seen.

If the EU projects its values across the globe through its foreign policy, then actively injecting development policy into its overall strategy makes imminent sense. *Eurobarometer* data suggest that the public largely views the EU as a credible and effective actor, especially vis-à-vis the United States, and more able to project and defend European values. The close association between development policy and the generous social policies common in the EU provides European policymakers the opportunity to justify to European citizens the necessity for more active foreign involvement at little to no political cost.

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