COMMITMENTS OR PROHIBITION? THE EU ANTITRUST DILEMMA

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THE ISSUE Excluding cartels, most investigations into suspected infringements of European Union competition law are resolved with ‘commitment decisions’. The European Commission drops the case in exchange for a commitment from the company under investigation to implement measures to stop the presumed anti-competitive behaviour. Commitment decisions are considered speedier than formal sanctions (prohibition decisions) in restoring normal competitive market conditions. They have a cost, however: commitments are voluntary and are unlikely to be subject to judicial review. This reduces the European Commission’s incentive to build a robust case. Because commitment decisions do not establish any legal precedent, they provide for little guidance on the interpretation of the law.

POLICY CHALLENGE

The European Commission relies increasingly on commitment decisions. More transparency on the substance of allegations, and the establishment of a higher number of legal precedents, are however necessary. This applies in particular to cases that tackle antitrust issues in new areas, such as markets for digital goods, in which companies might find it difficult to assess if a certain behaviour constitutes a violation of competition rules. To ensure greater transparency and mitigate some of the drawbacks of commitment decisions, while retaining their main benefits, the full detail of the objections addressed by the European Commission to defendants should be published.

Source: Bruegel.
Commitments or Prohibition? The EU Antitrust Dilemma

Excluding Cartels, 62 percent (29 out of 47) of European Commission antitrust decisions from May 2004 to December 2013 did not formally sanction an antitrust violation. After a first assessment of the case, the Commission confronts the companies suspected of infringing the rules with its preliminary findings. The investigation may then continue and result in a prohibition decision, which compels the company to stop its abusive behaviour and pay a potentially hefty fine. Most notably, the Microsoft I and Intel cases resulted in prohibition decisions. Alternatively, the company can offer to stop its behaviour and make a number of commitments. If those commitments address the Commission’s preliminary concerns, the Commission might make those commitments binding and stop its investigation with no further consequences for the companies involved, which admit no wrongdoing.

Commitment decisions have been common for the majority of antitrust cases investigated in the last decade. Of abuse-of-dominance cases, which are prohibited under Article 102 TFEU, 75 percent (18 out of 24) were resolved with commitment decisions. Under the current competition commissioner Joaquin Almunia, only one Article 102 prohibition decision was taken, compared to 10 commitment decisions. Figure 1 shows the trend in decisions since May 2004, when commitment decisions were formally introduced in European Union regulation.

Commitment decisions are often used to respond rapidly to abuses that are causing significant harm to consumers and risk hampering the development of a market if not quickly stopped. However, commitment decisions come at cost: they are based on a preliminary assessment of the concerns and they do not formally identify any infringement. Since the companies involved admit no wrongdoing and the decision is very unlikely to be challenged in court, the European Commission publishes very little information about its theory of harm in the commitment decision. Indeed, this is implicitly part of the deal: the absence of a clear identification of the concerns minimises the risk of private actions for damages against the companies, and it also limits the Commission’s exposure to potential external criticism.

Commitment decisions, therefore, offer little guidance to the market on how similar scenarios might be assessed by the Commission in the future. Problems might be temporarily solved, but there is little guarantee that they will not re-emerge in the long term. Commitment decisions treat the symptoms but do not cure the illness.

The Commission seems to be aware of this trade-off. It has said that prohibition decisions are made whenever there is a significant need for ‘deterrence, punishment and legal precedent’. However, this claim is not fully supported by the facts. Few prohibition decisions have been adopted in novel areas of intervention for which legal guidance is much needed. This can be most clearly seen in cases of patent abuse in standard setting, notoriously a difficult area of intervention for antitrust. These cases concern how the adoption of a standard can enable holders of essential patents to extract unfair rents from licensees of the standardised technology (see Mariniello, 2013, for an analysis). This involves the interpretation of Article 101 TFEU, which prohibits anti-competitive agreements, and Article 102 TFEU, which prohibits abuse of dominance. See footnote 1.

Figure 1: European Commission antitrust decisions* (May 2004 – Dec 2013)

Source: Bruegel based on DG Competition case search tool. Note: * excluding cartels. Article 101 TFEU prohibits anti-competitive agreements, Article 102 TFEU prohibits abuse of dominance. See footnote 1.
commitments such as ‘fairness’ and ‘reasonableness,’ which is particularly tricky in antitrust and on which no consensus exists amongst scholars. Yet, after seven years of investigations (including topical cases, such as Rambus, Qualcomm and IPCom\(^5\)) the Commission has not adopted any decision with precedent value. The current cases involving Samsung and Google-Motorola deal with the very same issues, but the likelihood that the two cases will be settled through commitment decisions is high\(^6\). Therefore, no clarification of the approach of the Commission in this area is to be expected any time soon\(^7\).

Other areas which would significantly benefit from legal guidance likewise lack strong legal precedents. Commitment decisions have been taken in the air transport [eg oneworld and Star cases], energy [eg EON gas market foreclosure cases] and new media [eg ebooks case] sectors, to mention a few, although new tools or novel theories of harm were underlying the Commission’s reasoning. It is possible that two of the most significant and controversial cases recently investigated by the European Commission, Google [search engine case] and Gazprom, will also be settled through commitment decisions\(^8\).

In this Policy Brief, I describe the institutional background behind commitment and prohibition decisions, discuss benefits and costs for each form of decision and report figures on decisions in the last nine years of antitrust enforcement in the EU. I conclude by proposing an amendment to the current regulation that would increase transparency in commitment decisions.

**INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND**

A specific procedure for commitment decisions was formally introduced a decade ago by Council Regulation 1/2003 in the context of the modernisation of EU antitrust law. Before then, settlements of antitrust proceedings were few and had an informal and unstructured nature [the vast majority of cases resulted in prohibitions with or without a fine]\(^9\). Under the current rules, an investigation for a suspected breach of EU competition law might lead to the adoption of a prohibition decision\(^10\) [see the figure on the front page for a simple illustration of the process]. That decision identifies the infringement, stops the anticompetitive behaviour, might impose remedies and could entail a fine of up to 10 percent of the guilty company’s global turnover. Before taking such a decision, the Commission must address the company with its preliminary concerns in a ‘Statement of Objections’. The company can then attempt to dispel the concerns by bringing up new arguments or evidence during the hearing process. The subsequent investigation phase might result in the Commission dropping the case if new evidence points to no infringement, although this is very uncommon\(^11\).

To avoid the adoption of a prohibition decision, the company under investigation can instead propose a set of commitments that, if deemed to address the concerns that have been preliminarily identified can be rendered binding by the Commission with a decision pursuant to Article 9 of Council Regulation 1/2003 [an Article 9 decision]. For example, in the IBM case the Commission was concerned that IBM would supply its competitors with mainframe computers at an unreasonably high price. The case was resolved through an Article 9 decision under which IBM committed to make spare parts and technical information swiftly available at a fair price to independent mainframe maintainers.

The Commission has the power to enforce Article 9 decisions: if the company is found to not comply with the commitments, it can be fined up to 10 percent of its global turnover\(^12\). The commitment decision can be appealed before the EU courts, which can question the proportionality of the commitments or whether the Commission’s assessment was manifestly incorrect. However, as companies enter voluntarily into commitment agreements, appeals are highly unlikely [Wils, 2008]. Kellerbauer (2011) notes that no appeal has ever been filed by parties addressed by a commitment decision; very few appeals were filed by third parties.

**THE TRADE-OFF: COMMITMENTS VERSUS PROHIBITION**

From a social welfare perspective there are two key reasons why violations of competition laws should be pursued by antitrust authorities: [a] to restore and preserve the correct functioning of the market when competition is
committed to maximise consumer surplus and (b) to minimise the risk that similar violations in other markets would occur in the future. Prohibition decisions respond to both requirements. Commitment decisions in most cases respond only to the first, though they might do it more efficiently. Table 1 summarises the benefits of both types of decisions for the Commission and the companies under investigation.

(a) Protect competition

Prohibition decisions arguably yield a more accurate identification of competition concerns, since more evidence is collected after the hearing process. Most importantly, prohibition decisions are naturally exposed to ex-post judicial examination: defendants can (and often do) appeal decisions before the EU courts. This places a significant pressure on the Commission, which could be censured if its assessment is deemed wrong by the court. Prohibition decisions therefore maximise the incentive to accurately identify the concerns and pinpoint the best solution. Conversely, the prospect of a prohibition decision might lead the Commission to drop a weak case, if it believes that it would not pass the court's review.

Commitment decisions on the other hand, come at an earlier stage in the process, when the investigation is not yet finalised. Commitment decisions provide less of an incentive for accuracy in the assessment because the likelihood that an Article 9 decision will end up in court is close to zero. Paradoxically, the Commission might have a greater incentive to adopt a commitment decision in cases for which there might be a greater need to establish a legal precedent through a prohibition decision. The more novel the theory of harm, the greater the risk of annulment by the EU courts, and the lower the attractiveness of prohibition decisions. This risk is well acknowledged in the literature. The key benefit of a commitment decision is arguably to provide a quicker response to an ongoing infringement. An analysis of the Commission’s decisions generally confirms this but also suggests more caution. The time from the opening of a proceeding to the adoption of the decision is on average 17 percent longer for prohibition decisions than commitment decisions: 28.5 versus 24.3 months. This changes though if decisions are categorised according to the nature of the infringement (Figure 2 on the next page). Commitment decisions are particularly popular in abuse of dominance cases (breaches of Article 102 of the EU Treaty). However, in these cases, commitment decisions have taken on average longer than prohibition decisions: 26 months.

**Table 1: The commitment versus prohibition decision trade-off**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Objective</th>
<th>Antitrust authority</th>
<th>Defendant</th>
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<tr>
<td>Benefits of commitment decision</td>
<td>Potentially faster procedure — earlier end to consumer harm; Reduced administrative costs — greater efficiency; Can craft remedies to open markets and reduce likelihood of future infringements; Can market-test remedies to better address the concerns.</td>
<td>Avoid fines; Defendant can propose remedies; Stops legal costs and ongoing bad publicity; Limit risk of action for damages.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benefits of prohibition</td>
<td>Deeper assessment — lower likelihood of errors; Increase Commission's accountability through exposure to judicial review; Establish a legal precedent — guidance for future assessments; Increase deterrence through fines; Fairness: allow follow-on private action.</td>
<td>New evidence or deeper assessment might lead to the case being dropped (no prohibition); Remedies may be less cumbersome than commitment decisions; Longer period before prohibition — can still enjoy illegal profits if any; Easier access to court for appeal — judicial review.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Bruegel.
against 22.7 months. That is: cases resulting in commitment decisions have been 15 percent slower than prohibitions. While this surprising result could be due to the lack of statistically significant figures (there have been only six Article 102 prohibition decisions since May 2004, and it cannot be excluded that a prohibition was adopted in those cases exactly because it was believed that they would not require a long investigation), it nevertheless suggests that the greater speed normally attributed to commitment decisions is not to be taken for granted.

Reducing the investigation period might allow a budget-constrained antitrust authority to allocate resources to pursue a greater number of potentially harmful cases. Most importantly, particularly in dynamic industries (such as ICT), timing can be critical. A settlement allows quick identification (albeit preliminary) of the issue and the introduction of a correction in the market in order to restore normal competition almost immediately. One should expect, therefore, commitment decisions to be particularly popular in rapidly evolving sectors. An analysis of the Commission’s decisions, however, seems to refute that idea. Only 24 percent of commitment decisions since 2004 applied to highly dynamic sectors compared to 61 percent of prohibition decisions.

(b) Ensure deterrence

The second reason for pursuing violations of competition law is to deter bad behaviour. Prohibition decisions identify the infringement and clarify the application of competition law. By creating a legal precedent that can be challenged before the courts, prohibition decisions help companies anticipate how the Commission will in the future assess certain behaviours. Prohibition decisions entail significant costs for infringers, most notably pecuniary sanctions, but they also increase expected legal expenses and the likelihood of follow-on damage claims by victims of the infringement. Prohibition decisions fully express the dissuasive power of antitrust action.

Commitment decisions, by contrast, do not sanction any infringement and include no admission of wrongdoing by the investigated companies. The scant detail reported in decisions gives little guidance on future behaviour to companies. Moreover, if the commitments are limited to stopping the infringement, they allow companies to keep the illegal profits from the period of the infringement. Little deterrence can therefore come from commitment decisions.

Such an effect can be mitigated by the design of remedies that not only stop the harmful behaviour and restore competition, as it is normally the case in prohibition decisions; additional remedies can also be imposed to reduce the risk of future violations. Such ‘proactive’ remedies could entail the opening of the market to favour entry of new competitors and to increase competition. For example, in some past cases in the energy sector, the Commission required the dominant company to divest significant assets to increase competition, as it is only stop the harmful behaviour.

14. ‘Highly dynamic sectors’ are defined based on the Eurostat grouping ‘High tech manufacturing or high tech services and financial services’.

15. See Choné et al. (2014). Some authors identify a negative and significant impact of investigations on company share prices (for example, Langus and Motta, 2007; Guenster and Van Dijk, 2011), whether or not a fine is levied. The most likely explanation for this is that investors suddenly realise that the current level of profits is overestimated in that it includes rents resulting from an illegal behaviour which will likely cease.

16. The E.ON case, for example:
leeway to the Commission to extract stricter conditions\textsuperscript{17}. From the Commission’s perspective, proactive remedies can be a useful tool. Despite the criticism of proactive remedies in the legal literature (see Georgiev, 2007, for example), they might be justifiable on economic grounds. Proactive remedies allow the Commission to offer the elimination of a fine in exchange for remedies that can affect market structure, increase competition and therefore potentially lead to higher welfare levels for consumers.

**CONCLUSIONS AND WAY FORWARD**

Table 2 indicates that there has been a significant shift in the European Commission’s policy choice of instrument for tackling antitrust violations. During Mario Monti’s period as competition commissioner, after the entry into force of Council Regulation 1/2003, four cases were closed with a prohibition decision but no commitment decision was taken\textsuperscript{18}. Under Neelie Kroes, about 50 percent more commitment decisions than prohibition decisions were taken. Under current commissioner Almunia, the ratio has ramped-up to three commitment decisions for each prohibition decision.

This increased use of commitment decisions is not necessarily problematic in itself. As discussed in the previous section, the choice of one or the other instrument could well be justified by the associated expected benefits\textsuperscript{19}. However, independently of whether this policy is based on the correct premises, the currently extensive use of commitment decisions calls for a refinement of the rules governing them.

If it is indeed the case that for most ongoing investigations, commitment decisions are more suitable for addressing the Commission’s concerns, the underlying institutional framework should be improved to mitigate drawbacks and retain benefits. Such a refinement would all the more be needed if commitment decisions could sometimes be used to avoid judicial review when the theory of harm is not solid enough.

The main drawback of commitment decisions is the absence of a clear identification of the antitrust violation. Not only does this imply that no guidance is provided to companies, it also significantly limits the accountability of antitrust authorities. With no ex-post legal review, the incentive for accurate and extensive assessment of the case at hand is limited.

\textbf{'It is possible that commitment decisions are taken when cases are discovered to be too weak to stand up in court.'}

\textbf{Table 2: European Commission antitrust decisions per commissioner}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Commissioner</th>
<th>Number of commitments</th>
<th>Number of prohibitions</th>
<th>Ratio (commitments/prohibitions)</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Monti*</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kroes</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Almunia</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Bruegel based on DG Competition case search tool. Note: Cases are attributed to the commissioner in charge at the time of the commitment decision or prohibition decision, according to the starting and final date of their mandates: Monti, from the entry into force of the new regulation for antitrust proceeding in May 2004 to 30 October 2004; Kroes, 22 November 2004 to 9 February 2010; Almunia, 9 February 2010 to present. * Decisions under Monti cover a period of only six months.
little information on which to judge the efficiency of the Commission’s actions.

Currently, commitment decisions do not spell out the full detail of the theory of harm that led the Commission to believe that the behaviour implemented by the company is harmful for consumers. The substance of allegations is not examined in depth and no detailed description of the practice leading to the infringement or the rationale behind the remedies is reported (Wagner Von-Papp, 2012). For decisions published since May 2004, the average length of commitment decisions is 21 pages compared to 160 for prohibition decisions.

The key reason why detailed information is not disclosed in commitment decisions is that none of the affected parties has an interest in doing so. With a short decision, the companies avoid disclosing information on their business, do not provide information that could trigger claims for damages and avoid bad publicity. The Commission avoids exposing its reasoning to potential external criticism. Because there are incentives for minimal disclosure of information, only a change in the law can foster transparency.

A fundamental refinement of the institutional mechanism should therefore entail a significant increase in transparency on the part of the Commission and a systematic exposure of commitment decisions to potential judicial review. The most straightforward way to obtain such an effect is to legally require the Commission to publish the details of its assessments that result in commitment decisions.

In cases that result in commitment decisions, Article 9 of Council Regulation 1/2003 already appears to imply the existence of a specific infringement [albeit preliminarily identified]. Commitments are accepted where there exists a need for “an infringement to be brought to an end.” The article could be amended to require the commitment decision to spell out how such an infringement has been identified. The published commitment decision could resemble a non-confidential version of a Statement of Objections.

One major objection to such a proposal would be that commitment decisions come at a preliminary stage of the Commission assessment. Therefore the Commission might be reluctant to disclose the details of an assessment that is still not finalised. However, commitment decisions introduce remedies on the basis of the preliminary assessment with concrete consequences for markets. Therefore, de facto, commitment decisions imply the acceptance of the infringement, except that no explicit remedial measures could be taken in the short decision, the companies would be reluctant to disclose the details of an assessment. The published commitment decision could resemble a non-confidential version of a Statement of Objections.

‘Commitment decisions do not spell out the full detail of the theory of harm, and allegations are not analysed in depth.’

‘There should be more transparency and exposure of commitment decisions to potential judicial review.’

This proposed amendment to the Regulation would nevertheless reduce the incentives for the Commission and the parties under investigation to converge on a commitment decision. Both parties would find commitment decisions less appealing, because the decision would naturally be more exposed to judicial review (particularly by third parties, which would have the information needed to challenge the substance of the Commission’s decision) and defendants would be exposed to potential damage claims. However, the proposal would not eliminate the incentive for the Commission and the defendant to settle. The major benefits of commitment decisions would be retained: for the Commission, the procedure could still be faster than for prohibition decisions, and remedies would be put in place earlier to restore the

Moreover, if the defendant is not coerced or ‘bluffed’ into the commitments and is given the tools to fully assess the strength of the Commission’s objections (including full access to the Commission’s file – see Wils, 2008, for a detailed discussion), one could safely assume that the defendant’s voluntary offering of commitments fairly complements the information considered during the preliminary assessment, mitigating the need for further investigation.

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20. Bruegel estimates. Sample: decisions in English published between May 2004 and December 2013 (42 decisions in total). Pages are counted from the page 1 to the Commissioner’s signature (eg annexes are excluded).
22. Wagner Von-Papp (2012) has a milder but similar proposal: for the European Commission to publish the details of the theory of harm that led to the preliminary finding of an infringement. Such a decision should then be challengeable before court if erroneous as a matter of law.
correct functioning of the market. Likewise, the defendant would be spared a fine and would save on legal expenses.

An increase in the transparency of commitment decisions would establish a balance between incentives: weak cases should be dropped, while commitment decisions should be based on arguments and evidence that are solid enough to provide clear guidance to markets on the application of competition law. Given the importance that commitment decisions have assumed in antitrust proceedings, their impact on consumers and markets is substantial and a consideration of how they can be improved is necessary. This should be a top priority on the competition policy agenda of the forthcoming new EU administration.

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REFERENCES


