INTERIM REPORT

of the Political Affairs Committee

on the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (Helsinki II)

Rapporteur: Mr Georgios ROMEOS
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At the sitting of 15 January 1990 the President of Parliament announced that he had referred the motion for a resolution by Mr Goria on the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (Doc. B3-0759/89) to the Political Affairs Committee pursuant to Rule 63 of the Rules of Procedure.

At its meeting of 31 January 1990 the Political Affairs Committee decided to draw up a report. It appointed Mr Romeos rapporteur on 1 February 1990.

The committee considered the draft interim report at its meetings of 22 May, 28-29 June and 20 September 1990.

At the last meeting it adopted the motion for a resolution by 26 votes to 3 with 3 abstentions.

The following took part in the vote: Goria, chairman; Crampton, first vice-chairman; Defraigne, second vice-chairman; van den Brink, third vice-chairman; Romeos, rapporteur; Antony (for Schönhuber), Baget Bozzo, Bertens (for Capucho), Lord Bethell, Cassanmagnago Ceretti, Ib Christensen, Coates, Dillen, Ephremidis, Fernandez Albor (for Ferrer (Rule 111(2))), Ford, Jepsen, Lagakos (for Pesmazoglou), Landa Mendibe (for Fini), Langer, Newens (for Balfe), Paisley, Penders, Piermont, Planas, Pons Grau (for Moran Lopez), Saby (for Cheysson), Sakellariou, Stavrakou (for Habsburg), Verde i Aldea, Walter and White.

The report was tabled on 24 September 1990.

The deadline for tabling amendments will appear on the draft agenda for the part-session at which the report is to be considered.
MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION

on the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
(Helsinki II Conference)

The European Parliament,
A. having regard to:
- the resolution tabled by Mr Goria (B3-0759/89) calling on the Council to take steps for the full and active involvement of the Community in the Helsinki II Conference,
- all its resolutions on security in Western Europe and the agreements on disarmament,
- the resolutions adopted between 1968 and 1986 on the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE),
- its resolution on the Helsinki Final Act (B2-0054/86),
- its resolutions on recent developments in Central and Eastern Europe and the unification of Germany,
- its resolutions on the Community's relations with the COMECON countries,
- the interim report by the Political Affairs Committee on the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (Helsinki II) (Doc. A3-0226/90),
B. having regard to the declarations of the summit meetings of Madrid, Rhodes, Strasbourg and Dublin on the progress of negotiations on disarmament and the CSCE,
C. noting the decisions taken - within the framework of the CSCE - during the conferences in Vienna (CFE and CSBM), London (information), Paris and Copenhagen (the human dimension) and Bonn (economic cooperation) and the positions adopted at the Warsaw Pact summit which immediately preceded it,
D. recalling the positions of the NATO Foreign Ministers meeting in Scotland on 7 and 8 June 1990,
I. The results of the Helsinki Final Act

The European Parliament notes that:
1. The Helsinki Final Act has contributed, particularly through the decisions of the bodies of the CSCE, to stabilizing the climate of peace and cooperation in Europe and respect for human rights, despite the fact that it was a political text and not an international treaty;
2. The countries participating in the CSCE, with certain exceptions, have promoted the ten basic principles of the Final Act;
3. Despite the progress made in the important area of human rights, it has been acknowledged that their continued violation jeopardizes democracy, peace and cooperation; the situation in Romania and Bulgaria gives particular cause for concern in this respect;
4. The majority of countries participating in the CSCE have respected the principles of territorial integrity, frontiers and the sovereign equality of States;
5. Unfortunately, circumstances have arisen in which the above principles have been violated by the use of force, and the fifth principle of the Final Act on the peaceful solution of differences has been ignored;
6. In the fifteen years since the signing of the Final Act, considerable progress has been made on cooperation in numerous sectors; although it has failed to reverse Europe's division into two politically, economically and militarily opposed blocs, that division fortunately seems to be disappearing;
7. The principles of the Helsinki Final Act, which does not constitute an international convention but a political text, have failed to prevent the flaring up and/or persistence of regional conflicts, especially in the Mediterranean area;
8. In conclusion, the principles of the Final Act have helped open up the way to major changes in Europe and provide a framework for cooperation which, though not yet effective in the Mediterranean region for example, nevertheless forms a basis on which it is now both possible and necessary to make significant further progress;
II. The changes in Europe

9. The changes in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the dismantling of the Berlin Wall have brought an end to the division of Europe and set the final seal on the Yalta Agreements;
10. The continued progress of many countries towards the establishment of democratic regimes based on free elections opens the way for a peaceful and democratic united Europe and creates the conditions for economic cooperation based on the free movement of individuals, goods, capital and services;
11. The changes in Europe offer particular opportunities in the field of security policy; the decades of military confrontation between NATO and the Warsaw Pact must be replaced by a process of ongoing cooperation between the two organizations;
12. The serious economic problems facing the countries of Central and Eastern Europe threaten progress towards both democratization and peace;
13. The unification of Germany is justifiably welcomed as the end of the Cold War and the beginning of the new construction of Europe;
14. The political, economic and defence issues arising from the unification of Germany are tied up completely with European security and cooperation;
III. Helsinki II

15. The countries of Europe and the USA have already agreed that the CSCE is the appropriate framework for planning the new Europe and establishing a new order of peace which will cover all the countries participating in the CSCE and the sensitive region of the Mediterranean;
16. The new CSCE summit conference - Helsinki II - must solve all the problems connected with security and cooperation and its decisions should take the form of an international treaty;
17. The context in which the conference should take place should be determined by the following points:
- the decisions and agreements of the CSCE (Bonn Conference on economic cooperation, Copenhagen Conference on the human dimension, Majorca meeting on the Mediterranean dimension, agreements on conventional arms limitation),
- the decisions of the European summit meetings and, in particular, the decisions of the special Dublin Conference,
President Mitterrand's proposals on a pan-European confederation and President Gorbachev's proposals on a common European home;

- the Belgian Government's proposal on the creation of a European Defence Council;

- Prime Minister Mazowiecki's proposal on a European Cooperation Council which would include the USA, Canada and the Soviet Union and the related proposal of Czechoslovakia's Prime Minister Havel on the creation of a European Security Commission,

- the decisions of the special European Council meeting in Dublin;

- the proposals that have been or may be made by the European Parliament or the various national parliaments on this subject;

18. The basic aims of the conference shall include:

- extending the circle of signatory States to include Albania at least and, possibly, other countries of the Mediterranean region that were excluded previously;

- formulating a pan-European security system based on cooperation in the political, environmental and economic spheres and mutual trust;

- establishing new principles that are recognized and accepted by all parties and setting up some organization such as a CSCE Security Council to promote these principles and monitor compliance with them;

19. In this context, a suitable procedure should be sought for the reshaping of the defence treaties and a pan-European body convened to implement security policy throughout Europe as a whole, involving all the countries participating in the CSCE;

20. The latest developments in the Persian Gulf show that, though military confrontation has abated in Europe, new security policy issues will arise not only inside Europe but also beyond its confines, and the European countries should take a united stand in response to such challenges;

21. Any decisions and agreements at the 4 + 2 conference concerning the position of a united Germany in the existing defence system must be made with a European security system in view;

22. In tandem with the Helsinki II Conference, swifter action is needed and new initiatives must be taken with regard to disarmament, the banning of chemical weapons, controlling the production and sale of weapons, the structure of the armed forces and determining the future of foreign military dispositions; naturally, negotiations should be intensified to achieve a drastic reduction in conventional, nuclear, chemical and bacteriological weapons with mutual and collective verification;

23. The conference should determine the procedure and mechanisms for intervening in any border disputes so as to avoid dangerous conflicts developing;

24. In the same spirit, it would be advisable to determine the procedure for intervening in complicated situations at the external borders of the territory covered by the collective security system;

25. In order to achieve this goal, intervention procedures must be established with a view to the peaceful settlement of differences and the avoidance of armed conflict;

26. It is clear that a collective security system will not be able to operate unless existing differences are resolved and peace is established in areas where disputes and conflicts exist because of violent interventions, as is still the case in various parts of Europe;

27. In view of the unanimous agreement that security and peace in Europe will be based on cooperation rather than militarization, Helsinki II must tackle the following basic issues:

   (a) the recognition and inviolability of current borders, respect for the sovereign equality of states and territorial integrity,

   (b) the definition of the substance of and the procedures for practising the right of self-determination of those entitled to exercise that right,

   (c) the definition of the rights and obligations of minorities within states, within the framework of the principles of the Helsinki Final Act on respect for the unity and territorial integrity of States,

   (d) the institution of pluralist democracy with free elections and respect for human rights and the rights of minorities as a prerequisite for a country's participation in the European edifice,

   (e) human rights must be given a new dimension to meet the social and economic requirements of individuals - the right to work/other right to livelihood; when an inhabitant is expelled from his country it is an obligation for us all; consequently, measures are required whose implementation by all the countries of the CSCE is mandatory;

   (g) organized crime, particularly that linked to the drugs trade, and terrorism threaten social peace and create further interstate disputes; regulations that are accepted and implemented jointly must therefore be introduced;

28. It is self-evident that the balanced development of all European countries and the closing of the gap between rich and poor countries can be achieved through economic cooperation and solidarity;

29. To this end, attention should be given to the creation of a Solidarity Fund which could also assist the poorer countries of the Third World. This fund could be financed from the resources saved as a result of reductions in armaments;

IV. Institutions and bodies of Helsinki II

30. To implement and monitor the decisions of the Conference, permanent arrangements and bodies with a fixed seat must be set up, in particular:

   (a) a permanent secretariat
   (b) a committee of permanent representatives
   (c) a council of foreign ministers
   (d) regular summit meetings;

All these bodies could operate within the framework of a European Security Council which, on the basis of the experience of the United Nations, should acquire the possibility of swift and effective intervention;

31. Decisions on any form of intervention must be taken collectively and always with the aim of maintaining peace and averting the use of force;
32. Supranational bodies set up to implement and monitor the decisions of Helsinki II should be given broader scope through the convocation of a parliamentary assembly, so that the whole new European edifice has firm democratic foundations; the Council of Europe could constitute the basis for such a parliamentary assembly;

V. The Community's role

33. Respect for human rights must be a statutory requirement of states taking part in Helsinki II processes and decisions; this calls for the strengthening of the role and effectiveness of the European Court of Human Rights;

34. The European Community can and must play a decisive role in Helsinki II in shaping the new structure of Europe;

35. The European Community is at present the only stable and dynamic supranational organization of states with a political and economic dimension;

36. To serve as the central focus of the new Europe, the Community must display a united front throughout both the CSCE and Helsinki II process;

37. This aim must be achieved at the EC countries' forthcoming intergovernmental conference by accelerating the movement towards political integration, economic and monetary union and the adoption of a common foreign policy and a common policy on security;

38. The united front presented by the Community during these processes must be based on firm democratic foundations and this presupposes constant cooperation on the part of the Council and the Commission with the European Parliament and the national parliaments;

39. The European Parliament must play a consistent and clearly defined role in the Helsinki II process:

(a) The European Parliament should be represented at the 35-nation summit by its President and a small delegation of members;

(b) European Parliament observers should be present at all CSCE meetings, as was the case at the Copenhagen Conference; to that end, the European Parliament should set up a temporary EP/CSCE delegation, appointed by the Political Affairs Committee, for the duration of CSCE II;

(c) The Council Presidency should keep the European Parliament regularly briefed on the positions of the Twelve at the various CSCE conferences;

40. The forthcoming conference between the European Parliament and the national parliaments in Rome must make provision for national parliaments to participate in the abovementioned processes and in the processes leading to the integration of the European Community;

41. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Commission, the Council, the Foreign Ministers of the Member States meeting in EPC and the governments and parliaments of all the countries participating in the CSCE.
ELAXNATORY STATEMENT

I. INTRODUCTION

1. The Helsinki Final Act, which was adopted in 1975, paved the way for cooperation between European nations and for concerted efforts to preserve peace, foster solidarity and secure respect for human rights.

2. The Final Act is the fruit of the common experience of European nations living through the two World Wars, the Cold War and the period of détente. For the people of Central and Eastern Europe it was the most important point of reference in their quest for freedom and democracy.

3. Now, in the new era dawning in Europe, a new framework for international cooperation must be found, the fundamental principles of the Final Act recast.

4. With the radical changes in Central and Eastern Europe - countries still moving towards democratization, the establishment of pluralist regimes and respect for human rights - and the reunification of Germany, events have leapt ahead of Helsinki.

5. In the new pan-European order now unfolding it is vital that an architecture be designed and set in place with the aim of preserving peace, promoting political cooperation and mutual economic support.

6. All of these developments raise questions about the very future of the continent of Europe. Questions such as the future of the military alliances, the format for and operation of pan-European security, the framework for cooperation, the impact of the German question on the new pan-European order, the future of existing structures, institutions and organizations, the future of the Community itself and, finally, the need for an institutional agreement to encompass all these aspects, a blueprint for an eventual peace treaty.

7. These issues are also at the root of the proposals already submitted from various quarters as part of the process of planning for the new pan-European edifice.

8. The new Helsinki II Conference should give rise to new institutional arrangements and agreements for procedures and bodies to maintain peace and cooperation. There is a need to define the operating framework for control mechanisms and the settlement of international disputes, within which territorial integrity and national sovereignty may be preserved.

9. This is the only approach that will enable the new peaceful pan-European order to unfold, guaranteeing the people of Europe democracy, peace, mutual trust and political, economic and cultural cooperation.

II. FROM THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT TO THE CSCE: THE POINTS OF DEPARTURE

10. With the exception of the UN Economic Commission for Europe, pre-1975 organizations and agreements reflected the Cold War climate and the atmosphere of mutual fear and distrust which prevailed in Europe at that time.

11. The signing of the Final Act was the ultimate expression of the people's desire for peace and cooperation and laid the foundation for the changes in Central and Eastern Europe, giving the future development of European nations a new geopolitical, strategic, political and economic dimension.

12. The Final Act was signed on 1 August 1975 and covers three basic areas of agreement:

(a) a declaration of principles,
(b) cooperation on economic affairs, science, technology and the environment,
(c) cooperation on human affairs (human rights, culture, information and education).

The Final Act devotes special attention to security and cooperation in the Mediterranean.

The declaration of principles, known as the Helsinki 'Ten Commandments', anticipated present developments, making the following stipulations:

1. Respect for the sovereign equality of states,
2. Refraining from the threat or use of force,
3. The inviolability of frontiers,
4. Respect for territorial integrity,
5. Peaceful settlement of disputes,
6. Non-intervention in internal affairs,
7. Respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms,
8. The right to self-determination of peoples,
9. Cooperation among states in all fields,
10. Fulfilment of all obligations under international law.

Although the Final Act is a political text and not an international treaty, it has made a vital contribution to détente, the consolidation of peace in Europe, respect for human rights and mutual understanding.

13. The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe ended by adopting the final text of January 1989 in Vienna. This is the last important text after the Final Act in that it introduces new and stricter obligations on states regarding the protection of human rights and brings disarmament within the scope of the CSCE process.

14. As regards the application of the Helsinki principles, on balance the general trend has been favourable. Most of the principles of the 'Ten Commandments' have been respected despite the fact that tension has increased and regional conflicts have intensified at international level. Also, the fact that Europe is still divided has not allowed the two opposing sides to move towards cooperation in the political, military and economic fields.

15. The result of increasing superpower confrontation was the perpetuation of existing but also the creation of new regional focuses for military conflict and violations of territorial integrity and the frontiers of independent states, particularly in the Mediterranean region.

16. The violation of basic Helsinki principles was clear evidence of the need for intervention mechanisms to settle disputes and avert conflict.

17. Present developments in Europe fully bear out the Helsinki principles and the CSCE accords and call for an international treaty to regulate all aspects of the problems created by the new situation.

III. THE NEW SITUATION IN EUROPE

18. The changes in Europe symbolized by the fall of the Berlin Wall surpassed any prediction as to the speed at which they would happen and what form they would take, putting an end once and for all to post-war divisions. The basic principles of the Final Act were held high (the inviolability of frontiers, self-determination of peoples, peaceful settlement of disputes, human rights, etc.), underscoring the constant relevance and importance of Helsinki in promoting a climate
of reciprocity and trust.

19. The old order imposed by the Yalta accords is no more. The continuing changes in Central and Eastern Europe, reforms within the Soviet Union, the redundancy of the Warsaw Pact and the reunification of Germany have completely changed the face of security and the balance of power in Europe.

20. The changes in Central and Eastern Europe are propelling their people towards multi-party democracy and full respect for human rights.

21. However, they appear to be paying a high price for these reforms. The transition to a free economy has brought to the surface the enormous economic problems in these countries and has already created tremendous difficulties in adapting the economic and social systems to the new conditions.

22. The Soviet Union which, as a superpower, was involved in a direct and equal struggle with the USA for world supremacy, is now caught up in the dynamics of perestroika. Faced on the home front with enormous political, social and economic problems and feeling the threat of nationalist upheavals in some of the republics, it is no longer in a position to play its dominant international role.

23. The German reunification process, which swept aside the initial difficulties of substance which arose internally (and with neighbouring European countries), raises a great many problems - political, economic, defence - with a direct bearing on the future of Europe, though principally in terms of the new international balance of power and security which will inevitably come into being.

24. For the first time since Yalta, these changes have given rise to a climate of instability creating a new quest for security in Europe. The questions which have already been raised as to whether the two military alliances (NATO and the Warsaw Pact) should continue to operate with their present structure and objectives, the redefinition of the principles of security at national and at European level and the need for cooperation between states (or groups of states) are signs of efforts to find a framework for a pan-European security system and a new order for maintaining peace.

IV. THE HELSINKI II CONFERENCE

25. In the wake of the changes in Central and Eastern Europe the question of the future of existing European structures has resurfaced.

26. There are a great many interesting proposals for setting up new institutional structures for cooperation (and for adapting the old structures). One of the first ideas was put forward by Vaclav Havel for the creation of a Czechoslovak-Polish federation as a counterweight to a unified Germany in Central Europe. In Bratislava, last April, the leaders of Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Poland and representatives of the governments of Austria, Yugoslavia and Italy met as an informal institutional body to discuss the possibility of resolving regional problems (borders, minorities, etc.) and coordinating their dealings with the European Community.

In Poland there has been an increasingly lively debate around setting up a Baltic forum, to include the Central European states (with the possibility of the Adriatic states taking part). The Balkan countries have already taken initiatives to cooperate in all sectors.

27. All these initiatives are indicative of the efforts being made by European leaders to devise a framework for cooperation in the new Europe. It seems, however, that they are all agreed (the USA and Canada included) that the most suitable framework for planning ahead - at the present stage at least - is the CSCE and the Helsinki II Conference scheduled for the end of the year.

28. Many proposals, such as the Gorbachev proposal on the 'common European home' have focused on the framework within which the Conference should operate. In his speech to the Council of Europe, the Soviet leader stressed the need for cooperation on security, the possibility of the USSR becoming a member of the Council of Europe with special status, the creation of a single economic area stretching from the Atlantic to the Urals, the setting up of a regional and environment security system (within the framework of a long-term continent-wide environment programme) and the operation of a pan-European environment agency, etc.

President Mitterrand proposed the setting up of a pan-European confederation. This proposal was supplemented by Jacques Delors' idea that the Community should be a federation within the pan-European confederation.

Mr Delors bases his proposal on the theory of concentric circles, the European Community in its present form representing the inner circle. The second circle would consist of the EFTA states which would constitute the European economic area and the third circle would consist of the Central and East European states and, possibly, the Balkan and Mediterranean states.

The Polish President Mazowiecki proposed that a European Cooperation Council should be set up, to include the USA, Canada and the USSR.

President Havel also proposed that a European Security Commission be set up in Prague composed of representatives of the CSCE states. A similar proposal was made by the Belgian Government to set up a European Defence Council.

29. These proposals, in conjunction with the decisions taken by the European Council (in particular the special summit in Dublin) and the CSCE decisions and agreements (particularly the conferences held in Bonn on economic cooperation, Copenhagen on the human dimension and Majorca on the Mediterranean dimension) and the conventional arms limitation agreements constitute a framework within which the Conference should operate.

30. The fundamental objective of the Conference is to give final shape to a pan-European security system. To achieve this objective, progress must be made on the banning of chemical weapons, controlling the production and sale of arms, the organization of the armed forces and the future of foreign troops. At the same time, efforts must be stepped up to reduce conventional and nuclear weapons and set up a system of collective verification.

31. As regards the reduction in the number of conventional weapons, two new rounds of negotiations are already in motion as a result of CSCE decisions.

The first is concerned with reducing conventional forces in Europe and aims to achieve a balanced reduction over a wide area from the Atlantic to the Urals. The proposal put forward by NATO and the Warsaw Pact in the CSCE negotiations provides for a reduction of 4700 fighter aircraft, 20 000 tanks, 60 500 pieces of artillery for NATO and 24 000 for the Warsaw Pact. In Ottawa last February it was also agreed that the number of US and Soviet troops in Central Europe would be reduced to 195 000 on each side and that 30 000 American troops would be stationed throughout the rest of the ATTU zone (Atlantic to the Urals).

During the same negotiations the Soviets proposed that each Alliance should retain 700 000 troops in Central Europe whereas the Western allies insisted on further cuts. (The second round of negotiations is on confidence-building and security measures).

32. As regards the two military alliances, there are two main areas for consideration:

(a) given current developments, that they should be abolished in
favour of a pan-European security system,

(b) to achieve a smooth transition to a pan-European security system, the two alliances must undergo a thorough reorganization and redefinition of their role, restricting the military aspects and transforming, under certain conditions, into political organizations, the ultimate aim being to incorporate both within the new pan-European security system.

Questions have also been raised about the role of the Western European Union. Last April, the representatives of the member states of the Union decided to strengthen the role of the organization in monitoring disarmament agreements and promoting relations with Central and Eastern Europe. In the Gulf crisis, it was the Union that decided that West European forces would take part in the naval blockade of Iraq.

33. The reunification of Germany - bringing together a member state of NATO, the Western European Union, the EEC and the Council of Europe on the one hand and a member state of the Warsaw Pact and COMECON on the other - is causing a new emphasis in the relations of the two blocs. It is imperative that any decisions taken either in the context of the 4 + 2 talks or the CSCE should provide for the participation of a united Germany in the pan-European security system.

34. A pan-European security system presupposes the peaceful co-existence of the participating states and the peaceful settlement of disputes (whether these are transnational disputes, or separatist movements challenging the status quo and the sovereignty of recognized states).

However, it is an essential condition that a state of peace exists in the regions at the external borders of the system. It is not possible to operate a collective security system in Europe when the Mediterranean - which is an important and integral part of Europe - is the scene of intensifying confrontation and conflict, the violation of the sovereign rights of recognized states and of human rights.

The recent crisis in the Gulf, but also the perennial problems in the Middle East and the Mediterranean, particularly Cyprus, Palestine and Lebanon, are a threat to peace in the region and the security of Europe.

35. Given that there is unanimous agreement that security and peace in Europe must be based on international cooperation and solidarity, the Helsinki II Conference must address the following basic issues:

(a) the recognition and inviolability of current borders, respect for the sovereign equality of states and territorial integrity,

(b) the definition of the right of self-determination and of the procedure for practising it,

(c) definition of the rights and obligations of minorities within states recognized by international treaty, within the framework of the principles of the Helsinki Final Act on respect for the unity and territorial integrity of states,

(d) the institution of pluralist democracy and respect for human rights as a prerequisite for a country's participation in the new pan-European edifice,

(e) a new dimension for human rights to meet the social and economic needs of individuals - the right to work, the right to welfare, the right to education etc.,

(f) the environment as a pan-European asset and its protection a pan-European obligation. This calls for the mandatory implementation of the requisite measures by all the CSCE countries,

(g) drugs, organized crime and terrorism threaten social peace and create further international disputes. Regulations that are accepted and implemented jointly must therefore be introduced.

36. A fundamental condition of maintaining peace in Europe is the balanced development of all states. A reduction in the economic gap between rich and poor countries and equal opportunities for economic development would create the right conditions for peaceful coexistence. To this end, consideration should be given within Helsinki II to the possibility of setting up a Solidarity Fund to aid the poorer countries of the Third World financed from resources saved through the abolition of conventional and nuclear weapons.

V. INSTITUTIONS AND BODIES OF HELSINKI II

37. To implement and monitor the decisions of the Conference an institutional framework must be set up, comprising (a) permanent secretariat

(b) a committee of permanent representatives

(c) a permanent seat

(d) a Council of Foreign Ministers and

(e) regular summit meetings.

On the basis of the proposals concerning the institutional organization of the pan-European security system, these bodies should operate within the framework of a European Security Council. Furthermore, using the experience of the United Nations, all the intervention procedures and mechanisms should be set up for the peaceful settlement of disputes and the prevention of armed conflict through swift and effective action.

38. If all these bodies are to be set up and operate correctly, the voice of the people must be heard. The convocation of a parliamentary assembly, using the Council of Europe as a basis, would ensure democratic control over the whole European edifice and interparliamentary cooperation (with the national parliaments and the European Parliament) in the relevant sectors. Decisions taken by the Helsinki II institutional bodies should be the outcome of collective procedures, be subject to control by the parliamentary assembly and aim to preserve peace and avert conflict.

39. An enhanced role for the European Court of Human Rights could be of parallel but no less importance in enforcing the legal obligations of states participating in the Conference to respect human rights.

VI. THE COMMUNITY'S ROLE

40. The European Community must take part in the Helsinki II Conference as a single entity, acting independently on a coordinated basis to meet the challenge of planning for the new Europe. Speeding up the process of economic and monetary union and political integration, and establishing a common foreign policy will also facilitate the attainment of this objective.

41. The European Community is present the only stable and dynamic supranational organization of states of a political and economic nature. It is the only institutional body to which its Member States have granted powers to pursue common policies. The level of integration, its legislation, its common policies, economic interdependence and political stability are a unique historical example of international cooperation.

42. The declaration by the Twelve in Dublin together with previous statements made at the summits in Madrid and Strasbourg indicate an emerging belief that the Community should play an instrumental role in preparing and making a success of the Helsinki II Conference. One of the aims of the Intergovernmental Conference on Political Union should be to define the Community's positions.
43. The European Parliament is the body to ensure that democratic principles are applied in drawing up a joint foreign policy and security policy. The European Parliament should play a full part in a well-defined capacity at the conference. It is therefore proposed that it should be represented at the conference by its President and a small delegation of members and that it should be able to take part - with observer status - in all the CSCE conferences (as was the case at the Copenhagen Conference). It should also receive regular reports from the President of the Council as to the positions adopted by the Twelve at the various CSCE conferences.

44. A joint meeting between the European Parliament and the national parliaments of CSCE states could be the first step towards interparliamentary cooperation and the setting up of the CSCE Interparliamentary Assembly.

45. In summary, we consider that the Community's presence at the Helsinki II Conference is absolutely essential for planning the new Europe which all Europeans aspire to. A new democratic Europe in which security is not based on the balance of military might but on mutual trust and cooperation.
ANNEX

MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION (Doc. B3-0759/90)
by Mr GORIA
pursuant to Rule 63 of the Rules of Procedure

on the conference on security and cooperation in Europe

The European Parliament,

A. having carefully considered President Gorbachev's proposal to hold a pan-European conference in 1990 with a view to bringing forward the holding of fresh discussions on the rules governing security and cooperation in Europe,

B. whereas the European Community in its own right should also play a prominent role in the discussions on security and, in particular, cooperation in Europe,

1. Calls on the Council to:
   (a) take all the initiatives necessary to ensure that the Council, Commission and the European Parliament play an active role in the discussions on the holding of a pan-European conference in the near future;
   (b) take all the initiatives necessary to ensure that, if the pan-European conference is held, the Commission participates as a full member;

2. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission and the parliaments and governments of the signatory states to the Final Act of the Helsinki Conference.