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EDITORIAL

By Isabelle Ioannides

Tomorrow never dies

“The best way to predict your future is to create it,” Abraham Lincoln wisely said. In today’s complex and fast-moving world, what we need more than hindsight or even foresight is insight. It is in this light that BEPA along with key EU institutions has launched and developed the inter-institutional project European Strategy and Policy Analysis System (ESPAS). Its aims and latest activities are presented in the first article of this issue of the *BEPA Monthly Brief (BMB)*.

This past month ESPAS reached a landmark with the organisation of the project conference on “Developing Strategic Thinking in the EU – Global Trends 2030”. The event sought to help push forward the debate on the challenges and options facing the Union between now and 2030, whilst also promoting a stronger global community of those working on long-term trends. Capitalising on this key event and building on the conclusions and knowledge produced in the ESPAS pilot project, the contractors responsible for preparing reports on three core areas – economy, society and governance and power – present in three subsequent articles of this *BMB* some initial insights

on the future key global trends and drivers and their implications for the EU. Their reports under progress aim to reach beyond conventional thinking and practices and to question underlying assumptions regarding challenges and policy choices likely to confront Europe and the wider world in the decades ahead.

The three articles also constitute an opportunity to consider emerging cross-cutting issues within and across the three themes of ESPAS. The sociological, geopolitical and economic implications of science and technology is an issue that creates synergies across the board. For this reason, the *BMB* features – for the first time – the work carried out by the Chief Scientific Adviser to President Barroso and her team. In their article they call on policy-makers to invest on science and technology, and call on scientists to engage in integrated foresight and strategic thinking, taking into account the holistic consequences of innovation.

Today dies tomorrow – a tomorrow that is never set in stone, but rather has surprises in store and requires decisions to be made. Actively building the future, however, helps make it less unpredictable. By embarking on the ESPAS journey, the EU has planted the seed that will allow us to be *futurewise* and turn tomorrow into a promise rather than a threat.

1 Le projet ESPAS : l'Union européenne met le cap sur 2030

Par Jean-Claude Thébault*

Les lecteurs du *Bepa Monthly Brief*, ceux notamment qui ont lu le numéro paru en octobre dernier, sont déjà familiers du projet ESPAS – European Strategy and Policy Analysis System. La singularité unique de ce projet, les développements récents qu'il a connus et le potentiel dont il est porteur méritent toutefois que l'on y revienne.

ESPAS est en effet un projet singulier et unique, tant par sa configuration que par les objectifs ambitieux qu'il s'assigne. Pour la première fois, les principales institutions de l'Union européenne – le Parlement, le Conseil, la Commission et le Service européen d'action extérieure (SEAE) – se sont associées pour travailler ensemble à la définition, au développement et à la mise en œuvre d'une capacité d'analyse stratégique des tendances globales au niveau européen ; pour la première fois, l'Union dans son ensemble – mais dans une perspective globale et non eurocentrique – cherche à anticiper sur le monde de demain, à en proposer sa propre vision et à élaborer les politiques qui y seront adaptées.

La conférence qui a eu lieu à Bruxelles les 18 et 19 février 2013 a été à cet égard un temps fort et une source d'encouragement. Organisée à un moment décisif du processus ESPAS, alors que les trois groupes de travail du projet viennent de commencer leurs travaux en collaboration avec les consultants extérieurs retenus, elle a permis de renforcer le dialogue fructueux engagé avec nos partenaires stratégiques du monde entier, en vue de mieux comprendre comment chacun, dans sa zone de pensée et d'influence, appréhende les grandes tendances du monde à venir, mais aussi d'envisager avec eux les moyens d'établir une communauté de réflexion de dimension mondiale.

Le BEPA se réjouit d'avoir pu contribuer, avec ses partenaires institutionnels, à l'animation et à l'enrichissement de ce projet, qui vise au développement d'une meilleure compréhension

mutuelle de nos défis communs, mais aussi à prendre la mesure du degré de concordance de nos réponses face à ces défis, sachant que notre interdépendance n'ira qu'en s'accroissant et nous confrontera tôt ou tard à la question centrale de la convergence de nos modèles de gouvernance à l'échelle globale.

La conférence de ce mois de février n'était cependant qu'un élément d'un processus qui sera actif tout au long des prochains mois. Tout d'abord, la mise en ligne d'un site web ESPAS va permettre de proposer le libre accès à un outil de travail et d'échange privilégié pour tous ceux qui s'impliquent dans la réflexion sur les tendances de long terme à travers le monde et qui souhaitent travailler toujours mieux en réseau. Ensuite, en septembre 2013, les groupes de travail interinstitutionnels rendront leurs conclusions, avant l'établissement d'un rapport définitif début 2014, dont les enseignements et les recommandations serviront à nourrir la réflexion des dirigeants actuels et à venir de l'Union européenne, pour les quinze ans à venir.

ESPAS est bien un projet politique : il ne vise pas à s'inscrire dans une pensée purement théorique ou universitaire, mais cherche à développer un savoir fondé sur un cadre d'analyse propre à susciter des conseils stratégiques ou opérationnels, tout au long du processus d'élaboration de la décision politique. Comme l'a d'ailleurs souligné le Président Barroso dans son discours d'ouverture de la conférence évoquée ci-dessus : "La question clé de notre futur, ce n'est pas tant les évolutions qui s'annoncent, que notre capacité politique à les mettre en forme."

C'est à cette exigence que répond le projet ESPAS, non sans une certaine ambition, non sans le sentiment d'une certaine urgence : le futur, c'est demain, et 2030 se construit dès aujourd'hui!

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2 Trends and drivers leading Europe into 2030

By *Cinzia Alcidi** and *Andrea Ricci***

The world economic order is in a period of transition. The shift in economic power from the traditional centres of Europe and the US towards Asia, which has been ongoing for the last two decades, is likely to continue in the coming twenty years. Emerging and developing nations will come to challenge Western hegemony and play a more important role than they currently do on the grounds of their escalating economic development. Overall, there is widespread agreement that we will tend toward a more multipolar world and a less multilateral system where power will shift away from the US and the EU, become more disperse and where bilateral negotiations will prevail over a multilateral approach.

As the high economic growth rate of emerging economies, in addition to fuelling the world economic development, will be the single most important driver reshaping international relations and world politics, the current socio-economic paradigm is coming under increasingly critical scrutiny. In this context, one can wonder to what extent the major economic powers of the past fifty years – the US, Europe and Japan – will be capable of reformulating their growth model in a sustainable direction, and of building new competitive advantages.

The magnitude and the speed of this shift in global economic outcomes are uncertain, however, as are the policy options they entail. This calls for a deeper understanding of the likely courses of world development over the coming two decades, allowing for the adoption of a strategic perspective about the role of the EU.

First, as the living standards of large segments of the population of the developing world converge with that of the citizens of the developed world in a context of limited resources, sustainability will emerge as a central issue. The conjunction of an ‘age of convergence’ with the onset of an ‘age

of scarcity’ will take interdependence to a new level. Striking an acceptable – legitimate and effective – burden-sharing balance will be a critical challenge. A second and twofold key issue relates to how to rebalance international politics and economics to make room for rising powers, while protecting the commons and halting climate change. The risk is that global limits to growth may entail a revision of priorities related to climate change and resource use, but also water down bold initiatives in other fields such as financial regulation. In this respect, the financial turmoil in the euro area and the subsequent debt and economic crises, have casted doubts on the European integration process and growth prospects.

In this new and rather hostile environment, the scope of influence of the European Union might dramatically decrease together with the share of its contribution to the world production, which might be crucially affected by challenges posed by demographics, external resource dependency and very low growth in productivity.

The brightest light is expected to come from technology, which will progress at high speed and breakthroughs in the cognitive function of IT machines. The development of other specific technologies is also likely to be afoot of large advances in many sectors helping to solve significant problems. Yet Europe and advanced economies in general, will be confronted with the major challenge of maintaining their role of technological centre vis-à-vis the increasing competition of emerging powers. At the same time, changes spurred by technological and social innovation will deliver new forms of organisation of labour and of enterprises. While a new equilibrium will be achieved in the long term, over the short run, such changes in the production structure may entail costs in terms of adaptation and job losses. It is there that policy-makers will have to show their talent.

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3 The value of uncertainty: assessing global societal trends

By *Stijn Hoorens**

The desire to predict what the future holds is not a new phenomenon: it characterises most of humanity's efforts to cope with uncertainty. When planning for the future, we should understand that the capacity to *predict* the future is rather limited and poor. Rather, an ability to *anticipate* plausible trends and their potential consequences is more realistic. In this context, RAND Europe is contributing to the inter-institutional project ESPAS by analysing global societal trends until 2030 and by drawing their implications for the EU. It focuses on: inequalities and the global middle class; the spread of information and access to education; the empowerment of individuals; changing demography; mobility and migration; and work and employment. A review of the existing literature appears to be pointing to some important emerging issues.

Several forecasts report on a rise of the global middle class. The OECD estimates that between now and 2030 the size of the middle income groups will have almost tripled globally. However, the models producing these estimates are by their own admission deterministic and devoid of policy context. They fail to account for a number of plausible scenarios, including protectionist policies, geopolitical strife and the recurrence of financial crises. Of Africa's burgeoning middle class, for example, 60% remain barely out of poverty. Assuming that this group will stabilise or expand is speculative and hence risky.

Demography, on the other hand, is like a freight train. Once underway, it is difficult to alter its direction. Projections of an ageing Europe are sensitive to assumptions about future fertility, migration and future life expectancy. But until 2030 Europe's population structure will be primarily driven by the bulge of baby boomers entering retirement. Given the wealth of evidence, and the limited impact of uncertainties, there is little doubt that Europe's labour force will be smaller and its population older, on average.

Migration is often viewed as a potential strategy for relaxing the pressures of a shrinking work force. But the future of migration is subject to

intense debate. Immigration policies in member states are almost as volatile as their election results, impacting legal but also illegal migration. And the future attractiveness of Europe for migrants is as uncertain as its economic prospects. In fact, Europe may end up competing for migrants with emerging economies, and potentially even transforming traditional 'host countries' into emigrant countries.

The socio-economic impacts of the Internet revolution and global access to (mobile) ICTs have been well documented. They have also spurred optimistic predictions on the future empowerment of citizens, which by some has been linked to a rising global middle class, partly due to improved access to education and the role of social media in democratisation.

It remains to be seen whether this increased availability of information equals better-informed and more empowered citizens. While college enrolment has increased consistently, there is little evidence regarding the actual impact on the overall quality of education.

Similarly, while it has become much easier for individuals to participate in the political process, it remains to be seen whether this leads to greater democratic engagement or one that only an organised few take advantage of. Many predictions have been based on anecdotal evidence in the popular media of the role of social media in the Arab Spring or the Obama election campaigns.

These examples illustrate the importance to consider the causal mechanisms underpinning forecasts of global societal trends and to challenge their assumptions. Rather than to lull decision-makers into a false sense of security, strategic analysis should aim to make governments more flexible and resilient to unexpected change. Hence, evidence of uncertainty will be equally valuable. As Nobel laureate Niels Bohr famously stated: "Prediction is very difficult, especially if it's about the future." This is not only true for interpreting lab results, but also for forecasting global societal trends.

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4 Empowering Europe's future

By *Giovanni Grevi** and *Bernice Lee***

As Robert Graves wrote, the future is no longer what it used to be. Yet, there is nothing inevitable about what is to come. Major trends (e.g. power redistribution, ageing societies, environmental degradation) can create self-fulfilling patterns and mind sets, especially once they acquire critical mass. But choices made today will shape future responses. Thus rigorous analysis of emerging trends, whose interaction will create constraints and opportunities for the future of the EU, is a must.

The “Empowering Europe’s Future” project, launched in the context of ESPAS, seeks to add value by mapping relevant data and shedding light on an increasingly uncertain and interdependent world. For actors capable of adjusting their paradigms to a changing context, the world becomes an arena for purposeful action, not just a source of unforeseen challenges. There will always be surprises, but resilience can be enhanced against the unravelling future.

Looking ahead, the EU strategic landscape features ongoing turbulence in the neighbourhood, where state fragility meets political mobilisation – in the streets and the virtual space. Managing the crisis of state power in the vicinity of Europe or beyond will be vital for both local actors and the Union, as an important but modest partner. Challenges to established institutions bring also prospects for renewal and opportunities to build domestic and international legitimacy on a broader base of participation.

Yet, questions await on the global scale. Have the rising powers reached the peak of their growth performance? Might the EU economy rebound, following the apparent upturn in the US? Will actors in the ‘emerged’ world turn more introverted, and the EU more confident? Innovation could be a major game-changer for all, especially the developing world where access to quality education remains challenging.

The geostrategic environment of the next two decades will likely remain riddled with tensions. The question is which small sparks will ignite a larger fire, and what could be the triggers. While

no large global or regional power has professed interests in conflict, military spending outside the West is set to grow rapidly. Small-scale incidents could have grave unintended consequences in critical theatres. This calls for strong preventive diplomacy from the Gulf to the South China Sea.

Resource security can trigger increasing tensions in the coming years. The general contention is that the world has entered a period of resource stress – with the potential for high and volatile prices, accelerated environmental degradation, disrupted supplies, and intensified political tensions over control and access to resources. Countries today face enormous challenges in managing the transition to sustainable ‘resource’ equilibrium under extreme stress conditions while keeping the lights on, and putting food on the table.

Investment and technology may bring temporary solutions to problems of resource availability and access. Yet, the scope and size of these challenges may overwhelm the ability of individual states and markets to adapt. The confluence of factors – demographic shifts, environmental pressures, rapidly changing global economy – may sharpen resource politics. The logic of zero-sum competition rather than cooperation and shared interest may continue to erode trust in already dysfunctional multilateral processes.

The anticipated energy independence of North America by 2030 offers some actors assurances of physical access to energy. For the US, the trend is for diminishing oil imports and growing gas surpluses, while emerging economies like China and India will become more dependent on oil imports from volatile regions. These developments will reshape global energy geopolitics and the future global climate change agenda.

Resource security is one of many challenges illustrating the broader gap between domestically-driven foreign policy priorities and the need for new forms of engagement to sustain a fragile globalisation. The ability of the EU to fill this gap could determine the extent of its future international influence.

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5 The art of integrated foresight

By *Anne Glover** and *Didier Schmitt***

Foresight is coming of age. It is used widely in international organisations, at EU level, in the member states, in academia and in the private sector. It is applied at global, regional, national and even local level. Depending on the stakeholder's interests, forward looking and foresight studies focus on scientific, technological, sociological, geopolitical or economic aspects. In addition, the timeframes of the studies are often different as is their geographical scope. Therefore, a comprehensive analysis that integrates all these aspects is frequently not addressed. This means that the big picture is recurrently missing; yet such a view from the top is essential for taking the most appropriate policy measures that can have long lasting effects.

As an example, related foresight studies on energy may take into account global climate change predictions but do not always consider local environmental issues. Decisions on public or private energy policies can also impact on quantitative water resources – because of biofuel-crop irrigation or shale gas extraction – or have qualitative consequences by polluting water tables. In turn energy issues can also impact on biodiversity, food security and health. Health can also be affected by energy policies, since the combustion of some fuels can lead to significant air pollution, and in turn, urban planning and transport can either exacerbate or alleviate these impacts.

Because of this entanglement, foresight must be regarded as a puzzle in which any societal aspect can be central, depending on the chosen perspective. A challenging open question is whether we could have foreseen some of the negative consequences of first generation biofuels had we used a more integrated foresight methodology.

Science4foresight

Funding science is investing in the future. When we talk about the International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor ITER one often hears that the reward will materialise only in 30-40 years from now. This however is wrong. It is the pathway towards the goal that will generate most of the innovations – and certainly some of them unexpected, as was the case with CERN (European Organisation for Nuclear Research) and the World Wide Web. Science and technology is often most productive and innovative at the interface of disciplines. Our challenge is to keep looking in every direction and to identify opportunities from the most unexpected source.

Science and technology then are *de facto* a common factor in foresighting. Not only will science have an impact on society (think of the consequences of the web and smartphones), but society will also impact on science, as indeed the attitude towards genetically modified organisms or nanotechnologies has demonstrated. “Science for policy” needs forward-looking approaches and foresight, because it is a good way to prepare minds for the challenges and changes ahead.

We also need to put risk and potential rewards in perspective when thinking about new technologies. Certainly we need risk assessments but even more so, we need reward assessments, something that is missing from the political debate. Foresight must also take into account this of risk/reward aspect.

Taking as an example intelligent mobility, it may well be that we should consider not owning a car anymore. If we take into account the social distress caused by road congestion and the technology advancement in automation and environment-friendly energy, new paradigm shifts will appear in the next two decades. Indeed, a flexible mobility service that can get

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us from one point to another in the most efficient and cost-effective way, while also caring for the environment and making mobility possible for all ages, could become a reality. The risk of such a change is losing our own control over machines (we will not drive ourselves), autonomy (we will depend on the availability of a service) and even some privacy. The reward may be that we generate more time for ourselves and rediscover increased social interaction.

There are also risks of inaction. Citizens may criticise policy-makers and scientists for not having spoken out on the price for society of the current transport situation in terms of health, environment impact and unnecessary time lost. Even now, the effects of private transport have substantial consequences. For example, in France, it is estimated that 20 billion man-hours are spent in transport every year and 5 billion euro are spent on pollution-induced diseases. The rewards and risks arising from a change in technologies and the habit of not being a car owner should be explained ahead of time. This is particularly important considering that studies have demonstrated that 92% of the time most cars are parked, and therefore not used.

Foresight4science

Strategic thinking is not only an attribute of foresight; it is also needed in science, technology and innovation. We are indeed faced with significant paradigm shifts such as the need to share global information on the research side (e.g. on climate change), while simultaneously becoming global competitors in a global market (green technologies). Science and technology need to take more into account the socio-economic aspects so as to be able to translate knowledge into innovation that can be taken up effectively by users. Interdisciplinary and innovation-oriented research benefit from having clear goals that must make sense for society; hence, the importance of social science, humanity and ethics.

The challenges ahead are immense. Think about the future of disease prevention and health care. Bioinformatics, which combines high

performance computing and biology, is now becoming the backbone of health research and the biosciences industry. For example, correlating individual genomes with certain diseases and with environmental data will provide a more efficient and personalised healthcare approach for an ageing population. We must look for a better link between the society of today and the science of tomorrow in order to integrate them into a coherent view, to deliver the best future possible for our citizens.

Communicate, communicate, communicate

Scientists must communicate much more proactively and effectively with society. They must also show empathy for public concerns and help find solutions. Rather than claiming to have the 'ultimate truth', scientists should offer options from which policy-makers can choose. In addition, foresight must be communicated not only to decision-makers but also to the general public. This approach will prepare for societal debates on new technologies and prepare the minds for future policy orientations. Moreover, it will also create the environment in which innovation can happen because its consequences (risks and rewards) will be better understood and accepted. Above all, innovation needs to be triggered by setting objectives: this is what foresight should aim for.

In this respect, it is important that foresight opens up also to industry and SMEs so that these stakeholders can see the big picture and possible pathways. It will provide them with long-term vision that will help orient their research and development strategies accordingly.

The European Strategy and Policy analysis System (ESPAS) project is certainly meant to help invent the future. It is a particularly challenging project not only because forward looking is a difficult exercise, but also because ESPAS is one of the very few activities that unite the European Commission, the European Parliament, the Council of the EU and the European External Action Service. This kind of collaboration should be encouraged. ESPAS is certainly showing the way forward.

4 Think Tank Twitter

Think Tank Twitter (TTT) aims to provide regular information and updates on what is produced by think tanks and research centres across Europe (and beyond) on EU policy issues. As an analogy to the original Twitter, each summary – or tweet – does not exceed 140 words, rather than characters. Those who wish to signal new publications for possible inclusion can send them to the email address bepa-think-tank-twitter@ec.europa.eu

A Case for Adjusting Fiscal Consolidation in the Eurozone

The author contends that while fiscal consolidation is essential to ensure the sustainability of eurozone countries' public debt, consolidation should be flexible and take into account downward revisions of growth. To preserve growth, both the pace and the quality of fiscal consolidation matters. The Commission should adapt flexible deadlines for fiscal correction to prevent excessive, pro-cyclical adjustments and on a case-by-case basis, grant delays if needed to ensure that countries create realistic targets. Adjusting the pace of consolidation should in turn be linked with closer scrutiny of the quality of corrections. Structural issues owing to lack of competitiveness or the cost of an ageing population must be addressed. Most importantly, since no fiscal indicator can perfectly capture the structural effort, further strengthening of policy coordination and surveillance is essential.

<http://www.egmontinstitute.be/papers/13/eur/EPB14.pdf>

European Foreign Policy Scorecard 2013

The study found that the euro crisis has continued to erode Europe's image, soft power and capacity to pursue its interest on the world stage. Some countries (e.g. Spain, Greece and Italy) are more affected than others, resulting in a limiting of their resources to areas of specific national interests rather than broader multilateral ones. Findings also showed that the foreign policy gap between Brussels and EU member states hinders joint approaches on issues like China. Moreover, despite the UK's apparent disengagement from Europe, it remains a committed European on foreign policy and a potent member of the "big three" driving the CFSP. Finally, the report maintains that the Franco-German partnership tends to falter in foreign policy issues and that Europe instead relies on broad coalitions of states that rarely involve both.

http://www.ecfr.eu/page/-/ECFR73_SCORECARD_2013_AW.pdf

The Importance of Trade and Capital Imbalances in the European Debt Crisis

This paper argues that intra-European payment imbalances are crucial for the survival of the EMU and that payment imbalances between the North and South have contributed to the accumulation of a large stock of foreign debt. The dynamic interplay between account imbalances and accumulation of foreign debt reveals that, once the system is driven into disequilibrium, the payment imbalance persists longer and the eventual adjustment is harder. Replacing private with public creditors can temporarily prevent the system from breaking down. However, this is only a temporary solution because the underlying imbalances will need increasing financing until equilibrium is restored by other means. A permanent solution is the ECB's outright monetary transactions programme, if the extension of the central bank's balance sheet can be tolerated.

<http://www.iie.com/publications/wp/wp13-1.pdf>

The End of the Journey

The author claims that for all the talk about the imminent demise of the EU, its member states have continued to show the same capacity for adaptation as Europe has displayed over time. Scepticism about the EU should not be put in the way of the Euro-Atlantic relationship. Now, in these pivotal times, it is neither the time to end the West as a defence and political community nor the time to walk away from Europe as an ever closer and larger union. August 2014, the 100th anniversary of WWI, coming a few months after the 65th anniversary year of the Washington Treaty, offers a historic opportunity to reassert this commitment. It will gain further credibility if it can rely on a Euro-Atlantic global strategy for the shared priorities of the entire Euro-Atlantic area.

http://www.gmfus.org/wp-content/blogs.dir/1/files/mf/1359578631Serfaty_EndofJourney_Jan13.pdf

The Agreement on the European Budget 2014/2020: The end of the (slight) suspense over the budget?

Several lessons can be learned from the latest European budget agreements, such as the growing role of the Presidency of the European Council as an independent player and the victory of member states' individual aspirations over the whole as a result of the economic crisis. Also, although the idea of compromise forms the core of European integration, the influence of the main gross contributors over the main net contributors was decisive. The budgetary negotiations may leave many who thought it would provide an opportunity for innovation disappointed, but the author explains that although the CAP was not renegotiated and the chapters barely changed, spending in research and competitiveness did slightly increase and by 2020 CAP will represent only one third of the European budget.

http://www.robert-schuman.eu/doc/questions_europe/ge-266-en.pdf

La Geopolítica del Pensamiento: Think Tanks y Política Exterior [The Geopolitics of Thought: Think tanks and foreign policy]

This report concludes that Europe is the second, behind the US, most populated with think tanks region in the world. Think tanks in Scandinavian countries stand out for their commitment to development and peace, while those in Latin America are focused on economic and social issues. The quantitative weight of Singapore (200%), obtained from the ratio of the number of think tanks in the country (6) to the number of citations (12), as cited in the 2011 *Global Go to Think Tank Report*, demonstrates the potential of this small country. In Europe, the five countries with the best quantitative weight are Poland, Germany, the UK, Sweden and Spain. On the other hand, Italy, France and The Netherlands are rated worse than expected.

http://www.cidob.org/es/publicaciones/monografias/monografias/la_geopolitica_del_pensamiento_think_tanks_y_politica_exterior

Strategic priorities for EU defence policy

This policy brief argues that if the EU is to have an effective foreign policy in the future, it will need a clear sense of its strategic priorities, and what it is prepared to do through its Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). The combination of a more turbulent neighbourhood, the US re-balance toward Asia, the shift in global military power and their own deep defence budget cuts should encourage EU governments to cooperate more closely on defence matters. However, assessing how global military power is changing, and how that may impact upon European external interests deserves much more attention from EU governments. In future, alongside a geographic focus on Europe's broad neighbourhood and helping to tackle some key threats to European security, CSDP should contribute to protecting vital European interests as well as projecting European values.

<http://www.fride.org/publication/1100/strategic-priorities-for-eu-defence-policy>

European Union Development Cooperation in a Changing Global Context

The paper aims to analyse EU experiences and political initiatives appropriate to tackle the challenges of the changing conditions of development cooperation. In reviewing the experiences within three policy areas – division of labour and complementarity, policy coherence for development, and comprehensive partnerships – and their appropriateness to deal with the challenges posed, the paper suggests that the EU should synchronise programming cycles to increase aid effectiveness. EU efforts on policy coherence in development would benefit from being narrowed to fewer thematic areas, with increased focus on institutional coherence between policy areas and instruments. If properly pursued and negotiated, comprehensive partnerships could form the basis of an approach to development cooperation. To accomplish this, the EU needs to develop a more realistic self-perception of its role in these partnerships.

<http://www.diis.dk/sw126398.asp>

6 BEPA News

BEPA Arrivals and Departures

Sarah Dubrulle left the BEPA Conferences Team on 1 February to join the Council of the EU. Our blue book stagiaires, Adriana Padilla-Albaladejo and Sarah Reinheimer, completed their traineeship period on 28 February. We wish them all the best.

BEPA welcomes Mihaela Moldovan, who joins the Coordination Unit from DG SCIC, and Katarzyna Dudzinska, a new secretary in the Chief Scientific Adviser's team.

Events

On 19-20 February, the European Group on Ethics (EGE) met to begin work on a new Opinion on the ethics of security and surveillance.

On 18 February, the three ESPAS Working Groups met with the contractors to analyse the first results emerging from their research on the three themes: economy, society and governance and power.

On 18-19 February, BEPA hosted the annual ESPAS conference titled "Developing Strategic Thinking in the EU – Global Trends 2030". President Barroso gave the opening speech. Internationally renowned speakers and experts from think tanks, academia, government and the EU institutions presented and discussed global trends and the development of the ESPAS project. Other topics included the prospects for the emergence of a global trends community, the challenge of prosperity, the empowerment of the individual and the future of international governance and power.

On 27 February, the newly established European Commission President's Science and Technology Advisory Council (PSTAC) convened for the first time to discuss how the Council will work, practicalities, lists of points to be presented to President Barroso and deliverables. PSTAC is an independent group of science and technology experts from academia, business and civil society, who work on a broad range of disciplines. It aims to provide foresight and recommendations to explore opportunities and make informed judgments based on evidence and advice provided. It is composed of 16 members and is chaired by Professor Anne Glover, Chief Scientific Adviser to President Barroso.

BEPA in partnership with Carnegie Europe hosted on 28 February the 4th EU-Russia Forum. Distinguished speakers included EEAS Executive Secretary General Pierre Vimont and former US Ambassador to Germany John Kornblum. Fifty participants from Russia, EU officials, member state representatives, and think tankers discussed the next stage of Russia's political and economic transformation, EU-Russia trade, energy, regional cooperation and geopolitical competition.

An ad hoc Cultural Committee met on 28 February for the first time to discuss how to implement the pilot project "New Narrative on Europe". Invited by President Barroso, politicians, intellectuals, artists, philosophers, academia, business, sports, and the media exchanged on how to reconnect citizens with Europe, revive the European spirit, strengthen EU democratic legitimacy, and create a European identity and vision that reflects its cultural values and unity. The project was originally launched as an EP initiative and Vice-President Reding and Commissioner Vassilou are also closely associated to it. From these discussions, a manifesto will be presented in January 2014.

Upcoming events

On 5 March, BEPA will host the workshop "Raising European Commission Awareness for Systemic Risks and Global Resilience." Chief Scientific Adviser to President Barroso, Professor Anne Glover will chair the event. Participants will include heads of Cabinet, Director-Generals, major business conglomerates and international NGO representatives. The event aims to raise awareness and preparedness if a disruption of the global socioeconomic system occurs. Topics to be discussed include possible scenarios, emergency response considerations, and possible next steps.

The EGE will hold its next monthly meeting on 19-20 March to continue its work on the Opinion on the ethics of security and surveillance.

On 21 March, the Inter-Service Group – created to facilitate better information exchange between Commission services working on ethics – will meet to discuss the recently adopted Opinion No. 27 on an ethical framework for accessing research, production and the use of energy.