

**REGION LEVEL EVALUATION**  
**Caribbean Region**

**Final Report**

**Volume II: Annexes**

August 2012

*Evaluation carried out on behalf of the Commission of the European Union*





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**Contract No EVA 2007/geo-acp**

**This evaluation is mandated by**

The Evaluation Unit for  
**EuropeAid Development and Co-operation Directorate General  
(DG DEVCO)**

*This evaluation is managed by the Evaluation Unit, which also chairs the Reference Group made up of members from DG DEVCO, DG TRADE, EEAS, and the EU Delegation in Guyana*

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*The opinions expressed in this document represent the views of the authors, which are not necessarily shared by the Commission of the European Union or by the authorities of the countries concerned.*

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## LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

<b>ACRONYM</b>	<b>MEANING</b>
ACP	African, Caribbean and Pacific partner countries
ACS	Association of Caribbean States
BIZCLIM	ACP Business Climate
BSO	Business Support Organisation
CA	Contribution Agreement
CARICOM	Caribbean Community
CARIFORUM	Caribbean Forum of ACP States
CARIFTA	Caribbean Free Trade Association
CARIPASS	CARICOM Travel Card System
CARTAC	Caribbean Regional Technical Assistance Centre
CBI	Caribbean Basin Initiative
CCCCC	Caribbean Community Climate Change Centre
CCJ	Caribbean Court of Justice
CCRIF	Caribbean Catastrophe Risk Insurance Facility
CCS	CARICOM Secretariat
CDB	Caribbean Development Bank
CDE	Centre for the Development of Enterprise
CDEMA	Caribbean Disaster and Emergency Management Agency
CDEMA CU	CDEMA Coordination Unit
CDERA	Caribbean Disaster Emergency Response Agency
CDM	Comprehensive Disaster Management
CEDA	Caribbean Export Development Agency
CET	Common External Tariff
CFD	Caribbean Forum for Development (formerly CGCED)
CGCED	Caribbean Group for Cooperation in Economic Development, (now CFD)
CIDA	Canadian International Development Agency
CISNET	Caribbean Intelligence Service Network
CISP	Caribbean Integration Support Programme
CKLN	Caribbean Knowledge and Learning Network
COHSOD	CARICOM Council for Human and Social Development
COTED	CARICOM Council for Trade and Economic Development
CPDC	Caribbean Policy Development Centre
CRA	Caribbean Rice Association
CREP	Caribbean Renewable Energy Development Programme
CRIP	Caribbean Regional Indicative Programme
CRIS	Common Relex Information System
CRITI	Caribbean Regional Information and Translation Institute
CRNM	Caribbean Regional Negotiating Machinery
CROSQ	Caribbean Regional Organisation for Standards and Quality
CRSP	Caribbean Regional Strategy Paper
CSME	CARICOM Single Market and Economy
CSP	Country Strategy Paper
CTPSD	Caribbean Trade and Private Sector Development Programme
DAP	Drug Abuse Programme
DB	Doing Business (World Bank)
DCI	Development Cooperation Instrument
DFID	Department for International Development
DG AIDCO	Directorate General of the European Aid Cooperation Office
DG DEVCO	EuropeAid Development and Co-operation Directorate General
DG RELEX	Directorate General External Relations

DIPECHO	European Commission Humanitarian Aid department's Disaster Preparedness Programme
DOM	Départements d'outre-mer (French Overseas Departments)
DR	Dominican Republic
DR-CAFTA	Dominican-Republic Central America Free Trade Agreement
EBA	Everything But Arms
ECCB	Eastern Caribbean Central Bank
ECDG	East Caribbean Donor Group
ECHO	European Community Humanitarian Office
ECLAC	Economic Commission for Latin America & the Caribbean
EDF	European Development Fund
EDU	Export Development Unit
EEAS	European External Action Service
EIB	European Investment Bank
EIDHR	European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights
EPA	Economic Partnership Agreement
EQ	Evaluation Question
ETR	End of term review
EU	European Union
EUD	Delegation of the European Union
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
GCCA	Global Climate Change Alliance
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GIZ	Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit
HoD	Head of Delegation
IBRD	International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
ICT	Information and Communications Technology
IDB	International Development Bank
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IMPACS	Implementation Agency for Crime and Security
ISDR	International Strategy for Disaster Reduction
ISPRI	Institutional Support Programme for Regional Integration
JC	Judgement Criterion
JEU	Joint Evaluation Unit
LAC	Latin America and the Caribbean
LDC	Least Developed Countries
LDC	Less Developed Country (in CARICOM)
MCDDR	Multi-Country Drug Demand Reduction Programme
MDC	More Developed Country (in CARICOM)
MDG	Millennium Development Goal
MERCOSUR	Mercado Común del Sur
MFN	Most Favoured Nation
MTR	Mid-term Review
NAFTA	North America Free Trade Agreement
NAO	National Authorising Officer
NGO	Non Governmental Organisation
NSA	Non-State Actors
OAS	Organization of American States
OAS/CICAD	Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission
OCT	Overseas Countries and Territories
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OECS	Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States
OMR	Outermost Region
OTN	Office of Trade Negotiations
PRSP	Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper

PS	Participating States
PSC	Project Steering Committee
PSDP	Private Sector Development Programme
QSG	Quality Support Group
RAO	Regional Authorising Officer
RDF	Regional Development Fund
RG	Reference Group
REDTRAC	Regional Drug Law Enforcement Training Centre
RIO	Regional Integration Organisation
RIP	Regional Indicative Programme
RNM	Regional Negotiating Machinery
RPR	Rural Poverty Reduction
RPTF	Regional Preparatory Task Force
RSP	Regional Strategy Paper
SME	Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises
SPRD	Strategic Plan for Regional Development
SPS	Sanitary and Phyto-Sanitary Measures
TBT	Technical Barriers to Trade RPTF
TCF	Technical Cooperation Facility
TEI	Tertiary education / training institution
TL	Team Leader
TOR	Terms of Reference
T&T	Trinidad and Tobago
UNAIDS	United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNFPA	United Nations Population Fund
US	United States
USAID	United State Agency for Development
USD	US Dollar
UWI	University of the West Indies
WB	World Bank
WTO	World Trade Organization
XCD	Eastern Caribbean Dollar





## **ANNEX I: TERMS OF REFERENCE**



COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN UNION

**Evaluation of the Commission of the European Union's  
co-operation  
with  
the Caribbean Region  
Regional Level Evaluation**

**TERMS OF REFERENCE**

**23 August 2010**

## **1. Mandate and objectives**

Systematic and timely evaluation of its programmes is a priority of the Commission of the European Union (further referred to as 'Commission'). The focus is on the **results and impact** (effects) of these programmes against a background of greater concentration of external co-operation and increasing emphasis on **result-oriented approaches**, particularly in the context of the programmes of the Relex Family<sup>1</sup>.

The evaluation of the Commission's co-operation with **the Caribbean** is part of the 2010 evaluation programme as approved by External Relations and Development Commissioners.

The main objectives of the evaluation are:

- to be accountable and provide the relevant external co-operation services of the Commission and the wider public with an overall independent assessment of the Commission's past and current cooperation relations with the Caribbean; and
- to identify key lessons in order to improve the current and future strategies and programmes of the Commission.

## **2. Background**

### **Regional Background**

The Caribbean region comprises of many small island states scattered over a wide geographical area (see map in Annex 8) that have a variety of cultures, languages and levels of economic development. There are a total of 42 million living in the Caribbean region<sup>2</sup> but the majority of small island states have populations of fewer than 400,000. Growth in the Caribbean has been strong over the period 2003-2009 averaging 3.9%<sup>3</sup>.

There are a number of Caribbean nations that are officially part of the European Union (EU), they are collectively known as outermost regions (OMRs)<sup>4</sup>. There are also some islands that maintain a special relationship with certain EU member states, which are collectively known as Overseas Countries and Territories (OCTs)<sup>5</sup>. OCTs receive external EU support under the European Development Fund (EDF), while OMRs are only eligible for internal EU funding (e.g. regional funds).

The Caribbean States are, in general, democratic, with regular national elections and demonstrate many elements of good governance. Most institutions and democratic bodies are in place but often lack capacity to fully fulfil their mandate. Across the region civil society plays a strong role and there is, in general, a free press, active trade unions and strong private sector.

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<sup>1</sup> Directorates General of External Relations (RELEX), Development (DEV) and the EuropeAid Co-operation Office (AIDCO).

<sup>2</sup> Statistic from the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC)

<sup>3</sup> Statistics from ECLAC

<sup>4</sup> OMRs in the Caribbean include: French Guiana, Martinique, Guadeloupe, Saint Barthélemy and Saint Martin (all are part of France).

<sup>5</sup> OCTs in the Caribbean include: Aruba and Netherlands Antilles (who have a special relationship with the Netherlands); and Anguilla, Montserrat, Turks and Caicos Islands and Cayman Islands (who have a special relationship with the UK).

In terms of trade, the Caribbean economies rely heavily on a very limited number of products such as bauxite, alumina, banana, sugar and rum. However, new sectors have emerged in areas such as aquaculture, agro-processing and ecotourism. In a small number of Caribbean States financial services plays a dominant role in the economy. The United States is the major trading partner of the Caribbean, although trade with the EU is significant (especially in its role as a key importer of bananas).

Overall, the region enjoys a relatively high level of education and health and is on course to meet many of the MDGs but there are some countries that are still lagging behind (e.g. Haiti and Guyana). Key social problems include high levels of HIV-AIDS prevalence rates (second only in magnitude to Sub-Saharan Africa) and issues such as high levels of crime and recycling of illegal money. The region also suffers from high levels of emigration, leading to a brain drain of vital professionals in many countries.

In terms of Human Development<sup>6</sup>, one Caribbean country is judged to be developed (Barbados), while eight are judged to have high human development (Antigua and Barbuda, Cuba, Bahamas, Trinidad, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, Dominica and Grenada) and six are judged to have medium human development (Dominican Republic, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Belize, Jamaica, Guyana and Haiti).

The Caribbean is one of the most disaster-prone areas in the world, ranking among the top 10 countries by number of disasters per land area and per head of population. Climate change has, and will increasingly, hit the Caribbean hard, with more extreme weather events (such as droughts, floods and hurricanes) and increases in sea levels.

In the area of regional integration, there has been a gradual move toward closer cooperation and economic integration over the past few decades. In 1968 the Caribbean Free Trade Association (CARIFTA) was formed. Within a year Antigua, Barbados, Trinidad and Tobago, Guyana, Dominica, Grenada, St. Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, St. Vincent, Jamaica and Montserrat had all joined CARIFTA. They were followed by Belize in 1971.

In 1973 it was decided to transform CARIFTA into a Common Market leading to the formation of the Caribbean Community and Common Market (CARICOM). In 1983 the Bahamas joined CARICOM<sup>7</sup> and it was followed by Suriname in 1995 and Haiti in 1998. Since 1989 CARICOM has decided to advance towards a Single Market and Economy (CSME). The CSME came into existence in 2006 and has set itself an aim for full implementation by 2015. Steps taken so far include the issuing of a CARICOM passport for some member states and the establishment of a Caribbean Court of Justice (CCJ).

In 1981 seven (rising later to nine) eastern Caribbean countries<sup>8</sup>, who wanted to pursue greater economic integration at the sub-regional level, formed the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS). It has a single currency and member states share common functions, such as diplomatic missions, judiciary and regulatory bodies.

In 1993 the Caribbean Forum of African, Caribbean and Pacific States (CARIFORUM) was established with the aim to manage and co-ordinate policy dialogue with the EU, manage the

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<sup>6</sup> Based on the UN Human Development Index for 2009 (using data from 2007)

<sup>7</sup> But did not become a member of the Common Market.

<sup>8</sup> Members of the OECS include: Antigua and Barbuda, Dominica, Grenada, Montserrat, St Kitts and Nevis, St Lucia, and St Vincent and the Grenadines. Anguilla and the British Virgin Islands are associate members of the OECS.

regional funding of the European Development Fund (EDF) and promote wider regional integration. CARIFORUM includes the members of CARICOM, along with the Dominican Republic and Cuba.

The final key regional body is the Association of Caribbean States (ACS), which was set-up in 1994 to promote co-operation within the wider Caribbean region. It includes a greater number of countries in the region (e.g. including many from South and Central America<sup>9</sup>), in addition to those that are members of CARIFORUM.

### EC-Caribbean Development Co-operation Legal and Policy Framework

The European Consensus, which was agreed in 2006, states that the primary and overarching objective of EU development co-operation is: "the eradication of poverty in the context of sustainable development".

As an ACP region, support to the Caribbean region is covered under the Cotonou Agreement which was signed in 2000 and entered in force in 2003. Article 1 of this agreement places the emphasis on the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). EC support to the Caribbean is focused on achievement of the MDGs, whilst also taking into account the fundamental principles laid down in Article 2 of the Agreement and the essential and fundamental elements defined in Article 9.

Article 28 of the Cotonou Agreement sets out the general EC approach to regional cooperation and integration. It focuses on bringing ACP countries into the world economy by: promoting economic co-operation; free movement of persons, goods and capital; diversification of economies; and greater trade. Cooperation in the area of regional economic integration is covered by Articles 29, 30 and 35.

The Cotonou Agreement is implemented through the European Development Fund (EDF), which is funded by EU Member States outside the EU budget process. Each EDF period up to the 9<sup>th</sup> EDF was five years. The 10<sup>th</sup> EDF covers a 6 years period.

The Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) between CARIFORUM and the EU was agreed in 2008 and has a clear development and regional integration focus in line with the Cotonou Agreement.

#### Overview of Past and Ongoing EC Development Co-operation

The EC has been the largest donor to the Caribbean region since 1975. Development co-operation under the EDF has been guided since 1994 through the EC/CARIFORUM. The regional programme for the EC is run from the EU Delegation in Guyana. However, different programmes covered under the Regional Strategy Papers (RSPs) are also assigned to and are implemented by different Delegations in the region.

The **RSP for the period 2003-7** had an overall aim of 'the beneficial integration of the Caribbean region into the world economy through a global repositioning aimed at achieving sustainable economic growth, regional cohesion and stability and continued improvements in living conditions'.

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<sup>9</sup> These include: Turks and Caicos Islands, Aruba, France, Columbia, Venezuela, Panama, Nicaragua, Netherlands Antilles, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Mexico.

The total commitment for the period was **€57 million**. 75-90% for the focal sector and 10-25% for the non focal sectors.

Focal sector of Intensification of Regional Integration was based on:

- Regional economic integration;
- Integration into the world economy; and
- Economic repositioning.

Non focal sectors focused on fighting the major vulnerabilities posing serious constraints on regional economic development and political and social stability:

- Drugs control; and
- Disaster management.

The **RSP for the period 2008-13** has the global objective of 'poverty reduction and integration into the global economy'. The anticipated results of the RSP are:

- Deeper and wider regional economic integration and cooperation;
- Deeper and wider regional cooperation in addressing vulnerabilities and social issues;
- Improved capacity to meet commitments arising out of the EPA; and
- Greater involvement of non-state actors in the decision making process.

The total commitment for the period is **€165 million**. 85-90% for the focal area and 10-15% for the non-focal area.

Focal area: Regional economic integration and cooperation and EPA priority areas including capacity building.

Its global objective is 'to promote economic growth and increased international competitiveness through regional economic integration and cooperation, thereby contributing to poverty reduction'.

Its specific objective is 'sustainable development and cooperation through expansion of the regional economic base and active participation in a CARIFORUM/EC EPA'.

It has six sub themes:

- OECS Economic integration and trade;
- CSME - and CARICOM integration;
- Intra-CARIFORUM economic and social cooperation;
- CARIFORUM/DOM/OCT/EULAC economic cooperation and trade;
- EPA implementation; and
- Investing in Human Capital.

Non focal area: Vulnerability and social issues

Its global objective is 'to contribute to poverty reduction through the reduction of special vulnerabilities'.

Its specific objective is 'sustainable social development, continued improvement in living conditions and engagement of non-state actors as partners in the development process'.

It has three sub themes:

- Crime and security cooperation;
- Civil society participation; and
- Institutional support / programme implementation.

Other relevant financing available to the Caribbean region during the period 2003-10 includes:

- Global ACP projects, such as those that focused on Rural Poverty Reduction (RPR), Renewable Energy, Rice;
- European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights;
- Rapid Reaction Mechanism/Instrument for Stability;
- Instrument for Humanitarian Aid;
- EU Food Facility;
- Water and electricity facilities; and
- European Investment Bank.

### **3. Scope**

#### **Temporal and legal scope**

The scope for the evaluation covers the Commission's co-operation strategies and their implementation, including all activities and modalities, during the **period 2003-2010** (i.e. the implementation of RSPs 2003-7 and 2008-13 under the 9<sup>th</sup> and 10<sup>th</sup> EDFs).

The scope of the evaluation is the Commission's co-operation strategies and their implementation during the period.

The Consultants must assess:

- the relevance and coherence<sup>10</sup> of the Commission's co-operation strategies (all instruments included) for the period<sup>2</sup> (strategic level);
- the consistency between programming and implementation for the same period;
- the value added<sup>11</sup> of the Commission's interventions (strategic and implementation levels);
- the 3Cs: coordination and complementarity of Commission's interventions with other donors' interventions (focus on Member States), and coherence<sup>12</sup> between Commission's interventions in the field of development and cooperation and other Commission policies likely to affect the partner region. In this context special attention should be paid to the cooperation between the Caribbean ACP States and Overseas Countries and Territories;
- the **implementation** of the Commission's co-operation, focusing on impact, sustainability, effectiveness and efficiency for the period<sup>2</sup> and on intended effects for the period under the programming cycle;

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<sup>10</sup> Coherence corresponds here to the evaluation criterion (see annex 6).

<sup>11</sup> See annex 5.

<sup>12</sup> Coherence refers here to one of the 3Cs (see annex 6).

- whether cross-cutting and key issues<sup>13</sup> were actually taken into account, on the one hand, in the programming of documents and, on the other hand, to what extent these issues have been reflected in the implementation modalities and in the effects of the interventions (strategic and implementation level);
- whether the recommendations of the previous regional level evaluation covering the period 1996-2002 have been taken into account.

### **Thematic scope**

The following co-operation areas should be accessed. Although, during discussions with the Reference Group during the inception phase, it may be necessary to concentrate on a limited number of the non focal sectors/ areas:

1. The focal sector/area of 'regional economic integration'.
2. The following themes covered under the non focal sector/area:
  - Drugs control/crime and security cooperation;
  - Disaster management;
  - Civil society participation;
  - Institutional support/programmes implementation;
  - Cooperation with the OCTs; and
  - Education.
3. Relevant key cross cutting issues include: gender and youth issues; governance and capacity building; environmental sustainability; migration; and human rights.
4. Support benefiting the Caribbean from global ACP programmes (e.g. RPR) should also be taken into consideration within the scope.

The results of completed evaluations (mid, final or ex-post) of Commission's interventions are important material on which the Consultants have to build. They are part of the secondary information to be collected and used as such.

## **4. Key deliverables**

The overall methodological guidance to be used is available on the web page of the EuropeAid Joint Evaluation Unit under the following address:

[http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/how/evaluation/introduction/introduction\\_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/how/evaluation/introduction/introduction_en.htm)

Following the signature of the contract, the main key deliverables are<sup>14</sup>:

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<sup>13</sup> The Consultants have to offer well argued proposal which cross-cutting and key issues they recommend to focus on. Cross-cutting issues are: gender, environment, HIV and human rights.

<sup>14</sup> The Consultants have to provide, whenever asked and in any case at the end of the evaluation, a list of all the documents read, data collected and databases built.

- The inception meeting where evaluation questions and judgement criteria will be presented;
- The inception report;
- The desk report;
- The draft final report (including the PowerPoint presentation synthesising the results of the evaluation);
- The seminar in the region;
- The final report;
- The methodological note on the quality control system<sup>15</sup>.

NB: For all reports, the Consultants may either accept or reject the comments made by the Joint Evaluation Unit and/or the Reference Group, but in case of rejection they must justify (in writing) the reasons for rejection (the comments and the Consultants' responses are annexed to the report/deliverable). When the comment is accepted, the reference to the text of the report (where the relevant change has been made) has to be included in the response sheet.

#### **4.1. The inception meeting**

Upon approval of the launch note by the Joint Evaluation Unit, the Consultants proceed to the structuring stage leading to the production of an inception report.

The main part of the work consists in the analysis of all key relevant documents regarding the Commission's co-operation with the Caribbean. The Consultants will also take into account the documentation produced by other donors and international agencies.

If relevant, a brief exploratory mission could be organised.

On the basis of the information collected and analysed, the Consultants will propose evaluation questions and prepare explanatory comments for each. The choice of the questions determines the subsequent phases of information and data collection, elaboration of the methods of analysis, and elaboration of final judgements. The Consultants will also identify appropriate judgement criteria.

A meeting will be held with the Reference Group<sup>16</sup> to discuss:

- the evaluation's central scope;
- the scope extended to related policies;

and to validate:

- the intervention logic according to official documents (and using logical diagrams);
- the evaluation questions;
- explanatory comments associated to each evaluation questions (when possible, indicate judgement criteria).

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<sup>15</sup> Note to be produced within the framework of the quality control activities accounting for 2.5% of the total budget of the evaluation excluding the seminar.

<sup>16</sup> All Reference Group meetings will be held by video-conference in order that participants in the region can participate.



Upon validation by the Reference Group, the evaluation questions become part of the ToR.

## 4.2. Inception report

At the end of the inception phase, the Consultants must deliver an **inception report**, which finalises the evaluation questions and judgement criteria and describes the main lines of the methodological design including the indicators to be used, the strategy of analysis and a detailed work plan for the next stages.

The inception report contains the following elements:

- the national background/context (political, economic, social, etc.);
- the cooperation context between the Commission/EU and the partner region;
- the intervention logic (both faithful and actual) of Commission's cooperation;
- the validated evaluation questions;
- a limited number of appropriate judgement criteria per evaluation question;
- a limited number of quantitative and/or qualitative indicators related to each judgement criterion;
- a proposal containing suitable working methods to collect data and information in the Commission's headquarters and EU Delegations, including information coming from the region itself and other donors in the region;
- a first outline of the strategy and the methods to analyse the collected data and information indicating any limitations;
- a concise description of the development co-operation rationale of the Commission with the Caribbean related to each evaluation question;
- a detailed work plan for the next stages.

If necessary, the report will also confirm the content of the launch note concerning the following points:

- the final composition of the evaluation team and
- the final work plan and schedule.

The two latter points will be agreed and confirmed through a formal exchange of letters between the Consultants and the Commission.

This phase may include a short preparatory and exploratory visit of the Consultants to the field (if not already done before).

## 4.3. Desk report

Upon approval of the inception report the Consultants proceed to the final stage of the desk phase. At the end of this phase, the Consultants will present a desk report setting out the results of this phase of the evaluation including all the following listed elements:

- the evaluation questions with the agreed judgement criteria and their corresponding quantitative and qualitative indicators;

- progress in the gathering of data. The complementary data needed for the analysis and to be collected in the field have to be identified;
- first analysis and first elements of answer to the evaluation questions (when available), remaining assumptions to be tested in the field phase;
- an exhaustive list of all the activities covered during the period and an exhaustive list of all activities examined during the desk phase, bearing in mind that activities analysed in the desk phase (including ROM) have to be representative;
- methodological design, including evaluation tools ready to be applied in the field phase: (i) suitable methods of data collection within the Caribbean indicating any limitations, describing how the data should be cross-checked and specifying the sources, (ii) appropriate methods to analyse the information, again indicating any limitations of those methods in the Caribbean;
- a work plan for the field phase: a list with brief descriptions of activities for in-depth analysis in the field. The Consultants must explain their representativeness and the value added of the visits.

**The field mission cannot start before the evaluation manager has approved the desk report.**

#### **4.4. Field reporting**

The fieldwork shall be undertaken on the basis set out in the desk report and approved by the Reference Group (which includes the Delegation). The work plan and schedule of the mission are agreed in advance with the Delegation concerned. If during the course of the fieldwork it appears necessary to deviate from the agreed approach and/or schedule, the Consultants must ask the approval of the Joint Evaluation Unit before any changes may be applied. At the conclusion of the field mission the Consultants present the preliminary findings of the evaluation:

- (1) presentation during a de-briefing meeting with the Delegation;
- (2) presentation to the Reference Group shortly after their return from the field.

## 4.5. Final reports and seminar in the region

### 4.5.1. The Draft Final Report

The Consultants will submit the draft final report in conformity with the structure set out in annex 2. Comments received during de-briefing meetings with the Delegation and the Reference Group must be taken into consideration.

If the evaluation manager considers the report to be of sufficient quality (cf. annex 3), he/she will circulate it for comments to the Reference Group. The Reference Group will convene to discuss it in the presence of the evaluation team.

Along with the draft final report, the Consultants shall produce a short presentation (PowerPoint) synthesising the main results of the report and following the structure outlined in annex 4. This presentation, the structure of which could be used for the Consultants' presentation during the seminar, will become an annex of the final synthesis report.

### 4.5.2. The regional seminar

The Consultants will make the appropriate amendments based on comments expressed by the Reference Group and the Joint Evaluation Unit. The accepted draft final report will be introduced by the EC and presented by the consultants at a seminar in Guyana<sup>17</sup>. The purpose of the seminar is to present the results, the conclusions and the preliminary recommendations of the evaluation to the National Authorities, the relevant Delegations<sup>18</sup> as well as to all the main stakeholders concerned (EU Member States, representatives of civil society organisations and other donors, etc.).

The Consultants shall prepare a presentation (PowerPoint) for the seminar. This presentation shall be considered as a product of the evaluation in the same way as the reports. For the **seminar** up to 100 copies of the report with annexes on CD-Rom (see annex 2 of the ToR) have to be produced and delivered to the EU Delegation in Guyana (the exact number of reports and delivery date will be specified by the Joint Evaluation Unit at least three weeks before the seminar). The electronic version of the report and the annexes has to be provided to the Joint Evaluation Unit.

Consultants shall produce minutes of the seminar, these minutes being also a product of the evaluation.

### 4.5.3. The Final Report

The Consultants will prepare the final report based on the comments expressed at the seminar and on the basis of further comments from the Reference Group, the Delegation and/or the evaluation manager. Both the presentation (PowerPoint) synthesising the results of the evaluation and the presentation made at the seminar will be revised in accordance to the final report and annexed to it.

The final report has to be approved by the Joint Evaluation Unit before being printed.

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<sup>17</sup> The Delegation in Guyana coordinates and implements much of the regional EC programme in the Caribbean, and so will act at the focal point for the Caribbean regional evaluation. However, it should be noted that some regional projects, in particular those in relation to the Eastern Caribbean, are implemented by the Barbados Delegation and they will need to be consulted when relevant.

<sup>18</sup> Principally this will be the Guyana and Barbados Delegations (who manage the regional programmes). However, draft final recommendations should also be shared with the relevant country Delegations (i.e. Jamaica, Dominican Republic, Haiti, Cuba, Suriname and Trinidad and Tobago) in order to get their feedback.

110 copies of the **Final Main Report** must be sent to the Joint Evaluation Unit with additional 10 reports with all printed annexes. A CD-Rom with the Final Main Report and annexes has to be added to each printed report (PDF format).

The evaluators have to hand over on an appropriate support (electronical or paper) all relevant data gathered during the evaluation.

For publication on internet, the Joint Evaluation Unit must also receive the different versions (if different languages) of the executive summary, both in WORD and PDF format.

The contractor shall submit a methodological note explaining how the quality control and the capitalisation of lessons learned have been addressed.

The Joint Evaluation Unit makes a formal judgement on the quality of the evaluation (cf. annex 3).

## **5. Evaluation questions**

The evaluation will be based on a limited set of evaluation questions (to a maximum of ten), covering seven evaluation criteria: relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, impact, sustainability, coherence and the Commission's value added.

Besides the evaluation criteria, evaluation questions will also address: cross-cutting issues, the 3Cs, and other key issues.

The evaluation criteria and key issues will be given different weightings based on the priority accorded to the evaluation questions.

More information on the evaluation criteria and key issues and on the main principles for the drafting of evaluation questions can be found in annexes 5, 6 and 7.

## **6. Responsibility for the management and the monitoring of the Evaluation**

The Joint Evaluation Unit is responsible for the management of the evaluation with the assistance of the Reference Group.

Information will be given to the Consultants after the signature of the contract concerning the documents referred in Annex 1.

## **7. The Evaluation Team**

The evaluation team should possess a sound knowledge and experience in:

- evaluation methods and techniques in general and, if possible, of evaluation in the field of external relations;
- the Caribbean region;
- the following fields: regional integration (from an economic and governance perspective), trade, capacity development, crime and security issues, disaster management and civil society participation;
- the following language(s): English (reporting language), Spanish and French.

The Joint Evaluation Unit strongly recommends that the evaluation team should include Consultants from the region (notably, but not only, during the field phase) with in-depth knowledge of key areas of the evaluation.

Consultants must be independent from the activities evaluated. Conflicts of interests must be avoided.

It is highly recommended at least for the team leader to be fully familiar with the methodological approach set by the Commission (cf. Joint Evaluation Unit’s website: [http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/how/evaluation/introduction/introduction\\_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/how/evaluation/introduction/introduction_en.htm)).

## 8. Timing

The indicative framework below has to be filled by the Consultants.

<i>Evaluation Phases and Stages</i>	<i>Notes and Reports</i>	<i>Dates</i>	<i>Meetings/Communications</i>
<b>Desk Phase</b>		<i>Sep 10</i>	
Structuring Stage	Short presentation (intervention logic, EQs and 1 <sup>st</sup> set of JC)		RG Meeting
	Draft Inception Report		Optional: Short preparatory visit of the Consultants to the field.
	<b>Final Inception Report</b>		A formal exchange of letters between the Consultants and the Commission confirms the final composition of the evaluation team and the final work plan and schedule.
Desk Study	Draft Desk Report		RG Meeting
	<b>Final Desk Report</b>		
<b>Field Phase</b>			De-briefing meeting with the Delegation.
	Presentation		RG Meeting
<b>Synthesis phase (seminar in the region)</b>			
	1st draft Final report		RG Meeting
	Revised draft Final report		<b>Regional Seminar</b> Up to 100 copies of the report with annexes on CD-Rom have to be delivered to the Delegation; electronic version of the report and the annexes has to be provided to the Joint Evaluation Unit.

	<b>Final Report</b>	<b>Feb 12</b>	110 copies of the Final Main Report must be sent to the Joint Evaluation Unit with additional 10 reports with all printed annexes. A CD-Rom with the Final Main Report and annexes has to be added to each printed copy. The different versions of the executive summary must be sent in WORD and PDF version, and the methodological note.
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The final timing will be the one annexed to the contract signed.

## **9. Cost of the Evaluation**

The overall costs include:

- The **evaluation** as such;
- 2.5% of the total budget excluding the costs of the seminar are to be used for **quality control**;
- A **seminar** in the region.

The total of these 3 elements must not exceed € **300,000**.

NB: The budget for the seminar (fees, per diems and travel) will be presented separately in the launch note.

## **10. Payments Modalities**

The payments modalities shall be as follows:

- 30% on acceptance of the Inception Report, plus 2.5% of the agreed budget to be used for quality control;
- 50% on acceptance of the Draft Final Report;
- the balance on reception of hard copies of the accepted final report, the methodological note on the quality control system and the list of all the documents red, data collected and databases built.

Seminar related costs are to be invoiced and paid separately.

## **ANNEX 1: INDICATIVE DOCUMENTATION FOR THE EVALUATION**

### *General documentation*

- Communications of the Commission;
- Various regulations.

### *Region*

- CRIS<sup>19</sup> (information on the projects and ROM<sup>20</sup>) and other databases concerning the financed projects, engagements, payments, etc.;
- Cooperation strategies;
- Conclusions of the Mid-term and End-of-Term Reviews;
- Key government documents of planning and policy;
- Evaluation reports of the projects;
- Relevant documentation provided by the local authorities and other local partners, and financial backers, etc.

The four following documents are to be handed to the Consultants:

- On access to the information contained by the ROM system for an evaluation;
- Methodological note from Eureval concerning North-South approach to regional level evaluations;
- Template for Cover page;
- Example of executive summary – Mozambique evaluation.

In addition, the Consultants will have to consult the documentation available on Internet (DAC/OECD and EU Inventory, if necessary) as well as the documentation listed or available within the Joint Evaluation Unit (AIDCO/0/3 Library).

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<sup>19</sup> Common RELEX Information System

<sup>20</sup> Results Oriented Monitoring

## **ANNEX 2: OVERALL STRUCTURE OF THE FINAL REPORT**

The overall layout of the report is:

### **Final report**

- Executive summary (1)
- Context of the evaluation
- Answers to the evaluation questions
- Conclusions (2)
- Recommendations (3)

Length: the final report must be kept short (70 pages maximum excluding annexes). Additional information regarding the context, the activities and the comprehensive aspects of the methodology, including the analysis, will be put in the annexes.

#### (1) Executive summary

The executive summary of evaluation report should be maximum 5 pages. The template and structure for the executive summary are as follows:

- a) 1 paragraph explaining the challenges and the objectives of the evaluation;
- b) 1 paragraph explaining the context in which the evaluation takes place;
- c) 1 paragraph referring to the methodology followed, spelling out the main tools used (data of the projects visited, of the interviews completed, the questionnaires sent, the focus groups, etc. have to be listed);
- d) The general conclusions related to sectoral and transversal issues on one hand, and the overarching conclusion(s) (for example on poverty reduction) on the other hand, have to be clearly explained;
- e) The 3 to 5 main conclusions should be listed and classified;
- f) The 3 to 5 main recommendations should be listed according to their priority.

Points a) to c) should take 1 to 2 pages.

Points d) to f) should not take more than 3 pages.

#### (2) Conclusions

- The conclusions have to be assembled by homogeneous "clusters" (groups). It is not required to set out the conclusions according to the evaluation criteria;
- The general conclusions related to sectoral and transversal issues and the overarching conclusion(s) (for example on poverty reduction) have to be explained in detail;
- The chapter on "Conclusions" has to contain a paragraph or a sub-chapter with the 3 to 5 principal conclusions presented in order of importance;



- The chapter on "Conclusions" must also make it possible to identify subjects, for which there are good practices and the subjects, for which it is necessary to think about modifications or re-orientations.

### (3) Recommendations

- Recommendations have to be linked to the conclusions without being a direct copy of them;
- Recommendations have to be treated on a hierarchical basis and prioritised within the various clusters (groups) of presentation selected;
- Recommendations have to be realistic, operational and feasible. As far as it is practicable, the possible conditions of implementation have to be specified;
- The chapter on "Recommendations" has to contain a sub-chapter or a specific paragraph corresponding to the paragraph with the 3 to 5 principal conclusions. Therefore, for each conclusion, options for action and the conditions linked to each action as well as the likely implications should be set out.

### **Annexes (non exhaustive)**

- National background
- Methodological approach
- Information matrix
- Monograph, case studies
- List of institutions and persons met
- List of documents consulted
- Synthetic presentation of the main results of the evaluation (5 slides per evaluation question)

## **NOTE ON THE EDITING OF REPORTS**

- The final report must:
  - be consistent, concise and clear;
  - be well balanced between argumentation, tables and graphs;
  - be free of linguistic errors;
  - include a table of contents indicating the page number of all the chapters listed therein, a list of annexes (whose page numbering shall continue from that in the report) and a complete list in alphabetical order of any abbreviations in the text;
  - contain one (or several) summaries presenting the main ideas. For example, the answers to the evaluation questions and the main conclusions could be summarised and presented in a box.
- The executive summary has to be very short (max. 5 pages);
- The final version of the report shall be typed in single spacing and printed double sided, in DIN-A-4 format;
- The font shall be easy to read (indicative size of the font: Times New Roman 12);
- The presentation shall be well spaced (the use of graphs, tables and small paragraphs is strongly recommended). The graphs must be clear (shades of grey produce better contrasts on a black and white printout);
- The main report shall not exceed 70 pages including the cover page, the table of content, the lists of annexes and abbreviations;
- The content must have a good balance between main report and annexes;
- Reports shall be glued or stapled; plastic spirals are not acceptable due to storage problems.

The Cover page must use the template mentioned in annex 1.

### **Please note that:**

- The Consultants are responsible for the quality of translations and their conformity with the original;
- All data produced in the evaluation are property of the Commission.

**ANNEX 3 - QUALITY ASSESSMENT GRID**

<b>Concerning these criteria, the evaluation report is:</b>	<b>Unaccep table</b>	<b>Poor</b>	<b>Good</b>	<b>Very good</b>	<b>Excellent</b>
<b>1. Meeting needs:</b> Does the evaluation adequately address the information needs of the commissioning body and fit the terms of reference?					
<b>2. Relevant scope:</b> Is the rationale of the policy examined and its set of outputs, results and outcomes/impacts examined fully, including both intended and unexpected policy interactions and consequences?					
<b>3. Defensible design:</b> Is the evaluation design appropriate and adequate to ensure that the full set of findings, along with methodological limitations, is made accessible for answering the main evaluation questions?					
<b>4. Reliable data:</b> To what extent are the primary and secondary data selected adequate? Are they sufficiently reliable for their intended use?					
<b>5. Sound data analysis:</b> Is quantitative information appropriately and systematically analysed according to the state of the art so that evaluation questions are answered in a valid way?					
<b>6. Credible findings:</b> Do findings follow logically from, and are they justified by, the data analysis and interpretations based on carefully described assumptions and rationale?					
<b>7. Validity of the conclusions:</b> Does the report provide clear conclusions? Are conclusions based on credible results?					
<b>8. Usefulness of the recommendations:</b> Are recommendations fair, unbiased by personnel or shareholders' views, and sufficiently detailed to be operationally applicable?					
<b>9. Clearly reported:</b> Does the report clearly describe the policy being evaluated, including its context and purpose, together with the procedures and findings of the evaluation, so that information provided can easily be understood?					
<b>Taking into account the contextual constraints on the evaluation, the overall quality rating of the report is considered.</b>					

#### **ANNEX 4: STRUCTURE OF THE (POWERPOINT) PRESENTATION SYNTHESISING THE MAIN RESULTS OF THE DRAFT FINAL REPORT**

1. The presentation shall comprise not more than five slides for each evaluation question and shall be structured as follows:
  - a) The first slide will recall the (potential) link between the question and the synthetic logical diagram(s) of impact;
  - b) The second slide will present us with the reasoning chain indicating, for each EQ, the selected Judgement Criteria and Indicators (accompanied, when relevant, by target levels), as agreed during the structuring stage of the evaluation;
  - c) The third slide will display the evaluators' findings, following the same structure as in b);
  - d) The fourth slide shall present the limitations of the demonstration and of the findings;
  - e) If need be, some explanatory text may be added in a fifth slide.
2. In addition, further slides will be added for overall conclusions and recommendations.

#### **ANNEX 5: EVALUATION CRITERIA AND KEY ISSUES**

- (1) Definitions (or links leading to the definitions) of the **five OECD-DAC evaluation criteria** (sometimes adapted to the specific context of the Commission) can be found in the glossary page of the Joint Evaluation Unit's website, at the following address:

[http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/evaluation/methodology/glossary/glo\\_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/evaluation/methodology/glossary/glo_en.htm)

- (2) As regards **coherence** (considered as a specific Commission's evaluation criterion) and the **3Cs**, their meaning and definition can be found in Annex 7.

- (3) **Value added of the Commission's interventions:** The criterion is closely related to the principle of subsidiarity and relates to the fact that an activity/operation financed/implemented through the Commission should generate a particular benefit.

There may be three practical elements to illustrate possible aspects of the criterion:

- 1) The Commission has a particular capacity for example experience in regional integration, above those of the Member States;
- 2) The Commission has a particular mandate in the framework of the '3Cs' and can draw Member States to a greater effort together;
- 3) Commission's cooperation is guided by a common political agenda embracing all Member States.

## **ANNEX 6: NOTE ON THE CRITERION OF COHERENCE AND ON THE 3Cs**

Practice has shown that the use of the word "COHERENCE" brings a lot of questions from both evaluation team and evaluation managers. This situation comes from the use of the same word "COHERENCE" in two different contexts.

Indeed, coherence is one of the two evaluation criteria that the Commission is using in addition to the 5 criteria from DAC/OECD and coherence is a specific concept for the development policy as defined in the Maastricht Treaty. The definitions of the same word in the two different contexts are not overlapping and give misinterpretation; to solve this problem the following decision is taken.

### **Decision:**

The definitions of relevance and coherence from Commission's budget glossary must be used for the evaluation criteria<sup>21</sup>:

- **Relevance:** the extent to which an intervention's objectives are pertinent to needs, problems and issues to be addressed;
- **Coherence:** the extent to which the intervention logic is not contradictory/the intervention does not contradict other intervention with similar objectives, in particular within the Commission's external assistance policies;
- **The notion of complementarity as evaluation criteria has to be deleted.**

The definition of the 3Cs has to be given with reference to the Maastricht Treaty modified by the Amsterdam Treaty (articles 177 up to 181, to be adapted if necessary with the Lisbon Treaty):

### **Coordination** (article 180):

The Community and the Member States will coordinate their policies on development cooperation and will consult each other on their aid programmes including in international organisations and during international conferences. They may undertake joint action. Member States will contribute if necessary to the implementation of Community aid programmes.

The Commission may take any useful initiative to promote the coordination referred to in paragraph 1.

### **Complementarity** (article 177):

The Community policy in the sphere of development cooperation, which is complementary to those pursued by Member States, shall foster: (.....)<sup>22</sup>

### **Coherence** (article 178):

The Community shall take into account of the objectives referred to in article 177 (Community policy in the sphere of development cooperation) in the policies that it implements which are likely to affect developing countries.

The 3Cs have to be dealt with as key issues for the Community policy in development cooperation and have never been seen as evaluation criteria.

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<sup>21</sup> According to the DAC Glossary the **relevance** is the extent to which the objectives of a development intervention are consistent with beneficiaries' requirements, country needs, global priorities and partners' and donors' policies. The terms 'relevance and coherence' as Commission's evaluation criteria cover the DAC definition of 'relevance'.

<sup>22</sup> The Lisbon Treaty foresees reciprocal relations between the Community and the Member States and not anymore univocal direction Member States towards the Commission.

## **ANNEX 7: PRINCIPLES REGARDING THE DRAFTING OF EVALUATION QUESTIONS**

### **Main principles to follow when asking evaluations questions (EQ)**

- (1) Limit the total number of EQ to 10 for each evaluation.
- (2) In each evaluation, more than half of EQ should cover specific actions and look at the chain of results.
  - Avoid too many questions on areas such as cross cutting issues, 3Cs and other key issues which should be covered as far as possible in a transversal way, introducing for example specific judgement criteria in some EQs.
- (3) Within the chain of results, the EQs should focus at the levels of results (outcomes) and specific impacts.
  - Avoid EQs limited to outputs or aiming at global impact levels,
  - In the answer to EQs, the analysis should cover the chain of results preceding the level chosen (outcomes or specific impacts).
- (4) EQ should be focused and addressing only one level in the chain of results.
  - Avoid too wide questions where sub-questions are needed (questions à tiroirs),
  - Avoid questions dealing with various levels of results.

(for example looking at outcomes and specific impacts in the same EQ).
- (5) The 7 evaluation criteria should not be present in the wordings of the EQ.
- (6) General concepts such as sustainable development, governance, reinforcement, etc. should be avoided.
- (7) Each key word of the question must be addressed in the answer.
  - Check if all words are useful,
  - Check that the answer cannot be yes or no,
  - Check that the questions include a word calling for a judgement.
- (8) EQ must be accompanied by a limited number of judgement criteria; some of them dealing with cross cutting and some key issues (see point 2 above).
- (9) A short explanatory comment should specify the meaning and the scope of the question.

## ANNEX 8: MAP OF THE CARIBBEAN REGION



## ANNEX II: EVALUATION METHODOLOGY

This annex explains the methodology and various steps used for the Caribbean regional level evaluation.

### Evaluation Process

The evaluation comprises four successive main phases with the tasks summed up in the table below:

**Table 1: Evaluation process**

	Inception Phase	Desk Phase	Field Phase	Synthesis Phase	Seminar and dissemination <sup>23</sup>
<b>Timing</b>	Oct-Dec 2010	Jan-May 2011	June-July 2011	Sep 2011-July 2012	<i>Spring 2012</i>
<b>Activities</b>	Reconstruction of the intervention logic; Formulation of evaluation questions	Study of available documentation Interviews, Brussels, EUD Guyana; Formulation of preliminary answers & hypotheses. Planning field phase	Field visits including Interviews with EUDs and stakeholders	Crosscutting analysis and formulation of conclusions and recommendations, Discussion of conclusions and recommendations with RG	<i>Discussion of conclusions and recommendations with seminar participants</i>
<b>Reference group meetings</b>	Nov 2010	Jan 2011	July 2011	Nov 2011	<i>Spring 2012</i>
<b>Outputs</b>	Inception Report	Desk Report	Presentation	Final Report	<i>Final Report</i>

During the whole process, the Evaluation Team interacted closely with the Reference Group, chaired by the EU Joint Evaluation Unit and composed by representatives for the concerned EU services in Brussels and at the regional EUD in Guyana. At the Reference Group meetings (RGM), held as videoconferences, the Group provided information and advice to the team. Subsequently, the team approached individual group members for interviews or informal advice. The RG's comments to the draft team outputs were taken into consideration before finalising the outputs.

In the **Inception Phase**, the Team studied the EU-Caribbean relations, including:

- The main sectors and modalities of intervention (supported by the establishment of an inventory of the individual interventions and of an electronic platform to facilitate the sharing of information among all team members) and
- The “faithful” intervention logic applied under EDF9 and EDF10

On this background, the Team reconstructed the common intervention logic for the whole evaluation period (see Annex III).

The reconstructed intervention logic and the evaluation criteria and issues mentioned in the Terms of Reference (TOR) were the points of departure for the Team's identification of nine evaluation questions (EQs). With corresponding Judgement Criteria (JCs) and indicators, the EQs provided the framework for the further work of the evaluation.

Tables 2 and 3 below provide an overview of the evaluation questions and of their coverage of the cooperation sectors and of the five OECD and 2 EU evaluation criteria:

<sup>23</sup> Even though it was initially foreseen in compliance with EU methodology, the Seminar did at the end not take place.



**Table 2: Overview of Evaluation Questions**

<b>EQ 1</b>	To what degree did EU cooperation objectives respond to CARIFORUM priorities and were in line with EU Member States' and other donors' objectives?
<b>EQ 2</b>	To what extent did the institutional frameworks and aid modalities support the achievement of expected regional strategy results?
<b>EQ 3</b>	To which extent have the interventions of the Commission contributed to deeper and wider regional economic integration?
<b>EQ 4</b>	To which extent have the EU interventions contributed to the integration of sub-regions within the group of CARIFORUM members?
<b>EQ 5</b>	To what extent have EU interventions contributed to a more competitive Caribbean region within the global economy?
<b>EQ 6</b>	To what degree has the EU co-operation contributed to create the context for deepened trade relations between the EU and the CARIFORUM member states and among the CARIFORUM member states?
<b>EQ 7</b>	To what extent has the EU support contributed to the fight against crime and illegal drug trafficking in the Caribbean Region?
<b>EQ 8</b>	To what extent did the EU interventions strengthened the capacity of the region to better manage disasters?
<b>EQ 9</b>	To what extent has EU support for education and training contributed to regional economic integration?

Each of the nine questions covers at the least three of the five OECD DAC and two EU evaluation criteria “sustainability” and “value added”. Also crosscutting issues like environment, gender and youth or the 3 Cs (coordination, complementarity and coherence) were taken into consideration. The table below shows the sector-coverage of each EQ and the relationship / correspondence to the evaluation criteria and issues. The design of the evaluation questions also takes into account results and recommendations of the previous regional level evaluation.

**Table 3: Correspondence of Evaluation Criteria and EQs**

	RELEVANCE	EFFICIENCY	EFFECTIVENESS	IMPACT	SUSTAINABILITY	VALUE ADDED	COHERENCE	CROSSCUTTING ISSUES	3 CS *
EQ1 strategy	X					X	X		X
EQ2 delivery modalities		X	X						
EQ3 regional integration			X	X	X				
EQ4 sub-regional integration			X	X	X				
EQ5 international competitiveness			X	X	X	X		X	
EQ6 EPA			X		X	X			
EQ7 drugs and crime			X	X				X	
EQ8 disasters			X	X				X	X
EQ9 human resources development			X	X	X			X	

In the **Desk Phase** the evaluation team:

- a) Collected data and project / programme documentation, including statistical information, from:
  - EU headquarters (Common Relex Information Services-CRIS-database), including monitoring reports
  - The European Union Delegation (EUD) in Guyana,
  - Selected stakeholders, including other donors' activities
  - Open sources, including media and internet,
  - Previous relevant evaluations

All information was uploaded to an online platform by which the whole evaluation team could access and exchange large amounts of data. The bibliography of this report is found in Annex IV and the available documentation on the cooperation programmes and projects in the inventory of EU interventions in Annex V.

- b) Conducted interviews with the concerned EU services in Brussels (see Annex VI for list of persons consulted).
- c) Held preliminary discussions with the EUD in Guyana and the CARICOM Secretariat (CCS) in Guyana. (see list of persons consulted in Annex VII)
- d) Elaborated questionnaires for a survey addressing the National Authorising Officers (NAOs) and Business and Private Sector Organisations in the region. (The questionnaires and the survey results are found in Annex VIII)
- e) Approached, when needed, stakeholders telephonically or by E-mail for supplying information supplementary to the above sources, or to follow up on questions raised by those sources.
- f) Analysed the information provided through the above mentioned sources (a-e) in order to elaborate preliminary answers to the evaluation questions and hypotheses to be tested during the field mission.
- g) Elaborated the methodology for the field phase, including a common, semi-structured, interview guide to be used by the individual team members in relation to the EQs they were in charge of. A detailed plan was elaborated for which stakeholders were to be addressed on what questions and by whom. The selection of the 8 countries to be visited (see Table 3 below) was based on:
  - The location of EUDs in charge, the regional organisations and Project Management Units (PMUs) of importance to the EQs
  - The need to visit a representative sample of the Caribbean states combined with the budgetary limitations of the evaluation.

The Desk Report provided preliminary answers to the evaluation questions and hypotheses to be tested during the field phase. It described the methodology to be used during the field phase and provided a detailed work plan for the field phase.

The Desk Report was created by first collecting the available information on the EQs according to the indicators that were formulated in the Inception Report under the EQ-related JCs, while indicating the sources, possible lack of needed information and corresponding remedial action foreseen. Next, based on their respective indicators, judgements were formulated. Finally, preliminary answers to the EQs were formulated, based on the judgements.

The detailed information on the indicators was organised by EQs and judgements in an Information Matrix (Annex IX), while the main Report contained the preliminary answers.

The **Field Phase** started with Team briefings at the EUD Guyana and at the CCS. Subsequently, part of the team went to Barbados for interviews, including with representatives of EUD Barbados. Finally, the individual team members travelled according to their specific agendas as indicated in Table 4 which also shows the list of countries visited.

**Table 4: Field phase country visits**

Countries/Expert	Team Leader (EQs 1-5)	Deputy TL (HR)	Sector expert (EPA)	Sector expert (disaster)	Sector expert (crime& drugs)
Guyana Briefing/ Meetings/	June 14-17	June 14-16	July 3 -6	June 14-16	July 7-8
Guyana Team meeting	June 14	June 14		June 14	
<b>Barbados</b>	June 17-25	June 17-20	July 3-6	May 24-27	July 11-12
<b>Grenada</b>		June 21-24			
<b>Trinidad &amp; Tobago</b>			July 7-9	June 16-17	July 13-14
<b>St. Lucia</b>	June 25- July 4				
<b>Jamaica</b>			July 10-12		July 5-6
<b>Dominican Republic.</b>			June 27-30		
Debriefing at third RGM, Brussels	July 19	July 19	July 19	July 19	July 19
Team work-session, Brussels	July 18 July 20	July 18 July 20	July 18 July 20	July 18 July 20	July 18 July 20

Given the high amount of information available and the impossibility to analyse all in an exhaustive manner the evaluation team has focused both their desk and field studies on a representative sample for EDF projects/programmes (for EDF7, EDF8, EDF9 and EDF10) in line with the sectors covered by the 9 evaluation questions listed in following table.

**Table 5: List of projects/programmes analysed in field phase**

Title	Duration	Allocation in €	Sector Classification
Regional Weather Radar System (9 ACP RCA 001)	2003-2011	12.820.000	Disaster
Institutional Support and Capacity Building for Disaster Management in the Caribbean (9 ACP RCA 009)	2007-2012	3.400.000	Disaster
EU Contribution to the Caribbean Catastrophe Risk Insurance Facility (CCRIF) (9 ACP RCA 020)	2007-2013	8.000.000	Disaster
Multi-Country Drug Demand Reduction Programme. (8 ACP AB 003/DOM 012/ GRD 011/ SVG 008)	2003-2011	1.075.000	Drugs & Crime
Support To Caribbean Knowledge and Learning Network (CKLN-I) (9 ACP RCA 010)	2006-2011	1.999.000	Education
Vocational Tertiary Education & Training In Caribbean Region - University of Technology Jamaica (8 ACP RCA 024)	2001-2009	2.600.000	Education
Regional Law School In The Bahamas (9 ACP RCA 018/019)	2007 (cancelled)	1.689.900	Education
Capacity Building and International Support to the Caribbean Knowledge and Learning Network (CKLN-II) (9 ACP RPR 164)*	2007-2014	10.000.000	Education
Programme Environment Transfrontalier Haiti/ Rep. Dominicaine (8 ACP RCA 015)	2000-2004	10.712.223	Environment

Title	Duration	Allocation in €	Sector Classification
Projet Environnemental Transfrontalier (HT-DR) (9 ACP RCA 011)	2006-2012	2.500.000	Environment
Caribbean Regional Negotiating Machinery (8 ACP TPS 110)	2004-2007	1.030.000 (according to RSP EDF10)	EPA
Support to the Forum of Caribbean States in the implementation of the commitments undertaken under the Economic Partnership Agreement (EDF10)	201 -2015	47.100.000	EPA
Support to the Forum of Caribbean States in the implementation of the commitments undertaken under the EPA (EDF10)	na -2015	47.100.000	EPA
OECS Human Resource Development Tertiary Level Programme (7 ACP RPR 580)	1996-2009	5.946.000	Government & Civil Society
OECS Export capability enhancement programme (7 ACP RPR 762)	2000-2009	1.179.793	Government & Civil Society
Support to Caribbean regional technical assistance centre (8 ACP RCA 042)	2003-2009	1.800.000	Government & Civil Society
Transitional institutional support (Capacity Building for CARIFORUM) (9 ACP RCA 002)	2003-2007	710.000	Regional Integration
Technical Cooperation Facility (TCF) (9 ACP RCA 007)	2004-2010	1.583.000	Regional Integration
Développement économique du corridor nord d'île Hispaniola (9 ACP RCA 004)	2004-2010	53.879.825	Regional Integration
Caribbean Integration Support Programme (CISP) (9 ACP RCA 012/013)	2006-2010	40.500.000	Regional Integration (incl. Drugs & Crime & EPA)
Regional Technical Cooperation Facility (EDF10)	2011-2014	3.000.000	Regional Integration
Regional Private Sector Development Programme (EDF10)	2011-2014	28.300.000	Regional Integration
CSME and Economic Integration (EDF10)	2011-2014	24.940.000	Regional Integration (incl. EPA)
Caribbean Regional Tourism Sector Development Program (8 ACP RCA 035)	2003-2009	8.000.000	Tourism
Programme "Initiative Pesticides" (PIP) (All ACP)	2001-2010	33.787.701	Trade
Integrated Development Programme for Caribbean rum industry (ALL ACP )	2001-2011	70.000.000	Trade
Support to competitiveness in the rice sector in the Caribbean (9 ACP RPR 006)	2003-2013	22.060.000	Trade
Caribbean Trade and Private Sector Development Program (CTPSD) (9 ACP RCA 008)	2005-2009	2.600.000	Trade
Caribbean Trade and Private Sector Development (9 ACP RCA 016)	2007-2012	7.900.000	Trade
Montserrat New Airport (8 ACP RCA 040)	2003-2009	7.857.867	Transport
Dominica Air Access Improvement Programme (9 ACP RCA 003)	2003-2011	11.950.000	Transport
<b>TOTAL (AMOUNTS ALLOCATED IN €)</b>		<b>451.080.309</b>	

The Team members mutually supported the answers to their respective EQs by examining questions of importance to other EQs than the ones covered by themselves during the individual visits. Where possible, the interviews included NAOs and private sector organisation managers using the questionnaires already elaborated, in order to supplement the results of the survey. When face to face interviews were not possible, telephone calls and/or e-mail contact was used.

At the end of the field phase, the results were presented at a Reference Group meeting in Brussels and the occasion was used for a common Team work-session.

In order to allow for in-depth analysis of specific programmes, projects or cooperation issues that may be of interest to the overall assessment, the following **case studies** relating to different EQs were carried out during the field phase.<sup>24</sup>

- ❖ CSME component of the Caribbean Integration Support Programme (CISP, EDF9)
- ❖ Project supporting the Caribbean Regional Negotiating Machinery (EDF8)
- ❖ Multi-Country Drug Demand Reduction Programme. (EDF8)
- ❖ CKLN (centered on delays, EDF8)

The detailed case studies can be found in Annex XI.

The objective of the **Synthesis Phase** was to check the reliability of the quantitative and qualitative information obtained during the field phase and to analyse it in order to arrive at well-founded judgements and response to the evaluation questions. Changes to the desk phase analysis results were made first on the indicator level, next by adjusting the judgements accordingly and finally by adjusting the draft final answers to the EQs

Having arrived at the draft final EQ answers, the Team undertook crosscutting analyses of the answers, in order to arrive at overall conclusions in response to the objectives of the evaluation. Where appropriate, recommendations were made to address the issues raised by the findings.

Contrarily to what was stated in the ToRs, the managers of the evaluation decided against a Seminar for dissemination and discussion of the Synthesis Report, for the disproportionately high financial and organisational effort it would have required. The present Final Report has nevertheless been subject to comments from the Reference Group members.

### **Limits to the Process of Data Collections, Analysis and Judgement Formulation**

Although the evaluation team has tried optimising the use of time allocated in the successive phases there were certain limits to the evaluation which regarded generally:

- Problems with the mobilisation of qualitative and quantitative data, in particular with respect to the CRIS data base (document coding errors, outdated information, non-availability of ROM reports for all major projects/programmes);
- The fact that the available statistics are not always considered very reliable. The uncertainty starts with demographic data, the actual numbers of the population is not known for all CARIFORUM countries. Generally trade data are never complete (smuggling and non-reporting represent a serious problem in a number of countries). Trade statistics, like any source of information, are not free of mistakes and omissions. In particular, FDI flows are difficult to capture accurately (like trade in services data) by their nature, i.e. due to the intangibility of the financial flows. In addition, it is difficult to establish a correlation between an increase/decrease in a countries/region's trade statistics and EU support. Taking into account this difficulty, the evaluators assessed statistical information carefully, not giving them a too high importance and trying to cross check with qualitative information elsewhere available, whenever possible;

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<sup>24</sup> A fourth project was contemplated as a study case, Regional Weather Radar System (EDF 9), but dropped as it repeated too closely the answer to EQ8.


- Limits of institutional memory, that is to say to the unavailability of certain information or key stakeholders due to high turnover of staff at EU Headquarters and in the delegations as well as the CSS and other organisations concerned;

During the Field Phase, the following specific limitations to the realisation of the methodology planned for in the desk phase were encountered. The limitations are also mentioned in detail in the Information Matrix (Annex VIII):

- A major limitation was the limited number of responses to the questionnaire sent to all NAOs of CARIFORUM countries (who were granted anonymity). In spite of several reminders (including from the EU evaluation manager) only four of the fifteen recipients responded. Information and views of responding NAOs were considered but the number of NAOs and more so the number of responses did not allow for statistical use (see Annex VII).
- The number of responses to the PSO survey was also poor (19 out of over 150, including two PSOs operating at regional level and PSOs in seven out of 15 countries (Bahamas, Barbados, Haiti, Jamaica, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, and Trinidad and Tobago). Given the low response rate, this information has only been used to a limited extent and with caution in the analysis (See same Annex VII).
- In certain cases, delayed implementation of activities has not made it possible to assess their impact or sustainability.
- In other cases delayed reporting or meetings prevented the team from its foreseen use of these products / activities.
- Foreseen focus group meetings related to EQ9 did not materialise, due to field visit during the academic summer break.
- In the cases where the EU has supported activities together with other donors, the exactness of the assessment of the EU contribution is limited by an attribution problem

These limitations are reflected in the concerned EQ-answers and consequently in the conclusions of the draft Final Report.

**Figure 1: Limitations and Approach to the Evaluation**



\* NB: EDF interventions regard those regional interventions made available by the Commission's data base CRIS (state December 2010) falling in the evaluation period (4 EDF7 major interventions closed during evaluation period, 17 for EDF8, 23 for EDF9 and 7 for the currently running EDF10).

## Overview of Judgement Criteria, Indicators and Respective Methods Used

**EQ 1: TO WHAT DEGREE DID EU COOPERATION OBJECTIVES RESPOND TO CARIFORUM PRIORITIES AND WERE IN LINE WITH EU MEMBER STATES AND OTHER DONORS' OBJECTIVES?**

**JC 1.1:** The intervention strategy responds to the CARIFORUM agenda.

Indicator 1.1.1: Evidence of continued political dialogue

Indicator 1.1.2: Consistency of priorities and strategies (including the choice of focal/non focal sectors) with CARIFORUM agenda

Indicator 1.1.3: Evidence of active participation of regional institutions in programming, identification, formulation

**JC 1.2:** The EU intervention strategy is in line with the EU co-operation objectives and other relevant EU development policies

Indicator 1.2.1: Consistency of priorities and strategies (including the choice of focal/non focal sectors) with EU development policies and EU regional-level strategies

Indicator 1.2.1: Consistency of priorities and strategies (including the choice of focal/non focal sectors) with EU development policies and EU regional-level strategies

**JC 1.3:** The EU co-operation strategy at regional level is complementary with its strategies at the national levels

Indicator 1.3.1: Coherence between RSP/RIP and a sample of CSP/NIP

Indicator 1.3.2: Examples at sector/country level complementarity

**JC 1.4:** The EU interventions are coordinated with interventions of other donors, taking in account the commitments of the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness and the EU Code of Conduct.

Indicator 1.4.1: Existence of CARIFORUM/CARICOM resources dedicated to donors coordination and a monitoring plan for all-donor execution and programming of RIO support

Indicator 1.4.2: Processes and systems in place for the development of complementarity and value-added between the EU and EU Member States

Indicator 1.4.3: Percentage of joint field missions, diagnostics and reviews

Indicator 1.4.4: Concentration on 2 focal sectors

Indicator 1.4.5: Number of sectors with a lead ownership

**JC 1.5:** The EU took into account the recommendations of the previous evaluation (2005)

Indicator 1.5.1: Consistency of EDF10 strategy elaboration and programming with recommendations of the 2005 evaluation

Indicator 1.5.2: Existence of reports showing that the management response to the previous evaluation has been implemented

Indicator 1.5.3: Cross-cutting issues have been considered in the EDF10 strategy

**Table 6: Methods used for analysis of EQ1**

Judgement Criterion	Documentary Analysis	Statistical Analysis	Interviews	Meeting with Stakeholders/beneficiaries	Analysis of specific interventions	Validity XXX –high XX – with minor restrictions X - limited	Comments (on problems, specific issues of note, etc.)
JC 1.1	☑		☑	☑		XXX	+ Surveys of NAOs
JC 1.2	☑		☑	☑	☑	XX	+ Surveys of NAOs
JC 1.3	☑		☑	☑	☑	XXX	+ Surveys of NAOs
JC 1.4	☑		☑	☑	☑	XX	
JC 1.5	☑		☑		☑	XXX	

**EQ2 TO WHAT EXTENT DID THE INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORKS AND AID MODALITIES SUPPORT THE ACHIEVEMENT OF EXPECTED REGIONAL STRATEGY RESULTS?**

**JC 2.1:** The EU organisation enables the adequate implementation of the regional strategy.

Indicator 2.1.1: Planning and execution of interventions meet established timelines.

Indicator 2.1.2: Evidence of coordination of implementation of activities across the region

Indicator 2.1.3: Evidence of systematic monitoring and evaluation and subsequent follow-up of the co-operation

**JC 2.2:** The EU support contributed to create the capacity of CARICOM Secretariat to be the key partner for the formulation and implementation of the EU regional strategy.

Indicator 2.2.1: Staffing levels meet operational requirements as specified in Institutional work plans

Indicator 2.2.2: Existence of sufficient non-staff resources including financial

Indicator 2.2.3: Existence of effective and operational systems, processes and procedures within the Secretariat

**JC 2.3:** The aid modalities chosen were appropriate for obtaining the expected output.

Indicator 2.3.1: Efficiency and effectiveness scores in ROM reports of regional interventions

Indicator 2.3.2: Reduction of transaction costs of aid modalities as rated by key stakeholders

**Table 7: Methods used for analysis of EQ2**

Judgement Criterion	Documentary Analysis	Statistical Analysis	Interviews	Meeting with Stakeholders/beneficiaries	Analysis of specific interventions	Validity XXX –high XX – with minor restrictions X - limited	Comments (on problems, specific issues of note, etc. )
JC 2.1	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		XXX	Survey of NAOs
JC 2.2	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	XXX	
JC 2.3	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	XXX	Survey of NAOs

**EQ3: TO WHICH EXTENT HAVE THE INTERVENTIONS OF THE EU CONTRIBUTED TO DEEPER AND WIDER REGIONAL ECONOMIC INTEGRATION?**

**JC 3.1:** The EU interventions enhanced the capacities of CARICOM Secretariat and RIOs to implement the CARICOM Single Market and Economy (CSME)

Indicator 3.1.1: Improvement in human and financial resources of CARICOM Sec and RIOs

Indicator 3.1.2: Evidence of a plan for strengthening capacities of CARICOM Sec and RIOs

**JC 3.2:** The EU interventions contributed to CSME implementation

Indicator 3.2.1: Increased number in circulation of persons

Indicator 3.2.2: Increased intra-Caribbean trade in goods

Indicator 3.2.3: Increased intra-Caribbean exchange in services

Indicator 3.2.4: Achievement of objectives in harmonisation of policies, laws and regulation

Indicator 3.2.5: Increase in intra-regional investments

**JC 3.3:** The EU interventions contributed to the economic integration of the Caribbean OCTs and DOMs into the region

Indicator 3.3.1: Increased trade between region and OCTs

Indicator 3.3.2: Increased trade between region and DOMs



**Table 8: Methods used for analysis of EQ3**

Judgement Criterion	Documentary Analysis	Statistical Analysis	Interviews	Meeting with Stakeholders/beneficiaries	Analysis of specific interventions	Validity XXX –high XX – with minor restrictions X - limited	Comments (on problems, specific issues of note, etc. )
JC 3.1	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	XX	Survey of NAOs and PSOs
JC 3.2	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	XX	Survey of NAOs and PSOs
JC 3.3	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	XXX	

**EQ4. TO WHICH EXTENT HAVE THE EU INTERVENTIONS CONTRIBUTED TO THE INTEGRATION OF SUB-REGIONS WITHIN THE GROUP OF CARIFORUM MEMBERS?**

JC 4.1: The intervention of the EU contributed to the delivery of the OECS strategic plan and its implementation

Indicator 4.1.2: Common OECS policies for integration put in place

Indicator 4.1.3: Increase in OECS trade with CARICOM members

JC 4.2: The EU support contributed to the economic integration of Hispaniola island.

Indicator 4.2.1: Increased bilateral trade

Indicator 4.2.2: Evidence of cooperation decisions from Joint DR/Haiti meetings

Indicator 4.2.3: Time saved travelling the North coastal road

**Table 9: Methods used for analysis of EQ4**

Judgement Criterion	Documentary Analysis	Statistical Analysis	Interviews	Meeting with Stakeholders/beneficiaries	Analysis of specific interventions	Validity XXX –high XX – with minor restrictions X - limited	Comments (on problems, specific issues of note, etc. )
JC 4.1	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	XXX	
JC 4.2	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	XX	+ Survey of NAOs and PSOs

**EQ5: TO WHAT EXTENT HAVE EU INTERVENTIONS CONTRIBUTED TO A MORE COMPETITIVE CARIBBEAN REGION WITHIN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY?**

JC 5.1: EU interventions contributed increasing competitiveness of traditional industries in the region.

Indicator 5.1.1: Existence of an evolution of regional and national strategies and policies designed to increase competitiveness of traditional industries

Indicator 5.1.2: Improved capacity of associations of traditional industries to undertake competitiveness studies leading to policy dialogue with appropriate levels of government

Indicator 5.1.3: Increased levels of exports aimed at more diversified markets

JC 5.2: EU interventions helped to diversify the CARIFORUM economies.

Indicator 5.2.1: Trends in growth of new industries within national economies

Indicator 5.2.2: Increased employment opportunities for women

Indicator 5.2.3: Export results in new industries

**JC 5.3:** EU interventions contributed to a better compliance with international SPS and environmental standards and other TBT regulations

Indicator 5.3.1: Adoption of international SPS and environmental standards and other standards by industries of the region

Indicator 5.3.2: Existence of monitoring systems measuring compliance.

**JC 5.4:** EU support to regional BSOs contributes to long-term private sector development.

Indicator 5.4.1: Range and quality of Services provided by BSOs

Indicator 5.4.2: Existence of budgetary and financial frameworks that ensure that BSOs are sustainable in long term

Indicator 5.4.3: Improvement in most countries of the rating of the investment climate as measured by the World Bank in “Doing Business”

**Table 10: Methods used for analysis of EQ5**

Judgement Criterion	Documentary Analysis	Statistical Analysis	Interviews	Meeting with Stakeholders/beneficiaries	Analysis of specific interventions	Validity XXX –high XX – with minor restrictions X - limited	Comments (on problems, specific issues of note, etc. )
JC 5.1	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	XXX	+ Survey of NAOs and PSOs
JC 5.2	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>				XXX	+ Survey of NAOs and PSOs
JC 5.3	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	XX	
JC 5.4	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	XX	+Survey of PSOs

**EQ 6: - TO WHAT DEGREE HAS THE EU CO-OPERATION CONTRIBUTED TO CREATE THE CONTEXT FOR DEEPENED TRADE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE EU AND THE CARIFORUM MEMBER STATES AND AMONG THE CARIFORUM MEMBER STATES?**

**JC 6.1.** The EU support to the EPA-related reforms has facilitated the negotiation of the EPA

Indicator 6.1.1: Existence of EPA-related reforms developed by the CARIFORUM Member States

Indicator 6.1.2: Existence of new trade regimes obtained in the negotiation of EPA

Indicator 6.1.3: Evidence of projects increasing the capacity to meet commitments arising out of the

**JC 6.2:** The support to the Caribbean Regional Negotiating Machinery (CRNM-OTN) has provided the institution with a reliable funding system and the capacity to effectively prepare and participate in trade negotiations.

Indicator 6.2.1: Evidence that CRNM-OTN has enhanced its performance in participation in international negotiations processes

Indicator 6.2.2: Level of EU financial support to CRNM-OTN for the EPAs negotiations

**JC 6.3:** The EU interventions supported active involvement of the private sector and the NSA in EPA negotiation and implementation processes.

Indicator 6.3.1: Evidence of active NSA-participation in the regional EPA negotiation process

Indicator 6.3.2: Evidence of the ability of the private sector to exploit the benefits of the agreement

Indicator 6.3.3: Evidence that communication campaigns have improved private sector’s adherence to the EPA implementation and EU visibility

**Table 11: Methods used for analysis of EQ6**

Judgement Criterion	Documentary Analysis	Statistical Analysis	Interviews	Meeting with Stakeholders/beneficiaries	Analysis of specific interventions	Validity XXX – high XX – with minor restrictions X - limited	Comments (on problems, specific issues of note, etc. )
JC 6.1	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	XX	Reforms undertaken at national level, particularly those countries not visited were not possible to evaluate. We used EU programming information as well as the interviews with persons involved in the trade negotiations at the time.
JC 6.2	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	XX	It was not possible to determine the contribution of the EU vs. other donors in the overall programme and capacity building of the CRNM/OTN. They have moved; change of staff made it difficult to locate the necessary files.
JC 6.3	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	XX	Contribution from private sector development programme was evaluated on another EQ. Indication from private sector representatives was through IOs not firms directly.

**EQ 7: TO WHAT EXTENT HAS THE EU SUPPORT CONTRIBUTED TO THE FIGHT AGAINST CRIME AND ILLEGAL DRUG TRAFFICKING IN THE CARIBBEAN REGION?**

**JC 7.1:** The EU contributed to the strengthening of co-operation between Caribbean Member States and regional law enforcement and related institutions in the fight against crime and illegal drug trafficking.

Indicator 7.1.1: The existence and effectiveness of intra-regional mechanisms set up at the policy levels of government to improve coordination between states in the fight against drug trafficking and related trans-border crimes.

Indicator 7.1.2: Programmes among law enforcement and related institutions strengthened in intelligence gathering, sharing and planning to fight crime and illegal drug trafficking.

Indicator 7.1.3: Evidence of clear national policies and programmes in drug demand and supply reduction.

Indicator 7.1.4: Laboratories improved and forensic capacity of member states enhanced through training

Indicator 7.1.5: Evidence of greater sharing of data/intelligence on drug trafficking through and between member states increased

**JC 7.2:** The EU interventions helped regional and national law enforcement and related institutions to coordinate policy and build capacity in implementation monitoring in the fight against crime and illegal drug trafficking.

Indicator 7.2.1: Existence of formal links for Information sharing between law enforcement agencies

Indicator 7.2.2: Existence of National Drug Councils or equivalent bodies to address drug reduction/prevention and supply reduction programmes.

Indicator 7.2.3: Success of National Drug Reduction/Prevention Councils in putting in place shared programmes for coordination of drug demand/supply reduction efforts.

Indicator 7.2.4: Existence of analyses indicating an increase in member states' capacity to analyse and properly assess the incidence of the drug problem through proper surveillance, data collection and analysis for planning.

Indicator 7.2.5: Extent to which EU interventions have contributed to strengthening of research and reinforcing monitoring capabilities in effecting proper surveillance, data collection and analysis to inform planning.

Indicator 7.2.6: Increased ability of National Drug Councils to deal with primary prevention as well as secondary or tertiary treatment modalities.

Indicator 7.3.1: The extent to which local communities have been involved in promoting greater drug demand/supply reduction efforts.

Indicator 7.3.2: The extent of data availability for policy formulation and public/community advocacy in the fight against drug-related crimes and drug trafficking

Indicator 7.3.3: Decrease in the number of infringements reported by community social workers at ministries, departments and agencies of government.

**JC 7.4:** The EU interventions helped to increase regional effectiveness in the fight against drug abuse and related crimes.

Indicator 7.4.1: Decrease in the number and severity of crimes related to drug use and trafficking.

Indicator 7.4.2: Decrease in the level of drug use by females who are often influential in the reduction of trafficking or use by their male counterparts.

**Table 12: Methods used for analysis of EQ7**

Judgement Criterion	Documentary Analysis	Statistical Analysis	Interviews	Meeting with Stakeholders/beneficiaries	Analysis of specific interventions	Validity XXX –high XX – with minor restrictions X - limited	Comments (on problems, specific issues of note, etc. )
JC 7.1	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		XX	Unavailability of data on specific intervention activities to support analysis given nature of activities.
JC 7.2	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>				X	Limited time allocated to field work did not facilitate direct contact with involved stakeholders at the policy level.
JC 7.3	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	X	Full analysis would require contact with public awareness raising institutions for better assessment of validity, hence secondary information
JC 7.4	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	XX	Required sources were available but no evidence-based analyses of actual impact and effectiveness given the number of donors in the sector.

**EQ8: TO WHAT EXTENT DID THE EU INTERVENTIONS STRENGTHEN THE CAPACITY OF THE REGION TO BETTER MANAGE DISASTERS?**

**JC 8.1:** The EU contributed to the establishment of a functional early warning system/meteorological radar system.

Indicator 8.1.1: # of meteorological radar systems installed, functional and tested in the region as a result of EU support

Indicator 8.1.2: Existence of secure and functional telecommunication networks, linking the new and existing radars in the region

Indicator 8.1.3: Evidence of improved capacity of human resources to utilize technological improvements in radar systems.

Indicator 8.1.4: Real-time access to reliable weather and climate data (including composite radar images), through the use of digital technology of modern weather radars and communication systems in the region, is available

**JC 8.2:** The EU contributed to the adoption and implementation of the Regional Comprehensive Disaster Management (CDM) strategy.

Indicator 8.2.1: Type and quality of technical advice and assistance provided to country partners by the targeted regional institutions of EU support

Indicator 8.2.2: Existence of national disaster legislation that better integrate CDM as a result of EU support

**JC 8.3:** The EU contributed to enhancing disaster response coordination in the region.

Indicator 8.3.1 Existence of coordination systems and processes to link EU support with that of ECHO and vice versa

Indicator 8.3.2: Level of complementarity between EU support and that of other donors in addressing post-disaster needs

**Table 13: Methods used for analysis of EQ8**

Judgement Criterion	Documentary Analysis	Statistical Analysis	Interviews	Meeting with Stakeholders/beneficiaries	Analysis of specific interventions	Validity XXX –high XX – with minor restrictions X - limited	Comments (on problems, specific issues of note, etc. )
JC 8.1	☑	☑	☑	☑	☑	XXX	
JC 8.2	☑		☑	☑	☑	XX	Data provided has internal coherency issues. Poor consistency of answers from interviewees regarding the cause of project inefficiencies such as delays. Both are reflected in the report. Suggestions for alternative organisations to work with cannot be made.
JC 8.3	☑		☑	☑	☑	XX	Conclusions are valid but with minor restrictions given the nature of making conclusions regarding assessing donor and EU coordination, in particular for disaster management, which is complex.

**EQ 9: TO WHAT EXTENT HAS EU SUPPORT FOR EDUCATION AND TRAINING CONTRIBUTED TO REGIONAL ECONOMIC INTEGRATION?**

**JC 9.1:** Tertiary education / training institutions (TEIs), representing most of the CARIFORUM member states, have established coordinated programmes that explicitly relate to regional integration and enhance the use of ICT.

Indicator 9.1.1: Agreement among the CARIFORUM Member States on priorities for common programmes

Indicator 9.1.2: Evidence of active TEI network-participation, or students/trainees participation, from most of the member states

Indicator 9.1.3: Evidence of operational distance education systems and programs with regional level coverage that relate to the objectives set out in the RSP for EDF9 and EDF10

Indicator 9.1.4: Evidence of the Bahamas Law School Library functioning and supporting the regional integration aspects of the Law School education

**JC 9.2:** EU support has contributed to a better match between human resources needs in technical capacity across the region and the graduates of TEIs

Indicator 9.2.1: Evidence of curricula reflecting identified needs relating to regional integration, including ICT and language skills

Indicator 9.2.2: Size of education /tuition fees does not prevent effective exploitation of the human resource base

Indicator 9.2.3: Examples of employability of graduates / trainees that relate to regional integration

JC 9.3: Functioning networks that have been established between education and training institutions at the regional level have created the conditions for a lasting and integrated programme

Indicator 9.3.1: Evidence of continued government support for the new education or training programmes / the Caribbean Knowledge and Learning Network (CKLN)

Indicator 9.3.2: Examples of the involved TEIs / the CKLN having been able to generate income in line with the assumptions in the financing agreements of the concerned projects (such as selling bandwidth access to TEIs)

**Table 14: Methods used for analysis of EQ9**

Judgement Criterion	Documentary Analysis	Statistical Analysis	Interviews	Meeting with Stakeholders/ beneficiaries	Analysis of specific interventions	Validity XXX –high XX – with minor restrictions X - limited	Comments (on problems, specific issues of note, etc. )
JC 9.1	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	XX	Delayed CKLN implementation only allowed for an assessment of likely prospects for coordinated programmes.
JC 9.2	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	XX	It was not possible to identify detailed information about the finalisation and possible results of the UTech project. Attempted focus group meetings at TEIs were not possible under the summer period.
JC 9.3	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	XX	Delayed CKLN implementation only allowed for an assessment of possible, alternative prospects for financial sustainability.

### **ANNEX III: INTERVENTION LOGICS FOR EDF9 AND EDF10**

The Regional Strategy Paper (RSP) for the period 2003-2007 (EDF9) had an overall aim of 'the beneficial integration of the Caribbean region into the world economy through a global repositioning aimed at achieving sustainable economic growth, regional cohesion and stability and continued improvements in living conditions'. The total commitment for the period was €57 million, with 75-90% for a single focal sector (Intensification of Regional Integration) and 10-25% for non-focal sectors.

Focal sector of Intensification of Regional Integration was based on:


- An expansion in the regional economic base to increase market opportunities, improve the attractiveness of investments and achieve greater economies of scale;
- Strengthened trade-related capacity to enable the Caribbean to take part in, and take advantage of, international trade negotiations; and
- Integrating the Caribbean into the world economy in order that it can seize new and diversified opportunities.

Non-focal sectors focused on fighting the major vulnerabilities posing serious constraints on regional economic development and political and social stability:

- Drugs control; and
- Disaster management.

The diagram depicted in Figure 2 retraces the logic of intervention under EDF9. It should be noted that the diagram is a faithful presentation of what is in the programming and other relevant implementing documents.

**Figure 2: Logic of intervention of EDF9 (faithful) 2003-2008: Total €57M**



EDF 9 – 2003-2007 (faithful): Total: € 57M

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The Regional Strategy Paper (RSP) for the period 2008-2013 has the global objective of “poverty reduction and integration into the global economy”. The total commitment for the period is €165M with 85-90% for the focal sector and 10-15% for the non-focal sector. Its second global objective is “to promote economic growth and increased international competitiveness through regional economic integration and cooperation, thereby contributing to poverty reduction”.<sup>25</sup>

The anticipated results of the RSP are:

- Deeper and wider regional economic integration and co-operation;
- Deeper and wider regional co-operation in addressing vulnerabilities and social issues;
- Improved capacity to meet commitments arising out of the EPA; and
- Greater involvement of non-state actors in the decision making process.

The Focal area is Regional economic integration/cooperation and EPA priority areas including capacity building. Its specific objective is “sustainable development and cooperation through expansion of the regional economic base and active participation in a CARIFORUM/EU EPA”. It has four sub-themes:

- CSME establishment and fostering CARICOM integration;
- Deepening of integration of OECS Economic Union both internally and with the CSME;
- Strengthening intra-CARIFORUM regional cooperation; and
- EPA implementation.

The non-focal sectors deal with vulnerability and social issues. The global objective is “to contribute to poverty reduction through the reduction of special vulnerabilities”. The specific objective is 'sustainable social development, continued improvement in living conditions and engagement of non-state actors as partners in the development process'. It has three sub-themes:

- Crime and security cooperation;
- Civil society participation; and
- Institutional support / programme implementation.

Within the first six months of the signing of the Regional Indicative Programme, CARIFORUM had to specify the strategic orientations of the regional policy agenda in a Roadmap. This roadmap is meant to provide indications of measures in CARIFORUM integration initiatives, including on OECS integration initiatives, on cooperation between the Dominican Republic and – CARICOM, and on building capacity for EPA implementation.


This Roadmap is supposed to be reviewed annually by CARIFORUM, and thus facilitate measurement and possible adjustments of the RIP's contribution to the regional development, integration and cooperation agenda.

The next figure retraces the logic of intervention under EDF10 from the main interventions identified at this stage in focal and non-focal sector to the global impact. Again the diagram is a logical reconstruction of the RSP and RIP for the EDF10 programming period.

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<sup>25</sup> CARIFORUM- European Community Regional Strategy Paper 2008-2013, p. vii-viii.

**Figure 3: Intervention logic of EDF10 (faithful) 2008- 2013: Total €165M**



Besides the programmable aid under the EDF Regional and Country Programmes, countries of the Caribbean region could access assistance during the period 2003-2010 from many other funding instruments. These include:

- Private sector support programmes for ACP countries like CDE,<sup>26</sup> BizClim,<sup>27</sup> EBAS,<sup>28</sup> the €20million facility for EPA negotiations, and from mid-2004 onwards the €50million Trade.Com facility;<sup>29</sup>
- Special framework for assistance to ACP banana producers;
- Measures for countries that are parties to the ACP Sugar protocol;
- EU Budget Lines used to finance specific operations, in particular for environmental and natural resources conservation, humanitarian aid and food security, support to democracy, human rights initiatives, NGOs and HIV/AIDS related operations;
- EU thematic programmes (e.g. migration) financed from the EU budget;
- Global ACP projects, such as those that focused on Rural Poverty Reduction (RPR), Renewable Energy, or ACP-EU Water;
- The Disaster Preparedness Programme (DIPECHO) which started operations in the region in 1996;
- EDF intra-ACP funds for crosscutting issues – trade, natural disasters, culture, etc.
- European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) with a budget of €1.104M for the period 2007 – 2013.
- EU Food Facility;<sup>30</sup>
- Rapid Reaction Mechanism/Instrument for Stability;
- NGO co-financing;
- Instrument for Humanitarian Aid;<sup>31</sup>
- STABEX and SYSMIN, replaced by FLEX, a new EDF9 system designed to replace and to compensate for financing gaps in the budget of ACP countries due to a significant drop in export earnings. So far, no Caribbean country has proved to be eligible;
- Investment Facility of the European Investment Bank (EIB);
- EU Member States bilateral funds (e.g. Aid for Trade); and
- The Global Climate Change Alliance (GCCA) between the EU and developing countries, which is financed through the “Environment and sustainable management of natural resources, including energy” thematic programme, for which an additional €50M have been allocated for the 2008-2010 period. Moreover, resources earmarked under EDF10, i.e. the national and

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<sup>26</sup> Centre for the Development of Enterprise. CDE is an ACP (African, Caribbean and Pacific)/EU joint Institution created in the framework of the Cotonou Agreement. CDE's financial resources mainly come from the European Development Fund (EDF). Its objective is to ensure the development of professional ACP enterprises operating in the private sector. Under supervision by EuropeAid/AIDCO, the CDE manages ProInvest, a €110M EU/ACP partnership programme dedicated to capacity building of ACP intermediary organisations.

<sup>27</sup> The ACP Business Climate (BizClim) promotes the Private Sector Enabling Environment Facility (PSEEF), which is an EU funded initiative under the Cotonou Agreement.

<sup>28</sup> The European Business Assistance Scheme (EBAS) is a grant fund which operates on a cost-sharing basis to encourage businesses and intermediary organisations (trade associations, chambers of commerce, etc.) finance expansion projects

<sup>29</sup> The TradeCom Programme was established to provide and coordinate trade-related technical assistance to ACP countries. It aims at consolidating, and even creating, where absent, the necessary capacity that would enable ACP countries to craft trade policies with a view to achieving sustainable development, poverty reduction and successful integration into the global trading system. See: <http://www.tradecom-acpeu.org>

<sup>30</sup> Regulation (EC) No 1337/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2008 establishing a facility for rapid response to soaring food prices in developing countries.

<sup>31</sup> Council Regulation (EC) No 1257/96 of 20 June 1996 concerning humanitarian aid.

regional envelopes that can contribute to the GCCA, and about €200M under the intra-ACP programme in the area of climate change, the environment and disaster risk prevention.<sup>32</sup>

- In the crime and security area, the Caribbean region also benefits from the Instrument for Stability (implemented over the period 2009-2011). Under the project “fighting organised crime on the cocaine route” an indicative budget of €18M - €22M is allocated in order to implement various measures that address organised crime, trafficking and terrorism on the new cocaine route from Latin America and the Caribbean to Western Africa.<sup>33</sup> The centre of the Caribbean region’s multilateral Crime and Security architecture is IMPACS (Implementation Agency for Crime and Security). IMPACS also benefited from the Caribbean Integration Support Programme (CISP 9 ACP RCA 012-013).<sup>34</sup>

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<sup>32</sup> See Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament of 18 September 2007 – Building a global climate change alliance between the European Union and poor developing countries most vulnerable to climate change.

<sup>33</sup> See Commission (2009) „The Instrument for Stability- Multi-annual indicative programme 2009-2011“, Brussels 8.4.2009 C (2009) 2641.

<sup>34</sup> See <http://www.caricomimpacs.org/>

## ANNEX IV: LIST OF DOCUMENTATION

The following list of bibliography is sorted by category and by author.

Author	Year	Document Title
<b>EU POLICY DOCUMENTS</b>		
EU	2010	Briefing for IMPACS, April 2010
EU	2010	Commission Staff Working Document- EuropeAid Annual Report- Accompanying document to the Report from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament
EU	2009	Commission Decision of on the financing of humanitarian actions from the general budget of the European Communities in Cuba (ECHO/CUB/BUD/2009/01000)
EU	2009	The Instrument for Stability – Multi-annual Indicative Programme 2009-2011, C(2009)2641
EU	2009	Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament - EU Strategy for Supporting Disaster Risk Reduction in Developing Countries
EU	2008	Regional Strategy Paper/Regional Indicative Programme (RSP/RIP)
EU	2008	Regulation (EU) No 1337/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2008 establishing a facility for rapid response to soaring food prices in developing countries.
EU	2008	Commission Staff Working Paper- The EU – a global partner for development Speeding up progress towards the Millennium Development Goals- Aid for Trade monitoring report 2008
EU	2007	Financing Agreement No. 6615/AB between EU and Antigua & Barbuda, Dominica, Grenada and St. Vincent & the Grenadines
EU	2007	Regional Strategy Paper/Regional Indicative Programme (RSP/RIP)
EU	2007	Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament - EU Code of Conduct on Division of Labour in Development Policy COM(2007) 72 final
EU	2007	Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament- Building a Global Climate Change Alliance between the European Union and poor developing countries most vulnerable to climate change
EU	2006	Joint declaration by the Council and the representatives of the governments of the Member States meeting within the Council, the European Parliament and the Commission on the development policy of the European Union entitled "The European Consensus" [Official Journal C 46 of 24.2.2006]
EU	2006	Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament and the European Economic and Social Committee- An EU-Caribbean Partnership for Growth, Stability and Development
EU	2006	Commission Staff Working Document- Document accompanying the Proposal for a Council Regulation amending Regulations (EEC) No 404/93, (EU) No 1782/2003 and (EU) No 247/2006 as regards the banana sector - Towards Reform of the Aid Scheme for Community Banana Producers
EU	2006	POSEI: The preferred Option for Bananas
EU	2004	Financing Agreement Caribbean Knowledge and Learning Network (CKLN-II) project, EDF IX
EU	2003	Financial Regulation of 27 March 2003 applicable to the 9th European Development Fund
EU	1999	Council Regulation (EU) No 856/1999 of 22 April 1999 establishing a Special Framework of Assistance for Traditional ACP Suppliers of Bananas

Author	Year	Document Title
EU	1996	Council Regulation (EU) No 1257/96 of 20 June 1996 concerning humanitarian aid.
EU	1995	The Caribbean and European Union
EU	na	International Cooperation Activities in the Seventh Framework Programme
EU ( EU Delegation Guyana)	2010	Regional Report, April-August 2010, Annex 3, Project Fiches
EU (Commission, DG ECHO)	2004	Emergency Humanitarian Aid Decision - reference number: ECHO/-CR/BUD/2004/02000
EU (Council of the EU)	2010	EU-LAC SUMMIT, Towards a new stage in the bi-regional partnership: innovation and technology for sustainable development and social inclusion” MADRID ACTION PLAN 2010-2012
EU (Council of the EU)	2007	Agreement Amending for the Second Time the Partnership Agreement between the Members of the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States, of the one part, and the European Community and its Member States, of the other part, Signed in Cotonou on 23 June 2000, as first amended in Luxembourg on 25 June 2005
EU (ROM by Andronicos Phylactopoulos)	2004	Monitoring Report- Development of Vocational Tertiary Education and Training in the Caribbean Region- University of Technology (UTECH) Jamaica
EU and CARIFORUM	2010	IV EU-CARIFORUM Summit Joint Communiqué
EU and CARIFORUM	2008	Regional Strategy Paper and Regional Indicative Programme 2008 – 2013
EU and CARIFORUM	2008	Economic Partnership Agreement between the CARIFORUM States, of the one part, and the European Community and its Member States, of the other part
EU and CARIFORUM	2006	Addendum to the Caribbean Region Regional Strategy Paper and Indicative Program
EU and CARIFORUM	2003	Regional Strategy Paper and Regional Indicative Programme
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Caribbean Policy Research Institute (CaPRI)	2010	The Economic Partnership Agreement - Towards a new Era for Caribbean Trade (Report R-10-002)
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CARIMPACS	2010	Projects to be submitted for Funding under EDF10

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CARIMPACS	2009	Implementation Report, 9 <sup>th</sup> EDF Project, Institutional Support to CARICOM IMPACS, November 2009 – January 2010
CDEMA	2011	Final Report for the Institutional Support and Capacity Building for Disaster Management in the Caribbean Project
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<b>REGIONAL POLICY DOCUMENTS</b>		
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Caribbean Community Climate Change Centre (CCCC)	<a href="http://www.caribbeanclimate.bz">www.caribbeanclimate.bz</a>
Caribbean Development Bank (CDB)	<a href="http://www.caribank.org">www.caribank.org</a>
Caribbean Knowledge and Learning Network (CKLN)	<a href="http://www.CKLN.org">www.CKLN.org</a>
CARICOM	<a href="http://www.caricom.org">www.caricom.org</a>
CARICOM Implementation Agency for Crime and Security (IMPACS)	<a href="http://www.caricomimpacs.org">http://www.caricomimpacs.org</a>
CARICOM Regional Trade Information System	<a href="http://tradsysonline.caricomstats.info/Home.aspx">http://tradsysonline.caricomstats.info/Home.aspx</a>
TradeCom Programme	<a href="http://www.tradecom-acpeu.org">http://www.tradecom-acpeu.org</a>
UNCTAD Stat	<a href="http://unctadstat.unctad.org">http://unctadstat.unctad.org</a>
UNDP Barbados and the OECS	<a href="http://www.bb.undp.org/index.php?page=regional-risk-reduction-initiative">www.bb.undp.org/index.php?page=regional-risk-reduction-initiative</a>
Union de Naciones Suramericanas	<a href="http://www.pptunasur.com">www.pptunasur.com</a>
United Nations Human Development Reports	<a href="http://hdr.undp.org/en/">http://hdr.undp.org/en/</a>

**Project/Programme Related Documents consulted**

Project Number	Title	Financing Agreement	ROM	Project Synopsis	Response Sheets/ Conclusion Sheets	Auditing Reports	CRIS Implementation Report	Other related documents
7 ACP RPR 385 9 ACP RPR 231	Integrated Caribbean Reg. Agriculture and Fisheries Dev. Prog.	X	16	16	14			
7 ACP RPR 580	OECS HUMAN RESSOURCES DEVELOPMENT TERTIARY LEVEL PROGRAMME							X
7 ACP RPR 754	CARRIBEAN REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME	X	XX	XX	X			
7 ACP RPR 762	OECS EXPORT CAPABILITY ENHANCEMENT PROGRAMME	X	X	X	X			
8 ACP RCA 014	JAMAICA MARITIME INSTITUTE	X	XX	XX				
8 ACP RCA 015	Programme Environnement Transfrontalier Haiti/ Rep. Dominicaine	X	XX	XX	XX			
8 ACP RCA 024	Vocational Tertiary Education and Training in the Caribbean Region - Uni of Technology Jamaica	X	X	X	X	X	X	
8 ACP RCA 035	CARRIBEAN REGIONAL TOURISM SECTOR DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM	X						
6 ACP RPR 597 7 PTU MON 010 8 PTU MON 002 8 ACP RCA 040	MONTSERRAT NEW AIRPORT	X	XX	XX	XX			
8 ACP RCA 042	SUPPORT TO CARIBBEAN REGIONAL TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE CENTRE							
8 ACP AB 003 8 ACP DOM 012 8 ACP GRD 011 8 ACP SVG 008	MULTI-COUNTRY DRUG DEMAND REDUCTION PROJECT	X	XXX	XXX	XXX			X
9 ACP RCA 001	REGIONAL WEATHER RADAR WARNING SYSTEM	X	X	X				
9 ACP RCA 002	TRANSITIONAL INSTITUTIONAL SUPPORT (CAPACITY BUILDING FOR CARIFORUM)						X	
9 ACP RCA 003	DOMINICA AIR ACCESS IMPROVEMENT PROGRAMME	X	XX					

Project Number	Title	Financing Agreement	ROM	Project Synopsis	Response Sheets/ Conclusion Sheets	Auditing Reports	CRIS Implementation Report	Other related documents
9 ACP RCA 004	DEVELOPPEMENT ECONOMIQUE DU CORRIDOR NORD DE L'ILE D' HISPANIOLA	X	X	X	X			
9 ACP RCA 007	TECHNICAL COOPERATION FACILITY (TCF)	X					X	
9 ACP RCA 008	CARRIBBEAN TRADE AND PRIVATE SECTOR DEVELOPMENT PROGR(CTPSD)	X	X	X				
9 ACP RCA 009	Institutional Support and Capacity Building for Disaster Management in the Caribbean	X	XX	X	X			
9 ACP RCA 010	Support to Caribbean Knowledge and Learning Network	X		X				
9 ACP RCA 011	Projet Environnemental Transfrontalier (HT-DR)	X	XXX					X
9 ACP RCA 012 9 ACP RCA 013	Caribbean Integration Support Programme (CISP)	X	XXX					X
9 ACP RCA 014	Capacity Building and Institutional Support for the Caribbean Court of Justice	X	X					
9 ACP RCA 016	CARRIBBEAN TRADE AND PRIVATE SECTOR DEVELOPMNT	X	XX	XX	XX			
9 ACP RCA 017	Caribbean Trade and Private Sector Development Programme - Phase II	X	XX	XX				
9 ACP RCA 018/ 9 ACP RCA 019	Regional Caribbean Law School, The Bahamas	X						
9 ACP RCA 020	EU CONTRIBUTION TO THE CARIBBEAN CATASTROPHE RISK INSURANCE FACILITY (CCRIF)	X	X					
9 ACP RCA 024	STANDBY FACILITY (B-Envelope): Tropical Storm Noel Rehabilitation Assistance for the Dominican Republic + Tropical Storm Gustav Emergency Recovery Grant	X						
9 ACP RPR 006	SUPPORT TO THE COMPETITIVENESS OF THE RICE SECTEOR IN THE CARRIBBEAN	X	xxx	X				
9 ACP RPR 167	Capacity Support for Sustainable Management of Energy Resources in the Caribbean Region	X				X		
na (EDF10)	Delivering Vision 2020 in the Caribbean		X	X	X			
na (EDF10)	Regional Technical Cooperation Facility - 10th EDF							X
na (EDF10)	Regional Private Sector Development Programme	(x)						
na (EDF10)	Economic Integration and Trade of OECS - 10th EDF							

Project Number	Title	Financing Agreement	ROM	Project Synopsis	Response Sheets/ Conclusion Sheets	Auditing Reports	CRIS Implementation Report	Other related documents
na (EDF10)	Support to the Forum of Caribbean States in the implementation of the commitments undertaken under the Economic Partnership Agreement	X						
9 PTO REG 009	Multi-Country Programme for the Implementation of UNCTAD ASYCUDA WORLD	X						
9 PTO REG 013	Management of Protected Areas to Support Sustainable Economies	X						
9 PTO REG 014	GLOBAL C ENVELOP AND REGIONAL ALLOCATION FOR HUMANITARIAN, EMERGENCY AND REFUGEE AID ASSISTANCE FOR ALL OCT'S							X
8 ACP TPS 125	INTEGRATED DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME FOR CARIBBEAN RUM INDUSTRY	X		XXX			X	
All ACP	TRADE.COM ALL ACP INSTITUTIONAL TRADE CAPACITY BUILDING FACILITY	X	XX	XX	XX			
8 ACP TPS 108	PROINVEST	X						X
8 ACP TPS 114 9 ACP TPS 040	Programme "Initiatives Pesticides"	X					X	X
9 ACP RPR	Disaster Risk Management sub-regional programme under the EU-ACP Natural Disaster Facility	X	X					X

## **ANNEX V: INVENTORY OF EU PROJECTS/ PROGRAMMES**

This annex presents the list of regional EDF funded projects (part I) and the list of bilateral projects (part II) for the CARIFORUM region. Furthermore, regional OCT projects that affect Caribbean OCTs have also been identified and listed (part I.a).

Funding from the "all ACP" (TPF) EDF programmes and EU budget line funding allocated to the Caribbean region has also been researched in the CRIS database, but as part I.b of the inventory reveals few projects/programmes could be identified. As regards the EU budget line funding, support was mainly received under the budget lines for environment, drugs and bananas. The European Investment Bank (EIB) has been contacted and provided a list of regional EIB loans granted to the Caribbean, which is stated under part I.c) of the current inventory. Lastly, part II gives a list of bilateral EDF9 and EDF10 support to each of the 15 CARIFORUM countries. This information also includes budget line funding during the period 2003-2010.

### **Note on data compilation and organisation**

The CRIS database provides detailed information about the technical, financial and accounting progresses of EU funded projects. The system displays the names of the country and region where the interventions are planned, the project title and numbers, the planned budget<sup>35</sup> and the corresponding budget lines as well as the DAC codes referring to the sector of intervention.

The evaluators used the information collected from the databases to compile comprehensive "project lists" of regional and bilateral projects providing an overview of the EU's interventions in the Caribbean from 2003 to 2010. As a number of projects from previous EDFs (EDF7 and EDF8) were either closed or are still ongoing within the evaluation period, these have been included in the inventory of regional Caribbean projects and are also considered in the reconstruction of the intervention logic.

Inventory I) contains the exact start and end dates (when available) for each regional project. This information allowed the team to identify all interventions falling inside the scope of the evaluation for temporal reasons. The regional and bilateral project lists were sorted by period of intervention (EDF) or Decision Number (in case of budget line funding) as well as funding source (EDF and Budget Lines). DAC Codes (where available) allowed to identify the main sectors of interventions and to subsequently carry out a sector analysis.

The research was conducted on the basis of geographical criteria. For each Caribbean country, the full list of projects carried out by the Commission of the EU was downloaded together with the lists of regional (RPR and RCA) and OCT projects (PTO). Irrelevant entries were deleted from the inventory.<sup>36</sup> In order to bridge the information gap to the best extent possible, the data collected for the regional and (some) bilateral projects was compared with the inventory of the evaluation teams of these parallel running country level evaluations for the Dominican Republic and Jamaica.

The list of bilateral projects has been created in order to identify national projects with regional significance. Although being member of the ACP group, Cuba has been excluded from the list because the Caribbean country did not sign the Cotonou agreement and is therefore not eligible for EDF funding. For reasons of simplicity, all projects (whether open or closed) which fall outside the evaluation period have been excluded from the list of bilateral projects. The list is thus not exhaustive but gives an orientation of the volume of country level funding allocated to the 15 Caribbean countries.

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<sup>35</sup> In addition to the planned budget, CRIS consultation provides also the amounts contracted and paid.

<sup>36</sup> All pre-financing agreements and cancelled projects have been deleted from the list.

### I) List of Regional Projects (EDF funding)

Project Number	Decision (CRIS) Number/ Funding type	Title	Sector or DAC classification	Implementation			Financial Data (in EURO)		
				EU sign. Date of FA	starting date	closing date (DLE)	Allocated	Contracted	Paid
7 ACP RPR 385 9 ACP RPR 231	FED/1994/006-337	Integrated Caribbean Reg. Agriculture and Fisheries Dev. Prog.	Multisector Aid	09.02.1995	23.03.1995	28.07.2009	17.826.938	17.826.938	17.826.938
7 ACP RPR 580	FED/1996/006-380	OECS HUMAN RESSOURCES DEVELOPMENT TERTIARY LEVEL PROGRAMME	Gov. & Civil Society	29.07.1996	23.12.1996	28.07.2009	5.946.000	5.376.647	5.131.301
7 ACP RPR 754	FED/1999/014-470	CARRIBEAN REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME	Gov. & Civil Society	22.06.1999	01.01.2001	28.07.2009	9.144.400	9.054.849	5.335.137
7 ACP RPR 762	FED/1999/014-645	OECS EXPORT CAPABILITY ENHANCEMENT PROGRAMME	Trade Policy	23.09.1999	01.06.2000	28.07.2009	1.179.793	1.151.984	1.012.000
<b>TOTAL EDF7 (projects closed in eval period)</b>							<b>34.097.131</b>	<b>33.410.419</b>	<b>29.305.376</b>
8 ACP RCA 001	FED/1998/013-906	Caribbean Regional Anti-Money Laundering programme (1998-2002)	Drugs/Crime	12.05.1998	01.01.1998	31.12.2004	3.678.068	3.678.068	3.678.068
8 ACP RCA 004	FED/1999/014-344	1ST WORK PROGRAMME BBD 2.865.268 (FROM 07.99 TO 12.99)	Trade Policy	20.05.1999	31.12.1999	28.07.2009	12.279.301	11.852.325	11.852.325
8 ACP RCA 005	FED/1999/014-421	STRATEGIC PLANNING IN PUBLIC SERVICES	Gov. & Civil Society	17.05.1999	01.10.1999	28.07.2009	1.300.000	1.266.119	1.238.144
8 ACP RCA 009	FED/1999/014-484	University of Technology Programme	Education	24.06.1999	01.08.1999	31.10.2008	54.597	54.597	54.597
8 ACP RCA 014	FED/1999/014-663	JAMAICA MARITIME INSTITUTE	Environment	31.01.2000	01.06.2000	26.07.2009	1.730.000	1.519.069	1.519.069
8 ACP RCA 015	FED1999/014-664	Programme Environnement Transfrontalier Haiti/ Rep. Dominicaine	Environment	04.10.1999	01.07.2000	31.12.2004	10.712.223	1.071.223	1.071.223
8 ACP RCA 020	FED/2000/014-931	STRENGTHENING OF MEDICAL LABORATORY SERVICES IN CARRIBEAN	Health	04.08.2000	01.10.2001	28.07.2009	6.842.207	6.842.207	6.842.207
8 ACP RCA 024	FED/2000/015-259	Vocational Tertiary Education and Training in the Caribbean Region - Uni of Technology Jamaica	Education	08.05.2001	30.09.2001	30.09.2009	2.600.000	1.707.849	1.315.312
8 ACP RCA 029	FED/2002/016-026	DESIGN FOR THE DOMINICA AIRPORTS	Transport	18.09.2002	31.03.2003	29.09.2004	550.000	492.816	492.816

Project Number	Decision (CRIS) Number/ Funding type	Title	Sector or DAC classification	Implementation			Financial Data (in EURO)		
				EU sign. Date of FA	starting date	closing date (DLE)	Allocated	Contracted	Paid
8 ACP RCA 031	FED/2001/015-768	OECS WASTE DISPOSAL B (71016) - LOAN INCREASE (7 RPR 507)	WATSAN	21.12.2001	04.12.2000	31.03.2003	1.300.000	1.300.000	1.300.000
8 ACP RCA 034	FED/2002/015-853	NELSON'S DOCKYARD SEAWALL RESTORATION	Transport	14.06.2002	15.10.2002	31.12.2004	1.720.425	1.720.425	1.720.425
8 ACP RCA 035	FED/2002/015-916	CARRIBEAN REGIONAL TOURISM SECTOR DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM	Tourism	27.11.2002	30.06.2003	31.12.2009	8.000.000	7.606.551	6.064.555
6 ACP RPR 597 7 PTU MON 010 8 PTU MON 002 8 ACP RCA 040	FED/2002/016-034	MONTserrat NEW AIRPORT	Transport	29.11.2002	31.07.2003	28.07.2009	7.857.867	7.765.778	7.653.448
8 ACP RCA 042	FED/2002/016-111	SUPPORT TO CARIBBEAN REGIONAL TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE CENTRE	Gov. & Civil Society	11.02.2003	01.06.2003	28.07.2009	1.800.000	1.800.000	1.677.493
8 ACP AB 003 8 ACP DOM 012 8 ACP GRD 011 8 ACP SVG 008	FED/2002/016-120	MULTI-COUNTRY DRUG DEMAND REDUCTION PROJECT	Drugs/Crime	18.03.2003	31.12.2003	15.04.2011	1.075.000	1.005.579	759.287
8 ACP RCA 043	FED/2003/016-134	CARIBBEAN-LA REGIONAL PREPARATORY CONFERENCE - INFISO	Gov. & Civil Society	23.01.2003	28.01.2003	27.07.2003	74.083	74.083	74.083
8 ACP RCA 044	FED/2003/016-230	Caribbean financial services corporation (cfsc)	Banking & Fin. Services	22.04.2003	25.03.2003	28.07.2009	8.000.000	6.915.639	4.915.639
<b>TOTAL EDF8 (open projects and projects closed in eval period)</b>							<b>70.873.770</b>	<b>56.672.328</b>	<b>52.228.692</b>
9 ACP RCA 001	FED/2003/016-297	REGIONAL WEATHER RADAR WARNING SYSTEM	Disaster	17.12.2003	01.11.2003	30.06.2011	13.200.000	12.480.377	11.774.695
9 ACP RCA 002	FED/2003/016-307	TRANSITIONAL INSTITUTIONAL SUPPORT (CAPACITY BUILDING FOR CARIFORUM)	Reg. Integration	31.07.2003	31.07.2003	31.12.2007	710.357	710.357	710.357
9 ACP RCA 003	FED/2003/016-347	DOMINICA AIR ACCESS IMPROVEMENT PROGRAMME	Transport	31.12.2004	09.12.2003	31.12.2011	11.950.000	11.767.921	10.778.364
9 ACP RCA 004	FED/2003/016-348	DEVELOPPEMENT ECONOMIQUE DU CORRIDOR NORD DE L'ILE D' HISPANIOLA	Reg. Integration	?	12.08.2004	2010?	53.879.825		



Project Number	Decision (CRIS) Number/ Funding type	Title	Sector or DAC classification	Implementation			Financial Data (in EURO)		
				EU sign. Date of FA	starting date	closing date (DLE)	Allocated	Contracted	Paid
9 ACP RCA 005	FED/2003/016-392	FEAS. STUDY: FUTURE OF THE ICT REGULATORY AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK AND ESTABLISH AND DEV. OF THE IST IN THE CARRIBBEAN	Communication	?	30.09.2003	31.08.2006	161.812	161.812	161.812
9 ACP RCA 006	FED/2003/016-479	PREP TENDER DOCUMENTS - RADAR SUPPLY & SUPPORT- RADAR SYSTEM	Disaster	?	15.12.2003	31.12.2006	48.061	48.061	48.061
9 ACP RCA 007	FED/2004/016-619	TECHNICAL COOPERATION FACILITY (TCF)	Reg. Integration	12.08.2004	20.07.2004	31.10.2010	1.582.920	1.582.920	1.582.920
9 ACP RCA 008	FED/2004/017-433	CARRIBBEAN TRADE AND PRIVATE SECTOR DEVELOPMENT PROGR(CTPSD)	Trade	31.12.2006	06.04.2005	30.06.2009	2.600.000	1.767.235	1.705.199
9 ACP RCA 009	FED/2006/018-433	Institutional Support and Capacity Building for Disaster Management in the Caribbean	Disaster	31.12.2007	14.09.2006	31.12.2010	3.400.000	3.241.657	2.206.729
9 ACP RCA 010	FED/2006/018-420	Support to Caribbean Knowledge and Learning Network	Education	31.12.2007	14.03.2006	30.09.2011	1.999.000	1.988.900	1.962.900
9 ACP RCA 011	FED/2006/020-702	Projet Environnemental Transfrontalier (HT-DR)	Environment	21.12.2006	23.10.2006	31.12.2012	2.500.000	2.116.292	383.708
9 ACP RCA 012 9 ACP RCA 013	FED/2006/018-475	Caribbean Integration Support Programme (CISP)	Reg. Integration	31.12.2007	27.11.2006	30.04.2010	40.500.000	39.134.543	26.665.413
9 ACP RCA 014	FED/2007/020-776	Capacity Building and Institutional Support for the Caribbean Court of Justice	Gov. & Civil Society	31.12.2008	17.08.2007	31.12.2012	1.315.000	1.315.000	406.812
9 ACP RCA 015	?	TECHNICAL COOPERATION FACILITY II (TCF II)	Reg. Integration		23.07.2010	30.09.2010	1.000.000	621.246	251.746
9 ACP RCA 016	FED/2007/020-834	CARRIBBEAN TRADE AND PRIVATE SECTOR DEVELOPMNT	Business & Other Services	19.09.2007	19.09.2007	31.12.2012	7.900.000	7.837.504	7.309.627
9 ACP RCA 017	FED/2007/019-273	Caribbean Trade and Private Sector Development Programme - Phase II	Business & Other Services	24.11.2007	?	?	0	0	0
9 ACP RCA 018/ 9 ACP RCA 019	FED/2007/019-148	Regional Caribbean Law School, The Bahamas	Education	29.08.2007	29.08.2007	31.12.2013	1.689.900	0	0
9 ACP RCA 020	FED/2007/020-897	EU CONTRIBUTION TO THE CARIBBEAN CATASTROPHE RISK INSURANCE FACILITY (CCRIF)	Disaster/ Emergency Response	21.12.2007	21.12.2007	31.12.2013	8.000.000	8.000.000	8.000.000

Project Number	Decision (CRIS) Number/ Funding type	Title	Sector or DAC classification	Implementation			Financial Data (in EURO)		
				EU sign. Date of FA	starting date	closing date (DLE)	Allocated	Contracted	Paid
9 ACP RCA 024	FED/2008/020-385	STANDBY FACILITY (B-Envelope): Tropical Storm Noel Rehabilitation Assistance for the Dominican Republic + Tropical Storm Gustav Emergency Recovery Grant	Disaster	21.12.2007	21.12.2007	31.12.2011	14.752.478	10.772.007	7.527.325
9 ACP RPR 006	FED/2003/016-291	SUPPORT TO THE COMPETITIVENESS OF THE RICE SECTEUR IN THE CARRIBEAN	Reg. Integration	17.12.2003	12.11.2003	30.09.2013	22.060.335	21.775.388	21.792.831
9 ACP RPR 162	FED/2008/020-292	Preparation of a Geothermal-based Cross-Border Electrical Interconnection in the Caribbean	Energy	17.12.2007	17.12.2007	31.12.2013	1.500.000	0	0
9 ACP RPR 164	?	Capacity Building and Institutional Support to the Caribbean Knowledge and Learning Network - Phase II (CKL- II)	Education	?	19.12.2007	31.10.2014	10.000.000	9.800.000	4.900.000
9 ACP RPR 167	FED/2009/021-752	Capacity Support for Sustainable Management of Energy Resources in the Caribbean Region	Capacity Building	31.12.2008	19.12.2010	31.12.2013	1.635.000	0	0
<b>TOTAL EDF9 (open and closed projects)</b>							<b>202.384.688</b>	<b>135.121.220</b>	<b>108.168.500</b>
na (EDF10)	FED/2009/222-937	Delivering Vision 2020 in the Caribbean	NGO support	02.12.2009	01.01.2010	31.12.2014	4.000.000	?	724.309
na (EDF10)	FED/2009/021-428	Regional Technical Cooperation Facility - 10th EDF	Reg. Integration				3.000.000	64.950	0
na (EDF10)	FED/2009/021-819	Infrastructure Trust Fund for the Caribbean	Reg. Integration				0	0	0
na (EDF10)	FED/2009/022-056	Regional Private Sector Development Programme	Business & Other Services	na	na	na	28.300.000	0	0
na (EDF10)	FED/2009/022-086	Economic Integration and Trade of OECS - 10th EDF	Reg. Integration	na	na	na	0	0	0
na (EDF10)	FED/2009/022-088	Support to the Forum of Caribbean States in the implementation of the commitments undertaken under the Economic Partnership Agreement	Reg. Integration	27.07.2010		26.02.2015	47.100.000	0	0
na (EDF10)	FED/2010/022-737	CSME and Economic Integration	Reg. Integration				24.940.00	0	0
<b>TOTAL EDF10 (planned projects)</b>							<b>107.340.000</b>	<b>64.950</b>	<b>724.309</b>

*\*NB grey shades indicate that information is missing*

**I a) List of Regional OCT Projects Regarding Caribbean OCTs (EDF funding)**

Project Number	Decision (CRIS) Number/ Funding type	Title	Implementation			Financial Data (in EURO)		
			EU sign. Date of FA	starting date	closing date (DLE)	Allocated	Contracted	Paid
9 PTO REG 001	FED/2003/016-514	STRATEGIC PLANNING IN PUBLIC SERVICES	22.12.2003	22.12.2003	31.12.2009	646.000	646.000	646.000
9 PTO REG 003	FED/1999/014-476	Strengthening of Medical Laboratory Services in the Caribbean	16.11.2004	05.10.2004	30.06.2009	1.138.503	1.138.503	1.138.503
9 PTO REG 009	FED/2007/019-605	Multi-Country Programme for the Implementation of UNCTAD ASYCUDA WORLD	20.12.2007	20.12.2007	31.12.2012	1.550.000	1.380.100	524.064
7 PTO REG 034 9 PTO REG 010	FED/1995/007-831	Extension Caribbean Regional Tourism Development	25.06.1996	27.12.1995	12.01.2012	165.863	165.863	165.863
9 PTO REG 011	??	Strengthening the Integration of the British and Dutch OCTs in the regional response to HIV/AIDS through PANCAP	25.03.2008	25.03.2008	31.12.2013	6.000.000	5.618.448	2.470.199
9 PTO REG 012	FED/2008/020-231	Technical Cooperation Facility - all OCT	26.02.2008	21.12.2007	31.12.2013	2.769.000	2.349.433	2.349.433
9 PTO REG 013	FED/2008/020-229	Management of Protected Areas to Support Sustainable Economies	07.12.2007	20.03.2008	31.12.2014	2.475.000	1.635.575	326.895
9 PTO REG 014	FED/2007/020-892	GLOBAL C ENVELOP AND REGIONAL ALLOCATION FOR HUMANITARIAN, EMERGENCY AND REFUGEE AID ASSISTANCE FOR ALL OCT'S	21.12.2007	21.12.2007	31.12.2013	22.173.623	21.826.955	9.277.115
9 PTO GPR 003	FED/2008/020-228	Technical Cooperation Facility for OCTs		29.08.2006	31.10.2010	430.237	430.237	430.237
<b>TOTAL EDF9 (open and closed regional Caribbean OCT projects)</b>						<b>37.348.226</b>	<b>35.191.115</b>	<b>17.328.309</b>

*\*NB grey shades indicate that information is missing*

**I b) List of Regional Budget Line Funding (All Countries) and All ACP EDF Funding to the Caribbean Region**

Project Number of EDF or Budget Line	Title	Sector or DAC classification	Implementation		Financial Data (in EURO)		
			EU date of decision	Disbursement deadline	Allocated	Contracted	Paid
FED/2001/015-561	INTEGRATED DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME FOR CARIBBEAN RUM INDUSTRY	Agro Industry	27.11.2001	31.12.2011	70.000.000	68.103.585	60.249.527
FED/2003/016-302	TRADE.COM ALL ACP INSTITUTIONAL TRADE CAPACITY BUILDING FACILITY	Trade			60.000.000	49.950.820	40.637.077
	PROINVEST	Trade	01.01.2000	18.10.2012	110.000.000	100.516.699	100.516.699
	Programme "Initiatives Pesticides"	Trade	01.01.2001	31.12.2010	33.787.701	33.787.701	33.787.701
FED/2007/019-184	Disaster Risk Management sub-regional programme under the EU-ACP Natural Disaster Facility	Emergency Response	21.12.2007	31.12.2015	12.000.000	4.907.945	1.927.612
BAN/2000/003-102	DOMINICA 2000 - ACHIEVING COMM. OF THE BANANA SECTOR (DOM/BL7/2000/01)	Agriculture	09.03.2001	30.06.2010	6.500.000	6.431.427	4.378.879
BAN/2001/003-110	DOMINICA SFA 2001 - BANANA SUPPORT PROGRAMME	Agriculture	15.04.2003	31.12.2009	6.700.000	6.693.233	6.626.542
BAN/2002/003-115	BAN 2001- ETUDES, EVALUATION ET MONITORING ( pour la mise en oeuvre du règlement CE 856/1999 du Conseil)	Agriculture		30.06.2006	500.000	318.581	315.431
BAN/2002/003-448	DOMINICA 2002 - ACHIEVING COMMERC. OF THE BANANA SECTOR AND PROMOTING RURAL EMPLOY	Agriculture	15.04.2003	31.12.2009	6.400.000	5.858.276	5.673.774
DCI-ENV/2009/203-175	Demarcation and establishment of the Caribbean Biological Corridor	Environment			2.800.000		
DRG/1995/ 004-112	Caribbean Regional Certificate Programme in Addiction Studies	Drugs	08.08.1995	31.12.2006	408.954	408.954	408.954
DRG/1997/ 003-714	DRUGS CONTROL COORDINATION MECHANISM IN THE CARIBBEAN	Drugs	13.10.1997	31.12.2006	190.910	190.910	190.910
DRG/1997/ 003-716	NORTH-SOUTH COOPERATION IN THE FIGHT AGAINST DRUGS : STRENGTHENING OF THE CCEC REGIONAL CLEARANCE SYSTEM NETWORK	Drugs	31.10.1997	31.12.2006	499.593	499.593	499.593
DRG/1997/ 003-718	UPGRADING OF FORENSIC LABORATORY CAPABILITIES IN THE CARIBBEAN	Drugs	22.10.1997	31.12.2006	378.835	378.835	378.835
DRG/1999/ 003-644	Precursor Programme for Caribbean Regional and Inter Regional Co-operation with Africa in Treatment and Rehabilitation	Drugs	17.12.1999	20.04.2004	633.146	633.146	633.146

Project Number of EDF or Budget Line	Title	Sector or DAC classification	Implementation		Financial Data (in EURO)		
			EU date of decision	Disbursement deadline	Allocated	Contracted	Paid
DRG/1999/ 003-646	INTER-REGIONAL TRAINING AND CAPACITY-BUILDING PROGRAM IN DRUG ABUSE PREVENTION AND TREATMENT FOR THE CARIBBEAN BASIN, CENTRAL and South DRUGS	Drugs	28.10.1999	31.12.2004	190.700	190.700	190.700
DRG/1999/ 005-838	NORTH-SOUTH CO-OPERATION IN THE FIGHT AGAINST DRUGS	Drugs	25.11.1999	31.12.2004	935.191	935.191	935.191
DRG/2000/ 004-882	Study on the ganja situation in the Caribbean	Drugs	01.01.2000	31.12.2004	31.883	31.883	31.883
ENV/1999/ 003-513	Regional initiative to promote community based natural tourism, environmental education and conservation of islands ecosystem in eastern Caribbean	Environment	07.08.1999	31.12.2005	1.299.038	1.299.038	1.299.038
ENV/2006/114-812	Practices and Policies that Improve Forest Management and the Livelihoods of the Rural Poor in the Insular Caribbean	Environment		31.06.2010	449.980	449.980	404.982
<b>TOTAL All ACP Countries and Budget Lines (Caribbean= zone benefitting)</b>					<b>313.705.931</b>	<b>281.586.497</b>	<b>259.086.472</b>

*\*NB grey shades indicate that information is missing*

**I c) List of EIB Funding to the Caribbean Region**

Funding type	Title	Sector	Implementation			Financial Data (in EURO)	
			Year of Signature	starting date	closing date	Allocated	Status
8 ACP RCA 017	CARIBBEAN INVESTMENT FUND	Banking and financial services	2000			10.000.000	Disbursed
EDF	CARIBBEAN MICROFINANCE LTD (CML)	Financial services	2001			5.000.000	Signed
EDF	CFSC GL III A	Credit line	2003			4.000.000	Disbursed
EDF	CFSC GL III B	Credit line	2003			4.000.000	Disbursed
8 ACP RCA 041	DFLSA GLOBAL FACILITIES	Financial services	2004			4.000.000	Disbursed
8 ACP RCA 041	DFLSA GLOBAL FACILITIES	Financial services	2004			1.000.000	Signed
EIB own resources	CARIBBEAN DEV BANK III FACILITY	Credit line	2005			40.000.000	Disbursed
EDF	CARIBBEAN DEV BANK IV B	Financial services	2006			20.000.000	Signed
EDF	AIC CARIBBEAN FUND BARBADOS	Financial services	2007			45.000.000	Signed
EIB own resources	DFL REGIONAL SME	Credit line	2008			9.000.000	Signed
<b>Total EIB loans (granted during evaluation period)</b>						<b>142.000.000</b>	<b>0</b>

*\*NB grey shades indicate that information is missing*

## II) List of Bilateral Projects by Country

					Financial Data (in EURO)		
Country	EDF No. / BL	Decision (CRIS) Number/ Funding type	Title	Sector or DAC Classification	Allocated	Contracted	Paid
Antigua & Barbuda	EDF9	FED/2003/016-310	STRENGTHENING OF TECHNICAL AND VOCATIONAL EDUCATION PROJECT	Education	3.883.407	3.708.770	3.628.940
Antigua & Barbuda	EDF9	FED/2003/016-331	PREP. FP - LEARNING RESOURCE CENTRE (+8 AB 1)	Education	4.541	4.541	4.541
Antigua & Barbuda	EDF9	FED/2004/016-583	TECHNICAL COOPERATION FACILITY (TCF)	Government & Civil Society	480.000	446.599	336.477
Antigua & Barbuda	EDF9	FED/2006/017-919	UPGRADING OF FACILITIES AT ANTIGUA STATE COLLEGE MORE THAN 20% OF NIP	Education	2.340.000	2.251.550	1.048.951
Antigua & Barbuda	EDF9	FED/2007/020-818	TECHNICAL COOPERATION FACILITY 2 (TCF 2)	Government & Civil Society	416.593	194.488	155.213
Antigua & Barbuda	EDF10	FED/2009/021-749	Technical Cooperation Facility, Support to Non-State Actors and Support Services to the NAO	Government & Civil Society	400.000	171.000	85.613
Antigua & Barbuda	EDF10	FED/2009/021-750	Public Financial Management Reform Programme	Government & Civil Society	3.000.000	0	0
Antigua & Barbuda	EDF10	FED/2010/022-407	General Budget Support - Vulnerability Flex 2010 in Antigua and Barbuda	General Budget Support	9.000.000	0	0
<b>Total EDF9 &amp; EDF10</b>					<b>19.524.541</b>	<b>6.776.949</b>	<b>5.259.735</b>
Bahamas	EDF9	FED/2004/016-602	TECHNICAL COOPERATION FACILITY (TCF)	Government & Civil Society	77.267	77.267	77.267
Bahamas	EDF9	FED/2007/018-803	Support to the social and economic development of the Family Islands in the Commonwealth of The Bahamas	Multisector	6.830.000	5.937.350	1.735.445
Bahamas	EDF9	FED/2007/019-148	Regional Caribbean Law School, The Bahamas	Education	1.689.900	0	0
<b>Total EDF9 &amp; EDF10</b>					<b>8.597.167</b>	<b>6.014.617</b>	<b>1.812.712</b>
Barbados	SUGAR	DCI-SUCRE/2006/018-418	Accompanying Measures 2006 for Sugar Protocol Countries	Agriculture	2.332.000	2.122.904	303.807
Barbados	SUGAR	DCI-SUCRE/2007/019-141	Accompanying Measures 2007 for Sugar Protocol Countries;	Communications	11.133.000	11.060.000	5.530.000
Barbados	SUGAR	DCI-SUCRE/2008/019-930	International Business & Financial Services - Sector Budget Support	Banking & Financial Services	10.134.000	9.679.806	4.858.034

					Financial Data (in EURO)		
Country	EDF No. / BL	Decision (CRIS) Number/ Funding type	Title	Sector or DAC Classification	Allocated	Contracted	Paid
Barbados	EDF9	FED/2003/016-315	TA FOR PREPARATION OF HEALTH SECTOR SUPPORT UNDER 9TH EDF /NIP	General Budget Support	28.603	28.603	28.603
Barbados	EDF9	FED/2004/016-584	TECHNICAL COOPERATION FACILITY (TCF)	General Budget Support	300.000	290.732	165.494
Barbados	EDF9	FED/2004/017-398	BARBADOS HEALTH PROGRAMME	Health	10.500.000	10.211.963	9.034.343
Barbados	EDF9	FED/2007/020-834	CARRIBEAN TRADE AND PRIVATE SECTOR DEVELOPMNT	Business Support	7.900.000	7.837.504	7.309.627
Barbados	EDF9	FED/2007/020-892	GLOBAL C ENVELOP AND REGIONAL ALLOCATION FOR HUMANITARIAN, EMERGENCY AND REFUGEE AID ASSISTANCE FOR ALL OCT'S	Emergency Response	22.173.623	21.826.955	9.394.278
Barbados	EDF9	FED/2007/020-897	EU CONTRIBUTION TO THE CARIBBEAN CATASTROPHE RISK INSURANCEFACILITY (CCRIF)	Emergency Response	8.000.000	8.000.000	8.000.000
Barbados	EDF10	FED/2009/021-492	10 EDF Technical Assistance to the Office of the NAO	Government & Civil Society	487.500	161.500	80.750
Barbados	EDF10	FED/2009/021-516	Barbados 10th EDF TCF and Support to NSA	Government & Civil Society	975.000	539.870	289.222
<b>Total EDF9 &amp; EDF10, including Budget Lines</b>					<b>73.963.726</b>	<b>71.759.837</b>	<b>44.994.158</b>
Belize	BANANAS	BAN/2000/004-650	BELIZE 2000 - BANANA INDUSTRY REHABILITATION BELIZE	Agriculture	3.100.000	2.877.855	2.900.449
Belize	BANANAS	BAN/2001/003-507	BELIZE 2001 - BANANA SUPPORT PROGRAMME	Agriculture	3.450.000	3.120.227	3.084.899
Belize	BANANAS	BAN/2002/003-444	BELIZE 2002 - SUPPORT TO THE BANANA INDUSTRY SFA 2002	Agriculture	3.500.000	3.067.709	2.897.105
Belize	BANANAS	BAN/2003/006-019	BELIZE SFA 2003 - Banana support programme	Agriculture	3.200.000	1.555.692	1.555.692
Belize	BANANAS	BAN/2004/016-921	BELIZE SFA 2004	Agriculture	2.930.000	2.711.699	2.694.135
Belize	BANANAS	BAN/2005/017-616	EU Banana Support Programme 2005	Agriculture	2.490.000	2.422.056	2.347.131
Belize	BANANAS	BAN/2006/018-439	Belize - EU BSP - SFA 2006	Agriculture	2.110.000	2.076.687	1.400.392



					Financial Data (in EURO)		
Country	EDF No. / BL	Decision (CRIS) Number/ Funding type	Title	Sector or DAC Classification	Allocated	Contracted	Paid
Belize	BANANAS	BAN/2007/019-245	Belize - EU BSP - SFA 2007	Agriculture	1.800.000	1.013.172	200.499
Belize	BANANAS	BAN/2008/020-121	Special Framework of Assistance (SFA) 2008 - Belize	Education	2.039.000	1.902.613	32.676
Belize	SUGAR	DCI-SUCRE/2007/019-275	Accompanying measures 2007 for sugar protocol countries - Belize	Rural Development	6.000.000	3.698.266	2.609.468
Belize	SUGAR	DCI-SUCRE/2008/020-032	2008 allocation of the Accompanying Measures for Sugar Protocol Countries (AMS) for Belize	Transport	9.000.000	0	0
Belize	SUGAR	DCI-SUCRE/2009/021-208	2009 allocation of the Accompanying Measures for Sugar Protocol Countries (AMS) for Belize	Agriculture	13.140.000	0	0
Belize	EDF9	FED/2004/016-564	TECHNICAL COOPERATION FACILITY (TCF)	Government & Civil Society	546.000	419.281	403.347
Belize	EDF9	FED/2005/017-067	Disaster prevention and preparedness mechanisms: New bridge over the Silver Creek, Hummingbird Highway	Emergency Response	1.000.000	843.089	644.008
Belize	EDF9	FED/2005/017-446	RURAL DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME	Agriculture	7.199.000	7.159.529	6.963.383
Belize	EDF10	FED/2009/021-189	Belize Rural Development Project II	Rural Development	10.000.000	0	0
Belize	EDF10	FED/2009/021-190	Support to the NAO Office of Belize	Government & Civil Society	1.800.000	117.550	58.770
Belize	SUGAR	SUCRE/2006/018-466	Accompanying Measures 2006 for Sugar Protocol Countries (EU Support to the Belize Country Adaptation Strategy for Sugar - 2006 Allocation (Phase 1))	Agriculture	3.038.000	2.919.411	2.813.910
<b>Total EDF9 &amp; EDF10, including Budget Lines</b>					<b>76.342.000</b>	<b>35.904.835</b>	<b>30.605.864</b>
Dominica	BANANAS	BAN/2000/003-091	DOMINICA 1999 - COMMERCIALISATION & PROMOTION RURAL DVPMT IN DOMINICA	Multisector	6.500.000	6.388.878	6.311.137
Dominica	BANANAS	BAN/2003/006-029	Dominica SFA BAN 2003	Tourism	5.900.000	5.539.065	2.826.550
Dominica	BANANAS	BAN/2004/016-923	DM- SFA 2004	Transport	5.300.000	4.910.448	4.659.960
Dominica	BANANAS	BAN/2005/017-621	SFA Dominica 2005	Rural Development	4.510.000	4.469.511	3.987.710

					Financial Data (in EURO)		
Country	EDF No. / BL	Decision (CRIS) Number/ Funding type	Title	Sector or DAC Classification	Allocated	Contracted	Paid
Dominica	BANANAS	BAN/2006/018-359	Special Framework of Agreement Dominica 2006	Agriculture	3.830.000	3.467.752	2.753.611
Dominica	BANANAS	BAN/2007/018-994	Enhancing Rural Sector Development	WATSAN	3.260.000	100.000	25.514
Dominica	BANANAS	BAN/2008/020-054	SFA 2008 - Enhancing Rural Sector Development	WATSAN	3.603.000	310.662	238.485
Dominica	EDF9	FED/2004/016-585	TECHNICAL COOPERATION FACILITY (TCF)	Government & Civil Society	360.000	325.079	323.837
Dominica	EDF9	FED/2006/017-929	ROAD IMPROVEMENT PROGRAMME	Transport	470.220	450.220	442.256
Dominica	EDF9	FED/2006/020-708	INSTITUTIONAL STRENGTHENING OF NSA SECTOR AND CAPACITY BUILDING ON NSA ORGANISATIONS	Government & Civil Society	300.000	267.223	78.139
Dominica	EDF9	FED/2007/018-910	Road Improvement Project (Phase II)	Transport	3.200.000	2.459.192	450.433
Dominica	EDF10	FED/2007/020-828	PRIVATE SECTOR AND GROWTH DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME	Business Support	12.690.000	12.631.850	10.237.850
Dominica	EDF9	FED/2007/020-829	PRIVATE SECTOR AND GROWTH DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME	Business Support	4.380.000	4.380.000	2.878.950
Dominica	EDF9	FED/2008/020-292	Preparation of a Geothermal-based Cross-Border Electrical Interconnection in the Caribbean	Energy	1.500.000	0	0
Dominica	EDF10	FED/2008/021-043	TECHNICAL COOPERATION FACILITY TCF	Government & Civil Society	570.000	545.906	220.000
<b>Total EDF9 &amp; EDF10, including Budget Lines</b>					<b>56.373.220</b>	<b>46.245.786</b>	<b>35.434.432</b>
Dominican Republic	EDF9	FED/2003/016-249	Support to the NAO office	Government & Civil Society	644.273	644.273	644.273
Dominican Republic	EDF9	FED/2003/016-277	Study on the dairy sector	Trade	73.214	73.214	73.214
Dominican Republic	EDF9	FED/2003/016-327	Feasibility and identification study for the education sector of EDF9	Education	147.024	147.024	147.024
Dominican Republic	EDF9	FED/2003/016-329	Prep. FP for programa de iniciativas locales	?	19.740	19.740	19.740
Dominican Republic	EDF9	FED/2003/016-430	SOPORTE AL SECTOR MINEROA	Mineral Resources & Mining	19.978.386	19.216.185	13.410.147

Country	EDF No. / BL	Decision (CRIS) Number/ Funding type	Title	Sector or DAC Classification	Financial Data (in EURO)		
					Allocated	Contracted	Paid
Dominican Republic	EDF9	FED/2003/016-528	TA for interinstitutional coordination of external trade STABEX	Trade Policy	2.006	2.006	2.006
Dominican Republic	EDF9	FED/2004/016-593	Technical Cooperation Facility	Government & Civil Society	2.214.000	2.213.778	2.213.355
Dominican Republic	EDF9	FED/2005/017-752	CIVIL SOCIETY PROGRAMME (PRIL)	Government & Civil Society	7.000.000	6.832.105	6.016.542
Dominican Republic	EDF9	FED/2005/017-753	APPUI AU SECTEUR EDUCATION	Education	3.343.344	2.950.578	2.950.140
Dominican Republic	EDF9	FED/2006/017-928	PROGRAMME D'APPUI INSTITUTIONNAL A LA GESTION DE FINANCES PUBLIQUES	Government & Civil Society	10.000.000	9.880.318	7.281.163
Dominican Republic	EDF9	FED/2007/018-824	Reconstruction of Road and Bridge Infrastructures Damaged by Hurricane Jeanne	Transport	10.000.000	9.161.753	6.686.702
Dominican Republic	EDF9	FED/2007/018-825	BUDGET SUPPORT FOR POVERTY REDUCTION	General Budget Support	33.374.945	33.374.945	33.374.945
Dominican Republic	EDF9	FED/2007/018-826	Institutional Support Programme for Regional Integration	Construction	4.586.000	4.236.640	2.451.038
Dominican Republic	EDF10	FED/2007/018-831	Deuxième phase appui budgétaire sectoriel Education	Education	63.530.000	63.530.000	55.780.000
Dominican Republic	EDF9	FED/2007/018-852	RECONSTRUCTION OF SCHOOLS IN EASTER REGION OF DOMINICAN REPUBLIC	Construction	1.960.000	1.808.704	1.655.544
Dominican Republic	EDF9	FED/2007/018-853	STRENGTHENING THE NATIONAL CAPACITY FOR DISASTER PREVENTION	Environment	6.500.000	6.423.649	6.104.149
Dominican Republic	EDF9	FED/2008/019-709	Cultura del Agua contra la Pobreza	WATSAN	1.873.045	384.969	187.074
Dominican Republic	EDF10	FED/2008/020-376	Capacity Development for Sector Policies in the Area of Competitiveness	Business Support	5.100.000	2.177.771	481.000
Dominican Republic	EDF10	FED/2008/020-377	TECHNICAL COOPERATION FACILITY - TCF	Government & Civil Society	4.200.000	2.330.732	1.539.846
Dominican Republic	EDF9	FED/2009/021-633	Tropical Storm Noel Dominican republic	Reconstruction Relief & Rehabilitation	7.500.000	7.500.000	7.500.000
Dominican Republic	EDF10	FED/2009/021-799	Programa de Apoyo a la Reforma de la Gestion de la Administracion Publica.	Government & Civil Society	8.000.000	2.625.658	946.996

					Financial Data (in EURO)		
Country	EDF No. / BL	Decision (CRIS) Number/ Funding type	Title	Sector or DAC Classification	Allocated	Contracted	Paid
Dominican Republic	EDF10	FED/2010/022-202	Competitiveness Sector Budget Support	Business Support	22.900.000	0	0
Dominican Republic	EDF10	FED/2010/022-276	General Budget support to fight against poverty	General Budget Support	61.000.000	0	0
<b>Total EDF9 &amp; EDF10, including Budget Lines</b>					<b>273.945.976</b>	<b>175.534.042</b>	<b>149.464.896</b>
Grenada	BANANAS	BAN/2002/003-449	GRENADA 2002 - RURAL ENTREPRISE DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME	Agriculture	500.000	150.488	146.728
Grenada	BANANAS	BAN/2003/005-624	Special Framework of Agreement. Grenada SFA 2003	Agriculture	500.000	496.398	485.702
Grenada	BANANAS	BAN/2004/016-991	GD SFA 2004	Business Support	500.000	468.267	468.267
Grenada	BANANAS	BAN/2005/017-622	SFA Grenada 2005	Rural Development	500.000	490.175	490.175
Grenada	BANANAS	BAN/2006/018-360	Special Framework of Assistance. Grenada SFA 2006	Agriculture	500.000	450.000	240.092
Grenada	BANANAS	BAN/2007/019-000	Improving the Competitiveness of the Economy of Grenada	Rural Development	500.000	450.000	114.811
Grenada	BANANAS	BAN/2008/020-244	Establishment of a Spice Research Station and Farming System - Grenada SFA 2008	Agriculture	500.000	453.652	229.435
Grenada	EDF8	FED/2000/015-331	FRANCHISE ART 195 A - BANANES	General Budget Support	367.546	367.546	367.546
Grenada	EDF9	FED/2004/016-609	TECHNICAL COOPERATION FACILITY (TCF)	Government & Civil Society	430.000	401.486	310.748
Grenada	EDF9	FED/2005/017-758	POST EMERGENCY SCHOOL REHABILITATION PROJECT	Reconstruction Relief & Rehabilitation	10.223.402	10.141.653	10.141.653
Grenada	EDF9	FED/2006/020-726	SOUTHERN GRENADA WATER SUPPLY IMPROVEMENT PROJECT	WATSAN	6.700.000	5.989.928	4.912.943
Grenada	EDF10	FED/2007/020-805	POVERTY REDUCTION THROUGH PRIVATE SECTOR DEVELOPMENT EMPLOYMENT AND GROWTH	Business Support	21.160.000	17.538.244	13.453.244
Grenada	EDF10	FED/2008/021-046	TECHNICAL COOPERATION FACILITY, TCF	Government & Civil Society	500.000	263.950	179.744

					Financial Data (in EURO)		
Country	EDF No. / BL	Decision (CRIS) Number/ Funding type	Title	Sector or DAC Classification	Allocated	Contracted	Paid
Grenada	EDF10	FED/2008/021-049	SUPPORT SERVICES TO THE NAO	Government & Civil Society	500.000	462.614	306.913
<b>Total EDF9 &amp; EDF10, including Budget Lines</b>					<b>43.380.948</b>	<b>38.124.401</b>	<b>31.848.002</b>
Guyana	ENVIRONM ENT	DCI-ENV/2009/021-549	Sustainable Coastal Zone Protection through Mangrove Management	Environment	4.165.000	0	0
Guyana	SUGAR	DCI-SUCRE/2007/019-067	Guyana Annual Action Plan 2007 on accompanying measures for Sugar.	Agriculture	20.458.750	19.998.325	19.941.456
Guyana	SUGAR	DCI-SUCRE/2008/019-925	Guyana Annual Action Programme 2008 on Accompanying Measures for Sugar	Agriculture	24.373.000	24.173.000	19.338.400
Guyana	SUGAR	DCI-SUCRE/2009/021-411	Guyana Annual Action Plan 2009 on Accompanying Measures on Sugar	Agriculture	18.127.000	0	0
Guyana	EDF9	FED/2003/016-457	MICRO-PROJECTS PROGRAMME	Government & Civil Society	3.364.619	3.364.619	3.364.619
Guyana	EDF9	FED/2004/016-544	INSTITUTIONAL STRENGTHENING OF THE NAO'S OFFICE	Government & Civil Society	710.000	703.257	689.476
Guyana	EDF9	FED/2004/016-566	TECHNICAL COOPERATION FACILITY (TCF)	Sectors not specified	520.335	520.335	520.335
Guyana	EDF9	FED/2004/016-892	Poverty Reduction Budget Support	Non-Food Commodity Assistance	40.446.379	40.102.541	33.602.541
Guyana	EDF9	FED/2006/018-471	9th Sea Defences Programme Infrastructure Design	Environment	623.276	623.276	623.276
Guyana	EDF9	FED/2006/018-668	9th EDF Sea Defences Programme	Environment	17.018.000	16.830.400	6.084.147
Guyana	EDF9	FED/2007/019-262	New Technical Cooperation Facility under 9th EDF	Government & Civil Society	561.172	506.972	438.648
Guyana	EDF9	FED/2007/020-780	TECHNICAL COOPERATION FACILITY II	Government & Civil Society	580.000	511.230	372.492
Guyana	EDF9	FED/2007/020-848	STRENGTHENING THE INTEGRATION OF THE BRITISH AND DTCH OCTSIN THE REGIONAL RESPONSE TO HIV/AIDS THROUGH PANCAP	Reproductive Health	6.000.000	5.618.448	2.470.199
Guyana	EDF10	FED/2008/021-041	INSTITUTIONAL STRENGTHENING OF THE NAO'S OFFICE	Government & Civil Society	1.000.000	143.706	116.460

					Financial Data (in EURO)		
Country	EDF No. / BL	Decision (CRIS) Number/ Funding type	Title	Sector or DAC Classification	Allocated	Contracted	Paid
Guyana	EDF10	FED/2008/021-042	DEVELOPMENT OF LAND USE PLANNING	Environment	3.000.000	0	0
Guyana	EDF10	FED/2009/021-426	Technical Cooperation Facility	Government & Civil Society	1.000.000	0	0
Guyana	SUGAR	SUCRE/2006/018-530	Accompanying measures 2006 for Sugar Protocol Countries	Agriculture	5.228.670	5.228.670	5.228.670
<b>Total EDF9 &amp; EDF10, including Budget Lines</b>					<b>147.176.201</b>	<b>118.324.778</b>	<b>92.790.719</b>
Haiti	FOOD SECURITY	DCI-FOOD/2009/021-911	Set of measures implementing the Facility for rapid response to soaring food prices in developing countries	General Budget Support	5.800.000	5.800.000	5.800.000
Haiti	FOOD SECURITY	DCI-FOOD/2009/021-981	Micro-Finance pour la production agricole en Haïti	Agriculture financial services	1.000.000	0	0
Haiti	HUMAN RIGHTS	DDH/2003/005-949	B7-701 EIDHR Microprojects 2003, Haiti	Government & Civil Society	374.871	372.729	364.205
Haiti	HUMAN RIGHTS	DDH/2004/016-740	19 04 03 EIDHR Microprojects 2004, Haiti	Human Rights	334.141	334.141	309.690
Haiti	HUMAN RIGHTS	DDH/2005/017-477	MP2005 Haiti Campaigns 2 and 4	Human Rights	638.850	618.035	578.035
Haiti	HUMAN RIGHTS	DDH/2005/017-645	ELE : EUEOM Haiti	Elections	3.604.336	3.604.336	3.604.336
Haiti	EDF9	FED/2003/016-308	APPUI AU 4EME RECENSEMENT GENERAL DE LAPOPULATION ET DE L'HABITAT (RGPH)	Statistical Capacity Building	1.241.000	1.241.000	1.214.155
Haiti	EDF9	FED/2003/016-324	PROGRAMME D'AIDE D'URGENCE EN HAITI	Multisector	5.570.772	5.570.772	5.456.470
Haiti	EDF9	FED/2003/016-354	PRD - PROGRAMME DE REHABILITATION ET DE DEVELOPPEMENT D INFR ASTRUCTURES SOCIO-ECONOMIQUES DE BASE / HAITI	Reconstruction Relief & Rehabilitation	27.170.200	26.581.863	24.276.888
Haiti	EDF9	FED/2004/016-598	TECHNICAL COOPERATION FACILITY	Government & Civil Society	2.305.000	2.254.149	2.147.937
Haiti	EDF10	FED/2004/016-961	Programme d'informations territoriales pour le développement durable PITDD	Environment	10.500.000	6.794.070	2.350.274
Haiti	EDF9	FED/2004/016-977	Programme de renforcement intégré du milieu des affaires	Business Support	7.990.000	7.885.327	7.389.041

Country	EDF No. / BL	Decision (CRIS) Number/ Funding type	Title	Sector or DAC Classification	Financial Data (in EURO)		
					Allocated	Contracted	Paid
Haiti	EDF9	FED/2005/017-441	NATIONAL WATER COMMISSION - INSTITUTIONAL STRENGTHENING	WATSAN	1.110.000	1.070.122	1.012.712
Haiti	EDF9	FED/2005/017-442	APPUI AUX ELECTIONS DE 2005	Elections	10.000.000	9.900.000	9.900.000
Haiti	EDF10	FED/2005/017-548	Programme de réhabilitation et de relance économique post-crise (PRPC)	Government & Civil Society	128.900.000	99.814.905	82.777.139
Haiti	EDF9	FED/2005/020-663	APPUI ADDITIONNEL AUX ELECTIONS 2005	Elections	7.920.000	7.920.000	7.920.000
Haiti	EDF10	FED/2005/020-665	PROGRAMME DE REHABILITATION DE LA VILLE DE GONAIVES ET DE SA REGION	Reconstruction Relief & Rehabilitation	15.090.000	12.604.431	6.168.195
Haiti	EDF9	FED/2005/020-667	RENFORCEMENT DES CAPACITES LOCALES POUR LA GESTION DU RISQUE EN HAITI	Reconstruction Relief & Rehabilitation	6.000.000	5.873.153	5.084.111
Haiti	EDF9	FED/2005/020-671	CONVENTION FORMATION PROFESIONNELLE	Education/ VET	5.597.700	5.514.360	3.492.428
Haiti	EDF9	FED/2006/020-683	APPUI AU SECTEUR DE LA JUSTICE	Human Rights	3.000.000	3.000.000	2.810.000
Haiti	EDF9	FED/2006/020-702	PROJET ENVIRONNEMENT TRANSFRONTALIER	Environment	2.500.000	2.116.292	1.831.333
Haiti	EDF9	FED/2006/020-710	CONVENTION DE FINANCEMENT APPUI BUDGETAIRE D'URGENCE	Emergency Response	10.200.000	10.000.000	10.000.000
Haiti	EDF9	FED/2006/020-736	PROJET D'APPUI AU BUREAU DE L'ORDONNATEUR NATIONAL	Capacity Building	2.500.000	2.500.000	1.889.943
Haiti	EDF9	FED/2006/020-737	PROJET D'APPUI AU BUREAU DE L'ORDONNATEUR NATIONAL	Capacity Building	1.000.000	893.541	676.267
Haiti	EDF9	FED/2006/020-742	ECHO/HTI/EDF/2006/01000 HAITI AIDE HUMANITAIRE D'URGENCE EN FAVEUR POPULATIONS DE LA REP D'HAITI, VICTIMES INONDATIONS	Emergency Response	160.000	141.942	141.942
Haiti	EDF9	FED/2006/020-752	ECHO/HTI/EDF/2007/01000 AIDE HUMANITAIRE EN FAVEUR DES VICTIMES DES INONDATIONS	Emergency Response	1.500.000	1.453.342	1.453.342
Haiti	EDF9	FED/2007/020-775	PROGRAMME D'AIDE BUDGETAIRE	General Budget Support	28.580.000	28.088.946	27.680.806
Haiti	EDF9	FED/2007/020-783	TCF-TECHNICAL COOPERATION FACILITY	TCF	2.116.000	1.882.079	1.237.686

					Financial Data (in EURO)		
Country	EDF No. / BL	Decision (CRIS) Number/ Funding type	Title	Sector or DAC Classification	Allocated	Contracted	Paid
Haiti	EDF9	FED/2007/020-796	PROGRAMME DE RENFORCEMENT DE LA QUALITE DE L'EDUCATION EN HAITI II (PARQUE II	Education	14.000.000	8.613.147	6.569.128
Haiti	EDF10	FED/2008/021-047	APPUI BUDGETAIRE GENERALE A LA STRATEGIE NATIONALE POUR LA CROISSANCE ET LA REDUCTION DE LA PAUVRETE (ABG-SNCRP)	General Budget Support	62.000.000	60.189.000	59.113.400
Haiti	EDF10	FED/2008/021-048	FACILITE DE COOPERATION TECHNIQUE	Government & Civil Society	3.000.000	358.335	78.844
Haiti	EDF10	FED/2009/021-608	Programme d'appui à la politique nationale des Transports	Transport	194.100.000	10.000.000	10.000.000
Haiti	EDF10	FED/2009/021-788	Programme Intérimaire d'Appui à la Gouvernance & l'investissement local (AGIL)	Government & Civil Society	5.500.000	0	0
Haiti	EDF10	FED/2009/021-794	Programme d'Appui au Renforcement de la Société Civile Haïtienne (PARSCH)	Government & Civil Society	7.800.000	0	0
Haiti	EDF10	FED/2009/021-795	Appui au Renforcement de la Culture & l'Art pour le Développement Economique et Social (ARCADES)	Culture & Recreation	3.700.000	0	0
Haiti	EDF10	FED/2010/022-435	Programme d'appui budgétaire général en appui au PARDH et au DSNCRP	General Budget Support	47.000.000	0	0
<b>Total EDF9 &amp; EDF10, including Budget Lines</b>					<b>629.802.870</b>	<b>332.990.017</b>	<b>293.328.304</b>
Jamaica	BANANAS	BAN/2002/003-443	JAMAIQUE 2002 - SPECIAL FRAMEWORK OF ASSISTANCE	Agriculture	4.700.000	4.601.346	4.434.349
Jamaica	BANANAS	BAN/2003/006-028	Jamaica SFA BAN 2003	Agriculture	4.400.000	4.209.500	3.659.044
Jamaica	BANANAS	BAN/2004/016-985	SFA 2004 JM	Agriculture	4.830.000	4.795.038	4.706.208
Jamaica	BANANAS	BAN/2005/017-617	Jamaica SFA 2005	Agriculture	4.110.000	3.891.436	3.775.798
Jamaica	BANANAS	BAN/2006/018-440	Jamaica - EU BSP - SFA 2006	Agriculture	3.490.000	3.488.748	2.566.008
Jamaica	BANANAS	BAN/2007/019-389	European Union Banana Support Programme (EUBSP) - SFA 2007	Agriculture	2.970.000	783.884	338.393
Jamaica	BANANAS	BAN/2008/020-088	Special Framework of Assistance (SFA) 2008	Agriculture	2.525.000	149.833	73.282



Country	EDF No. / BL	Decision (CRIS) Number/ Funding type	Title	Sector or DAC Classification	Financial Data (in EURO)		
					Allocated	Contracted	Paid
Jamaica	ENVIRONM ENT	DCI-ENV/2009/ 021-550	Climate Change Adaptation and Disaster Risk Reduction - Jamaica	Environment	4.130.000	4.130.000	0
Jamaica	SUGAR	DCI-SUCRE/2006/ 018-467	Sector Policy Support Programme (SPSP) - Jamaica	Agriculture	5.218.000	5.071.430	5.061.949
Jamaica	SUGAR	DCI-SUCRE/2007/018-943	Accompanying measures 2007 for sugar protocol countries - Jamaica	Agriculture	25.000.000	24.940.000	24.940.000
Jamaica	SUGAR	DCI-SUCRE/2008/019-827	Accompanying measures 2008 for sugar protocol countries – Jamaica – Sector Budget Support component	Agro-Industries	9.804.000	9.065.100	9.038.150
Jamaica	SUGAR	DCI-SUCRE/2008/019-863	Debt Reduction and Growth Enhancement Programme (DRGEP)	General Budget Support	9.000.000	9.000.000	9.000.000
Jamaica	SUGAR	DCI-SUCRE/2009/021-292	Accompanying measures 2009 for sugar protocol countries – Jamaica – Sector Budget Support component	Agro-Industries	8.466.000	8.127.000	0
Jamaica	SUGAR	DCI-SUCRE/2009/021-295	Debt Reduction enhancement programme 2009	General Budget Support	8.350.000	8.350.000	8.350.000
Jamaica	EDF9	FED/1997/013-587	NOTHERN COASTAL HIGHWAY IMPROVEMENT PROJECT (NCHIP)	Transport	80.000.000	79.696.989	79.562.278
Jamaica	EDF9	FED/2000/015-096	POVERTY REDUCTION PROGRAMME	Multisector	5.041.052	5.041.052	5.116.570
Jamaica	EDF9	FED/2003/016-379	Port Antonio water and sewerage (21613)	WATSAN	15.000.000	15.000.000	1.000.000
Jamaica	EDF9	FED/2003/016-410	PRIVATE SECTOR DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME "COMPETITIVE JAMAICA"	Industry	17.500.000	14.836.969	14.394.768
Jamaica	EDF9	FED/2003/016-464	Stakeholder workshop for transport policy	Transport	2.590	2.590	2.590
Jamaica	EDF9	FED/2003/016-482	Institutional strengthening of the office of the NAO	Government & Civil Society	126.319	126.319	126.319
Jamaica	EDF9	FED/2003/016-498	TA FOR PREP. OF JAMAICA ROAD SUB SECTOR POLICY AND MASTER PLAN	Transport	701.494	657.041	657.041
Jamaica	EDF9	FED/2004/016-570	TECHNICAL COOPERATION FACILITY (TCF)	Government & Civil Society	875.370	825.371	825.371
Jamaica	EDF9	FED/2004/016-973	Emergency Assistance - Budgetary Support	Emergency Response	25.000.000	25.000.000	25.000.000

Country	EDF No. / BL	Decision (CRIS) Number/ Funding type	Title	Sector or DAC Classification	Financial Data (in EURO)		
					Allocated	Contracted	Paid
Jamaica	EDF9	FED/2004/017-427	Emergency assistance to the victims of hurricane Ivan	Emergency Response	1.041.613	1.021.127	1.021.127
Jamaica	EDF9	FED/2005/017-441	NATIONAL WATER COMMISSION - INSTITUTIONAL STRENGTHENING	WATSAN	1.110.000	1.070.122	1.012.711
Jamaica	EDF10	FED/2006/018-682	POVERTY REDUCTION PROGRAMME II	Multisector	10.100.000	9.554.290	2.526.088
Jamaica	EDF9	FED/2007/015-096	Poverty Reduction Programme	Multisector	5.041.051	5.116.570	5.116.570
Jamaica	EDF9	FED/2007/018-842	Intervention for Rural and Parochial Roads Rehabilitation and Maintenance	Transport	2.000.000	1.894.021	1.782.973
Jamaica	EDF9	FED/2007/018-966	REHABILITATION NEGRIL & OCHO RIOS WASTEWATER TREATMENT PLANTS	WATSAN	3.030.000	299.000	0
Jamaica	EDF9	FED/2007/018-995	INSTITUTIONAL STRENGTHENING OF THE PLANNING INSTITUTE OF JAMAICA II	Government & Civil Society	1.000.000	804.256	173.841
Jamaica	EDF9	FED/2007/018-998	9th EDF Technical Cooperation Facility II	Government & Civil Society	1.371.300	0	0
Jamaica	EDF9	FED/2007/019-197	Institutional Strengthening of Road Maintenance Institutions and Budget Support to the Road Sector	Transport	12.250.000	11.149.244	2.894.465
Jamaica	EDF9	FED/2007/019-603	Budget Support Programme for Hurricane Dean Rehabilitation	Reconstruction Relief & Rehabilitation	2.500.000	2.500.000	2.500.000
Jamaica	EDF9	FED/2007/020-798	INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY FOR IMPROVING EDUCATION, DIVERSIFICATION AND COMPETITIVENESS (ICT4EDC)	Education	2.960.000	2.899.800	693.196
Jamaica	EDF9	FED/2007/020-819	TECHNICAL COOPERATION FACILITY II (TCF)	Government & Civil Society	1.369.914	1.303.168	727.980
Jamaica	EDF9	FED/2007/020-896	HURRICAN DEAN REHABILITATION BUDGET SUPPORT	Emergency Response	5.050.000	5.022.621	5.022.621
Jamaica	EDF10	FED/2008/019-983	Debt Reduction Enhancement Programme (DRGEP)	General Budget Support	40.000.000	0	0
Jamaica	EDF10	FED/2008/019-984	Security Sector Reform Programme	Government & Civil Society	33.000.000	0	0
Jamaica	EDF10	FED/2008/021-023	10TH EDF TECHNICAL CO-OPERATION FACILITY (TCF)	Government & Civil Society	1.750.000	133.864	93.072

					Financial Data (in EURO)		
Country	EDF No. / BL	Decision (CRIS) Number/ Funding type	Title	Sector or DAC Classification	Allocated	Contracted	Paid
Jamaica	EDF10	FED/2008/021-024	DEBT REDUCTION AND GROWTH ENHANCEMENT PROGRAMME (DRGEP)	Debt	57.000.000	56.501.195	43.301.195
Jamaica	EDF10	FED/2008/021-025	SECURITY SECTOR REFORM PROGRAMME (SSRP)	Government & Civil Society	33.000.000	32.500.000	22.111.000
Jamaica	EDF10	FED/2009/021-184	Tropical Storm Gustav Rehabilitation	General Budget Support	1.900.000	1.900.000	1.900.000
Jamaica	EDF10	FED/2009/021-500	10th EDF EPA Development Programme	Business Support	11.250.000	0	0
Jamaica	SUGAR	SUCRE/2006/018-467	Accompanying Measures 2006 for Sugar Protocol Countries (Sector Policy Support Programme (SPSP) - Jamaica)	Agriculture	5.218.000	5.071.430	5.061.949
<b>Total EDF9 &amp; EDF10, including Budget Lines</b>					<b>473.181.702</b>	<b>370.530.350</b>	<b>298.566.905</b>
Saint Kitts & Nevis	SUGAR	DCI-SUCRE/2007/019-334	Accompanying Measures 2007 for Sugar Protocol Countries;	Non-Food Commodity Assistance	10.457.000	10.164.542	5.603.810
Saint Kitts & Nevis	SUGAR	DCI-SUCRE/2009/021-664	Accompanying Measures 2009 for Sugar Protocol Countries, St. Kitts and Nevis	General Budget Support	10.425.000	0	0
Saint Kitts & Nevis	EDF9	FED/2003/016-346	INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY (IT) BASED TRAINING AND MANAGEMENT	Education	3.067.264	2.860.918	1.962.890
Saint Kitts & Nevis	EDF9	FED/2004/016-582	TECHNICAL COOPERATION FACILITY (TCF)	Government & Civil Society	500.000	442.674	401.681
Saint Kitts & Nevis	EDF10	FED/2009/021-496	St. Kitts - Nevis 10th EDF Technical Assistance to the NAO's Office	Government & Civil Society	225.000	58.282	28.348
Saint Kitts & Nevis	EDF10	FED/2009/021-515	St. Kitts - Nevis 10th EDF TCF and Support to NSA	Government & Civil Society	450.000	183.941	159.095
Saint Kitts & Nevis	EDF10	FED/2010/022-231	Safety and Security Improvement Programme	Conflict Prevention	5.625.000	0	0
Saint Kitts & Nevis	SUGAR	SUCRE/2006/018-394	Accompanying Measures 2006 for Sugar Protocol Countries	Social/ welfare services	2.845.000	2.748.516	2.117.996
Saint Kitts & Nevis	SUGAR	SUCRE/2008/019-969	Accompanying Measures 2008 for Sugar Protocol Countries for St.Kitts & Nevis	Banking & Financial Services	9.433.000	8.773.000	0
<b>Total EDF9 &amp; EDF10, including Budget Lines</b>					<b>43.027.264</b>	<b>25.231.873</b>	<b>10.273.820</b>
Saint Lucia	BANANAS	BAN/2002/003-447	ST.LUCIE 2002 - RURAL ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION PROGRAMME	Multisector	8.800.000	8.030.240	7.499.084

					Financial Data (in EURO)		
Country	EDF No. / BL	Decision (CRIS) Number/ Funding type	Title	Sector or DAC Classification	Allocated	Contracted	Paid
Saint Lucia	BANANAS	BAN/2003/006-020	Sainte Lucia SFA 2003-Bananas	WATSAN	8.000.000	6.821.491	6.255.210
Saint Lucia	BANANAS	BAN/2004/016-999	LC - SFA 2004 Banana Commercialisation, Economic Diversification and Poverty Reduction through human resource dvpt & training.	Agriculture	7.260.000	6.830.776	5.372.624
Saint Lucia	BANANAS	BAN/2005/017-623	SFA St. Lucia 2005	Agriculture	6.170.000	5.206.939	2.477.920
Saint Lucia	BANANAS	BAN/2006/018-361	Special Framework of Assistance. St. Lucia SFA 2006	Agriculture	5.410.000	5.118.912	2.496.669
Saint Lucia	BANANAS	BAN/2007/018-984	Improving the competitiveness of the Rural Economy of Saint Lucia	Tourism	4.600.000	1.849.810	793.530
Saint Lucia	BANANAS	BAN/2008/020-067	SFA 2008 - Education Enhancement through Information and Communications Technology Programme	Education	4.808.000	1.055.000	520.154
Saint Lucia	EDF9	FED/2004/016-603	TECHNICAL COOPERATION FACILITY (TCF)	Government & Civil Society	450.000	429.284	284.897
Saint Lucia	EDF9	FED/2006/017-954	NEW NATIONAL HOSPITAL PROJECT	Health	23.098.300	22.028.000	1.048.635
Saint Lucia	EDF10	FED/2008/021-044	TECHNICAL COOPERATION FACILITY, TCF	Government & Civil Society	607.500	449.868	379.862
Saint Lucia	EDF10	FED/2008/021-050	SUPPORT TO THE NAO	Government & Civil Society	607.500	0	0
<b>Total EDF9 &amp; EDF10, including Budget Lines</b>					<b>69.811.300</b>	<b>57.820.321</b>	<b>27.128.585</b>
Saint Vincent & Grenadines	EDF9	FED/2003/016-389	EDUCATION SUPPORT PROGRAMME	Education	5.516.075	5.432.344	4.678.467
Saint Vincent & Grenadines	EDF9	FED/2004/016-616	TECHNICAL COOPERATION FACILITY	Government & Civil Society	500.000	463.088	451.939
Saint Vincent & Grenadines	EDF9	FED/2007/020-773	IMPROVEMENT OF EDUCATION THROUGH THE USE OF INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY (ICT)	Education	8.010.000	4.911.327	618.545
Saint Vincent & Grenadines	EDF9	FED/2007/020-774	IMPROVEMENT OF EDUCATION THROUGH THE USE OF INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY (ICT)	Education	4.400.000	4.400.000	177.575
Saint Vincent & Grenadines	BANANAS	BAN/2002/003-445	ST.VINCENT ET GRENADINE 2002 - SUPPORT TO THE BANANA INDUSTRY 2002	Agriculture	6.100.000	5.906.489	5.418.470
Saint Vincent & Grenadines	BANANAS	BAN/2003/006-024	Saint Vincent & Grenadines-SFA BAN 2003	Education	5.600.000	5.025.502	4.030.139

					Financial Data (in EURO)		
Country	EDF No. / BL	Decision (CRIS) Number/ Funding type	Title	Sector or DAC Classification	Allocated	Contracted	Paid
Saint Vincent & Grenadines	BANANAS	BAN/2004/016-994	VC - SFA 2004 - Economic Diversification through Private Sector Dvpt Programme	Business Support	5.330.000	4.966.490	4.390.453
Saint Vincent & Grenadines	BANANAS	BAN/2005/017-624	SFA 2005 - Agricultural and Economic Diversification	Rural Development	4.530.000	4.428.274	4.039.630
Saint Vincent & Grenadines	BANANAS	BAN/2006/018-362	Special Framework of Assistance. St. Vincent SFA 2006	Agriculture	3.850.000	3.530.212	2.210.717
Saint Vincent & Grenadines	BANANAS	BAN/2007/019-058	Special Framework of Assistance. St. Vincent SFA 2007	Rural Development	3.270.000	554.643	106.133
Saint Vincent & Grenadines	BANANAS	BAN/2008/020-089	Agricultural and Economic Diversification - SFA 2008	Education & training	3.463.000	30.000	7.654
Saint Vincent & Grenadines	EDF10	FED/2008/021-045	TECHNICAL COOPERATION FACILITY, TCF	Government & Civil Society	780.000	73.420	70.696
Saint Vincent & Grenadines	EDF10	FED/2010/022-234	SVG 10EDF NIP: Modernisation of the Health Sector in St. Vincent & the Grenadines	Health	6.690.000	0	0
<b>Total EDF9 &amp; EDF10, including Budget Lines</b>					<b>58.039.075</b>	<b>39.721.789</b>	<b>26.200.419</b>
Suriname	BANANAS	BAN/1995/004-540	SURINAME 1995 - SYSTEM SPECIALE D'AIDE AUX FOURNISSEURS DE BANANES 2686/94	Agriculture	3.447.040	3.447.040	3.447.040
Suriname	BANANAS	BAN/2001/003-114	SURINAME 2001- BANANA SUPPORT PROGRAMME	Agriculture	2.113.766	2.113.766	2.113.766
Suriname	BANANAS	BAN/2002/003-440	SURINAME 2002 - SUPPORT TO THE RESTRUCTURING OF THE BANANA SECTOR	Agriculture	2.226.868	2.226.868	2.226.868
Suriname	BANANAS	BAN/2003/006-027	Suriname SFA BAN 2003	Agriculture	2.110.213	2.110.213	2.110.213
Suriname	BANANAS	BAN/2004/016-986	SR -SFA 2004	Agriculture	2.214.112	2.068.612	2.068.612
Suriname	BANANAS	BAN/2005/017-629	Suriname SFA 2005	Agriculture	1.879.030	1.829.030	2.011.933
Suriname	BANANAS	BAN/2006/018-298	SFA 2006 - Support to the restructuring of the Suriname banana sector	Agriculture	1.670.000	1.666.569	1.731.814
Suriname	BANANAS	BAN/2007/019-195	SFA 2007	Agriculture	1.379.000	0	0

					Financial Data (in EURO)		
Country	EDF No. / BL	Decision (CRIS) Number/ Funding type	Title	Sector or DAC Classification	Allocated	Contracted	Paid
Suriname	BANANAS	BAN/2008/020-075	Support to the restructuring of the banana sector in Surname - SFA2008	Agriculture	1.207.000	384.562	423.019
Suriname	EDF9	FED/2002/016-054	DRUG DEMAND REDUCTION PROGRAMME IN SURINAME	Health	893.000	766.303	766.303
Suriname	EDF9	FED/2003/016-261	RESTAURATION OF ST PETER AND ST PAUL CATHEDRAL	Culture & Recreation	2.800.000	2.629.612	2.431.656
Suriname	EDF9	FED/2003/016-401	REHABILITATION, UPGRADING AND INSTITUTIONAL STRENGTHENING OF THE NIEUWE HAVEN TERMINAL, PARAMARIBO-SURINAME	Transport	29.666.688	29.517.589	29.594.315
Suriname	EDF9	FED/2003/016-455	TA TO THE REHABILITATION OF THE PORT OF PARAMARIBO INSTUT., ORGANISATI., LEGAL AND REGULATORY	Transport	487.408	487.408	487.408
Suriname	EDF9	FED/2004/016-561	TECHNICAL COOPERATION FACILITY-(TCF)	Government & Civil Society	800.843	800.843	800.843
Suriname	EDF9	FED/2005/017-772	PUBLIC PRIVATE PARTNERSHIP - SURINAME BUSINESS FORUM (SBF)	Business Support	2.400.000	2.323.801	1.797.725
Suriname	EDF9	FED/2006/018-633	Institutional Strengthening of Transport Sector in Suriname	Transport	3.100.000	2.988.740	1.641.449
Suriname	EDF9	FED/2006/018-635	Sustainable Tourism Capacity Building Programme (SSTCBP)	Tourism	1.500.000	1.307.811	963.630
Suriname	EDF9	FED/2006/018-643	Suriname NGO Institutional Strengthening Programme (SNIS)	Government & Civil Society	1.700.000	1.542.741	688.267
Suriname	EDF9	FED/2006/020-704	ECHO/SUR/EDF/2006/01000 HUMANITARIAN AID FOR PEOPLE AFFECTED BY FLOODS IN SURINAME	Emergency Response	700.000	692.293	692.293
Suriname	EDF9	FED/2007/018-810	TECHNICAL COOPERATION FACILITY (TCF)	Government & Civil Society	708.618	652.618	520.534
Suriname	EDF10	FED/2008/021-039	TECHNICAL COOPERATION FACILITY	Government & Civil Society	2.300.000	521.851	465.757
Suriname	EDF10	FED/2009/021-427	Rehabilitation of the Eastern part of the Suriname East West road connection: Meerzorg- Albina	Transport	17.500.000	17.280.067	0
<b>Total EDF9 &amp; EDF10, including Budget Lines</b>					<b>82.803.587</b>	<b>77.358.338</b>	<b>56.983.445</b>
Trinidad & Tobago	SUGAR	DCI-SUCRE/2007/019-118	T&T Annual Action Plan 2007 under AMSP	Agriculture	6.000.000	5.809.187	2.509.512

Country	EDF No. / BL	Decision (CRIS) Number/ Funding type	Title	Sector or DAC Classification	Financial Data (in EURO)		
					Allocated	Contracted	Paid
Trinidad & Tobago	SUGAR	DCI-SUCRE/2008/020-105	T&T Annual Action Plan 2008 under AMSP	Trade Policy	9.974.000	9.774.000	0
Trinidad & Tobago	EDF9	FED/2004/016-620	TECHNICAL COOPERATION FACILITY	Government & Civil Society	666.617	666.617	666.617
Trinidad & Tobago	EDF9	FED/2004/016-974	Support to National HIV/AIDS Strategic Plan	Reproductive Health	3.830.707	3.807.209	3.668.209
Trinidad & Tobago	EDF9	FED/2007/019-180	Disaster Management Support for Trinidad and Tobago (DIMASTT)	Emergency Response	111.019	90.019	54.011
Trinidad & Tobago	EDF9	FED/2008/020-164	Sector Policy Support Programme to the non-University Tertiary Education Sector in Trinidad and Tobago	Education	27.088.198	26.982.586	4.682.586
Trinidad & Tobago	EDF10	FED/2008/021-040	TECHNICAL COOPERATION FACILITY	Government & Civil Society	1.000.000	202.043	107.868
Trinidad & Tobago	EDF10	FED/2009/021-434	Support to Enabling Competitive Business in Trinidad and Tobago	Government & Civil Society	16.340.000	0	0
<b>Total EDF9 &amp; EDF10, including Budget Lines</b>					<b>65.010.541</b>	<b>47.331.661</b>	<b>11.688.803</b>

**Total amounts for bilateral EDF and Budget Line support to 15 CARIFORUM countries during 2003-2010 (based on CRIS data from December 2010):**

**Allocated: €2.120.980.117**  
**Contracted: €1.449.669.593**  
**Paid: €1.116.380.799**

## ANNEX VI: LIST OF PERSONS CONSULTED

Name	Institution/Unit
Agard, Yvonne	ED, St. Lucia Coalition of Service Industries
Albu, Alexandru	EUD Guyana
Alexander, Dave	Drug Control Officer, Drugs control Secretariat, Min. of Education, Grenada
Allen, Cheronne	Manager Planning, JAMPRO, Jamaica
Alleyne, Candia	Resource mobilisation officer, (former CKLN-I trainer), T.A. Marryshow Community College (TAMCC), Grenada
Alleyne, Simon	Programme officer at the Department of Emergency Management Barbados
Anselme, Celine	EUD Guyana
Anthony-Browne, Laura	Office of the National Authorising Officer for EDF St. Vincent and the Grenadines
Ayow, Tonya	CARIMPACS
Baldwin, Robert	Head of Social Development Section EUD Barbados
Bannister, Simone	DFID Climate Change Adviser, Barbados
Bardouille, Nand	Communication expert, Guyana Coalition of Service Providers, Guyana
Bellers, Roger	DFID Disaster Risk Reduction Adviser, Barbados
Benett, Winston	ED, CROSQ, Barbados
Biesebroek, Arend	Commission of the EU (DG DEVCO)
Blackman, Debbie	Business Development officer, EDU, OECS, St. Lucia
Blackman, Paul U.E.	Language Centre teacher, CKLN trainer, in charge of activities in six countries
Blackwood, Mansfield	USAID Senior Technical Specialist, Barbados
Boedhoe, W.	Office of the National Authorising Officer for EDF Suriname
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Name	Institution/Unit
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Vacher, Alex	UNDP Program Officer, Barbados
Veira, Valerie	CEO, Jamaica Business Development Corporation, Jamaica
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## ANNEX VII: SURVEYS

### a) Survey sent to NAOs

In February 2011, the evaluation team sent the below survey to the 15 National Authorising Offices (NAOs) in the CARIFORUM beneficiary countries. The respondents were granted anonymity and encouraged several times to state their views on the eight issues related to the evaluation questions ((i) strategy, (ii) aid modalities, (iii) regional integration, (iv) international competitiveness, (v) EPA negotiations and implementation, (vi) crime and security, (vii) disaster management and (viii) human resource management). Despite several requests to assist the evaluators with answering the survey questions, the response rate was modest. Only four NAOs returned answered questionnaires. On that background, their answers have only been used in relation to specific questions regarding their countries, while no attempt has been made to draw any general conclusions from the four responded surveys.

#### Survey Questions to the National Authorising Offices (NAOs)

##### 1. Strategy

Do you consider the EU's co-operation with the Caribbean Region between 2003 and 2010 as complementary to the interventions at the national level?

Areas of intervention	Yes	no	Comments
Regional integration			
EPA negotiation & implementation			
Competitiveness			
Crime and security			
Disaster management			
Human resources development			

##### 2. Aid modalities

Do you consider that aid modalities were appropriate for obtaining the expected results?

		Comments
Yes		
No		

### 3. Regional integration

To which extent did the EU regional co-operation contribute to the integration of your country into the region?

High	Medium	Low	Comments

### 4. International competitiveness

Do you consider EU regional interventions contributed to increase international competitiveness of your country in the following ways?

Areas	Yes	no	Comments
Increased competitiveness of traditional industries			
Diversification into new competitive industries			
Compliance with SPS, environmental or other standards			
Other			

### 5. EPA negotiations and implementation

Do you know examples of EU support in your country through the CRNM/OTN (Caribbean Regional Negotiating Machinery / Office of Trade Negotiations)) to any national *government agencies* for the EPA negotiations and implementation between 2003 and 2010?

Area	Yes	No	Description/Results
a. Capacity building for the preparation and participation in trade negotiations			
b. Support for obtaining trade regimes in EPA negotiations			
c. Support for the EPA implementation and the EPA accompanying measures			
d. Provision of studies, assessments and briefs			
Other:			

## 6. Crime and security

Has your country been involved in cooperation with other countries of the Caribbean Region as a response to EU support in the fight against crime and illegal drug trafficking?

		Comments
Yes		
No		

## 7. Disaster management

Do you know examples of EU support to any national organisations in your country for disaster (risk) management (including through other organisations such as the Caribbean Disaster Emergency Management Agency –CDEMA-) between 2003 and 2010?

Area	Yes	No	Description/Results
a. Capacity Building for National Disaster Organisation(s)			
b. Support for development/ enhancement of National Disaster Strategy			
c. Support for development/ enhancement of National Disaster Legislation			
d. Provision of equipment/ technological improvements			
e. Provision of related capacity building to utilize equipment/ technological improvements			
Other:			

## 8. Human resources development

Do you know examples of EU support to educational institutions (like institutions participating in the Caribbean Knowledge and Learning Network, CKLN) in your country – or of EU support to educational institutions in other CARICOM countries, which are frequented by persons from your country? If yes:

Examples	Value of support		
	High	Average	Low



## **b) Survey Sent to Caribbean Private Sector Organisations (PSOs)**

In February 2011, the evaluation team sent the survey below to representatives of more than 150 private sector organisations operating in the region. The respondents were granted anonymity.

**SURVEY**

**1. Thank you for your willingness to assist us in evaluating the support of the European Commission to the Caribbean region. The following questionnaire takes about 15 minutes. Please finish by clicking the "Done" button at the end of the page.**

**\*Note that all answers will be treated confidentially in the evaluation report. If you would like to give us the possibility to contact you for obtaining more information or if you would like to receive the results of this survey please state your contact details below**

**2. Can you give examples of European Union regional interventions that contributed to the economic integration of your country into the region?**  
**If yes, please also indicate how you value the support with HIGH, AVERAGE or LOW**

Example:   
Example:   
Example:

**3. From the experience of your organization or members, have interventions/funding of the EU contributed to ...? (Please select 1 or more options)**

1) increase competitiveness of traditional industries in the region

2) diversify into more competitive sectors

3) better comply with international standards (e.g. sanitary & phytosanitary, environmental)

4) the development of business support organizations

5) other

6) no support from EU interventions received

Please specify any of the ticked boxes (1-5) here

**4. Have you received support for being involved in the negotiations and/or implementation of the EU-CARIFORUM Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) in the following manners?**

- 1) Meetings and workshops related to the EPA
- 2) Support for the involvement in the EPA negotiation process
- 3) Capacity building to meet EPA commitments
- 4) Provision of information (studies, brochures etc.) informing about benefits and changes related to the EPA
- 5) No support from EU interventions received
- 6) I don't know the EPA

Please specify any of the ticked boxes (1-4) and state WHO provided the support (if any)

**5. Have you (or your members) received EU support (including ECHO/DIPECHO and through other organizations such as CDEMA) for disaster management between 2003 and 2010 in any of the following areas?**

- 1) Capacity building
- 2) Support with immediate post/disaster needs and/or recovery
- 3) Provision of equipment/ technological improvements
- 4) Provision related capacity building to utilize Equipment/technological improvements
- 5) Any other
- 6) No support from EU interventions received

Please specify any of the ticked boxes (1-5) here:

**6. Are you familiar with the "Caribbean Knowledge and Learning Network" (CKLN) which trains people in business skills using modern information and communication technology?**

(\*the CKLN was established by CARICOM, is supported by the EU and includes e.g.the University of West Indies, UTECH Jamaica and the Commonwealth of Learning)


- Yes
- No

If yes, please specify your answer here:

Only 19 PSOs answered the questionnaire and not all five questions were always replied. Besides two PSOs operating at regional level, the answers were received from organisations active in seven out of the total 15 CARIFORUM countries (Bahamas, Barbados, Haiti, Jamaica, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, and Trinidad and Tobago).


Given the low response rate, this information has only been used to a limited extent and with caution in the analysis. For example, it is likely that positive answers to knowledge about or participation in EU supported activities is biased by the small number of respondents, whereas negative answers, such as lack of knowledge about the existence of the CKLN, should be more reliable. The responses are illustrated for some questions in the figures below.

**Figure 4: Replies to PSO survey question on EU contribution to international competitiveness**




**Figure 5: Replies to PSO survey question on EPA support**

Have you received support for being involved in the negotiations and/or implementation of the EU-CARIFORUM Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) in the following manners?




**Figure 6: Replies to PSO survey question on disaster management**



**Figure 7: Replies to PSO survey question on CKLN**

Are you familiar with the "Caribbean Knowledge and Learning Network" (CKLN) which trains people in business skills using modern information and communication technology? (the CKLN was established by CARICOM, is supported by the EU and includes e.g. the University of West Indies, UTECH Jamaica and the Commonwealth of Learning)



## ANNEX VIII: EVALUATION MATRICES

### EQ 1 Relevance

**EQ 1: To what degree did EU cooperation objectives respond to CARIFORUM priorities and were in line with EU Member States' and other donors' objectives?**

**Evaluation criteria :** Relevance, Coherence, Valued Added and the 3Cs

**Justification:** Co-operation with a region differs largely from co-operation with a country for a number of reasons including the fact that each country has its own developmental problems, needs and strategies. This is not least true for the Caribbean region consisting of 16 ACP countries,<sup>37</sup> which have different colonial backgrounds, cultures, institutions, and levels of development. On top of that, the region is made up of more than 7,000 small and large islands scattered over a wide geographical area. The Caribbean region has made unprecedented efforts, since the 1950s, in developing regional cooperation and economic integration. CARICOM is one of the most ambitious and most advanced integration projects after the EU itself. In response to the integration plans of the region, the EU co-operation made regional integration a priority and focal sector, in EDF9 as well as in and EDF10. CARIFORUM, embedded now within the CARICOM Secretariat, is an expression of the willingness of the region to engage in a dialogue with the EU and make the best of the co-operation managed by the Commission of the EU. Still, the context indicated above is a permanent challenge to the definition of priorities and strategy of the cooperation.

**Scope:** The EQ refers to issues of Relevance, Coherence, Valued Added and the 3Cs. It covers all region and cooperation sectors of EDF9 and EDF10.

**Answer to JC 1.1:** The intervention strategy responds to the CARIFORUM agenda.

Political dialogue increased, but policy dialogue remained difficult. The EU and the Caribbean Region, through CARICOM and CARIFORUM, have a long history of continued and fruitful political dialogue. With EDFs 9 and 10, the priorities and strategies of EU co-operation are very consistent with the CARIFORUM agenda, including in the choice of focal and non-focal sectors. However, regional integration has lost political momentum in many Caribbean countries. The new generation of Caribbean political leaders has lost part of the global perspective, it is less regionalist. Therefore national interests and agendas interfere in the dialogue between the EU and the region.

The best example of adequate response to the CARIFORUM agenda is the Caribbean Integration Support Programme (CISP), the largest programme launched during the period under consideration, very consistent with CARICOM and CARIFORUM policies for regional integration. During the time scope of the evaluation, the participation and capacity of regional institutions has increased in programming, identification and formulation.

A Roadmap was elaborated by the region for the implementation of the EDF10. It was supposed and to be reviewed annually by CARIFORUM, and thus facilitate measurement and possible adjustments of the RIP's contribution to the regional development, integration and cooperation agenda. The Roadmap for EDF10 was a good idea, but it is not based on a real strategy, has no real priority, has no time table, came late, and is not updated. Although more focused than the EDF9, the EDF10 is still too scattered.

<sup>37</sup> 15 countries for the evaluation, as Cuba is not a beneficiary of the EDFs 9 and 10.

Indicator 1.1.1: Evidence of continued political dialogue	1. Documentation review
<p><b>Information on Indicator</b></p> <p>The EU interventions operate on both country and regional level whereas most important development partners like Canada and UK tend now to operate on a regional level only. The EU cooperation is (due to the Cotonou Agreement) more formally tied into cooperation with the Caricom Secretariat (along with Cariforum) than cooperation of most other partners. Political dialogue increased during the time scope of the evaluation, but policy dialogue remained difficult. Political dialogue with the region is first a challenge since the EU focuses on dialogue and support to regional integration of the ACP Caribbean States represented by CARIFORUM when the historical and main engine of representation of the region and regional integration is the CARICOM formed mostly by the former British West Indies.</p> <p>CARIFORUM (CF) represents the 14 CARICOM states plus DR and Cuba <sup>38</sup>. Most of the dialogue with CARIFORUM has been on technical issues, much less relating to policy dialogue. A second issue is that regional integration has lost political momentum in many Caribbean countries. The new generation of Caribbean political leaders has lost part of the global perspective, it is less regionalist. The level of debt and the economic crisis has made short term urgent responses a priority for most CF governments. But the loss of support to regionalism is deeper.</p> <p>The situation was summarized as such by a recent study funded by DFID, “stakeholders are deeply pessimistic about the future of, in particular, CARICOM integration, and see the region burdened by a lack of vision, weak implementation of decisions, mistrust, poor leadership and institutional decline.”<sup>39</sup></p> <p>Europe has strong historic ties with the Caribbean region. It is present and part of the Caribbean through the Outermost Regions (OMRs) and Overseas Countries and Territories (OCTs). With the exception of Cuba, they have also signed the Cotonou Partnership Agreement with the EU.</p> <p>Political dialogue increased in 2006 with the Participation of Commissioner Louis Michel in CARIFORUM meetings with Ministers of External Relations, ambassadors of the Caribbean States and the SG of CARICOM/CARIFORUM. The EPA process also intensified dialogue on the most important policy areas and on the reform agenda.</p> <p>Since the adoption of the 2006 strategy,<sup>40</sup> many new factors have made political dialogue even more needed:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➤ Since the conclusion of the Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) between the EU and CARIFORUM the relations are no longer based on unilateral preferential trade regimes and a donor-recipient relationship, but on a partnership with mutual obligations.</li> <li>➤ The financial crisis hit the economies of the region.</li> <li>➤ The same crisis placed some Caribbean states in the forefront of criticism for their non-transparent offshore financial services.</li> <li>➤ Progress towards the completion of the CSME has slowed down.</li> </ul>	

<sup>38</sup> Cuba is a member of CARIFORUM and has signed a 'partial scope' free trade zone agreement with CARICOM. However, the country is not a signatory of the Cotonou Agreement and consequently not benefiting from EDF support.

<sup>39</sup> Caribbean Regional Integration, UWI Institute of International Relations, Trinidad and Tobago, April 2011

<sup>40</sup> See European Commission (2006) An EU-Caribbean Partnership for Growth, Stability and Development: [http://ec.europa.eu/development/icenter/repository/communication\\_86\\_2006\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/development/icenter/repository/communication_86_2006_en.pdf)

- The end of preferential trade regimes for sugar and bananas created tensions between EU and CARICOM members.
- The controversies surrounding the EPA negotiations and delays in the implementation of some development aid programmes added to tensions.
- Climate change became of vital interest for the Caribbean and the EU.
- Drug trafficking and related crimes increased their damage.
- The new US administration showed renewed interest in the Caribbean region.
- The EU negotiated association agreements in Latin America and the Caribbean region like the ones with Mexico, Chile, Colombia/Peru, Central America and the MERCOSUR.
- Negotiations for a Free Trade Agreement with Canada are on-going.
- New international players like China, Brazil and Venezuela show increased interest in the region.

Taking stock of such factors, the EU and CARIFORUM Heads of State and Government, during the May 2010 EU-CARIFORUM Summit, adopted an outline for a Joint EU-Caribbean Strategy which is coherent with the two regions' wish for bi-regional political dialogue to become the main vehicle for addressing a range of issues of common interest. The Joint communiqué<sup>41</sup> stressed the following:

- commitment to the UN Charter, respect of universal human rights, democracy and the rule of law;
- will to strengthen the political partnership and work together to improve the quality of life of all their peoples;
- commitment to increasing CARICOM integration process;
- establishment of a Caribbean Infrastructure Trust Fund advancing EPA implementation;
- co-operation on the use of innovation and technology, including in the pursuit of food security in the Caribbean region;
- need to increase co-operation in the fields of climate change and the biodiversity loss;
- commitment to the reconstruction of Haiti following the devastating earthquake of 12th January 2010; and
- agreement to meet again on the occasion of the VII Summit of Heads of State and Government of the European Union and Latin America and the Caribbean in 2012 or at any earlier date.

Two years earlier, in May 2008, the Joint Statement adopted at the 3rd EU-CARIFORUM summit in Lima, had already confirmed the commitment of both regions to establish a structured and comprehensive political dialogue.

On the occasion of the Thirty-Second Regular Meeting of the Heads of Government of the Caribbean Community in Frigate Bay, St.Kitts, CARICOM Heads of Government met with Mr. Andris Piebalgs, European Union Commissioner for Development in special session on 2 July 2011. A series of political and cooperation issues were discussed. The encounter marked a new phase in further enhancing Caribbean-EU relations. Development cooperation has picked up significantly, the CARIFORUM/EU Economic Partnership

<sup>41</sup> See EU-CARIFORUM Joint Communiqué, Madrid, 17 May 2010: [http://ec.europa.eu/development/icenter/repository/iv\\_eu\\_cariforum\\_summit\\_joint\\_communique\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/development/icenter/repository/iv_eu_cariforum_summit_joint_communique_en.pdf)

Agreement is being implemented and both Sides are working together on a Joint Caribbean/EU Strategy to lay the groundwork for a more mature relationship which will encompass political dialogue and development cooperation.

**Indicator 1.1.2: Consistency of priorities and strategies (including the choice of focal/non focal sectors) with CARIFORUM agenda**

- 2a. Documentation review,
- 2b. CARIFORUM/CARICOM reports
- 2c. Press reports on Internet
- 2d. Interviews with EUD and CCS heads

**Information on Indicator**

Priorities and strategies of EU co-operation since 2003 are consistent with the CARIFORUM Agenda. In application of Article 1 of the Cotonou Agreement, support to the Caribbean region is focused on the achievement of the MDGs. Article 28 focuses on integrating ACP countries into the world economy by promoting economic cooperation, the free movement of persons, of goods and of capital, the diversification of economies, and trade expansion. Cooperation in the area of regional economic integration is covered by Articles 29, 30 and 35. The EU articulated the following aims in 2006 in its communication "An EU-Caribbean Partnership for Growth, Stability and Development" (COM (2006) 86), confirmed by the European Council that same year:

- strengthen its political partnership with the region;
- support regional integration and help Caribbean countries respond to foreign competition; and
- help the region address its specific vulnerabilities, including increasing its ability to respond to natural disasters and combat drug trafficking.

The Regional Strategy Paper (RSP) for the period 2003-2007 (EDF9) had an overall aim of 'the beneficial integration of the Caribbean region into the world economy through a global repositioning aimed at achieving sustainable economic growth, regional cohesion and stability and continued improvements in living conditions'. The focal sector was the Intensification of Regional Integration. Non-focal sectors focused on fighting the major vulnerabilities of drugs control and disaster management.

The Regional Strategy Paper (RSP) for the period 2008-2013 (EDF10) has the global objective of "poverty reduction and integration into the global economy". Its second global objective is "to promote economic growth and increased international competitiveness through regional economic integration and cooperation, thereby contributing to poverty reduction".<sup>42</sup> The Focal areas are regional economic integration/cooperation and EPA including capacity building. The non-focal sectors deal with physical and social vulnerabilities.

The report "Towards a development vision and the role of the Single Economy", approved in 2007<sup>43</sup> provided a vision for the Caribbean Community. It served as the basis for the 'road map' elaborated a year later. But it is above all the result of extensive consultations and reports discussed at the highest levels of CARIFORUM since at least year 2005. The development vision is summarized in the following "mission statement": *"We envision a Caribbean Community in which every citizen has the opportunity to realise his or her human potential and is guaranteed the full enjoyment of their human rights in every sphere; in which social and economic justice is enshrined in law and embedded in practice; a Community from which poverty, unemployment and social exclusion have been banished; in which all citizens willingly accept a responsibility to contribute to the welfare of their*

<sup>42</sup> CARIFORUM- European Community Regional Strategy Paper 2008-2013, p. vii-viii.

<sup>43</sup> Approved by The Twenty-Eighth Meeting Of The Conference Of Heads Of Government Of The Caribbean Community, 1-4 July 2007



*fellow citizens and to the common good; and one which serves as a vehicle for the exercise of the collective strength of the Caribbean region, and the affirmation of the collective identity of the Caribbean people, in the world community.”*

This is the vision and agenda shared by the EU cooperation strategy for the region.

CARICOM objectives are translated into treaties, political decisions, and action programmes. Its regional integration strategy is centred on the CSME. As part of preparation of the EDF9, for the first time, CARIFORUM designed a regional integration development strategy (RIDS) <sup>44</sup>. Its priority and strategy is to deepen regional integration of the “core” Caribbean countries (CARICOM) and to widen and deepen the regional integration of the other Caribbean countries in starting or developing areas of functional and economic cooperation. This wider Caribbean is of utmost importance as it includes the two more important countries (demographically and economically at least), the Dominican Republic and Cuba. A long term view is that they could join CARICOM. The regional integration strategy at the level of CARIFORUM encompasses, but also widens the strategy of CARICOM, as it also extends cooperation with the OCTs and DOMs. However, the EDF9 was far too ambitious, was too scattered, with too many components.

Within the first six months of the signing of the Regional Indicative Programme for EDF10, CARIFORUM had to specify in a Roadmap the strategic orientations of the regional policy agenda. This roadmap was meant to provide indications of measures and actions taken to secure progress in the CSME and other CARIFORUM integration initiatives. It was also meant to provide information on OECS integration initiatives and on the development of closer cooperation between the DR and CARICOM. Finally it was meant to provide information on action taken and programmes initiated and implemented by CARIFORUM in respect of building capacity for EPA implementation. This Roadmap was supposed to be reviewed annually by CARIFORUM, and thus facilitate measurement and possible adjustments of the RIP’s contribution to the regional development, integration and cooperation agenda. In fact it was produced late, and has not been updated for the last 18 months. Also, it was of little use for the region, as almost 70% of needs are indicated as high priority actions. Although more focused, the EDF10 is still too scattered.

Support to CSME (see Study case in Annexes) is the largest component of the Caribbean Integration Support Programme (CISP) launched under the EDF9 and still in operation after an extension. With close to €20M, it accounts for over 50% of the total CISP budget. The path to a CSME was mapped out by CARICOM in the “Work Programme to Complete the Establishment of the CSME” in May 2004. The CISP total budget is €40.5M and contains 9 components ranging from the CSME of around 50% of the budget, through the creation of an information and translation institute (Caribbean Regional Information and Translation Institute or CRITI), to the establishment of a Caribbean Information Society, the creation of harmonised statistics, and measures to address the supply and demand for drugs. Six of the components and part of a seventh are combined in a Contribution Agreement (CA) with CARICOM.

Another example: the creation of the Caribbean Regional Information and Translation Institute (CRITI) is relevant in many ways: it will stimulate greater regional integration, objective of the CISP (EDF9), it will benefit national and regional institutions, of the public sector but also of the private sector, supporting at the same time Haiti’s further integration in CARICOM, and CARICOM cooperation with the Dominican Republic. The main challenge continues to be ensuring long term sustainability. The other components of the CISP are also relevant, including the project supporting the extension of the Ogle Airport Project. It is situated 10 km away from Georgetown, when the other airport is an hour away from Georgetown. It will therefore improve national travels, and not least, the access to the HQ of the CARIFORUM Secretariat, situated 2 km away. Several airlines expressed their willingness to operate at this airport and develop links with the region.

However, if programming and implementation has been targeted to support the integration of CARICOM and OECS there was not the same support to activities in which all CARIFORUM countries were involved, that is including the DR, as with programmes of the EDF8 (e.g. Caribbean Regional Program at University Level-Culp, Tourism programme or the CARIFORUM Cultural Center).

<sup>44</sup> See summary in annex 4 of the Regional Strategy Paper of the EDF 9

<b>Indicator 1.1.3: Evidence of active participation of regional institutions in programming, identification, formulation</b>	3a. Reports 3b. Interviews or mail contacts with donors
<p><b>Information on Indicator</b></p> <p>Involving active participation of the beneficiaries is far more complex in the case of a region than in the case of a country. The EU adopted a flexible approach particularly for the programming of the EDF10. More than the EDF9, it takes in account the geographic specificities: integration under the CSME, integration of the OECS; cooperation of Haiti and DR within the CARIFORUM. The programming of the EDF10 was also more collaborative.</p> <p>The needs assessment for EPA implementation is an example of active participation of CCS. CARIFORUM and EU established the Regional Preparatory Task Force (RPTF) in order to advance the preparation of support measures. The RPTF comprised trade negotiators and development experts from both sides. Needs assessment were completed in many areas like SPS, TBT, trade facilitation, competition Policy or public procurement. Studies addressed in priority four areas: identification of specific needs at national and regional levels, specific projects addressing identified needs, survey of initiatives in the same issues in CARIFORUM countries, develop financing proposals.</p> <p>The Delegation in charge of the cooperation with the region is based in Georgetown where CARICOM has its HQ. The officers of both institutions meet monthly and at ad hoc meetings. The Head of Delegation himself meets various times per year with the CARIFORUM Secretariat. For the programming of the EDF10, meetings were attended by thematic specialists and many partner organisations (NGOs, CARIFORUM member states, DOMs). However, the Executive Director of CARIFORUM considers that part of the problem was the negotiation of programming with DG Dev instead of AIDCO and lack of access to the Support Quality Group.</p>	
<p><b>Preliminary Answer to JC 1.2:</b> The EU intervention strategy is in line with the EU co-operation objectives and other relevant EU development policies</p>	
<p>The overall objectives of the Commission's interventions in the Caribbean region correspond to those of the Commission's development policy and of the ACP successive agreements: poverty reduction, sustainable development and integration into the world economy. The Commission has adopted a strategy of open regionalism by supporting achievement of these objectives through the construction of a regional integrated space to which both the regional programmes and parts of the national programmes, together with non-programmable instruments, contribute. The sector policies of EU interventions are coherent with the overall EU development objectives.</p>	
<b>Indicator 1.2.1: Consistency of priorities and strategies (including the choice of focal/non focal sectors) with EU development policies and EU regional-level strategies</b>	1a. Document Review 1b. Interviews DEV DG, DG Trade
<p><b>Information on Indicator</b></p> <p>The overall objectives of the Commission's interventions in the Caribbean region correspond to those of the Commission's development policy and of the ACP successive agreements: poverty reduction, sustainable development and integration into the world economy. The alleviation of poverty is in part served by the two last two objectives. The Commission has adopted a strategy of open regionalism by supporting achievement of these objectives through the construction of a regional integrated space to which both the regional programmes and parts of the national programmes, together with non-programmable instruments, contribute.</p> <p>The EU intervention strategy in the Caribbean region is in line with EU co-operation objectives and development policies with third world countries, as stated in art.177 of the Treaty establishing the European Community: <i>promoting the smooth and gradual integration of developing countries into the world economy; assisting the sustainable and economic development of the developing countries, and more particularly the most disadvantaged among them; and promoting the campaign against poverty in the developing</i></p>	

*countries*. Those objectives have been confirmed and reinforced in the Cotonou Agreement. They are also in line with the communication of 2006 "An EU-Caribbean Partnership for Growth, Stability and Development" (COM (2006) 86)<sup>45</sup> confirmed by the European Council that same year, already mentioned in previous section.

Since the adoption of the 2006 strategy, the EU and CARIFORUM Heads of State and Government, during the May 2010 EU-CARIFORUM Summit, adopted an outline for a Joint EU-Caribbean Strategy which is coherent with the two regions' wish for bi-regional political dialogue to become the main vehicle for addressing a range of issues of common interest (see details in a previous section).

The regional strategy is also coherent with many All-ACP programmes and EU budget lines in the trade sectors and in other sectors like SPS, natural disaster, energy environment, education, migration, or health.

#### **Indicator 1.2.2: Coherence of sector policies with overall EU development objectives**

2a. Document Review

2b. Interviews DEV DG, DG Trade

#### **Information on Indicator**

The sector policies of EU interventions are coherent with the overall EU development objectives. In the strategy of EDF9, the focal sector is the intensification of regional integration and non-focal sectors are vulnerabilities of drugs traffic and disaster. In the strategy of EDF10, the focal sectors are regional economic integration/cooperation and the EPA, and the non-focal sectors physical and social vulnerabilities.

#### **Answer to JC 1.3:** The EU co-operation strategy at regional level is complementary with its strategies at the national levels

Complementarity between regional and national programmes is high in four important CARIFORUM countries (Jamaica, DR, Trinidad and Tobago and Barbados), particularly in key issues like the enhancement of international competitiveness, or even more so in regard to EPA implementation, but not in the other countries. Most (smaller) Cariforum States have limited their national programmes to other priorities as they knew economic and trade matters were covered in the regional programmes. According to the Programming Guidelines of the EU the RIP should be designed first. However, the NIPs were drafted and signed first. As a consequence, although the NIPs were designed with a reserve of money in order to complement the regional interventions, coherence is not always adequate.

The best example of complementarity at sector level is the case of the main intervention under EDF10, the EPA implementation programme complemented by many projects and interventions of the National Indicative Programmes (NIP). In the context of present challenges to the region, there is also complementarity on the issue of enhancing international competitiveness. Disaster prevention and action is the one sector where complementarity seems highest and most effective.

Complementarity RIP/NIP could be enhanced by regular meetings at the level of HoD but also at expert/thematic level between Caribbean EUD. It could also be enhanced by setting aside funding in future NIPs to ensure implementation of regional programmes at national level. The RIP should also take more into account the needs of the regional matters at the country level and acknowledge better countries as stakeholders and beneficiaries.

<sup>45</sup> See European Commission (2006) An EU-Caribbean Partnership for Growth, Stability and Development: [http://ec.europa.eu/development/icenter/repository/communication\\_86\\_2006\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/development/icenter/repository/communication_86_2006_en.pdf)

<b>Indicator 1.3.1: Coherence between RSP/RIP and a sample of CSP/NIP</b>	1.a. Documentation Reviews 1.b. Interviews EU Delegations 1.c. Interviews CARIFORUM/CARICOM
<p><b><u>Information on Indicator</u></b></p> <p>According to the Programming Guidelines of the EU (2007), the RIP should be designed first. In fact because EPA negotiations took longer than expected and the design of EDF10 was late, the NIPs were drafted and signed first. As a consequence, although the NIPs were designed with a reserve of money in order to complement the regional interventions, coherence is not always adequate. For instance there are overlaps in issues of competition and of SPS, where national programmes do the similar things as the regional. Another example is the regional project supporting renewable energies<sup>46</sup>: because of a very late start, some countries elaborated their own legislation on the issue (St. Vincent, St. Lucia and Jamaica at least), when the project was supposed to offer a common legislation.</p> <p>A major bottleneck identified in the independent CSME appraisal and ROM reports is the lack of administrative capacity at national level, a disconnection between national absorption capacity and the activities developed at regional level. The EDF10 Programme was planned with remedies with a new monitoring system, and a standby facility for capacity-building support for the CARICOM Member States.</p> <p>The references to CARICOM and regional integration in strategy documents of the countries of the region are usually dispersed and do not indicate an articulation between national and regional development, but many of the national priorities mirror those of the Caribbean region as a whole, given the similar size and vulnerabilities of most Caribbean countries. This situation is reflected in the EU regional strategy with the region, which is complementary with national strategies. The EDF10 NIPs of the region are closely oriented towards activities linked to the EPA: five programmes target competitiveness, three contribute to governance and public administration reforms, and three focus on infrastructures. Complementarity is high in four important CARIFORUM countries (Jamaica, DR, T&amp;T and Barbados), but not in the others, in part due to the sequencing referred above (when some NIPs were drafted, RSP was not yet ready), but not only (some small islands said they did not want to take national level funding for competitiveness or regional integration as they expected funding for these sectors to be received from regional funds).</p> <p>A review of the EU cooperation with Jamaica indicates a high degree of coherence with the regional programme. There are synergies between the national Private Sector Development Programme 2004-2009 and the technical assistance provided for private sector firms from the Caribbean Trade and Private Sector Development Programme administered by Caribbean Export. Complementarity was reinforced from the fact that JAMPRO was the implementing agency for PSDP and also sat on the Board of the Caribbean Export. Assistance was aimed at increasing the competitiveness of small &amp; medium size enterprises. The national Sugar Transformation Programme supported through budget support from the EU Accompanying Measures for Sugar protocol countries 2006-2013 was complemented by the regional Caribbean Rum programme. There is also strong congruence between the national and regional programmes in the area of drug trafficking.</p> <p>The same examination of the EU interventions in the DR demonstrates just as much coherence with the regional programme. The Institutional Support Programme for Regional Integration (ISPRI) of the DR EDF 9 RIP strengthened institutional capacities to achieve greater trade integration with the partners of EPA, both in Europe and the Caribbean. This programme provided training, technical assistance and equipment to local institutions. It funded studies of regional scope like for instance the one on deepening regional integration with the Caribbean, or the study on functional cooperation with Caribbean institutions. This programme (ISPRI) is also complementary with the regional interventions in support of EFA implementation planned to start in 2011. Not only ISPRI seeks to strengthen institutional capacities to achieve greater trade integration with the partners of EPA,</p>	

<sup>46</sup> Capacity Support for Sustainable Management of Energy Resources in the Caribbean Region, EDF 9

but this programme provides for the direct support to the Directorate of Foreign Trade of the Ministry of Industry and Trade (called DICOEX), which is the office responsible for the implementation and administration of treaties and / or agreements.

Still in the case of the DR, other national projects come in support of regional trade integration, like PROEMPRESA and PROBANANO of EDF8. The support to the National Competitiveness Council (CNC) and other institutions that make up the National Competitiveness Council is complemented by regional actions implemented through Caribbean Export, the Support Programme to the Rum Sector, and the Binational Programme developing the Northern Corridor of Hispaniola.

Coherence is also present in non-focal sectors. The Institutional Support Program for Capacity Building for Disaster Management in the Caribbean, implemented by CDEMA, is complementary of the recently finalized Programme for Disaster Prevention and Preparedness (PPD). The PPD focused on strengthening prevention and response capabilities in the Northeast region. There does not seem to be complementary actions in the sector of Crime and security, or in the sector of Human resources development.

In Barbados, there is coherence between the regional and the national programme in all focal and non-focal areas of EDFs 9 and 10, except in human resources development, where the NAO considers the link is difficult as each country has its own agenda.

#### **Indicator 1.3.2: Examples at sector/country level complementarity**

- 2.a. Documentation Reviews
- 2.b. Interviews EU Delegations
- 2.c. Interviews CARIFORUM/CARICOM
- 2.d. Interviews DEV DG

#### **Information on Indicator**

The best example of complementarity at sector level is the case of the main intervention under the EDF10, the EPA implementation programme (€72.6M out of €143M allocated for the focal area). In addition to the resources of the Regional Indicative Programme (RIP) for EPA implementation and accompanying measures, many of the National Indicative Programmes (NIP) of the Caribbean countries includes related projects such as support to negotiation capacity, standards, diversification of production, competitiveness, public administration and tax reforms, or export infrastructures. In total, the EU allocates 75% of the national programmes resources (or €454M out of some €600M) to trade-related assistance.

A second good example is the EDF10 Regional Private Sector Development Programme (EU contribution of €28M) implemented by CEDA. It complements at the national level many initiatives funded by EDF like the Special Framework for Assistance to Traditional Banana Producers (SFA). These include (among others): Budget Support programmes in Dominica (€17.0M) and Grenada (€17.5M) with a focus on improving the business environment and investment climate; and Projects in Jamaica (€17.5M) involving the empowerment of private sector organisations as well as Suriname (€2.4M) which establishes an operational platform for public and private dialogue.

In the context of present challenges to the region, there is also complementarity on the issue of enhancing international competitiveness. Reforms to the business climate and support to private sector development are priorities in many poverty reduction strategies of Caribbean countries. Accordingly, a number of EU-funded National Indicative Programmes (NIPs) have also prioritised trade, notably the NIP of the Dominican Republic (competitiveness) and Jamaica (trade development), as described above. Disaster prevention and action is the one sector where complementarity seems highest and most effective.

**Answer to JC 1.4:** The EU interventions are coordinated with interventions of other donors, taking in account the commitments of the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness and the EU Code of Conduct.

So far, donors' coordination was driven by the donors themselves. The coordination amongst donors is well structured in Barbados (where most development partners have their regional centres). The East Caribbean Donor Group (ECDG), chaired by UNDP, is a mechanism for cooperation by development partners operating in Barbados and the Eastern Caribbean. At a minimum four times a year the East Caribbean Donor Group (ECDG) meets reviewing issues and projects. It is comprised of six thematic areas:

- Poverty and Social Sector Development - UNDP
- Macro Economic and Public Financial Management - CIDA
- Private Sector Development - IADB
- Governance - USAID
- Environment, Energy and Climate Change - EU
- Disaster Management - UNRC

In the case of Private Sector Development, one of the sub-groups, a Google group facilitates sharing of information on projects. DFID will also set up with IADB and CIDA a web page with information on private sector development on the platform of the Compete programme.<sup>47</sup>

Coordination is the will of the donors, and possible since there are not so many important donors, but this is not the will of the beneficiary (CCS) who prefers divide and rule. The CCS does not participate in ECDG, neither do the MS. The CCS showed more interest in bilateral dialogue and negotiations. Donors stressed often the need, but the CS did not call a donors coordination meeting for three years until it called one for December 6, 2010. As in many other institutions funded by donors, the CS probably feared that coordination would mean better use but fewer funds. At the donors meeting in December 2010, the CS presented a "Preliminary Outline for a Strategic Plan for Regional Development" (SPRD), a resource mobilisation strategy which consists in the design of programmes offered to donors for support, and for the first time again a matrix of donor's intervention. However, this matrix is not complete, at least for the EU interventions, and is only useful if turned into a data base. A meeting was supposed to be called 6 months later that is in June 2011 and review proposals for an improvement of donors' coordination.

The areas of most advanced coordination of donors are in Disaster Management<sup>48</sup> and in the energy sector. The electronic data base developed by GIZ will offer this year a sustainable energy clearing house. The CCS is also drafting a Caribbean energy roadmap and strategy with the support of IDB. The Guyana EUD proposed the CCS to develop a Coordination pilot mechanism for CSME issues.

The tendency among donors is

- a) to look away from national intervention, concentrating more on regional interventions;
- b) to pull away or reduce support to the region and

<sup>47</sup> [www.competecaribbean.org](http://www.competecaribbean.org)

<sup>48</sup> See EQ8

c) to concentrate on LDCs.

As only Belize and Haiti are LDCs in the region, this is overseeing the fact that the Caribbean MDCs are also small island states in a context of high vulnerability (economic crisis, climate, crime).

Interventions have been coordinated between EU and EU member states active in the region. They are not always complementary but coordination made them at least coherent. The objective should be to make ultimately the Regional Strategy not only the frame of reference for the RIP but also for the bilateral cooperation of EU Member States in the promotion of regional integration and support for EPA implementation.

The guiding principle of the EU Code of Conduct (maximum of two focal sectors) is applied. The existence of ECDG for almost five years has been useful in coordinating donors. Still coordination has not yet reached the point of joint diagnostic, programming or evaluation missions. Also institutional assessments are often duplicated. There is no sector yet with a lead ownership.

**Indicator 1.4.1: Existence of CARIFORUM/CARICOM resources dedicated to donors coordination and a monitoring plan for all-donor execution and programming of RIO support**

1a. CARIFORUM/CARICOM reports

1b. Interviews with Guyana EUD and CARIFORUM/CARICOM executives

**Information on Indicator**

The CISP (EDF9) has a budget heading for donors coordination. But the CCS has shown little interest in donors' coordination, to the extent that it suggested in June 2010 to delete this budget heading. Also coordination is difficult because the agencies are located in different countries, and not in Georgetown, which hosts the HQ of the CCS.

The Caribbean Group for Cooperation in Economic Development (CGCED), led by WB, disappeared as the Heads of State became frustrated by the prominent role of the WB. CDB evaluated whether the Bank could take that role, and concluded it was not in a position to do so. The WB invested lots of resources in developing an internet platform on the projects in the region, but it did not last. It was open to anybody, the donors did not feel comfortable with it, and criticized its accuracy. The Eastern Caribbean Development Group (ECDG), with UNDP assuming the secretariat, made of 6 sub-groups, is a less ambitious project, but works well in some sectors. The overlapping or duplication is limited.

So far, donors' coordination was driven by the donors themselves. The coordination amongst donors is well structured in Barbados (where most development partners have their regional centres), focusing on Barbados and the OECS, with an overall coordinating group (ECDG) chaired by UNDP and subgroups on six subjects. Coordination is the will of the donors, and made possible since there are not so many important donors, but this is not the will of the beneficiary (CCS) who prefers divide and rule. The CCS showed more interest in bilateral dialogue and negotiations.

Donors stressed often the need, but the CS did not call a donors coordination meeting for three years until it called one for December 6, 2010. As in many other institutions funded by donors, the CS probably feared that coordination would mean better use but fewer funds. A radical change happened in last December 2010 when the CS called for a donors meeting. This meeting was attended by the main donors in the region. Eleven of them participated out of a total of 21 International Development Partners (IDP) active in the region: Australia, EU, CIDA, DFID, Germany, IDB, JICA, UNDP, UNFPA, UNICEF, World Bank. DFID and CIDA now concentrate their support at the regional level.

At this meeting the CS presented a "Preliminary Outline for a Strategic Plan for Regional Development (SPRD), which is very different from the Road Map as it is a strategy, not a matrix of objectives or activities. It also goes well beyond in time and enriches the concept of development. Equally important, the CS presented a resource mobilisation strategy which consists in the design of programmes offered to donors for support. It stresses the role of regional institutions in the identification and design of programmes. The CS also prepared for the first time a matrix of donors' intervention, which is very useful given their large number (21). However, this matrix is not complete, at least for the EU interventions,

and is only useful if turned into a data base. It was decided to institutionalize the meeting and hold the next one within 6 months time. It was also decided that an internet portal would be established and more coordination mechanisms (e.g. thematic, ad hoc) explored till the next meeting announced for the summer 2011 in Georgetown.

In the meantime, the Secretariat is doing a survey, with the support of CIDA, covering the key important areas of harmonisation, effectiveness, and complementarity between the Secretariat and the Member States. It will be ready by mid-May.

An efficient donors coordination, in the context of the Caribbean region and institutions, requires:

- Creation of a web platform on the CS website
- The adoption of a common format for reporting on cooperation projects and programmes
- Reporting from the very stage of programming , then of identification, and of formulation
- Upload of all relevant documents on the region, produced by CS, IDP or academia.
- Creation of an Steering Committee, a mixed body of CS and IDP representatives, meeting every two months
- Offering access to the data bank on a website restricted to participating and agreed IDP, the CS and its regional institutions, plus any institution agreed by the Advisory Committee
- Maintenance and moderation by as CS administrator, reporting to the Steering Committee
- A search access allowing to access information on all products, services, sectors, issues dealt with at any moment and by any IDP
- Discussion fora on main sectors and issues
- Sectorial meetings (physical and video conferenced)

**Indicator 1.4.2: Processes and systems in place for the development of complementarity and value-added between the EU and EU Member States**

2a. Documentation review

**Information on Indicator**

Interventions have been coordinated between EU and EU member states active in the region. They are not always complementary but coordination made them at least coherent. Like the coordination with other donors, the coordination and therefore complementarity with EU MS is somehow handicapped because most are not present in Georgetown. They are more present in fact in Barbados. Also the Caribbean has limited attention by EU MS. If not complementary, EU and MS interventions are at least coordinated and coherent.

From 2006 onwards there has been much cooperation with EU Member States (MS) on EPAs and regional integration. EU aid for trade packages were instigated in response to the WTO negotiations, which included MS. The EU continued contacts with EU MS. The Roadmap was also an important asset with regards to providing the basis for complementarity. For the first time the EDF10 Caribbean RS and RIP were supposed to be ready before the CS and NIPs. Unfortunately this was made impossible due to EPA negotiations and a RIP process that lasted longer than planned.

The draft of the Caribbean RS, of the RIP and the Roadmap, is value added by the EU to MS cooperation in the region.



<b>Indicator 1.4.3: Percentage of joint field missions, diagnostics and reviews<sup>49</sup></b>	3a. Documentation review 3b. Interviews with donor representatives 3c. EUD Guyana
<p><b><u>Information on Indicator</u></b></p> <p>The existence of East Caribbean Development Group (ECDG) for almost five years has been useful in coordinating donors. Donors representatives interviewed beyond EU (CIDA, UNDP, DFID) confirm that coordination has not yet reached the point of any joint programming or evaluation missions, in spite of a provision of the EDF10 RIP that reads on page 40 that the Evaluation of EDF10, undergoing a mid-term evaluation “<i>may be undertaken jointly with EU Member States and possibly also with other donor agencies</i>”. Also institutional assessments are sometimes duplicated, for instance with WB. There are however regional programmes like support to CARTAC, PANCAP, or the CRNM executed jointly with other donors. More of them will be executed jointly under the EPA implementation programme (see EQ6).</p>	
<b>Indicator 1.4.4: Concentration on 2 focal sectors<sup>50</sup></b>	4. Documentation review
<p><b><u>Information on Indicator</u></b></p> <p>Both EDF9 and EDF10 RIP respond to the concentration on a maximum of 2 focal sectors (Guiding principle number 1 of the EU Code of Conduct) as indicated in section 3.3 of vol I of the Evaluation Report.</p>	
<b>Indicator 1.4.5: Number of sectors with a lead ownership<sup>51</sup></b>	5a. Documentation review 5b. EU Del Guyana
<p><b><u>Information on Indicator</u></b></p> <p>There is no sector yet with a lead ownership (Guiding principle number 2a of the EU Code of Conduct)</p>	
<b><u>Answer to JC 1.5: The EU took into account the recommendations of the previous evaluation (2005)</u></b>	
<p>The main recommendations of the previous evaluation (2005) have been taken into account in programming of EDF10. The programming and initial steps of EDF10 show that the initial management responses to the evaluation of 2005 have been implemented. All cross-cutting issues have been considered in the EDF10 strategy.</p>	

<sup>49</sup> Indicator number 10 of the Paris Declaration

<sup>50</sup> Guiding principle number 1 of the EU Code of Conduct

<sup>51</sup> Guiding principle number 2a of the EU Code of Conduct

<b>Indicator 1.5.1: Consistency of EDF10 strategy elaboration and programming with recommendations of the 2005 evaluation</b>	<p>1a. Process of elaboration of RSP/RIP EDF10 and Evaluation 2005</p> <p>1b. Interviews with Guyana EUD and CARIFORUM/CARICOM executives</p>
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**Information on indicator**

As the following table shows, the recommendations on programming of the previous evaluation (2005) have been taken into account in the programming of EDF10.

**Table 15: Uptake of recommendations from previous evaluation**

<b>Main Recommendations on programming of the 2005 Evaluation of EU cooperation with the Caribbean Region</b>	<b>Actions in programming of EDF10</b>
<p>Ensure that programming is based on :</p> <p>(i) in depth analysis of the integration process;</p> <p>(ii) identification of the main constraints</p> <p>(iii) prioritisation of actions contributing to the creation of a regional integrated space;</p>	<p>The 2006 communication had an in depth analysis of the integration process ("EU-Caribbean partnership for growth, stability and development" which was adopted by the Commission in 2006 (COM (2006) 86 final of 2.3.2006). Also the 10<sup>th</sup> CRIP is based on a thorough analysis of the process.</p> <p>Most of the funds of the 10<sup>th</sup> CRIP contribute to the objective of a regional integrated space.</p>
<p>Engage in a policy dialogue, involving partner and donors, to develop a long-term vision on how to achieve regional integration and cohesion; this should lead to a roadmap and tentative agenda</p>	<p>Policy dialogue intensified since 2006 (see information on indicator 1.1.1)</p>
<p>Play a proactive role in this dialogue and in the formulation of the roadmap</p>	<p>Road map was opportunity for dialogue. It is ready, although late and was not updated as planned.</p>
<p>It is recommended that more systematic and continuous consultations be organised between the Commission Services and CARIFORUM, on the one hand, and the private sector on the other.</p>	<p>Consultations of the Caribbean private sector took place on EPA negotiation and implementation issues, but they are not judged sufficient by the private sector (see EQ6 indicator 6.3.3)</p>
<p>Take into account the development asymmetries between the Caribbean countries and the specific geographical constraints in the design of the Commission's interventions</p>	<p>Asymmetries are taken into consideration in the EDF10 programming, in focal and non-focal sectors</p>

<b>Indicator 1.5.2: Existence of reports showing that the management response to the previous evaluation has been implemented</b>	2a. Documentation Review 2b. Interviews with Guyana EUD and CARIFORUM/CARICOM executives
<p><b><u>Information on indicator</u></b></p> <p>The only reporting on the management response to the previous evaluation is the follow up one year later in the Fiche Contradictoire of the 2005 Evaluation.<sup>52</sup> The programming and initial steps of the EDF10 show that those responses have been implemented.</p>	
<b>Indicator 1.5.3: Cross-cutting issues have been considered in the EDF10 strategy</b>	3. Documentation Review
<p><b><u>Information on indicator</u></b></p> <p>All cross cutting issues have been considered in the EDF10 strategy.</p> <p>According to Article 101 of the European Consensus, there are 8 cross-cutting issues</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Human rights</li> <li>2. Gender equality</li> <li>3. Democracy</li> <li>4. Good governance</li> <li>5. Children's rights</li> <li>6. Indigenous people's rights</li> <li>7. Environmental sustainability</li> <li>8. Combating HIV/AIDS.</li> </ol> <p>The RSP/RIP document for the EDF10 specifies (page 43) <i>"In all programmes the following cross-cutting issues form part of the support strategy::</i></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>i. Gender issues</li> <li>ii. Youth and unemployment</li> <li>iii. Environment</li> <li>iv. Migration</li> <li>v. Development and strengthening of regional structures, institutions, and procedures to develop capacity</li> <li>vi. Human rights, children's rights and indigenous peoples' rights." </li></ol>	

<sup>52</sup> See Evaluation of the Commission's Regional Strategy for the Caribbean, DRN-ADE-ECO-NGC, 2005

The RIP left out three in its list, that are of importance for the region: Democracy, Good governance and above all combating HIV/AIDS, since it is the second most affected region in the world. However it dedicates a whole paragraph to HIV/AIDS (page 13). It is also mentioned as a sector of intervention of many other donors. Interventions in favour of democracy and governance are also mentioned in different opportunities.

On human rights, the RSP/RIP document for the EDF10 stresses (page 10)

*Strengthening the political partnership between CARIFORUM States and the EU, on the basis of universal values including democracy, human rights, good governance, support to civil society and peace and security, is a priority in EU-CARIFORUM relations. The Joint Statement adopted at the 3rd EU-CARIFORUM summit in Lima, May 2008, confirmed the commitment of both regions to establish a structured and comprehensive political dialogue (page 10)*

On environment, the document indicates (page 44)

*Environment will be mainstreamed into the different priority and non-priority programs of the strategy. For each sector, a screening will be made in order to determine what type and what level of environmental impacts could be expected. This will help decide whether a Strategic Environmental Assessment is needed or not. If needed, SEAs will be undertaken and their conclusions will be integrated in the design of the proposed actions.*

On the gender issue, the document reads on page 15

*The women's rights are reasonably well established in the region, although the issue of violence against women, and particularly domestic violence, is a serious concern.*

But this is corrected or completed on page 43

*Gender mainstreaming must be emphasized as a strategy for promoting gender equality in the region. Such an approach must take into account the social, cultural, economic and political inequality between women and men in all activities (e.g. policy, administrative, human resource and financial) and promote the empowerment of women. (page 43)*

Finally, the identification fiche for the EDF10 CSME programme has no special focus on gender equality, but one of the activities under result 1.1 will have a particular impact on women. It concerns the access rights to social services in the host country for the dependents of the migrant worker (mostly women and children). In addition, the programme has a special focus on environment: result 2.2 specifically targets the integration of environmental concerns into regional and national policies.

## EQ 2 Aid Modalities

### EQ2 To what extent did the institutional frameworks and aid modalities support the achievement of expected regional strategy results?

**Evaluation criteria :** Efficiency and Effectiveness

#### **Justification:**

The question is meant to assess how much the evolution of aid modalities and their use in the context of the institutional frameworks in place on the European side as well as on the Caribbean side contribute to ensuring that the results and expected impacts of the interventions of the Commission were achieved. It is also meant to answer the question of whether a different framework could have generated more benefits for the same cost.

**Scope:** The EQ refers to the criteria of Efficiency and Effectiveness. The scope also covers the entire period of evaluation, all interventions implemented during the period, programmed from EDF7 to EDF10.

**Answer to JC 2.1:** The EU organisation enables the adequate implementation of the regional strategy.

The planning and execution of interventions do not meet timelines. The execution of the EDF8, the programming and the execution of the EDF9, and the programming of EDF10 were all delayed. The many examples of delays in planning and execution are not primarily due to the EU organisation. They are mostly due to the limited capacities of CCS in programming and execution. The slow pace of activities is also due to a governance issue. All decisions of the CCS require consensus, hence the slow pace of policy adoption and implementation.

Still, the EUDs in charge do not have the sufficient staff for the regional programme. The Guyana EUD asked HQ for a reinforcement of its staff dedicated to the regional programme. So did the Barbados EUD, in charge of a significant number of regional projects, increased during the EDF10, due to the EPA implementation programme through international organisations based in Barbados. This calls for a reinforcement of the capacities of the Caribbean EUDs to manage the regional programme. It could be done in several ways, by strengthening Guyana and/or Barbados EUD and/or by extending responsibilities of regional programmes beyond Guyana and Barbados EUD.

The activities across the region are not well coordinated between donors (see JC 1.4) and between the regional and the national programmes. Contrary to plans and the Programming Guidelines, the RIP of EDF10 was elaborated months after the NIPs, when it was planned to be ready first. This makes the coordination of the implementation more difficult.

Coordination across the region, in the context of economic integration, means securing that each CARIFORUM member has the capacity to implement the policies adopted at the regional level.

In general, the design of regional programmes and later the corresponding activities must assess more carefully the absorption capacity of each CARIFORUM country, monitor regularly the progress in their implementation and take quick action for remedy whenever possible. The M&E Office of the CCS will throw light on this issue with a report to be ready in 2011 on the implementation of the 9<sup>th</sup> regional programmes by Caribbean MS. This issue was adequately addressed when the CISP was extended. The resources were reallocated and focused not only on areas that will continue to receive support under the EDF10, but particularly on reinforcing the capacity of the national CSME focal points.

According to the monitoring reports retrieved from CRIS, most projects and programmes of more than €1M are monitored.

<b>Indicator 2.1.1 Planning and execution of interventions meet established timelines.</b>	1a. Documentation review 1b. Progress reports
<p><b>Information on Indicator</b></p> <p>The planning and execution of interventions did not meet timelines. The execution of the EDF8 was around a year late , so was the programming and the execution of the EDF9 and the programming of EDF10. The RSP is the responsibility of HQ. The programming is done by the Guyana Delegation, while the implementation responsibility is shared with other Delegations, mainly Barbados for the OECS projects and the trade and PSD programmes implemented by CEDA.</p> <p>The many examples of delays in planning and execution, as illustrated below, are not primarily due to the EU organisation, but to the limited capacities of CCS in programming and execution. The slow pace of activities is also due to a governance issue: all decisions of the CCS require consensus, hence the slow pace of policy adoption and implementation. The limits of CARICOM governance is clearly recognized in the Strategic Plan for Regional Development 2011-1016:</p> <p><i>“In the past, narrow conceptions regarding the exercise of sovereignty have stood in the way of the establishment of a viable system of Regional governance....It will be necessary for the Community to adopt a viable system of Regional governance consistent with the logic of Regional economic integration.”</i></p> <p>The capacity for formulation and implementation is also hampered by the design, at the initiative of the CCS, of projects and programmes that have too many actions, or are too complex, for both the human and financial resources available (“too few eggs in too many baskets”).</p> <p>Finally, the regional section of the Delegation in Guyana, a key actor in programming and implementing is under-staffed. The Delegation has been asking for at least a temporary extra officer. The alternative would be to examine the feasibility to charge the other delegations of the region with implementing more projects/programmes.</p> <p>The programming of the EDF10 was more than one year late. Contrary to Programming Guidelines, the NIP of the region was drafted before the RIP. This was not due to the EU organisation but mostly due to belated EPA negotiations. The programming of the EDF10 also suffered long delays due to the limitations of CARIFORUM. Technical assistance had to be recruited in order to speed the process of programming.</p> <p>A second example of long delay is the formulation of the largest programme of the EDF10, supporting EPA implementation. Here again, the delay was not due to EU organisation. The number of interventions proposed by the CCS in the Project Identification Fiche (PIF) was so high that the Delegation had first to negotiate their reduction, then to amend the intervention logic. It also had to work out an agreement where interventions would not be implemented by the CCS, neither, as was later contemplated, by the Caribbean Development Bank (CDB) but by International organisations (see EQ6 for details).</p> <p>The rate of implementation of the CISP, the largest programme under the EDF9 was very low in the beginning: 14% between during the first two years but increasing to 40% at the end of third year and with spectacular progress during the first seven months of the fourth year with a rate of implementation of 72%, (see analysis of reasons below under 2.2.1).</p> <p>For the EDF10, implementation has accelerated since May 2010. Some projects started or were about to start implementation in March 2011:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Private sector support programme (€28M) signed with CEDA</li> <li>- Support to CSME (€25M): the Action Fiche was ready; signature with CCS was pending on some problems, like how to involve Haiti and Belize, and how to strengthen CCS capacity to implement.</li> <li>- Support to OECS trade capacity building (€6M)</li> </ul>	

- Support to OECS promotion of tourism through a hospitality institute (€6.6M)
- Hispaniola bi-national programme

The Support to OCT SMEs was rejected because the competitive component was not clear and because of the absence of an adequate implementation modality.

The Guyana EUD asked HQ for a reinforcement of its staff dedicated to the regional programme. The Barbados EUD also asked HQ for a reinforcement of its staff. The EUD has in charge Barbados, OECS countries and OCTs, and a significant number of regional projects, which is increased during the EDF10, due to the EPA implementation programme through international organisations based in Barbados. The regional programmes now under the responsibility of the EUD under are CEDA, OECS, CKLN, and two thirds of the EPA Programme (new Rum, CDB, CARTAC, CROSQ). Between operations and finance and contract, the EUD calculates the regional programme occupies the equivalent of 2.5 to 3 jobs.

#### Indicator 2.1.2 Evidence of coordination of implementation of activities across the region

#### 2a. Interviews at EU Delegations

#### 2b. Interviews at CARICOM

#### 2c. Interviews with beneficiaries

#### Information on Indicator

The activities across the region are not well coordinated between donors (see JC 1.4) or between the regional and the national programmes. The Delegation in charge of a project is supposed to keep in touch with all other delegations concerned and circulate project documents. This raises the question of how much interest there is for a project when the level of activities is limited and above all when the expected results are small and/or remote.

An important obstacle to coordination across the region is due to delays in programming or project start. An example of the consequence of late programming is the fact that contrary to plans and the Programming Guidelines, the RIP of EDF10 was elaborated several months after the NIPs, when it was planned to be ready first.

The difficulties in implementation of the CSME component of the EDF9 CISP were partly due to an optimistic planning that overestimated the difficulty of coordination of the CCS with the CARICOM MS. All have a focal point for the CSME, but some with only one or two dedicated government officers, usually already overloaded. Some countries have a dedicated person or two, well located in government; but others, usually smaller countries, have already overloaded individuals taking on this role as well. The respective Ministries of Trade, Legal Affairs and other implementing Ministries have limited manpower and therefore are not always in a position to dedicate the requisite manpower to maintain the momentum of implementation. This issue was adequately addressed when the CISP was extended. The resources were reallocated and focused not only on areas that will continue to receive support under the EDF10, but particularly on reinforcing the capacity of the national CSME focal points.

An example of difficult coordination due to a late start is the EDF9 regional project Capacity Support for Sustainable Management of Energy Resources. Its first expected result is a stronger capacity to support renewable energy in the region and the second is increased investment in renewable energy. It is meant to build on the CREDP (Caribbean Renewable Energy Development Programme) started in 2004 and funded by WB and implemented by UNDP and GTZ. The FA was signed in May 2008, but the contribution agreement was only signed in November 2010. This two-year delay was due to waiting for the institutional assessment of the Secretariat. The EU subsequently concluded another hybrid contribution agreement with CCS. The project is to end in December 2011, which reduced its implementation period from 3 years to 14 months. Some countries did not wait and have already elaborated their own legislation, such as St. Vincent, St. Lucia or Jamaica, while the project is supposed to offer a common legislation.

Also under the second result, investment was supposed to benefit from CRETAF, a financial facility for feasibility studies, set up under CREDP, which no longer exists. Findings

from the last Financial Audits indicate that the Delegation will have to issue a Recovery Order (RO) for €1.4M against CARICOM due to ineligibles in several projects. Until today, CARICOM has never honoured any RO. Based on this precedent and looking at future payments in the pipeline it is very likely that the RO will be offset against the first advance for this programme. In this case, the chances for CARICOM to implement it on time (or at all) are extremely slim.

Coordination across the region, in the context of economic integration, means securing that each CARIFORUM member has the capacity to implement the policies adopted at the regional level. This issue was adequately addressed when CISP was extended into 2011. The resources were reallocated and focused not only on areas that will continue to receive support under the EDF10, but particularly on reinforcing the capacity of the officers in charge of the national CSME focal points.

In general, the design of regional programmes and, by extension, any corresponding activities, needs to include a much more in-depth assessment of the absorption capacity of each CARIFORUM country, regularly monitor the progress during implementation and take quick remedial action whenever necessary. The M&E Office of the CCS will throw light on this issue with a report still under preparation at the time of the field visits on the implementation of the 9<sup>th</sup> regional programmes by Caribbean member states.

**Indicator 2.1.3. Evidence of systematic monitoring and evaluation and subsequent follow-up of the co-operation**

**3.Documentation review**

**Information on Indicator**

Projects and programmes of more than €1M are monitored through ROM mechanisms. The list of such projects and programmes found in CRIS are in the table under Indicator 2.3.1.

The RSP of the EDF9 reads: *In conformity with Art. 11 of Annex IV to the Cotonou Agreement and the Letter of Notification dated 25 September 2001, the RIP will incorporate an enhanced monitoring, review and evaluation system. It will cluster all elements relevant to the implementation of the strategy and to the Cotonou review process. Quantitative and qualitative indicators will measure the achievement of the strategic goals and assess relevance, efficiency, effectiveness and impact. Indicators will be defined for the following main areas: (i) regional economic integration; (ii) the trade agenda; (iii) functional regional co-operation; (iv) governance, financial issues and financing of the regional institutions; (v) implementation of EDF programmes and projects. The indicators will relate to information that is collected in a timely manner and enable a certain degree of comparability across regions.*

The Intervention Framework of the RIP (annex 1 of RSP/RIP) offers indicators, but not quantitative or as defined above.

In the EDF9 RSP/RIP, on page 20, monitoring appears under the same budget as Policy dialogue, programme review and auditing, with a budget of 3 – 4% of a total of €57M.

The EDF10 RIP reads, on page 40: *Monitoring of results and evaluations of impact of individual activities (programmes, projects, sectors) under this RSP will be undertaken in line with the Technical and Administrative Provisions that are attached to each individual Financial Agreement prepared to implement this RSP. The results and impact of the Community's cooperation with the Caribbean Region implemented through the RIP and through other external actions funded by the general budget of the European Community, will be assessed by means of an independent external evaluation. This evaluation may be undertaken jointly with EU Member States and possibly also with other donor agencies.*

The RIP does not refer this time to indicators nor comparability across regions, but suggests that evaluations could be carried out with other EU Member States and other donors, in the spirit of, and in compliance with the commitments of the Paris Declaration.



**Answer to JC 2.3: The aid modalities chosen were appropriate for obtaining the expected output.**

The aid modalities chosen were not appropriate for obtaining the expected outputs. The ROM reports found in CRIS and reviewed for the purpose of the evaluation are too few to draw conclusions on the evolution of ratings of efficiency and effectiveness of the projects and programmes of the region during the period under consideration. The efficiency and the effectiveness of the interventions tended to decline between the 8<sup>th</sup> and 9<sup>th</sup> EDF.

Under the EDF9, the EU applied a rule of aid effectiveness in choosing the form of a Contribution Agreement for the main regional programme, the Caribbean Integration Support Programme (CISP). This aid modality was supposed to increase ownership and reduce transaction costs. But in practice the adoption of a hybrid CA slowed down implementation instead of reducing transaction costs.

The EDF10 RSP reads on page viii: « *The implementation modalities will be designed to secure timely programming and efficient implementation through a limited number of projects/programmes and through the use of quick disbursing mechanisms which maintain transparency and accountability* ».

In principle a Contribution Agreement with the CCS would reduce transaction costs. However, the institutional auditing concluded in 2010 that the conditions were not there yet for the implementation of EPA of the EDF10 under this modality. A recent mission of the Court of Auditors confirms that CCS is not eligible for contribution agreements and a fortiori for budget support.

Indicator 2.3.1 Efficiency and effectiveness scores in ROM reports of regional interventions

1a. ROM reports

**Information on Indicator**

We reviewed all marks of the latest reports of all projects and programmes available from the Commission's database CRIS. However we did not find monitoring reports for all projects for two reasons: some projects are not monitored, particularly those under €1M, most recently launched projects have not yet been monitored, and some reports are not in the CRIS data-base. For each project of the inventory above €1M, we took note of the A, B, C or D mark given in the latest monitoring report available. According to the Handbook for ROM of EU assistance,<sup>53</sup> the marks have the following meanings:

- a. The project is very good, fully according to or better than to plan. There is every indication that it will achieve its Purpose and Objectives.
- b. This is a good project, broadly progressing as planned. But certain corrective measures might be required if the project is to fully reach its Purpose and Objectives.
- c. The project has problems. Without corrective measures it will not meet its Purpose and Objectives.
- d. The project has serious deficiencies. Substantial corrective measures, major redesign or termination of the project is necessary.

The following table was done on the basis of the tables in Annex "Efficiency and effectiveness of projects and programme of the Caribbean region". The analysis indicates the following tendencies:

- For Efficiency under the EDF8, very few projects are rated here (6), and the majority (4) are rated B
- For Efficiency under the EDF9, more projects are rated (14), but the majority (8) are rated C.

<sup>53</sup> EC Results-Oriented Monitoring - Handbook for the ROM System, EuropeAid, Brussels, 2008

This could indicate a loss of efficiency.

- For Effectiveness, under the EDF8, out the very few projects rated here (6), and the majority (4) is rated B
- For Effectiveness, under the EDF9, more projects are rated (14), but a minority (5) is rated B and half of them are rated C

This could indicate of loss of effectiveness.

Overall, between EDF 8 and 9, efficiency and effectiveness have declined

**Table 16: Marks in latest monitoring report of project/programmes of the Caribbean Region**

	Efficiency				Effectiveness			
	A	B	C	D	A	B	C	D
<b>EDF8</b>	0%	67%	17%	17%	17%	67%	17%	0%
<b>EDF9</b>	0%	43%	57%	0%	14%	36%	50%	0%

Indicator 2.3.2 Reduction of transaction costs of aid modalities as rated by key stakeholders

2a. EU Delegation Guyana

2b. EU Delegation Barbados

2c. Beneficiaries

Under the EDF9, the EU applied a rule of aid effectiveness in choosing the form of Contribution Agreement for the main regional programme, the Caribbean Integration Support Programme (CISP). This aid modality was supposed to increase ownership and reduce transaction costs. But the key stakeholders (EU Delegation in Guyana and Barbados) consider that in practice the adoption of a hybrid CA slowed down implementation instead of reducing transaction costs.

More precisely, six of the components and part of a seventh were combined in a Contribution Agreement (CA) with CARICOM. The CISP (€40.5M), has 9 components ranging from the CSME (around 50% of the budget), to the production and harmonisation of statistics, the creation of the Caribbean Regional Information and Translation Institute (CRITI), the establishment of a Caribbean Information Society, and measures against the traffic for drugs. One component and part of another have delegation agreements (signed between CARICOM and the implementing body): respectively Phase II of Ogle Airport development with the Government of Guyana and the Implementing Agency for Crime and Security (IMPACS) with the Government of Trinidad and Tobago. There was also a CA with UNDP for the component Caribbean Regional Technical Assistance Centre (CARTAC).

The CA is managed by the CCS in a hybrid form. As a result of the application of the recommendations of the 2006 Institutional Assessment, the CCS uses its own recruitment rules for hiring staff but it must use the EU procurement rules for services, equipment and supplies. A second audit in acknowledged progress in the CCS's internal systems, but recommended the use of EU procurement rules. However, instead of reducing transaction costs, this added complexity to the implementation of CISP.

As already mentioned, in 2008 the EDF9 also programmed a project called Capacity Support for Sustainable Management of Energy Resources in the Caribbean Region within CISP. But the contribution agreement was only signed in November 2010, with more than two years delay due to waiting for the institutional assessment of the Secretariat. The EU then concluded another hybrid contribution agreement with CCS. The implementation was reduced to 14 months since implementation ends on December 31, 2011.

The EDF10 RSP reads on page viii: « *The implementation modalities will be designed to secure timely programming and efficient implementation through a limited number of projects/programmes and through the use of quick disbursing mechanisms which maintain transparency and accountability* ».

In principle a Contribution Agreement with the CCS would reduce transaction costs. However, the institutional auditing concluded in 2010 that the conditions were not yet in place for the implementation of EPA of the EDF10 under this modality. Only one area, the one most closely related to CCS, that is the CSME programme was signed under this modality (for other areas see EQ6).

The policy of other donors supports the view and practise of EU, looking for more regional partners. The CCS remains a partner for the main donors like EU, UK or Canada, but became less important as implementer than other organisations in the region like for instance CRNM, CDB, WB, IMF, CDB, OECS, ECCB or UNDP.

The CCS is not the only implementer that reduced the efficiency of EU interventions. In several other cases, the implementer chosen by the EU was far from delivering the expected results. The weakness of the Caribbean Disaster and Emergency Management (CDEMA) reduced the value of EU support (see section 4.8). So was the case for the Implementation Agency for Crime and Security (IMPACS) whose operation were widely criticized to the point that the Director was demised on charges of corruption (see section 4.7). Likewise the results of Caribbean Knowledge Learning Network (CKLN) resulted mediocre in part due to an inefficient management and loss of interest by the World Bank (see section 4.9).

### EQ 3 Regional Economic Integration

**EQ3: To which extent have the interventions of the EU contributed to deeper and wider regional economic integration?**

**Evaluation criteria:** Effectiveness, Impact, Sustainability.

**Justification :**

Deeper economic integration was and is a key objective of the EU co-operation strategy during EDF9, EDF10, and before. It is supposed to be the intermediate impact of many EU interventions during the period considered, at national level (capacity building) and at regional level, particularly the implementation of the Caribbean Single Market and Economy (CSME). Wider regional economic integration is the objective of the support to the cooperation between the region and OCTs and DOMs.

**Scope:** Interventions implemented and programmed during 2003-2010; entire Caribbean region.

**Answer to JC 3.1: The EU interventions enhanced the capacities of CARICOM Secretariat and RIOs to implement the CARICOM Single Market and Economy (CSME)**

The main regional project of the EDF9, the CISP, strengthened in resources and human capacities several key regional institutions, mostly CRNM, CARTAC, CROSQ, and the OECS Secretariat. Human resources of the CCS were improved significantly through the CISP programme. The programme recruited up to 86 persons. Nearly all of the 11 sub-components of the CSME project, involving most of the units in the CCS, required strengthening of the human resources needed for technical expertise, but even more for

managing the administrative tasks of the project. Still, the progress of the implementation capacity of the CCS has been slow.

The CCS capacities have been supported in the past by Technical Cooperation Facilities. It has been also supported under the EDF9 by several components of the CISP (see above). It will be supported during the EDF10 by several projects foreseen by the EDF10 Regional Indicative Programme in order to achieve its means “Strengthening of capacities of agencies/institutions involved in the implementation of regional programmes » (RSP/RIP, page 42)

The Identification Fiche of the EDF10 CSME and economic integration programme draws the lessons of the previous and still on-going CSME programme of EDF9. It therefore plans to strengthen the capacities at the CCS, with the set-up of a dedicated Project Management Team recruiting for that effect persons now working on the EDF9 CISP. A lesson learned in the EDF9 for the design of the EDF10 CSME project is also the need to strengthen the absorption capacities at the national level, which has been major obstacle for CSME implementation. CIDA supported the CCS in the past but will no longer do so.

The EU interventions also enhanced capacities of already existing regional organisations like CRNM, CARTAC, CROSQ, IMPACS and the OECS Secretariat. EU interventions were key in the creation of the Caribbean Regional Information and Translation Institute (CRITI) and the Competition Commission.

**Indicator 3.1.1: Improvement in human and financial resources of CARICOM Sec and RIOs**

1a. Documentation review

1b. CARICOM Sec

1c. EU Delegation Guyana

1d. EU Delegation Barbados

1e. RIOs

**Information on Indicator**

The main regional project of the EDF9, the CISP, strengthened in resources and human capacities several key regional institutions, mostly CRNM, CARTAC, CROSQ, and the OECS Secretariat. IMPACS benefited also from training. The progress within the implementation capacity of the CCS has been slow, in spite of significant support from CISP.

Budget Support ensures more ownership on the programming and implementation of aid, increases the absorptive capacity of administrations burdened by different donor’s rules, and improves financial resources through a reduction of transaction costs. However, this modality was excluded and therefore the EU intervention did not improve directly financial resources.

But the CISP programme improved human resources of the CCS in many ways. The CISP, an umbrella Programme with an allocation of €40.5M, recruited up to 86 persons, which is a large share of the CSS staff (around 25%), a number reduced to 46 with the extension of the project granted at the end of 2010. Nearly all of the 11 sub-components of the CSME project, involving most of the units in the CCS, required strengthening of the human resources needed for technical expertise and even more for managing the administrative tasks of the project.

The main support is provided under component 9 of the CSME, with €5.9M for increasing the capacity of CCS to co-ordinate the regional programmes and to enhance the effectiveness of their financial management. Within the CSME activities, €1.1M was also dedicated to support the start-up phase of the legal and institutional division of the CCS and also, under activity 6, €1.9M to support CSME administrative capacity at national and regional levels. The CSME dedicated €1.6M to provide institutional support to the CARICOM Work Programme management and administration. The CSME also supported the improvement of human resources in the statistical office of the CCS within a total budget of statistics of €3.4M. With the extension and budget reallocations of CISP done by mid-2010, an additional €1M within the CSME component was transferred to support the MS national

administrations<sup>54</sup>. CRITI and the Competition Commission are new organisations created and staffed with support of the same CISP regional programme.

**Indicator 3.1.2: Evidence of a plan for strengthening capacities of CARICOM Sec and RIOs**

2a. Documentation review

2b. CARIFORUM Sec

2c. EU Delegations

2d. RIOs

**Information on Indicator**

The CCS capacities had been supported in the past by Technical Cooperation Facilities. It is supported under the EDF9 by several components of the CISP (see above). It will be supported during the EDF10 by several projects foreseen by the EDF10 RIP in order to achieve its means “Strengthening of capacities of agencies/institutions involved in the implementation of regional programmes » (RSP/RIP, page 42).

The Identification Fiche of the EDF10 CSME and economic integration Programme draws the lessons of the previous and still on-going CSME programme of the EDF9. It therefore plans to strengthen the capacities at the CCS, with the set-up of a dedicated Project Management Team, recruiting for that effect persons now working under the EDF9 CISP. A lesson learned in the EDF9 for the design of the EDF10 CSME project is also the need to strengthen the absorption capacities at the national level, which has been major obstacle for CSME implementation. CIDA supported the CCS in the past but will no longer do so.

**Answer to JC 3.2: The EU interventions contributed to CSME implementation**

Continued support was directed for establishing a regional framework, but the CARICOM is far from achieving its objectives in harmonisation of policies, laws and regulation<sup>55</sup>. According to the audit carried out in 2009 by the CSME Unit, member states had complied with just 50% of the measures required to give full effect to the Single Market.<sup>56</sup> The process is complex and slow because of the governance set up where CCS elaborates and proposes, but has no supranational authority (like the EU institutions) and depends on decisions of meetings of Heads of Governments and action at the level of the MS. The main challenge for CSME is political will and the capacity for Member States to integrate the regional policies into their national plans.

The free movement of persons is far from being respected by most governments<sup>57</sup>. The intense brain drain from the Caribbean benefits developed countries more than the region due to the lack of application of the provisions under the CSME. Table 17 below indicates that a very limited number of skills certificates have been issues in 12 years (1996-2008), most of them by Guyana, Trinidad and Tobago and Jamaica.

According to the most recent statistics on intra-regional trade, CARICOM’s intra-regional exports, mainly mineral fuels and derivatives, are still small, constituting only 16% of total exports of the CARICOM countries. As the region has made no major headway since the intra-CARICOM trade is likely to have remained of the same percentage. Also the recession has revived protectionist moves.

<sup>54</sup> Addendum n°1 to FA N° 9582/REG

<sup>55</sup> CARICOM Secretariat, Summary Report of the Appraisal of the State of Implementation of the Single Market. CSME (CONV)/2009/1/6. 6 October 2009

<sup>56</sup> See CARICOM website under <http://tradsysonline.caricomstats.info/Home.aspx>

<sup>57</sup> See for instance this very recent article among many : [http://www.jamaicaobserver.com/columns/Rickey-Mar-28\\_7508031](http://www.jamaicaobserver.com/columns/Rickey-Mar-28_7508031)

The CCS does not produce statistics on intra-Caribbean exchange in services. Our hypothesis, based on the basis of the dominance of tourism and financial services directed at markets outside the Caribbean, is that intra-Caribbean trade in service has not significantly increased in the recent past.

For the Single Market side of CSME there is still room for more legislation, like on SPS, but above all the legislation is not always complied for various reasons, political or lack of infrastructure and capacity.

For the Single Economy the objective is very far from achieved. The CCS plans are to have a framework by 2015 focusing on monetary and fiscal policy, but the latest Summit of Heads of State of CARICOM in July 2011 decided to concentrate efforts on the completion of the Single Market, making of the Single Economy only a long term objective. The exchange controls, the currency convertibility or double taxation remain huge challenges for the CSME. The CSME has encouraged Intra-regional foreign direct investments which have averaged 10% of total FDI inflows to MS in the most recent years, mostly in banking and insurance, tourism, distribution and manufacturing.

#### Indicator 3.2.1: Increased number in circulation of persons

1. CARICOM Sec Statistics
2. Document review

#### Information on Indicator

The citizens of CARIFORUM countries, the business organisations, the media and some governments complain regularly that the free movement of persons is far from being respected by most governments<sup>58</sup>. They claim that the intense brain drain from the Caribbean benefits developed countries more than the region due to the lack of application of the provisions under the CSME. As indicated by the table below a very limited number of skills certificates have been issues in 12 years (1996-2008), most of them by Guyana, Trinidad and Tobago and Jamaica.

The agreements concerning free movement of persons are written in the article 45 of the Revised Treaty. Laws and regulations facilitate the free movement of skills in the following categories: university graduates, artists, media workers, musicians and sports persons. The circulation of persons is also facilitated by the *Agreement on Transference of Social Security Benefits*, which is currently operational. All CARICOM countries except Haiti, the Bahamas and Montserrat have removed restrictions on the Right of Establishment. The *Inter-Governmental Agreement to establish a Regional Accreditation Body* has been adopted. A CARICOM passport is issued by most Member States.

Free movement for gainful economic activity within the CSME is available to wage-earners, self-employed persons and to persons establishing companies and other types of business organisations. The main changes brought about by the CSME are:

- abolition of the Work Permit
- introduction of the CARICOM Skills Certificate (CARICOM Certificate of Recognition of Skills Qualification)
- definite entry for six (6) months
- indefinite stay in a Member State
- the right to transfer one's social security benefits from one CARICOM state to another

However, labour market information at the regional level is so poor that the CSME audit found it was not possible to assemble independent statistical data and determine the level of implementation of the CSME objective of free movement of skills. A "Free Movement Impact Study", funded by CISP, is under writing.

<sup>58</sup> See for instance this very recent article among many : [http://www.jamaicaobserver.com/columns/Rickey-Mar-28\\_7508031](http://www.jamaicaobserver.com/columns/Rickey-Mar-28_7508031)

**Table 17: Total Free Movement of Skills, 1996-2008**

COUNTRY	SKILLS CERTIFICATES							
	2008						FROM INCEPTION	
	PERIOD	ISSUED	APPLICATIONS REJECTED	VERIFIED	INDEFINITE ENTRY GRANTED	SPOUSES AND DEPENDENTS	ISSUED	VERIFIED
ANTIGUA & BARBUDA	Jul.-Oct. 08	13	0	11	N.I.	14	13	11
BARBADOS	Jan.-Dec. 08	143	9	113	N.I.	N.I.	455	256
BELIZE	Jan-Oct. 08	56	0	4	N.I.	21	N.I.	N.I.
DOMINICA	Jan-Oct. 08	33	0	3	3	3	101	4
GRENADA	Jan-Oct. 08	37	3 pending	0	19	0	207	0
GUYANA	Jan-Dec. 08	547	30	0	2	N.I.	2168	0
JAMAICA	Jan-Dec.5 08	363*	1	4	N.I.	37	1393	N.I.
ST. KITTS & NEVIS	Jan-Dec. 08	44	2	5	N.I.	21	135	5
SAINT LUCIA		N.I.	N.I.	N.I.	N.I.	N.I.	N.I.	N.I.
ST. VINCENT & GRENADINES.		N.I.	N.I.	N.I.	N.I.	N.I.	N.I.	N.I.
SURINAME	2008	16	1	0	1	0	53	1
TRINIDAD & TOBAGO	Jan-Nov. 6, 08	251	incomplete	incomplete	N.I.	N.I.	1,685	N.I.
<b>Total (approximate)</b>		<b>1503</b>	<b>43</b>	<b>140</b>			<b>6210</b>	

\* Source: Status of implementation of the Single Market, CARIFORUM Secretariat, Oct 9. 2009

**Indicator 3.2.2: Increased intra-Caribbean trade in goods****2. CARICOM Sec Statistics****Information on Indicator**

CARICOM countries trade under a common external tariff with common rules of origin. Free movement of goods has existed for a long time but it still lacks some legislation, e.g. on some SPS measures. CARIFORUM Member countries display a high degree of openness, with foreign trade/GDP ratios of over 100%. Over two-thirds of the external trade is with the USA, EU and Canada.

The most recent statistics on intra-regional trade for each CARIFORUM member state are the 2008 figures below. As the region has made no major headway since, the trends reflected in the following table are still dominant. CARICOM's intra-regional total exports are still small: US\$ 3.8 billion in 2008, out of which around 60% is mineral fuels and derivatives. The intra-regional trade constitutes only 15.3% of total exports of the CARICOM countries.<sup>59</sup> Also in the regional comparison with the Central American Market the coefficient for the years 1986-2009 which include the evaluation period, intra-CARICOM trade ranks low (see Figure 8, Coefficient of 11.2 for CARICOM compared to 23.4 for Central American Market).

**Table 18: CARICOM Intra-regional Total Exports by Country : 2004-2008 ('000 US\$)**


YEAR	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008
<b>CARICOM total</b>	<b>1.247.223</b>	<b>2.439.849</b>	<b>2.895.299</b>	<b>2.281.989</b>	<b>3.776.628</b>
<b>MDCs</b>	<b>1.129.094</b>	<b>2.291.514</b>	<b>2.754.459</b>	<b>2.135.530</b>	<b>3.599.004</b>
Barbados	105.161	139.108	150.824	183.646	157.077
Guyana	112.456	107.322	124.339	132.556	120.315
Jamaica	51.926	47.043	52.990	56.390	65.845
Suriname	...	...	...	...	...
Trinidad & Tobago	859.552	1.998.042	2.426.307	1.762.938	3.255.768
<b>LDCs</b>	<b>118.129</b>	<b>148.335</b>	<b>140.840</b>	<b>146.459</b>	<b>177.624</b>
Belize	23.372	22.810	23.013	19.493	16.018
OECS	94.757	125.525	117.827	126.966	161.606
- Antigua & Barbuda	...	27.213	...	23.027	...
- Dominica	25.344	24.663	26.149	23.679	24.520
- Grenada	8.836	12.934	14.064	12.585	16.406
- Montserrat	2.193	550	677	1.108	1.300
- St. Kitts & Nevis	997	1.310	2.396	2.243	3.188
- Saint Lucia	36.296	34.200	49.760	29.786	72.295
- St. Vincent & Gren.	21.091	24.655	24.781	34.539	43.898

\* Source: CARICOM Regional Trade Information System Tradys Online: <http://tradsysonline.caricomstats.info/Home.aspx>

<sup>59</sup> See CARICOM website under <http://tradsysonline.caricomstats.info/Home.aspx>



**Figure 8: Coefficient of Intra-regional and Intrasub-regional trade, 1986-2009**




\* Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC, 2010)

Intra-Caribbean exports are increasingly dominated by Trinidad and Tobago, which accounted for 80% of the total in 2008. The country mainly sells natural gas and oil to Jamaica, Barbados and Guyana. Energy products accounted for 65% of intrasubregional exports in 2008. As reflected in the following figure, the intra-Caricom trade is very important for small economies. The OECS countries Grenada, Dominica and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines in particular sell half their exports in the subregional market. Intra-Caribbean trade is also above the average for the subregion in Guyana and in Trinidad and Tobago, but represents a smaller proportion of total trade for the Bahamas, Haiti and Jamaica.<sup>60</sup> Also the recession has revived protectionist moves, using mostly NTBs, like Jamaican frozen patties barred from entering Barbados or Barbadian sausages barred from entering Jamaica.

<sup>60</sup> See [http://www.eclac.org/publicaciones/xml/6/40696/crisis\\_generated\\_in\\_the\\_centre\\_and\\_a\\_recovery\\_driven\\_by\\_the\\_emerging\\_economies.pdf](http://www.eclac.org/publicaciones/xml/6/40696/crisis_generated_in_the_centre_and_a_recovery_driven_by_the_emerging_economies.pdf)

**Figure 9: CARICOM: Intra-Caribbean trade of the member countries as a proportion of all exports, 2005-2008**



\* Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of United Nations Commodity Trade Data Base (COMTRADE).

**Indicator 3.2.3: Increased intra-Caribbean exchange in services**

- 3a. CARICOM Sec Statistics
- 3b. Documentation review
- 3c. Interview CEDA

**Information on Indicator**

The CCS does not produce statistics on intra-Caribbean exchange in services. This is due, according to CEDA, and the private sector organisations, to the lack of capacity of most countries to capture the data, apart from the tourism sector. In the meantime, services are the fastest growing segment of world trade and it is no surprise that it represents the bulk of export earnings for the majority of CARICOM States, with the main exception being Trinidad and Tobago. The exports of services are relatively undiversified, with tourism accounting for 70% of the total, followed by financial services.

Our hypothesis, based on the basis of the dominance of tourism and financial services directed at markets outside the Caribbean, is that intra-Caribbean trade in service has not significantly increased in the recent past.

<b>Indicator 3.2.4: Achievement of objectives in harmonisation of policies, laws and regulation</b>	4a. Documentation review 4b. Interview CARICOM Sec 4c. Guyana Del and other EUD
<p><b><u>Information on Indicator</u></b></p> <p>A continued support was directed to assist establishing a regional framework, but the CARICOM is far from achieving its objectives in harmonisation of policies, laws and regulation. The process is complex and slow because CCS elaborates and proposes, but has no supranational powers and depends on decisions of meetings of Heads of Governments and action at the level of the MS. The main challenge for CSME is political will and the capacity for Member States to integrate the regional policies into their national plans.</p> <p>The Single Market side of CSME entered in operation in 2006 and is materialized by the five freedoms of movement of goods, services, skills, capital, and right of establishment. The Member States have implemented the vast majority of legal instruments, but the CSME unit stresses that there is not yet full legislative compliance by all the Member States, like limitation in the free movement of skills. Also some policies are not fully developed like the areas of government procurement, contingent rights, e-commerce, or movement of goods involving free zones. According to the audit carried out in 2009 by the CSME Unit, member states had complied with just 50% of the measures required to give full effect to the Single Market.<sup>61</sup></p> <p>The free movement of skills is limited to certain categories: university graduates, artistes, media workers, musicians and sports persons. A CARICOM passport is now being issued by most Member States. An inter-governmental agreement established a Regional Accreditation Body, the Agreement on Transference of Social Security Benefits is operational. On the issue of right of establishment, legislative and administrative action has been taken to remove restrictions in all States except in Haiti, the Bahamas and Montserrat. Also there is still room for more legislation, like on SPS. And above all the legislation is not always adhered to for various reason, political or lack of infrastructure and capacity. Restrictions have been removed on the free movement of capital. Cross listing and trading takes place in the Stock Exchanges of Barbados, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago.</p> <p>The Single Economy side of CSME has the following main components:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➤ monetary policy coordination</li> <li>➤ financial policy harmonisation</li> <li>➤ capital market integration</li> <li>➤ fiscal policy coordination and harmonisation</li> <li>➤ investment and incentives policy harmonisation</li> <li>➤ sectoral policy harmonisation re-industry, agriculture, tourism, transport and other services</li> </ul> <p>The CARICOM Investment Code (CIC) is a significant achievement. It covers all goods and services, except financial services covered by a separate agreement. Certain small-scale activities are reserved for nationals of Member States. It liberalises capital movements and current transactions. It establishes common regional principles for Environmental</p>	

<sup>61</sup> CARICOM Secretariat, Summary Report of the Appraisal of the State of Implementation of the Single Market. CSME (CONV)/2009/1/6. 6 October 2009

Protection and Intellectual Property, Competition Policy, Consumer Protection and Corporate Social Responsibility; and sets up a mechanism for the resolution of Investor-State Disputes. Also CROSQ is fully operational and the Competition Commission was created as early as 2008.

However, the Single Economy is far from achieved. The exchange controls, the currency convertibility and double taxation remain huge challenges for the CSME. The regime for market administration is not yet developed concerning the right of establishment, the restrictive business practices or the consumer protection. As already indicated the statistical information on labour is deficient and does not allow the development of regional labour market policies. The latest Summit of Heads of State of CARICOM in July 2011 decided to concentrate efforts on the completion of the Single Market, making of the Single Economy only a long term objective.

Implementation difficulties are properly identified by the UWI study already mentioned<sup>62</sup> (i) political resistance arising out of differences in national circumstances and interests, (ii) absence of supra-nationality in governance, and (iii) administrative and institutional deficiencies at the national level associated with small size and absence of critical mass of technical and professional personnel.

#### Indicator 3.2.5: Increase in intra-regional investments

5a. Documentation review

5b. Interview CARICOM Sec

5c. Guyana Del and other EUD

#### Information on Indicator

The CSME has been successful in encouraging intra-regional foreign direct investments, which have averaged 10% of total FDI inflows to MS in recent years.<sup>63</sup> The CSME has facilitated the creation and development of Pan-Caribbean firms<sup>64</sup> in several sectors, mostly in banking and insurance, tourism, distribution and manufacturing. Trinidad and Tobago remains by far the main intra-regional investor followed by Barbados and Jamaica. The main destinations have been the same Jamaica and Barbados, but also the OECS countries, Belize, Guyana and Suriname.<sup>65</sup> At the broader level of DR- Caricom relations, it is worth mentioning that in 2009 the DR company Leon Jimenes made a US\$30M majority share investment into breweries in Antigua, Dominica and St. Vincent, and in 2011 invested in a canning and waste water treatment plant in St. Vincent.

#### Answer to JC 3.3: The EU interventions contributed to the economic integration of the Caribbean OCTs and DOMs into the region

Four task forces have been created for the promotion of DOM and OCT cooperation with CARIFORUM countries. Only the trade task force meets on a regular basis. In the meantime the trade of Caribbean OCTs with the Caribbean has not significantly increased over the years 2004-2008. In fact, trade of OCTs with the Caribbean is very marginal, with exports below US\$0.3M in 2008 and imports below US\$0.2M in the same year, as indicated below.

There are three Départements d'Outre-Mer (DOMs) in the Caribbean. None of them, according to latest figures available, have developed significant trade with the Caribbean Region. Imports by Martinique from the Caribbean ACP were in 2008 only 1% of its total imports, and 2% of its total exports. The figure is only slightly better for imports of

<sup>62</sup> Caribbean Regional Integration, UWI International Relations Institute, Trinidad and Tobago, April 2011

<sup>63</sup> See "Towards a development vision and the role of the Single Economy", CCS, 2007

<sup>64</sup> Like Trinidad Cément, Grace Kennedy & Co, RBTT Bank Ltd., Intercomercial Bank, Republic Bank Ltd., First Caribbean International Bank, First Citizens' Bank, Trinidad & Tobago Unit Trust Corp, Guardian Holdings, CMMB, Goddard Enterprises Ltd. Barbados Shipping & Trading, CLICO Ltd., Jamaica Broilers Group Ltd., Associated Brands Industries, WITCO, or Jamaica Producers Group.

<sup>65</sup> See "Towards a development vision and the role of the Single Economy", CCS, 2007

Guadeloupe, but remains marginal. The same isolation from the ACP Caribbean is true for Guyana, with marginal imports and exports.

### Indicator 3.3.1: Increased trade between region and OCTs

- 1a. Trade statistics
- 1b. Findings of the on-going OCT evaluation
- 1c. Interreg
- 1d. CARICOM sec
- 1e. EUD Guyana

#### Information on Indicator

Four task forces have been created for the promotion of DOMs and OCTs cooperation with CARIFORUM countries. Only the trade task force meets on a regular basis. In the meantime the trade of Caribbean OCTs with the Caribbean has not significantly increased over the years 2004-2008. A steep decrease in 2007 could be due to the economic crisis. It will be possible to measure the effect of this crisis when figures of 2009 and of 2010 are released. The most striking fact is that according to the following table, trade with the Caribbean is marginal, with exports below US\$0.3M in 2008 and imports below US\$0.2M in the same year.


A few examples in countries with fairly reliable data <sup>66</sup>:

- Anguilla: a mere 2% of its exports are destined to the CARIFORUM market, a share that has declined from 15% five years ago. Anguilla sources 7% of its imports from the CARIFORUM market.
- British Virgin Islands: the CARIFORUM countries absorb only 0.5% of their exports and provide only 2% of their imports.
- Montserrat: CARIFORUM buys only 1% of its exports, but provides a significant part (21%) of its total imports.
- Netherland Antilles: they also export a significant amount to the CARIFORUM market (9% of total exports).

One of the three objectives of the EDF10 OCT SME Programme (€15M) submitted to the QSG/OCT Task Force in June 2011 is to promote stronger collaboration, trade and investment relations among the EU, CARIFORUM and the Caribbean Overseas Countries and Territories.

<sup>66</sup> See Development Finance, Cooperation, « Analysis of the Regional Economic Integration Processes OCTs within their region and with the EC », Jan. 2010

**Figure 10: Caribbean OCTs trade with CARIFORUM**



\*Source: DFC, *Analysis of the Regional Economic Integration Processes OCTs within their region and with the EU*, Jan. 2010.

**Indicator 3.3.2: Increased trade between region and DOMs**

- 2a. Documentation review
- 2b. Findings of the on-going OCT evaluation
- 2c. Interreg
- 2d. CARICOM sec
- 2e. EUD Guyana

**Information on Indicator**

None of the three (French) Départements d’Outre-Mer (DOMs) in the Caribbean have, according to latest figures available, developed significant trade with the Caribbean Region. Imports by Martinique from the Caribbean ACP were in 2008 only 1% of its total imports, and 2% of its total exports. The figure is only slightly better for imports of Guadeloupe, but remains marginal. The same isolation from the ACP Caribbean is true for French Guyana, with marginal imports and exports practically non-existent.

**Table 19: Trade Partners of Martinique (2009)**

	imports (€ M)	%	exports (€ M)	%	Balance for Martinique
Metropolitan France	1 519	55	90	25	-1 429
Other EU	569	21	4	1	-516
Guadeloupe	44	2	210	57	166
Guyana	8	0	38	1	30
Non ACP Caribbean*	157	6	5	1	52
ACP Caribbean	32	1	7	2	-25
Others	436	16	1	4	-42
<b>Total</b>	<b>2 766</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>36</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>-2 399</b>

\*Source : French Customs

**Table 20: Trade partners of Guyana (2009)**

	imports (€ M)		exports (€ M)
Metropolitan France	352	Metropolitan France	49.5
Other EU	99	Other EU	22.7
US	17	USA	37
Martinique	64	Martinique	6
Non ACP Caribbean	17	Non ACP Caribbean	0.2
ACP Caribbean	61	ACP Caribbean	2
Guadeloupe	65	Guadeloupe	11.1

\*Source : French Customs

**Table 21: Trade partners of Guadeloupe (2009)**

	imports (€ M)		exports (€ M)
Metropolitan France	1 160	Metropolitan France	72,6
Other EU	259	Other EU	1,7
USA	141	USA	3,9
Martinique	9	Martinique	21,6
Non ACP Caribbean	96	Non ACP Caribbean	0,3
ACP Caribbean	21	ACP Caribbean	1,4
Guyana	6	Guyana	65

\* French Customs

## EQ 4 Sub-regional Integration

### **EQ4. To which extent have the EU interventions contributed to the integration of sub-regions within the group of CARIFORUM members?**

**Evaluation criteria :** Effectiveness, Impact, Sustainability

#### **Justification:**

The CARIFORUM countries register very different levels of development. Within the 14 CARICOM countries, only six are considered as “more developed countries” by the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas, while the other eight are considered as “less developed countries”. Supporting sub-regional integration is one of the strategies that can contribute to a more even development of the region.

**Scope:** Criteria: Effectiveness, Impact. Geographic scope OECS and Hispaniola. Interventions and programming 2003-2010.

#### **Answer to JC 4.1: The intervention of the EU contributed to the delivery of the OECS strategic plan and its implementation**

The EU, along with other donors, has supported the OECS integration policies since the start and supports currently the conformation of the Economic Union proposed under the revised OECS Treaty of Basseterre.

With the project to conform an Economic Union, the OECS will become a stronger sub-region within Caricom and Cariforum. The relevance and need of supporting the process is high. The EU supported indirectly the OECS Sec capacities in the recent past, strengthening EDU's institutional capacity for effective programme administration and execution. The EDF10 programme (€12.6M) is meant to enhance the technical capacity of OECS and EDU to manage an expanded portfolio of interventions (details under the following indicator). The institutional assessment undertaken in 2010 concluded that the OECS Secretariat met two out of the four pillars. It did not meet yet the two criteria of accounting and procurement. As a consequence the EDF10 programme cannot be implemented through a contribution agreement but through a decentralised project approach using the EU procurement procedures.

The OECS established an Eastern Caribbean Common Market (ECCM) with its own CET, which was later harmonised with that of the wider CARICOM. It harmonised Customs legislation in each Member State. It achieved full monetary integration with a single currency pegged to the US dollar, and managed by the Eastern Caribbean Central Bank (ECCB). The OECS integration includes also common policies in functional areas. The OECS has a single telecommunications regulator body, a common judiciary and supreme court, a single Civil Aviation Authority and joint diplomatic representations.

The exports of OECS countries to CARICOM members increased by 171% over 2004-2008. They reached US\$161M in 2008, which is 76% of the total exports of OECS countries. As indicated in the table below, during 2004-2008, some OECS countries increased significantly their intra-regional trade.



<b>Indicator 4.1.1: Increase in capacities of human resources and budget of OECS Secretariat</b>	1a. Documentation review 1b. OECS Secretariat 1c. EU Delegation Barbados
<p><b><u>Information on Indicator</u></b></p> <p>The OECS Secretariat is a small organisation with its own budget of around US\$15M, but an overall budget twice this amount with donors' contributions. It has a staff of 175 persons. This figure includes the external offices, namely the Export Development Unit (EDU) responsible for trade, export and private sector development in Dominica, the Trade Missions and joint High Commissions in Geneva, Ottawa, Toronto, Brussels, and Porto Rico.</p> <p>With the project to conform an Economic Union, the OECS will become a stronger sub-region within Caricom and Cariforum. The relevance and need of supporting the process is high. The EU did not support directly the OECS Sec in the recent past but it is planned to build a partnership with it in the future.</p> <p>The EU, already under the EDF7, with the OECS Export Enhancement Programme, provided financial and technical support to EDU. The EDF9 and on-going Caribbean Trade and Private Sector Development Programme seeks to increase competition of firms through market expansion and export diversification support, strengthen Business Support Organisations' capacity in the delivery of services, but also strengthen EDU's institutional capacity for effective programme administration and execution. Also a project of the All ACP Trade.com programme held six workshops and trained in legal drafting of trade laws 52 officials of the OECS sub-region. This resulted in the drafting of four pieces of legislation and 15 other pieces being reviewed. A second project of the Trade.com programme, which came to an end in early 2011, provided the design of a trade facilitation framework</p> <p>The EDF10 programme (€12.6M) is meant to enhance the technical capacity of OECS and EDU to manage an expanded portfolio of interventions (details under the following indicator). In order to facilitate smooth commencement of the project the OECS Secretariat recruited additional technical staff.</p> <p>The institutional assessment undertaken in 2010 concluded that the OECS Secretariat met two out of the four pillars. It did not meet yet the two criteria of accounting and procurement. As a consequence the EDF10 programme cannot be implemented through a contribution agreement but thorough a decentralised project approach using the EU procurement procedures.</p> <p>CIDA, but also WB and CDB have supported for many years the OECS Secretariat, and in the case of CDB, in particular its statistical office. So did UNDP in strategy formulation and institutional strengthening. The IDB channels funds for the OECS through the CDB. The main institutional support is brought by CIDA under the Institutional Support Programme (ISP). This programme of around C\$2.5M started in 2007 and is supposed to end in 2013.</p>	

<b>Indicator 4.1.2: Common OECS policies for integration put in place</b>	2a. Documentation review 2b. OECS Secretariat 2c. EU Delegation Barbados
<p><b><u>Information on Indicator</u></b></p> <p>The seven members of the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS)<sup>67</sup> account for 4.5% of the population of CARIFORUM, around 10% of its GDP and 7% of the exports. With the support of the EU and other donors, the Member States of the OECS have developed the most integrated space in the region. The OECS established an Eastern Caribbean Common Market (ECCM) with its own CET, which was later harmonised with that of the wider CARICOM. It harmonised Customs legislation in each Member State. It achieved full monetary integration with a single currency pegged to the US dollar, and managed by the Eastern Caribbean Central Bank (ECCB). The OECS integration includes also common policies in functional areas. The OECS has a single telecommunications regulator body, a common judiciary and supreme court, a single Civil Aviation Authority and joint diplomatic representations.</p> <p>The EU has supported the OECS integration policies since the EDF7. The EU supports currently the conformation of the Economic Union proposed under the revised OECS Treaty of Basseterre. The deepening of integration of OECS Economic Union, both internally and with the CSME, is the objective of the current project of €12.6M, which is part of the focal sector of the EDF10. Activities of this programme are focused on the removal of restrictions to the movement of factors of production in order to reach full integration of the OECS market. The programme will address key areas such as capacity building, enhancement of competitiveness and innovation, strengthening Business Support Organisations (including the newly established OECS Coalitions of Services Industries), providing the companies with technical assistance, marketing support and offering institutional support of the OECS Secretariat, including the OECS Export Development Unit (OECS-EDU).</p>	
<b>Indicator 4.1.3: Increase in OECS trade with CARICOM members</b>	3a. Documentation review 3b. OECS Secretariat 3c. EU Delegation Barbados
<p><b><u>Information on Indicator</u></b></p> <p>As mentioned under EQ3, the intra-regional trade constitutes only 16% of total exports of the CARICOM countries.<sup>68</sup> The only countries which increased their exports over 2004-2008 to the Community are T &amp; T, Barbados and some OECS countries. The exports of OECS countries to CARICOM members increased by 171%. They reached US\$161M in 2008, which is 76% of the total exports of OECS countries. As indicated in the table below, during 2004-2008, some OECS countries increased significantly their intra-regional trade. The increase of CARICOM intra-regional is higher than the increase of OECS intra-regional trade, but the former is almost entirely due to T&amp;T oil exports.</p>	

<sup>67</sup> Member states: Antigua and Barbuda, Dominica, Grenada, Montserrat, St. Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia and St. Vincent and the Grenadines.

Associate members: Anguilla, British Virgin Islands.

<sup>68</sup> See CARICOM website under <http://tradsysonline.caricomstats.info/Home.aspx>

**Table 22: OECS exports of goods to CARICOM 2004-2008 (M US\$)**

YEAR	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2004-2008 %
<b>Intra-CARICOM total</b>	<b>1247</b>	<b>2439</b>	<b>2895</b>	<b>2281</b>	<b>3776</b>	<b>303%</b>
<b>OECS</b>	<b>94</b>	<b>125</b>	<b>117</b>	<b>126</b>	<b>161</b>	<b>171%</b>
Antigua & Barbuda	...	27	...	23	...	...
Dominica	25	24	26	23	24	96%
Grenada	8	12	14	12	16	200%
Montserrat	2	1	1	1	1	50%
St. Kitts & Nevis	1	1	2	2	3	300%
Saint Lucia	36	34	49	29	72	200%
St. Vincent & Grenadines	21	24	24	34	43	205%

\* Source: CARICOM Regional Trade Information System Tradys Online: <http://tradsysonline.caricomstats.info/Home.aspx>

#### **Answer to JC 4.2: The EU support contributed to the economic integration of Hispaniola island.**

Bilateral trade has increased rapidly, due to the growth of Dominican exports to Haiti, today its second export market, with US\$634M in 2009. Haitian exports to the DR remain insignificant (US\$13M in 2009). Real trade is in fact higher because intense smuggling both estimated in at least US\$100M.

There was no evidence of active cooperation and decisions until the meeting of the Joint Commission in September 2010. For the first time in 10 years the sub committees met and established work plan in areas of investment, financial services, tourism, environment protection, health and transport. Also, on March 30. 2011, in his speech to the UN Security Council, *the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Dominican Republic suggested that alternative energy sources be found and implemented and the interconnection of Haitian and Dominican electrical and gas distribution networks offered to transform Haiti's energy matrix.*

Thanks to the new Northern Coastal Road, the time required of driving from the Dominican border to Cap Haitien has been reduced from an average of three hours to an average of 45 minutes. The market in Dajabon was not completed as planned in 2010, neither by mid 2011. The termination of the Dajabon market is planned to be financed under the EDF10 Bi-national programme.

#### **Indicator 4.2.1: Increased bilateral trade**

1a. Documentation review

#### Information on Indicator

Bilateral trade increased rapidly, due to the growth of Dominican exports to Haiti, today its second export market. Dominican "National Exports" to Haiti, which means registered as non free zone exports or re-exports by Dominican Customs, amounted to US\$261M in 2009. Exports of Dominican Free Zones to Haiti have increased over the years to reach US\$383M in 2009. In the meantime, Haitian exports to the DR reached only US\$13M. The trade imbalance, in favour of the DR, is of US\$634. This trade imbalance has been

growing very rapidly in the recent years. It was only of US \$154M in 2005.

Haiti is now the second export market of the DR, the US market coming first with 58% of total exports in 2008 and the Haitian market with 8% the same year. The main Dominican export product is textiles and apparel (38% in 2008). Real trade is in fact higher. According to the Centro de Exportación e Inversión de la República Dominicana (CEI-RD), total exports of the DR to Haiti, formal and informal, reached more than US\$1000M in 2010<sup>69</sup>..

**Indicator 4.2.2: Evidence of cooperation decisions from Joint DR/Haiti meetings**

2a. Haiti EU Delegation

2b. DR EU Delegation

2c. On-going Evaluation of EU support to the DR

**Information on Indicator**

There was no evidence of active cooperation and decisions of the Joint Commission for years until September 2010. During 1996-2000, the Haitian-Dominican Joint Commission registered ten meetings of its sub-commissions. Eight cooperation agreements were signed in various areas like sports, culture, migration and environmental protection. Ten years after the EU pledged support to the Joint Commission, there is still no joint official strategy for the development of the Border Zone. Lack of institutional capacity and political direction explain in part the limited success of the EU's contribution. Since 2000, the Joint Commission did not meet until 2007. It was really reactivated in 2010, with the Joint Declaration of Ouanaminthe, and the joint meeting of September.

For the first time in 10 years the sub-committees met and established work plan in areas of investment, financial services, tourism, environment protection, health and transport. On March 30, 2011, in his speech to the UN Security Council, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Dominican Republic suggested that alternative energy sources be found and implemented and to interconnect Haitian and Dominican electrical and gas distribution networks.

**Indicator 4.2.3: Time saved travelling the North coastal road**

1. Documentation review

2. EU Del in Santo Domingo

**Information on Indicator**

The North Coastal Road built with the support of the EU joins Dajabon on the Dominican side of the boarder to Cap Haitien (75 km). The time required driving from the Dominican boarder to Cap Haitien has been reduced from an average of three hours to an average of 45 minutes. It facilitates access to the industrial zone of Ouanaminthe and the agro production of the North of Haiti. The traffic intensified and the Dajabon market days are very busy. The bridge and the market were not completed as planned before end of 2010. The market in Dajabon was not completed as planned in 2010, neither by mid- 2011. The termination of the Dajabon market is planned to be financed under AFD and EDF10 support.<sup>70</sup>

<sup>69</sup> Comercio Trasfronterizo entre República Dominicana y Haití, Roberto Despradel, March 2011

<sup>70</sup> Evaluation of EC cooperation with the Dominican Republic

## EQ 5 International Competitiveness

**EQ5: To what extent have EU interventions contributed to a more competitive Caribbean region within the global economy?**

**Evaluation criteria:** Effectiveness, Impact, Sustainability; Crosscutting issue of gender

**Justification:**

Competitiveness is a key result expected of the EU co-operation during the period covered by the evaluation. The aim of CRSP/CRIP of EDF9 refers to it through the concept of “global repositioning” while the overall objective of CRSP/CRIP of EDF10 makes a nominal reference to “increased international competitiveness”.

**Scope:** Criteria of Effectiveness, Impact, Sustainability, Value Added; Crosscutting issues of gender.

Geographic scope is all CARIFORUM countries. Period covered is 2003-2010 of EDF and non EDF interventions.

**Answer to JC 5.1: EU interventions contributed to increased competitiveness of traditional industries in the region.**

Only a few Caribbean countries have made significant progress in developing their traditional exports, like the DR for its bananas, mangos and a few other fruits thanks mostly to the cheapest labour in the region coming from Haiti. The DR has become the third biggest ACP banana producer over the last 10 years increasing their exports to the EU by several hundred percent. The DR could take advantage of the EPA and start exporting sugar and clothes to the EU. Suriname also restarted banana exports with the help of EU support.

The Sugar Accompanying Measures, the Special Framework of Assistance (for Bananas), and the Programme of support to the Caribbean rice industry centred on improving competitiveness and in the first two cases in supporting diversification. The Rum Support Programme managed to increase productivity, change the entire strategy by shifting from export of bulk rum to branded rum and to improve waste management.

In several countries competitiveness was also enhanced by non regional projects supporting exports and private sector development (like PSDP in Jamaica, Proempresa and Probanano in the DR, or Intra ACP programmes).

The major associations of main traditional industries improved their capacity to undertake competitiveness studies leading to policy dialogue with the government: the regional West Indies Rum and Spirits Producers' Association (WIRSPA), thanks to the regional EDF8 Rum Support Programme, and, in the countries concerned, the national associations of banana and sugar industries, thanks to the support of the corresponding EU interventions.

However, a few countries have made significant progress in developing their exports. In the area of non-traditional exports Antigua has initiated its first shipment of mango exports to the UK market. Horticultural exports from the Dominican Republic to the EU (as well as the US and Canada) are also expanding. The Caribbean rums, largely as a consequence of the EU supported Rum Project, has increased its exports and diversified its markets. CARIFORUM rum exports grew from US\$6M in 2006 to US\$100M in 2008.

<b>Indicator 5.1.1. Existence of an evolution of regional and national strategies and policies designed to increase competitiveness of traditional industries</b>	1a. Documentation review 1b. CARICOM Secretariat
<p><b><u>Information on Indicator</u></b></p> <p>The region benefited of four main commodity adjustment programmes. The Sugar Accompanying Measures, the Special Framework of Assistance (for Bananas), and the Programme of support to the Caribbean rice industry have centred on improving competitiveness and in the first two cases in supporting diversification. The Rum Support Programme sought to increase productivity, change the entire strategy by shifting exports from bulk to branded rum and to improve waste management. It was a bold and questioned innovation since it was managed by the regional organisation of the beneficiaries themselves (WIRSPA) and since it provided direct support to the rum producers.</p> <p>The strategies of most governments, faced with loss of preferences, have evolved towards trade liberalisation and the adoption of competitiveness policies, but with mixed results. Jamaica is maybe the best example of such changes. In the sugar sector, the government responded to the loss of preferences, with a policy of privatisation and modernisation of the industry. It also launched a drive to increase the land under sugar cane by bringing unutilised land into production. In order to offset the erosion of preferences, the EU supported the sector during the period 2002-2009 with a total support of about €66M under the AMS facility. Above €51M were disbursed as at October 2010.<sup>71</sup></p> <p>The banana sector went also through a change of policies. Faced with the loss of preferences, and frequent natural disasters, the industry decided in 2008 to end exports of bananas to the EU. With the long-standing support of SFA programmes, the industry managed to increase production and productivity, but for local consumption and processing. In order to accompany the loss of preferences, the EU offered to provide a final one-off measure over the current financial framework of the EU. The new financial support is delivered through "Banana Accompanying Measures" (BAMs) of a total of about €190M over the four year period 2010-2013. BAMs are expected to focus on three main areas of work: boosting the banana industry competitiveness in the long run; promoting economic diversification in rural areas; and addressing the broader social, economic and environmental impacts of adaptation.</p> <p>At the same time, some degree of traditional trade preferences on the EU market have been preserved and partially extended under the CARIFORUM-EU EPA.</p> <p>However, the main evolution in policies is the efforts by most governments and supported by the EU interventions, towards diversification. These efforts to diversify the economies of most CARIFORUM countries were already supported under the sugar and banana programmes. It is now in the EDF10 Regional Private Sector Development Programme (€28M) implemented by CEDA. One of the expected results is "High potential niche sectors identified by the region strengthened to benefit from EPA provisions ». The sectors mentioned are agro-processing, light manufacturing, fashion and garment, creative industries, professional services, specialized tourism, and alternative energy.</p>	

<sup>71</sup> Evaluation of EC co-operation with Jamaica 2002-2009

<b>Indicator 5.1.2: Improved capacity of associations of traditional industries to undertake competitiveness studies leading to policy dialogue with appropriate levels of government</b>	2a. Documentation review 2b. CARICOM Secretariat 2c. Beneficiaries 2d. EU Delegations																																																
<p><b>Information on Indicator</b></p> <p>The West Indies Rum and Spirits Producers' Association (WIRSPA), which was in charge of implementing the regional rum support programme, has improved this capacity to undertake competitiveness studies leading to policy dialogue with the government. Its institutional strengthening was in fact one of the stated objectives of the Programme. In the countries concerned, associations of banana and sugar industries also improved their capacity to undertake competitive studies and dialogue with governments, thanks to the support of the corresponding EU interventions mentioned above.<sup>72</sup></p>																																																	
<b>Indicator 5.1.3: Increased levels of exports aimed at more diversified markets</b>	3a. CARICOM statistics 3b. Country statistics 3c. Beneficiaries																																																
<p><b>Information on Indicator</b></p> <p>Although unilateral preferential trading arrangements were established as a development tool to stimulate and diversify Caribbean exports, and in spite of the support programmes, trade preferences have not delivered the expected results of overall trade performance. Traditional industries, in spite of the growing importance of services (above all tourism), are still very important for the region. For instance, in 2007, 6% of the EU imports of Caribbean goods were rum, followed by almost the same value for sugar, bananas and ferronickel. As indicates the case of Jamaica, as a consequence of lack of competitiveness, the export volume of main traditional crops have declined:</p> <p><b>Table 23: Jamaica export volume of traditional crops, 2004-08 (in tonnes)</b></p> <table border="1" data-bbox="147 1029 1037 1305"> <thead> <tr> <th>Exported Crop /Year</th> <th>2004</th> <th>2005</th> <th>2006</th> <th>2007</th> <th>2008</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td>Sugar</td> <td>159,908</td> <td>112,928</td> <td>140,445</td> <td>153,053</td> <td>136,070</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Bananas</td> <td>27,657</td> <td>11,560</td> <td>32,428</td> <td>17,391</td> <td>40</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Coffee</td> <td>1,721</td> <td>864</td> <td>1,448</td> <td>1,183</td> <td>1,133</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Citrus</td> <td>3,874</td> <td>2,375</td> <td>2,115</td> <td>3,840</td> <td>2,914</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Pimento</td> <td>297</td> <td>419</td> <td>255</td> <td>453</td> <td>502</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Cocoa</td> <td>670</td> <td>200</td> <td>204</td> <td>471</td> <td>275</td> </tr> <tr> <td><b>Total</b></td> <td><b>194,127</b></td> <td><b>128,346</b></td> <td><b>176,895</b></td> <td><b>178,398</b></td> <td><b>142,942</b></td> </tr> </tbody> </table> <p><i>*Source: Planning Institute of Jamaica (2009), Final Draft Agricultural Sector Plan, p.6, September.</i></p>		Exported Crop /Year	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	Sugar	159,908	112,928	140,445	153,053	136,070	Bananas	27,657	11,560	32,428	17,391	40	Coffee	1,721	864	1,448	1,183	1,133	Citrus	3,874	2,375	2,115	3,840	2,914	Pimento	297	419	255	453	502	Cocoa	670	200	204	471	275	<b>Total</b>	<b>194,127</b>	<b>128,346</b>	<b>176,895</b>	<b>178,398</b>	<b>142,942</b>
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<sup>72</sup> Evaluation of EC co-operation with Jamaica 2002-2009

However, a few countries have made significant progress in developing their exports, like the DR for its bananas, mangos and a few other fruits thanks mostly to the cheapest labour in the region coming from Haiti. Suriname also restarted banana exports with the help of EU support.

In the banana sector, while hurricane damage has driven the Windward Islands out of the EU market, the Dominican Republic and Suriname were able in 2010 to capitalise on high prices by expanding their banana exports to the EU by 33% and 22% respectively. Over the past four years the Dominican Republic tripled its sales in Spain, with 25% of the country's banana production being exported to the European market.

In the area of non-traditional exports Antigua has initiated its first shipment of mango exports to the UK market. Horticultural exports from the Dominican Republic to the EU (as well as the US and Canada) are also expanding.

The Caribbean rum exporting countries, largely as a consequence of the EU supported Rum Project, have increased their exports and diversified their markets. The “Authentic Caribbean Rum” Marque developed under the EU programme is registered in 41 countries plus the member states of the EU (as an EU Community marque). According to the Dominican Association of Rum Producers (ADOPROM), the Dominican exports have reached almost 3 million cages a year in 2010 thanks to the Programme supporting the Caribbean Rum Industry (8 ACP TPS 125). The DR is now a major exporter, with increases not only to Europe and the USA, but also to Chile where it delivers approximately 500,000 cages a year. Additionally, it has prompted investment in modernisation, increased the competitiveness of the sector and contributed to environmental protection, the adoption of technology and the creation of new permanent jobs. CARIFORUM rum exports grew from US\$6M in 2006 to US\$100M in 2008 only.<sup>73</sup>

#### **Answer to JC 5.2: EU interventions helped diversifying the CARIFORUM economies.**

The region's export structure shows the contrary: an increased concentration of products. In 1997, the top 20 products account for 51% of total exports and this share increased to 70% in 2007.<sup>74</sup> The only sectors of significant weight and growth are mineral fuels and chemical products, accounting for more than 70%.<sup>75</sup> Except for tourism and rum exports, supported by the EDF8 Rum Support Programme, there is no indication yet of significant growth of exports. Even the light industries, which prospered in the past in some countries under free zone regimes, have declined. This trend is particularly important for the DR free zones industries which employed up to 195 000 workers at the turn of the century and has lost more than 50 000 since that year.

Major constraints to competitiveness include insufficient transport infrastructure and mostly poor business environment (see JC 5.4). Wages are also relatively high in CARIFORUM member states, with the exception of Haiti, plagued with the two constraints mentioned above. This reflects mainly the fact that most of the Caribbean countries are middle-income countries, and their low flexibility compared to other middle-income countries<sup>76</sup>.

The stated strategy of many governments is to increase value added in the tourism sector. Tourism has been supported by EU interventions in the past and will continue to be under the EDF10. For instance, the OECS project will support the development of an OECS Training Centre in Tourism and Hospitality, already based in Antigua and Barbuda.

The Regional Strategy of the EDF10, partly based on this diagnostic, seeks to frame the assistance to CARIFORUM countries in their economic diversification efforts, namely to move away from overdependence on commodity exports and into services.

<sup>73</sup> See DG TRADE [http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/stories/full\\_stories.cfm?id=167&langId=en](http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/stories/full_stories.cfm?id=167&langId=en)

<sup>74</sup> See Caribbean: Accelerating Trade Integration, World Bank and OAS, April 2009.

<sup>75</sup> See [http://www.caricomstats.org/Files/Databases/Trade/eXCELpercent20FILES/CC\\_Total.htm](http://www.caricomstats.org/Files/Databases/Trade/eXCELpercent20FILES/CC_Total.htm)

<sup>76</sup> See Caribbean: Accelerating Trade Integration, World Bank and OAS, April 2009



There is no indication of significant increased employment for women in the region, except in countries where tourism is developing. Free zone industries have created a lot of jobs for women in the past, but these industries have receded here again for lack of competitiveness.

However, the DR found new niches in international markets. It doubled the value and the share of its exports to the European market thanks to non-traditional products like banana, avocado and mango, particularly organic products. This result is due in part to the All ACP pesticide programme. It is above all attributable to a favourable situation of the DR, which combines large extents of fertile land and by far the cheapest labour of the region (Haitian immigrants). Also bananas take advantage of a better access to the EU markets under the EPA. Growth of service exports do not show in statistics because of underdeclaration of sales and of statistical offices ill equipped for registering activities in services.

Diversification is now stressed in the EDF10 Regional Private Sector Development Programme (RPSDP-€32M) being implemented by CEDA. However, the CEDA leadership considers it was not sufficiently involved in the design of the RPSDP, and that allocating only €400,000 to innovations is very little, when the economy has to diversify.

**Indicator 5.2.1:Trends in growth of new industries within national economies**

1c. Beneficiaries

1a. Documentation review

1b. CARICOM/ Sec

**Information on Indicator**

The region's export structure does not show a growth of new industries, but instead an increased concentration of products. In 1997, the top 20 products account for 51% of total exports and this share increased to 70% in 2007. The increase in concentration is related to a decreasing dependence on bananas but increased dependence on fuels and metals as a source of foreign exchange, particularly in Trinidad and Tobago<sup>77</sup>. The table below depicts the value of CARICOM domestic exports per commodity classification at the beginning of the evaluation period and in 2009. Data for the year 2007 give an indication of the trend before the economic crisis that started at the end of that same year. The only sectors of significant weight and growth (shown in table 6 in current US dollar rates) are mineral fuels and chemical products, accounting for more than 70%.<sup>78</sup> The sector Beverages and tobacco also increased significantly, thanks to rum exports, actively supported by an EU intervention.

The only sectors of significant weight and growth in current US dollars are Mineral Fuels & Chemical products. The sector Beverages and tobacco also increased significantly, thanks to rum exports, actively supported by an EU intervention.

The stated strategy of many governments is to increase value added in the tourism sector, by generating more sophisticated tourism products and diversifying the supply of services, through standardisation and quality certification of agriculture and manufacturing products devoted to the tourism industry. The overall strategy is to promote of value chains or upwards linkages between agriculture, manufacturing and tourism and other services, like well-being services and creative services.

Tourism has been supported by EU interventions in the past and will continue to be under the EDF10. For instance, the OECS project will support the development of an OECS Training Centre in Tourism and Hospitality, already based in Antigua and Barbuda.

<sup>77</sup> See Caribbean: Accelerating Trade Integration, World Bank and OAS, April 2009.

<sup>78</sup> See [http://www.caricomstats.org/Files/Databases/Trade/eXCELper cent20FILES/CC\\_Total.htm](http://www.caricomstats.org/Files/Databases/Trade/eXCELper cent20FILES/CC_Total.htm)

**Table 24: Value of CARICOM domestic exports per commodity (2002, 2007 & 2009 in US\$M)**

SITC commodity description	2002	2007	2009	2009/2002	2007/2002
	Value	Value	Value	Value	Value
<b>All sections</b>	<b>5,257</b>	<b>16,647</b>	<b>11,138</b>	<b>212%</b>	<b>317%</b>
Food and live animals	863	1055	818	95%	122%
Beverages and tobacco	174	332	323	186%	191%
Crude materials inedible, except fuels	789	1924	811	103%	244%
Mineral fuels, lubricants, related materials	1,974	9,318	7,141	362%	472%
Animal and vegetable oils, fats and waxes	6	8	8	133%	133%
Chemicals and related products, n.e.s.	645	2919	1099	170%	453%
Manufactured goods	460	781	495	108%	170%
Machinery and transport equipment	70	105	59	84%	150%
Miscellaneous manufactured articles	124	125	101	81%	101%
Not classified elsewhere	151	80	283	187%	53%

\* Source: CARICOM Stats

Except for tourism in some countries, there is no indication yet of growth of new industries within national economies. The region's competitiveness is low reflecting its high costs of doing business, labour market rigidities, tariff dispersion, and trade costs. Some analyses suggest that the Caribbean's exports may be moving down the value ladder.<sup>79</sup>

Binding constraints to competitiveness include labour market rigidities, tariff dispersion, and trade costs. The small size of the Caribbean economies also limits the region's competitiveness. The DR, not CARICOM but CARIFORUM, is the exception, favoured by size and very cheap labour (see below Indicator 5.2.3) These efforts to diversify the economies of most CARIFORUM countries were already supported under the sugar and banana programmes.

Diversification is now stressed in the EDF10 Regional Private Sector Development Programme (RPSDP-€32M) being implemented by CEDA. However, the CEDA leadership considers it was not sufficiently involved in the design of the RPSDP. The grants component, for instance, was designed without monitoring of the results of the grants of the previous EDF9 programme. Also it considers that allocating only €400,000 to innovations is very little, when the economy has to diversify.

Growth of service exports do not show in statistics for a number of reasons. The main reason is the fact that countries are only laying the ground for a diversification in services. It is too early to see results. Also businesses accustomed to under declare sales, for tax reasons. Finally, statistical offices are ill equipped for registering activities in services.

<sup>79</sup> See Caribbean: Accelerating Trade Integration, World Bank and OAS, April 2009.

<b>Indicator 5.2.2: Increased employment opportunities for women</b>	2a. Labour statistics 2b. Caribbean Policy Development Center																																																																																																																																						
<p><b>Information on Indicator</b></p> <p>Existing statistics do not capture this information. The Caribbean Policy Development Center (CPDC) stresses that there is no indication of significant increased employment for women in the region, except for countries where tourism is developing. Tourism is the Caribbean's biggest employer after the public sector. However, the economic crisis and its possible rebound is a serious threat for the region. Over past decade hotel stats were consistently positive until 2008 and 2009 when all key indicators were negative UK arrivals to the Caribbean fell 6% last year on 2009 and are down almost 30% since 2007. The decline is significant as UK visitors account for almost one quarter of tourists from Europe and a high proportion of all visitors to some countries (one third of all visitors to Barbados for instance are from the UK). Recovery started in 2010<sup>80</sup></p> <p>Free zone industries have created a lot of jobs for women in the past, but these industries have receded here again for lack of competitiveness.</p>																																																																																																																																							
<b>Indicator 5.2.3: Export results in new industries</b>	3a. Documentation review 3b. CARICOM Sec 3c. Beneficiaries																																																																																																																																						
<p><b>Information on Indicator</b></p> <p>As indicated under indicator 5.2.1, there is no significant diversification of exports of goods. Concerning services, tourism related exports continue to dwarf the other exports of service, as indicated. As can be read in the table, the trade surplus in services tends to deteriorate, imports growing at a faster rate than exports.</p> <p><b>Table 25: CARIFORUM trade in services by category for 2003-2008 (in million US\$)</b></p> <table border="1" data-bbox="159 967 1655 1334"> <thead> <tr> <th rowspan="2">Service Type</th> <th colspan="2">YEAR</th> <th colspan="2">2003</th> <th colspan="2">2004</th> <th colspan="2">2005</th> <th colspan="2">2006</th> <th colspan="2">2007</th> <th colspan="2">2008</th> </tr> <tr> <th>export</th> <th>import</th> <th>export</th> <th>import</th> <th>export</th> <th>import</th> <th>export</th> <th>import</th> <th>export</th> <th>import</th> <th>export</th> <th>import</th> <th>export</th> <th>import</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td>Transport</td> <td>1,074</td> <td>2,572</td> <td>1,189</td> <td>2,678</td> <td>1,126</td> <td>3,133</td> <td>1,246</td> <td>3,391</td> <td>1,338</td> <td>3,861</td> <td>1,152</td> <td>3,793</td> <td></td> <td></td> </tr> <tr> <td>Travel*</td> <td>8,426</td> <td>1,227</td> <td>8,905</td> <td>1,391</td> <td>9,902</td> <td>1,500</td> <td>10,831</td> <td>1,492</td> <td>11,477</td> <td>1,526</td> <td>10,027</td> <td>1,231</td> <td></td> <td></td> </tr> <tr> <td>Communications</td> <td>422</td> <td>123</td> <td>489</td> <td>145</td> <td>437</td> <td>165</td> <td>466</td> <td>176</td> <td>481</td> <td>189</td> <td>415</td> <td>162</td> <td></td> <td></td> </tr> <tr> <td>Construction</td> <td>4</td> <td>60</td> <td>4</td> <td>42</td> <td>6</td> <td>80</td> <td>7</td> <td>271</td> <td>13</td> <td>245</td> <td>1</td> <td>73</td> <td></td> <td></td> </tr> <tr> <td>Insurance</td> <td>232</td> <td>530</td> <td>288</td> <td>529</td> <td>322</td> <td>698</td> <td>301</td> <td>755</td> <td>348</td> <td>808</td> <td>84</td> <td>592</td> <td></td> <td></td> </tr> <tr> <td>Financial services</td> <td>51</td> <td>75</td> <td>59</td> <td>91</td> <td>116</td> <td>80</td> <td>119</td> <td>99</td> <td>162</td> <td>97</td> <td>61</td> <td>81</td> <td></td> <td></td> </tr> <tr> <td>Computer and information</td> <td>78</td> <td>38</td> <td>78</td> <td>93</td> <td>80</td> <td>37</td> <td>67</td> <td>45</td> <td>57</td> <td>52</td> <td>48</td> <td>43</td> <td></td> <td></td> </tr> </tbody> </table>		Service Type	YEAR		2003		2004		2005		2006		2007		2008		export	import	export	import	export	import	export	import	export	import	export	import	export	import	Transport	1,074	2,572	1,189	2,678	1,126	3,133	1,246	3,391	1,338	3,861	1,152	3,793			Travel*	8,426	1,227	8,905	1,391	9,902	1,500	10,831	1,492	11,477	1,526	10,027	1,231			Communications	422	123	489	145	437	165	466	176	481	189	415	162			Construction	4	60	4	42	6	80	7	271	13	245	1	73			Insurance	232	530	288	529	322	698	301	755	348	808	84	592			Financial services	51	75	59	91	116	80	119	99	162	97	61	81			Computer and information	78	38	78	93	80	37	67	45	57	52	48	43		
Service Type	YEAR		2003		2004		2005		2006		2007		2008																																																																																																																										
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
<sup>80</sup> Source: Caribbean Tourism Organisation (CTO)

Service Type	YEAR		2003		2004		2005		2006		2007		2008	
	export	import	export	import	export	import	export	import	export	import	export	import	export	import
Royalties and licence fees	51	104	52	103	54	114	57	124	59	160	63	138		
Other business services	600	1,123	758	1,310	839	1,523	839	1,603	916	1,769	806	1,714		
Personal, cultural & recreational services	21	5	28	6	30	4	31	7	30	9	39	8		
Government services n.i.e.	228	338	250	325	308	358	303	403	331	432	308	340		
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>11,187</b>	<b>6,194</b>	<b>12,100</b>	<b>6,713</b>	<b>13,221</b>	<b>7,694</b>	<b>14,267</b>	<b>8,365</b>	<b>15,212</b>	<b>9,149</b>	<b>13,004</b>	<b>8,174</b>		

\* Source: UNCTAD Stat (2011); \* includes goods and services acquired from an economy by non resident travellers during visits shorter than 1 year.

There is no indication yet of growth of new industries within national economies of CARICOM. Even the light industries, which prospered in the past in some countries under free zone regimes, have declined. This trend is particularly important for the DR free zones industries which employed up to 195,000 workers at the turn of the century and has lost more than 60,000 since. As indicated in the figure below, the contribution of Free Zone industries to GDP has declined since 2004.

**Figure 11: Free zone value added and contribution to GDP: 1995-2008**



\*Source: data from CNZFE

However, in the DR, non-traditional products like banana, avocado and mango, particularly organic products, showed a bigger dynamic. Dominican exports found new niches in the international markets. In 2000, exports to the United States and Puerto Rico represented 87.3% of the total exports. In 2010 they represented 52.3%. Exports to the European market became almost doubled in the last 10 years, passing from some 5.8% (US\$335.2M) in 2000, to 9.4% in 2010 (an amount of US\$611.3M), according to Central Bank statistics. These results are due in part to the All ACP pesticide programme. It is also attributable to a favourable situation of the DR, which combines large extents of fertile land and by far the cheapest labour of the region (Haitian immigrants). Also bananas were offered better access under the EPA.

**Answer to JC 5.3: EU interventions contributed to a better compliance with international SPS, environmental standards and other TBT regulations**

EU regional programmes, and All-ACP, as well as interventions of other donors, like GIZ, have supported the adoption of international standards. CROSQ was supported by a component “Support to CROSQ” of the EDF9 CISP, with a total budget of €697,000. Support ended in December 2010. It will receive support under EDF10 on TBT issues. The project managed to develop a quality culture and improve the standards of quality of medical and chemistry laboratories of the region through training and TA. The Caribbean region was also a beneficiary of the successful All ACP Pesticides Initiative Programme (PIP) carried out between 2002 and 2010<sup>81</sup>. The Programme supported the compliance by producers, particularly constraining for small producers, of the new regulatory requirements of the EU, from traceability to EurepGap certification. The latter imposes requirements for the storage and safe use of pesticides, good agricultural practice, hygiene, and respect for the environment.

**Indicator 5.3.1: Adoption of international SPS and environmental standards and other standards by industries of the region**

- 1a. Documentation review
- 1b. CARICOM Sec
- 1c. Beneficiaries
- 1d. CROSQ
- 1e. EU Delegation Barbados
- 1f. EU Delegation Guyana

**Information on Indicator**

EU regional programmes, and All-ACP, as well as interventions of other donors, like GIZ, have supported the adoption of international standards. CROSQ was supported by a component “Support to CROSQ” of the EDF9 CISP, with a total budget of €697,000. Support ended in December 2010.

The project managed to develop a quality culture, and improve the standards of quality of medical and chemistry laboratories of the region, through training and TA. CARICOM is not a member of ISO, but MS are part of ISO. The project supported for instance the participation of Jamaica to ISO meeting in order to defend the interests of the region in a subcommittee on starches. However, the modalities of CISP made implementation too slow as every spending required the authorisation of CCS. According to CROSQ, the procurement unit would say one thing and finance unit another one. There was a need for a dedicated implementation unit. CROSQ also complains it was not informed it had to use fixed exchange rates. The organisation and quality of the standards monitoring systems was effectively strengthened, according to CROSQ management, but, according to the report on the appraisal of the State of the CARICOM single market, no Member State has implemented legislation for all of the regional standards<sup>82</sup>.

Under activity 2.1 of the CSME component of CISP, the main programme under the EDF9, a budget of €917,044 also was dedicated to complete the capacity to apply sanitary and phyto-sanitary regulations by strengthening the lead of role of CAHFSA. All-ACP Programmes have also benefited the region: the €42M Strengthening Fisheries Programme, the €30M Strengthening Food Safety Systems through SPS measures, and the €30M support programme to adjust the SPS control System in line with the EU regulation on Official Feed and Food controls. A component of the EDF10 EPA Support Programme will address also the issue of standards through CROSQ, with a budget of €1.1M.

<sup>81</sup> See Final evaluation of the Pesticides Initiative Programme (PIP), Italtrend, June 2008

<sup>82</sup> Report on the appraisal of the State of the CARICOM single market, CCS, 2010

<b>Indicator 5.3.2: Existence of monitoring systems measuring compliance.</b>	2a. Documentation review 2b. CARICOM Secretariat 2c. Beneficiaries 2d. CROSQ 2e. EU Delegation Barbados 2f. EU Delegation Guyana
<b><u>Information on Indicator</u></b> No evidence of such a monitoring system. However, under EPA Art. 53, the EU will undertake to “assist CARIFORUM States in ensuring compliance with SPS measures of the EC Party”.	
<b><u>Answer to JC 5.4: EU support to regional BSOs contributes to long-term private sector development.</u></b>	
<p>Caribbean Export (Barbados) has provided continued support to BSO for their institutional strengthening and development of quality services.</p> <p>Still, many and key BSOs of the region are still very dependent on donors for their sustainability.</p> <p>The <i>Doing Business</i> score provides an assessment of the change of business climate of 13 CARIFORUM countries between June 2005 and June 2010. It indicates that the business climate improved in 12 of those countries and only declined in one of them, Suriname. The improvement is very marked in three countries (Haiti, DR and Guyana), while only mild in the others. However, the more updated Global Competitiveness Index of the World Economic Forum released in September 2011 gives a worse picture.</p> <p>The WEF noted that while the region was heterogeneous, the nations shared “persistent challenges” in terms of a lack of physical security (the WEF even attributed Jamaica’s fall in the ranking mainly to its deterioration in security); poor development of infrastructure; an inefficient allocation of production and human resources infrastructure; and an increasingly a lag in innovation against other more developed, but also emerging, economies.</p>	
<b>Indicator 5.4.1: Range and quality of Services provided by BSOs</b>	1a. Documentation review 1b. CARICOM Sec 1c. Beneficiary BSOs 1d. EU Delegation Guyana 1e. EU Delegation Barbados
<b><u>Information on Indicator</u></b> Caribbean Export (CEDA) supported the capacity of Business Support Organisations (BSOs) to deliver services to their members through enhancing management capacities, facilitating BSOs’ participation in promotional and study tours, helping BSOs to organise sector specific seminars and conferences.	

It was key support to the Caribbean Business and Investment Support Network CARIBISNET. A regional forum for BSOs was organized in July 2006, with the objective of defining common needs and developing a common strategy to address them. Representatives from 38 BSOs attended. As a result, CARIBISNET was established with 34 BSOs as members. CARIBISNET is now a network of around 50 established Caribbean Private and Public sector non-financial BSOs, whose primary goal is to improve collaboration, information exchange and the development of common services among members. CEDA also supported existing Investment Promotion Agencies (IPAs) and Trade Promotion Organisations (TPOs) as well as the establishment of new ones.

**Indicator 5.4.2: Existence of budgetary and financial frameworks that ensure that BSOs are sustainable in long term**

- 2a. Documentation review
- 2b. CARICOM Sec
- 2c. Beneficiary BSOs
- 2d. EU Delegation Guyana
- 2e. EU Delegation Barbados
- 2f. BSOs

**Information on Indicator**

Except in the main sector of activity of the region, which is tourism, BSOs interviewed<sup>83</sup>, due a small membership, the size of those members, and/or the economic crisis, indicate that they are still very dependent on donors for their sustainability.

**Indicator 5.4.3: Improvement in most countries of the rating of the investment climate as measured by the World Bank in “Doing Business”**

“Doing Business Index

**Information on Indicator**

The *Doing Business* score provides an assessment of the change of business climate of 13 CARIFORUM countries between June 2005 and June 2010. It indicates that the business climate improved in 12 of those countries and only declined in one of them, Suriname. The improvement is very marked in three countries (Haiti, DR and Guyana), while only mild in the others.

The 5-year measure of cumulative change illustrates how the business regulatory environment has changed from the editions 2006 and 2011 of the *Doing Business* index of the World Bank. Instead of highlighting which countries currently have the most business friendly environment, this approach shows the extent to which an economy’s regulatory environment for business has changed in 5 years. The 2006 edition refers to the situation in June 2005 and the 2011 edition refers to the situation in June 2010.

This following table reflects all cumulative changes in the business regulation as measured by the Doing Business indicators for the 13 Caribbean countries followed by Doing Business since 2005. This year’s DB change score ranges from -0.1 to 0.54. More details on how the DB change score is constructed can be found in the methodology section of the website : <http://www.doingbusiness.org/methodology>

<sup>83</sup> See Isit per country in Annex n°6

**Table 26: *Doing Business* change of score for Caribbean countries (2005-2010)**

Countries	Score
Haiti	+ 0.13
Dominican Republic	+ 0.12
Guyana	+ 0.05
St. Vincent and the Grenadines	+ 0.02
Antigua and Barbuda	+ 0.02
Grenada	+ 0.02
Trinidad and Tobago	+ 0.02
Belize	+ 0.01
Jamaica	+ 0.01
Dominica	+ 0.01
St. Kitts and Nevis	+ 0.01
St. Lucia	+ 0.01
Suriname	-0.01

\* Source: *Doing Business, Caribbean States, World Bank, 2011*

However, the region as a whole is far from ranking high in *Doing Business*. According to the most recent data released by *Doing Business*<sup>84</sup>, the highest ranking in the Caribbean is St. Lucia's (rank 52 out of 183) followed by an Eastern Caribbean State, Antigua and Barbuda, with a ranking of 57. In contrast, The Bahamas is much further down at 85; while Trinidad and Tobago and Jamaica, which have traditionally been seen as major corporate centres in the region, were ranked at 68 and 88, respectively. However, St. Kitts and Nevis and St. Vincent and the Grenadines, which are increasingly promoting their reputation as international business centres, stood at 95 and 75, respectively. The other CARICOM nations making it into the top 100 were Belize at 93, Dominica at 65, and Grenada at 73. Guyana and Haiti did not make it above this bar, ranking at 114 and 174, respectively. The table below indicates the rank of each country for the *Doing Business* Index and its sub-indices.

<sup>84</sup> Not taking into account Barbados, see rankings in <http://www.doingbusiness.org/rankings>



**Table 27: Ranking of Caribbean countries in Doing Business Index**

	Ease of Doing Business Rank	Starting a Business	Dealing with Construction Permits	Getting Electricity	Registering Property	Getting Credit	Protecting Investors	Paying Taxes	Trading Across Borders	Enforcing Contracts	Resolving Insolvency
<b>St. Lucia</b>	52	53	13	13	115	98	29	52	110	165	58
<b>Antigua &amp; Barbuda</b>	57	80	21	16	124	98	29	135	71	70	81
<b>Dominica</b>	65	48	18	65	116	78	29	73	88	167	98
<b>Trinidad &amp; Tobago</b>	68	74	93	24	175	40	24	65	52	169	133
<b>Grenada</b>	73	60	11	39	154	98	29	91	40	162	119
<b>St. Vincent &amp; G.</b>	75	58	6	21	141	126	29	73	38	101	183
<b>Bahamas</b>	85	73	79	105	177	78	111	56	48	123	34
<b>Jamaica</b>	88	23	49	112	103	98	79	172	97	126	26
<b>Belize</b>	93	152	9	53	137	98	122	55	107	168	29
<b>St. Kitts &amp; Nevis</b>	95	64	16	33	164	126	29	133	44	114	183
<b>Dominican Rep</b>	108	140	105	123	105	78	65	94	45	83	154
<b>Guyana</b>	114	87	28	144	104	166	79	115	82	73	138
<b>Suriname</b>	158	173	98	38	170	159	181	34	105	178	157
<b>Haiti</b>	174	180	139	75	131	159	166	118	145	96	162

Source: data from *Doing Business 2011*.

Likewise, the Global Competitiveness Index of the World Economic Forum released in September 2011<sup>85</sup> gives a relatively negative picture. Only one Caribbean country, Barbados, ranks within the top 50 and large regional economies such as Jamaica and the Dominican Republic have seen their rankings tumble several places. Its global competitiveness was ranked at number 42, up one place from last year's ranking. Other CARICOM countries who improved their positions were Trinidad and Tobago, which hopped three positions from 84 to 81, and Guyana, which rose one place to 109. Next up behind Guyana was the Dominican Republic, whose ranking at 110 marked a dramatic tumble of nine positions in just one year. However, this was not as large a drop as Jamaica, which saw its ranking plunge by 12 levels to 107. New CARICOM entrants to the list this year were Suriname, which ranked 112; Belize, which ranked 123; and Haiti, which at 141 was ranked ahead of only African nation Chad on its level of competitiveness. In its commentary on the results, the WEF noted that while the region was heterogeneous, the nations shared "persistent challenges" in terms of a lack of physical security (the WEF even attributed Jamaica's fall in the ranking mainly to its deterioration in security); poor development of infrastructure; an inefficient allocation of production and human resources infrastructure; and an increasingly a lag in innovation against other more developed, but also emerging, economies.

<sup>85</sup> <http://www.weforum.org/issues/global-competitiveness>

## EQ 6 EPA

**EQ 6: - To what degree has the EU co-operation contributed to create the context for deepened trade relations between the EU and the CARIFORUM member states and among the CARIFORUM member states?**

**Evaluation criteria:** Effectiveness, Impact, Sustainability

### **Justification:**

The negotiation of Economic Partnership Agreements was envisaged in the Cotonou Agreement. Furthermore, cooperation to support this negotiation process was envisaged in article 37.3: *"The preparatory period shall also be used for capacity-building in the public and private sectors of ACP countries, including measures to enhance competitiveness, for strengthening of regional organisations and for support to regional trade integration initiatives, where appropriate with assistance to budgetary adjustment and fiscal reform, as well as for infrastructure upgrading and development, and for investment promotion."*

Under the focal sector "Intensification of regional integration/Integration into the world economy", the EDF9 CRSP mentions that the *"Strategy support will be also directed at the strengthening of trade-related capacity in order to help the region play its full part in and take full advantage of international trade. Support will focus on the Regional Negotiating Machinery (RNM), involving its integration into the regional institutional machinery, the development of overarching trade policies and strategies, the enhancement of technical, financial, managerial and information-communication capacities, the strengthening of links to and capacity of national administrations and private sector organisations. Specific support will be provided to the preparation, negotiation and implementation of EPAs, (...)"*. The trade negotiations in CARIFORUM are co-ordinated by the Caribbean Regional Negotiating Machinery (CRNM-OTN).<sup>86</sup> The co-ordination of stakeholder consultation is challenging especially for a region like the Caribbean, which is diversified with a wide range of interests and complex national agendas. The EU support to the CRNM-OTN is important in order to allow this institution to reach its regional objective and negotiate international trade agreements

Based on the above, EPA as the first comprehensive all encompassed trade agreement signed by 14 of the 15 member states (the Dominican Republic had previously signed the DR-CAFTA) was a critical exercise to build capacity and to help those countries address multiple issues including fiscal reform, competitiveness issues, etc.

**Scope:** Effectiveness, impact and sustainability of sector support and crosscutting issues

### **Judgement to JC 6.1. The EU support to the EPA-related reforms has facilitated the negotiation of the EPA**

EPA is one successful case of donor coordination. Multiple donors supported the CRNM efforts during the negotiations considering that whatever actions were taken to prepare the region for EPA negotiations and implementation would also benefit its competitiveness and its relationships with other. CIDA, IDB and DFID have also been large contributors to CRNM even before EDF funding started in 2004.

The EDF funding (under the 8 ACP TPS 110 as well as EDF9 CISP) was critical to the negotiation process itself, the number of meetings needed to carry the negotiations to a successful ending increased as the process near its conclusion. In year one of EDF9 CISP (2007-2008): 24 meetings (technical negotiations as well as technical working groups) were needed to drive the region to the signature of the agreement. This was separate from CRNM staff travelling to consult individual member states and to assist in addressing

<sup>86</sup> In keeping with a decision taken at the 30th Meeting of the Conference of Heads of Government of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) held 2-4 July 2009 in Guyana, the Caribbean Regional Negotiating Machinery (CRNM) will now be referred to as the **Office of Trade Negotiations (OTN)**.

their concerns. All stakeholders agreed that without this support, there would not be an EPA signed.

The EU and CARIFORUM established the RPTF (Regional Preparatory Task Force) to identify the needed reports to assist the region in the negotiation and the implementation of the EPA. To date 13 studies have been completed, but most of them were finalized after the negotiations have concluded. So they were mostly directed to implementation.

There were several support offered to what can be considered EPA related support in the EDF9 CISP and previous support for CSME under previous programme which helped the region advance in the negotiation. For example, completion of the CARICOM Service regime permitted the region to be in a position to negotiate services with a third party. Support to national level (ISPRI in Dominican Republic) also helped build capacity. However, the majority of the resources dedicated to support the negotiation that came through the 8 ACP TPS 110 (and a subcomponent of EDF9 CISP) was dedicated to support the negotiation process itself (attendance to meeting, technical working groups, colleague of negotiators, etc) than to related reforms.

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The EU funding was critical to the negotiation process itself, the number of meetings needed to carry the negotiations to a successful ending increased as the process near its conclusion. In year one of EDF9 CISP, component 2: 24 meetings (technical negotiations as well as technical working groups) were needed to drive the region to the signature of the agreement. This was separate from CRNM staff travelling to consult individual member states and to assist in addressing their concerns.

**The case of ISPRI (Institutional Support for Regional Integration 9 ACP DO 014/07) :**

Only national level programme aiming at complement regional level actions as well as EPA implementation. Although originally designed to support both the negotiation and implementation; it also started late in 2007. Total EDF amount of €5M. Assisted Dominican Republic in capacity building of regional entities as it relates to quality, sanitary, trade facilitation with EPA partners, public private dialogue. It also supported interlink with between DR and CARICOM institutions including customs, CROSQ-DIGENOR, development of strategy for closer relationship CARICOM-DR, analysis of regional preference, etc. Dissemination of EPA in the meeting and with public sector entities, development of a NGO strategy for EPA implementation Unit, etc.

**Indicator 6.1.1: Existence of EPA-related reforms developed by the CARIFORUM Member States**

1. Projects documentation
2. Interviews with CRNM staff, CARICOM Sec, public and private entities
3. EU Del DR

**Information on Indicator:**

There are some limited reforms that have been undertaken as it relates to EPA implementation. In regards to the negotiation, EDF funding arrived late to have a meaningful impact on reforms at it relates to negotiation. However, funding supported critical consultation with member states which assisted them in understanding the process and signing the agreement.

A series of programmes that were designed to support the EPA negotiations in fact started activities in 2007 (EDF9 CISP/CRNM, ISPRI, Trade.com) which could not make a meaningful impact on the negotiations themselves. However, those programmes have made a contribution towards the EPA conclusion of negotiations and capacity building for

implementation. A couple of institutions, which are not only EPA related, had offer specific EPA related support: the CARICOM Competition Commission and the Caribbean Agricultural Health and Food Safety Agency (CAHFSA), new entities that are expected to play a role in EPA implementation and competition policies (along side the DR Unfair Practices and Competition Commission, also supported by EU funds of Trade.com and ISPRI). These institutions are expected to be supported by EDF10 EPA implementation programme. Support has also been given to CROSQ (standards and quality) under the EDF9 CISP and is expected to continue under EDF10 CSME Programme. ISPRI in DR, for example was the promoter of an MOU between CROSQ and DIGENOR (DR Bureau of Standards).

EDF10 EPA implementation programme is also supposed to support actions in several sectors including fiscal reforms, statistics, among others. There are also several national programmes in Jamaica, Trinidad & Tobago and Dominican Republic under EDF10 that are designed to support EPA related activities.

**Indicator 6.1.2: Existence of new trade regimes obtained in the negotiation of EPA**

1. EPA text
2. Interviews with national public and private sector

Different areas are signed as important elements of the EPA: maintenance of free access for goods, lifted of quotas requirements, new market access in services, protocol on cultural cooperation, focus on innovation, level of commitment on development cooperation, commitments on intellectual property are all gains for the region in EPA.

The CARIFORUM region has three concentric circles of intra regional integration: the OECS economic union (which is in process), the Caribbean Single Market and Economy (CSME) with 12 member states, including the 6 belonging to the OECS economic union and a deeper intra CARIFORUM relationship with closer cooperation with Haiti and Bahamas and in the context of the CARICOM-DR Free Trade Agreement. Regional Preference under the EPA (art. 238) has given all CARIFORUM state a common intra regional regime which did not existed before (especially for Haiti and Bahamas which are not part of the CSME, OECS or CARICOM-DR FTA). EPA has also supported and protected the regional integration processes, which- for the first time- is part of a trade agreement.

One new trade arrangement (which was unexpected as not in the original agenda) was established in art. 238 of the agreement which addresses the matter of regional preferences. The EPA and the regional preference clause have established a trade regime which countries within CARIFORUM and outside the CSME had not been able to put into place by themselves for various reason (for example lack of an active agenda to address those bilateral relationships). For the first time, The Bahamas has a trade framework that would not have been possible to be achieved through their mere membership in CARICOM. Also the DR and Haiti have not been able to negotiate a trade agreement before and do now benefit from such an agreement in the frame of the EPA. It also gave CARICOM-DR a framework in services and investment which did not exist under their previous free trade agreement. The exclusion and long term phase out period (up to 25 years) are also first addition into trade agreement, as well as flexibility in the rule of origin and access to EU innovation mechanisms

<b>Indicator 6.1.3: Evidence of projects increasing the capacity to meet commitments arising out of the EPA</b>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. RSP-RIP for the 9th and 10th EDF</li> <li>2. Project documentation</li> <li>3. Interviews EPA implementing Units</li> </ol>
<p><b>Information on Indicator:</b></p> <p>There has been substantial improvement over the institutional arrangement of EPA in the second and third quarter of 2011. The majority of the bilateral institutions have been established. CARIFORUM has appointed an EPA Coordinator and the EPA Implementing Unit established in the CARICOM Secretariat is now a CARIFORUM Unit. The Trade and Development Committee met for the first time in June 2011. However, the only EPA programme that has been in place since the signature of the agreement was the ISPRI in DR. Other funding however, is supporting the establishment of EPA implementing Units in different member states (including the regional Unit) such as the CARTFUND financed by DFID. EDF10 national resources are expected to support efforts in Trinidad &amp; Tobago and Jamaica.</p> <p>EU support was also delivered through other sources: national indicative programmes (ex. ISPRI in DR), Trade.com, and the EDF9 CISP which were also mostly executed after the conclusion of the EPA negotiations in 2007, so the reforms supported under those initiatives had no direct impact in the negotiations, but it is expected that they will assist the implementation. Support has been given to reforms including fiscal reforms in OECS, support to the OECS Secretariat in drafting of legal documents and trade negotiations, support to CRNM/OTN, capacity building and training for Ministries of Foreign Trade in Belize, Guyana, Jamaica, DR, among others.</p> <p>Projects within the 10<sup>th</sup> EDF Road Map which were identified through the RTPF studies. Only a fraction of those are being financed by the 10<sup>th</sup> EDF Regional Indicative Programme in its focal and non focal sectors. Among the commitments areas included in the EDF10 EPA implementing Programme are: customs facilitation, competition policies. There are other areas such as intellectual property, SPS, agriculture, etc which are expected to be addressed by other funding sources, including all ACP funding, for example, agriculture.</p> <p>The capacity building in the region geared at the trade negotiations and support to CRNM/OTN will help the region deal with the next steps in the commitments and further negotiations pending. OTN and the CARICOM EPA implementation Unit have both staff trained by the projects (8 ACP TPS 100, EDF9 CISP, Trade.Com, etc). There also support to CROSQ (CARICOM Regional Organisation for Standard and Quality) which is addressing the issue of standards. The EU is also supporting the establishment of a new body on Food Safety and SPS issues: (Caribbean Agricultural Health and Food Safety (CAHFSA). There has also been support at national level including ISPRI in DR which has undertaken training, studies and technical assistance for Customs, Ministry of Trade, Foreign Affairs (Foreign Trade), etc. Trade.Com also supported different capacity building exercise for OECS, Jamaica, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Belize, Guyana and Dominican Republic. The EDF10 EPA implementing Programme is expected to address capacity building in customs, SPS, TBT, services, Competition Policy, fiscal reform, etc.</p> <p>However, the funds for EPA implementation are also coming more than 2 years after signature of the agreement. Only 1 project (regional private sector development programme) has started. There has been delays in the programming of the EDF10 due to several reasons including: a) delay in the development of the road map as it was a new exercise for both CARIFORUM and EU, it needed to get CARIFORUM approval and also took time; b) 10<sup>th</sup> programming exercise is a new process, including two approval processes (Identification fiche and action fiche) as well as fitting the process into the Delegations annual work programme. c) There was also delays in deciding on implementing modalities and agencies. Only two regional entities had passed the four pillars audit: Caribbean Export and Caribbean Development Bank (CDB). Then there was a delay in defining if CDB would be the entity implementing the EDF10 or the EPA implementing programme. Later it was decided that CDB would not be an implementing agency.</p>	

There are also limited resources available for the EPA implementing Unit and the job to be done to guide and support the national implementing unit, the regional actions, the joint implementing bodies and the make up with deficiencies in general, which was the approach that the CRNM/OTN undertook successfully to guarantee the pace of the negotiations.

One special case regarding support for implementation is Haiti. Throughout the documents and report of implementation of 8 ACP TPS 110 and 9<sup>th</sup> CISP, there are recorded a couple of visits to Haiti, but also the postponement of activities due to various reason. Haiti's current EPA Unit indicates Haiti has not received any assistance and it needs a lot of help. EDF10 EPA implementation fiche does identify dedicated funds to assist Haiti in being able to increase capacity in order to meet the commitments of EPA. There are also bilateral EDF funds (partially NIPs as well as RIP).

**Judgement to JC 6.2: The support to the Caribbean Regional Negotiating Machinery (CRNM-OTN) has provided the institution with a reliable funding system and the capacity to effectively prepare and participate in trade negotiations.**

The CRNM was established by CARICOM Heads of Government in 1997 and it reported directly to them. Its membership also included the Dominican Republic and Cuba. The CRNM was the entity delegated to negotiate the EPA at technical level on behalf of all CARIFORUM countries. It was also in charge of preparing and organizing all matters related to the trade negotiations. The CRNM received funding from CARIFORUM government for its basic administration, but it had to rely on donor support for the undertaking of most of the activities needed for negotiations. It had to build the capacity of the professionals and technical staff and at the same time support the national governments in their decision making process. The CRNM is perhaps the best example of donor coordination in CARIFORUM. Almost all donors have made a contribution one time or another to different projects and activities undertaken by the CRNM. In 2009, CARICOM Member States decided to eliminate the independent status of the CRNM and transform it into the Office of Trade Negotiations within the CARICOM Secretariat. Dominican Republic membership ceased at that time.

EU supported the EPA negotiation process, mostly through the 8ACP TPS 110 project (€1.8M), however a few of the funding designed to support the negotiations were under EDF9 resources (EDF9 CISP (€4.8M) which programming exercise started after the official launch of negotiations and actual programme implementation in mid 2007. While the availability of other donor funding as well as flexibility in the implementation of the first tranche of resources (8 ACP TPS 110) which had 5 riders important to undertaken the amount of actions needed in the negotiation process, it is important to know that the delay on the availability of resources could have affected the negotiations. It is important as a similar pattern seem to follow in the availability of resources for implementation under the EDF10, although there is no perceived unavoidable deadline for completion of commitments under the implementation.

**Indicator 6.2.1: Evidence that CRNM-OTN has enhanced its performance in participation in international negotiations processes**

1. Projects documentation
2. CRNM/OTN reporting and website
3. Interviews with past and present directors general

**Information on Indicator:**

The CRNM/OTN was able to conclude on time the EPA negotiations with recognized success and, in spite to some countries opinion, with a good level of support. The fact they have been able to continue smoothly into the Canada-CARICOM negotiations indicates a good capacity that has been built. A know how and expertise have been built. It is not clear if CRNM/OTN will be the one to work in the negotiations of the build in agenda of EPA which is expected to start after 5 years or in 2013. But it clearly oversee the WTO through an office in Geneva and the Canada-CARICOM negotiations which have held 3 rounds of negotiations since 2009 and has a calendar of actions which are currently

ongoing.

There has been a host of persons trained during the negotiation period (CRNM staff, colleagues of negotiators, technical experts, coordinators of working groups, and officials at different member states governments) and who participated as expert in different capacities who are now able to use the knowledge for other negotiations in the context of WTO, Caricom-Canada, etc. EDF resources (EDF9 CISP, Trade.com) have also trained individual from various Cariforum member states in the Master of International Trade from UWI-Barbados. A few of these individuals are working in different capacity in their ministries, at OTN or CARICOM Secretariat. A few of the EPA lead technical negotiators have left CRNM/OTN due in part to the increase level of bureaucracy that is implied by the absorption of the CRNM by the CARICOM Secretariat. Five out of the 7 persons working at the regional EPA implementing Unit have been employees of the CRNM and have gained expertise through the EPA negotiation process. The current EPA Coordinator on behalf of CARIFORUM was the former coordinator of the EDF8 ACP TPS 110 at CRNM/OTN.

The OTN continues to follow up the negotiations at the WTO level.

**Indicator 6.2.2 : Level of EU financial support to CRNM-OTN for the EPAs negotiations**

1. CRNM/OTN report
2. Project documents
3. Interviews in CNRM/OTN and CARIFORUM


**Information on the indicator:**

CRNM/OTN received basic funding for the negotiations (2004-2007) from the 8 ACP TPS 110 (€1.08M) which cover costs for attendance to meetings, technical studies, technical working groups, etc. Without this support it would have been difficult to execute negotiations in the timeframe agreed particularly the active participation of member states in the process as most countries lacked the resources.

During that period CRNM also received funding from other sources: EU (Proinvest-Trinnex, trade.com, EDF9 CTPSDP, etc) and non EU (CIDA, DFID, IDB, and Commonwealth Secretariat) which also helped with studies, consultations, workshops, etc. The CRNM had to educate at the same time than consult in order to assist public and private sectors in arriving at the understanding and developing of positions in different areas, including the cultural sector. This required a lot of resources which were not available from EU. The EDF9 CISP had a €4.8M component for CRNM which only started in May 2007, 7 months before the conclusion of the negotiations. Similar challenges happened with other resources aiming to assist in the negotiation process such as the ISPRI programme in DR or the Trade.com project


In the period from 2004-2008, CRNM/OTN received over €7M in donor funding. These were fairly large programme of over half a million. There were other supports from CDE, PROINVEST, Trade.com, OAS and others which also supported activities, but which we do not have the data. The info also did not include CARIFORUM member states' contribution to CRNM on its annual quota.

**Figure 12: Donor funding received by CRNM/OTN 2004-2009 by main donors**



Sources: EU (Cariforum reports, EDF9 estimate based on report spent on trade negotiations (until Oct.2008), DFID and IDB figures from CRNM/OTN and USAID and CIDA from IDB Caribbean Aid for Trade report 2009

**Figure 13: Duration of 8EDF ACP TPS 110 & riders from 04/2004-12/2007**



Source: \* CARIFORUM/CRNM Reports to PMU from 2005 to 2007

**Judgement to JC 6.3: The EU interventions supported active involvement of the private sector and the NSA in EPA negotiation and implementation processes.**

The EPA framework agreed in 2004 and all other documents agree on the importance of including Non-State Actors in the process. CRNM/OTN work plan included the active participation of private sector in trade negotiations. Their participation was limited to certain working groups and several seminars were delivered to engage them in discussions. (indicators J.6.3.1) However, only those countries whose private sector could afford to dedicate resources to following up the negotiations and to travel as part of their national delegations to the negotiating round did have a full and active participation. These countries were Barbados (Barbados Trade Team), Trinidad and Tobago (Chamber and Manufacturers) and Dominican Republic (more than a dozen institutions). Jamaica attended selected meetings.<sup>87</sup> Other Non State Actors felt they were not engaged in a meaningful way, although they attended a few working groups and seminars. They indicate the lack of resources, particularly of the NGOs as a reason for this lack of participation. Also information was not shared properly at national or regional level in spite of the number of seminars or bulletins produced<sup>88</sup>.

The private sector representatives as well as other Non-state actors were invited to many technical working groups as well as took part in other consultations which were financed by EDF resources (8 ACP TPS 110 and EDF9 CISP). Non-State Actors regional entities (CAIC (Caribbean Association of Industry and Commerce), CPDC (Caribbean Centre for Policy Development), CCL (Caribbean Congress of Labour) and CEC (Caribbean Employers' Confederation)) were invited to be part of the RPTF meetings. Two meetings of NSA were held during the negotiation process, although towards the end in 2006 and in 2007.

<sup>87</sup> Interviews with private sector in Barbados, Trinidad & Tobago and Dominican Republic.

<sup>88</sup> Interview Caribbean Policy Development Centre (CPDC)



Three countries have regular attendees in the negotiation round: Barbados, Trinidad and Tobago and Dominican Republic. Jamaica private sector had a limited participation. Others private sector argue they lack the capacity (human resource and financial) to follow up the negotiation process more closely.

There were other consultations and workshops by sectors which wide private sector representation. For example, the cultural study and workshop financed by PROINVEST in 2006 was the origin of the discussions and decisions on cultural issues within the EPA. PROINVEST supported the first consultation of the Cultural industries sector which established the basis to highlight this sector as one of the most important for CARIFORUM countries and identified areas to be highlighted in the negotiations. The EPA has a Cultural Protocol which was the first for a trade agreement.

**Indicator 6.3.1: Evidence of active NSA-participation in the regional EPA negotiation process**

1. Projects documentation
2. Interview with CPDC, private sector reps, and CRNM staff

**Information on the indicator:**

Participation of non state actors are indicated in the Cotonou Agreement, EPA negotiations principles agreed and in the EPA text itself through the establishment of a CARIFORUM-EU Consultation Committee composed of civil society representative from both groups.

There is limited evidence of NSA involvement in EPA negotiation, particularly the non private sector groups. The Caribbean Policy Development Centre (CPDC) had prepared different documents and position EPA related (a few of them still in their website), but were not actively involve in the process and it still not engaged at implementation level.

The RPTF called for the establishment of the Network of Non State Actors for EPA negotiations coordinated by (CPDC) and supported by the Caribbean Employer Confederation (CEC), the Caribbean Congress of Labour (CCL) and the Caribbean Association of Industry and Commerce (CAIC). However no resources were identified. Two meetings of the Network (under the coordination of the CEC) were held in 2006 and 2007 with resources from the EDF9 CTPSDP and 9<sup>th</sup> EDF CISP. However, the resources under the EDF9 CISP allocated to NSA (€350,000), has not been fully utilized or programmed according to a Monitoring and projects report. The EDF10 Regional Programme has allocated funding for NSA among the non focal sectors and not as part of the focal EPA related sector, but funding is still in the programming face. A PIF was already prepared.


The Consultative Committee of the EPA on the CARIFORUM side has still not been officially confirmed. Therefore a meeting of this Committee is yet to be convened. However, at the moment of interviews with CARIFORUM officials it was informed that the PIF at that stage (it could have been modified) did not contemplate participation of NSA in the EPA process (including monitoring).

Haiti and the Bahamas have signed the EPA (Haiti in December 2009), but are not part of any economic scheme like the CSME which can allow them to be fully integrated into the process and to undertake the capacity building process to engage with the EU and the rest of the region (DR is also not part of the CSME, but has had experience in international trade -WTO, DR-CAFTA, FTAs with CARICOM and Central America- and received direct EDF support). Bahamas is not a member of the Common Market of CARICOM and it is just now accessing to WTO. Haiti has had many challenges particularly at the institutional level and critically after the devastation of the earthquake of January 2010. Both countries need to be engaged and particularly Haiti. There were some provision in the EDF9 to support the insertion Haiti within the EPA context, but funds were not utilized. There are provisions under EDF10 of over €1M for support to Haiti insertion into EPA, as well as €5M bi-national funding for Haiti-DR private sector support.

<b>Indicator 6.3.2: Evidence of the ability of the private sector to exploit the benefits of the agreement</b>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Interviews with private sector representatives</li> <li>2. Interviews EPA implementing Units/Governments</li> <li>3. CARIFORUM EPA Unit</li> <li>4. EU Delegation Barbados, DR</li> </ol>
<p><b><u>Information on the indicator:</u></b></p> <p>According to private sector entities interviews there is a lot still to be done to help them address the constraints both in the supply side as well as market issues related to EPA. There are many factors that hinder competitiveness, but above all lack of information is considered the biggest hurdle. Not only information about the agreement itself which seems to be a problem in certain member states (OECS, Bahamas, Haiti), but also of how to address specific non tariff market restrictions (example, cement in Martinique and Guadeloupe).</p> <p>Specific projects supporting the private sector offered capacity building for the organisation of some sectors, particularly in the creative and cultural industries. The EDF9 Caribbean Trade and Private Sector Development Programme included different interventions in those directions. The CTPSDP also supported individual firms as well as private sector BSOs. They also held EPA sensitisation workshops throughout CARIFORUM member states. The organisation of regional associations, particularly in the creative industries (audiovisual, fashion, music) as well as professional services (management consultants, architects, ICT) have created the seed for groups to articulate their interests in policy and other matters, but also to identify market opportunities.</p> <p>Other all ACP programmes have at least initiated projects to support the private sector in areas needed in the context of the EPA different private sector led initiatives such as the establishment of the CARIFORUM-EU Business Forum (Bizclim), the start of Mutual Recognition Agreements (MRAs) for architects and engineers (trade.com), market research for specific services sector programmes (Bizclim), establishment of the Caribbean Network of Service Coalitions- CNSC; (Proinvest) among others. EDF9 CISP has also supported research on behalf of some of the sectors, especially the cultural industries (co-production agreement, strategy for the entertainment sector, etc).</p> <p>In the survey of business support organisation, although the majority (over 60%) had attended a meeting or a seminar regarding EPA, only about a quarter received support to participate in negotiations, build capacity or receive info on a regular basis. Even the information provision is slightly under 50%. This results were similar to those highlighted in the interviews with private sector representatives which still feels they are catching up to EPA and lack fundamental support to assist the firms in tapping to its opportunities both in the 27 EU member states as well as the overseas territories in the Caribbean such as the French Department of Martinique and Guadeloupe.</p>	

**Figure 14: Replies to PSO survey question on EPA**

Have you received support for being involved in the negotiations and/or implementation of the EU-CARIFORUM Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) in the following manners?



In interviews with Private sector representatives the main complaint is about the lack of information on where the opportunities are for CARIFORUM firms in the EU market and how to overcome trade barriers, including the French Department which a few firms in the region are attempting because they assume a Caribbean island would be easier for them and less expensive than to market in mainland Europe.

**Indicator 6.3.3: Evidence of communication campaigns have improved private sector's adhesion to the EPA implementation and EU visibility**

- 5. Interviews with private sector representatives
- 6. Interviews EPA implementing Units/Governments
- 7. CARIFORUM EPA Unit

There is no evidence that the communication campaigns have improved private sector adhesion to EPA implementation. Particularly because the CARIFORUM countries have taken a slow approach to EPA implementation. There is still the expressed need for more information that will allowed firms to understand the opportunities in the EU market. According to private sector entities that is the main constraints on EPA implementation

The CRNM/OTN and other organisations in the region (Caribbean Export, CROSQ, others) have prepared material which is EPA related. Also at national level: Barbados, DR (ISPRI programme), etc. The CNRM also produced a video *Turning point: Insight the Economic Partnership Agreement* which was financed by Trade.com and coordinated by the CRNM. It is currently available on the CRNM website. CRNM also has a radio programme and newsletter which are extensively used for EPA information dissemination. Market studies and briefs were also published in the CRNM website. Most documents produced by the different projects financed by EU programmes have at least initiated the actions to support the private sector in areas needed in the context of the EPA. EPA Implementing Unit has also started a newsletter recently.

As indicated for the BSO survey, only 46% indicated receiving information related to EPA which represents a significant information gap. The CARIFORUM EPA Unit has recently appointed a private sector liaison that along with the PR and communication officers should drive the efforts.

## EQ 7 Crime and Illegal Drug Trafficking

### EQ 7: To what extent has the EU support contributed to the fight against crime and illegal drug trafficking in the Caribbean region?

**Evaluation Criteria:** Effectiveness, Impact (*Cross-cutting Issues – Youths and Human Rights*)

#### **Justification:**

Illicit drug trafficking constitutes a major threat to regional economic development and political and social stability for the Caribbean as a whole in that it negatively impacts economic growth and investment. The EU programme of drug control in EDF9 and EDF10 entailed a continuation of support provided under the 1996-2001 Barbados Plan of Action.

The drug problem is multi-faceted and reflects differences within the Caribbean relating to levels of development, the incidence of poverty and even location. There is, however, a common denominator in poverty at the root of the drug abuse and drug related crime. The region lies in the major route for illicit drug trafficking between major areas of supply and demand and is therefore susceptible to collateral impacts from the trade especially affecting the poor who become involved and suffer from the harmful effects of trans-border activities. They are often responsible for high levels of crime and violence which lead to forced migration of skilled personnel from the more severely affected territories and negatively impact regional economic growth and development.

Drug demand/supply reduction has therefore become a major intervention strategy in addressing the problem through programmes which have been implemented even prior to EDF9 in the Bahamas, Trinidad and Tobago, Jamaica, St. Lucia, Dominican Republic, Belize and Suriname. Despite these initiatives, the region as a whole, lacked adequate capacity to effectively address growing problems related to drug trafficking and related criminal activities: inadequate institutional capacity for programme coordination and policy development, inadequate education and public awareness, insufficient community involvement and inadequate research and monitoring of drug trafficking and its effects in the region. For these reasons, the EU programmes implemented under EDF9 in the territories of St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Antigua and Barbuda, Dominica and Grenada, 2003-2007, were targeted at addressing these glaring deficiencies<sup>89</sup>. Accordingly, EU support was specially directed at encouraging the development of clear national policy and operational coordination capacity; strengthening research and monitoring capabilities; helping member states to develop primary, secondary and, in some instances, tertiary prevention programmes; and fostering the active involvement of communities in drug demand reduction efforts through greater public awareness. The interventions have sought to strengthen not only law enforcement and related institutions involved with prevention, but also National Drug Councils in addressing various manifestations of the drug trafficking

<sup>89</sup> Financing Agreement No. 6615/AB (Multi-Country Drug Demand Reduction Programme/MCDDRP))

and related crime problems in a holistic manner. EU initiatives contributed to reduce trafficking, by encouraging greater regional collaboration and co-operation and reduced demand, facilitated increased investment, growth and stability and contributed to integration of the region as a whole in the global economy. With a principal focus on reduced trafficking to Europe, inadequate attention was placed on addressing actual consumption levels in the Caribbean. Increased drug seizures in Jamaica, which are reflective of the general Caribbean trend, suggest reduced consumption anecdotally. Since couriers are usually paid in kind, consumption varies inversely with drug seizures. Data for the principal categories of drug seizures are shown below for Jamaica in Kilogrammes (kgs)<sup>90</sup>:

**Table 28: Drug seizures, Jamaica (2005-2009)**

	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009
Marijuana	14428	37199	45212	35507	22294
Cocaine	153	109	93	27	264
Hashish	471	122	41	51	-

Source: Narcotics Division, Jamaica Constabulary force (JCF)

No equivalent consumption data exists regionally.

EU support has been identified under the following EDF9 projects:

- Multi-Country Drug Demand Reduction Programme (from EDF8 funds/implemented under EDF9 - 2003-2007)
- Vulnerabilities and Social Issues: Crime and Security Co-operation
- Caribbean Integration Support Programme (9 ACP RCA 012-013) financing the Implementation Agency for Crime and Security (CARIMPACS).

**Scope:** Effectiveness, Impact, Crosscutting Issues - Youth and Human Rights. Entire Caribbean Region. Period 2003-2010.

**Preliminary Answer to JC 7.1: The EU contributed to the strengthening of co-operation between Caribbean Member States and regional law enforcement and related institutions in the fight against crime and illegal drug trafficking.**

The EU programme benefitted new as well as a number of existing institutions within the region<sup>91</sup>. The latter included the Regional Drug Law Enforcement Training Centre (REDTRAC, Jamaica), the Regional Police Training Centre (RPTC, Barbados), the Inter-Agency Drug Control Training Centre (CIFAD, Martinique) and the Regional Search Centre (RSC, Jamaica). REDTRAC was actually established in 1996 from funds donated by the Government of the USA through the United Nations Drug Control Programme (UNDCP) and the Jamaican government. The main focus of the Centre's activities was on the strengthening of the capabilities of the Police, Customs, Port Security, Defence Forces, Judiciary, Prosecutors and other drug control bodies, but courses for other disciplines such as health, social welfare and education were also implemented. The RPTC established in 1956 to provide entry level basic training for police and law enforcement officers within the eastern Caribbean is now fully funded by the Government of Barbados and currently offers "on-line" training to police officers. CIFAD, established in 1992, provides law enforcement training for police, justice departments and customs as well as

<sup>90</sup> Narcotics Division, Jamaica Constabulary force (JCF) mns.org.jm

<sup>91</sup> Various Internet sources, i.e. <http://www.acp-eucourier.info/content/fight-against-drug-trafficking-priority-eu-caribbean-partnership>;

addiction prevention training for medical professionals. EU support to these existing institutions in this regard has been to strengthen coordination and provide specific services in the areas of Intelligence/Information sharing, anti-money-laundering activities; treatment and rehabilitation; improvement of forensic sciences services, drug law enforcement training; precursor chemicals control and formation of National Drug Councils which have contributed to reduced drug trafficking and related criminal activities. Collaboration between the RIFC, other law enforcement entities, member states and other stakeholders in data collection and analysis, though treated confidentially, was useful in assessing the level of threats posed by the proliferation of drugs and to inform policy formulation. This resulted in an increased number of seizures through enhanced analysis of information received and consequently constituted a valuable contribution to the regional counter narcotic, through EU support to CARIMPACS' subsidiary, the RIFC<sup>92</sup>.

**Indicator 7.1.1: The existence and effectiveness of intra-regional mechanisms set up at the policy levels of government to improve coordination between states in the fight against drug trafficking and related trans-border crimes.**

1a. Document Reviews  
1b. ROM Reports

**Information on Indicator:**

EU interventions contributed to reinforce the institutional capacity of government bodies (National Drug Councils) to coordinate drug demand reduction efforts, to strengthen research and monitoring capabilities, to reinforce and improve prevention programmes and raise the level of public awareness through greater community involvement. This was carried out through the work of the Caribbean Regional Task Force on Crime and Security<sup>93</sup>. The results achieved demonstrated that much could be accomplished by strengthening the capacity of the anti-drug secretariats to institutionally develop and manage drug prevention programmes through effective and relevant research. With time, it became evident that the drug problem affected all sectors of society and collectively should be addressed accordingly. Despite this awareness, there remained glaring deficiencies in the regional response, notably, lack of container-ray machines, inadequate counter narcotics training, poor profiling of individuals and activities and in the identification of high risk groups, a lack of alternate activities to the drug trade relevant to each territory and insufficient coordination among member states. EU funding of regional entities such as REDTRAC contributed to improving and strengthening senior law enforcer's anti-narcotics capabilities and to reduced drug trafficking through establishment of regional mechanisms and linkages.

**Indicator 7.1.2: Programmes among law enforcement and related institutions strengthened in intelligence gathering, sharing and planning to fight crime and illegal drug trafficking.**

2a. RSP/RIPs  
2b. Internet reports/Sources  
2c. CARIMPACS

**Information on Indicator:**

Regional Drug Control Activities have been largely influenced by the need to enter into commitments from the various international conventions and action plans and have involved law enforcement and related institutions in member states. EU assistance under EDFs 9 & 10 include, in particular, strengthening law enforcement institutions, national drug councils and related activities and actions to strengthen the effectiveness of these institutions such as in: intelligence/information sharing, education, drug law enforcement training, treatment and rehabilitation, improvement of forensic sciences services, precursor chemicals control and regional coordination. These activities have complemented other actions related to customs law enforcement, mutual legal assistance treaties, regional justice protection, legislative framework and the criminal justice system and precursor chemicals control. In examining the contribution of EU assistance, it was considered coherent with assistance from other donors in supporting law enforcement institutions/intelligence/security agencies through their national points of contact. In particular, this related to UN Office on Drug Control (UNODC) as well as the OAS programmes (CICAD) dealing with demand and supply reduction and training, drug treatment and rehabilitation affecting National Drug Councils. The CARIMPACS Final Report did not provide

<sup>92</sup> Major Collin Millington, RIFC, Barbados

<sup>93</sup> Established following the 22<sup>nd</sup> Meeting of CARICOM Heads of Government July 2001 held in Nassau, Bahamas. CARICOM Secretariat Report/News

any assessment of the effectiveness of the training carried out on standardised tools conducted as far back as May 2010.	
<b>Indicator 7.1.3: Evidence of clear national policies and programmes in drug demand and supply reduction.</b>	3a. Country Drug Control Reports 3b. RSP/RIPs 3c. Internet Sources on EU Regional Drug Cooperation
<b>Information on Indicator:</b> Drug demand reduction has, for a considerable time, been high on the agenda of EU – Caribbean cooperation. The EU has been the principal contributor to the BPA including epidemiological surveillance and treatment and rehabilitation projects. A reported 10% of the funds under the EDF8 have been directed at financing drug demand reduction programmes in the region in the countries noted earlier under the BPA). These initiatives were continued under the programme carried out from un-utilised balances from EDF8 in the territories of the Eastern Caribbean in Antigua and Barbuda, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Dominica and Grenada. The specific purpose was to: strengthen national capacity in programme coordination and policy development related to drug demand reduction; to contribute to reinforcing an adequate well-functioning monitoring system, guaranteeing proper surveillance through regular data collection, analysis and results dissemination to facilitate better planning and decision-making; to enhance primary, secondary and tertiary prevention among competent authorities with community support; and to raise public awareness on matters related to drug abuse prevention and control, thereby promoting greater community involvement in drug demand reduction efforts. The beneficiary territories, by and large, developed clear national policies and operational programme coordinating capacity, strengthened research and operationally adequate system on drug demand reduction; primary, secondary and tertiary prevention programmes and increased public awareness of drug abuse problems and community involvement in drug demand-reduction efforts. The results from these initiatives have, however, been “mixed” due to various challenges faced in the respective member states <sup>94</sup> .	
<b>Indicator 7.1.4: Laboratories improved and forensic capacity of member states enhanced through training<sup>95</sup></b>	4a. CARIMPACS Reports 4b. CARIMPACS, PEs I & II 4c. CARIMPACS - Implementation Reports 4d. CARIMPACS – Addendum to PE # II
<b>Information on Indicator:</b> The level of forensic capacity regionally has been below a satisfactory level <sup>96</sup> . This related to both the standard of laboratories as well as the requisite human capacity both numerically and qualitatively. Under the CARIMPACS programme, plans were initiated to engage consultancy services to undertake an audit of forensic capacity (€60,000 allocation) <sup>97</sup> with the aim of establishing a regional forensic capacity to meet the needs of Law Enforcement and Security Agencies and inform future projects. The first/sole tender in late/December 2009 failed because of administrative non-compliance and the request to negotiate with the sole tender on issues not properly addressed was rejected by the EU. A new tender was launched in June 2010 and the series of steps set out to implement the results of the consultancy. This component under EDF9 focused on assessing the current capacity of existing forensic laboratories and the capacity of member states to conduct forensic work. No actual	

<sup>94</sup> MCDDRP Implementation reports; ROM Reports – Antigua and Barbuda, Grenada, St. Vincent and the Grenadines

<sup>95</sup> A change of Indicator from “Conduct of Training Workshops in CARIFORUM member states” is suggested. This is considered a better indicator for this purpose.

<sup>96</sup> CARICOM Implementation Reports, EDF 9

<sup>97</sup> Addendum 1 to PE II, CARIMPACS

facilities upgrading took place. The assessment made recommendations to be used to improve forensic laboratories and facilitate the provision of forensic laboratory science services to all CARICOM member states.

With respect to the training component in improved knowledge among law enforcement agencies on precursors and alternate substances, draft terms of reference were developed which identified the specific areas of training to be pursued and a proposal was received from the United Nations Office on Drug Control (UNODC) to implement this component and link it with the Forensic Capacity Assessment component. Derogation was approved for a negotiated procedure with UNODC<sup>98</sup> and the requisite training scheduled for November 24-26, 2010. The training reportedly contributed to enhancing the capacity of law enforcement officers to detect, identify and handle illicit drugs and diverted precursor chemicals. Trainees recorded satisfaction on completion of the course.

**Indicator 7.1.5: Evidence of greater sharing of data/intelligence on drug trafficking through and between member states increased<sup>99</sup>.**

5a. ROM Reports

5b. CARIMPACS – Addendum 1 to PE # II

5c. CISP Financing Agreement

**Information on Indicator:**

Strengthening coordinating mechanisms, of which information sharing regionally has been a critical component, has been identified as a major deficiency of the fight against crime and illegal drug trafficking. Expansion of the capacity for increased data/intelligence sharing, as an additional activity, was consequently added<sup>100</sup> from unutilised funds from PE 1, under CARIMPACS, which also involved an extension for the period of implementation for CARIMPACS for a second time by 4 months to May 2011. An audit of the intelligence framework, procedures and processes revealed that the intelligence mechanisms and services available to Member States were not efficiently utilised<sup>101</sup> to ensure the most efficient and effective intelligence environment. This led to a revision of the system of Intelligence National Points of Contact and implementation of re-sensitisation training. The training was successful in developing the standardised and harmonised training to administrators of intelligence agencies and facilitated the development of relationship among intelligence practitioners across the region. The training delivered the following tools: a Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) Manual, National/Regional Threat Assessment Formats, Common Situational Report (SITREP) Formats and Manuals for CISNET/CARIBSEC. While the RIFC was the lead implementer for this component and training equipped practitioners with appropriate skills towards elimination of regional threats, expansion of the programme beyond the original 22 trainees in May 2009, had to be abandoned because of the January 2010 earthquake due to the unavailability of the regional facilitators who were deployed to assist with the Haitian earthquake. The expansion and upgrading of capacity with respect to the CARICOM intelligence Sharing network (CISNET) facilitated secure exchange of intelligence reports especially related to trafficking of drugs, guns and ammunition and terrorism. The plan to extend capacity to the full fifteen members to include Montserrat and Haiti did not materialise due to a lack of capacity in both hardware and software to make the system effective. Regional drug trends, however, would be better tracked through collaboration between the Regional Intelligence Fusion Centre (RIFC) and the Regional Information and Communication Technology Centre (RICTC). This additional activity entailed the provision additional 2 terminals and relevant software purchased and specialist training effected in member states on the use of the intelligence tools and in drug threat assessment.

<sup>98</sup> CARIMPACS Implementation Report/Update

<sup>99</sup> A change from “Evidence of greater sharing of data on drug trafficking between states” is suggested.

<sup>100</sup> Change with the Addendum 1 to Programme Estimate 2 (PE 2)

<sup>101</sup> Final Report: Institutional Support for CARICOM IMPACS, May 2011



**Preliminary Answer to JC 7.2: The EU interventions helped regional and national law enforcement and related institutions to coordinate policy and build capacity in implementation monitoring in the fight against crime and illegal drug trafficking.**

The Barbados Plan of Action (BPA), 1996-2001, covered areas of demand reduction, treatment and rehabilitation and epidemiological surveillance, maritime, customs and judicial cooperation, control of precursors and money laundering. The succeeding programme, utilising EDF8 balances under EDF9, shifted focus to the development and implementation of Caribbean-specific strategies, involving regional coordination, institutional strengthening and capacity building. On the demand side, the programme addressed research, epidemiological surveillance, education and public health and specialised training of professionals and coordination of demand reduction projects. On the supply side, efforts against production, sale, transportation was to be strengthened and, through institutional strengthening and capacity building, regional capabilities enhanced in planning, coordinating, supervising and delivering training related to supply reduction. This programme was supported by actions coordinating the efforts between the European Union, the Caribbean and Latin America to achieve success of regional endeavours based on the principle of “shared responsibilities”.

An important component of the EU’s approach throughout has been research to generate the hard data necessary for informing policy at the regional level. The availability of hard data would serve to improve the evidence-base for assessment of the level of national and regional Threat Assessment and to determine the level of drug use in member states. The long term objective was to contribute to integrated policies to address issues such as money laundering and trans-border criminal related activities. Institutional strengthening to facilitate increased monitoring of drug threats. The formulation of policies on evidence-based research would also facilitate better monitoring. Specifically, the capabilities of the CARICOM Intelligence Sharing Network (CISNET) were upgraded to facilitate the greater sharing of information on trafficking of drugs, guns and increase terrorism<sup>102</sup>. The EU’s contribution involved equipment provision through CARIMPACS, a strengthened data base and the draft of a regional Counter Narcotic Strategy. There is no indication of the implementation of this strategy and consequently the extent of its effectiveness and impact on the illegal drug trade.

**Indicator 7.2.1: Existence of formal links for Information sharing between law enforcement agencies**

1a. Internet Sources

1b. Documentation Reviews

**Information on Indicator:**

Recognising the guiding principle of “shared responsibility between origin, transit and destination countries” in the fight against crime and illegal drug trafficking, the EU has been working within this context with other stakeholders e.g. the UNODC to establish clear networks for information sharing. Recognizing the need for more coordinated efforts to combat the escalating threat posed by drug trafficking in the Caribbean and the Americas, experts from the region recently met in the Santo Domingo Mechanism/Managua Pact in mid-2010 to discuss ways of sharing information on organized crime trends and responses in an interregional initiative covering Central America and the Caribbean<sup>103</sup>. The programme aimed to facilitate policy coordination between Central American and Caribbean States in their fight against drug trafficking and organized crime, generate more information and statistics for evidence-based policies, develop an information-sharing mechanism on drug and crime trends and provide legal advice to assist policymakers in the States of the region. Experts agreed on the progressive development of a network of strategic analysts in Central America and the Caribbean and will rely on the data and trends analyses generated at the centres of excellence established as well as an information-sharing mechanism that will be installed in the region. A similar expert meeting specifically for the Caribbean countries was planned for the end of the year 2010, to pave the way for a joint high-level meeting between Central America and Caribbean policymakers by the beginning of 2011. Whether this meeting took place and the extent to which formal links were established for information-sharing among law enforcement agencies and member states of the Caribbean is not clear. Also unclear is the specific role which the EU, played or what links were established with CISNET in this regard.

<sup>102</sup> Addendum No. 1 to PE II of IMPACS

<sup>103</sup> Internet Source: UNODC. Project Start date June 2010 with end date December 2013

<b>Indicator 7.2.2: Existence of National Drug Councils or equivalent bodies to address drug reduction/prevention and supply reduction programmes.</b>	2a. ROM Reports 2b. National Drug Programmes
<p><b>Information on Indicator:</b></p> <p>Efforts continued following the BPA to strengthen individual programmes in drug demand reduction by sharing experiences, best practices and lessons learned while recognising the particular features and circumstances of the respective territories. The establishment of sustainable drug demand reduction institutions was central to initiatives undertaken under EU programmes. EU initiatives have supported the establishment of national drug councils and the drawing up of national plans to address the fight against illegal drugs, including drug demand. Grenada established a National Council on Drug Control (NCODC) and formulated a 2003-2007 Master Plan on Drugs. Antigua set up a National Drug Council (NDC), a National Drug Information Centre (NDIC) for drug demand reduction and an Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) and drafting a National Drug Master Plan. Dominica created a National Drug Abuse Coordinating Agency (NDACA) with responsibility for drafting a National Anti-Drug Master Plan. On the supply side, capacity building of law enforcement agencies has been implemented to reduce the supply of drugs by improving the capacity of law enforcement officers in training in areas such as management, leadership, investigative techniques, financial and intelligence issues, forensic capabilities, human rights and weapons. Existing organisations have been used to give the actual training while programmes/materials would be shared with existing institutions in the field. Indications are that this aspect met with reasonable success.</p>	
<b>Indicator 7.2.3: Success of National Drug Reduction/Prevention Councils in putting in place shared programmes for coordination of drug demand/supply reduction efforts.</b>	3a. Document Reviews 3b. Internet Sources 3c. ROM Reports
<p><b>Information on Indicator:</b></p> <p>One of the important elements of EU assistance in demand/supply reduction strategies involved encouragement in the establishment of National Drug Reduction/Prevention Councils or their strengthening to enhance their effectiveness and impact on the illegal trafficking in drugs and the resultant effects on crime. Both aspects (establishment and strengthening) are important but the extent of sustainability in contributing to reduction in both demand and supply is in considerable doubt. For instance, no evaluation has been undertaken, after almost 6 years, with respect to the DDRP in the OECD sub-region even though the programme ended from year 2006. An objective assessment of the contribution of the EU has therefore not been done though anecdotal references allude to the contribution in increasing overall effectiveness and impact.</p>	
<b>Indicator 7.2.4: Existence of analyses indicating an increase in member states' capacity to analyse and properly assess the incidence of the drug problem through proper surveillance, data collection and analysis for planning.</b>	4. Document Reviews
<p><b>Information on Indicator:</b></p> <p>This indicator seeks to assess the extent to which the capacity of member countries to analyse and properly assess the incidence of the drug problem has been increased as a result of EU intervention. Relevant reports and documentation developed by member states' Drug Councils contributed to the body of information available to member states and to the increased ability to compile additional data and undertake analyses of the problems facing such states. To a limited extent, CARIMPACS constituted a regional resource on drug issues and related problems of crime, including money laundering, trade in guns and terrorism. This assessment did not result in quantitative results but the response, even though qualitative, enable an assessment even anecdotally that increased capacity in member country institutions came about as a result of EU support.</p>	

<b>Indicator 7.2.5: Extent to which EU interventions have contributed to strengthening of research and reinforcing monitoring capabilities in effecting proper surveillance, data collection and analysis to inform planning.</b>	<b>5. CARIMPACS Implementation Reports</b>
<p><b>Information on Indicator:</b></p> <p>One of the important results from strengthening CARIMPACS was the development of standardised tools to assist law enforcement officers in the use of threat assessment templates and other standardised tools. A Working Group was convened which edited the contents of the Manual of Best Practices on Regional Investigation Techniques and the refinement of procedures to generate evidence in the development of drug issues. Work on threat assessment templates was carried out in collaboration with the Regional Intelligence Fusion Centre (RIFC)<sup>104</sup> which had responsibility for threat assessment in the region. This component of CARIMPACS some thirty (22) National Points of Contact and Alternates in standardised procedures, threat assessment formats and intelligence management and was initially scheduled in early May 2010. Activities carried out under PE I entailed laying the groundwork for establishing the status of human resources and infrastructure capacity initiatives undertaken by law enforcement and security entities, determining where gaps still existed and conducting research to identify potential areas for infrastructural and human resource development. Training in the use of threat assessment templates, and generally implementing initiatives aimed at enhancing capacity, communication and cooperation among agencies were also executed under PE II. These training activities enhanced the capacity of drug interdiction officers to operate on a regional basis with increased effectiveness while regional drug interdiction protocols were established with funding under PE II. All activities contributed to the ability of the member states to overcome the challenges posed by the geographic and political nature of Caribbean “separateness” which affected the level of coordination, collaboration and sharing of scarce equipment and resources in a negative manner.</p>	
<b>Indicator 7.2.6: Increased ability of National Drug Councils to deal with primary prevention as well as secondary or tertiary treatment modalities.</b>	<b>6a. ROM Reports</b> <b>6b. Internet Sources</b> <b>6c. Newspaper Reports</b>
<p><b>Information on Indicator:</b></p> <p>Placing focus on demand reduction methods is both a more lasting and cost-effective method of drug abuse prevention and control. This is consistent with the hemispheric strategy for demand reduction to be a critical component of efforts to reduce trafficking in narcotics. The EU programmes provided strong support to prevention as well as secondary and tertiary treatment in programmes reinforcing this level of control in the MCDDRP affecting the Eastern Caribbean territories. EU funds have also supported primary prevention as a component of the EU-Drug Abuse Programme (EU DAP)<sup>105</sup>. The EU has funded a number of workshops on Behaviour Change Communication for Drug Abuse Prevention Planning, one of which was organized jointly with the Caribbean Community Secretariat and the National Council for Drug Abuse (NCDA) Jamaica, with funding under the EDF9 Programme. The February 10, 2010 workshop in Jamaica at the Knutsford Court Hotel<sup>106</sup> sought to strengthen the capacity of national drug abuse councils to incorporate behaviour change models and strategies in their prevention planning programmes in a bid to change behaviour and attitudes of those who might be inclined to abuse a substance. The organisers hoped that the workshop would spawn four primary objectives: assist the more than eighty participants to apply selected aspects of behaviour change communication strategies and associated tools; understand the importance of the research, behaviour change and policy continuum; review existing or proposed prevention programmes in the context of behaviour change communication models and identify (one) behaviour change programme for implementation across the Caribbean. Topics for the Jamaican workshop included: Shaping Communication for Caribbean Audiences; Communication, Culture, Science and Strategic thinking for Behaviour Change Communication; Education–Edutainment: Reconnecting with Caribbean Youth; Research, Policy and Behaviour Change; and Work life Planning for Substance Abuse Prevention Agencies. In this</p>	

<sup>104</sup> Addendum 1 to PE II: CARIMPACS

<sup>105</sup> EU DAP is a school-based drug abuse prevention education programme

<sup>106</sup> Jamaica Observer February 2010

regard, such programmes also were directed at cross-cutting issues affecting youths who are the principal targets of demand reduction initiatives.

**Preliminary Answer to JC 7.3: The EU interventions raised public awareness of drug-related crimes in the region.**

The EU has funded programmes designed to contribute to strengthening drug abuse prevention by increased public awareness of the evils of illegal drug trafficking and related crime. The MCDDRP had, as one of its purposes, the raising of public awareness on matters related to drug abuse prevention and control through promotion of greater community involvement in drug demand reduction efforts. This served to increase public awareness of drug abuse problems and increased community involvement in drug demand reduction. Such programmes have involved training of youths and youth leaders to design and implement primary drug prevention activities; strengthening relationships with community-based organisations; developing cadres of pre-school and kinder-garden teachers to teach drug prevention programmes and funding appropriate manuals as teaching materials for wider circulation; training peer counsellors and helping to strengthen national drug programmes at the community levels. Such programmes were usually complemented by relevant skills training, leadership training, drug use education programmes through youth training workshops<sup>107</sup>. Similarly, the CCS, with EU funding, facilitated research and through greater public interaction and edutainment increased the public's appreciation of the importance of prevention education. Through manuals, videos, and capacity building of practitioners, the CCS was able to mount programmes which reached a larger number of persons with anti-drug messages. These initiatives also helped to stimulate greater public awareness and interest in the short term. However, while some programmes have essentially met with success their sustainability has been challenged by the lack of continued support by some civil society organisations.

**Indicator 7.3.1: The extent to which local communities have been involved in promoting greater drug demand/supply reduction efforts.**

1a. Community-Based Organisations/Non-State Actors

1b. Newspaper Reports

**Information on Indicator:**

Non-state actors (NSA) have been playing an increasingly important in civil society governance generally and in mobilising communities to play a significant role in drug demand reduction efforts. Community engagement has been driven by the need to reduce poverty by creating alternative life styles and encouraging greater skills training and entrepreneurship. Initiatives have been particularly directed at youths. This indicator seeks to assess the effectiveness of these initiatives and the impact EU interventions have had or continue to have on communities where programmes have been implemented. The effectiveness of community engagement was related to availability of data on the nature and extent of the problem of drugs at the community levels but the engagement of local communities constituted an effective mechanism to reach “ordinary” citizens in educating them about the evils of drug use at the community as well as the national level. Here again, the efforts bore short term success which declined with a lack of continued support from NSA.

**Indicator 7.3.2: The extent of data availability for policy formulation and public/community advocacy in the fight against drug-related crimes and drug trafficking**

2a. CARIMPACS Documentation

2b. Implementation Reports

2c. Internet Sources

**Information on Indicator:**

One of the specific objectives of the formation of CARIMPACS was to create a sustainable regional monitoring and coordinating body responsible for policy formulation, strategy and the coordination of inter-agency operations in drug supply reduction. A further objective was also the creation of a sustainable regional infrastructure on drug issues including

<sup>107</sup> MCDDRP: Grenada Final Implementation Report

the formulation of policy on illegal drugs. An assessment of the relevance and status of implementation of recommendations identified in the report of the 2002 CARICOM Regional Task Force on Crime and Security (CRTFCS) and illegal drugs constituted an important rationale for its existence. A Caribbean-wide meeting of involved stakeholders in September 2010, determined, after evaluation of the 16 recommendations of the CRTFCS identified both the challenges for Member States and the key priority areas for the way forward. These involved: Judicial System Reform, Enhanced Border Control and continued capacity building for law enforcement officers. That the recommendations of the Task Force continued to be as relevant in 2011 as they were in 2002 implied that significant in-roads into the crime and drugs problem were not achieved by work undertaken by CARIMPACS. In fact, a draft of priority areas for further work in regional supply reduction was developed.

**Indicator 7.3.3: Decrease in the number of infringements reported by community social workers at ministries, departments and agencies of government.**

3a. Ministries, Departments and Agency (MDA) Reports

3b. Law Enforcement Reports

**Information on Indicator:**

The incidence of civil infringement perpetrated by drug offenders are often monitored by community social workers who keep records of the frequency and quality of offences committed by individuals under the influence of socially undesirable drugs. These reports are often collated from reports to ministries, departments and agencies of government (MDAs) or civil society related organisations. It is important to note that “minor” infringements often lead to more serious indictable offenses, sometimes imprisonment with “hardened” criminals in lock-ups and ultimately escalating behaviour of drug related activities involving “harder” drugs, gun-trafficking and more deleterious anti-social behaviours. While there has been an increase in the number of reported cases of infringements by community social workers, the data has not been collated for effective analysis and policy formulation. Further, data collected largely depended on the level of attention to detail demonstrated by such workers and was influenced by the number of such officers bringing breaches to public attention from schools, youth organisations and child care institutions. The reporting of such cases has not been consistent either within territories or among territories to induce widespread policy changes. There has however been an increased awareness and early efforts to separate minor offenders from hardened cases though increased investment in new facilities constitute a barrier to implementing desired changes.

**Preliminary answer to JC 7.4: The EU interventions helped to increase regional effectiveness in the fight against drug abuse and related crimes.**

The drug demand reduction problem as is the reduction in illegal trafficking in drugs is a multifaceted problem requiring a concerted effort on all fronts to meaningfully address the problem<sup>108</sup>. Problems facing the Caribbean have related to the fact of different stages of development, varying locations in the known paths of the drug trade, different levels of poverty and different manifestations of the problem. For effectiveness within the wider Caribbean, the approach requires a menu of complementary strategies and increased collaboration and cooperation among all agencies in the fight against both drug trafficking and its relationship to crime. The contribution and focus of the EU has been to increase the effectiveness of various initiatives by seeking to address the problem at the root causes of poverty. This approach has met challenges based on the vulnerabilities and special characteristics of various member states but has proven to be the correct approach through the encouragement of alternative lifestyles and addressing the “root causes” of poverty, rather the mere symptoms or manifestations of the drug trafficking and crime problem. The EU also encountered challenges posed by CARIMPACS which failed the four pillars of accountability and is currently the subject of corruption allegation involving its previous Director who has been sent on leave pending the outcome of the issue and an Interim Director installed to head the organisation<sup>109</sup>.

<sup>108</sup> Various Internet Reports

<sup>109</sup> <http://www.trinidadexpress.com>

<b>Indicator 7.4.1: Decrease in the number and severity of crimes related to drug use and trafficking.</b>	1a. Law Enforcement Records 1b. CARICOM Secretariat Reports (Supply Reduction) 1c. CARIMPACS Implementation Reports 1d. RSP/RIP Documents 1e. Evaluation Reports
<p><b>Information on Indicator:</b></p> <p>The scattered nature of Caribbean states and the presence of numerous physical access points make effective border control extremely difficult and challenging. EU involvement through CARIMPACS has contributed to more effective border control and preventing any significant increase in illegal trafficking. Further, the nature of drug related crimes, by criminal justice records, have indicated a greater level of severity and brutality especially between rival gangs. It proved far more difficult, however, to establish in a precise manner the link between illegal trafficking and the correlation between this trade and the level of crime for want of adequate data and records to establish a causal relationship. Anecdotally, it is however true to say that restraining the flow of illegal drugs through the Caribbean contributed to suppression in escalating crime.</p>	
<b>Indicator 7.4.2: Decrease in the level of drug use by females who are often influential in the reduction of trafficking or use by their male counterparts.</b>	2a. Law Enforcement Reports 2b. Probation Department Reports 2c. National Drug Council Reports
<p><b>Information on Indicator:</b></p> <p>Women often are significant sources of both benefits and factors of influence on their male counterparts in aspects of behaviour change or otherwise<sup>110</sup>. The desire for lavish lifestyles, particular among young males, has often been influenced by the need to have their female counterparts enjoy particular symbols of affluence and the “get-rich-mentality”. The ability to target females within the efforts to reduce illegal drug trafficking and related crime though pursued as a strategy did not bring up any significant results. This was in part due to the fact that whereas it was pursued in some territories, notably Granada, and to a lesser extent in Jamaica, the effort was not sufficiently sustained to bear tangible results. It remains to be determined whether this strategy constituted a lost opportunity in effectively impacting the drug culture particularly among anti-social male youths.</p>	

<sup>110</sup> MCDDRP: Implementation/ROM Reports: Grenada, Antigua and Barbuda

## EQ 8 Disaster management

**EQ8: To what extent did the EU interventions strengthen the capacity of the region to better manage disasters?**

**Evaluation criteria:** Effectiveness, Impact, Coordination, (*Crosscutting Issue: Environment*)

**Justification:**

Disaster management is a key priority in the Caribbean region, given the frequency of their occurrence and the impact they have on the social and economic life of persons and countries. Addressing disaster management in the region is a critical part of providing support for economic development and poverty reduction as enhancing capacity to prepare for, mitigate, respond to and recover from disasters underpins progress and stability in the region. The JCs under this EQ will allow for an assessment of the Commission's contribution to enhancing disaster management capacity in the region.

**Scope:** covers the entire period of evaluation, including programming from EDF9 and EDF10, as well as through ECHO.

**Answer to JC 8.1: The EU contributed to the establishment of a functional early warning system/meteorological radar system.**

One aspect of EU support to strengthening disaster management in the Caribbean had as objective supporting four beneficiary countries (Trinidad & Tobago, Guyana, Barbados and Belize) to reduce their vulnerability to adverse weather, particularly floods. The intent of this Regional Radar Warning Project (9 ACP RCA 1) was to provide a modern weather radar system (using Doppler<sup>111</sup> and digital techniques) to each National Meteorological Organisation (NMO) of the four beneficiary countries, thereby making more accurate, real-time weather data available to the relevant services in the region in an easily accessible way.

Based on desk review, interviews and field visits, it is evident that EU support has made some contribution: the four new radar systems have been installed in the target countries and these installations certainly represent an important contribution – in terms of hardware – to the establishment of a functional early warning system/meteorological radar system (Indicator 8.1.1). However, at different times these radars were and are experiencing operational challenges as recently as June 2011. Furthermore, the related project components focused on strengthening of human resources for utilizing the improved technology were not implemented. Capacity issues relating to the executing agency were noted in the final evaluation and other documentation as negatively affecting the achievement of results and timeliness.

However, challenges were experienced in terms of what are perceived as difficult and complicated EU procurement rules and procedures, which allegedly contributed to the capacity building components of the project not being implemented and the related key expected results being unachievable (Indicator 8.1.3). It is clear that a fully functional early warning system/meteorological radar system has not been fully established in the region as anticipated by this time, but this is due to reasons beyond the successes or failures of EU support alone. Caribbean stakeholders interviewed expect that the full regional 'mosaic' will be in place and be implemented in the near future, and this will render the support provided by the EU more useful and relevant into the future (Indicator 8.1.2). It should be noted that there have been some improvements with regards to access to some weather and climate data, including composite radar images and all countries' NMOs have benefitted from this at certain times, while radars would have been functional (Indicator 8.1.4).

<sup>111</sup> A Doppler radar is a specialised radar that can measure radial velocity, the instantaneous component of motion parallel to the radar beam (i.e., toward or away from the radar antenna), National Weather Service Glossary

<b>Indicator 8.1.1: Number of meteorological radar systems installed, functional and tested in the region as a result of EU support</b>	1. Interviews with NMS representatives from 4 target countries: Barbados, Belize, Guyana and Trinidad 2a. Documentation Review 2b. Interviews with other key stakeholders CMO, CIMH, EU-Guyana & Barbados, project monitors/evaluators 3a. Documentation of network access 3b. Review of # /types of access (as stored in database, if applicable); (same for indicators below)
<p><b>Information on Indicator:</b></p> <p>EU support to the region, through the implementing agency – the Caribbean Meteorological Organisation (CMO) – has resulted in the successful installation of 4 Doppler radar systems. Radar systems have been installed and tested in Barbados, Belize, Guyana and Trinidad and Tobago. When these are functional and utilized, this is a significant contribution to EWS/meteorological radar systems in the Caribbean, a needed aspect of disaster preparedness and response. The field phase confirmed that not all radars are functional all the time. In addition, they are not being fully utilized as part of a functional telecommunication network, which does not fully exist yet in the region. To some extent, when functional, they are generating reliable weather and climate data in an improved manner.</p> <p><b>Sources:</b></p> <p><i>“At the end of the year 2009, the Implementing Agency for the project, the CMO, had achieved the first Result required in the Logframe (that is, four new weather radar systems installed and brought into operation (...) with improved weather forecasts being achieved for each of the beneficiary countries.” (Final Evaluation Report, October 2010, p.28)</i></p> <p><i>“The NMSs previously utilised satellite images for severe weather predictions. All partner countries agree that the Doppler Radar System was a great and necessary addition to their Emergency Preparedness Regime. The impact is curtailed by the limited skills of the end users and forecasters with respect to the manipulation of the system. It is also limited by the unavailability of the composite images and this equipment in 2 of the 4 countries remains unused. The radar images are accessed by the general public and the Emergency Preparedness Organisations. There is some use of data by government agencies for short term planning and it is hoped that this can be further increased and expanded following training in the system capability thus contributing to increased impact. The partner countries have demonstrated that they are pleased with the radar systems and willing to meet the increased financial costs associated with the operations of the system as specified in the terms of the MOUs. This is further demonstrated by the purchase of spares on a country basis despite the central store established by the project” (ROM Monitoring Report, July, 2011)</i></p>	
<b>Indicator 8.1.2. Existence of secure and functional telecommunication networks, linking the new and existing radars in the region.</b>	See above
<p><b>Information on Indicator:</b></p> <p>The existence and functionality of a regional telecommunication network, which would now integrate the newly installed radars is beyond the scope of accountability of EU support. However, the existence and functionality of the network is an important aspect of the purpose of the installed radars. A regional telecommunication is not yet fully in place. No serious factual and detailed assessment of the effectiveness of the improved weather forecast results has yet been made. Nonetheless, data suggests that the linkage was not considered adequate enough to be considered functional. At different times, as much as three of the four radars were experiencing challenges that would affect functionality,</p>	



though they were being addressed. In addition, further capacity building would be required to harness potential of the radars as part of the network, once achieved (see findings under 8.1.3 below).

The field phase looked into the functionality of the new radars as part of the larger telecommunication network as well as undertaking a cursory assessment of the quality of data emerging. And the field phase confirmed that the regional mosaic is not yet in place.

It should be noted that EU support had previously also contributed to the establishment of a radar system in the Dominican Republic and that some support seems to have also been provided to Jamaica for this purpose during the period.

It should be noted that some Caribbean countries (OCTs) are expected to also benefit from EU support to the Regional Risk Reduction Initiative being implemented by UNDP and OECS, as it is also expected to include a regional early warning systems (EWS) pilot for the OCTs, based on the ITU automated alert protocol for warnings.

**Sources:**

*“The Regional communication system is in place and even a new international processing data system has been installed. However, the supply of national data for the composite system is still not effective in the four countries. CMO attribute the problem is with the NMS's who have not adequately set up their own communications for the transmission of their data. However, it must be questioned if there is a general lack of complete confidence amongst all meteorological staff, at the forecasting front, due to the lack of forecaster training. After all, the failure to implement such a significant training programme (both in terms of manpower input and finance) must be having some affects.” (Final Evaluation Report, October 2010, p.42)*

*“Past experience with the use of weather radars in the region indicates that each one of the four radar systems would get integrated in the national / regional weather warning system and serve at a national as well as regional level for many years to come. However, it is critical that appropriate training is received by the end-users not only in meteorology and system maintenance but also in operational capabilities and data management”. (ROM Monitoring Report: 02/12/05)*

*“... no serious factual and detailed assessment of the effectiveness of the improved weather forecast results has yet been made. The Trinidad radar has a loss in sectors which rotates in the azimuth a full 360 degrees. Although initially thought to be an antenna problem, antenna signal reception tests have shown that this not so and it is a software problem. The radar manufacturer suggests that the problem is related to a combination of antenna speed and software processing time. It is being addressed. The Guyana radar is working well but the tower construction has problems. The Barbados radar's microwave link from the Tower to the meteorological office is having interference from an unknown microwave source. The NMA staff report that the appropriate National Telecommunications Office have investigated the problem It is hoped that another approach might solve the problem. The Belize radar is working well but the low height of the radar antenna could raise concern with respect to the safety of the local electromagnetic radiation. The CMO have plans to commission a survey by an independent and reputable institution to test and verify the conformity of the radar emissions to international health and safety standards.” (Final Evaluation Report, October 2010, p.28-29)*

*“Only one of the results, to install 4 new radars, was achieved. Result 4 refers to improved access to weather data for the larger public. This was partially achieved in the beneficiary countries since radar images are hosted on the websites of the NMSs... This result is only partially achieved since there is no access to regional composites / mosaic as planned... Due to limited training end users are severely handicapped in their use of the data though many used the manuals to improve their skills. Most system displays are still in need of calibration to reflect the national rainfall patterns”. (ROM Monitoring Report, July 2011)*

*“Implementation was plagued by delays due to the lack of availability of EU 9th EDF templates, debates with EU task managers over the route to be taken including derogation for the origin rule. It is noted that at commencement the project was managed by the Trinidad Delegation downgraded to satellite status in 2004 with final decisions being made by the Guyana Delegation, closed for a critical period during floods. Despite the fact that the partner governments signed the MOUs and supplied personnel and other resources to the*

*project in general, there were delays associated with site identification, site / land handover and other decision making, delays in the award of works contracts due to failed tenders, delays to construction works due to rain, etc. In the case of Guyana construction had to be halted after 3 months and restarted at a different site when the Guyana Civil Aviation Authority which had previously signed off on the location realised that the radar would be too close to the airport navigation system. The GoG met all associated costs. This contract remained problematic, finally going to dispute settlement. Due to changes in communication protocols the provision of composite data was affected and to date still not available through the dedicated communication link as envisaged. Result 2. Hardware was supplied although not all sites have appropriate software to utilise it.” (ROM Monitoring Report, July 2011)*

*“The OCTs R3I covers the English and Dutch overseas countries and territories in the region, a total of 7 territories (Anguilla, Aruba, British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, Montserrat, Turks and Caicos, and the Netherlands Antilles (Bonaire, Curaçao, St. Maarten, Saba, and St. Eustatius)). They are highly vulnerable to various natural hazards and climate change impacts, also having fragile ecosystems and concentrations of settlements and major functions in low lying coastal areas and other hazard prone locations. This project seeks to address the risk and exposure of these small islands by providing a network of regional infrastructure, programmes, policies and protocols to strengthen their capacity to predict and prepare for natural hazards, thus improve resilience and reduce risk and subsequent loss. R3I is funded by the European Commission to the tune of €4.932m covering a period of 3 years (2009-2011). By the end of the project it is expected that there will be:*

- Increased capacity in hazard mapping and associated vulnerability assessments, to further be incorporated into spatial information systems to inform planning and development processes*
- A regional early warning systems (EWS) pilot for the OCTs, based on the ITU automated alert protocol for warnings*
- Capacity built in response, rescue and recovery, in order to shorten recovery periods through the use risk assessment and mitigation practices for development planning*
- Strengthened local disaster management structures and capacities in terms of tools and best practices to support comprehensive disaster risk management*
- Greater cooperation and coordination between the OCTs, with documentation and dissemination of best practices*

*The R3I emphasises intra-regional learning and sharing of tools, knowledge and best practices to enhance the territories’ individual and collective capacities. It will, among other activities, support OCT disaster management and GIS departments with modelling, simulation and planning; and build on the related experience and knowledge in the Cayman Islands. Further plans are to integrate results of modelling into quantitative multi-hazard vulnerability maps to support investment in hazard mitigation strategies; and complete and/or initiate building vulnerability studies and improve quantitative risk assessment of critical infrastructure to support the investment in hazard mitigation strategies”.<sup>112</sup>*

**Indicator 8.1.3. Evidence of improved capacity of human resources to utilize technological improvements in radar systems.**

See above

#### **Information on Indicator**

Though some evidence suggests that some training was completed during the execution period and therefore some capacities were likely improved, the majority of desk review data suggests that this portion of EU support remains incomplete and human resource capacity to utilize technological improvements in radar systems have not improved. In fact, this remains one of the key shortcomings of project implementation that has also negatively affected the overall success of newly installed radars, as functionality and use remain lower than planned. Capacity limitations within the execution agency were noted as affecting timeliness and the achievement of results. The field phase confirmed all data

<sup>112</sup> See: <http://www.bb.undp.org/index.php?page=regional-risk-reduction-initiative>

collected through the desk phase.

The field phase confirmed that as of 2011, no further training has been conducted, which may have allowed further potential to be realized and what gaps still remain.

**Sources:**

**Supportive evidence:**

*“The technical component of the training programmes for the NMSs went well and was successful. Many of the technical staff who were interviewed expressed satisfaction with the technical training provided by the radar company (SELEX). It was provided in a timely manner. Theoretical and practical training was undertaken in Germany together with “hands on” training and then “on-the-job” training for each specific radar as it was being installed. Some of the National Meteorological Services are planning to send more technical staff to the company’s courses.” (Final Evaluation Report, October 2010, p. 29)*

**Detractive evidence**

*“Unfortunately, the forecasters' programme was not implemented and led to a number of difficulties in completing the project which are examined in the subsequent sections of this report... The CMO are working on the difficulties but consider that there is some tardiness by the forecasters in putting efforts into this part of the operation. This aspect is possibly caused by the project's failure to provide a competent forecaster training programme in weather radar operation. Whilst the management and forecasters met by the evaluators were very positive about the new system and upbeat in the work that they were doing, there was unanimous comment that they could do better with the proper training. Their present expertise seemed to be based on a broad, but short, appreciation of the modern capabilities of Doppler radar received in general meteorological courses. The failure to provide the half million euro training programme for the forecasters is a very disappointing part of this project.” (Final Evaluation Report, October 2010, p. 29)*

*“Meteorological training component not spent. The Programme Estimate No.2 included a Meteorological training component for TT\$ 3,480,000.00 (EUR 480,000), a strategic component of the project, which was not spent”. (Final Evaluation Report, October 2010, p. 27)*

*“Training programme for Meteorological Officers: This was a failure, and as indicated above, the lack of the forecaster formal training programme has possibly hindered the ability of those staff to gain the best from the advanced capabilities of the new Doppler, digital radar system.” (Final Evaluation Report, October 2010, p. 42)*

*“Past experience with the use of weather radars in the region indicates that each one of the four radar systems would get integrated in the national / regional weather warning system and serve at a national as well as regional level for many years to come. However, it is critical that appropriate training is received by the end-users not only in meteorology and system maintenance but also in operational capabilities and data management. “(ROM Monitoring Report: 02/12/05)*

*“Complex projects such as this one, funded by the EU, should have an Implementing Agency with adequate project management capacity.” (Final Evaluation Report, October 2010, p.8)*

According to the Final Evaluation, *“the institutional capacity of the Implementing Agency (CMO) was possibly the most critical issue for the project implementation...”* The Evaluation Team believes that the inadequate Staff of CMO is still a major problem for the sustainability of the project as much still has to be done in order to gain the best performance out of the radar systems. (Final Evaluation Report, October 2010, p. 48)

*“The training of forecasters, system administrators and other end users was grossly inadequate both in terms of its length and depth as well as in terms of the number of participants. The LFM states that 120 meteorologists and 150 non-meteorologist end users would be trained but participants totalled less than 60 or 25%. Result 3 - This component was not achieved due to the 9th EDF d+3 rule, which fell on 31st October 2006, 22 months after the establishment of the PMU. There was no training in the use of*

*composite data. The budget was 13.2 MEURO of which only 87% was disbursed the rest was de-committed.” (ROM Monitoring Report, July 2011)*

*“The impact is curtailed by the limited skills of the end users and forecasters with respect to the manipulation of the system. It is also limited by the unavailability of the composite images and this equipment in 2 of the 4 countries remains unused. The need to improve impact has been acknowledged and the CMO is currently pursuing discussions with other donors aimed at securing funds for further training of technicians as well as forecasters and end users.” (ROM Monitoring Report, July 2011)*

*“Unfortunately the capacity building component of the project was not executed with technicians sighting that the 4 weeks training in Germany coupled with one week during the installation was inadequate. Technicians were selected from each country according to the availability of appropriate personnel; however there has been a 50% loss in the number of technicians available in Barbados and at CIMH, 60% in Belize and Guyana, with only Trinidad & Tobago still having access to all three of the technicians trained in Germany by Gemtronix. This situation needs to be addressed to ensure the longevity of the equipment and sustainability.” (ROM Monitoring Report, July 2011)*

**Indicator 8.1.4. Real-time access to reliable weather and climate data (including composite radar images), through the use of digital technology of modern weather radars and communication systems in the region, is available**

See above

#### **Information on Indicator**

Overall, this indicator was difficult to assess from desk review and very little evidence was found. A factual and detailed assessment of the effectiveness of the improved weather forecast results has not yet been made. From data that does exist, findings are mixed: The field phase confirmed that NMSs are producing local images and producing local forecasts and several end users have indicated that the forecasts are better, due to the increased detail of images and the ability of the Doppler system to produce many more forecasting capabilities. There are though, still problems with the composite images. This is possibly caused by the project's failure to provide a competent forecaster training programme in weather radar operation and the lack of a fully functional regional network or system. In fall 2010 there were still problems with full distribution of the composite images although the system technically works. Unfortunately, the fact is that all four sites of the radar project system are not fully meeting the required project results and so any assessment of this aspect is somewhat incomplete.

It should be noted that some Caribbean countries (OCTs) are expected to also benefit from EU support to the Regional Risk Reduction Initiative being implemented by UNDP and OECS, as it will also address increasing capacity in hazard mapping and associated vulnerability assessments, to further be incorporated into spatial information systems to inform planning and development processes as well as a regional early warning systems (EWS) pilot for the OCTs, based on the ITU automated alert protocol for warnings. This support began only near the end of the period under evaluation.

#### **Sources:**

*“...no serious factual and detailed assessment of the effectiveness of the improved weather forecast results has yet been made.” (Final Evaluation Report, October 2010, p.28)*

*“All the National Meteorological Services are producing local images and producing local forecasts. Several end users (e.g. Civil Aviation Authorities, emergency services etc.) have indicated that the forecasts are better, due to the increased detail of images and the ability of the Doppler system to produce many more forecasting capabilities, such as wind speeds and direction at varying heights. There are though, still problems with the composite images operated through Meteo- France based in Martinique. However, Meteo-France claims that the composite images are available. The CMO are working on the difficulties but consider that there is some tardiness by the forecasters in putting efforts into this part of the operation. This aspect is possibly caused by the project's failure to provide a competent forecaster training programme in weather radar operation. Whilst the management and forecasters met by the evaluators were very positive about the new system and upbeat in the work that they were doing, there was unanimous comment that they could do better with the proper training. Their present expertise seemed to be based on a broad, but short, appreciation of the modern capabilities of Doppler radar received in general meteorological courses. The failure to provide the half million euro training programme for the forecasters is a very disappointing part of this project.” (Final Evaluation*

Report, October 2010, p. 29)

*“In one or two years there should be a detailed follow on study, by an experienced team consisting of experts in tropical weather forecasting, economic growth of the region and disaster management in the region, to establish the extent to which the long terms objectives of the project have been, or are likely to be achieved, due to the benefits provided by the new weather radar systems”.* ((Final Evaluation Report, October 2010, p. 10)

*“At the time of the site visits, the Evaluation Team found that there are still problems with full distribution of the composite images although the system technically works. The CMO consider that the problem is with the NMSs, some of whom are not effecting their own communications for the transmission of local data to Meteo-France... Unfortunately, the fact is that all four sites of the radar project system are not fully meeting the required project results”.* (Final Evaluation Report, October 2010, p. 40)

*“Improved access to reliable weather radar data for a larger public. Interviews indicated that beneficiaries were aware of the improved capabilities and access to images on the internet. However, the main need is for improved forecasts from the NMSs to the beneficiaries who use the information for action to be taken. For this, good comments were received from the users of the forecasts, but there were indications that a more proactive approach needs to be taken by the NMSs in identifying some of the requirement aspects of these directly user organisations and an 'it is here for you' approach. Unfortunately, the NMSs are not recording the number of users who are accessing their web-site (hits). However, according to the information collected during interviews with the NMSs, the number of phone calls received for occasional problems on the websites is increasing. Due to the lack of an official survey of users, this number of phone calls is considered a proxy indicator of the improved access to weather data for the larger public.”* (Final Evaluation Report, October 2010, p. 42)

In the Caribbean, a Regional Risk Reduction Strategy (also known as R3I = Regional Risk Reduction Initiative) is being developed with EU assistance through the EU Regional Delegation in Barbados - and it is being implemented via a contribution agreement through UNDP Barbados and the OECS (Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States):

*“The OCTs R3I covers the English and Dutch overseas countries and territories in the region, a total of 7 territories (Anguilla, Aruba, British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, Montserrat, Turks and Caicos, and the Netherlands Antilles (Bonaire, Curaçao, St Maarten, Saba, and St. Eustatius)). They are highly vulnerable to various natural hazards and climate change impacts, also having fragile ecosystems and concentrations of settlements and major functions in low lying coastal areas and other hazard prone locations. This project seeks to address the risk and exposure of these small islands by providing a network of regional infrastructure, programmes, policies and protocols to strengthen their capacity to predict and prepare for natural hazards, thus improve resilience and reduce risk and subsequent loss. R3I is funded by the European Commission to the tune of €4.932m covering a period of 3 years (2009-2011). By the end of the project it is expected that there will be:*

- *Increased capacity in hazard mapping and associated vulnerability assessments, to further be incorporated into spatial information systems to inform planning and development processes*
- *A regional early warning systems (EWS) pilot for the OCTs, based on the ITU automated alert protocol for warnings*
- *Capacity built in response, rescue and recovery, in order to shorten recovery periods through the use risk assessment and mitigation practices for development planning*
- *Strengthened local disaster management structures and capacities in terms of tools and best practices to support comprehensive disaster risk management*
- *Greater cooperation and coordination between the OCTs, with documentation and dissemination of best practices*

*The R3I emphasises intra-regional learning and sharing of tools, knowledge and best practices to enhance the territories' individual and collective capacities. It will, among other activities, support OCT disaster management and GIS departments with modelling, simulation and planning; and build on the related experience and knowledge in the Cayman Islands. Further plans are to integrate results of modelling into quantitative multi-hazard vulnerability maps to support investment in hazard mitigation strategies; and complete*

*and/or initiate building vulnerability studies and improve quantitative risk assessment of critical infrastructure to support the investment in hazard mitigation strategies".*<sup>113</sup>

### **Answer to JC 8.2: The EU contributed to the adoption and implementation of the Regional Comprehensive Disaster Management (CDM) strategy.**

The regional CDM Strategy, as managed by the CDEMA CU, is a key guiding regional disaster management strategy in the region with the buy-in and support of 18 countries (Participating States (PS)) and all donor agencies. It addresses a variety of relevant disaster management areas related to the various phases of the disaster cycle: preparedness, mitigation, response and recovery. EU support through the Institutional Support and Capacity Building for Disaster Management in the Caribbean (9 ACP RCA 009) has made contributions to the adoption and implementation of the Regional CDM Strategy through its regional and national support and is supporting donor coordination and complementary in regional disaster management capacity building initiatives, one of the intents of the Regional CDM Strategy (Indicators 8.2.1, 8.3.2).

EU support has been provided and contributions have been made in a number of areas including:

- Enhancing public awareness on CDM, wherein key public education and awareness strategies, policies and programmes have already been developed and shared;
- ICT enhancement and planning; facilitating regional dialogue and interaction on CDM; development of national CDM strategies;
- Provision of CDM capacity building at the national, sub-regional and regional levels; and,
- Assisting countries in revising or developing critical CDM legislation through the development and dissemination of a draft Model CDM Legislation for countries in the region to adapt (Indicators 8.2.1, 8.2.2).

However, the level of achievement of results during the period has been affected by timeliness issues in project management and implementation. The majority of results achieved occurred outside the period under review (i.e. in 2011), with the exception of the development of public awareness materials, the provision of some ICT hardware to National Disaster Offices, support provided for some regional meetings and dialogue, provision of some capacity building and the development of the draft CDM Model legislation. The executing agency (CDEMA) experienced challenges with regards to procurement and fund use that resulted in some funds being lost to the project and corresponding expected results to not be achieved during the expected implementation period, if at all. Monitoring reports pointed to the executing agency's lack of familiarity with EU procurement rules and procedures as one of the causes of implementation delays and interviews confirmed this as well as issues related to the absorptive capacity of the organisation. Though it was noted that further training and assistance could have allowed certain challenges to be mitigated in a timely manner and thereby avoiding major delays and result achievement, future support provision through this organisation is nonetheless being questioned by the EU Delegation based on the experiences of managing the project as well as on technical, efficiency and absorptive capacity issues.

Also worth noting is the contributions from DIPECHO (spell out) activities in countries throughout the region during the period because of the focus of these interventions on building disaster preparedness (and response) capacity specifically at the local/community level, though mostly in Haiti and the Dominican Republic. Lastly, the more recent R31 project is expected to make contributions to building national (and to some extent, regional) capacity for the adoption and implementation of the regional CDM Strategy in some key areas related to hazard mapping, GIS, modelling, vulnerability assessments, and early warning, and information sharing overall, albeit only for OCTs. The warning and hazard mapping/modelling enhancements could benefit the Caribbean even beyond the OCTs who would benefit more directly. However, though the project is highly regarded in the region and expectations are high in terms of results to be achieved in the near future, the project is behind schedule and key results were not achieved as planned during the review period (indicator 8.2.1).

<sup>113</sup> See: <http://www.bb.undp.org/index.php?page=regional-risk-reduction-initiative>

In addition to support being provided to countries through CDEMA CU, the CU itself is benefitting from direct support as it is transitioning to becoming CDEMA from 2009 to the present. The CU is also benefitting from related advisory services, as follow up to an overarching institutional audit, as well as from language training, ICT and HR support, all of which can serve to strengthen the CU in its ability to manage and implement the Regional CDM Strategy and to strengthen its work with PS towards adoption and implementation of the Regional CDM Strategy as well.

However, most stakeholders agree that thus far, planned organisational changes or enhancements and other capacity building has neither resulted in any real organisational change or strengthening nor any improvements in terms of how the CU provides support to countries (Indicator 8.2.1).

**Indicator 8.2.1. Type and quality of technical advice and assistance provided to country partners by the targeted regional institutions of EU support**

1. Documentation Review
  - 2a. Interviews with CDEMA CU, EU-Barbados
  - 2b. Interviews with CDEMA PS representatives
  - 2c. Interviews with project monitors/evaluators
2. Review of CDEMA Regional ICT network/ platform and equipment
  - 4b. Interviews with other key donors in the region (to include DFID, CIDA, UNDP, etc.)/ same for indicators below

**Information on Indicator:**

Since 2009, a variety of projects and programming were initiated to provide different types of support, advice and assistance to CDEMA's member states in the adoption and implementation of the Regional CDM Strategy, which all 16 (now 18) states are parties to. Much of this programming was/is being provided through the CDEMA Coordinating Unit (CU) as executor of the programming and main target regional institution for EU support in disaster management in the region.

In addition to support provided to the CU for strengthening its coordination role with other member states, support is being provided in the following areas that contribute to the adoption and implementation of the Regional CDM Strategy:

- the development of CDM public awareness policies, strategies and materials for countries to utilise and for the region to benefit from;
- Provision of regional forums on CDM, including addressing specific topics on disaster risk management mainstreaming at the national level and advanced disaster recovery planning for public, private and civil sector entities;
- Provision of language training for national disaster management staff;
- Undertaking of a CDM review and support in developing a CDM Plan of Action in Haiti and Dominican Republic;
- Web-based CDM training;
- Strengthening at the sub-regional level;
- Development of a regional infrastructure for CDM information sharing, and ICT Contingency Plan, and ICT assistance at the national level.

The last of these was with a view to increasing the use of ICT for emergency planning thereby making CDM more effective and its capacity enhanced for information sharing among CDEMA member states.

According to available documentation and confirmed through the field phase, all programming has been initiated either in 2009 or by 2010. There is little documentation available providing evidence for full result achievement overall. There is some documentation on results in the area of public awareness, where a Draft Model General Public Education/Awareness Programme, CDM Promotional Programme, School Awareness Programme, University Awareness Programme and Draft Model Public Education/Awareness Strategy and Policy were all developed, and wherein the CDEMA website has been launched. In addition, there is some documentation on results achieved in some areas related to ICT (i.e. provision of some equipment to the CU and National Disaster Offices in some countries), such as the drafted ICT Contingency Plan.

The field visit confirmed that most results achieved emerged after the end of the review period and later than expected. Delays seem to have resulted from management challenges on the part of the implementing/executing agency. Due to procurement and other challenges, some project funds were lost and therefore key results could not be achieved. While the implementing/executing agency points to the complexity and rigidity of EU procedures, the delegation highlights that assistance was always available to overcome these and that therefore fault lies with the implementing/executing agency for the lack of results achieved during the review period.

Beyond programming to and through CDEMA, DIPECHO programming documentation often notes planned contributions to the Regional CDM Strategy, and programming addresses a variety of issues and areas including local capacity building, and increasing preparedness and response capacity in countries. In addition, it is further noted that achievement of results expected under the more recent Regional Risk Reduction Initiative (R3I) project (for OCTs only) is expected to make contributions to building national (and to some extent, regional) capacity for the adoption and implementation of the regional CDM Strategy in some key areas related to hazard mapping, GIS, modelling, vulnerability assessments, and early warning. The project emphasises intra-regional learning and sharing of tools, knowledge and best practices to enhance the territories' individual and collective capacities. By the end of 2010, a number of baseline studies in OCTs had been completed that would have identified a number of gaps and areas to be addressed by the project moving forward. A number of other activities under the project began to get under way in late 2010.

With regards to the CU itself, the organisational restructuring strategy was completed in August 2010. The field visit found that no real changes have yet been observed with regards to the degree to which the CU has been strengthened in terms of its co-ordination role within the region and its ability to provide support to member states in the adoption and implementation of the Regional CDM Strategy, inter alia, through an assessment of some of the results of aspects above including ICT upgrading and language training. Most National Disaster Offices have not witnessed any improvements.

#### **Sources:**

*“Most of the key results that would contribute to effectiveness are still a work in progress.”* (ROM Monitoring Report March 2010)

*“Note the Status of Consultancies to be implemented under the Institutional Support and Capacity Building for Disaster Management in the Caribbean Project at April 1, 2010. Organisational Restructuring of the CDEMA CU as it transitions to CDEMA”: Final Report submitted in August 2010...*

*...Language training in French, Spanish and Dutch: to be offered to member state representatives in late 2010...*

*The development and adaptation of a model public education/awareness policy and strategy: is in progress. Draft model programmes, policies and strategies in support of CDM will be presented for further input and modification: later in 2010. Results are also to inform the implementation of the creation, reproduction and distribution of disaster-related public awareness materials and media: All activities set to be complete by the end of 2010...*

*Regional infrastructure for information sharing and development and adaptation of model contingency ICT plan: List of ICT equipment recommended for supply to CDEMA's Participating States (PS) and the CU finalised. Results of this consultancy to inform the implementation of “provision and installation of ICT-based information sharing equipment*



and software”. *This support is noted as supposed to be complete by end of 2010.* Upgrade of relief supplies tracking system and virtual library *both initiated in 2010.* Consultancies have interdependence with regional infrastructure for information sharing and development and adaptation of model contingency ICT plan. Opportunities for synergies to be explored...

Web-based training for CDM. *Process begun in mid 2010...*

*CDM Review and Plan of Action for DR and Haiti – Consultancies began at end of 2010.”*

*(Status of consultancies to be implemented under the Institutional Support and Capacity Building for Disaster Management in the Caribbean Project at April 1, 2010)(Updated Work Implementation Plan for the Project, April 2010)*

”As mandated by the consultancy’s terms of reference a Regional Technical Consultation was convened on Thursday April 15, 2010. Comments and technical input were garnered for inclusion in the final models. Consensus on the core concepts for the public education and awareness products to be developed and disseminated was reached. The consultation’s thirty-seven (37) participants were drawn from a cross section of stakeholder bases and partner organisations inclusive of CDEMA’s Participating States. Invitees were experts in public education and awareness and/or disaster management.

The Participating States’ representation included disaster management public education experts from Anguilla, Antigua, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, Grenada, Haiti, Jamaica, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, the Turks and Caicos Islands and the Virgin Islands, UK. While representatives of the Association of Caribbean Media Workers, the International Federation of Red Cross, the Barbados Association of Journalists, the Department for International Development, the University of the West Indies’ Caribbean Institute of Media and Communication and the Cave Hill Guild of Students and United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO)/ Ministry of Education Barbados also attended.

The meeting was presented with the following consultancy deliverables:

- Draft Model General Public Education/Awareness Programme
- Draft Model CDM Promotional Programme
- Draft Model School Awareness Programme
- Draft Model University Awareness Programme
- Draft Model Public Education/Awareness Strategy and Policy (A and B)”

*(Institutional Support And Capacity Building For Disaster Management In The Caribbean Project - QUARTERLY PROGRESS REPORT, 1 MARCH – 31 MAY 2010)*

*”The draft ICT Contingency Plan, a key deliverable of the above-captioned consultancy was presented to CDEMA’s Information and Communication Systems Advisory Committee (ICSAC) Meeting on Friday April 16, 2010. In attendance were ICT specialists from the Participating States and other stakeholders in the field of information and communications. The representatives were drawn from the Participating States of Grenada, Turks and Caicos Islands, Haiti, Jamaica, Virgin Islands, Antigua, St. Kitts & Nevis, Barbados as well UNSPIDER, UNESCO and the ITU. Based on recommendations proffered during the ICSAC Meeting the draft ICT Contingency Plan was amended and presented to the CDEMA Technical Advisory Committee in May 2010 for review and endorsement. A demonstration of the plan was also exhibited at this meeting. The activities outlined ensured broad stakeholder input to achieve the increased use of ICT for CDM effectiveness and implementation in disaster management. Additionally it ensures through implementation of systems, sufficient linkages with donors and partners. Through implementation of the contingency plan an agreed model will be adopted ensuring standardisation of ICT platforms,*

equipment type and use in the Participating States.” (Institutional Support And Capacity Building For Disaster Management In The Caribbean Project - QUARTERLY PROGRESS REPORT, 1 MARCH – 31 MAY 2010)

“The project has hosted regional forums on CDM, which have achieved greater policy awareness relating to: disaster risk management mainstreaming at the national level; advance disaster recovery planning for public, private and civil sector entities; and CDM related tools, model products, and information and education materials.” (ROM Monitoring Report, March 2009)

“The EDF project has allocations not only for the assessment of (ICT) capacities but also capacity building that would provide assistance to address the concerns identified in the assessment”. (Summary Of The Meeting Of The Eastern Caribbean Donor Group For Disaster Management (ECDG/DM) 25 November, 2009)

#### Indicator 8.2.2. Existence of national disaster legislation that better integrate CDM as a result of EU support

See above

##### **Information on indicator:**

An important indication of national adoption of CDM and one that is also at the foundation of CDM national implementation is legislation. EU support is providing important assistance in the area of national disaster legislation as the CDEMA-executed Institutional Support and Capacity Building for Disaster Management in the Caribbean Project includes the development of model national CDM legislation for CDEMA states. Whereas support was expected to result originally in the promulgation of legislation directly at the national level, the institutional and political realities of the national level enabling environments have necessitated a refocusing of expected results on the development of the model CDM legislation to be made available for countries to use in developing or revising their own national disaster legislation. The field phase confirmed that the draft version of the model legislation had been completed during the review period, and was circulated for comments throughout the region by the end of 2010. Evidence suggests that it was then completed and made available to all CDEMA PS after the end of 2010. The majority of countries interviewed suggested that they were not happy with the model CDM legislation that emerged and did not feel the development process adequately took into account their comments and perspectives. Few are intending to utilize the model legislation for the revision or development of their own CDM legislation, although a minority of countries were both happy with the product and have utilized it in their own country.

##### **Sources:**

“Note the Status of Consultancies to be implemented under the Institutional Support and Capacity Building for Disaster Management in the Caribbean Project at April 1, 2010...:

*Review of existing Disaster Management Model Legislation and Regulations and Adaptation* – supposed to be drafted by fall 2010.

CDM Review and Plan of Section for DR and Haiti – Consultancies began at end of 2010, deliverables in mid-2011.

*(Status of consultancies to be implemented under the Institutional Support and Capacity Building for Disaster Management in the Caribbean Project at April 1, 2010)*

“Whereas Regional Governments are supportive of CDM and the interest and political will is present, the legislative machinery is very slow. It will be very difficult to promulgate any national legislation in a period less than five years. The project may therefore be more effective focusing on CDM policy frameworks rather than legislation, and in stimulating the political debate with respect to developing CDM policy and issuing CDM legislation.” (ROM Monitoring Report, March 2009)

“The OVI for Result 2 ‘At least four CDEMA Member States adopt or amend CDM disaster legislation and regulations’ cannot be seen as a legitimate target because adoption falls outside the project’s direct control. The best that can be achieved is that CDM disaster legislation is developed, promoted and recommended.” (ROM Report March 2010)

“Due to unavoidable delays resulting from CDEMA’s intervention on the Haiti earthquake, the Review of Existing Disaster Management Model Legislation and Regulations and Adaptation will not conclude on March 31, 2010.” (*Report Of The 6th Meeting Of The EDF Executive Committee April 2010*)

CDEMA reports on Revisions to Amendments to Draft National Disaster Management Bill from Fall 2010 suggest revised Legislation would be finished by end of 2010.

**Answer to JC 8.3: The EU contributed to enhancing disaster response coordination in the region.**

The Caribbean is a region very prone to disasters and where a flurry of donor activity can be witnessed in (preparedness and) disaster response. Thus, assessing EU contributions to disaster response coordination is a difficult task, but can be gleaned by looking at the degree to which the EU disaster response support can be considered as coordinated with and complementary to that of other donors and of the region and countries themselves. The existence of processes for coordination among EU services presents another manner for assessing such contributions.

Planned coordination between other EU support and that of ECHO, and vice versa, has taken place, including joint field visits, needs assessments for targeting programming and dialogue between the Commission (DG DEV) and ECHO DG for planning and coordination purposes. From DIPECHO project design documentation can be seen that there has been planned coordination with other EU initiatives funded through the EDF, and vice versa, with a view to synergies, mutual benefits and combined effectiveness (Indicator 8.3.1). In some cases, EDF funding was intended utilised in a coordinated manner to build on ECHO programming, but there are few mechanisms in place to ensure the coordination and complementarity on the ground. Opportunities for strengthened cooperation and cross-fertilisation in terms of sharing experiences and expertise are therefore being missed. A recent evaluation of DIPECHO action plans concluded that linkage and coordination between ECHO and other EU services needed to be strengthened. The field phase confirmed that this remains an issue and there are potential synergies to be capitalised on. There is much to be gained from improved coordination systems and processes between ECHO and delegations and between ECHO and other EU programming overall (Indicator 8.3.1).

There is evidence to suggest some complementarity between EU support and that of other donors in addressing post-disaster needs. The EU is perceived both as collaborative and as providing important complementary financial support through ECHO during the response phase. Given the nature of ECHO programming in particular, implemented through and with partners that are deeply entrenched in national and regional coordination platforms and systems, documentation and interviews suggest complementarity is indeed sought. Key EU partners such as the Red Cross or OXFAM coordinate and work jointly for immediate response needs assessments in affected countries and work with other donors and regional response organisations for coordinated response and related programming (Indicator 8.3.2). DIPECHO action plans note that these projects have been (or are planned to be) undertaken in coordination with and in complementary fashion to other donors’ activities in the country (or region), including the CDM Strategy. DIPECHO was noted as filling a particular niche (or gap) in terms of donor disaster management programming, focusing on the community level in the post-disaster context. The EU was noted as a key player, if not the leader, in some of the donor working groups active in the sector and region, in terms of coordination on programming in disaster and other aspects. The EU also contributes to the Caribbean Catastrophe Risk Insurance Facility, working in coordination with other donors in this regional catastrophe fund for Caribbean governments and contributing to an important post-disaster financial resource for countries (Indicator 8.3.2).

However, a recent evaluation of DIPECHO action plans has also recommended that DG ECHO should become more involved at the regional level and with other donors active in countries and in the region, with a view to strengthened complementarity, coordination and overall effectiveness in the EU’s disaster management support. The field phase confirmed this need. The EU is recognized as a strong supporter of disaster management in the region and a valuable partner, but increased communication and further coordination would lend to programmatic improvement in this area (Indicator 8.3.2).

<p><b>Indicator 8.3.1 Existence of coordination systems and processes to link EU support with that of ECHO and vice versa</b></p>	<p>1. Documentation Review</p> <p>2a. Interviews with DG DEVCO, ECHO representatives in Brussels and Dominican Republic</p> <p>2b. Interviews with other key donors in the region (DFID, CIDA, USAID/OFDA, UN-OCHA, UNDP, CDB, etc.) and other responding organisations (CDEMA) &amp; partners (OXFAM, Red Cross)</p> <p>2c. Interviews with monitors/evaluators (same for indicator below)</p>
<p><b>Information on Indicator:</b></p> <p>There is some evidence of planned coordination between other EU support and that of ECHO, and vice versa, including joint field visits, needs assessments for targeting programming and dialogue between the Commission (DG DEV) and ECHO DG for planning and coordination purposes. DIPECHO project design documentation (i.e. action plans) suggest that there has been planned coordination with other EU initiatives funded through the EDF, and vice versa, with a view to synergies, mutual benefits and combined effectiveness (Indicator 8.3.1). In some cases, EDF funding was intended utilised in a coordinated manner to build on ECHO programming, but there are few mechanisms in place to ensure the coordination and complementarity on the ground. Opportunities for strengthened cooperation and cross-fertilisation in terms of sharing experiences and expertise are therefore being missed. A recent evaluation of DIPECHO action plans concluded that linkage and coordination between ECHO and other EU services needed to be strengthened. The field phase confirmed that this remains an issue and there are potential synergies to be capitalised on. There is much to be gained from improved coordination systems and processes between ECHO and delegations and between ECHO and other EU programming overall.</p> <p><b>Sources:</b></p> <p><i>“Since September 2001, a dialogue on the coordination of disaster preparedness activities for the Caribbean has been pursued with the Commission’s Directorates General for Development and Europe Aid Coordination Office with a view to achieving a greater involvement of these services in that field. ECHO has always recalled the importance of including disaster risk reduction as a cross-cutting issue in all the country/regional strategy papers. In the region, DG DEV is planning the implementation of a regional disaster preparedness programme with CDERA within the Regional Indicative Programme under the 9th EDF. Furthermore, DG DEV is funding a meteorological radar project which will cover the whole Caribbean region. During the fifth DIPECHO Action Plan ECHO will ensure a good coordination with other disaster preparedness initiatives that are currently being prepared for the Dominican Republic and Haiti using funds from the B - Envelope of the 9th EDF, thus contributing to the LRRD process. ECHO financed NGOs in the region will be kept abreast of those programmes so that they can institute appropriate coordination.” (Fifth DIPECHO Action Plan for the Caribbean) <a href="#">LINK TO 2 EDF9 PROJECTS (CDEMA and Radar Warning)</a></i></p> <p><i>“The CMO and the Disaster Reduction and Recovery Unit/UNDP regional office in the Caribbean are collaborating on another project directly linked to this radar project. This one year project is funded through the Disaster Preparedness Program – ECHO, will use the radar images provided by the new network which would then made available, with appropriate training, to natural disaster preparedness organisations and agencies in the Caribbean. The CMO/UNDP collaborating will start with existing radars in Jamaica and the Dominican Republic, both of which will cover these two countries and Haiti. The idea is to extend this dynamic to the rest of the region once the four new radars become</i></p>	

operational.“ (Radar Warning Project, Financial Agreement)

“Under a first emergency decision ECHO made available € 1.5 million (see point 5). In addition, the Commission has decided, in agreement with the government of Grenada, to use all funds available from the B-envelope (€ 3.9 million) of the 9th European Development Fund (EDF) of Grenada for rehabilitation. However, as under the given circumstances this amount appears insufficient the Commission has undertaken the necessary steps to increase it to € 7.8 million. Adoption of the formal decision is expected by mid-November 2004.”(Humanitarian Aid Decision reference number: ECHO/GRD/BUD/2004/01000)

“With the official resumption of EU-Cuba cooperation in October 2008, avenues are being explored to provide new Commission assistance through different funding instruments, notably to mitigate the negative impact of the hurricanes. A joint declaration was signed by the Director General of the European Commission's Directorate General for Development and the Cuban Vice-Minister for Foreign Investment and Economic Cooperation in Havana on 27 November 2008 on the basic orientations of forthcoming development cooperation. Furthermore, the inter-service mission in November 2008 was a first step to identify concrete options, whereby specific importance will be attached to ensuring LRRD with DG ECHO funded action.”(COMMISSION DECISION of on the financing of humanitarian Actions from the general budget of the European Communities in Cuba (ECHO/CUB/BUD/2009/01000))

“Emergency humanitarian aid for people affected by Tropical Storm Noel and subsequent floods and mudslides in Haiti and the Dominican Republic. From field visits carried out by DG ECHO's Desk officer and Head of Caribbean office to projects funded by the Primary Emergency Decision, in close coordination with the European Commission Delegation in the Dominican Republic, and via discussions with partners, local authorities and Civil Defence representatives, it is clear that further support is needed. The European Commission will not set up any new DG ECHO support offices, but DG ECHO's Caribbean office in Santo Domingo will provide technical assistance to appraise project proposals and to monitor humanitarian operations financed by the Commission. The EU Delegations are establishing how remaining 9th EDF funds can be mobilised to assist tropical storm victims, ensuring a transition from relief to reconstruction.” (Emergency Humanitarian Aid Decision reference number: ECHO-CR/BUD/2007/01000)

#### **LINK TO EDF TROPICAL STORM NOEL PROJECT**

“Principal objective: To save and preserve lives during the emergency caused by Hurricane Dean in the Caribbean region Specific objective: To provide multi-sector emergency relief and recovery assistance to hurricane Victims. Information on identified needs comes from the UN Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), the Caribbean Disaster Emergency Response Agency (CDERA), USAID, OPDEM, Pan American Health Organization (PAHO), the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent societies (IFRC), the French Red Cross (FRC), the Norwegian Red Cross (NRC) and Oxfam-GB. The European Commission will not set up any new DG ECHO support offices, but DG ECHO's Caribbean office in Santo Domingo will provide technical assistance to appraise project proposals and to monitor humanitarian operations financed by the Commission. EU Delegations are establishing how current 9th EDF funds can be mobilised to assist hurricane victims, ensuring a quick transition from relief to reconstruction. Partners: CR-E, CR-F, CR – NOR, FAO, IFRC-FICR, OXFAM GB, PAHO, UNICEF” (COMMISSION DECISION of on the financing of emergency humanitarian operations from the 9th European Development Fund in Caribbean. Decision reference number: ECHO-CR/EDF/2007/01000)

“The team observed little in the way of complementarity, coherence and coordination (CCC) across EU Services in the course of the field work. While mechanisms exist for sharing information and planning, there are no formal structures. In the context of the Caribbean region it appears that the different EU instruments generally do not coordinate around the issue of DRR in a systematic way. Results in the area of LRRD have been mixed during the APV and VI. In general it appears that the partners are applying their own ‘form’ of LRRD rather than basing their efforts on the EU model. There is, however, an increasing recognition across Commission Services that LRRD is an important concept and one that needs to be taken more seriously. However, without any significant improvement in CCC across the EU service, there is unlikely to be an improvement in LRRD. Coordination between EU Services in the area of DRR is limited. Little effort is being made by EU Services to coordinate strategies, plans and activities. While both DG ECHO and DIPECHO partners are active in supporting national DM strategies in the countries where they work, DG ECHO engagement at the regional level has been limited. Recommendation7b: DG ECHO should support partners to investigate potential sources of additional funding either within the EU, other intentional donors or from sources from within the target countries

*themselves. This implies greater coordination with other donors, both internal to the EU as well as others. [Strategic–DG ECHO field offices] Recommendation11a: While strategic and programmatic coherency and coordination is the responsibility of all the EU Services, DG ECHO should be more proactive in working with other EU Services in order to integrate DRR issues and considerations in all planning. Priority should be given to improving relations with DG DEV and the Delegations (DGRELEX) [Strategic DG ECHO in Brussels and through the field offices] Recommendation11b: A comprehensive internal advocacy strategy and implementation plan needs to be developed by DG ECHO in order to enhance a better understanding of DIPEHO and the role of DRR and the planning process fall relevant EU Services, as well as external partners in the region.” (EVALUATIONOFDIPECHOACTIONPLANSFORTHECARIBBEAN. MainReport21April2009)*

**Indicator 8. 3. 2 : Level of complementarity between EU support and that of other donors in addressing post-disaster needs**

See above

**Information on Indicator:**

There is evidence to suggest some complementarity between EU support and that of other donors in addressing post-disaster needs. The EU is perceived both as collaborative and as providing important complementary financial support through ECHO during the response phase. Given the nature of ECHO programming in particular, implemented through and with partners that are deeply entrenched in national and regional coordination platforms and systems, documentation and interviews suggest complementarity is indeed sought. Key EU partners such as the Red Cross or OXFAM coordinate and work jointly for immediate response needs assessments in affected countries and work with other donors and regional response organisations for coordinated response and related programming (Indicator 8.3.2). DIPECHO action plans note that these projects have been (or are planned to be) undertaken in coordination with and in complementary fashion to other donors’ activities in the country (or region), including the CDM Strategy. DIPECHO was noted as filling a particular niche (or gap) in terms of donor disaster management programming, focusing on the community level in the post-disaster context. The EU was noted as a key player, if not the leader, in some of the donor working groups active in the sector and region, in terms of coordination on programming in disaster and other aspects. The EU also contributes to the Caribbean Catastrophe Risk Insurance Facility, working in coordination with other donors in this regional catastrophe fund for Caribbean governments and contributing to an important post-disaster financial resource for countries.

However, a recent evaluation of DIPECHO action plans has also recommended that DG ECHO should become more involved at the regional level and with other donors active in countries and in the region, with a view to strengthened complementarity, coordination and overall effectiveness in the EU’s disaster management support. The field phase confirmed this need. The EU is recognized as a strong supporter of disaster management in the region and a valuable partner, but increased communication and further coordination would lend to programmatic improvement in this area.

**Sources:**

*“Emergency Assistance to the Victims of Hurricane Ivan. Specific objective 1: To provide emergency assistance to hurricane victims in the sectors of food, water, shelter, sanitation, health, non-food items and humanitarian co-ordination. Partners include: CROIX-ROUGE - FICR-IFCR-CH, OXFAM-UK, TSF, FRANCE, UN-PAHO, and UNICEF. ECHO partners in the field (OCHA, PAHO, UNICEF, Red Cross Movement, and Oxfam GB) are finalising their detailed evaluation.”(Emergency Aid Decision reference number: ECHO-CR/BUD/2004/02000)*

*“Emergency Assistance to the Victims of Hurricane Jeanne in Dominican Republic. To provide emergency assistance to hurricane victims in the sectors of water, shelter and health. Field assessment missions were organized by the United Nations Resident Coordinator, together with the United Nations Disaster Assessment and Coordination (UNDAC) team. Representatives of the Civil Defence/Emergency Operations Center (COE), the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) and the World Food Programme (WFP) took part in these missions. Furthermore, an ECHO assessment mission was deployed. Partners include: CROIX-ROUGE – ESP, MOVIMONDO, UN – PAHO”(Emergency Humanitarian Aid Decision reference number: ECHO/DOM/BUD/2004/01000)*

*“There does exist other projects in matter of disaster preparedness in the Dominican Republic executed by different international organizations, such as Cruz Roja Española, Cruz Roja Dominicana, Intermon Oxfam, Plan International etc... Far from being a threat of double financing, the organizations that are executing these kinds of programmes coordinate their actions in order to get a greater impact and avoid an overlapping of actions, by means of the Plataforma de Gestión de Riesgos of which ACPP is an active member.”(DIPECHO Action Plan proposal agreement. Annex 1, Single form: ECHO - Asamblea de Cooperación por la Paz (ACPP) / Spain. Community Disaster Preparedness in order to reduce vulnerability in communities located in Zoco’s river basin, in Ramón Santana and San Pedro de Macoris municipalities, Dominican Republic)*

*“The Action will result from an interagency coordination effort between three agencies of the United Nations System in Cuba: UN Development Program (UNDP), UN-Habitat, and UN Children Fund (UNICEF), all of which have gathered relevant experience in the disaster risk reduction sector in Cuba in the recent years. Activities of all three agencies in this field are entailed within the system’s cooperation area “Natural disasters and risk”, one of the five priority areas identified within the UN Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) 2008-2012, as shown in the table below... Synergies can also be found with the Caribbean Risk Management Initiative (CRMI), launched in 2004 to foster exchange of experiences in RRM among Caribbean countries. Important inputs to the project will be delivered by UN-Habitat and UNICEF in two key sectors of the disaster risk reduction approach: the housing sector and the education. As part of the UN System in Cuba, UNDP, UN-Habitat and UNICEF are closely coordinated with the rest of agencies, funds and programmes of the system at the Interagency Group for Natural Disasters and Risk, which coordinates the homonymous UNDAF cooperation area. The same group, which is coordinated by the Representative in Cuba of World Food Programme (WFP), turns into the UN Emergency Team (UNETE) in case of an emergency. At a regional level, UNDP is linked to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). Synergies can also be created through the close collaboration with the Caribbean Risk Management Initiative (CRMI), launched by UNDP’s BCPR and the Regional Bureau for Latin America and the Caribbean in 2004 as an umbrella programme designed to build capacity across the Caribbean region for the management of climate-related risk. Relevant partners of UNDP in the region are the Caribbean Disaster Emergency Response Agency (CDERA), and the Caribbean Community Climate Change Center (CCCC).” (Proposal agreement. Annex 1, Single form: ECHO United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) - Cuba Strengthening local capacities in risk reduction management in Granma Province)*

*“Reduce the impact of disaster on the most vulnerable populations in the Caribbean through the establishment of efficient and coordinated regional response capacities. Specific objectives: strengthening disaster management capacity in the Caribbean. Components: Internal and external planning and coordination mechanisms between the Red Cross with CDERA, OCHA, Oxfam, OFDA, ECHO, WFP, UNICEF and PAHO. Since early 2004 and in response to natural disasters in the Caribbean region, ECHO has funded emergency relief and recovery assistance to the tune of EUR 13.8 million. The funds were used to support multi-sectoral assistance in the Bahamas, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti and Jamaica. A substantive part of these funds were channelled through IFRC. In addition, under the latest DIPECHO programme which ended in 2004 ECHO funded disaster preparedness projects in the Caribbean region for a total amount of EUR 2.5 million.” (Humanitarian Aid Decision reference number: ECHO/-CR/BUD/2005/01000)*

*“The IFRC takes part in many of the inter-agency groups that are developing or refining aspects of the humanitarian reform process and actively participates in a number of the global clusters. For example, it has taking an active role in the OCHA-led Task Team looking at the activation and function of the clusters, the Humanitarian Coordination System Strengthening Project and the wider discussions taking place within the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC). At the global level, the Emergency Shelter Cluster is co-chaired by UNHCR and IFRC. IFRC is convener of the Emergency Shelter Cluster in disaster situations. The Federation also participates in the bi-annual meetings of Easter Caribbean Donor group; a group chaired by the Caribbean Disaster and Emergency Response Agency and composed of UN agencies, Oxfam and other International Organisations. The purpose of this group is to discuss issues around risk, disasters and emergencies and means for better coordination. Additionally, the Federation is actively working towards the goals outlined in the Comprehensive Disaster Management (CDM) strategy and framework. As co-chair of the Civil Society Sub Sector working group which seeks to increase coordination and cooperation to “operationalize” the (CDM) strategy and framework, the IFRC and a NS representative would also work closely with CDM Harmonization Council. This will provide a link between the different projects’ national level activities and the regional strategy and will also provide a clear channel for disseminating lessons learned and results of implementation to regional actors.”(DIPECHO Action Plan - proposal agreement. Annex 1, Single form: ECHO Finnish Red Cross (Suomen Punainen Risti) / Finland “Strengthening the capacities of nine vulnerable communities in preparing for, and responding to hazards in Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and in Trinidad and Tobago.)*

*“Save the Children in Haiti has developed and maintains full-fledged participation and involvement in all coordinating mechanisms operating in both the development and humanitarian fields in Haiti, including sector-specific NGO clusters (international and local), central and local governments, the UN system as well as local missions of international organizations such as the Red Cross and IRC&RC. In the Southeast, Save the Children works in collaboration with ACDI/VOCA who is delivering food security and health services. Prospective projects to be submitted to ECHO to address multi-sectoral needs to prevent malnutrition will take into account disaster preparation needs of the community. Dialogue continues with OXFAM UK working in Belle Anse Commune to ensure complementarities of interventions and avoid duplication, particularly with water and sanitation issues. Plan International was also contacted to review their current DRR efforts in the area. Under the overall coordination of the Civil Protection Directorate (DPC) within the Government of Haiti Ministry of Interior and Territorial Units, a number of bilateral and multilateral donor agencies have become increasingly active in disaster risk reduction in Haiti. This includes the UN system (UNICEF, WFP, WHO/PAHO, MINUSTAH etc.), international humanitarian agencies (USAID/OFDA, CIDA, ECHO, Red Cross, MSF, MDM and PSF missions from several countries, international non-governmental agencies such as CRS, CARE, World Vision, Plan International, Concern Worldwide, Action Contre la Faim, Parole & Action, PADF, Food for the Poor, MSH, Welt Hunger Hilfe, OXFAM missions from Great-Britain, Germany and Québec, etc. Over the last two to three years, efforts coordinated by the local UNOCHA (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance) at information sharing and program coordination have borne fruit through the creation and operation of sector clusters, thereby preventing/avoiding wasteful duplication of efforts and ensuring program complementarities. “DIPECHO Action Plan - proposal agreement. Annex 1, Single form: ECHO – Save the Children Netherlands) “Community and School-based Disaster Risk Reduction in South East Department, Republic of Haiti.*

*“In Jamaica the project team and JAS will coordinate their activities with the Local Red Cross Branch. Coordination meetings will take place to ensure that the contingency plans developed at community level are integrated within the Red Cross emergency response plans. In Jamaica, at the national level, Oxfam will also coordinate its activities with FAO national office, and Christian Aid on the systematization and learning about DRR integration into livelihoods. Both organizations have experience in integrating DRR into livelihood development. Regarding urban disaster preparedness Oxfam will coordinate learning activities with Catholic Relief Services, which is currently implementing an urban Disaster Preparedness project in Kingston with USAID-OFDA funding. In Haiti, the main coordination forum that Oxfam is attending and will continue to attend is the GACI (Groupe d’Appui de la Cooperation Internationale). At the regional level, Oxfam will coordinate its activities principally with the IFRC, CDEMA, FAO sub-regional office in Barbados (on DP and Livelihood integration) and the UN-ISDR. Oxfam will also participate actively in all the Civil Society working group<sup>114</sup> activities (meeting and advocacy activities) and will further explore with CDEMA the involvement of Oxfam in the CDM Harmonization Committee structure as well as CDEMA’s role as technical adviser to the project” DIPECHO Action Plan – ECHO – OXFAM GB Enhancing Disaster Preparedness integration in rural livelihoods and urban planning in the Caribbean*

*“The European commission has provided the united nations with a lot of support in its efforts to develop and implement the cluster system. Nevertheless, this disaster showed that a lot still needs to be done to improve its effectiveness and efficiency.” (BEYOND EMERGENCY RELIEF IN HAITI JANUARY 2011 Groupe URD- January 2011)*

*“DG ECHO only participates to a limited extent in regional initiatives such as the Comprehensive Disaster Management (CDM) initiative and is therefore potentially missing opportunities for promoting DRR among stakeholders. Given diminishing donor support to many countries in the Caribbean as their economies strengthen, coupled with fewer DRR funding sources, DIPECHO has itself become a key ongoing source of finances. However, this does not imply that DIPECHO is, by default, responsible to provide funding for scaling up and replicability. Recommendation 7b: DG ECHO should support partners to investigate potential sources of additional funding either within the EU, other intentional donors or from sources from within the target countries themselves. This implies greater coordination with other donors, both internal to the EU as well as others. [Strategic-DG ECHO field offices] DG ECHO should become more engaged with other key donors and agencies such as DFID, CIDA, USAID. The Caribbean Development Bank (CDB) and the Association of Caribbean States (ACS) in coordinating DRR efforts” (EVALUATION OF DIPECHO ACTION PLANS FOR THE CARIBBEAN. Main Report 21 April 2009)*

<sup>114</sup> Civil Society group of the Caribbean Disaster Management Conference.



“Aiming to contribute to the Comprehensive Disaster Management Strategy and Framework (CDM)<sup>115</sup> endorsed by members of CARICOM, the region’s blue print for disaster management programming and to the efforts of CDM Harmonization Council and Civil Society Sub Sector working”

## EQ 9 Human Resources Development

### EQ 9: To what extent has EU support for education and training contributed to regional economic integration?

**Evaluation criteria:** Effectiveness, Impact, Sustainability; Crosscutting Issues

#### **Justification:**

Under the focal sector “Intensification of Regional Integration / Economic Repositioning”, the EDF9 CRSP mentions that the objective of training an internationally competitive labour force will relate with the new paradigm of Caribbean competitiveness (knowledge-based economy). Support will focus on education and training at the technical and university level, based essentially on the exchange of capacity within and outside the Region, the reinforcement of distance education systems and the development of language skills. It will involve the development of regional capacity for education and training in services, including Information and Communication Technology (ICT).

Based on the above, human resource development with emphasis on knowledge-based economy, in line with the corresponding regional strategies, is in focus for the EU support to the Caribbean Region. Considering the many small and relatively isolated island states in the region and their needs for coordinated efforts, distance education and enhanced use of ICT, the team considers such support to be of importance for needed human resource development, as reflected in this evaluation question.

**Scope:** Effectiveness, impact and sustainability of sector support and crosscutting issues

#### **Other sector support:**

In addition to the regional projects mentioned in the main Report the EU has been providing approximately €5M to local universities through its EDU-Link programme; €1M for Caribbean students undertaking scholarship opportunities as part of its Erasmus Mundus Programme and approximately €10M to projects benefiting the Caribbean funded under the ACP Science and Technology Programme.<sup>116</sup>

<sup>115</sup> *Comprehensive Disaster Management Strategy and Framework 2007-2012*, Caribbean Disaster and Emergency Management Agency (CDEMA) of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM).

<sup>116</sup> “Under the focal sector “Intensification of Regional Integration / Economic Repositioning”, the EDF9 CRSP-objective of training an internationally competitive labour force relates with the new paradigm of Caribbean competitiveness (knowledge-based economy). Human resource development with emphasis on knowledge-based economy, in line with the corresponding regional strategies, is in focus for the EU support to the Caribbean Region in general. Support for the education sector has been a priority for the EU in the Caribbean region: Over the past 20 years (1990-2010), the EU has provided in excess of Euro 245 million towards Education and Human Resource Development (HRD) within the Caribbean region whole. This level of funding represents approximately 7% of the estimated Euro 4 billion in funding by the EU to the region across all sectors. Out of the 245 MEUR, 64 MEUR have been allocated for the CARIFORUM regional programmes over the period 1990-2010”. (*Financing Education in Barbados and the Eastern Caribbean*, p.1)

**Judgement to JC 9.1. Tertiary education / training institutions (TEIs), representing most of the CARIFORUM member states, have established coordinated programmes that explicitly relate to regional integration and enhance the use of ICT.**

The CKLN I-II projects represent a coordinated programme that enjoys political support from the CARIFORUM member states and represents TEIs in most of them, (indicators 9.1.1 and 9.3.1). Project objectives relate to regional integration and the enhanced use of ICT is a main strategic focus (Indicator 9.1.3). CKLN-I was to create the organisational framework in the education sector in 2007-09. The on-going CKLN-II (2008-13) focuses on the infrastructure and is to roll out the C@ribNET regionally and expand both the substance of TEI-involvement and the number of TEIs involved (intentionally also other actors including those from the private sector). The level of involvement of TEIs range from the elaboration of strategic plans to the start of the first courses (see table under indicator 9.1.2).

CKLN I and II have been strongly delayed. The first phase, that was to establish the fundament in the national education sectors in terms of enhanced TEI capacity for distance education and strengthened national research networks, did not fully meet that objective. Therefore, a reallocation of funds under CKLN-II in 2011 serves the continuation of these activities. While project implementation finally seems to be on track from 2010 onwards, major outputs of CKLN-II only started to be created in 2011.

The project **results** that should lead to outcomes, in terms of enhanced distance education and development of national and regional research networks have yet to materialise. For example, hardware and training in the application of new software in one participating TEI had only enabled the offering of one such course until now. Various interlocutors did not find that CKLN-I had resulted in institutional or ICT-network creation and were of the opinion that Caribbean TEIs were finding other network solutions while waiting for CKLN results.

CKLN is the main contributor to the EQ-statement that specifies: “*coordinated programmes that explicitly relate to regional integration and enhance the use of ICT*”. Other projects that attempted to serve this objective have been less successful. After lengthy delays, a project that was to support the **Regional Law School in the Bahamas** with a new library never got off the ground, due to limited interest by the involved governments, including the Government of the Bahamas, which did not provide its foreseen counterpart contribution, (indicator 9.1.5). The project that was to support the **Development of Vocational Tertiary Education and Training, on the Caribbean Region level**, at the University of Technology (UTech), Jamaica, did materialise but with a somewhat disappointing outcome, partly due to lack of full support from the University.<sup>117</sup> Political and institutional support from Member States and TEIs has been most forthcoming for the CKLN-projects, with their inherent and highly prioritised ICT-element.

**Indicator 9.1.1: Agreement among the CARIFORUM Member States on priorities for common programmes**

- 1a. Project documentation
- 1b. Internet sources
- 1c. Field study interviews

**Information on Indicator:**

The governments of the CARICOM /CARIFORUM Member States have, throughout the evaluation period, expressed and demonstrated their support to the Caribbean Knowledge and Learning Network, CKLN, (projects CKLN I and II) which is a major initiative for enhancing the use of ICT in the Region. From 2004, CKLN was organised as a non-profit foundation and since 2010 as a CARICOM Inter-governmental Agency.

<sup>117</sup> Information conveyed to the Evaluation from the EUD Jamaica. UTech was approached several times for supplementary information without response. In the files of the regional EUD, Guyana was found only a progress report from 2006.

In reverse, another regional education project, Support for the Law School in the Bahamas, was abandoned due to lack of Governments' dedication.

**Sources:**

The Conference of Heads of Government of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), at its Twenty-Third Meeting in Georgetown, Guyana, July 2002, recognised the potential of Information & Communication Technology (ICT) for enhancing and integrating our societies in areas such as education, health, poverty reduction, delivery of public information and governance – all objectives well articulated in the CARICOM Charter of Civil Society. In May 2004, further support was entertained and endorsed at the CARICOM Heads 15<sup>th</sup> Intercessional Meeting in St. Kitts. In October of the same year, the Articles of Association were prepared to establish the Caribbean Knowledge and Learning Network Foundation Limited as a not-for-profit entity in St. Georges, Grenada. At that time, eighteen CARICOM and associate member states (Anguilla, Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Montserrat, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, St. Lucia, Suriname and Trinidad and Tobago) agreed to become beneficiaries of the project.<sup>118</sup>

During the March 2010 CARICOM Heads of Government meeting in Dominica, Heads signed the instrument that establishes CKLN as a CARICOM Inter governmental Agency as defined by the Revised Treaty of Chagaramus.<sup>119</sup>

During the field studies, the Head of the ICT-unit in the CARICOM secretariat, representatives of the Government of Barbados and of the CKLN project reiterated the high political priority attached to CKLN by the CARIFORUM member states. The Government of Barbados has not yet signed its agreement for participation in the CKLN but this is expected to happen soon.

**Indicator 9.1.2: Evidence of active TEI network-participation, or students/trainees participation, from most of the member states**

2a. Project documentation

2b. Internet sources

2c. Field study interviews

**Information on Indicator:**

During the CKLN-I project, implemented 2008-2009, the project involved approximately 20 participating tertiary education and learning institutions serving as focal points for 15 CARIFORUM countries. The intensity of the participation varies but in most countries, strategic plans for open and distance learning has been elaborated with a national coverage. In line with the flexible approach of the project, it is expected that the ongoing second phase of the project (2006-2012) will expand the coverage to include other partners, such as private sector and international agencies.

However, field phase interviews with the CKLN and other stakeholders showed that the infrastructure network is to be extended in the first place to only one TEI in each country and that the national research network-basis still is to be strengthened through a re-allocation of CKLN-II funds to compensate for missing results in this respect from CKLN-I.

Given the nature of CKLN, it is to benefit students / trainees indirectly through increased access to the use of ICT in their education / training and through increased access to online-education options. This effect has, however, not yet been measurable due to strong delays in the implementation of CKLN-II, which only started effectively in 2010.

<sup>118</sup> Towards CARICOM Connectivity: Agenda 2003 & Platform For Action

<sup>119</sup> EUD Regional Report, April-August 2010, Annex 3, Project Fiches, p.21.

**Sources:**

EDF funding should allow extension of the CKLN project to a second set of up to an additional 20 TEIs from across the CARIFORUM territories. It is projected that in total 50 institutions will be participating in the CKLN. This number may be augmented by the participation of partners, regional associations, the private sector and international agencies. Nevertheless, the extension of the network infrastructure will be to only one TEI in each country.

The *CKLN Status Report on Programme of Work Completed during the Period 2009 –2010* showed that the following initiatives progress had been completed in the “institutional strengthening component” (in 15 countries). The table is based on the information in the Report.

**Table 29: Overview of CKLN interventions per country**

Country	Equipment provided	Technical/didactical training for TEI staff	Study tour participation	Institutional training for TEI / MoE	Stage of implementation
Antigua & Barbuda		X (60) +	X	X	Strategic plan
Belize	X		X		Strategic plan
Dominica		X (15)	X	X	Strategic and operational plans
Grenada	X	X		X	Operational courses being developed for residents
Montserrat					Strategic plan
St. Lucia		X		X	n. a.
St. Kitts and Nevis		X	X	X	Strategic plan
St. Vincent and the Grenadines		X	X	X	Strategic plan and draft operational plan
Jamaica <sup>120</sup>		X		X	Strategic plan
The Bahamas				X	Courses operational
Barbados		X		X	Strategic plan
Guyana	X	X			Needs assessment
Trinidad & Tobago		X		X	Strategic plan
Suriname	X			X	n. a.
Haiti					Initial CKLN-visit
Dominican Republic (n.a.)					n.a.

<sup>120</sup> The University Council of Jamaica (UCJ) was contracted to prepare regional guidelines for Open and Distance Learning. The document entitled *Quality Assurance in Distance Education: Guidelines for Practitioners* is expected to enable distance education to be addressed within the CARICOM supported Regional Framework for Quality Assurance

**Indicator 9.1.3: Evidence of operational distance education systems and programs with regional level coverage that relate to the objectives set out in the RSP for EDF9 and EDF10**

3a. RSP-RIP for the 9th and 10th EDF

3b. Project documentation

3c. CKLN information

**Information on Indicator:**

The CKLN represents an operational education systems and programmes with regional level coverage, the coverage of which, however, is still being developed. The Vocational Tertiary Education and Training-project, located at the Technical University of Jamaica, UTech, has also established distance learning with regional level coverage, however, according to available information, the impact has been modest.

The results of the CKLN I, CKLN II and UTech-projects include operational education systems and programmes with regional level coverage that relate to the objectives set out in the RSP for EDF9 and EDF10. However, according to available information, so far on a more embryonic stage than the ambitious objectives set out in the RSPs covering the evaluation period.

The below mentioned output-oriented below indicators of the RSP related to network functionality and training capacity seem finally to be on the way to be implemented under CKLN-II after a re-allocation of funds in 2011 in of the participating TEIs. Albeit on a generally more modest level, concentrating on the provision of hardware and courses in the use of soft-ware for distance education, which has only started in a few cases.

The field studies have confirmed that there is not yet evidence to be found regarding the impact-oriented indicators. This is mainly due to the strong delays of the CKLN-I and II projects as well as the absence of information on the finalisation of the UTech-project.

By all interlocutors in the field study, it was considered a main problem for the materialisation of the CKLN and distance learning visions that the rates for Internet provision are very high in the Caribbean region, where the markets appear too small to prevent monopoly prices being charged by the few providers.

**Sources:**

The RSP objectives were the following:

*European Community – Caribbean region Regional Strategy Paper and Regional Indicative Programme for the Period 2003 – 2007 (p.23 and Annex 1: Interventions Logic (p.2)):*

- Education and training at the higher and technical level, with emphasis on the development of a knowledge-based economy, will have been developed. This will involve the establishment of regional capacity for training and education in services including ICT, networking and exchanges among Universities and training centres within the region (including OCTs, DOMs and Cuba) and beyond (Europe and Latin America), the strengthening of distance education systems and the development of language skills.
- Enhanced progress will have been achieved in the objective of overcoming the digital divide, through the establishment of a pro-competitive and integrated regulatory framework for communication services, the promotion of access to ICTs and the establishment and development of the Information Society, including the interconnection with the EU-LAC initiative @LIS.

Results: Human resources with emphasis on a knowledge-based economy developed.

**Indicators:**

- Capacity for education and training in services installed.
- University and training centres networked and exchanges implemented.
- Distance education systems reinforced and fully operational.
- Language skills developed
- No. of people trained, areas developed, impact on productivity, diversification, competitiveness and employment

*European Community – Caribbean region Regional Strategy Paper and Regional Indicative Programme for the Period 2008 – 2013* (p.41), 6.3.4 Intervention (Programme) Areas:

For indicative purposes, approximately €143M (or 85-90% of €165M) shall be reserved for the Focal Area.

The major interventions envisaged for the focal area are:(vi) Investing in Human Capital – approximately 6%

An evaluation report suggests that CKLN has operated within its mandate and that the organisation performed creditably on this initiative.<sup>121</sup>

Information provided by the World Bank during the field study indicated that Internet connection is generally very costly in the Caribbean region and varies between countries, being particularly expensive in Belize. The World Bank was of the opinion that the establishment of CKLN and the “*Caribbean regional infrastructure communication programme*”, CARIBCIP, would contribute to lower the prices. The EUD Barbados expressed the opinion that this problem had to be dealt with politically by the governments of the region.

<b>Indicator 9.1.4: Evidence of the Bahamas Law School Library functioning and supporting the regional integration aspects of the Law School education</b>	4a. Project documentation 4b. EUD information 4c. Field study interviews
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**Information on Indicator:**

The project aiming at the establishment of the library at the Bahamas Law School has not materialised, reportedly due to lack of dedication on the part of the involved Government.

**Sources:**

The objective of the project was: *To increase the provision of legal education in the Caribbean by construction of new library facilities at the Eugene Dupuch Law School.*

In the Regional Report, April-August 2010, Annex 3, Project Fiche it was mentioned that: « *Commitment of funds has to be made by 29/8/2010 but Delegation is still awaiting finalised plans for works tender. It seems that these plans may be subject to modifications making it impossible to commit the funds in time* ».

Finally, the project for EDF support to the Bahamas Law School did not start and the deadline in the financing agreement has now expired. The reason appeared to be basically a

<sup>121</sup> Evaluation of the Caribbean Knowledge and Learning Network (CKLN-I) project, Final Report, 2010

lack of interest on the side of Caribbean partners, (the Bahamas and other Caribbean countries). Also, there was a change of Government in the Bahamas and the new Government was unable or unwilling to find their contribution to the project. (Information provided by the EUD Jamaica to the Evaluation). The EU Delegations in Guyana and Barbados confirmed this information during the field studies.

### **Judgement to JC 9.2: EU support has contributed to a better match between human resource needs in technical capacity across the region and the graduates of TEIs**

Through the CKLN projects, the EU support to the education sector in the Caribbean is to contribute to the creation of a framework for a better match between TEI-outputs and the need for strengthening the human resource base, particularly regarding ICT capabilities. Strengthened ICT competencies are commonly acknowledged as being of key importance to Caribbean human resource development, even if stakeholder assessments of the seriousness of the problem varied. Stakeholders also indicated that the regional projects in this field are not very well integrated with national sector strategies or with the EU support for them.

According to TEI-stakeholder interviews and the 2010-Final Evaluation of CKLN-I, the extent to which the expansion of ICT capabilities is reflected in the TEI education and distance education is still limited (Indicators 9.2.1 and 9.3.2). According to responses to the evaluation survey (see Annexe II), the CKLN still has some way to go before it is well known by its potential partners. In conclusion, the regional EU support has not yet contributed to a better match between human resource needs in technical capacity across the region and the graduates of TEIs

The creation of the CKLN-network is combined with a new sector philosophy based on an investment-approach and to be run on sound business principles. So far, no evidence is available about the impact of this approach on the optimal use of the existing human resource base in the Caribbean region (Indicator 9.2.2).

The creation of the new framework is combined with the introduction of a sector philosophy based on an investment-approach and is to be run on sound business principles: *“These goals are set against the major challenge of marketing education and the acquisition of knowledge as the key to success in a modern society where other routes to success effectively compete as being more attractive and attainable. ... Similarly, there is a thrust to inculcate sound business strategies into the education environment so as to maximise on return on the high level of investment put into the sector, e.g. through the development of sector plans, institutional strategic plans and the establishment of decentralised boards of management”*.<sup>122</sup> So far, no evidence is available about the impact of this approach on the optimal use of the existing human resource base in the Caribbean region.

<sup>122</sup> S. Boyce, Financing Education in Barbados and the Eastern Caribbean, Vol. 1: An Overview of Education Initiatives financed by the European Union 1990 – 2010, p.6

<b>Indicator 9.2.1: Evidence of curricula reflecting identified needs relating to regional integration, including ICT and language skills</b>	1a. Project documentation 1b. Evaluation Report 1c. CKLN reporting and website 1d. Field study interviews 1e. Communication with EUDs
<p><b><u>Information on Indicator:</u></b></p> <p>The design of projects to support CKLN and UTech is relevant to the identified needs regarding regional integration. However, notwithstanding the below mentioned examples of distance learning, at this stage and not least owing to the delays in the CKLN-implementation, the impact on the general curricula development in the involved institutions appears to have been limited and mainly consisting in the provision of hardware and voluntary staff courses in the application of the “Moodle”-software in teaching and distance education.</p> <p>TEI expectations to CKLN-I, as expressed during its implementation in 2008-09, also went in the direction of direct support from the project for the establishment of much needed electronic students’ administration systems, which were, however, not provided. A re-allocation of CKLN-II funds in 2011 is intended to compensate for this by continuing the CKLN-I activities, including the establishment of students’ administrations at the TEIs.</p> <p>The re-allocation is in line with the recommendations of the 2010 CKLN-I evaluation, which also contain recommendations regarding the further development of the E-learning programmes that still needs to be implemented (see indicator 9.3.2 below).</p> <p><b><u>Sources</u></b></p> <p>General information about CKLN (from website) : <i>In November 2003, with seed monies from the World Bank, the Caribbean Knowledge and Learning Network (CKLN) project was developed with a strategic goal to: enhance the global competitiveness of the Caribbean region by upgrading and diversifying the skills and knowledge of its human resources through greater regional collaboration and connectivity</i></p> <p><i>In October 2004, the Caribbean Knowledge and Learning (CKLN) was registered as a regional not for profit foundation with headquarters in St. Georges, Grenada. A Council of Ministers drawn from CARICOM Member States, a Board of Directors made up of Caribbean professionals and a Chief Executive Officer was appointed to manage the affairs of the Foundation.</i></p> <p><i>CKLN is funded by regional and international donor agencies including the World Bank, the European Union, the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), the Organisation of American States (OAS), the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) and the Caribbean Development Bank (CDB) and supported by contributions from CARICOM member governments.</i></p> <p><i>“Grenada: Commenced project aimed at extending the reach of TA Marryshow Community College. The initiative seeks to enable TA Marryshow Community College to offer its education and training programmes to residents in St. Patrick’s and Carriacou using information and communication technology for synchronous and asynchronous teaching and learning. The primary deliverables are courses converted in online/blended format, capacity development of teachers, moodle learning management system, dedicated links to Carriacou and a video conferencing system. Implementation is ongoing and it is expected that the objectives will be realized before the end of the year.</i></p>	



*The Bahamas: Hosting services for e-learning was procured from supplier Embanet. This enabled the College of the Bahamas to make available online access courses to the Family Islands.*“ (CKLN: SUMMARY OF ACHEIVEMENTS. STATUS REPORT ON PROGRAMME OF WORK COMPLETED DURING THE PERIOD 2009 –2010)

**CKLN-I:** The overall objective of the project is to enhance competitiveness and productivity of the Caribbean's labour force by developing Regional capacity to utilise affordable ICT, such as by mainstreaming distance learning. The purpose of the project is to contribute to upgrading and diversifying skills and knowledge of the Caribbean people by improving the technical environment and the ability of Tertiary Education Institutions (TEIs) to deliver Contribution-efficient and effective ICT-based training.

The overall results of this project were:

- improved strategic planning capacity in the TEIs in delivering ICT based training;
- improved strategic planning capacity in the Ministries of Education;
- mainstreaming of low Contribution broadband connections to participating TEIs;
- strengthened local capacity to develop or customise, deliver and evaluate e-learning offerings;
- strengthened systems for students and faculty to access a range of e-learning offerings, including registration and records management; and
- CKLN operates on business principles.

(EU Progress Report, Apr-Aug 2010, Annex 3 (p.6))

Field study interviews indicate, however, that the above list of results from CKLN-I is slightly exaggerated in terms of the mentioned “mainstreaming of low contribution broadband connections to participating TEIs; strengthened local capacity to develop or customise, deliver and evaluate e-learning offerings; strengthened systems for students and faculty to access a range of e-learning offerings, including registration and records management; and CKLN operates on business principles” – all of which is to materialise under CKLN-II in 2011 onwards by the use of re-allocated funds (€2M).

**CKLN-II:** The overall objective of the project is to enhance regional competitiveness by upgrading the skills and knowledge of human resources in the Caribbean through greater regional collaboration and connectivity. The purpose of the project is to contribute to C@ribNET. It will coordinate, integrate and harmonise activities among and within countries (i.e., e-learning, e-inclusion, and research) to achieve a common objective through collective action and capitalisation on opportunities offered by ICT.

The project has two main objectives:

1. Provide social bandwidth to education, government, health and other public institutions in the region, facilitating exchange and establishment of joint research networks
2. Create a non-governmental organisation that represents the interests of this network organisation.
3. C@ribNET will be interconnected to the CLARA and GEANT networks.

The C@ribNet and its counterpart the CLARA network are R&D networks and therefore they are not intended to substitute themselves to existing telecom operators, which will, otherwise, distort the telecom market with a subsidized network. The project is expected to realise a significant level of self-sustainability at the end of five (5) years of

implementation.

The award of a contract for the design of C@ribNET regional strategy is a major milestone.

The field studies confirm that the above objectives are being pursued and that the C@ribNET contract has been followed in 2011 by procurement to the tune of €6M of the network infrastructure for the Caribbean region and for connections to CLARA and GEANT (the Latin American and European research networks, respectively).

It is worth noting that while CKLN-I focused on the educational aspects of the network, CKLN-II focuses on the network infrastructure with the educational focus being indirectly represented. To maintain the ultimate educational focus, the World Bank management team was reinforced with an educational specialist in 2011 and, as mentioned above, part of the CKLN-II funds were re-allocated to the continuation of the educational activities under CKLN-I.

**UTech:** “Mid Term Evaluation of Development of Vocational Tertiary Education and Training”, Final Report, October 2008 (p.4):

*The purpose of this European Commission (EU) University of Technology, Jamaica (UTech) programme is to assist UTech to produce professional, technical and managerial graduates in order to increase the pool of skilled and qualified labour in the Caribbean; this was to be done through academic staff development, establishing an open and distance learning unit and equipping the university as necessary.*

*The broad objective of the programme is to be a Caribbean rather than a specifically Jamaican programme, to contribute to the social and economic development of the Caribbean Region by strengthening the provision of tertiary education and training, primarily in key technical and vocational fields. The project purpose is to extend the capacity of UTech to produce professional, technical and managerial graduates in order to increase the pool of skilled and qualified labour in the Caribbean.*

*The project started in 2001 and was due to end on 30 September 2007 but an extension was granted till 30 September 2009 to allow the programme activities to be completed. The total cost of the programme is €2,600,000 and the EU contribution is for the full amount. The project design has an emphasis on Open and Distance Learning (ODL). The programme is focused on assisting staff and students in tertiary education institutions.*

However, according to information from the EUD, Jamaica, the programme has not been very successful, as also indicated by the Mid-term Evaluation in 2008.

Repeated communication with UTech did not bring additional information about the finalisation of this project. During the field studies, a search was made in the EUD Guyana-files, which only revealed a progress report from 2006. The EUD Jamaica was subsequently approached for further information and / or assessment of the issue and it expressed its consent with the assessment of the modest results as mentioned in the answer to EQ9 in the Main Report.

**Indicator 9.2.2: Size of education /tuition fees does not prevent effective exploitation of the human resource base**

2a. EU sector information

2b. CKLN Business Plan

2c. Field study interviews

**Information on the indicator:**

The overall policy for the EU support to the education sector has, in the evaluation period, rested on the philosophy of regarding education as an investment, also on the individual level. Whether this is conducive to the maximum effectiveness regarding the exploitation of the human resource base cannot be assessed on the basis on available information and will depend on general educational policies of the involved governments.

**Sources:**

CKLN is to be run on business principles. EUD Barbados mentions that within the last decade, there has been growing priority to education seen as a “seamless lifelong process”. Academic and technical areas are viewed as part of this continuum. This approach has included a changed perception of Technical and Vocational Education and Training (TVET) and the use of Information and Communication Technology (ICT) in changing the teaching-learning environment, in what has referred to as the “digital Caribbean hole”. *These goals are set against the major challenge of marketing education and the acquisition of knowledge as the key to success in a modern society where other routes to success effectively compete as being more attractive and attainable. ... Similarly, there is a thrust to inculcate sound business strategies into the education environment so as to maximise on return on the high level of investment put into the sector, e.g. through the development of sector plans, institutional strategic plans and the establishment of decentralised boards of management. (Financing Education in Barbados and the Eastern Caribbean, Sep 2010 (S. Boyce) Vol 1: An Overview of Education Initiatives Financed by the EU 1990 – 2010, p.3)*

Owing to the delayed implementation of CKLN-I and II, the field studies did not bring additional information on the issue.

**Indicator 9.2.3: Examples of employability of graduates / trainees that relate to regional integration**

3a. CKLN- and UTech information sought

3b. Questionnaire

**Information on Indicator**

It has not yet been possible to identify such examples, except from the development of the CKLN regional network, which has implied the training of substantial number of TEI-staff (see the above table under Indicator 9.1.2). Most of the respondents to the evaluation survey from the private sector were not aware of the existence of CKLN (15 out of 19, see Annex 2).

**Judgement to JC 9.3: Functioning networks that have been established between education and training institutions at the regional level have created the conditions for a lasting and integrated programme**

The CKLN is to establish functioning networks between national education and training institutions at the Caribbean regional level. Its **sustainability** rest on the continued political – and financial – support from the CARIFORUM Member States, and on the development of a viable business plan responding to the market niche, which is part of the overall rationale of the project. In the project documents, the impression is created that future CKLN sustainability primarily rests on its ability to sell bandwidth to TEIs as well as to the public and private sectors (Indicator 9.3.2). But according to the CKLN, its ICT-network has to be considered “a public good” implying that, in addition to membership fees, public subsidies would be needed. The World Bank was of the opinion that infusion of private capital would be needed, possibly by sharing the network with private companies.

The political and institutional sustainability of the CKLN is ascertained by the CARIFORUM Governments having reiterated their support to it. At the March 2010-CARICOM Heads of Government meeting, an instrument was signed that establishes CKLN as a CARICOM Inter-governmental Agency. The governance structure is, nevertheless, still not decided. It is foreseen that the final structure will anchor CKLN with CARICOM and the Member Governments, while keeping its relative autonomy (Indicator 9.3.1). However, possible future government subsidies have not yet been discussed explicitly according to the available sources. It is, therefore, assessed that there is strong need for CARICOM to re-address the future institutional status of CKLN and its financial implications.

The ongoing development of the business plan will be of pivotal importance to the future CKLN viability for the realisation of the initial commercial approach. The award of a contract for the design of C@ribNET regional strategy in 2010 was considered a milestone by the EU and since then, contracts have been awarded for the subsequent national

strategies (Indicator 9.3.2). Ultimately, financial sustainability will depend on the ability of the CKLN to create substance in the network through its on-going activities in order to make it attractive for TEIs, which may find other solutions.

The viewpoint was put forward by sector observers that CKLN is not well coordinated with the EU-supported Latin American research network, CLARA. CLARA also attempts to cover the Caribbean region, especially the non-Anglophone parts, and considers its technological solutions better than CKLN. In this line of thinking, there is an unproductive clash between the local geopolitical concept of “Latin America and the Caribbean” and the EU “ACP-concept” resulting in in-activity in the non-Anglophone parts of the Caribbean. Caribbean TEI-association with US or Canadian-based research networks was also mentioned as an alternative to the CKLN-option.

**Indicator 9.3.1: Evidence of continued government support for the new education or training programmes / the Caribbean Knowledge and Learning Network (CKLN)**

1a. Project documentation

1b. Evaluation Report

1c. Field study interviews

**Information on the indicator:**

There is evidence of continued government support for CKLN as reiterated during the March 2010 CARICOM Heads of Government meeting in Dominica, where the Heads signed the instrument that establishes CKLN as a CARICOM Inter governmental Agency.<sup>123</sup>

The final modalities of the future organisation of CKLN are still under negotiation. (*CKLN – C@ribNET – Business plan*, Aug 2010 (p.1)):

It is proposed that C@ribNET be supported and funded by three tiers of members:

*Tier 1 will be the member governments and their wholly owned institutions (roughly 45% of the membership).*

*Tier 2 will be not-for-profit tertiary learning institutions and governmental organisations not wholly owned by a single government (e.g., regional institutions like CARICOM) (roughly 20% of the institutions).*

*Tier 3 will be for-profit institutions that nevertheless still fit the limitations of the charter of CKLN, primarily for-profit tertiary learning institutions and selected other organisations (roughly 35% of the institutions).*

*The governance and funding of C@ribNET will reflect the primacy of the Tier 1 members. The governance will reflect the wide range of stakeholders involved, but will be controlled by the Tier 1 members. Any donor assistance, such as has already been committed by the European Union, will subject to donor terms be applied to benefit the Tier 1 members in the first instance. Tiers 2 should also benefit to a significant though lesser degree whilst Tier 3 will benefit to the extent of receiving quality services at competitive rates versus the market. This model, while in many ways similar to membership and business models elsewhere, also has aspects of it customized to the Caribbean.*

CKLN issued a tender, in 2011, for a sustainability strategy for CKLN, additional to the above business strategy. While the outcome of this sustainability strategy is not yet known, it is worth noting that field interviews indicated that the objective of self-sustainability is no longer considered realistic by CKLN, which prefers to refer to CKLN as a “public good that is nowhere run on purely commercial terms”. The World Bank expressed the opinion that an infusion of private capital, through the selling of access to the network would be needed to assure sustainability.

<sup>123</sup> Regional Report, April-August 2010, Annex 3, Project Fiches, p.21.

<b>Indicator 9.3.2: Examples of the involved TEIs / the CKLN having been able to generate income in line with the assumptions in the financing agreements of the concerned projects (such as selling bandwidth access to TEIs)</b>	2a. Field study interviews 2b. Evaluation report 2c. CKLN-information
<p><b><u>Information on the indicator:</u></b></p> <p>The award of a contract for the design of C@ribNET regional strategy in 2010 is considered by the EU as a major milestone. Since then, a contract has been awarded for the development of country specific Blue Prints for National Research and Education Networks (NRENS), the procurement process for the development of business and operational plans for NRENS has started; tenders for Supply of Bandwidth and Collocation Services and for Supply of Equipment for Access Nodes and Backbone Nodes have been launched. Consequent procurement for establishment of the regional network has been undertaken and a tender for a sustainability plan was about to be finalised in 2011.</p> <p>Field studies indicated that the possible selling of bandwidth has not yet reached a stage that allows for assessment of the realism of this option, while, as mentioned, opinions differs in preliminary assessments of the realism of the option.</p> <p>The 2010 CKLN-I evaluation is addressing the above questions as expressed in the below recommendations, most of which still need to be implemented.</p> <p><b><u>Sources</u></b></p> <p>CKLN: SUMMARY OF ACHEIVEMENTS. STATUS REPORT ON PROGRAMME OF WORK COMPLETED DURING THE PERIOD 2009 –2010:</p> <p><i>September 2010: Completion of Revised Operations and Business Plans for C@ribNET and Contract awarded for development of country specific Blue Prints for National Research and Education Networks (NRENS) and Launch of Tender for Supply of Bandwidth and Collocation Services Launch of Tender for Supply of Equipment for Access Nodes and Backbone Nodes.</i></p> <p><i>November 2010: Completion of evaluation of Bids for Supply of Bandwidth and Collocation Services. Commencement of the procurement process for the development of business and operational plans for NRENS. Project Launch on development of blue prints for NRENS.</i></p> <p><b>Final Evaluation Report of CKLN-I, p.4:</b> <i>There were some interesting developments as a result of the intervention, key among them being the establishment of guidelines for open and distance learning quality assurance in the region.</i></p> <p><i>In general, several recommendations may prove useful to build on the project. Chief among them are:</i></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. <i>Using contingency planning for supporting project lag phases where funds have not been allocated;</i></li> <li>2. <i>Establishing a programme management framework which emphasizes frequent project monitoring and evaluation;</i></li> <li>3. <i>Re-configuring the CKLN Council to include Prime Ministerial representation and paying attention to the assignment of Board members to the CKLNA when it is formed;</i></li> <li>4. <i>Re-aligning CRISPAC and TAC as the Network AGM and establishing three steering committees as sub-committees of the Board of Directors;</i></li> <li>5. <i>Separating the construction of a Business Plan from the CKLN Strategic Plan and making use of dedicated human and other resources to convert the CKLN into a revenue-generating entity;</i></li> </ol>	

6. *Establishing official partnership agreements with other regional agencies such as ACTI, CTO and CAREC;*
7. *Recommending the establishment of a regional policy framework for strengthening tertiary education sectors;*
8. *Developing clear guidelines for priority allocation of funds and monitoring delivery to support tertiary education ODL capacity building that is to be coordinated by Ministries of Education;*
9. *Preparing official guidelines for selection and distribution of resources particularly equipment especially in situations of scarce resources;*
10. *Insisting on course & programme development activities to be done in accordance with broad global rules and guidelines established by CKLN but performed by TEIs in collaboration with ACTI;*
11. *Development and monitoring of TEI quality assurance capacity for e-learning programmes;*
12. *Development of Open Education Resources & application of enhanced video & other forms of technology to relay information & best practices to beneficiaries/ stakeholders.*

## ANNEX IX: DATA ON TRADE AND EU SUPPORT THROUGH EDF9

### Trade

**Table 30: Detailed repatriation of sectors per CARIFORUM member state in 2000**

Country Sector	Agriculture (% of GDP)	Industry (% of GDP)	Services (% of GDP)
Antigua	3,9	19,8	76,3
Bahamas	2	19,3	78,7
Barbados	4,3	16,3	79,4
Belize	16,7	21,2	62,1
Dominica	18,1	23,5	58,4
Dominican Rep.	7,2	35,9	56,8
Grenada	7,3	22,2	70,5
Guyana	31,1	29	39,9
Haiti*	29	20	51
Jamaica	7	25,5	67,4
St. Lucia	7	19	74
St. Kitts & Nevis	2,7	28,8	68,5
St. Vincent & Grenadines	10,8	24	65,2
Suriname	11,2	25,1	63,7
Trinidad & Tobago	1,4	49,5	49,1

*Source: Commission of the EU – DG Trade website*

**Table 31: Detailed repatriation of sectors per CARIFORUM member state in 2009**

Country Sector	Agriculture (% of GDP)	Industry (% of GDP)	Services (% of GDP)
Antigua	3,6	28	68,4
Bahamas	1,6	19,7	78,7
Barbados	3,8	18,4	77,8
Belize	12,2	22,8	65
Dominica	19,5	23,2	57,3
Dominican Rep.	6,2	32,5	61,3
Grenada	6,5	18,4	75,1
Guyana	28,1	21,7	50,2
Haiti*	25	16	59
Jamaica	6,2	22,1	71,7
St. Lucia	4,9	18,2	76,9
St. Kitts & Nevis	2,8	22,4	74,8
St. Vincent & Grenadines	7,5	24,5	68
Suriname	4,7	40,2	55,1
Trinidad & Tobago	0,4	52,5	47,1

*Source: Commission of the EU – DG Trade website*

**Table 32: Inward Foreign Direct Investment stock for Caribbean countries and OCTs (2003-2009)  
 in million US\$**

ECONOMY	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009
Anguilla*	338	430	547	689	808	907	969
Antigua and Barbuda	1.047	1.142	1.363	1.722	2.060	2.233	2.372
Aruba*	1.022	1.155	1.271	1.886	1.806	2.043	2.123
Bahamas	4.435	4.878	5.441	6.147	6.893	7.732	8.386
Barbados	465	489	617	862	1.200	1.486	1.775
Belize	377	488	615	724	867	1.058	1.153
British Virgin Islands*	<b>40.158</b>	<b>57.764</b>	<b>48.674</b>	56.174	<b>84.721</b>	<b>129.341</b>	<b>156.229</b>
Cayman Islands*	26.623	36.292	46.513	<b>58.259</b>	81.061	86.652	97.923
Cuba	74	77	93	119	149	185	215
Dominica	349	377	396	422	469	526	572
Dominican Republic	3.598	3.956	5.276	6.477	8.098	11.145	13.303
Grenada	563	630	700	789	941	1.085	1.164
Guyana	882	912	989	1.091	1.244	1.422	1.566
Haiti	119	124	150	311	386	415	446
Jamaica	5.130	5.732	6.918	7.801	8.667	10.104	11.166
Montserrat*	86	89	89	92	99	111	118
Netherlands Antilles*	426	447	489	467	701	967	1.084
Saint Kitts and Nevis	738	801	894	1.005	1.139	1.317	1.456
Saint Lucia	1.100	1.181	1.259	1.493	1.765	1.938	2.104
Saint Vincent & the Grenadines	609	675	715	824	955	1.114	1.239
Suriname	na	na	na	na	na	na	na
Trinidad & Tobago	9.714	10.712	11.652	12.535	13.365	16.166	16.875
Turks & Caicos Islands*	18	3	111	169	266	365	460
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>97.872</b>	<b>128.354</b>	<b>134.774</b>	<b>160.059</b>	<b>217.659</b>	<b>278.310</b>	<b>322.699</b>

\* = OCTs; **bold**: highest amount per year; *italic*: lowest amount per year

Source: UNCTAD Stat (consulted in June 2011)




**Table 33: CARICOM Intra-regional total exports by country (2004-2008) in US\$ ‘000:**


YEAR	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008
<b>CARICOM total</b>	<b>1.247.223</b>	<b>2.439.849</b>	<b>2.895.299</b>	<b>2.281.989</b>	<b>3.776.628</b>
<b>MDCs</b>	<b>1.129.094</b>	<b>2.291.514</b>	<b>2.754.459</b>	<b>2.135.530</b>	<b>3.599.004</b>
Barbados	105.161	139.108	150.824	183.646	157.077
Guyana	112.456	107.322	124.339	132.556	120.315
Jamaica	51.926	47.043	52.990	56.390	65.845
Suriname	...	...	...	...	...
Trinidad & Tobago	859.552	1.998.042	2.426.307	1.762.938	3.255.768
<b>LDCs</b>	<b>118.129</b>	<b>148.335</b>	<b>140.840</b>	<b>146.459</b>	<b>177.624</b>
Belize	23.372	22.810	23.013	19.493	16.018
<b>OECS</b>	<b>94.757</b>	<b>125.525</b>	<b>117.827</b>	<b>126.966</b>	<b>161.606</b>
Antigua & Barbuda	...	27.213	...	23.027	...
Dominica	25.344	24.663	26.149	23.679	24.520
Grenada	8.836	12.934	14.064	12.585	16.406
Montserrat	2.193	550	677	1.108	1.300
St. Kitts & Nevis	997	1.310	2.396	2.243	3.188
Saint Lucia	36.296	34.200	49.760	29.786	72.295
St. Vincent & Grenadines	21.091	24.655	24.781	34.539	43.898

\* Source: CARICOM Regional Trade Information System Tradys Online: <http://tradysonline.caricomstats.info/Home.aspx>

**Figure 15: EU imports from Caribbean ACP countries (2006, 2008, 2010)**




**Figure 16: EU exports to Caribbean ACP countries (2006, 2008, 2010)**




## Sectors of EU support through EDF9

**Figure 17: EDF9 (2003-2007) regional level amounts allocated per sector**



\* Source: data extracted from CRIS (state December 2010)

**Figure 18: EDF9 (2003-2007) regional level amounts paid per sector**



\* Source: data extracted from CRIS (state December 2010)

## ANNEX X: CASE STUDIES

### Case Study 1: CSME Programme (component 1 of CISP)

Established in 1973, the Caribbean Community and Common Market, CARICOM, is meant to forge a regional integrated area, the CARICOM Single Market and CARICOM Single Economy (CSME). The CSME aims at the integration of the economies of CARICOM into a unified Single Market in which people, goods, services and capital can move freely, and into a Single Economy that functions under the same coordinated and harmonized economic policies.

According to the Financial Agreement, the Overall Objective of the Caribbean Integration Support Programme (CISP) is to contribute to the region's integration and repositioning in the world economy. The Project Purpose is to address capacity constraints of CARIFORUM and its member states so that they may effectively promote and deepen regional integration, cooperation and development.

The component n°1 of CISP, "Establishment and Consolidation of the CSME", can be considered as the most relevant of all CISP components, especially in the context of implementation of the EPA. The CSME component is also the largest component of the CISP with a budget of €19.9M, or about 50% of the total.

#### Box 1: Components of the CISP

- I. *Support to a range of measures to implement the Common Single Market and Economy (CSME).*
- II. *Support for the external trade negotiations carried out by CARIFORUM countries.*
- III. *Support for the establishment and operation of the Caribbean Information and Translation Institute to be located in Suriname.*
- IV. *Support to the improvement and harmonised production of economic statistical data at the regional and national levels in CARICOM.*
- V. *Support to the development of the Caribbean Information and Communication Society.*
- VI. *Support to the reduction of Supply and Demand for illegal drugs.*
- VII. *General support to the CARICOM Secretariat.*

The Single Market component of the CSME came into effect on 1 January 2006, except for the Member States of the OECS (who have been granted a delay until 1 July 2006) and Haiti and the Bahamas (who are not members of the Common Single Market). The CCS has developed a "Work Programme to Complete the Establishment of the CSME" (CSME WP) drafted in May 2004 which identifies the major outstanding requirements and issues that need to be tackled to complete the full establishment of the CSME.

#### Poor logic of intervention

CISP as a whole has a very general logframe and OVIs are not very "SMART"<sup>124</sup>. There was no specific logframe for the CSME component, which appears as one result in the CISP. In order to achieve this result the CSME component lists 13 areas of intervention (see box below) and a wide range of activities included in each of these taken out from the CSME WP. However, the activities appear to have been put together quickly in order to commit funds of EDF9, and unspent EDF8, before deadlines were passed.

There was no Overall Work Programme (OWP) or implementation schedule for CISP and each WP addressed a very wide range of activities but their role in achieving the PP is implicit rather than explicit. Most cross-cutting issues were not taken sufficiently into account. Assumptions refer to Member states capacity to implement regional policies.

The risks mentioned relate to the political will of MS, which is valid but outside CARICOM's powers to address. There was no specific phase out strategy in the design but EDF10 will continue this work in a more structured and focused way.

<sup>124</sup> i.e., Specific, Measurable, Achievable, Relevant, Time-Bound.

## **Box 2: Areas of intervention under the CSME component of CISP**

- I. Establishing and consolidating the legal and institutional framework of the CSME.*
- II. Reviewing and improving mechanisms and regulations for national treatment and market access.*
- III. Developing and improving framework for macro-economic and sectoral policy co-ordination.*
- IV. Implementing business facilitation measures through CROSO and upgraded customs administrations.*
- V. Promoting measures to protect stakeholders' interests and welfare.*
- VI. Supporting CSME administrative capacities at national and regional levels.*
- VII. Developing and implementing public education programme on CSME.*
- VIII. Providing institutional support to Work Programme management and administration.*
- IX. Providing support to disadvantaged countries in their integration into the wider CARICOM/CARIFORUM system.*
- X. Implementing measures to improve Civil Society participation in the CSME.*
- XI. Establishing and improving measures for improving international donor coordination.*
- XII. Arranging for the sharing of EU experiences with Caribbean regional institutions.*
- XIII. Monitoring, evaluating and auditing programme implementation.*

### **Complex Implementation modalities**

CISP is implemented under a Contribution Agreement managed by the CCS and signed between the CCS and the European Commission. The programme management staff is integrated into the existing structure of CCS. The Programme recruits staff using its own procedures but uses EU procurement procedures for TA and equipment.

An external institutional audit of the CARICOM secretariat attested CARICOM's sound financial management, as is required if the European Commission is to sign a CA. The first Institutional assessment resulted in 38 recommendations to be implemented before CARICOM rules could be applied. It was agreed that for staff recruitment CARICOM rules apply. The 2<sup>nd</sup> Institutional Assessment recommended that CARICOM should continue using EDF procedures unless a range of measures are implemented.

The structure of the CSME component is complex, the main implementation unit for the Market side is in Barbados, but the Economy side is in Guyana and the Competition Commission is in Suriname. It does not have its own PMU or steering committee although issues are discussed at the monthly CISP Project Management Group.

The CISP has a Programme Steering Committee for management and monitoring. The EU is by far the major contributor to the funding of the CSME Work Programme.

The project was to be implemented over a too short period (three years) considering the implement capacities of the CARICOM MS. The strengthening of CCS capacities also needed more time, as reflected by Institutional Assessments.

However the programme was not designed for adequate result assessment. As there was no Overall Work Plan (OWP), anything not done under one WP is rolled over into the next WP. The WP and narrative reports are detailed but describe activities, not results. The use of the indicators of the CSME WP was introduced during the implementation phase. Those “performance indicators” of the WP are mainly activities/outputs. Despite recommendations in ROM reports, a Logical Framework was no developed specifically for the CSME component or an M & E system elaborated.

Coordination between donors has been driven by the donors themselves. The CCS has been reluctant for years to go beyond bilateral relations and take the initiative or full coordination with donors. At a donors meeting in December 2010, it presented a “Preliminary Outline for a Strategic Plan for Regional Development” (SPRD), a resource mobilisation strategy which consists in the design of programmes offered to donors for support, and a matrix of donor’s intervention. However, at least for the EU interventions this matrix is not complete and it is only useful if turned into a data base. A meeting was supposed to be called six months later and review proposals for an improvement of donors’ coordination. The concern expressed by CCS for donors’ coordination still needs to be confirmed.

Relevant cross-cutting issues, including donor coordination, were not adequately mainstreamed. Environmental issues, though important, are mentioned in some reports but, given the sensitivity of the region's ecosystems, require a higher profile. Only in December 2010 was a broad based donor coordination meeting convened.

### **Poor efficiency...**

The CA was signed on 20 April 2007. The EUD raised serious concern about the poor quality of the first implementation report (6 months) and the slow rate of implementation. The report for Year 1 was of better quality but the financial implementation of Year 1 was still only around 10% of the initial forecast. Unlike the EUD, CARICOM was convinced it could catch up in year II and III, but it proved impossible and the EUD extended the Contribution Agreement for a period of 8 months, to 31 December 2010.

Since March 2008 monthly operational meetings took place between the EU Delegation and CARIFORUM. Numerous derogation requests showed a lack of comprehension of EU procedures and the use of ineffective tendering procedures, with a high failure rate. The CCS agreed to move to less and larger, international tenders, to reduce the very high tender failure rate.

The mid-term evaluation that took place between July-October 2009 did not recommend a further extension of the FA, but de-committing the unspent funds and reallocate them to CARTAC and to build CSME implementation capacity at the national level. It was already clear that a major roadblock was the limited capacity of implementation of most CARICOM Member States. Instead a rider in 2010 extended the time limit by 18 months together and budget reallocations were approved. The Financial Audit concerning Year 2 Work Plan received in March 2010 confirmed suspected irregularities.

Component 1 realised the lowest implementation rate of all components of 7.8% as at end of May 2009. By end of May 2010 the CSME component had only committed and spent €7.9M leaving €11.9M for the Y4 six months extension. The level of overall implementation was constrained by many factors:

- Poor responses to calls for tenders and high number of failed tender procedures, led to re-tendering and in some cases required the application of the negotiated procedure; this was partly due to as lack of awareness of CISP by consultants and other service providers and unattractive price considerations, or reputation of late payments;
- Delays in recruitment of staff and key technical experts;
- CCS staff spending more of their time writing ToR and managing TA than actually contributing their own expertise directly to the component;
- Slow rate of procurement processing, attributable to weak procurement capacity at the CCS;
- Limited project management capacity at the CCS.

On April 30, 2011, CSME component expenditure amounted to €12.4m, which is more 60% of its budget, a significant improvement against the previous year due mostly to improved procurement, greater flexibility of EDF10 rules and increased efficiency from consolidation of tenders, particularly for equipment.

The Secretariat suffers from a very high turnover due the fact that more than 40% of the staff is hired on temporary contracts, out of which half by international donors. In addition, the CCS has not done a salary alignment to the market since 2003. The recommendations of two studies on human resources management commissioned by the CCS in 2009 and 2010 have not been implemented.

Based on the critical comments of the second Institutional Assessment and the Mid-term evaluation, the Delegation has pushed for reinforcement of project management, for the recruitment of procurement staff, for the increase of international tenders and requested a thorough revision and reorientation of activities of the programme.

Until now, the CCS has been reluctant to support donor's coordination, preferring bilateral relations. A first donor coordination meeting took place in July 2007 in which CARICOM had gathered main donors in an effort to harmonize reporting requirements, but no follow up took place. Since then, coordination between donors was driven by the donors themselves. However, at a donors meeting in December 2010,

the CCS presented a “Preliminary Outline for a Strategic Plan for Regional Development” (SPRD), a resource mobilisation strategy which consists in the design of programmes offered to donors for support, and for the first time again a matrix of donor’s intervention. However, at least for the EU interventions this matrix is not complete and it is only useful if turned into a data base. A meeting was supposed to be called six months later and the CCS to make proposals for an improvement of donors’ coordination. The renewed interest expressed by CCS for donors’ coordination still needs to be confirmed.

### **...and limited results**

The results are also constrained by the implementation capacities of the CARICOM Member States (MS). The MS have all focal points for the CSME. Some countries have a dedicated person or two, well located in government; but others, usually smaller countries, have already overloaded individuals taking on this role as well. The respective Ministries of Trade, Legal Affairs and other implementing Ministries have limited manpower and therefore are not always in a position to dedicate the requisite manpower to maintain the momentum of implementation. The global recession negatively impacted this commitment resulting in more inward-looking approaches by some states. This issue was adequately addressed when the CISP was extended. The resources were reallocated and focused not only on areas that will continue to receive support under the 10th EDF, but particularly on reinforcing the capacity of the national CSME focal points.

Results are finally constrained by the governance of the CARICOM. The CCS does not have supranational powers. It delivers reports, policy papers and draft legislation to the relevant committees, for the Heads of Government eventually to agree upon, by consensus, and for the MS to implement at their own discretion and pace.

The CSME Unit efficiently managed to deliver outputs for the five core regimes of the Single Market component with a staff of six members, against the required cadre of 9. Most activities of the Programme concern the completion of the Single Market which entered into force in 2006, that is, before project start. According to the latest information available on CSME implementation to date<sup>125</sup> the five core regimes of the Single Market have the necessary legislative framework in place but are not always complied with due to the lack of infrastructure and capacity of many MS.

Many lasting benefits are worth mentioning: CROSQ is fully operational, the legal and institutional framework has been strengthened (significantly competition policy, competition law, and competition Commission inaugurated in 2008), mechanisms and regulations for national treatment and market access improved (anti-dumping, trade remedies, online company registries), CSME's administrative capacity at the MS and regional levels enhanced (ICT networks), the legal department in the CCS has been strengthened, stakeholders' interests, particularly labour and consumer protection strengthened (Immigration Act, dangerous goods, e-commerce protection), a public education programme implemented (manuals on consumer protection, CSME, immigration, labour), the awareness raising of the CSME amongst students was very successful, and weaker states supported in the integration process (measures for Belize, OECS, Haiti, Suriname).

The circulation of persons is still very limited and a controversial issue. It is also a grey area since labour market information are not reliable and the lack of statistical data does not allow to determine the level of implementation of the CSME objective of free movement of persons. A “Free Movement Impact Study”, funded by CISP, was preparation for the coming 31st annual CARIFORUM Summit to be held Jamaica.

The CCS does not produce statistics on intra-Caribbean exchange in services. Our hypothesis, based on the basis of the dominance of tourism and financial services directed at markets outside the Caribbean, is that intra-Caribbean trade in service has not significantly increased in the recent past.

For the Single Economy the objective is very far from achieved. The CCS plans are to have a framework by 2015 focusing on monetary and fiscal policy. Little progress has been made in terms of policy coordination and the legal and institutional framework. The region failed in particular to iron out an agreement on monetary union, on harmonisation of incentives, and on the CARICOM agreements on

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<sup>125</sup> CARICOM Secretariat, Summary Report of the Appraisal of the State of Implementation of the Single Market. CSME (CONV)/2009/1/6. 6 October 2009

investment and on financial services. The CSME has encouraged Intra-regional foreign direct investments which have averaged 10 % of total FDI inflows to MS in the most recent years, mostly in banking and insurance, tourism, distribution and manufacturing.

While progress has been made in the CSM, the impact has not been such as to significantly affect the wider overall objective of contributing to the region's integration and repositioning in the global economy, but the potential is there. According to the most recent statistics on intra-regional trade, CARICOM's intra-regional exports are still small: US\$3.8 billion in 2008, out of which around 60% is mineral fuels and derivatives. This constitutes only 16 % of total exports of the CARICOM countries. As the region has made no major headway since, the intra-CARICOM trade is likely to have remained of the same %. According to the audit carried out in 2009 by the CSME Unit, member states had complied with just 50% of the measures required to give full effect to the Single Market.<sup>126</sup> Also the recession has revived protectionist moves.

### **High sustainability**

Sustainability is high, for many reasons. First, CSME is the core area of activity of the CCS. Second all the CARICOM MS support the process, although some have more difficulty in implementation than others. However, the global economic crisis has also made some countries turn inwards and integration has become less of a priority. This is also reflected in the delays incurred by MS in paying their contributions to the CCS. Third the private sector is involved. Fourth, the general public less so but subject to large public awareness raising efforts in the final phase of the programme and under the 10th EDF. Finally, while the current programme has been extended until end of 2011, funding is already committed to a follow-on project (€25M) "CSME and the Integration Programme" which will consolidate the CSM, address aspects of the economy component previously placed on hold, enhance the capacity of MS to absorb the policy material emerging from the programme and provide inputs into the development programmes through a "Built-in-Agenda". Target groups will continue to make use of the relevant results though a comprehensive programme of public awareness and education on the CSME needs engaging the private sector and the general public.

### **Some lessons learnt:**

#### Risk assessment required more attention.

Several factors were underestimated:

- the level of commitment of MS governments to regionalism
- the resources and capacity of the MS for implementation.
- the implementation capacities of the CCS, in spite of the number of positions created and supported by the Programme.

If risks had been better assessed, the programme would have been designed with a more centralised management.

#### Time frame has to be realistic.

Given the number of results (13), and activities (74) under component n°1, the time frame of 36 months was not realistic.

#### The situation of all stakeholders has to be taken into consideration.

The slow pace and in the end low delivery of results is largely due to the lack of capacity of MS for implementation of the CSME.

#### A partner institution cannot be transformed from outside.

The CA was a new concept to be tested, but did not result. The component eleven of CISP was supposed to strengthen the capacity of the CCS, but staff recruitment and training could not be done in time nor be

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<sup>126</sup> See CARICOM website under <http://tradsysonline.caricomstats.info/Home.aspx>

transparent enough. Also large inputs in audits, institutional assessments, and recommendations did not have the expected impacts.

The partner institution needs adequate human resources management

The CCS implemented only partly, and late, the recommendations of two studies commissioned in 2009 and 2010. Among other weaknesses, the CCS suffers from a very high turnover due the fact that more than 40% of the staff is hired on temporary contracts, out of which half by international donors. In addition, the CCS has not done a salary alignment to the market since 2003.

Need for an adequate internal M&E framework

In the absence of “SMART” indicators<sup>127</sup>, and of a full-fledged M&E unit of CCS, adequate management of the programme is difficult.

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<sup>127</sup> i.e., Specific, Measurable, Achievable, Relevant, Time-Bound.



## **Case Study 2: Capacity building in support of the preparation of the EPA under CARIFORUM**

### **Summary**

The CARIFORUM Grant Agreement (GA), entitled “Enhancement of CARIFORUM Regional Capacity for External Trade and Economic Negotiations”, was signed on February, 2004 and its implementation was originally expected to conclude by December of the same year. The total amount of the GA was €761,460. It was envisaged as an initial support before the start of the EDF9 CISP project which had a €5M allocation for support and capacity building for the negotiation. Due to the delays for various reasons of EDF9 programming and approval process, it was necessary to continue using these funds in order to sustain the negotiations rounds more or less as scheduled. A total of 5 riders were requested and approved. A few of them were no cost extensions; other included an increase in allocation. In total the programme provided €1,089,307.54.

The funds aimed at ensuring preparation of negotiation strategies and briefs, promotion of genuinely regional positions, intimate involvement of all elements of CARIFORUM civil society in the process, development of a regional pool of technical and negotiating resource personnel as well as strengthening statistics on trade in services.

Due to the fact that these resources were supposed to be bridge funding and to the delay in EDF9 CISP start up, the many riders and the consequent administrative delays they entailed, implementation of all activities envisaged were not possible or could not be executed on time. In a prioritisation exercise based on availability of resources and cash flow, the focus was the negotiating process itself (principal negotiations meeting, technical negotiations meeting and technical working groups), leaving other activities to other donor programmes. However, the funds under this project were critical to provide support for the negotiation meetings as well as the technical working group which needed to arrive at regional positions for the negotiations. It is clear to stakeholders that without this support, the EPA could not have been achieved and certainly not within the timeline before the expiration of the WTO waiver for ACP countries.

Two key factors contributed to the successful conclusion of this programme: a) the flexibility in extending the support and offering up to 5 riders and extension in time and budget, b) donors’ coordination at CRNM level which contributed to the availability of alternative funding which could be used to avoid serious delays in vital meetings.

### **Programme implementation<sup>128</sup>**

The CARIFORUM Grant Agreement (GA), entitled “Enhancement of CARIFORUM Regional Capacity for External Trade and Economic Negotiations”, was signed on February 2004 and its implementation was originally expected to conclude by December of the same year. The total amount of the GA was €761,460.

Formal implementation of the programme, however, only began in October 2004 after the funds of the first disbursement (€580,160) were made available to the CRNM which had been designated as the implementing agency on behalf of CARIFORUM. This delay was due to a number of administrative factors, such as the lengthy process to obtain approval for opening a bank account in Euros in Barbados.

The delay of the starting date made necessary to request an extension of the implementation period until December 31, 2005. Rider No. 1 was approved in February 2005 and the budget lines were realigned to make the operations of the GA more consistent with the execution of the CRNM Technical Work Programme on EPAs.

It should be noted that the implementation period of Rider 1 of the Grand Agreement was predicated on the approval of EU funding under the “Institutional Support/Capacity Building for External Trade and Economic Negotiations” programme, which was funded from the EDF9 Caribbean Regional Indicative Programme (CRIP). This programme, originally expected to start in January 2006, builds on the activities carried out under the GA and contains provisions aimed at supporting the EPA negotiating process during

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<sup>128</sup> According to reports prepared by CRNM and rider requests.

the last two Phases (Phases III and IV) of the CARIFORUM-EU Joint Plan and Schedule for EPA negotiations.

The Financing Proposal for EDF9 Programme was submitted by CARIFORUM in May 2005. However, the European Commission embarked itself on a review of its cooperation policy which resulted in a significant delay of the process for approval of all regional programmes being considered under the EDF9 CRIP. In order to avoid a gap in the funding of EPA activities it has been necessary to request several extensions of the implementation period along with an increase of the resources available under the Grant Agreement.

In this regard, Rider No. 2 was approved in December 2005, and included a reallocation of the funds not yet committed under the GA plus the programming of an additional €96,652.54. The new budget prioritized on the negotiation activities envisaged under Phase III of the CARIFORUM-EU Joint Schedule of Negotiations. The new implementation dateline was April 30, 2006.

By March 2006, a request for a no-cost extension of the implementation period until August 2006 was formally submitted. The purpose for this third Rider was to guarantee the participation of CARIFORUM negotiators in the EPA negotiating process during the period May-August 2006 and to avoid a disruption in this process. Rider No. 3 incorporated a reallocation of the budget lines of the GA

By May 2006, it was necessary to submit a revised version of the EDF9 programme for funding consideration and it was clear that the funds under this programme would not be available until early 2007. The revised version was submitted as a component of a larger Caribbean Integration Support Program. In view of this, once again it was necessary to request a new rider of the GA in order to secure funding for the negotiating activities until the end of 2006. Rider No. 4 was approved in August 2006. This extended the implementation period until December 2006 and increased the funds by €230,995 to cover all the negotiating related activities under Phase III of the EPA negotiations. The additional funds brought the total value of the Grant Agreement to €1,809,107.51.


By the end of March 2006, the payments under the GA totalled €550,801.22, equivalent to 94.9% of the first disbursement, and the CRNM requested the second disbursement.

There have been delays in the release of the second tranche of the financial resources envisaged under the Grant. This once again affected the expenditure rate of the programme.

As a result of the delay in processing the disbursement, a serious cash-flow problem of the programme surged and it affected a series of activities envisaged in the Implementation Schedule during the period April-September 2006.


By August 31, 2006 the cumulative payments under the Grant Agreement was of €581,095.00, which represents approximately 99% of the original advance.

**Figure 19: Project duration and extensions granted in months**



\* Source: Rider no.5 to Grant Agreement of April 2007


**Figure 20: Project amounts and allocation per rider**



\* Source: Rider no.5 official documentation

It is important to note that due to delays in disbursement and approval of riders, some of the intra-CARIFORUM technical consultations necessary to build regional consensus on the different negotiating issues had to be curtailed or postponed. To face this situation and keep up with the pace of the regional consultations without affecting the EPA negotiating process, the CRNM has been forced to search for alternative financial venues. In this regard, funding has been provided from alternatives sources on a temporary basis.

**Figure 21: EDF8, EDF9 and other funding for CRNM**



\* Source: own analysis, Note: EDF8: €1,089M, EDF9: €1.2M (estimated based on progress report), others CIDA, DFID, IDB, PROINVEST estimated at €3M, based partially on the IDB Aid for Trade report of 2009

The contribution of the programme in the overall support for EPA negotiation by donor funding do not include the CARIFORUM governments' contribution.

## Analysis of programme

### RELEVANCE

The project was critical to support the negotiation process and to fill the gap left by the delay in programming and approval of the EDF9 funding which was the original source of funding envisaged to finance the negotiation related activities. In this sense it was critical to arrive to the conclusion of the negotiation in time. The project was highly relevant, and essential to the EPA negotiation.

### EFFICIENCY

The project implementation was full of delays which required a number of riders including extensions, reallocations and budget add on in order to cover the CARIFORUM needs for the EPA negotiations as

well as to make up for the delay in the programming and approval of the EDF9 funding. As indicated by CRNM's reports activities had to be shifted to other sources of funding in order not to cancel envisaged activities. On the another hand, this possible and no significant delay was a good example of coordination and specifically donor coordination.

### **IMPACT**

It is very difficult to evaluate the impact of this project as it has many complementary and also important other actions financed by other donors. However, from the point of view that most of the activities financed were the key negotiations meetings (principal and technical) as well as preparatory meetings of Ministers and Technical staff involved in the negotiation and that the funding extended from 2004 until almost beginning of 2007, it could be said that the impact in the successful conclusion of the negotiation within the agreed timeframe was significant.

### **EFFECTIVENESS**

The fund was effective in achieving the main purpose of assisting the trade negotiations as the core of the negotiations meetings were financed by this programme, including principal negotiators meeting, technical negotiations meeting, CARIFORUM Ministerial Meetings as well as technical working groups. All this activities were the centre of the EPA negotiations.

### **SUSTAINABILITY**

The purpose of the programme, capacity building for EPA negotiation, was fulfilled. The capacity built, however, is still being utilized for the most part within the region either in the CRNM/OTN itself or in other Units, including a few EPA implementing Units both at regional and national level.

### Case Study 3: Multi-Country Drug Demand Reduction Programme (MCDDRP)

#### Background

The Caribbean Region as a whole had, by the turn of the 21st Century, become a major corridor for drug trafficking to the major metropolitan markets of the USA, Canada and Western Europe. Drug demand reduction had for some time figured high on the priority of EU cooperation following the major contribution of the EU to the Barbados Plan of Action 1996-2001. Trafficking resulted in some illicit substances finding their way into domestic demand and severely impacting the social and economic conditions of the population, particularly affecting young males, thus escalating trends in criminal activity. The Drug demand reduction (DDR) problem had become an economic as well as a political problem in the Caribbean Region. The OECS countries of Grenada, Antigua and Barbuda, St. Vincent and the Grenadines and Dominica were no exception. The DDR problem was diverse in nature and impacted the territories in different ways dependent on the level of development, incidence of poverty, and geographical location. The situation differed between territories. Antigua and Barbuda was a major trans-shipment location. St. Vincent and the Grenadines was a major marijuana producer in the Eastern Caribbean. Some territories set up or strengthened various drug control bodies, commenced programmes of DDR and formulated Master Plans for drug demand reduction. To address the problem, the territories faced several difficulties: little data on which to assess the enormity of the problem, insufficient monitoring and research, inadequate capacity for programme coordination and policy formulation, inadequate public education and the fact that communities were not sufficiently engaged in the fight against crime and illegal drug trafficking.

#### The EU intervention

The MCDDRP had six (6) components through which activities were to be carried out and these activities were programmed in annual approved work plans as hereunder which recognised the identified needs of the participating territories:

**Table 34: Overview of MCDDRP interventions per country**

Countries/Activities Years	Antigua and Barbuda			Dominica			Grenada			St. Vincent and the Grenadines		
	1st	2nd	3rd	1st	2nd	3rd	1st	2nd	3rd	1st	2nd	3rd
Institutional Development	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	-	-	-	-
Training	X	X	-	X	X	X	X	X	-	X	X	-
Research/Surveys	X	X	-	-	-	-	X	X	-	-	-	-
Awareness/education	-	x	X	-	X	X	X	X	X	-	X	X
Treatment & Rehabilitation	-	-		-	-	-	-	X	X	X	X	X
Community Activities	-	-	X	x	x	x	-	x	x	-	X	X
Total EDF (€)	350,000			260,000			280,000			185,000		
<b>GRAND TOTAL:</b>										<b>1,075,000</b>		

The Implementation modality was by Annual Work Programmes, programme estimates and decentralised project management with delegation through the NAOs to Antigua and Barbuda's (A & B) National Drug Information Centre (NDIC), Dominica's National Drug Prevention Unit (NDPU), Grenada's National Council on Drug Control (NCODC) and St. Vincent and the Grenadines' (SVG) and National Drug Abuse Coordination Agency (NDACA) respectively. The EU Delegation in Barbados was to play an important role in ensuring a regular flow of information and collaboration as well as monitoring by the implementing entities twice yearly against Annual Work Programmes. Budgetary allocations were based on the relative sizes of the various territories with the largest allocation going to A & B and the smallest going to SVG. The former, a major tourism destination, the largest of the territories served as a major

transshipment location because of the numerous coves and inlets which made policing of its border difficult. SVG as the major producer and seller of marijuana naturally had special problems in controlling demand and trafficking among the local population given the spread of the islands. The ingrained nature of the trade graded in the four territories posed significant problems of control for local drug control agencies on both the demand and supply fronts and it was not surprising that these territories experienced very poor performance. While Dominica comprised a single landmass, its very mountainous nature provided ample scope for hidden cultivations and use.

### The Response of the Territories

The organisational structure of implementation demonstrated differing levels of commitment to addressing the problem. A & B suffered from problems of management associated with the matrix type organisational structure. The project manager reported to the NAO while the director of the division through which the project was implemented, and who had formal responsibility for drug abuse reduction, felt that that office should have access to project resources at will. This negatively impacted efficient operations and the ability to efficiently deliver planned outputs. In SVG, the Project Secretariat reported to a Senior Management Committee of the Ministry of Health but the project manager operated somewhat independently and the implementing body was really a coordinating agency. The responsibility for the programme in the Ministry of Health was explained by the fact that increasing drug use had been posing a serious health problem and drug abusers were treated at a Mental Health Clinic. This was an undesirable placement as it understated the severity of the drug problem because drug abusers refused to attend the facility for fear of being labelled as insane. In Grenada, the management of the Drug Secretariat under the NCODC was professionally structured and managed within a well-developed policy framework based on a “Drug Prevention and Control Act”. Dominica, like Grenada, was well structured and managed along lines displayed by the latter territory. The different approaches, based on varying priority needs had implications for the level of national commitment and consequently resource allocation to supplement that provided by the EU funding.

The differing foci of the four programmes, indicative of the relative importance of the various components, meant that there would be the need for an effective mechanism to properly coordinate and ensure efficient collaboration in respective areas among the territories. No explicit mechanism existed, only that general coordination fell within the EU Delegation office in Barbados. The fairly successful implementation of the programme of drug demand reduction in **Grenada** provided a platform on which to draw lessons for implementation elsewhere in the Caribbean.

### The Programme in Grenada

Grenada was the most southerly of the OECS Windward Islands with an area of 133 square miles and a population of about 100,000 persons. The island is 21 miles long and 12 miles at its widest point. The



country includes the “large island” of Grenada and a few smaller ones on the southern edge of the Grenadines, with Carriacou and Petit Martinique the most significant. The island is volcanic in nature and is blessed with numerous bays and harbours. Referred to as the “Spice Island” of the Caribbean because of its internationally famous indigenous spices, mace and nutmeg product, Grenada boasts a thriving tourism industry as well.

The programme was implemented under the NCODC, which fell within the legislative framework of the “Drug Prevention and Control Act”. This provided a sustainable regulatory framework for the programme.

Implementation was carried out by a technical Programme Secretariat of committed staff, championed by the head of the Secretariat specially drawn from the Ministry of Education for that purpose. By

implication, this meant that Grenada considered DDR as a long-term strategy with demand reduction as the pivot of this long-term strategy. “*I think that the reason I was chosen to head the Secretariat was because the thrust of the programme was going to be addressed at the most impressionable individuals, namely youths and children, and the education system at large*”, commented the Head of the Secretariat in a most characteristically unassuming manner. The fact that the Act preceded the establishment of the NCODC was also significant. It provided for an orderly development of the overall drug strategy that was to emerge. When the EU funding was approved under the RIP, the Secretariat set about developing the DDR programme based on identified priority needs to effectively utilise the resources left over from EDF8.

### **Programme Development and Implementation**

Project design for the 2003-2006 programme involved a wide cross-section of stakeholders spanning the social sectors (health and education) of government, other government, youths, rehabilitation centres, the police and law enforcement agencies, non-state actors, print and electronic media, consultants, musicians, Drug Council of Jamaica and the EU among others. By the time funding was in place, the Secretariat’s programme was developed. Though the first disbursement was approximately one (1) month late in delivery, October 2003, the Secretariat continued planning to be in a better position to utilise the resources when received. Grenada, from the beginning, focussed on all six (6) components in the first year of programme implementation. These comprised: Institutional Strengthening, Research, Training, Public Awareness/Education, Treatment and Rehabilitation, and Community Activities. The primary objective of the Grenada component was to reduce the use of drugs and problems related to drug use. The intervention was to directly address the following: insufficient institutional capacity in programme coordination and policy formulation, inadequate education and public awareness programmes, insufficient involvement of communities in drug demand reduction efforts and insufficient/inadequate research and monitoring capability. The expected results therefore were therefore: a clear national policy and operational programme coordination enhanced, a strengthened research and monitoring capability, prevention programmes developed at the primary, secondary and tertiary levels and increased public awareness and community involvement.

### **Policy Support**

An important initiative of the Secretariat of the NCODC, in terms of the evolution of the process of addressing DDR, was the elaboration of a *National Anti-Drug Master Plan (2004-2008)*, approved by the Cabinet in July 2004. This was to guarantee the longer-term sustainability of the overall programme. It defines the national policy and priorities and apportioned responsibilities for the entire drug control programme within a logical framework. The Plan covered control of cultivation and manufacturing, suppression of illegal trafficking, reduction of illegal demand, legislative, judicial and regulatory aspects, financial aspects and money laundering. It also set out an operational strategy and implementation plan to effectively address the drug problem.

### **Project Steering Committee (PSC) and Reporting**

This committee comprised 6 persons, including the Drug Control Officer, with responsibility to oversee and validate the overall direction and policy of the programme, receive and review progress reports, technical and financial reports and approve work programmes. The output from the PSC was the basis for reporting to the EU Delegation in Barbados which provided information from other participating territories on programme direction and policy matters and matters of common interest within the framework of the sub-regional initiatives and strategies.

### **Implementation Arrangements**

Operational management of the programme was carried out by a staff of 4 persons, a Drug Control Officer, two officers and a secretary, which acted as the Executive Secretariat of the of the NCODC, which ensured coordination and monitoring. Institutional strengthening of the secretariat involved procurement of a vehicle, photocopier, multimedia equipment, television set and a computer. Research activities focused on an in-depth evaluation of the drug treatment and rehabilitation problem and an examination of the sociological impact of drug use on society. Research findings in both instances served to inform policy formulation. Training involved the development of a cadre of officers capable of designing and implementing drug prevention programmes at all levels. Awareness public education

involved the use of television, production of audio-visual and printed material and radio programmes. These all sought to examine various aspects of the drug problem with a view to informing the public and engaging their support in the fight against illegal drugs. The component relating to treatment and rehabilitation involved training a cadre of specialised workers – medical, law enforcement, guidance and counselling officers – to design and develop programmes in primary, secondary and tertiary prevention. Considerable reliance was placed on Community Activities as the basis of the overall strategy. The pillars of this strategy involved: training a cadre of youth and community leaders in prevention control programmes; establishing and strengthening the working relations with community-based organisations; training pre-school and kinder-garden teachers to teach drug prevention programmes with the use of a manual produced for that purpose; training peer counsellors for all secondary schools to conduct peer counselling programmes and strengthening the implementation of the national drug control programme.

### **Programme Performance and Assessments**

The programme was considered relevant to the needs of Grenada, consistent with the EU focus of assistance and designed to meet the individual focus of respective territories. It was particularly relevant for Grenada given the growing problem of drug use locally and hence the focus on public awareness and community activities. The sub-regional programme design made no provision for a mechanism for coordination and collaboration beyond the liaison role played by the Barbados Delegation. Individual countries were not required to develop actual Logical Frameworks consistent with the very basic one developed for the entire programme and Grenada did not set up a dedicated “Log Frame” for the purpose of guiding programme development and providing a basis for monitoring and evaluation. Grenada’s programme was assessed as well run and efficient, possessing a well developed policy framework based on the “Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act” and a good relationship with the EU Delegation in Barbados. This was achieved notwithstanding the fact after one year of implementation, disaster struck with the impact of Hurricane Ivan (September 7, 2004), which devastated some 80% of the economy of Grenada disrupting activities for over one month. A no cost expansion was approved in October, which allowed implementation of activities affected by the Hurricane. “We never thought we could recover for a long time from this catastrophe but this disaster somehow had an effect of galvanising our people and we did what many thought was impossible; we did not allow ourselves to be daunted even though the facilities housing our activities were destroyed. We simply had meetings and planning activities outdoors” recalled the Programme Manager. Thereafter, “implementation progressed rather successfully, despite many challenges, which arose mainly due to the on-going effects of the Hurricane and subsequent delays in the disbursement of the funds”. A ROM assessment showed that based on experiences drug programmes and awareness efforts, involving the local press in the awareness process and involving community support can bring positive results.

The foundation for effective implementation of the programme was community involvement /activities and education. “Indeed the foundation was established through the implementation of project activities particularly in the areas of training, public awareness, education and community activities” said the Programme Manager. Community engagement, a not simply a focus on equipment and supplies was the basis of successful implementation the programme and the DDRP strengthened the overall drug control programme as outlined in the National Anti-Drug Master Plan, 2004-2008. But how were component activities carried out? The activities were well integrated in the Ministry of Education with support from other ministries notably social welfare, community development and security. For small territories, such as Grenada, a measure of political support, though not over-bearing, is essential to get community buy-in. Improved public awareness and the focus on youths had a positive effect on the programme and were instrumental in the successes achieved by the programme as indicated by Grenada statistics on drug-linked crime, prostitution and HIV. While coordination within Grenada was instrumental in achieving fairly successful results under the NCODC, the local programme could have benefitted from a sub-regional communication mechanism facilitating coordination and collaboration. The implementation of the EU supported drug demand reduction programme had a clear impact on initiatives to reduce demand generally. The impact of training, national coordination and capacity building in reducing drug demand contributed to a reduction of drug related crime and fostered economic activities through alternative livelihoods encouraged as entrepreneurial ventures. This redounded to the benefit of longer term economic growth and development. While EU funding was involved, Grenada demonstrated national ownership through all phases of development from design to execution and closure of the project to ensure sustainability. Design reflected a participatory approach by involved stakeholders. Training and



capacity development ensured the necessary capability to implement the programme using local organisational systems and EDF procedures. Following ending of the programme the function was fully absorbed in the Ministry of Education for purposes of sustainability on skills developed under the programme.

“We did not rely on a lot of hardware and equipment since we believed that attacking the drug control programme from the point of prevention and community involvement were both more effective and long lasting as a means of reducing crime and illicit drug trafficking as social problems. We relied on the resources we had available and in abundance” commented the Programme Manager. The result was that the programme was more sustainable and there was a greater sense of pride and accomplishment as the Secretariat and population at large “owned” the drug control programme.

During the life of the programme, two ROM exercises were undertaken which basically concluded that the programme in Grenada in large measure achieved its objectives despite challenges in the Hurricane (2004), initial difficulties in following EDF financial and procurement procedures and consequent delays in procurement. To date, no final assessment of the programme has been undertaken and no universal lessons consequently drawn from the implementation of the programme in written form as a basis for influencing further development of similar programmes.

Several years after the closure of the programme in Grenada (all programmes ended the same time), the evaluator asked the Programme Manager (PM): “*What do you think has accounted for your relatively successful programme regarding reduction of drug demand as opposed to SVG?*” By this time, the PM had reverted to his substantive job in the Ministry of Education (MOE) where the programme was housed. “*In the 1980s, the problem started in Grenada where local production suffered as a result of certain conditions with the result that marijuana had to be imported from SVG. But in 2004, Hurricane Ivan devastated the remnants of local production. We continue to receive daily information from the police in the MOE, thus making the Unit able to coordinate all aspects of the fight against drugs, treatment and including financial crimes related to illicit trafficking*”. The previous PM critically assessed the coordination aspects of the programme then indicating that though some training, regional workshops were held, coordination was not adequate as specific mechanisms were non-existent beyond a Task Manager’s link in the EU Delegation in Barbados. Workshops were also considered too general though he recounted an excellent one held in the major drug trafficking centre in the Caribbean. He was also not aware of the existence of intelligence sharing among law enforcement agencies and whether this continued. “The entire public awareness programme, using the approach of “behaviour change modification” through “edutainment” underlies the success of the programme”.

About the general implications of the programme for the remainder of the Caribbean the former PM enumerated:

- The existence of a proper legislative and regulatory framework;
- A supportive policy framework of government, supported through medium-term budgetary provisions (hence a Master Plan);
- A well-structured Drug Council to provide oversight and a coordinating framework;
- A technically equipped Secretariat with the requisite skills and commitment;
- A committed and qualified team leader to the Secretariat;
- A programme designed and developed by a wide cross-section of involved stakeholders;
- An effective monitoring and evaluation framework with appropriate feedback mechanisms for policy modification, if necessary;
- Appropriate systems of donor and sector coordination, reflected in a programme approach to efficiently guide resource use, especially where territories were separated by long distances, which reduced information sharing;
- Dedicated systems of coordination and collaboration at both the supply (law enforcement, police, border control, customs etc.) and liaison with DDR entities and communities; and
- Proper systems of programme review and audit.

The PM admitted that though his Secretariat did not have all these systems working at a desirable level, he thought these were the minimum necessary for a fully functioning system.

## Case Study 4: Caribbean Knowledge and Learning Network-projects (CKLN I-II)

### BACKGROUND FOR DELAYS

#### 2002-2004: Genesis

The idea of a Caribbean “Centre of Excellence for Knowledge and Skills Development” (inspired by the World Bank-*Global Development Learning Network*) was first raised by World Bank Director, Mr Wolfensohn, in a speech to the Caribbean heads of state in 2002. In response was held:

- A brainstorming workshop with Caribbean TEIs in 2003;
- A start-workshop in 2004 for what was then named the Caribbean Knowledge and Learning Network; and
- The present CKLN-CEO was recruited, and
- Mr Wolfensohn enquired the EU for possible CKLN-funding.

Fast EU funding was possible below a ceiling of €2M and the CKLN-I budget of €1,999,000 was allocated in 2004.

#### 2005-2010: Delays

The allocation was followed by several years of waiting for the elaboration of first the EU-World Bank Agreement and next the World Bank-CKLN Agreement. In the meanwhile, CARICOM funded the CKLN Secretariat (now 10 staffs), based in Grenada where the prime minister was responsible for the CARICOM education activities.

Mandated by CARICOM to search for further funding for the infrastructure parts of CKLN, the CEO introduced the concept of the “Caribbean digital hole” to the EU inspired by a world mapping of research networks where only the Caribbean region was missing. In response, late 2007 the EU communicated the availability of €10M for the development of infrastructure and a financial proposal was signed in Dec 2007 – to be followed by a similar delay as for CKLN-I. Allegedly, it played a role that Mr Wolfensohn had been replaced by a new World Bank Director without the same enthusiasm for the project.

While the implementation of CKLN-I activities started in 2008, mainly consisting in the provision of hardware for participating TEIs and voluntary staff courses in the use of distance education-related software, continued CKLN-II delays led representatives of the EUD-Barbados and CKLN to travel to Washington in 2010.

#### 2010 and beyond: Renewed activities

As a result of this demarche, the present World Bank CKLN-manager was appointed. He and the CKLN CEO expressed to the evaluation that their cooperation has been excellent since then. May 2011, the World Bank wrote the EUD-Barbados to ascertain their high priority of the CKLN for which the World Bank support-team was strengthened by an educational expert in order to enhance the distance-learning perspective that formed an important part of initial CKLN objectives. The World Bank manager mentioned that the World Bank supports CKLN by a low management fee of 3% instead of the usual 5%. He expected derivative advantages for the CKLN from the World Bank support for another, new and similar project: “*Caribbean regional infrastructure communication programme*” (CARIBCIP)

CKLN-II implementation only started effectively in 2010. The major accomplishments till now have been the elaboration of a business plan and the procurement for the region-covering network infrastructure including one TEI in each country (€6M), further to a time-consuming settlement of the procurement procedures. Furthermore, another tender for enhancing the sustainability of the project was about to be concluded in June 2011.

**Table 35: Overview of CKLN interventions per country**

Country	Equipment Provided	Technical/didactical training for TEI staff	Study tour participation	Institutional training for TEI / MoE	Stage of implementation
Antigua & Barbuda		X (60) +	X	X	Strategic plan
Belize	X		X		Strategic plan
Dominica		X (15)	X	X	Strategic and operational plans
Grenada	X	X		X	Operational courses being developed for residents
Montserrat					Strategic plan
St. Lucia		X		X	n. a.
St. Kitts and Nevis		X	X	X	Strategic plan
St. Vincent and the Grenadines		X	X	X	Strategic plan and draft operational plan
Jamaica <sup>129</sup>		X		X	Strategic plan
The Bahamas				X	Courses operational
Barbados		X		X	Strategic plan
Guyana	X	X			Needs assessment
Trinidad & Tobago		X		X	Strategic plan
Suriname	X			X	n. a.
Haiti					Initial CKLN-visit
Dom. Rep. (n.a.)					

\* Source: CKLN reporting

In addition to a project extension by two years, CKLN has recently asked for a reallocation of €2M for strengthening the ICT-capacity of the participating TEIs and the National Research Networks (NRENS) that are to feed into the regional network, in continuation of the CKLN-I activities.

According to TEI-interviewees, CKLN-I had left some frustration with the TEIs, which had expected more tangible results not least regarding the establishment of electronic students' administration systems. The reallocation has been accompanied by additional staff recruitment that serves to accommodate this wish, the further development of the NRENS and the connection of national statistical databanks into a Caribbean databank. The overall objective of the reallocation is to create substance inputs for the network infrastructure in order to enhance its usefulness and thereby the motivation to pay for being connected to it.

Source: Field phase interviews and documentation research

<sup>129</sup> The University Council of Jamaica (UCJ) was contracted to prepare regional guidelines for Open and Distance Learning. The document entitled Quality Assurance in Distance Education: *Guidelines for Practitioners* is expected to enable distance education to be addressed within the CARICOM supported Regional Framework for Quality Assurance