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EDITORIAL

By Isabelle Ioannides

Welcomed or not?

Immigration as part of European history, has impacted widely on European societies and it will continue to do so. Immigrant employment patterns and entrepreneurship activities have developed rather quickly. Growing diaspora in EU member states has transformed international trade. Freedom of movement has helped Europe diversify itself culturally. Welfare systems have been extended to immigrant groups. The EU has evolved as a community of law supporting integration, through the development of new legislation dealing with discrimination, social exclusion, racism and xenophobia.

The Swiss referendum last February that voted narrowly “against mass immigration”, proposing greater control on the migration of EU citizens into Switzerland through the introduction of quotas, has put the issue of immigration and freedom of movement back on the table. As the EU and its member states consider how to react to the Swiss referendum, this initiative has given opponents of immigration inside the Union a motive to claim that the result represents widespread feeling in Europe. The autumn 2013 Eurobarometer reveals that, although still below economic concerns, migration is a topic EU citizens

think about more and more: there was a 6 point increase since last spring, with 16% of Europeans feeling that immigration is a key issue facing the EU today.

The divergences of opinions and high sentiments the issue of migration raises, point to its complexity due both to the number of categories of non-citizens (EU citizens living in a member state other than their own; non-EU nationals lawfully residing in the EU; third country nationals covered under association agreements; asylum seekers and refugees) and the nature of the policy (shared competences between the EU and its member states).

Responding to demographic pressures

The discussion on migration takes place as demographic trends become clearer. An ageing European population (estimates show that Europeans will have the highest average age globally in 2030) will have dire consequences on the working force. Member states with low fertility rates and large numbers of young people emigrating to find work will be particularly affected. Demographic pressures will only partially be compensated by recourse to women and the older generation that will increasingly enter the market. In parallel, migration patterns will change. For example, economic growth in certain regions may transform some countries that are currently sending immigrants (e.g. Turkey) into destination countries.

These demographic changes, the economic crisis, labour market shortages in high skilled sectors, and constant pressure to innovate have prompted governments around the world – including in Europe – to engage in a global competition for talent. The European Commission recently estimated that Europe would need 384,000 to 700,000 workers in the information and communication technology sector by 2015, and one million healthcare professionals by 2020. But in the race for high skilled migrant workers, the EU is said to be lagging behind countries such as Australia, Canada, Switzerland and the United States. To remedy this gap, the Commission has adopted the Scientific Visa and the Blue Card to attract top scientists and researchers to Europe and to expedite the entry of foreign professionals.

Various factors influence the decision to move to European societies: access to the labour markets, low tax rates and breaks for foreign workers, processing time for applications, language, a welcoming environment in the host country, welfare state regimes and provisions, a standardised and clear process for the recognition of foreign qualifications, and family reunification rights. But the ‘migration frame’ seems to have contributed to the relative unattractiveness of EU talent migration. A 2013 study published by CEPS showed that legislation (e.g. on social security) that does not link together easily in the member states and can therefore be confusing, hinders understanding of immigrants’ rights. The variable opt-in/out attitude of certain member states on the implementation of EU legislation on migration provides a further layer of complexity.

Reacting to fear

The report on global social trends prepared by RAND Europe emphasises that European attitudes towards migration and the extent to which the EU is able to recover from the crisis will also contribute to its attractiveness as a destination for migrants. The Commission has launched a study on the ‘welcome culture’ to try and demonstrate that cities in Europe that are most welcoming to incomers from other regions (of Europe) are also the most vibrant, economically successful and pleasant to live in.

European societies have indeed changed dramatically in the last decades and immigrants

have obviously played a major role, especially in the transformation of European economies. Consumer patterns have changed due to the impact of immigrants. Immigrant small businesses and ethnic entrepreneurship are playing an increasing role. In recent years, an obvious impact of highly skilled immigrants has been notable. Social life and worldview formations have changed in Europe through immigration as well.

What is unclear, however, is the distinction between the influence of immigration in European societies and that of globalisation. Arguably, the socio-political, economic and cultural transformation of Europe is as much the result of immigration as it is of globalisation. And cultural diversity and mobility are increasingly considered an important advantage for the competitiveness of a national economy in the context of globalisation, even if they can be seen as compromising labour market integration.

At the same time, European societies are concerned with safeguarding local and national customs, their identity (national as well as European), which they sometimes feel is at risk. This is where the potential of populist parties in Europe rests, and can complicate the search for fruitful solutions and weaken social ties within and across national borders. This is also where the Swiss referendum can be a lesson: while right wing populist parties usually struggle to gain more votes in elections, they can set the national political agenda in ‘extraordinary times’ by capitalising on sentiments on a single issue. Let us not forget that the Swiss government was against this initiative; yet it failed to mobilise voters.

It is important that efforts to address the realities of international mobility match the needs and priorities of all stakeholders. This requires a better use of existing tools (e.g. visa rules, mobility partnerships), but also implies reinforcing member state participation and implementation of EU policies. The financial crisis has opened a critical juncture in European cooperation and the forthcoming EP elections provide the necessary forum for a discussion on these critical issues – a window of opportunity that may not be available in ‘ordinary times’. This issue of the *BEPA Monthly Brief* hopes to give the impetus for this discussion on immigration, the opportunities it offers the EU, and the challenges ahead.

1 The Swiss referendum: Is free movement of people in danger in Europe?

By *Diego Acosta Arcarazo**

Swiss citizens voted on 9th February by a narrow majority of 50.3% in favour of a popular initiative entitled “against mass migration”. The Pyrrhic success in the proposal from the right wing Swiss People’s Party has led to countless reactions from the European Commission, political parties in several member states as well as the Swiss government.

This vote motivates the need to discuss and analyse both the legal consequences of the referendum, as well as the reasons that have led Swiss citizens to vote against free movement of people between its country and the EU and the countries of the European Economic Area (Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein). This debate has profound implications for the free movement of people in Europe, but must be clearly distinguished both legally and politically from similar ones taking place in other countries.

Consequences for Switzerland

First, and most obviously, Switzerland is not part of the EU. The main reason for the Swiss vote completely differs from debates which have been put forward in other parts of the EU. In a country where the unemployment rate among Swiss citizens stands at only 3.1%, the economy has not played a pivotal part in the success of the proposal. Rather, perceived overpopulation and the problems it seems to entail (e.g., transportation gridlock, housing shortages and booming prices) have played a central role. There has also been a clear divide between the vote in favour of the proposal in rural areas where migrant population is at its lowest, and the one against it in big cities, notably in Zurich or Geneva.

Switzerland and the EU are associated by seven bilateral agreements in force since 2002. These agreements deal with various issues such as transport, agriculture, scientific cooperation and free movement of people. This last agreement contains the so-called “guillotine mechanism” by which renouncing to it automatically entails the

termination of the other agreements. The initiative resulting from the referendum proposes to introduce a new article in the Constitution by which the maximum number of foreigners able to obtain a residence permit each year will be subject to quotas. Interestingly enough, this new article is vague in the sense of providing that the “annual ceilings and quotas for foreigners exercising a gainful activity will be determined in accordance with Switzerland’s global economic interests and in accordance with the principle of preferential treatment of nationals”. Thus, whereas the EU-Swiss relationship will be severely affected as will the circa 1.1 million EU citizens residing in Switzerland (mostly qualified German and French nationals), it is far from clear how Switzerland will legislate on the initiative.

Second, the Swiss government now has three years to renegotiate any international treaty contrary to this new constitutional provision. In the meantime, European citizens will continue to have the right to work and reside in Switzerland under the same conditions as nationals, although with an uncertain short-term future. The EU has strongly declared that Switzerland will not be entitled to an *à la carte* relationship. In other words, any restriction on the free movement of people will also affect the free movement of services and goods. The EU is Switzerland’s largest trading partner amounting for 57% of its exports in goods, and possible new obstacles on the access to the internal market are seen with concern by several Swiss companies. The Swiss electorate, however, was perfectly aware of the possible drawbacks in access to the internal market that a positive outcome would have entailed. It is possibly the reason why they had voted positively to free movement of people in the previous three referendums.

Consequences for the EU

It is necessary to discuss the possible implications for other European countries. Would it be possible to hold a similar referendum in any EU

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member state? The answer from a legal point of view is clearly no. Any member state that would like to limit free movement of people would need to either leave the EU or attempt to renegotiate its membership, something which seems politically terribly complex, if not impossible. Hence, despite the satisfactory pronouncements by certain political parties in the EU as to the results in Switzerland, this case is not a possible model for other countries.

Nevertheless, the Swiss referendum repositions the suitability of the free movement of people at the centre of the discussion. This has been recently largely debated in countries such as the UK, where several proposals have been presented (e.g., the possible cap to 75,000 residence permits per year for EU citizens). Leaving aside their illegality under EU law, notably the EU Treaties and Directive 2004/38, it is necessary to see how one may argue against these proposals and in favour of free movement of people in Europe.

In the last few months, two arguments have been mentioned, notably by the European Commission. First, from the perspective of business, national companies selling goods or services in the internal market would suffer from any limitation of the free movement provisions. In turn, the economic argument acclaims the economic growth that countries which have received EU workers have benefited from. This last argument was present during the Swiss referendum and has been the subject of well-known studies in EU member states such as the UK. One needs to be careful with comparing the two countries since the scope of the debates in either is distant from each other. In the case of Switzerland, the referendum would in principle affect all non-nationals regardless of their economic position. The debate in the UK has been more centred on the discussion about alleged welfare tourism, something which has, however, not been empirically proven in any case by the British authorities, as the Commission has pointed out on several occasions.

The future of mobility

There is yet a final argument in favour of free movement which has not been sufficiently voiced. It is worth remembering that contrary to popular

belief and despite almost complete open borders in Europe, differences in salaries and unemployment rates, only a tiny percentage of EU nationals make use of their right to free movement: 97% of the 500 million EU citizens remain in their home country; only around 3% reside in another EU member state. Crucially, this movement goes in various directions and not only from poorer to richer countries. Indeed, the 453,000 Swiss citizens residing in the 28 member states will probably be severely affected by the recent referendum. But how would this play out in some member states that have been recently critical of free movement such as the UK? According to recent government statistics, whereas 2.3 million EU nationals reside in the UK, the number of British nationals in the other 26 member states (statistics did not include Croatia) reach 2.2 million. This last argument, which we may label as the human argument in favour of mobility, needs to be put at the centre of any serious debate in Europe on the matter.

The question to put to political parties arguing in favour of restricting free movement of people is not only how they will cope with the negative economic consequences that any restriction will entail, but also what future they offer to their countrymen residing in the EU. Crucially, as has been argued, the populist right in Switzerland will now have to move from the comfortable position of rhetorically arguing against free movement and migration to a fully-fledged redesign which must achieve the impossible task of ensuring that current levels of prosperity are sustainable, while at the same time reducing the number of migrants although they have been instrumental in this feat. Indeed, for those defending mobility of citizens in Europe, the Swiss referendum may not be such bad news after all.

The problem is now in the hands of the Swiss and EU legislatures that will have to determine their positions and long-term responses to the referendum. The Swiss government, who had – let's not forget it – opposed the referendum, will now face the challenge to find a satisfactory solution in its negotiations with the EU. The current and new Commission will also need to deal with a far from ideal situation that will influence future debates in Europe.

2 Europe's migration challenge and its economic impact

By Rainer Münz*

Europe faces two challenges. On the one hand, unemployment in some parts of Europe, namely in the southern and south-eastern member states of the European Union, has reached unprecedented levels. On the other hand, a shortage of skilled labour in a growing number of regions and industries is also apparent. At the same time, demographic forecasts clearly demonstrate that this shortage will further increase. The impact of the demographic trend on Europe is particularly concerning. The reason is that Europe's 'native' workforce is ageing and the number of graduates from all levels of education is declining and will continue to decline in the coming decades.

In the short term: Facilitate EU labour mobility

The remedies to the migration challenge are obvious. In the short term, Europe needs more mobility of labour between EU member states – in particular between those with high levels of unemployment and those suffering from labour market shortages. Today, less than 1% of all economically active EU citizens move from one member state to another annually. This clearly shows that there is not yet a functioning single EU labour market.

The reasons for the absence of a single labour market are multifold. First, some European citizens who might find work in another EU member state lack the necessary linguistic competences. Others do not expect a speedy recognition of their acquired skills and therefore fear that the job offers they will receive will be below their skills level, which could lead to their de-qualification and to lower pay. Yet another reason is the fact that job seekers do not know how to start an EU-wide job search. Thirdly, there are structural barriers to mobility among the different EU member states. In some cases dealing with different social security systems is encouraging mobility, while in other cases

mobility is not facilitated since social and employer benefits are not fully portable across all 28 EU member states.

Furthermore, in most EU countries various professional groups are successful at maintaining entry barriers that favour 'insiders'. The outcome is obvious. Even if skilled EU citizens would show more interest in moving to another country, they could not easily become lawyers, teachers, civil servants, or establish a profitable business in the country of destination of their choice. Increasing home ownership also reduces the willingness and ability of EU citizens to move to another member state. This phenomenon is particularly true in crisis-hit regions and countries. The decreasing real estate prices in these areas tend to 'lock in' people who would otherwise be mobile.

In the long term: Facilitate high skilled migration

In the long run, even a higher degree of intra-European mobility would not be sufficient to close future gaps in European labour markets. As a result, European countries with ageing societies and stagnating or declining working age populations that lead to labour market shortages, will have to rely on immigrants. A number of EU member states accustomed to finding the kind of labour and skills they require easily, will need to think more strategically about how to attract qualified workers.

This challenge will not become easier over time. For demographic reasons in a not too distant future, many more economies – in particular China – will be in need of migrant labour. This means that the geography and composition of international migration is changing, as more countries will enter the global race for talent and skills. In the context of this emerging competition, the EU and its member states will have to develop smarter recruitment policies and improve their image as a destination for skilled migrants.

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While most sending countries have adopted liberal migration policies facilitating travel and emigration, receiving countries in Europe see migration control as a key element of their sovereignty. As a result, EU member states generally have ‘unilateral’ admission policies that are neither aligned with other receiving countries nor with key sending countries. Given this situation, bilateral agreements or mobility partnerships can only play a minor role in most EU migration policymaking.

Tackling the constraints on migration

This lack of cooperation between migrant sending and receiving countries increases the costs of migration and decreases the positive effects on socio-economic development. The direct (and sometimes excessive) costs include the issuing of visas and passports, the administrative fees for recruitment and travel agencies, the commissions on currency exchange, the fees on money transfer, and other levies. These indirect costs are a form of labour market discrimination: they lead to lower incomes compared to those of native workers with similar skills; to reduced ability to transfer acquired social rights and benefits across countries, which translates into lower or no pension payments; to lower health insurance coverage; and to reduced or no access to unemployment benefits.


Smarter policies could help reduce these costs and downsides of international migration. More cooperation at all points of the migration trajectory (in sending, transit and receiving countries) would offer policymakers the opportunity to craft policies that can be mutually beneficial and help mitigate the risks of migration.

One driver of restrictive migration policies is public opinion. Many Europeans are not ready to accept more international migrants in their respective countries. In parallel, political parties with a restrictive agenda on migration are becoming more popular. In such a context, the outcome of a recent referendum in Switzerland is telling. The Swiss electorate has voted in favour of abolishing the freedom of movement between the EU and Switzerland. The objective is now to replace it by a government administered quota system. Opinion polls carried out by Maurice de

Hond and Ifop seem to suggest a similar outlook: if asked in a popular referendum, citizens from a number of EU member states may have also voted in favour of restricting labour market access for workers coming from other European countries.

Unfavourable perceptions of migration create at least three challenges for the EU and its member states. First, they point to the need to organise political majorities in favour of more pro-active migration policies. Second, they emphasise the importance of making Europe more attractive for mobile people with talent and skills. Third, they encourage the move away from unilateral migration policies and toward negotiated win-win solutions aiming at reducing the costs of and enhancing the welfare gains from migration and remittances.

We should, however, keep in mind that more international migration from third countries and a greater degree of mobility between EU member states remains only one possible answer to future mismatches between the supply and the demand of labour and skills. EU member states with ageing populations must also consider other policies to protect the capabilities of their workforces. These should include increasing the retirement age and the participation of women in the labour force.



3 Think Tank Twitter

Think Tank Twitter (TTT) aims to provide regular information and updates on what is produced by think tanks and research centres across Europe (and beyond) on EU policy issues. As an analogy to the original Twitter, each summary – or tweet – does not exceed 140 words, rather than characters. Those who wish to signal new publications for possible inclusion can send them to the email address bepa-think-tank-twitter@ec.europa.eu

Monnet's Brandy and Europe's Fate

“I have always believed that Europe will be established through crisis, and that the outcome will be the sum of the outcomes of those crises”. The influence of the historical figure of Jean Monnet remains substantial. Confronted with the eurozone crisis, European capitals have taken measures that will allow Monnet's vision of a united Europe to survive. The author first presents Monnet's role in establishing an effective ECSC with a High Authority, and then analyses his fragile legacy: the EP and the EC were steps taken toward a federal democratic state but were contradicted by nation states determined to preserve sovereignty. To conclude, he considers that the way toward a United States of Europe may be back on track: the eurozone will keep on deepening integration and become, step by step, more like the USA.

<http://www.brookings.edu/research/essays/2014/monnets-brandy-and-europes-fate>

Heading Towards a European Federation: Europe's last chance

During the crisis period, Europe has confronted two emergencies: the need for European growth and for ways to match the euro with a political structure. The creation of a European Federation could create a new dynamic. The authors propose a method for building the Europe of the future: a blueprint for an international treaty comprising ten articles and establishing a Federation of initially 6-7 countries, including Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, and possibly Poland. The Federation is presented as the only way to revive growth, capable of fostering a new industrial dynamic through investment and cuts to the welfare state. France and Germany must change their outlook; political and economic cohesion (including finance, energy and defence issues) must be strengthened in Europe; and taxation must be harmonised.

<http://www.notre-europe.eu/media/towardseuropeanfederation-godinoverdier-ne-jdi-feb14.pdf?pdf=ok>

In Sickness and in Health: Protecting and supporting public investment in Europe

During the crisis, public investment has declined in Europe and the EU fiscal framework provisions in this field are very weak. On the contrary, public investment in the USA, Japan and Canada has increased. The negative effect of cuts is particularly problematic for countries confronted with recession and could undermine long-term growth potential or aggravate unemployment in Europe. The authors propose to amend the EU fiscal framework to protect public investment in recession times, with an appropriate asymmetric golden rule: a fiscal rule that excludes capital expenditure from the computation of budget deficit requirements. Equally, they advocate for implementing a massive European investment programme in bad times. They consider that the European Investment Bank's internal procedures should be revived and that its capital should increase.

<http://www.bruegel.org/publications/publication-detail/publication/812-in-sickness-and-in-health-protecting-and-supporting-public-investment-in-europe/>

Who Leads the New EMU? Implications of the economic crisis for the EU's institutions

The paper analyses the long-term implications that the choices made on the development of the EMU will have on the institutional set up. Crisis management has strengthened the intergovernmental structures of the EU political system at the expense of the communitarian decision-making process. Nevertheless, the situation has changed: the European Commission and ECB mandates have been broadened. The EP has been in a key position in the construction of the new economic/budgetary surveillance. The author considers that this reflects the reinforcement of the division of competences in the field of EU economic/fiscal policies. This fragmentation is dangerous for the EU democratic system since it disrupts the division of powers between the EU and member states and thus complicates democratic scrutiny of economic and fiscal policies.

<http://www.fiiia.fi/en/publication/397/who-leads-the-new-emu/>

Ten Years On: Rebooting the EU-China strategic partnership

China and the EU should strengthen discussions on global governance and focus their relation on pragmatic cooperation. The report concludes that the relationship between these two regions should move from discussions on trade to include climate change, urbanisation and security. On trade relations, wider-ranging links (e.g., on solar panels) could lessen misunderstanding. Although consultations are positive on global issues, security cooperation is poor and Europeans remain sceptical about China's international role, which focuses on a limited strategic agenda and regional politics. The recommendations listed include: cooperate on areas important to China's future growth (e.g., synergies on energy and climate issues); encourage contacts and exchanges between cities, ports and universities; promote the study of Mandarin; ensure that trade disputes do not envenom overall relations; actively pursue the negotiation of an agreement on investments.

http://www.friendsofeurope.org/Portals/13/Documents/Reports/2014/FoE_Report_RT_CHINA_web.pdf

The Geopolitics of Shale Gas

The study analyses the geopolitical impact of the US shale gas production on the EU and the impact of this US shale gas revolution on oil and gas prices. It concludes that the development of US shale gas may have destabilising effects on oil and gas exporters in the European neighbourhood, which may in turn negatively impact on intrastate stability. Even if shale gas is an American phenomenon, it could make natural gas prices in European markets drop and put a stress on the traditional construction in European and Asian markets. Algeria and Russia could be highly exposed to oil price fluctuations. The decreased US energy dependency on Middle Eastern resources could increase Chinese and Indian competition in this region. The EU is encouraged to support economic diversification.

<http://www.hcss.nl/reports/the-geopolitics-of-shale-gas/138/>

The EU, Russia and a Less Common Neighbourhood

The Vilnius Summit has highlighted the need to further focus on the Eastern Partnership, which is currently in crisis, and critically assess the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and EU-Russia relations. The author analyses the commonalities and distinctions in the approaches taken by the main stakeholders (EU, eastern partners and Russia). Russia adopts a hegemonic approach to its neighbourhood. In response, the EU should increase its resources to foster communication with societies in partner countries, abandon the question of the Association agreement with Ukraine, and focus on smaller measures (e.g., the introduction of visa freedom for short-term travel as a positive signal to Ukrainians). This approach should be linked to a modified European policy towards Russia that takes account of unresolved conflicts in the region and is more transparent on ENP objectives.

http://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/comments/2014C03_stw.pdf

European Foreign Policy Scorecard 2014

The ECFR scorecard provides an annual evaluation of the member states' performance in foreign policy. Conclusions are mitigated: on the one hand, 2013 was a good year compared to the previous one, with improvement on relations with Wider Europe, China and the Middle East. On the other hand, Europe has performed worse on multilateral issues, crisis management and relations with Russia. Iran and Kosovo remain clear successes, but a long-term comprehensive solution must be negotiated. The EU has faced serious challenges in the eastern and southern neighbourhoods: Russia competed with the EU in the post-Soviet area and the ENP's irrelevance has become clear, especially in Egypt and Syria. The EU's soft power in the neighbourhood is increasingly contested. The TTIP could be the EU's next big success, even if distrust on data protection remains problematic.

http://ecfr.eu/page/-/ECFR94_SCORECARD_2014.pdf

4 BEPA News

Départs

Philippe Legrain, conseiller principal et chef de l'équipe Analyse du BEPA, quitte la Commission et crée à Londres un think tank qui analysera les tendances en économie politique. Nous lui souhaitons une bonne continuation.

Activités

La première réunion du groupe d'experts en prospective de la Commission européenne – une initiative du Président avec le concours de l'équipe de la Conseillère Scientifique en chef et du BEPA – s'est tenue le 17 février. Les 20 directions générales impliquées ont défini le programme de travail du groupe pour la première moitié de 2014 : des fiches technologiques seront élaborées d'ici mi-mars et serviront de base pour des ateliers de travail qui auront lieu le 27-28 mars et 1-2 avril prochains. Le groupe participera aussi à l'élaboration d'un Eurobaromètre sur la prospective qui sera réalisé en juin. Le résultat de ces ateliers et de l'Eurobaromètre seront utilisés par le conseil scientifique et technique du Président pour leur rapport qui doit être rendu en juillet.

La conférence annuelle ESPAS « Global Trends 2030: Key Challenges ahead for the European Union » s'est déroulée ces 17 et 18 février à Bruxelles. Des experts venant d'Europe, de Russie, des Etats-Unis, de Chine, d'Inde, d'Amérique du Sud et d'Afrique se sont intéressés à des problématiques telles que le futur de l'économie européenne, la réplique de l'Europe à la pénurie de ressources et le rôle de l'Europe dans un monde de plus en plus polycentrique. Le Président Barroso est intervenu dans les débats lors d'une conversation avec le journaliste John Peet, de l'hebdomadaire *The Economist*. Un rapport de l'Union Européenne sur les tendances mondiales et leur impact sur l'Europe est prévu pour mi-2014.

Le Président Barroso lors de la conférence ESPAS le 18 février 2014.

Le 18 et 19 février, le Groupe Européen d'Ethique des Sciences et des Nouvelles Technologies s'est réuni afin de poursuivre l'élaboration de son Opinion sur les Technologies de Sécurité et de Surveillance.

Activités à venir

Le 1^{er} mars, la troisième et dernière assemblée générale des « Formes d'imagination et de pensée pour l'Europe » se déroulera à Berlin. À cette occasion, le comité culturel, composé de personnalités du monde artistique et culturel, présentera sa déclaration finale concernant le « Nouveau récit pour l'Europe » au président Barroso, en présence de la chancelière allemande Angela Merkel. L'événement sera suivi de représentations artistiques illustrant le lien entre le monde culturel et le projet européen.

Le 4 mars, le Président Barroso se verra remettre la médaille commémorative du centenaire de la naissance de Raoul Wallenberg, l'homme d'affaires et diplomate suédois qui a contribué par son action à sauver la vie de plusieurs dizaines de milliers de juifs de Hongrie pendant la Seconde Guerre mondiale. Cette médaille, frappée en 2012 par la Fondation internationale Raoul Wallenberg, vise à honorer ceux qui, par leur action personnelle et/ou par leur rôle officiel, prolongent l'esprit de Raoul Wallenberg, en faisant preuve d'esprit de solidarité et de courage civique, en instituant les valeurs morales comme principe de leur action et en promouvant les droits de l'Homme.

