

April 2011 – Issue 46

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## CONTENTS

Arab springs, European strings	1
Let us roll up our sleeves to shape a new Mediterranean	3
Répondre à l'urgence politique méditerranéenne	4
Are the Arab Revolutions the last nail in the UM coffin?	5
Arab spring, European split?	6
Think Tank Twitter	7
BEPA News	9

### EDITORIAL

By *Antonio Missiroli*

## Arab springs, European strings

Over the past four months the sequence and the combination of popular demonstrations across the Southern Mediterranean and the wider Middle East region have been described as: uprising, revolt, revolution, rebellion, awakening. Such a semantic breadth shows how difficult it still is to characterize the events that have been unfolding ever since last December.

The latest linguistic consensus is on “Arab spring”, a definition that conveys a sense of cultural geography, a feeling of seasonal renewal and the impression that a long winter of stagnation is gone for good.

There have indeed been several common features among the various “springs” that have shaken the Arab world over the past 20 weeks, starting with the domino effect rooted in comparable economic and political discontent across the region and spread by old and new media (from Al Jazeera to Google, Facebook and Twitter).

Similar socio-demographic features – with an overwhelmingly young, relatively well-educated but also dramatically under-employed population – went hand in hand with various autocratic political structures in which ageing (and often ailing) leaders presided over massively corrupt and repressive regimes. The triggering factors may have been contingent and country-specific (a spike in food prices, one tax too many) but the underlying causes were well discernible all across the region.

It used to be customary for Middle East pundits to wonder what “the Arab street” thought and talked about, as a sort of whispering crowd whose moods and opinions constituted a side show to the main drama on stage. Now we do have a clearer idea of what the Arab streets – and especially squares – may think. But what they may get in the end, both individually and collectively, is much less clear.

### From the scent of jasmine to the stench of oil?

To date, in fact, we have already witnessed at least three distinct lines of development on the ground:

- relatively soft “regime change”, culminated with the departure/resignation of the incumbent autocrat and the onset of a

democratic transition partly led by members of the previous elites (the “jasmine” revolution in Tunisia and the current situation in Egypt);

- reforms and concessions from above, meant as a pre-emptive measure or as a first response to brewing discontent, with the ruling “royal” family remaining in charge or basically unchallenged (Morocco, Jordan, in part also Saudi Arabia);
- the ugly ones, namely those situations in which massive violence has been used against demonstrators to fend off substantial reforms or “regime change”: while Libya is the most conspicuous case in point, Bahrain, Yemen and now Syria also fall into this category.

Each situation has been influenced by a number of variables: fragility/solidity of the State, ethnic/tribal and religious cleavages, availability of key resources, strategic location, exposure to foreign influence and the media. Furthermore, some situations may still take a nicer direction (Yemen) while others may turn nastier or remain difficult to read (Algeria, the dog that did not bark).

So, in fact, neither have we seen a linear negative trend since Ben Ali fled Tunisia, nor have we to expect an unstoppable democratization process throughout the Arab world. 2011 is definitely not 1989. But neither is it 1979, with an immensely popular revolution in Tehran crushed by the subsequent involution of the Islamic regime.

In the age of climate change, predicting the next seasons is nearly impossible. Yet Arab politics will definitely no longer be just a choice between authoritarian and corrupt rulers, on the one hand, and radical and violent Islamists, on the other. In turn, Western policy needs no longer be just a choice of the lesser evil – but neither should it become a race to pick winners.

### From surprise to reappraisal

The initial reaction of the “West” to the Arab springs was one of embarrassment and surprise. The embarrassment was due to the longtime support given – albeit to different degrees of intensity and visibility – to the autocratic rulers contested in the Arab streets and squares.

The surprise was largely due to the same cause. The Arab springs were broadly predictable, or at least imaginable, had someone connected all the dots properly: the basic information was there, and so were the symptoms. Yet this second “strategic surprise” in a decade had its roots in the *filtres cognitifs* that Western diplomatic and intelligence communities applied to the region, as Bruno Tertrais pointed out in “Le Monde” a few weeks ago. We did not see it coming because the *status quo* – however precarious – broadly suited existing policy priorities, and nobody felt like (or dared) rocking the boat.

Ever since, both Americans and Europeans have tried to regroup and catch up. Different “springs”, in fact, have required pulling different “strings” in order to prevent or contain violence and help channel events towards acceptable outcomes. At the same time, it is difficult to deal with each situation separately: spill-over effects are evident, and so is the risk of adopting double standards.

European governments have also been confronted with the specific challenges represented by different internal attitudes towards the region as well as uneven national exposure to migrants.

For its part, the EU has started reviewing its previous policies towards the Southern “neighbourhood” by emphasizing, in particular, the need to engage with civil societies; to offer better tailored and more relevant incentives and rewards to each neighbour (the “more for more” approach); and to reconsider the way in which “conditionality” – a notion inextricably linked to the EU accession process, now likely to be rebranded as “mutual accountability” – is to be applied to countries that are never to become part of (or just like) “us”.

The Commission released a first Communication to this end – jointly with the EEAS – in early March. A second one on the ENP proper is scheduled for May. This issue of BEPA Monthly Brief aims to provide additional food for thought, in the awareness that this is very much policy (and especially history) in the making.

# 1 Let us roll up our sleeves to shape a new Mediterranean

By Rosa Balfour\*

The EU must demonstrate it is a serious player by contributing to a new environment in the Mediterranean and fostering pluralism and human rights in North Africa and the Middle East. Any new strategy to this end must combine a long-term vision of the Euro-Mediterranean space with short- and medium-term policies that help the uprisings become irreversible.

In March a joint Commission-EEAS Communication illustrated a first step in rebranding the “more for more” concept: those countries which carry out free and fair elections will receive more of what Catherine Ashton called the three “Ms”: Money, Market access, Mobility. The ideas, incentives and approach are not new: the key is the “more”. Conditionality will indeed need to be refined in order to take into account the changing situation and reward those countries committed to building more representative political systems.

Still, there are problems. The entry benchmark for this new “partnership” is high. Tunisia and Egypt have never experienced free and fair elections and have chosen to vote soon for their parliaments (in July and September, respectively). The timing for the elections is still a disputed matter in Egypt, as it gives little time for the new parties to consolidate. Free and fair elections would require profound reforms of the media and new laws on political association and expression, electoral constituencies, supervision and conduct of polls – a process unlikely to be consolidated before the vote. And the new parliaments will have the crucial task of redrafting the countries’ constitutions, including those laws and rules that would notably enable free and fair elections.

Moreover, the trouble with the incentives lies in their delivery. The EU has been protective of its markets, has committed next to nothing in terms of resources (despite the calls for a “Marshall Plan”), and has been asking Tunis to block a few thousand irregular migrants when the region is managing hundreds of thousands displaced persons. The Communication is littered with appeals to the Member States to replenish near-empty funds and to allow international financial

institutions increase their spending and lending for these countries.

In other words, political honesty would require that the three “Ms” were accompanied by as many “IFs”: *if* the Member States were more generous; *if* they were less concerned with these limited migratory flows; and *if* they were prepared to extend the freedom of movement of goods towards some countries in the South Mediterranean.

## The short and the long term

Even if the EU were able to deliver on the promised incentives, however, its approach remains long-term. What has been entirely absent since Tunisians and Egyptians overthrew their rulers is short-term policies that could underpin the management of the crises at their height (as today’s response to Syria shows) and drive our engagement once the provisional governments settle in.

The EU has tools that can be of use in North Africa, such as technical assistance to prepare for the elections, capacity building in sub-state institutions and civil society, and experience with reforming police and the military. The forthcoming ENP review will put more emphasis on supporting civil society – a welcome development given that changes in the whole EU neighbourhood have resulted from social mobilisation. EU budgetary lines need to become more flexible to be able to deploy such tools at short notice. And short-term financial support to help the provisional governments assuage the consequences of the economic downturn of the past months would be further proof of our commitment.

Most importantly, a political vision should underpin all this. And it can only be developed by improving knowledge of the dynamics of change in North Africa by strengthening the EU Delegations there; fostering coordination between Member States; connecting with local political actors; and engaging on step-by-step priorities to make sure that the uprisings pave the way to a new Mediterranean.

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## 2 Répondre à l'urgence politique méditerranéenne

Par *Dorothee Schmid\**

Après des années de stagnation de la coopération euro-méditerranéenne, les révoltes arabes nous rappellent brutalement à la réalité politique de la région. Si le déclencheur immédiat du mouvement est plutôt à identifier du côté des inégalités économiques et sociales (avec comme point de départ symbolique l'immolation du jeune Bouazizi en Tunisie), le but des manifestants est bien en effet désormais de faire sauter le verrou politique qui bloque le changement depuis tant d'années dans les pays du périmètre arabe méditerranéen.

L'urgence politique méditerranéenne, enfin exposée dans toute sa clarté, n'est pas une surprise. L'aléa politique hante en effet depuis l'origine la politique méditerranéenne de l'Union, sous ses formes successives du Partenariat euro-méditerranéen, de la Politique de Voisinage et de l'Union pour la Méditerranée. La stratégie des Européens a toujours été prise au piège d'un paradoxe politique, car les finalités de l'Euromed, définies en 1995, sont bel et bien politiques : il s'agit de stabiliser et de pacifier un espace commun, en privilégiant certes la voie du développement et de l'interdépendance économique. Mais ce sont précisément deux obstacles de nature politique qui ont le plus contrarié l'accomplissement des objectifs de Barcelone : la conflictualité endémique entre pays partenaires méditerranéens, d'une part, qui complique la mise en œuvre de projets multilatéraux à l'échelle régionale ; et la dérive autoritaire et clientéliste des régimes de la rive sud, d'autre part, qui empêche la juste répartition des fruits d'une croissance dont le frémissement était pourtant enfin perceptible à la veille des révolutions.

### De l'échec à l'espoir

Les crises politiques majeures traversées au cours de la dernière décennie – le 11 septembre, puis les effets de l'intervention américaine en Irak – ont contribué à dégrader encore la qualité du lien euro-méditerranéen. L'Union européenne, qui s'annonçait dans les années 1990 comme un protagoniste majeur, bien qu'atypique, en Méditerranée, y est désormais perçue comme un interlocu-

teur lourd et dépourvu d'intentions claires, incapable de résoudre les conflits ou de faire avancer les libertés, et cherchant à neutraliser tous les sujets politiques au risque de les voir pourrir. L'échec de l'Union pour la Méditerranée (UM) a parfaitement illustré ce syndrome : théoriquement fondée sur l'évitement du politique – on ne s'occupe que de « coopérations concrètes » et on fait l'impasse sur les désaccords – elle s'est fracassée sur l'écueil du conflit israélo-palestinien.

Aujourd'hui les transitions en cours donnent aux Européens la possibilité de travailler dans des conditions nouvelles. Du point de vue bilatéral, la nouvelle donne peut certes bouleverser dans un premier temps le cadre de travail existant ; elle doit surtout le revitaliser, car les nouvelles équipes au pouvoir pourront compter sur la résilience déjà éprouvée des cadres euro-méditerranéens. Les circonstances permettent aujourd'hui de réviser le contrat d'objectif noué avec chacun des pays de l'UM. La poussée démocratique devrait favoriser la mise en place de processus de décision plus participatifs et appropriés par les peuples des pays partenaires – ce qui nous donnerait enfin l'opportunité de surmonter l'inégalité intrinsèque d'un système où le Nord décide, tandis que le Sud se contente de gérer la rente d'une aide très peu conditionnée.

Les contraintes fondamentales de l'action européenne restent certes les mêmes : travailler sur le temps long, organiser des partenariats de progrès en insistant sur les besoins fondamentaux en infrastructures de nos partenaires et en les aidant surtout à instaurer des systèmes de gestion économique plus équitables et redistributifs. En Méditerranée plus qu'ailleurs, l'économie est encore sous le contrôle du politique et non l'inverse – une contrainte qui offre dans l'immédiat des leviers d'action intéressants. Mais pour aller au bout de sa mission en Méditerranée, l'Europe ne doit plus renoncer à l'exigence démocratique. La convergence politique est en effet seule garante à terme d'une relation égale et apaisée entre l'Union et les pays partenaires méditerranéens.

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### 3 Are the Arab Revolutions the last nail in the UM coffin?

By José Ignacio Torreblanca\* and Jordi Vaquer i Fanés\*\*

Even before the Arab Revolutions put into question the whole edifice of EU policy, the Union for the Mediterranean (UM) was already subject to heavy criticism.

Two years after its creation, the UM had barely managed to establish the rudiments of a substantial existence. The biannual summit of Heads of State and Government was postponed twice, the second time *sine die*. The permanent Secretariat lacked a proper budget, a programme and, since 28<sup>th</sup> February 2011, even a Secretary-General. Last but not least, the North-South co-presidencies never rotated – despite the initial commitment to do so.

As for policy content, the six projects on which it was based (de-pollution of the Mediterranean, maritime and land highways, civil protection, solar plan, Euro-Med University and the business initiative) made sluggish progress and were frequently hijacked by the politics of the unresolved Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

To many, the Arab Revolutions are the last nail in the coffin of an already moribund institution. Contrary to the depoliticized and technical nature of the UM, they argue, the future EU Mediterranean policy should be highly political. At first sight, the new “Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity”, although hastily arranged and with many elements of continuity, confirms – especially with its emphasis on differentiation and conditionality – this aim of repoliticisation. By contrast, the UM projects sound awkwardly detached from the urgent needs and demands of the Arab peoples.

In this context, proposals to revive the UM as a reaction to the Arab spring might be premature, to say the least. The time when it was acceptable to ignore the internal politics of our Mediterranean neighbours has come to an end. And this ignorance was one of the main premises under which the UM was conceived: forget politics and proceed with projects. Still, it might be too early to discard it as an instrument for future policy.

The UM remains an untested institution and the final outcome of the current turmoil is far from clear yet.

It is worth reminding that the UM is not an EU instrument. It is a strictly intergovernmental body that, in the name of co-ownership, has given non-EU member states equal footing in the decision-making process.

If the EU takes a stronger stance in favour of political reform, with increased conditionality and unambiguous differentiation, some countries will be left behind or even excluded outright. In that case, an intergovernmental and largely apolitical UM centred on technical projects could be – once its internal governance problems are solved – a way to keep the most reluctant Mediterranean partners on board. Even in that case, however, the deployment of fresher instruments – such as a Euromediterranean Development Bank or enhanced Euromed funding within the EIB and/or EBRD – might further empty the UM of content and purpose.

The UM’s best chances of survival are therefore linked to a scenario of mild conditionality which would follow an only partially successful Arab spring. That the worst case scenario for the Arab peoples is the best-case scenario for not reforming the UM, however, says it all.

In the end, the most important consideration to bear in mind is whether the UM will be an impediment for fresh thinking about the region. Equating the need for new initiatives in the Mediterranean with reviving the UM could lead to the same mistakes that placed the EU and some of its members on the wrong side of the divide between democracy seekers and authoritarian rulers.

Therefore, since co-ownership is supposed to be one of its core features, what about waiting to have new democratic partners in the South and then letting *them* decide whether the UM responds to their needs and expectations?

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\*\* Jordi Vaquer i Fanés is Director of CIDOB, the Barcelona Centre for International Affairs.

## 4 Arab spring, European split?

By *Timo Bebr\**

The Arab revolutions risk tearing at the substance of European solidarity. As the EU struggles to reassess its Mediterranean policies, national differences threaten to reinforce a North-South rift that the euro zone crisis had already opened.

North-South differences over the Mediterranean have been simmering for some time. Nicolas Sarkozy's 2008 attempt to exclude northern EU countries from his "Mediterranean Union" precipitated a brief crisis in Franco-German relations, which have remained tenuous ever since. And quarrels over funding priorities between the Southern and Eastern neighbourhoods have grown increasingly bitter.

However, the current split does amount to more than a simple division between spendthrift Southerners and parsimonious Northerners. Meanwhile, a curious reversal of roles has taken place. In the early days it was the EU's Mediterranean countries – led by France, Italy and Spain – which hesitated and seemed to side with their client-regimes in North Africa, while many Northern countries surged to the aid of peaceful protesters. A few months on, leadership over EU policy has been re-claimed by a French-led Mediterranean coalition seeking to outdo each other in displays of anti-regime fervour – while Northerners seem to be dragging their feet.

### Three sources of tension

Indeed, on at least three issues Northern EU-countries now seem to favour a somewhat different approach than their Southern counterparts.

First, when it comes to the reform of the ENP, most Northerners backed the proposals expressed in a February letter by German foreign minister Guido Westerwelle to Catherine Ashton. The letter opposed a substantial increase in funding for the Southern neighborhood or a reallocation of funds from the Eastern neighborhood, as suggested by Mediterranean countries. Instead, the letter proposed to terminate the ENP's 7-year financial programmes and set aside as much as half of the ENP funding in order to reward pro-

gress on democracy and human rights more flexibly. Other reforms suggested by Westerwelle included opening the EU's agricultural market (regularly opposed by Southern member states), support for education and student exchanges, and new channels of legal migration.

Second, many Northerners have appeared more reserved about Europe's role in the Arab revolutions. The NATO-led intervention in Libya has been spearheaded by France and the UK with a broader interpretation of the UN mandate than some coalition partners'. Similarly, France (and later also Italy) broke ranks with the rest of the EU by recognizing the National Transitional Council as sole representative of the Libyan people. France's President has also threatened other Arab dictators with military intervention should they fail to heed popular calls for reforms.

Northern European countries, by contrast, have tended to be more cautious about military intervention and the EU's role. Germany, most notably, abstained in the UNSC vote establishing a no-fly zone over Libya, while Swedish objections have slowed down a potential deployment of the EU battle groups in Misrata.

Third, intra-European differences over how to handle refugees have intensified following Italy's decision to issue them temporary visas. Most North European countries oppose a sharing of refugees at European level. While they have agreed to take on some from Malta, they have refused to do so in principle elsewhere – triggering a bitter reaction from Italy's interior minister.

Managing all these North-South differences will not be easy. Ultimately, however, a successful EU policy will have to reconcile both points of view while breaking with the idea of "lead nations" in our external relations. If anything, the substantial failure of the EU's Mediterranean policy in the recent past has demonstrated the fallacy of granting too much space to specific national interests.

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## 5 Think Tank Twitter

*Think Tank Twitter (TTT) aims to provide regular information and updates on what is produced by think tanks and research centres across Europe (and beyond) on EU policy issues. As an analogy to the original Twitter, each summary – or tweet – does not exceed 140 words, rather than characters. Those who wish to signal new publications for possible inclusion can send them to the email address [bepa-think-tank-twitter@ec.europa.eu](mailto:bepa-think-tank-twitter@ec.europa.eu)*

### A Fresh Start in Egypt? Actors, Interests, Scenarios

The assumption of power by the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces, following President Mubarak's ouster, could bring about Egypt's political opening. The country's future, however, is not solely dependent on whether the military delivers on its promises for constitutional amendments, free elections, and the transfer of power to a civilian government. The opposition forces must also propose concrete visions on the country's future political system. They must also organise themselves so as to feed their demands into the process. The report analyses the interests of the relevant stakeholders; their organisation and how power relations are shaped among them; and explores potential scenarios for Egypt's future. Given that international support will be necessary for a successful transition process, European policymakers are now faced with an opportunity to support genuine democratisation.

[http://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/comments/2011C06\\_ass\\_rll\\_ks.pdf](http://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/comments/2011C06_ass_rll_ks.pdf)

### The Limits of Endless Revolution

We should not exaggerate the possibility that the revolutions in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya will set off a chain reaction throughout the Arab world or the wider Muslim world. The activeness many expected to see from Islamic radicals has not been forthcoming. The Arab governments in Algeria, Jordan, Morocco, Yemen and Oman have agreed to concessions and even dialogue with the opposition as a way of lowering tensions. We should not exaggerate the influence of these recent events on the Middle East conflict, because no matter what kind of government emerges in Egypt, it will concentrate its attention above all on domestic issues. Authoritarian regimes in Central Asia are using the events in North Africa, especially in Libya, as an added argument in favour of a firm hand guaranteeing stable government in their countries.

[http://carnegieendowment.org/files/MalashenkoBriefing\\_2011\\_March\\_ENG.pdf](http://carnegieendowment.org/files/MalashenkoBriefing_2011_March_ENG.pdf)

### Morocco at the Crossroads

The recent upheavals in the Maghreb and the Middle East, and the growing problems of poor education and high unemployment are likely to bring to the fore challenges in Morocco's governance. Key concerns include the quality of institutions, reforms aimed at promoting the rule of law, curbing corruption and overhauling the judiciary. This paper argues that while institutional quality is a prerequisite for successful and sustainable socio-economic performance, this cannot be achieved without major reforms in the political system. There is a window of opportunity to accelerate reforms and address the acute centralisation of Moroccan politics and decision-making, the lack of accountability and the fragility of representative bodies. Seizing this opportunity could spare Morocco a period of instability, and ensure continuity in the transition that began in 1999.

<http://www.ceps.eu/book/morocco-crossroads-seizing-window-opportunity-sustainable-development>

### Rethinking the EU's Mediterranean Policies Post-1/11

This paper aims to explore the necessary rethink of Western policies towards the Mediterranean and what it entails for the European Union. The proposals in this study constitute concrete steps to review the EU's Mediterranean policies in line with the Union's fundamental rights and principles in its external action. In reviewing the European Neighbourhood Policy, the authors propose revamping the benefits on offer by reconsidering the overall amount of funds made available to the region for domestic development; rethinking the way in which such benefits and policy instruments are used and conditioned; extending the liberalisation of the four freedoms, particularly the free movement of persons and visa facilitation into the EU to citizens from the Mediterranean; establishing adequate monitoring mechanisms and engaging with a plethora of partners both within and beyond the region.

<http://www.iai.it/pdf/DocLAI/iaimp1106.pdf>

## What Not to Do in the Middle East and North Africa

As political change and social protests unfold in the Mediterranean, lessons from other political transitions suggest a number of mistakes the EU should avoid in the remoulded region. Ten are mentioned in this report and include, among other: being precise on how and where money assisting political reform can best be spent. Too much emphasis should not be placed on backing local pro-reformists seen as the most promising, moderate and charismatic short-term. Transitions should not be too heavily approached through the lens of deal-making between elites. The EU should be aware at how easily pernicious state capture occurs in the wake of democratic breakthrough. It should also not think that the all-encompassing export of the EU *acquis* will necessarily help democratisation and assist the development of political parties.

*<http://www.fride.org/publication/895/what-not-to-do-in-the-middle-east-and-north-africa>*

## Migratory Flows from North Africa: Challenges for the EU

Unprecedented flows of migrants are arriving on the EU's southern shores following recent political upheaval across North Africa and it is feared more will follow. The authors outline three challenges the EU and its Member States must cope with: the capacity to protect their borders, the capacity to respect the human rights of those fleeing persecution, and the capacity to exercise solidarity. While there is already evidence of a capacity to react when it comes to securing borders, the authors argue that Member States will now also have to demonstrate their ability to respect human rights when managing large migration flows from the south, and meaningful solidarity both with countries in the North African region and with EU countries struggling to cope with the new arrivals.

*[http://www.epc.eu/documents/uploads/pub\\_1241\\_migratory\\_flows\\_from\\_north\\_africa\\_-\\_challenges\\_for\\_the\\_eu.pdf](http://www.epc.eu/documents/uploads/pub_1241_migratory_flows_from_north_africa_-_challenges_for_the_eu.pdf)*

## European Foreign Policy Scorecard 2010

This first comprehensive assessment examines how Member States and EU institutions have contributed to the successes and failures of Europe's performance in foreign policy. It demonstrates how preoccupation with the economic crisis has led to the marginalisation of foreign policy in national capitals. The Scorecard grades Europe's ability to project its influence abroad on six themes: relations with China, the USA, Russia and Wider Europe, along with multilateral issues and crisis management. The EU's best performance ranged from partnership with the USA on terrorism to coordinating an international response to Iranian nuclear proliferation, to helping 'reset' relations with Russia, to successfully aiding Haiti. A lack of unity among Member States has contributed to EU failings, including human rights in China; the Dalai Lama and Tibet; bilateral relations with Turkey; and progress on Cyprus with Turkey.

*[http://www.ecfr.eu/page/-/ECFR\\_SCORECARD\\_2010\\_PDF.pdf](http://www.ecfr.eu/page/-/ECFR_SCORECARD_2010_PDF.pdf)*

## The Treachery of Strategies: A Call for True EU Strategic Partnerships

This paper congratulates the recent revival of debates on strategic partnerships and calls for the strict implementation of the 2010 September European Council conclusions. It recommends reflecting on the EU's global interests and priorities in search of an EU grand strategy. The paper recommends the EU and its Member States engage in true strategic partnerships by reviewing the EU institutional set-up to establish a cell dedicated to strategic partnerships within the EEAS or ensure that the size and composition of EU delegations reflect the strategic character of the relationship; promote better coordination between the EU and Member States vis-à-vis strategic partners; establish comprehensive and effective strategic dialogues and sectoral dialogues on security and defence with partners; review multilateral arrangements by boosting conflict mediation mechanisms with strategic partners.

*<http://www.egmontinstitute.be/paperegm/ep45.pdf>*



## 6 BEPA News

### Arrivée

Le BEPA souhaite la bienvenue à Ana Costa Freitas, expert national détachée du Portugal, qui rejoint l'équipe Outreach pour s'occuper du dossier de l'éducation supérieure. Mme Costa Freitas a une expérience considérable en matière de gestion dans le monde universitaire au niveau national, y compris sur le processus de Bologne.

### Evénements

Le 1<sup>er</sup> avril, le vice-ministre Lu Zhongyuan du bureau du Premier Ministre chinois Wen Jia Bao a présenté le 12<sup>e</sup> plan quinquennal chinois dans le cadre d'une réunion avec des représentants des DGs et des Cabinets.

Le BEPA a participé les 4 et 5 avril à la quatrième réunion du réseau des instituts gouvernementaux de recherche stratégique et de prospective, à l'invitation du Centre d'études stratégiques (CAS) français. Ont participé également des instituts du Royaume-Uni, d'Irlande, de Suède et des Pays-Bas. Cette rencontre visait à stimuler l'échange d'informations sur les programmes de recherche en cours et à débattre de thèmes d'intérêt commun.

Du 5 au 8 avril, le directeur général du BEPA Jean-Claude Thébault s'est rendu au Brésil pour des réunions avec des acteurs étatiques importants tels que le bureau du Président, les ministères des Affaires étrangères et des Finances. Il a aussi participé à une table ronde organisée par la Fundação Getúlio Vargas / Instituto Brasileiro de Economia.

Le 19 avril, le BEPA a participé à la 6<sup>e</sup> réunion du groupe de travail du projet ESPAS, qui s'est réuni afin de faire l'état des lieux sur le premier rapport EUISS et sur la coordination interinstitutionnelle ; planifier le deuxième rapport EUISS ; préparer les conférences qui sont liés au projet ; et discuter de l'avenir de l'initiative ESPAS après la fin du projet pilote.

### Activités à venir

Du 3 au 6 mai, le directeur général du BEPA Jean-Claude Thébault se rendra à Beijing pour des rencontres bilatérales avec des membres du

gouvernement chinois et des experts de think tanks. Dans le cadre de cette visite, le BEPA signera un protocole d'entente et de coopération avec le Bureau des Conseillers du Conseil des Affaires d'Etat (COSC). M. Thébault participera également à une conférence internationale de perspectives croisées pour la Chine et l'UE à l'horizon 2030, organisée par le COSC et la Délégation de l'UE en Chine.

Le 3 mai, le BEPA rencontrera une délégation de la Fondation sur le Développement Economique (IKV), y compris des membres de la société civile turque. Cette délégation sera en visite à Bruxelles afin de contribuer aux discussions sur les relations entre l'UE et la Turquie qui auront lieu au Parlement européen.

Du 22 au 24 mai, le BEPA sera représenté, au travers de son directeur adjoint Margaritis Schinas, à une conférence internationale qui aura lieu près de Washington, DC et portera sur les tendances mondiales 2030. Cet événement, organisé par l'Atlantic Council, le National Intelligence Council (NIC), le Bureau du Département d'Etat pour le renseignement et la recherche (INR) et la Fondation Stanley rassemblera des experts de laboratoires d'idées et des gouvernements d'Asie, d'Afrique, d'Amérique latine, Europe, Eurasie et Amérique du Nord.

Le 30 mai, le Président Barroso sera l'hôte d'une réunion de haut niveau co-présidée par les présidents du Parlement européen et du Conseil européen. Des personnalités éminentes de la communauté juive, musulmane et bouddhiste et les communautés chrétiennes – y compris les églises catholique, protestante et orthodoxe – discuteront avec les trois présidents d'«Un partenariat pour la démocratie et la prospérité partagée : une volonté commune de promouvoir les droits et libertés démocratiques».

Le 31 mai, le BEPA organise, en présence du Président Barroso, la première réunion du groupe d'experts sur la culture dont la mission est de proposer des initiatives et des actions culturelles européennes dans le cadre du mandat du Président.