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EDITORIAL

by Antonio Missiroli

Acting (and thinking) globally

Come June, European and world leaders engage in a chain of top-level meetings that are expected to address the common challenges we are all confronted with, and which culminate with the UN General Assembly in September. The summit season, however, does not end with the autumn: the “flat” world of the XXI century requires a quasi-permanent consultation process among key players – a process that goes well beyond the sphere of professional diplomats and involves political and business leaders, dealing rooms, non-governmental organisations and, of course, the media (old and new).

Does all this amount to a new model of “global governance” – however embryonic – for the decades ahead? Yes and No. Yes, because the variable geometry of summits shows how much more diffuse and sectoral “power” has become today. And No, because the international system remains fragmented, unstable, and in a state of flux.

The old world order is long gone. The multilateralist revival of the mid-late 1990s – epitomised by the

WTO (1994), the Kyoto Protocol (1997), the International Criminal Court (1998) and the UN Millennium Declaration (2000) – has not lived up to the expectations it raised. The US “unilateral moment” is also a thing of the past now. In turn, new or alternative trends struggle to establish themselves.

Take the BRICs: when Goldman Sachs Chief Economist Jim O’Neill first coined the acronym, in 2001, few expected it would capture the world’s attention and, above all, turn into a specific summit format (as it has done recently).

When 08/08/08 happened – namely the day, on 8 August 2008, when the war in Georgia broke out and the Beijing Olympics were solemnly inaugurated – a new era of Russian and Chinese assertiveness seemed to be on the cards.

The ensuing financial crisis and its economic repercussions have somewhat tamed the re-energized Russian bear. Now that it feels less threatened in Georgia and Ukraine but more vulnerable economically, Moscow appears more prone to reassessing its priorities and long-term prospects. The Katyn tragedy of last April should also be remembered as an effort at Polish-Russian reconciliation that was long overdue, and which can only benefit EU-Russia

relations at large and the freshly launched "partnership for modernisation".

Yet the crisis has weakened the "West" much more than the "rest", accelerating trends and developments that were already taking shape previously. Transatlantic relations are still central for both sides, but are much less central for managing the international system. To a certain extent, they even represent a catalyst for opposition and alternative groupings. Last December, in Copenhagen, the so-called BASIC countries (with South Africa replacing Russia) were indeed calling the shots, co-opting America and marginalising Europe.

The growing importance of the G-20 is the most obvious effect of all this: taken together, its twenty-something participants account for 87 % of world GDP. Behind the aggregate data, however, lurks a momentous shift: according to a recent OECD study, industrialised countries still make for 51 % of world GDP (as compared to 60 in 1990), but their share is expected to drop to 43 % by 2030.

Just a BIT?

This said, not all emerging powers – most of which happen to be also "strategic partners" of the EU – are equal. Apart from its considerable energy reserves, Russia displays a number of structural weaknesses and is, after all, quite an 'old' power. China is currently enjoying the best of both worlds – as an established player with a permanent seat on the UN Security Council and as a virtual leader (and occasionally model) for the developing world, as both a status quo and a revisionist power – but may soon be confronted with the dilemmas generated by such dual role.

The real challenge for the "West" in general (and the EU in particular) may come, however, from those emerging countries that see themselves as critical stakeholders with growing economic and political clout but without adequate recognition and representation in the current international system.

Brazil, India and Turkey are, arguably, the most significant among them. They are all big and populous democratic countries, and all with

strong historical, cultural and economic ties to Europe. While they qualify for being partners of the "West" on many accounts, however, they are also dissatisfied with the current international set-up, be it in the UNSC, the WTO negotiations, or energy-related matters – and Turkey also with its status and standing in the Euro-Atlantic community.

What happened recently with the joint Turkish-Brazilian initiative on Iran and their dissenting vote on sanctions in the Security Council seems to vindicate (along with India's own record on non-proliferation) the old saying whereby "where you stand depends on where you sit" – or not.

Too many Europeans – too little EU

The problem they raise is particularly painful for Europe, which is instead largely over-represented in all international bodies, formal and informal. In fact, Europeans make for half of the G-8, up to 1/3 of seats on the UNSC and in the G-20, and roughly 1/3 of votes in the IMF and the World Bank.

This hardly corresponds to the realities of the early XXI century, let alone those that are looming large on the horizon. And if both emerging and fellow old powers complain that there are too many Europeans around the table, we should in turn complain ourselves that there is too little EU – and even that little is, more often than not, under-performing.

Trading less presence for more influence – which can only come from speaking with a single voice – is becoming the overarching imperative for the Union and its member states. The trouble is that this will not come cost-free. For most European countries, relinquishing a place in the sun and/or voting rights on a board is a matter of national pride and could only be accepted if others do it to a comparable extent.

Moreover, bringing some order and logic into the Union's representation in the maze of international organizations and conventions Europeans are part of constitutes a challenge in its own right (as the Table prepared by CEPS and reproduced in this issue tries to show). Such a "patchwork" Europe –

itself the combined result of pre-existing legal competences, political constraints, precedents, ad hoc arrangements, and widespread reluctance to overhaul it – is a recipe for confusion, frustration, and ineffectiveness. Yet the costs for Europe may turn out to be substantial also in terms of concrete interests and trade-offs.

Managing interdependence

Tom Friedman's "flat" world is one characterised by interdependence and global real-time communication. Yet interdependence exists not only among geographical areas but also among policy issues. Climate change can hardly be tackled effectively without addressing also energy- and trade-related problems. Migration flows cannot be governed without adequate development- and human security-related actions. Financial regulation can hardly succeed in one country (or continent) alone, and it requires coordinated intervention on a large scale. Nuclear non-proliferation initiatives need to be credibly linked with shared approaches to energy security. And durable peace cannot be secured without justice and reconciliation.

The existing international institutions, however, seem incapable of connecting all these dots. Multilateral bodies are too specialised and too fragmented. The WTO "does" trade; the IMF "does" finance; various UN agencies and the World Bank "do" development; the UNSC "does" peace and security, and the IAEA "does" non-proliferation.

On top of that, an international community of almost 200 sovereign states makes it increasingly difficult to render such multilateralism truly effective: from Copenhagen itself to the UN Human Rights Council, the number of veto holders and potential spoilers has grown dramatically, and the traditional system of global governance is now under strain.

In a way, the policy challenges of the coming years can be formalised into a series of inter-related equations with a rising number of unknowns. In virtually all equations, Europe may have to give something in order to achieve its goals, while emerging powers want to get something before they may consider

giving. The US, in turn, still seems to be the only factor that is central across the entire (black) board, although it no longer is and acts as a fully independent variable.

Mini- vs. multilateral?

Here lies the rationale for the emergence of what 'Foreign Policy' editor Moises Naïm recently called – retrieving an old concept of international relations – "mini-lateralism", and the President of the US Council on Foreign Relations Richard Haass labelled as "elite" or "functional" multilateralism: that is, loose ad hoc coalitions of the willing and relevant countries aimed to address specific problems.

The G-20, yet again, has become the most important and arguably the most comprehensive of them all – although not the only one. It remains to be seen whether it will manage to evolve into a sort of "global governing board" and, if so, with what knock-on/collateral effects on existing multilateral bodies – starting with the UN.

Europeans are quite familiar with "mini-lateralism", if anything because they tend to practise it themselves, both inside and outside the Union. Europeans can also be good at connecting the dots and striking deals across the policy board: the EU is meant to do precisely that for and with its member states; and the so-called "community method" used to be the key means to that end. With the Lisbon Treaty, they now have also a better template for a more coherent and incisive external action and international presence – provided they do not waste the opportunity it offers.

The European Commission recently set up an internal working group of Directors General to reflect notably on global governance in light of the new Treaty. Come September, the European Council will devote an extraordinary meeting – open also to the 27 Foreign Ministers – to discussing relations with all EU "strategic partners". This issue of BEPA Monthly – along with other activities BEPA already has in the pipeline – intends to feed the debate and offer insights from think tanks and external experts.

1 Global governance in transition¹

By Giovanni Grevi*

Global governance – the collective management of common problems at the international level – is at a delicate juncture. The growing number of issues on the international agenda (and their complexity) is outpacing the ability of international organizations to cope. As power spreads to new state and non-state actors, no individual country is in a position to lead reform on its own.

This challenges not only the EU and the US but also the emerging powers, as they rise in an increasingly interdependent system marked by interconnected risks. Reform of global governance needs to match far-reaching change in the international system. Failure to do so could pave the way to unrestrained competition and pervasive instability.

A changing international agenda

The international agenda is a moving target. Successive ‘generations’ of global challenges have been piling up and compounding each other. The cumulative impact of emerging issues, coupled with longstanding ones, generates hazards and risks that cannot be easily contained.

Three features of globalization are driving demands for more effective global governance: deepening interdependence, cross-cutting policy issues, and the combination between domestic politics and international talks.

The rise of China, India, Brazil, and other fast-growing economies has taken interdependence to new levels. Trade and investment patterns have diversified and resulted in value chains spread across different countries and continents. Financial imbalances between deficit and surplus countries have contributed to trigger the crisis and remain central to any lasting solution.

Deepening interdependence goes far beyond the purely economic dimension to encompass environmental and energy issues. The multiple links among climate change, the economic crisis, and state fragility – “hubs” of risk for the future – illustrate the

interconnected nature of the challenges on today’s international agenda.

Many of these issues involve interwoven domestic and foreign elements. The roots of the financial crisis, for example, involve domestic policies with large-scale international repercussions. Climate change is another example of an issue where domestic priorities need to be reconciled with broader international goals. With economic growth declining in many countries, national politics will increasingly create tight constraints on international cooperation – and reduce the scope for compromise.

A shifting balance of power(s)

The progressive shift towards a “multi-polar” world is complicating the prospects for effective global governance. Today, the legitimacy and credibility of the US and the EU as political leaders is openly questioned by other players and large swathes of the international community. This owes in part to their perceived shortcomings in providing the public goods they guaranteed up till recently, and in part to the view that their positions on e.g. trade and climate change are unfair to the interests of others.

The expanding power assets of emerging countries help to reinforce their influence. Building on economic success, their message resonates well beyond their borders. Yet power is not only shifting from established to emerging powers (and to some extent the developing world) but also toward non-state actors – be they agents or spoilers of cooperation.

In such more heterogeneous international system, diverse views on global governance and international cooperation coexist. As a result, it is increasingly difficult to separate a functional approach to collective problem-solving from genuinely political considerations. Some emerging and many developing countries are reluctant to endorse the very concept of global governance,

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¹ This article draws on the findings of the joint EUISS-NIC (National Intelligence Council, USA) project ‘Global Governance 2025’.

which is perceived as a “Western” narrative. The North-South divide still features high in the worldviews of India and Brazil as well as many African states. Respective assessments of ‘fairness’ and ‘equanimity’ in international trade and environmental negotiations – or ‘security’ proper – often diverge. This is also a consequence of the strong domestic focus of most emerging and developing countries, driven by the imperative of growth, at a time when the EU and the US are also turning more introverted.

In other words, sovereignty seems to be alive and kicking. The proud assertion by individual countries and, in particular, large powers, of their sovereign prerogatives is a notable trend of the last few years. While their domestic political systems widely differ, the US, Russia, China and India – among others – share an ingrained suspicion for global governance mechanisms that could impinge on their own sovereignty.

On balance, major powers subscribe to forms of international cooperation and supervision that they regard as embodying their interests or, at least, not directly damaging them. Such a selective approach, however, is running into trouble because the number of those who can afford picking and choosing is growing.

This leads to the imperative of addressing the tension between inclusiveness and effectiveness in multilateral frameworks – which, in turn, goes to the heart of the legitimacy question. The current US administration insists on the need to devise pragmatic solutions to achieve results. For its part, the EU seeks a difficult balancing act between “mini-lateralism” and multilateralism. On the other hand, most emerging powers and much of the developing world put a strong emphasis on more inclusive and better representative institutions as the core condition for their genuine engagement.

At any rate, unease with what are often regarded as “Western” norms and regimes has not translated so far in an alternative master plan to existing institutions and seems unlikely to do so in the foreseeable future. Alignments are likely to be, more than ever, issue-dependent. China and India are on the same side when negotiating CO₂ emissions reductions but on opposite fronts regarding the reform of the UN Security Council. Russia and Brazil may join forces (in the BRIC

format) to advocate new frameworks of global economic governance but have gone separate ways on the sensitive Iranian nuclear dossier. Such “variable geometry” undermines for the moment prospects for grand bargains on a new set-up for global governance.

Adaptation and innovation

Institutions have somewhat adapted as new issues have emerged. These adaptations have been spurred as much by outside forces as by the institutions themselves.

Three types of innovation are of particular interest as pointers for the future: a) the emergence of informal groupings of leading countries, such as the G-20; b) regional cooperation, notably in East Asia; and c) the contribution of non-state actors to institutional adaptation. These innovations cannot serve as alternatives to law-based, inclusive multilateral institutions that can deliver those public goods that summits, non-state actors, and regional groupings cannot supply (at least in a reliable way). These include decisions enjoying universal legitimacy; mechanisms for implementation and monitoring of national measures; and, in sectors like trade, instruments to resolve disputes.

Looking ahead, neither traditional frameworks nor new forms of cooperation alone are likely to solve global governance problems. However, the two can complement one another. Future progress in international cooperation is likely to take place at the interface between old and new, formal and informal, governmental and non-governmental, global and regional governance frameworks.

Informal groupings. The proliferation of regular summit-level meetings held outside global (or regional) institutions is the most visible feature. The G-8 and especially the G-20 have already significantly affected global governance, with their emphasis on networked coordination of national policies and on deliverables.

The development of such ‘Gs’ responds to two basic needs: to foster collective leadership to jointly address common problems; and to reflect the changing balance of world power. At a time of profound change in international relations, summit diplomacy serves the important purposes of familiarising leaders with one another and building trust and confidence among them.

Informal groupings may be increasingly called upon to serve as top-level international agenda-setting bodies, as the G-20 did in coping with the fallout of the financial crisis. In perspective, such groupings can play an important bridging role between bilateral partnerships, mini-lateral formats and multilateral frameworks.

A debate is under way on whether the G-20 should enlarge its remit further, thus becoming a sort of informal global governance “hub.” However, many observers argue that the G-20 would suffer from a “capacity deficit” in dealing with a broader agenda. Furthermore, when informal groupings are too small, their legitimacy is questioned; when they are relatively large, (like the G-20), doubts emerge as to their internal cohesion, while their legitimacy remains contested.

Regional cooperation. While no definitive trend can be detected, some progress toward closer cooperation at the regional level has been achieved over the last decade in regions as diverse as South America, Africa and, most notably, East Asia.

Over the next decades, regional cooperation could make further strides due to a mix of factors. First, there is growing dissatisfaction with the performance of global institutions. Second, relative power is shifting at regional level too; pre-eminent actors such as China, Japan, and Brazil have chosen to work through regional cooperative frameworks to manage political differences and confirm their leadership. Third, the global financial crisis has hit all regions and amplified both the suspicion of external interference and a sense of self-reliance in addressing economic and political challenges.

The key question is whether regionalism will prove to be a building block of global governance or a drain on it.

Non-state actors. Such actors as non-governmental organizations, networks of experts, and business are playing a central role both on the ‘demand’ and ‘supply’ sides of global governance. They contribute to setting the international agenda and are essential partners in implementing solutions.

Private philanthropy, often associated with business and civil society initiatives or public authorities, has made an important difference in areas

such as health and education. Hybrid, public-private partnerships (PPPs) have emerged as an important ingredient of innovation, notably in the field of sustainable development. Their relevance is likely to grow as they reach out to multiple stakeholders.

Non-state actors have been at least as effective as states at reframing issues and mobilising publics – a trend that seems set to continue. The International Criminal Court and Landmines Ban Treaties were both led by civil society actors and supported by like-minded states.

In addition to their role as agenda setters, non-state actors are essential sources of knowledge and expertise. Expertise is becoming more salient in all fields of international policymaking, from managing the implications of technological innovation to food and resource scarcity – all issues that require constant monitoring.

The challenge of reform

Short of determined action to reverse this trend, the gap between the ‘demand’ and the ‘supply’ side of global governance is set to widen. Innovation is quietly happening but the capacities of the current institutional patchwork – however much bolstered by increasing non-state support and regional mechanisms – will be stretched by the type of challenges facing the global order over the next few decades.

Several clusters of problems – such as global financial imbalances, failing states, climate change, and resource scarcity – may not be effectively tackled without major governance reforms. All involve more preventive action, which in turn requires shared assessment of these challenges and closer monitoring of the implementation of (international and national) measures.

Reforming global governance regimes and practices takes time, and decisions – once adopted (or not) at multilateral level – have long-term consequences: the political investment is ‘locked in’. This is why it is essential to take a long-term view of the challenges to be confronted and of the positions and priorities of key stakeholders. No lasting solution to global challenges will be achieved without the participation of critical power centres from all regions.

2 What external representation for the EU

By Michael Emerson* and Piotr Maciej Kaczynski**

In the wake of the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, it seems worth reviewing the present arrangements for the institutional representation of the EU in international organisations, negotiations, and conventions of international law. This is what a research working group – including CEPS, EPC, Egmont and the the University of Leuven – has recently set out to do.

The subject is ripe for two reasons. First, while the innovations of the Lisbon Treaty enhance the international role of the EU, modalities for external representation remain to be followed through. With the EU having acquired international legal personality, the nameplate “European Union” has replaced that of “European Commission” in various fora. This marks the point where the EU as such becomes more of a ‘state-like’ entity. Beyond the nameplate symbolism, however, many complex and substantive issues still need to be tackled.

The complexity follows from the growth of EU competences in the numerous treaty revisions since the 1980s, and their multiple legal and institutional formats: exclusive and shared competences, the three pillar structure (revised to two by Lisbon), the “mixed agreements”, and so on. The Union’s enlargement, also, has made various aspects of the status quo increasingly cumbersome and obsolete: constituencies on the IMF board that mix EU and non-EU states; or the numerical dominance of the EU member states in the Council of Europe and OSCE, coupled with weak observer status for the Union as such.

Second, there is the question of how the EU can advance its declared objective of “effective multilateralism”. It is increasingly apparent that the EU has now to reshape its external representation in order not to prejudice this objective. Moreover, new emerging powers want to gain adequate recognition and clout in multilateral and global fora: the recent Brazil-Russia-India-China (BRIC) summit in April 2010 was explicit

on this point. And the over-representation of EU member states in those fora is the other side of this same coin, and needs to be addressed.

What for

The EU’s concerns are thus part of the broader international search for more effective global governance. The UN system now has nearly 200 members, with the EU programmed to enlarge further (at least in the Balkans) from 27 to over 30. These large numbers make decision-making unwieldy unless there are two- or multi-tier structures, analogous to the governance of big companies which have many sovereign shareholders, a more limited board of directors and, more often than not, an even more restricted executive committee. The G7-8/20 and UN Security Council are the most important examples of selected groups, but the former are only semi-institutionalized and ad hoc, whereas the latter is limited in its scope.

In any case, the EU and its member states will have a large responsibility for helping (or blocking) developments towards a more effective multilateral order. Some US analysts who take a pessimistic view of the capacity of the multilateral organizations to adapt argue for a “mini-lateral” rather than multilateral system, i.e. for shifting the main action in international affairs to targeted coalitions of small numbers of relevant and like-minded countries. If this were to become a major trend, how would the EU and its members work with it?

While the EU institutions and the member states are busy with the first and most obvious steps in the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty, starting with the creation of the European External Action Service, there is growing awareness that these issues of external representation will have to be confronted at some stage.

What is still lacking is a systematic review of the current state of play and, in particular, a coherent rationale for strengthening the EU’s presence in

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line with its (new) competences. The starting point is of course the Lisbon Treaty, namely those articles which concern foreign and security policy and those which catalogue the competences of the Union (TFEU Articles 3, 4, 5, 6) by graduating them. In the table below we reproduce the listing of EU competences of these several types and locate selected international organizations and conventions within those categories – to provide some initial guidance.

Who sits where

There are indeed several types of representation of the EU and its member states (MS) on the international stage. Just to sketch the main ones:

All MS as full members, EU/EC as observer. This is the most prevalent model within global multilateral organizations. However, this does not prevent EU institutional representatives from concerting more or less informally with their opposite numbers without the presence of the member states (e.g. Council of Europe, IFIs);

All MS plus EU/EC as full members. Where EU competences are particularly important, such as in trade (WTO) and agriculture (FAO), the Commission has a full status alongside the member states;

Some MS plus EU/EC as full participants. This is prevalent in less formalized bodies (e.g. G7-8/20) where the larger member states are present alongside the EU as (more or less) full participant with both the Council Presidency and the Commission;

EU/EC as full participant/contracting party, no MS. This is mostly the case with highly specialized international agreements for individual agricultural commodities or metals;

Some MS as full members, EU/EC no status. The UN Security Council is a special case with two EU countries (F, UK) as permanent members, up to three others being elected on a rotational but occasional basis, while the Union is not even an observer. The Lisbon Treaty, however, provides for EU representatives to be invited and express common positions. The EU has no status at the World Bank either, and only the European Central Bank has partial observer status at the IMF;

Constituency arrangements and voting weights. In some organizations (e.g. IMF, EBRD) there are so-called "constituency" arrangements for clustering the smaller member states in ad hoc groups. This often raises the issue of allocating voting weights internally and, now, also that of including all new EU members.

Who negotiates for whom

The question of who negotiates for the EU is related to (but not fully coincident with) the issue of membership in multilateral organizations. Articles 216-219 of the TFEU set out in detail procedures for the Council to give negotiating mandates to the negotiator and entrust the Commission or the High Representative to make recommendations for who should be the negotiator. Yet they do not fully clarify who (i.e. what kind of figure) such negotiator should be.

The most complex situations arise where the EU and the member states have shared competences, or there is a mix of exclusive and shared competences. There are cases where such arrangements have been worked out in an apparently satisfactory manner. For example in the FAO, at meetings with multiple agenda points, the EC/EU and the member states declare at the beginning who is competent for what between Commission, and member states.

There are, however, other organizations and conventions where the EU has shared competences and where the current state of affairs is either messy or uncertain. In some cases, new solutions are currently being tested – in light also of the Lisbon Treaty – for possible changes in the distribution of roles between the institutions, for example in the field of environment and climate change and the UNEP-Mercury negotiations.

It would be premature to draw precise conclusions for a project which is still at an initial stage. The ambition is to present a strategic review of the issue and set out what the EU would need to do to in order to be adequately equipped – in terms of both presence and influence – as a global player. In general, this will require an extensive "upgrade" of the external representation of the Union, which often languishes with rank of observer even where its competences may be substantial.

EU representation in international bodies

Table prepared by CEPS

Competences	Organisations and Conventions	Status of EC & Member States
Foreign, security and defence policies (including general political affairs)	UN General Assembly UN Security Council OSCE NATO Non-Proliferation Treaty Council of Europe G7/8/20	EC observer, MS members 2 MS perm. + up to 3 MS rotating EC observer, MS members 24 MS EAEC signatory & MS EC observer, MS members EC participant, some MS
1. Exclusive (Art.3)		
A. Customs union	World Customs Organization (WCO)	Member
B. Competition policy	World Intellectual Property Org. (WIPO)	Observer
C. Monetary policy (for euro zone)	IMF Bank for International Settlements (BIS) OECD	ECB observer, MS members ECB on Board, some MS EC observer, 21 MS members
D. Fisheries & marine biological policies	Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas UN Conference on Highly Migratory Fish Multiple regional fisheries organizations: Mediterranean, NE Atlantic, NW Atlantic, SE Atlantic, Antarctic, Western and Central Pacific Organizations for species: tuna, salmon	EC & MS members EC & MS members EC Member & some MS EC signatory & some MS
E. Trade policy	WTO UN Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL)	EC & MS members EC observer, some MS members
2. Shared (Art.4)		
A. Internal market	International Standards Organization (ISO) Codex Alimentarius Commission	EC cooperation, MS members EU & MS members
B. Social policy	International Labour Organization (ILO)	EC observer, MS members
C. Cohesion (regional)		
D. Agriculture and Forestry	FAO IFAD Multiple product organizations: olive oil, sugar, cocoa, coffee, jute, tropical timber, rubber, grains, new varieties of plants	EC & MS members EC observer, MS members EC & some MSmembers
E. Environment	UN Environmental Program UN FCCC (climate change) Kyoto Protocol UN Conference on Environm. and Dev. Convention on Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) International Tribunal of the Law of the Sea International Seabed Authority Protection Marine Environ. of N. Atlantic Protection of the Danube River	EC observer, some MS members EC & MS members EC & MS members EC & MS full participants EC & MS members EC & MS members EC & MS members EC & 12 MS members EC & 6 MS members

Competences	Organisations and Conventions	Status of EC & Member States
F. Consumer protect.	-	-
G. Transport	International Civil Aviation Org. (ICAO) International Maritime Organization (IMO) Eurocontrol	EC observer, MS members EC observer, MS members EC & 21 MS members
H. Trans-Eur. Networks	-	-
I. Energy	International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) International Energy Agency (IEA) Energy Charter Treaty	EC observer, MS members EC participates, 17 MS members EC and MS members
J. Freedom, security and justice	International Court of Justice (ICJ) International Criminal Court (ICC) European Convention of Human Rights UN High Commission for Refugees World Conf. against Racism/Racial Discr. Fourth World Conference on Women UN Convention against Illicit Drugs Traffic UN Convention against Transnat. Crime	- EU cooperation agreement EU & all MS acceding parties EC observer, MS members EC & MS full participants EC & MS full participants EC & MS full members EC & MS full members
K. Public health, safety	-	-
L. Research, Technology, Space	International Telecommunications Union (ITU) Outer Space Treaty World Summit on the Information Society International Fusion Energy Org. (ITER) Science and Technical Center in Ukraine	EC sector memb, MS members EC observer, most MS members EC & MS full participants EAEC member, no MS EAEC & EC member, no MS
M. Development and humanitarian aid	World Bank World Food Programme (WFP) UNDP UNCTAD World Summit on Sustainable Development UN Conference on Least Dev. Countries World Food Summit	- EC & many MS donors EC observer, MS members EC observer & partial member EC & most MS full participants EC & most MS full participants EC & most MS members
3. Coordination (Art.5)		
A. Economic policies	EBRD OECD	EEC & MS shareholders EC observer, 21 MS members
B. Employment policies	ILO	EC observer, MS members
C. Social policies	ILO	EC observer, MS members
4. Supplementary (Art.6)		
A. Human health	World Health Organization (WHO) UN Population Fund (UNFPA)	EC observer, MS members EC observer, MS members
B. Industry	UN Industrial Development Org. (UNIDO) Multiple Organizations for commodities: nickel, copper, lead and zinc	Partnership, most MS members EC & some MS members
C. Culture	UNESCO	EC observer, MS members
D. Tourism	UN World Tourism Organization	Most MS members
E. Education, training, youth, sport	UNESCO UNICEF	EC observer, MS members EC observer; MS members

3 BEPA News

Events

On 19 June, on the occasion of the launch of the new programme on Global Governance of the European University Institute in Fiesole, BEPA co-organised with the EUI a closed seminar on "What should the EU agenda for global governance be?".

Commission President Barroso, who participated in the Seminar and delivered the programme's Inaugural Lecture the day before, agreed with EUI President Josep Borrell and Director-General Jean-Claude Thebault that the Institute and BEPA would further collaborate on the new programme.

Activities in the pipeline

On 30 June BEPA organises – jointly with DG COMP, DG TRADE, DG ECFIN and DG TAXUD – the 18th Micro-economic Jacquemin Seminar. Devoted to "Presenting global economic solutions for a better world", the Seminar will host Professor Dennis J. Snower and Dr. Alessio Brown from the Kiel Institute for the World Economy. This seminar series was launched by BEPA in 2005 to provide a forum for bringing together top economists from the academia and the relevant Commission DGs.

On 9 July BEPA organises – in cooperation with the Church and Society Commission of the Conference of European Churches (CSC/CEC) and the Commission of the Bishops' Conferences of the European Community (COMECE) – a Dialogue/Seminar on "Combating poverty and social exclusion in the framework of the EU 2020 strategy".

On 19 July, BEPA organises a dedicated meeting with religious leaders, in line with previous initiatives launched by President Barroso since 2005. This year the event – which will be co-chaired by the President of the European Parliament, Jerzy Buzek, and by the President of the Council, Herman Van Rompuy – will be devoted to "Combating poverty and social exclusion". For the first time, not only the leaders of the three

monotheistic religions, but also sikh and hindu communities will take part.

Research

Following a workshop on social innovation organised for the President in 2009, BEPA is in the process of finalising a report recommending up to 40 measures to create a more enabling environment for social innovations. These are social in both their ends and means: they offer ways to alleviate the negative impacts of the crisis on the most vulnerable populations, to address societal challenges, and to favour fundamental changes in attitudes and values, strategies and policies, structures and processes.

Social innovations are not a panacea but, if encouraged and enforced, they can help give short term solutions to some of the pressing issues European citizens are confronted with. In the longer term, they should be seen as part of the new culture of empowerment that the Commission already promotes in different policy fields.

After sketching the political and economic background for such an initiative, the draft report suggests a definition of what social innovation is and what it is not; looks at the characteristics and barriers which social innovators confront; and presents an inventory of actions taken by the Commission which have supported such innovations so far. The pressing demand from stakeholders and think tanks working on this issue is to see social innovation recognised at top political level to make it easier then to act at every level, get funding, facilitate networking, and scale up ventures.

The draft report also suggests an initiative which could entail up to 40 measures to improve the governance, the funding, the "enabling" of (and the research on) social innovation. Some could be implemented straight away, while some others need further preparation and negotiation. These measures are organised around the three approaches to social innovation (social demands, societal challenge and systemic change) which correspond to the three pillars of Europe 2020 for an inclusive, green and smart Europe.