Report

drawn up on behalf of the Political Affairs Committee

on the Horn of Africa

Rapporteur: Mr. C. Ripa di Meana
By letter of 9 December 1982 the Political Affairs Committee received authorization to draw up a report on the Horn of Africa.

On 7 February 1983 in a sitting of the whole House the committee was authorized to report on this subject.

The European Parliament referred the following motions for resolutions, tabled pursuant to Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure, to the Political Affairs Committee as the committee responsible:

- on 13.1.1983, the motion for a resolution tabled by Mr PEDINI and others on the situation in the region of Eritrea (Doc. 1-1129/82)
- on 11.4.1983, the motion for a resolution tabled by Mr HAHN and others on the forcible repatriation of Ethiopian refugees in Djibouti (Doc. 1-23/83)
- on 11.4.1983, the motion for a resolution tabled by Mr ALMIRANTE and others on the situation in Eritrea (Doc. 1-45/83)

The Committee on Development and Cooperation was asked for an opinion on the abovementioned motions for a resolution.

On 16 March 1983 the Political Affairs Committee appointed Mr RIPA DI MEANA rapporteur.

The Political Affairs Committee considered the report at its meetings of 23-24 November 1983 and 28 February - 1 March 1984. At the latter meeting it unanimously adopted the motion for a resolution.

The following took part in the vote: Mr HAAGERUP, vice-chairman; and acting chairman; Mr CHARZAT, second vice-chairman; Mr FERGUSSON, third vice-chairman; Mr RIPA DI MEANA, rapporteur; Lord BETHELL, Mr CARIGLIA, Lady ELLES, Mr FELLERMAIER (deputizing for Mr B. FRIEDRICH), Mr GEROKOSTOPoulos (deputizing for Mr BOURNIAS), Mr HABSBURG, Mr von HASSEL, Mrs van den HEUVEL, Mr ISRAEL (deputizing for Mr de la MALENE), Mr KLEPSCH, Mr MOMMERSTEEG (deputizing for Mr DESCHAMPS), Mr NORMANTON (deputizing for Mr NEWTON DUNN), Mr d'ORMESSON, Mr PENDERS, Sir J. SCOTT-HOPKINS, Mrs SCRIVENER (deputizing for Mr DONNEZ), Mr SEITLINGER (deputizing for Mr BARBI), Mr VAN MIERT, Mr WALTER and Mr ZAGARI.
The opinion of the Committee on Development and Cooperation is attached.

The report was tabled on 6 March 1984.

The deadline for tabling amendments to this report will be indicated in the draft agenda for the part-session at which it will be debated.
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The Political Affairs Committee hereby submits the following motion for a resolution to the European Parliament, together with explanatory statement:

**Motion for a Resolution**

on the Horn of Africa

**The European Parliament,**

- having regard to its resolution of 10 May 1979 on respect for human rights in Ethiopia,
- having regard to its resolution of 14 December 1979 on the tragic plight of refugees, particularly children, in the Horn of Africa,
- having regard to its resolution of 23 May 1980 on the wretched situation of the refugees in Somalia,
- having regard to its resolution of 11 July 1980 on the dramatic situation of the refugees, especially the children amongst them, in the Horn of Africa,
- having regard to its resolution of 18 November 1982 on the situation in Somalia,
- having regard to its resolution of 14 April 1983 on emergency aid for Ethiopia,
- having regard to the motion for a resolution tabled by Mr PEDINI and others on behalf of the EPP Group on the situation in the region of Eritrea (Doc. 1-1129/82),
- having regard to the motion for a resolution tabled by Mr HAHN and others on the forcible repatriation of Ethiopian refugees in Djibouti (Doc. 1-23/83),

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1 OJ No. C 140, 5.6.1979, p. 82  
2 OJ No. C 4, 7.1.1980, p. 75  
3 OJ No. C 147, 16.6.1980, p. 120  
4 OJ No. C 197, 4.8.1980, p. 81  
6 OJ No. C 128, 16.5.1983, p. 63
- having regard to the resolution tabled by Mr ALMIRANTE and others on the situation in Eritrea (Doc. 1-45/83),
- having regard to the report of the Political Affairs Committee and the opinion of the Committee on Development and Cooperation (Doc. 1-1532/83),
A - bearing in mind the fact that Djibouti, Ethiopia and Somalia are signatories to the Lome Convention,
B - noting the political and economic links between some Member States and these countries,
C - noting the strategic importance of the Horn of Africa for both Western countries and the Eastern Bloc, being adjacent to the Arabian peninsula,
D - concerned about the 20-year-old conflict between the Ethiopian State and the Eritrean resistance, in which Ethiopia is being supported by many thousands of troops and military advisers from the Soviet Union, the German Democratic Republic, Cuba and South Yemen,
E - recalling the resolution adopted by the Assembly of the United Nations on 2 December 1950 which stated that Eritrea should constitute an autonomous unit federated with Ethiopia and having wide powers over its own internal affairs,
F - concerned also about the Tigrai conflict and the guerilla war in the Ogaden,
G - concerned about the danger of a fragmentation of the Ethiopian State which might render the region of the Horn of Africa and surrounding areas even more unstable,
H - alarmed by the growing large-scale militarization of the region of the Horn of Africa, aggravated by Ethiopian policies and military action,
I - concerned about the tripartite agreement between Ethiopia, Libya and South Yemen which is foisting outside tensions into the region of the Horn of Africa,
L - recalling the resolution of the Foreign Ministers at the Islamic Conference in Islamabad in 1980, which called for the withdrawal of Soviet and allied troops from the region and also the removal of foreign bases in the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea and the exclusion of this area from superpower confrontation,

M - disturbed at the tension which exists between Ethiopia and her neighbours,

N - keenly concerned about the drought and famine afflicting the peoples of Ethiopia, Somalia and Djibouti,

O - greatly alarmed by the plight of refugees in the Horn of Africa and neighbouring countries such as the Sudan,

P - considering that the tripartite agreement between Ethiopia, Djibouti and the United Nations High Commissioner on the repatriation of Ethiopian refugees in Djibouti should not lead to forcible repatriation,

Q - disturbed by the consequences of the creation of semi-permanent refugee camps in the Ogaden,

R - concerned about the human rights situation in the region, particularly in Ethiopia,

1. Strongly condemns the multiple interventions of the Soviet Union and the countries of the Eastern Bloc in the Horn of Africa and the stationing and use in action of troops from the Soviet Union, Cuba, the German Democratic Republic and South Yemen,

2. Invites all the great powers not to make this region a place of confrontation and rearmament,

3. Asks the Foreign Ministers meeting in political cooperation and the Council of Ministers as such to adopt a common standpoint on the problems of the Horn of Africa in order to take all such initiatives as may contribute to a solution of the conflicts and the re-establishment of friendly relations between the states and ethnic groups of the region,
(b) to bring pressure to bear on the Soviet Union to withdraw its troops and those of countries allied to it from Ethiopia and to work together with the international community to aid the refugees and the people threatened by famine,

(c) to strongly urge the Ethiopian Government to find a peaceful and negotiated solution of the conflict between it and the Eritrean peoples which takes account of their identity, as recognized by the United Nations resolution of 2 December 1950, and is consistent with the basic principles of the OAU,

(d) to invite the Governments of Ethiopia, Somalia and Kenya to find peaceful solutions to their territorial and ethnic differences in such a way as to take account of the legitimate interests of the populations,

(e) to bring all possible pressure to bear on the governments of the states of the region to respect human rights,

(f) to ask, in particular, the Government of Ethiopia to release or bring to trial the former Royal family of Ethiopia, bearing in mind that the peoples of Europe, who attach great importance to respect for human rights, are providing substantial amounts of aid to promote the development of the countries of the Horn of Africa and to help meet the needs of the peoples of the area;

4. Calls on the European Community, in consultation with the UNHCR, to take active measures to solve the problems of the refugees in the region as proposed by the delegation of the European Parliament in June 1983;

5. Calls on the Commission to maintain and increase its food aid for the countries of the region, including Sudan, and for the peoples of Eritrea and Tigra, both of them being severely affected not only by drought and famine, but also by military conflict, and to ensure that the means of its distribution are improved;

6. Invites the European Community to do all in its power to help Ethiopia, Somalia and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees to reach a tripartite agreement on the voluntary repatriation of Ethiopian refugees in Somalia;

7. Asks the Commission of the European Communities to take all necessary steps to ensure that the humanitarian aid granted reaches all the people affected, irrespective of their political sympathies.
8. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Foreign Ministers meeting in political cooperation, the Governments of the Member States, the parliaments of the Member States, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and the Governments of Ethiopia, Somalia and Djibouti.
Europe cannot remain indifferent to the tragic events taking place in the Horn of Africa - not only for humanitarian reasons, but also for specificall political reasons. The conflicts in the region are causing unspeakable suffering for its peoples, a suffering compounded by the harsh consequences of chronic underdevelopment. Furthermore, these conflicts, by engaging the interest of the main powers, are tending to turn the entire region into a focal point of international tension.

For both these reasons, the fact that there are no discernible prospects of an early peaceful solution is yet another reason for concern.

What is more, the political situation in the Horn of Africa is complicated by so many different but interrelated elements that it is extremely difficult to interpret the facts with any accuracy and to move towards a solution of the problems.

The region comprises three states: Ethiopia, Somalia and Djibouti. Apart from their ethnic and historical differences, these countries have widely differing international goals and sympathies which have induced Ethiopia and Somalia in particular to engage in ruinous open and guerrilla warfare.

In addition, Ethiopia is a country which consists of many different ethnic groups and faces internal difficulties from nationalists, such as the Eritreans, who cannot accept the idea of integration into the Ethiopian State.

This inherent complexity of the Horn of Africa is compounded by other factors, namely the equally complex relations which Ethiopia and Somalia have with other countries with which they share a common land border, such as Sudan and Kenya, but also with other neighbouring countries such as South Yemen.

In this introduction, we shall confine ourselves to the main problems, which may be outlined as follows:
A - Internal ethnic problems

- Eritrea: The Eritrean demand for the right of self-determination led to the outbreak of war between the central power in Addis Ababa and the various Eritrean liberation fronts. This war has lasted twenty years (see below).

- Tigre: (together with Shoa, the region of Tigre forms the historical centre of the ancient State of Ethiopia). The Addis Ababa government is faced by a rebellious movement which is demanding a large measure of autonomy.

- Ogaden: This region of Ethiopia, which borders on Somalia and is inhabited mainly by nomadic Somali peoples, has been the subject of Somali territorial claims, particularly in the past. They resulted in open conflict between Ethiopia and Somalia in 1977 and 1978.

- Strategic and military problems and major power activity in the region: The Horn of Africa is regarded as being of major strategic importance (control of the Bab el Mandeb Straits, the India Ocean and the oil routes of the Persian Gulf) by both the Western countries and the Eastern bloc. The presence of the Soviet Union, first in Somalia and then in Ethiopia, brought about a militarization of the region, the establishment of a United States presence in Somalia and a strengthening of the French presence in Djibouti.

- The refugee problem: All three countries in the region, but also neighbouring Sudan, are more or less severely affected by the problem of refugee camps, set up to cope with the large-scale migrations following the Ethiopia-Eritrea and Somalia-Eritrea conflicts.

- Underdevelopment and famine: This is perhaps the largest 'structural' problem to be dealt with, particularly in Ethiopia, but also in Somalia and Djibouti. Leaving aside the possibility of economic industrial development in the future, these countries are faced with the problems of arid land, most of it unfit for cultivation, and severe recurrent drought, which constantly threaten the social cohesion of communities which rely essentially on agriculture for their livelihood.
The reasons for the Somalia-Ethiopia and Ethiopia-Eritrea conflicts are complex and rooted in the pre-colonial and colonial past. To remove the causes today will therefore be a very difficult task. Further complications arise from the geo-political position of the Horn of Africa, which faces onto the Indian Ocean, is not far from the Persian Gulf and therefore forms an integral part of the 'arc of crisis'. Consequently, in addition to encouraging foreign intervention in its internal crises, it is deeply influenced by the opposing strategies of the main powers, which take a keen interest in the balance of advantage in an area of crucial importance.

The arms race and the continuous expansion of military expenditure (which diverts resources away from measures to combat underdevelopment) in the region are a major and serious aspect of the crisis. But the presence of foreign troops is equally disturbing, in that it is a symptom and in some cases the cause of the precariousness of the area's stability.

It is possible to say that this 'foreign' presence was started in the region by the arrival of the Soviets in Somalia at the end of the 1960s (see chapter on Somalia) and by their subsequent move to areas close to the Ethiopian border.

There is, of course, a 'qualitative' difference between the US and the USSR presence in the region: while Moscow, whose presence also includes troops from Cuba and the German Democratic Republic as well as Soviet advisers, is mainly concerned with the internal affairs of Ethiopia and provides military support in the conflict with Eritrea (although there is obviously a strategic purpose behind the Soviet presence as well), the Americans in Somalia (and Kenya) and to some extent the French in Djibouti are primarily concerned with external factors, e.g. control of the Indian Ocean and the Bab el Mandeb Straits.

However, while it would be wrong to assume that the purpose and consequences of the presence of these foreign powers are identical, we are bound to note that the frequency with which the local conflicts take on the appearance of what might be called a bipolar confrontation makes it all the more difficult to arrive at a peaceful and equitable solution.
Following a revolution led by the military, one country in the region, Ethiopia, came within the Soviet sphere of influence and is currently tied to Moscow by a treaty of friendship and cooperation. Another country, Somalia, which also underwent a military-style revolution and was also for a time closely tied to Moscow, now professes to be a defender of Western interests. Local alliances and alliances formed with the major powers are often contradictory, opportunistic and interchangeable. In 1979, for example, pro-American Kenya and pro-Russian Ethiopia concluded a mutual defence treaty, essentially to counter the threat from Somalia.

The Ethiopia-Eritrea conflict originated in the violation by Addis Ababa of a United Nations resolution concerning the arrangements for the decolonization of Eritrea. The violation occurred in 1962. The resolution dates back to 1950. The result has been a cruel and bloody conflict which raises problems of principle in which the whole of Africa feels involved. Europe has a clear duty to support the demands for implementation of the decisions which were adopted in an international forum (and which were also accepted by Ethiopia). Moreover, in view of the immense loss of life, the devastation and the uninterrupted flow of refugees into countries which themselves suffer from extreme poverty, Europe must continue to hope for a cessation of hostilities and for the opening of constructive negotiations able to satisfy the demands of Eritrea without, however, ignoring those of Ethiopia - which is concerned lest a settlement trigger a process of disintegration of the State - and of the African continent as a whole, which is loath to endorse territorial changes imposed by force.

It is perhaps not unrealistic to hope that a settlement of the conflict which avoided humiliating Ethiopia and ensured the peaceful co-existence of the peoples and nations concerned would create conditions that would induce the Soviets and Cubans to leave the area. The end of the conflict might also weaken the role of the military in Addis Ababa, which in turn might facilitate the start of a process of internal democratization or, at least, the emergence of a regime which is more open and more willing to respect human rights.

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1 See page 12
the Somalia-Ethiopia conflict originated in Mogadishu's claims to all territories in adjacent countries inhabited by people of Somali stock. Its justification is therefore to be found in Somali (or Pan-Somali) national sentiment. The Somali case nevertheless conflicts with the tendency to confirm the frontiers established by colonialism, which everywhere in Africa is considered essential in order to avoid widespread conflict. Moreover, as in the days of empire, present-day Ethiopia is a multinational state. The secession of Ogaden could mark the beginning of its disintegration, which would have unpredictable but very serious destabilizing consequences.

To conclude, Europe cannot but be extremely disturbed by the continuing state of tension throughout the Horn of Africa. It must seek to promote a solution which reconciles the principle of the inviolability of frontiers with the rights of the minorities and the rights of citizenship. However difficult such a solution might seem, the authority and powers which the Community itself or individual Member States still exercise in the region should impel Europe to introduce joint measures which, taking account of local conditions, would help break the mould of bipolarism.
a - From empire to revolution

Ethiopia has an area of 1,223,600 km$^2$, is divided into 14 provinces and is inhabited by more than 33,500,000 people of considerable ethnic and linguistic diversity who settled in the country in successive epochs. By far the largest population group is made up of people of strictly Ethiopian stock (the Sidomo and Galla tribes). Then come the Somalis, the Tigreans and the Amhara. A few black minority groups (Nilotes and Bantus) are scattered over various regions. The official language is Amharic.

There is a variety of religions, which closely follow ethnic lines: the peoples of strictly Ethiopian stock adhere to a Christian-Coptic faith, while the peoples of the East and the South are for the most part Muslims or animists. The minority religious groups include the Falashas, an ancient Jewish population which has always opposed the Abyssinian Negus. Today, the members of this population group, which is very small, are often considered 'second class' citizens.

Ethiopia is a member of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the United Nations and the group of African, Caribbean and Pacific states (ACP) associated with the European Community through the Lomé agreements.

Ethiopia has an ancient history. In the XIXth century, after a period of indecisive wars between Christian princes, the Negus (the supreme authority) unified the country. With the opening of the Suez Canal, the country became a focal point of rivalry between the European powers: the British established a base in Aden in 1839, while the Italians settled in Eritrea at the end of the century and the French settled in Djibouti.

Fascist Italy occupied Ethiopia in 1935 and brought Ethiopia, Eritrea and Somalia into Italian East Africa (IEA). Ethiopia won back its independence in 1941 and returned Emperor Haile Selassie to power.

Based on feudalism, the Ethiopian political system entered a crisis stage in 1960 (a crucial year for many African states), when there were serious manifestations of student unrest.

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1 The presidency of the OAU is this year held by Ethiopia.
The inability of the government to introduce agricultural reforms and the guerrilla activities in Eritrea (see also the problem of Eritrea) combined to heighten tensions within the country.

In February 1974, owing to a number of contingent factors, such as an exceptional rise in the cost of living resulting from the world economic and financial crisis of 1973, the troops in Eritrea revolted and were soon joined by the troops stationed in the capital. The break between the government and the military rapidly became irreparable. On 12 September 1974, the sovereign was deposed.

b - The new revolutionary government

In the following months a coordinating committee was set up consisting of 120 military personnel drawn from all the services (the DERG).

On 22 November 1974, the head of the Provisional Military Administrative Council, Anam Andorn, was assassinated, together with 29 civilians and 30 military personnel associated with the previous regime. Teferi Bente was appointed in his place, assisted by two vice-presidents: Atnafu Abata and Colonel Menghistu, who was later to assume power in 1977.

The new government summed up its 'philosophy' in the motto 'Ethiopia above all' (ityopya teqdam). The Ethiopian Church gave its official support to the new military government in 1974.

At the beginning of 1975, banks, insurance companies, industries and commercial undertakings were nationalized. In March 1975, all agricultural land was nationalized and a programme of agricultural reform was launched, based on the creation of large collective farms and on the granting of small plots to individuals for direct cultivation.

c - Current economic situation

Few data are available on Ethiopia's economy. There is no doubt, however, that the situation is very difficult. This was admitted by the Head of State, Menghistu Haile Mariam, at the second congress of the Commission for the Organization of the Ethiopian Workers' Party (see below). By far the most significant datum in the agricultural sector is that, while the gross product increased by 4.9% in 1979, it rose by only 2.4 and 2% in 1980 and 1981 respectively. This means that the growth of agriculture, which accounts for 50% of the gross
national product and 90% of exports, has been totally inadequate. This is in part explained by the fact that the years before 1979 were marked by a decline in production. Even so, in the early 1980s the rate of productive growth was lower than the rate of population growth. What is more, in the rural areas - where consumption is higher than in the past - there is often no incentive to raise production levels: hence the prevalence of subsistence farming and the resulting difficulty in supplying the urban centres. What little surplus there is is sold on the black market which, although highly risky in view of the repressive laws, is the only way in which farmers can be sure of a reasonable income. According to the government, this unsatisfactory situation is caused by the inefficiency of the State farms, which produce 14 quintals of cereals per hectare, as against a target figure of 25 quintals.

In the light of this situation, some of the underlying principles of the centrally managed agricultural reform of the military regime which succeeded Haile Selassie have already been called into question, and it is now proposed that they should be modified to enable the State to give support to small private productive units.

Industry is in a worse state than agriculture. The 180 largest undertakings in the country have all been nationalized. This has resulted in a reduction in production is absolute terms, even though a few new industries have been created. However, there is far more concern about the agricultural sector, not least because the 1983 harvest was disastrous owing to the drought. It is clear, finally, that all the economic problems are exacerbated by the current military operations in Eritrea and other provinces, since to finance them has necessitated an excessive increase in military expenditure.

d - Current internal situation and the Soviet presence

Ethiopia is at present governed by the Provisional Military Administrative Council (CMAP) and the Council of Ministers. Lieutenant-Colonel Menghistu, who assumed power in February 1977, is Head of State and President of the CMAP and the Council of Ministers.

As far as political opposition is concerned, the regime would seem to have nothing to fear. The 'red terror' of 1978-79 completely destroyed the Ethiopian Revolutionary Peoples' Party which, although
of Marxist persuasion, had resisted the policies of the military government. The Ethiopian Marxist Socialist Movement (Messon), on which Menghistu had once depended in his ascent to power, has also been wiped out. The Ethiopian Democratic Union, which is led by a group of exiles representing the old aristocracy, has very little influence, at least among the Amhara. There are certainly military splinter groups. The two main factions, within the Derg, the powerful organ of state through which the armed forces are able completely to control the political life of the country, are probably the pro- and anti-Soviet (or neutral) groups. At all events, there is less friction between the various factions than there was in the period following the fall of the Negus, which was marked by continuous internal purges. This whole process of relative stabilization has been made possible only by the harshest suppression of all forms of opposition, without the slightest consideration for human rights.

After leaving Somalia in 1976, the Soviets formed an alliance with Ethiopia in 1977. Their intervention will be of decisive importance in the war in Ogaden (see below).

There are various reasons for the Soviet support of Ethiopia: on the one hand, there are strategic military interests (base on the island of Dahlak in the Red Sea), and on the other there are ideological interests associated with the strategic military interests. The USSR seems to regard Ethiopia as a country which is in the process of transforming itself into a solidly 'Marxist' state which will thus become a stable 'bridgehead' in the African continent, which on the whole has remained immune to the Soviet system.

Numerically, the military strength of the Soviets and their allies in Ethiopia is as follows: 11,000 Cubans, 3,000 East Germans and 2,500 Russians. Today, the Soviets are the main suppliers of weapons, and the share of military expenditure in the Ethiopian budget rose from 2.5% in 1974 to 10.5% in 1980 (these are the official figures, but the real share is probably greater).

In December 1979, in conformity with the wishes of the Soviets, the authorities created the Commission for the Organization of the Working Population (COPWE) in order to recruit members of the future avant-garde party. The Ethiopian leaders were less than enthusiastic about this development since, according to reliable sources, they
feared that the organization of a Marxist-Leninist party on a vast scale might impose a system of popular control which would threaten to undermine the central power.

The pro-Soviet stance was largely dictated by a concern to safeguard at all costs the territorial integrity of the country, which has been threatened, particularly since the fall of the empire, by the revolt of ethnic groups which have very little in common.

The most serious rebellion, politically and militarily, has been that mounted by the Eritreans (see below). Other revolts against the central power are those led in Tigre by the Tigrean Peoples' Liberation Front (see below), in the region of Wollo by the Democratic Ethiopian Peoples' Movement, in Oromo (Galla) by the Oromo Liberation Front and in Ogaden by the Somalia Liberation Front (FLSO).

The pro-Soviet line was also encouraged by the indecisiveness of the Americans. Washington - which had long given military support to safeguard the unity of Ethiopia, a principal ally of the USA in Africa in the 1950s and 1960s - is now reluctant to extend military aid to Addis Ababa because of the country's serious and repeated violations of human rights and its failure to provide compensation for expropriated United States' property.

1 It seems that it was also on Soviet advice that Ethiopia signed, in August 1981, a defence pact with Libya and South Yemen with a view to obtaining Libyan capital and South Yemen military aid. When this pact became known, it was condemned in some Ethiopian circles as being 'against nature', since, by inviting further foreign intervention (that of Libya and South Yemen) in the Horn of Africa, it merely served to heighten internal tensions. It should, however be remembered that Soviet military advisers were already present in Ethiopia during the reign of Haile Selassie.

2 United States Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs - Background Notes. Ethiopia, August 1981. It is interesting to note that, notwithstanding the present coolness between the two countries, relations between the USA and Ethiopia have been close and friendly since as far back as 1900. This probably explains why, however distantly, the US continues to show an interest in the fate of Ethiopia.
Furthermore, the governing elite insist that the Ethiopian nation (integrity of the Ethiopian State within the established imperial boundaries, though with some dilution of the Amhara hegemony) is indivisible. Consequently, there have been no signs of a softening of the regime’s approach to the problems of Eritrea and the other minorities, nor is it likely that there will be in the future:

Addis Ababa will do no more than offer a measure of autonomy which, however, will be difficult to reconcile with the authoritarianism of the central power. Yet there is evidence of some discontent, at least amongst some members of the ruling faction, over the intentions of the USSR (which, for example, is criticized for urging a transfer of power to the civilian authorities). Any shift in the country’s relations with the USSR is, however, inconceivable unless there is some prospect of a solution to the Eritrean problem and, perhaps also, stabilization of the country’s borders with Somalia. As in the time of the Negus, Ethiopia’s policy is still to maintain the status quo. It is anxious to maintain good relations with the Sudan, a country which provides a secure base for the operations of many guerrilla movements. Its attempts to destabilize Somalia, not least by fomenting agitation against the regime of Siad Barre, are primarily aimed at preventing Mogadishu from unfurling the flag of an enlarged Somalia, bearing in mind its claims to Ogaden. It is plainly for these reasons that Ethiopia sought the protection of Moscow, and the USSR had no choice but to accommodate the fundamental objectives of its African policy with the need to respond to Ethiopia’s call for help.

The problem of the countless ethnic groups was raised in the 1976 programme on the ‘Ethiopian National Democratic Revolution’. Article 5 of this programme asserted, inter alia, that the right of self-determination for all the nationalities was fully acknowledged: ‘This means that each nationality will enjoy the regional autonomy necessary for it to be able to decide matters relating to its own internal affairs ...’ (Basic Documents of the Ethiopian Revolution, published by the Provisional Office for Mass Organization Affairs. Propaganda and Education Committee, Addis Ababa, May 1977, pp. 13 and 14). Colonel Mengistu nevertheless added a rider to this provision, to the effect that the government condemned all those who worked for their personal advantage and who opposed the unity of the revolutionary state in the name of nationalist separatism. (Speech made in May 1983. See Jo Mayall, ‘The National Question in the Horn of Africa’, in The World Today, Sept. 1983, p. 337).
The decolonization of Eritrea - 120,000 km² and a population of about 3.5 million - was hotly contested. The four main victorious powers of the Second World War failed to reach agreement on its future, even though the former colonial power, Italy, had surrendered all claims to the territory, as also to its other former colonies, with the signing of the peace treaty. It was not until 1950 that an agreement was reached in the United Nations, which was, however, adopted only after an extremely controversial debate. The essence of this agreement was that Eritrea should form part of a federal union with Ethiopia, under the Ethiopian Crown. The Federation came into being in 1952 and existed, despite various vicissitudes, for a decade. In 1962, following military intervention by Ethiopia, the Eritrean parliament was dissolved. The Federation then ceased to exist and Eritrea lost its autonomy, becoming a mere province of the empire.

From the point of view of international law, the Ethiopian action was totally illegal, since it violated an unequivocal resolution of the United Nations. It also violated the principle, which is one of the most solid bases of relations between the African countries, of the inviolability of the colonial frontiers, bearing in mind that at the time of the final decision the identity of Eritrea was separate from that of Ethiopia. What is bitterly contested is the specious nationalistic justification of Ethiopia's action, since there are undeniable historical and cultural differences between the Eritrean and Ethiopian peoples (identifiable with the different ethnic groups which had somehow been brought together under the controlling influence of the Ethiopian empire over many centuries). The action was also politically unacceptable, inasmuch as it resulted in internal repression and regional destabilization.

The annexation of Eritrea provoked the formation of an armed resistance movement. This was initially organized by the Eritrean Liberation Front (FLE). The movement gathered strength over the years, receiving the full support of the population. At the same time,

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however, political divisions emerged, which subsequently resulted in the creation of countless splinter groups. The FLE has ceased to be the dominant political and military group. The group which has most successfully extended its influence over the territory and the population is the Eritrean Peoples' Liberation Front (FPLE).

Then there are the peoples' liberation movements, as well as other smaller groupings. Broadly speaking, the FLE derives its inspiration from Islam, while the FPLE is of Marxist persuasion. The ultimate aim of all these groups is independence for Eritrea. They have repeatedly striven to settle their differences (which hinge on the social order to be established by Eritrea once it has won independence). But, although there have been formal declarations of reconciliation, the disagreements have persisted. There have been frequent bloody skirmishes between the different guerrilla movements, particularly in recent times. It is perhaps because of these conflicts that the Eritrean liberation fronts have never attempted to set up a government in exile or in the 'Liberated' territories.

Although there are no formal contacts between them, the Eritrean guerrilla movements and Somalia found that they had enough in common to launch, in 1977, a joint offensive against the Addis Ababa central government. This offensive was repulsed after little more than a year's fighting. The Eritrean objectives are, however, very different from the objectives of the Somalis. The former, unlike the latter, are clearly justified from the point of view of international law. Nevertheless, Eritrea's demand for independence gives rise to contradictions, since Ethiopia has invoked the UN's mandatory 'federal' decision and, on the basis of that decision, insists that the problem should be considered as a strictly internal one. Moreover, since fully twenty years have elapsed since the annexation of Eritrea, the principle of the inviolability of frontiers might easily be re-interpreted to strengthen the arguments of those who favour maintaining the status quo. The arguments of the Eritreans, it should be added, carry more credence with the Arab states than with the OAU from which, indeed, they have never evoked much sympathy.

As far as the military operations are concerned, these are not achieving the results which Addis Ababa had hoped: the 'red star' operation, launched in 1982, has more or less failed, while in February 1983 the
the Tigrean revolt gathered considerable momentum (see below)\(^1\).

Notwithstanding the presence and the military aid of the Eastern bloc countries, it is apparently extremely difficult for the Ethiopians to win an outright military victory. The Eritrean terrain is unsuited to tank offensives and is more favourable to guerrilla warfare operations such as those carried out in Afghanistan. The Ethiopian troops have used Soviet MI-24 helicopters and have been accused by the Eritrean Peoples' Liberation Front (FPLF) of having used toxic gases. These accusations have been denied by the Addis Ababa government and Western observers in the Ethiopian capital have not been able to establish the truth of the matter\(^2\).

It seems, moreover, that the Soviet Union is reluctant to become deeply involved in the Eritrean problem. Indeed, the 'red star' operation was not approved by the Soviets and observers have pointed out that if Addis Ababa were to succeed in settling once and for all the Eritrean problem by force of arms, it would strengthen the position of the nationalist factions in the DERG and in the army, which for the most part has been antipathetic to the Soviet presence\(^3\).

Aside from the military measures, there is an economic objective in Menghistu's strategy, which is to 'rebuild Eritrea', the aim being to weaken the resolve of the rebels by offering an alternative course to the Eritrean people which would involve improving their standard of living etc. The achievement of such an objective would be plainly difficult, both because of the enormous destruction caused by the war and because the prevailing situation is a disincentive to investment\(^4\).

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1 The northern region of Eritrea is still outside the control of Addis Ababa, but it now seems that military activities there have been immobilized owing to lack of support for the Eritreans (see Le Monde, 29.10.1983)

2 See Le Monde, 26.3.1982

3 See Le Monde, 23.3.1982

4 It once seemed likely that assistance for the rebuilding of Eritrea would come from Libya (Le Monde, 23.3.1982), but this now seems out of the question because of the financial difficulties recently experienced by Libya. For 1982, Ethiopia had earmarked 10% of its budget for Eritrea (Le Monde, op. cit.)
The Eritrean liberation movements receive very little aid from other countries. The United States is unwilling to get caught up in the conflict, apparently for two reasons. Firstly, it is likely that Israel would be hostile to US intervention, since it would not like to see the establishment of another Arab state in the area of the straits leading into the Red Sea. Secondly, the USA is convinced that, since the Soviet system is unpalatable to Africa as a whole, the end of the Eritrean revolt would induce the Soviets to withdraw from Ethiopia, just as they have already been forced to withdraw from Egypt, the Sudan and Somalia.

In these circumstances, the Eritreans have obtained what little support they have from certain Arab states, which are nevertheless antagonistic to the principle so firmly defended by the Organization of African Unity (OAU), that of the inviolability of the frontiers established at the end of the colonial period (see below).

Nevertheless, the Sudan has played a major part in the conflict by allowing the Eritrean liberation forces to take refuge on Sudanese territory. Although there have been attempts to reconcile the interests of Ethiopia and the Sudan, the results have been disappointing and the situation between the two countries today is one of stalemate. The Sudan has recently accused Ethiopia of supporting the rebel forces in the south.

In sum, the war in Eritrea is a source of tensions and severe economic and social problems, not just because there is still no prospect of an end to the conflict, but also because it has created an enormous refugee problem. There are at least 500,000 refugees, most of whom have been taken in by the Sudan (see below).

f - The problem of Tigre

In mid-February 1983, the DERG launched a widespread offensive against the Tigrean Peoples' Liberation Front (FLPT), deploying 40,000 troops and heavy artillery.

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1 See André Fontaine, Le Monde, 25.2.1982
2 See page 26
Unlike Eritrea, the Tigrean anti-government forces have repeatedly declared that they have no wish for total independence from Addis Ababa, but simply a large measure of autonomy. Furthermore, their motives would appear to be grounded in extreme left-wing ideologies. The FLPT professes to be a Marxist-Leninist movement. Even so, there has been mutual assistance between the Eritrean Peoples' Liberation front (FPLF) and the FLPT and it was this link, perhaps forged by incidental factors, which in 1992 enabled the Eritreans, inter alia, to stave off the 'red star' offensive.

The problem of Ogaden

The Ogaden problem brought open conflict, in 1977-78, between Somalia and Ethiopia.

Ogaden is inhabited by peoples of Somali ethnic origin, and it has always been Somalia's objective to reintegrate these peoples into its own territory, in pursuit of its policy of creating an enlarged Somali state (see chapter on Somalia).

In 1977, the Somali regular army invaded Ogaden and came close to routing the Ethiopian forces. The Soviet intervention on the side of Addis Ababa proved to be of vital importance, since it enabled tanks to be airlifted to Ogaden to repulse the Somali army and reconquer the region.

This Soviet-mounted operation was seen to be extremely important, not least from the military point of view, since it entailed, perhaps for the first time, the use of a rapid deployment force on the part of the Soviets.

The Soviet intervention was condemned by the Islamic Foreign Ministers Conference, held in Islamabad from 27 to 29 January 1980, in a resolution which denounced 'the armed aggression against the Somali Democratic Republic' as well as the presence of the Soviet Union and of some of its allies in the Horn of Africa. The resolution called, inter alia, for the withdrawal of the foreign bases in the Horn of Africa.¹

¹ Keesing's Contemporary Archives, p. 30242, 1980. The condemnation of Ethiopia may be explained by the fact that Somalia is an Arab country. Moreover, the Islamic Conference is strongly anti-Soviet.
In August 1980, a six-point resolution was adopted by an OAU commission meeting in Lagos. It called attention, inter alia, to the principle of the inviolability of the frontiers of OAU member states, as drawn at the time of independence.

The OAU continued to act as a mediator. In June 1981, the Assembly of Heads of State and of Government of the OAU adopted, despite Somali objections, a resolution affirming that Ogaden was 'an integral part of Ethiopia'.

Nevertheless, Somalia continued to support the guerrilla forces of the Western Somalia Liberation Front (FLSO), while proclaiming that it did not seek territorial aggrandizement (see chapter on Somalia).

The attitude of the Mogadishu government is that the Ogaden Somalis should have the right of self-determination and that it should be up to the FLSO to decide, once independence has been gained, whether Ogaden should be united with Somalia or a new state created.

The question of the fate of Ogaden nevertheless remains open. In 1982, Ethiopian forces crossed the frontier into Somalia and occupied two villages, Balanballe and Goldogob. These have still not been returned to Somalia.

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1 Africa Research Bulletin, August 1980, pp. 5763 and 5764. The members of the OAU commission are: Nigeria, Tanzania, Senegal, Liberia, Cameroon, the Sudan, Mauritania and Lesotho, which was not represented at the Lagos meeting.

2 Keesing's Contempory Archives, p. 31055

3 See Il Messaggero, 19.10.1983

4 Le Monde, 25.11.1983
II - SOMALIA

a - Internal situation and conflicts with neighbouring states

Somalia won independence in 1960 following the fusion of the former Italian colony and the former British Somaliland Protectorate. In 1969, following the assassination of the President of the Republic, the army seized power.

Following this coup d'état, which was led by the current President, Siad Barre, the 1960 Constitution was suspended and a new government formed by the Supreme Revolutionary Council.

In October 1970, President Barre pronounced Somalia to be a socialist state and began to prepare a revolutionary programme of national unification and economic and social reform.

In July 1976, the Supreme Revolutionary Council was dissolved and its powers were transferred to the new party: the Somali Revolutionary Socialist Party (SRSP).

In 1979, a new Constitution was introduced. The 127-member Peoples' Assembly met for the first time in January 1980. In October of the same year, President Barre declared a state of emergency on the grounds that 'opportunistic elements' were posing a threat to national stability. This state of emergency was ended in March 1982.

As far as internal policy is concerned, after a period of 'scientific socialism', the regime turned its attention to the privatization of various sectors of the economy.

The authorities also initiated a rapid process of 'Arabization' throughout the country. By contrast with Ethiopia, Somalia has no ethnic problems of the kind which would complicate relations between the State and society. President Siad Barre recently declared that 'we are a homogeneous nation in every respect\(^1\). Deep-rooted tribal tensions nevertheless exist.

\(^1\)Summary of World Broadcasts, 5 July 1983.
Since 1964, Somalia has laid claim to the Ethiopian territory of Ogaden (see above) and to some territories of neighbouring Kenya, both of which are inhabited by peoples of Somali ethnic origin. These claims are said to form the basis of a policy aimed at creating an 'enlarged Somalia', which, moreover, was prefigured in the Bevin Plan of the post-war era. Furthermore, the 1979 Constitution affirms the support of the Somali State for 'the liberation of the Somali territories still under the yoke of colonial oppression'. For the present, however, the Somali government's avowed intention is not to pursue its territorial claims.

b - From a Soviet Union presence to a United States presence

Relations between Somalia and the Soviet Union became much closer in 1969, when the army seized power and a socialist state was proclaimed.

The heavy dependence of the Somali army on the Soviets for necessary equipment and training increased the influence of the USSR, which in turn obtained for the Somalis various military 'facilities' and, in particular, use of the Berbera naval base. The Peoples' Republic of China financed a series of civilian projects.

In May 1977, the Western Somalia Liberation Front (FLSO) launched an offensive in Ogaden, with substantial support from the Somali government. The Soviets, for their part, were already prepared to fill the power vacuum in Ethiopia and, with their support and Cuban backing, the Addis Ababa army was able to turn the tables in a war that had at first seemed lost.

In November 1977, following promises from Saudi Arabia of financial aid for the acquisition of military equipment, on condition that

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1 In December 1980, following a visit by Mengistu to Kenya, the final communique called on Somalia to renounce its territorial claims in respect of Ethiopia, Kenya and Djibouti (Africa Research Bulletin, 1-31 August 1980, p. 5764).

2 James Mayell, op. cit., p. 339
it broke with the USSR, and friendly overtures from the United States, Somalia broke off relations with Cuba, abandoned the treaty of friendship with the Soviet Union and expelled 6,000 Soviet personnel from its territory.

In 1978, the United States extended financial aid to the Siad Barre regime, while refraining for the time being from providing it with military assistance.

On 22 August 1980, on the strength of an exchange of notes between Washington and Mogadishu, the United States was allowed access to expanding naval and air 'facilities'.

The Reagan Administration has increased economic and military aid to Somalia, to the extent that, with an allocation of 91.3 million dollars, it now ranks third among the African countries in receipt of US assistance.

American diplomacy is, however, faced with a difficult dilemma: how can it reconcile support for Somalia with possible future cooperation with Ethiopia, which has latterly manifested a desire to improve its relations with Western countries?

It is clear that Ethiopia's economic performance would make such an improvement rather difficult: exports have fallen while the cost of imports has risen, notably as a result of the increase in the price of oil. Moreover, the balance of payments deficit and the external debt are increasing at an equal pace.

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1 Sudan is the chief beneficiary ($230 million), followed by Kenya ($112.5 million).

2 See James Mayall, op.cit., pp.341 to 343. See also the visit of the Ethiopian Foreign Affairs Minister to the United Nations and his contacts with the US State Department.

In 1982, following the Ethiopian incursions into Somalia, the United States supplied Mogadishu with defensive military equipment, but it still refuses to provide heavy arms. Since February 1983, however, some forty US military instructors have been helping to train the Somali army (Le Monde, 25.11.1983).
The 1977-78 war destabilized the Somali regime. The President, Mohammed Siad Barre, has been challenged within the ruling junta. Both in the party and in the armed forces, the two centres of power, there has been growing dissent, with the result that there have been a few abortive attempts to overthrow the government. There has also been an increase in guerrilla activity, aimed not simply at removing Siad Barre, but at making sweeping changes in the regime as a whole.

The anti-government guerrilla movement poses a serious challenge to the regime. It is aided by Ethiopia which, after 1980, considered that to foment subversion within Somalia’s borders would be the most effective way of preventing Mogadishu from encouraging fresh uprisings in Ogaden against the Addis Ababa central government. Siad Barre has repeatedly denounced the incursions by Ethiopian troops into Somali territory and has also spoken of direct confrontations between the regular armies of the two countries. However, Ethiopia seems unwilling to commit itself to a direct invasion of Somalia; it prefers to act through the intermediary of opposition movements.

This form of Ethiopian intervention has met with a measure of support within Somalia, not so much on political grounds (rejection of certain anti-Ethiopian decisions taken by Siad Barre) as for tribal reasons. Siad Barre relies for support on his own tribe, the Meharans. Until very recently, the most powerful guerrilla organization was the Somali Deliverance Front, founded in Addis Ababa in 1979. Its strength derived primarily from the Mijurtein tribe. In 1981, it combined with two lesser groups to form the Democratic Front for the Deliverance of Somalia, a movement which was subsequently weakened by internal dissension.

At present, the strongest anti-government group is the Somali National Movement, which was founded in London in 1980. Its ethnic composition is predominantly Ishaak.
Djibouti has an area of 21,783 km² and a population of 350,000. The main ethnic groups are the Afars and the Issas, but there are also Somali, Arab and European minorities.

According to a United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) report, most of the Djibouti peoples live in conditions of dire poverty. The rural population is 'one of the poorest in East Africa' and 'extreme poverty also exists in the Djibouti urban agglomeration'. 90% of the territory is desert. Virtually all the rest is given over to grazing. Only 6,000 hectares, corresponding to 0.26% of the territory, is fit for cultivation, but none of this land is irrigated. In 1981, agricultural output covered a mere 3% of the country's food requirements. Independent for just six years, Djibouti lacks even the rudiments of an industrial structure. Its economy is focused entirely on the tertiary sector. Activity is concentrated in four sectors: building and public works, transport and telecommunications, services, and commerce. Virtually everything has to be imported, with the inevitable result that the country suffers from a chronic balance of trade deficit. At only 6.4%, the ratio of exports to imports is disastrous.

This small 'enclave' owes its economic survival to its geographical position. Djibouti is in an ideal position to control the Bab el Mandeb Straits, the point at which the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean meet. It was hoped to turn the Port of Djibouti into the Hong Kong of East Africa, but Djibouti has now been overtaken, in terms of volume of trade, by the Port of Jeddah, whose expansion in recent years, together with the decline in the importance of the Suez Canal, has been a serious blow to the country's economy. The railway linking the Port of Djibouti with Ethiopia is of key importance, in that it is used to transit 60% of Ethiopia's exports. Closed during the Ogaden war (1977-1978), this railway is now again functioning normally thanks to French aid.
France plays a special part in maintaining the economy. It provides 80% of the country's imports and is by far the most important contributor to cooperation schemes (education, health, etc.). Expenditure by French residents accounts for 50 and 75% of the value added in the commercial sector and the services sector respectively. The financial aid provided by the Arab countries (about 100 million dollars a year) is also useful, though not decisive, to the economy.

Politically, the country seems to have achieved a measure of stability under the leadership of President Hassan Gouled. In the years before and immediately after independence, there was acute tension between the two ethnic communities, the Afars and the Issas (the latter are of Somali stock). This arose because the Afars, who had enjoyed a privileged position in the colonial era, were forced into a somewhat subordinate role compared with the Issas thanks to a shift in the balance of power and influence during the period in question. Hassan Gouled succeeded, however, in averting civil war. As part of his policy of national reconciliation, he brought prominent members of the Afar community into the government (the Prime Minister is an Afar) and created, in 1981, an institutional structure based on the single party.

Relations with Ethiopia and Somalia are particularly delicate. Each of these two countries has always feared that the other wished to exploit Djibouti to its own advantage. Addis Ababa was particularly keen on the maintenance of the French colonial presence, which safeguarded the operation of the Ethiopia-Djibouti railway, while thwarting the expansionist claims of Mogadishu. Somalia, on the other hand, pressed for the country's independence, without disguising its hope that it would one day be incorporated into the Republic of Somalia. Between 1977 and 1980, Ethiopia encouraged Afar opposition to Hassan Gouled (then a popular figure among the Somalis). The Ogaden war, which forced the shutdown of the Addis Ababa-Djibouti railway and saw an unprecedented increase in support for the idea of an enlarged Somalia, changed and to some extent reversed the situation. Politically, Djibouti has drawn closer to Ethiopia and distanced itself from Mogadishu.
It is in Djibouti's interests that the region should remain stable. Although it may be seen as a sort of second Somali state, it mistrusts Somalia. In international forums, it has always striven to maintain a neutral stance, seeking to build up alliances in order to escape the vice-like grip of its two more powerful neighbours. This explains why it joined the Arab League. At all events, Djibouti remains a solidly pro-Western country. The cooperation agreements with France provide, inter alia, for the stationing of 4,500 French soldiers on its territory. Djibouti has also granted the American fleet access to its port.
The economy of the Sudan is in a precarious state. The disaster which seemed imminent two years ago, following the abandonment of the grandiose projects elaborated in the 1970s with the aim of making the Sudan the granary of the Arab world with massive assistance from the Arab Funds and OPEC, has been averted, but a number of economic distortions have been accentuated and given rise to contradictions which represent a grave threat to the country's stability.

International Monetary Fund sources indicate that President Gaafar El Nimeri has succeeded in arresting the surge in the foreign debt, which at present amounts to 7,800 million dollars. However, he has been unable to start the process of reducing the debt, which continues to place a very heavy burden on the national exchequer. By concentrating all its energies on restoring the balance of payments and on meeting the demands of international creditors, the government finds that it must pursue an economic policy which, by, for example, abolishing subsidies aimed at holding down the prices of various staple goods, has caused deep resentment and outbreaks of violent protest.

A number of distortions which have emerged in the past two years cast serious doubts on the ability of the Sudanese economy to survive for very much longer. The principal distortion arises from the uncertain role of the country's million or so emigrants, most of whom now work in the rich countries of the Gulf. These workers have done much to help make good the lack of hard currency and to sustain the local currency through their income transfers. However, the fall in oil revenue in the Emirates has forced them to curtail their development programmes. In consequence, many Sudanese migrants will be made redundant and compelled to return home, where all that awaits them is unemployment or a paltry subsistence wage of about 23 dollars a month.

The main agricultural products are cotton and sugar. Output of both products has risen considerably over the last year, which will enable the government to make substantial cuts in imports.
The discovery of a few large oil-fields, which have still to be exploited, in the southern regions of the country has revived the ancient quarrel between the central government in Khartoum, which represents the interests of the North, and the South. El Nimeri has altered the boundary lines of the southern provinces, which secured a measure of autonomy after a long war, so as to bring the main fields within the borders of the northern provinces. He has also decided that the refinery to process the crude oil produced is to be built in the North. All this has created acute tensions between the northern and southern provinces.

b - Ethnic and political problems

The conflict between the Arab Muslim peoples of the North and the black peoples (predominantly animists, but including a minority Christian element) of the South is the dominant theme of Sudanese domestic policy, and indeed the acid test of the ability of all governments in the region. The Sudan is the largest country of the African continent. It brings into very close contact two very different civilizations, the Arabs and the blacks, between whom there are frequent bitter confrontations. For many years after independence, which left political control of the country in the hands of the Arabs, the Sudan was racked by bloody civil war. This ended in 1972 thanks to an agreement which bestowed a large measure of autonomy on the South, which was divided into three provinces. For some years this new arrangement worked reasonably smoothly. But relations eventually deteriorated, especially after 1981. Many members of the Southern Regional Assembly were arrested, including its vice-president. The Council for the Unity of South Sudan, set up to oppose the administrative reform proposed by El Nimeri, was dissolved, after being accused of violating the law banning the formation of political parties outside the Sudanese Socialist Union. These events were followed by a resumption of guerrilla warfare. The Khartoum government denounced the resurgence of 'banditry'. Even the reliability of the Northern forces is uncertain. The years 1980 to 1982 saw important new developments: the dissolution of Parliament, new elections (based on a single list), a total reorganization of the party.

These tensions have been exacerbated by El Nimeri's decision to extend the application of Islamic law to the south of the country.
and the ousting of leading figures who had been close to the President. Left-wing parties and trade unions were destroyed by El Nimeri, who now enjoys the support of the Muslim (integrationist) Right, which, however, does not always see eye to eye with the army, which remains the ultimate arbiter of the country's fate.

c - Foreign policy

The Sudan has always had very close - and in some respects 'obligatory' - ties with Egypt (which for years actually contested its right to independence). As far as international alliances are concerned, Sudanese policy follows unerringly that adopted by Cairo. The two countries have a mutual aid agreement. Like Egypt, the Sudan is now pro-Western (very good relations with the USA, which has offered to guarantee its security under certain conditions) and stands firmly opposed to Libya. El Nimeri sees Tripoli as a source of internal subversion. Relations with Ethiopia have invariably been tense. Both countries have attempted to exploit their respective secessionist movements to the detriment of each other. Up to 1972, Ethiopia provided a secure base for the southern guerrillas (the Anya-Nya), who also enjoyed the support of Israel. In 1972, peace was restored to the southern regions through the mediation of Haile Selassie which resulted in an agreement between Khartoum and Addis Ababa. The Ethiopian revolution did much to damage relations between the two countries, especially when it took the form of a pro-Soviet movement. The desire of both sides to avoid an armed conflict has, however, always led to moderation and negotiation (as well as to the conclusion of more or less lasting agreements) whenever the situation has threatened to get completely out of control.

The Sudan is willing to harbour a few anti-Ethiopian guerrilla movements, particularly if they are Eritrean. In general, however, its attitude to such movements is highly ambiguous, since on the one hand it might offer protection and on the other counsel restraint. Equally unclear is its political position on the
Eritrean demand for independence (when the fate of Eritrea was decided at the end of the Second World War, there was some talk of partial annexation by the Sudan). The Sudan is more deeply involved than other countries of the region with the flow of refugees, who are confronting it with immense economic and political problems: by their very nature, the camps are a potential source of subversion. The agreements with Ethiopia, whose apparent purpose is to prevent the infiltration into Ethiopia of armed forces from the Sudan and to stem the flow of refugees in the opposite direction, have in practice been inoperative. In this connection, attention should be drawn to the increased tensions between the Sudan and Ethiopia, which the Sudan accuses of supporting the rebellious movements of the south.
V - KENYA

a - Economic situation

For many years Kenya has been one of the economically most progressive and politically most stable countries of black Africa. Today, however, it is encountering serious difficulties in its efforts to initiate a process of rapid industrialization.

Because of its systematic involvement in world trade, Kenya has suffered more than other African countries from the effects of the international recession. The deterioration of the terms of trade has resulted in an expanding balance-of-payments deficit and hence in a constant shortage of foreign currency since proceeds from exports of agricultural products - still the country's only major resource - have fallen sharply, while the value of imports, public expenditure and hence the internal and external debt continue to rise. These factors have in turn fuelled inflation and increased the rate of unemployment, a problem further accentuated by the process of urbanization.

The partial redistribution of the 'white lands' has failed to solve the Kenyan farmers' problem of a shortage of fertile land.

The Minister of Finance, Arthur Magugu, painted a gloomy picture of the economic situation when he presented the budget for 1983-84. Since 1978, when the crisis began, the terms of trade have deteriorated by 30%. In 1982, exports fell by 75%. In the same year, the current accounts deficit amounted to 427 million dollars. This was an improvement on 1980, when the need to make additional purchases of foodstuffs forced the deficit up to 503 million dollars. Nonetheless, this improvement was achieved only by curbing imports, which has had a negative impact on living standards and investment projects. In its new budget, the government has reduced import levies. In the short term, this is likely to increase the volume of imports and hence further increase the deficit.

The government is nevertheless trying to stimulate investment (while maintaining a mixed economy) and to meet the targets suggested by the International Monetary Fund. But, as the Finance Minister
has admitted, the economy will not pick up before 1985. There is a danger that this will create social tensions and that these will be intensified by tribal tensions.

b - Political situation

The political stability of Kenya was severely tested by the abortive coup d'etat of August 1982. This revolt, which was planned by the air force, was put down by the army. However, although the political and institutional structures have remained formally untouched, significant changes have in fact occurred. The armed forces have become essential to the country's internal equilibrium, thus diminishing the margin for manoeuvre of the civilian authorities. Furthermore, the fear of a fresh coup d'etat has led the government and President Daniel Arap Moi, on whom the Constitution bestows very extensive powers, to intensify a number of restrictive measures.

Presidential and parliamentary elections were held in August and September 1983. These had the unfortunate effect of reviving the climate of fear and nervousness that had been created by the attempted coup d'état. Tensions were further heightened by the arrest of many opposition leaders, by the violent confrontations which marked the election campaign and by the sacking of the powerful Minister for Constitutional Affairs, Charles Njonjo. The re-election of Arap Moi and the election of representatives to the new Parliament, all of whom are members of the single, Kanu, party, have done nothing so far to remove the threat to internal stability.

c - Foreign policy

Kenya has always belonged to the moderate, pro-Western movement. Its importance as a regional ally of the Western powers in the Horn of Africa and, above all, vis-à-vis the Indian Ocean has steadily increased. The most important development for this alliance was the decision to allow the United States armed forces
access to the Port of Mombasa, in return for which there has been a substantial flow of arms from the US to Kenya. This has helped to improve Kenya's relations with Somalia, which is also prepared to defend Western interests in the area. Nairobi is nevertheless mistrustful of Somalia and, at the end of the 1970s, came close to breaking off relations. The reason for this is that the Mogadishu government has never, on principle, abandoned its attempts to renegotiate the frontiers established in the colonial era, since its aim has always been the reunification of all the Somali peoples. A small Somali population is to be found in the northern region of Kenya.

Somali irredentism has created a few problems for the central authorities by fomenting further ethnic and tribal discord. It has also prompted Nairobi to show some support for Ethiopia, its ally against 'Pan-Somalism', even though they stand opposed in terms of their choice of social systems and international allies.

It will be appreciated, therefore, that an equitable settlement of the conflicts in the Horn of Africa would help to 'clear the air' as far as the policies pursued by Kenya are concerned.

1 Kenya is the second largest beneficiary in Africa of United States economic and military aid ($112 million).
VI - HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE COUNTRIES OF THE HORN OF AFRICA

Ethiopia

The European Parliament's resolution on human rights in the world\(^1\) unreservedly condemns 'the violations to a greater or lesser degree of basic human rights and fundamental freedoms in many ACP countries, in certain of which these violations could be considered to be gross and systematic, most notably in Ethiopia, Guinea and Uganda\(^2\).

In its latest report (1983), Amnesty International states that it is particularly disturbed by the number of cases of detention without trial, the number of arrests for political reasons, the fact that the government has still not provided information on various prisoners who 'disappeared' in 1979, the alleged torture of prisoners and the harshness of prison conditions.

Somalia

The situation seems to be less serious in Somalia than in Ethiopia. In its 1983 report, Amnesty International expresses concern about the detention without trial of opponents of the government, the harshness of prison conditions and brutal methods of execution.

The United States State Department publication 'Country Reports on Human Right Practices for 1982' points out that fundamental freedoms are still restricted, that in cases involving national security the government holds suspects in prison without bringing charges notwithstanding the provisions of the Constitution, and that political dissidents are not always tried in public.

Djibouti

According to the publication 'Country Reports on Human Right Practices for 1982', Djibouti probably complies with the internationally accepted human rights code applied to single-party states.

In its 1983 report, Amnesty International states that it was informed that 88 Ethiopian refugees, mostly students, were arrested and handed over to the Ethiopian authorities. The Djibouti government notified Amnesty that the individuals concerned had illegally entered the State and been involved in robbery and armed attacks. Requests for further details by Amnesty International have met with no response.

\(^1\) OJ C 161 of 20.6.1983, pp. 58 to 66
\(^2\) Idem, section (V), para. (a)
VII - THE PROBLEM OF REFUGEES IN THE HORN OF AFRICA AND IN THE SUDAN

As a consequence of the Somalia-Ethiopia and the Ethiopia-Eritrea conflicts, the refugee problem in the Horn of Africa and in neighbouring Sudan has assumed alarming proportions. In this chapter, we shall briefly review the situation, taking each country in turn.

Ethiopia

There are about 11,000 refugees in Ethiopia and they have lived there for 10 to 12 years. They are Somalis and come from the rural population of Somalia.

Somalia

In 1980, one million Somalis from Ogaden, Oromo, Bale and Sidomo took refuge in Somalia. However, this number has now somewhat diminished.

According to the Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees, they settled in the first half of 1981 and were joined by a further massive inflow of refugees in 1982 and at the beginning of 1983.

Most of the refugees are women and children, living in 35 refugee camps.

In March 1983, the High Commissioner for Refugees visited Somalia to carry out a survey of the needs of the refugees and of the settlement and reaccommodation problems.

During this visit, the Somali government announced that priority would be given to the repatriation of those wishing to return home and that a settlement programme would be introduced to help those who remained dependent on the support of others.

The Somali government also indicated that it would look favourably on a tripartite agreement such as that reached between Djibouti, Ethiopia and the Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees if, as in the case of Djibouti, the European Community provided aid.


2 President Mengistu himself is likely to agree on this procedure if it is proposed by the European Community. This was ascertained by the European Parliament's Kiehler Report (7 October 1983).
Djibouti

The number of refugees in Djibouti, almost all of whom are Ethiopians, was estimated at 35,000 in 1982. Most are women and children under 15 years of age. The refugees arrived in 1977-78 in the aftermath of the Ogaden war. They make up slightly less than 10% of the local population.

A tripartite commission, consisting of representatives of the Djibouti and Ethiopian governments and the High Commissioner for Refugees, met in 1983 and reached an agreement aimed at repatriation.

The European Community has provided aid to help implement the resettlement programme.

Repatriation began in September 1983. Unfortunately, however, there is evidence of some forcible repatriation.

The Sudan

At the end of 1982, the Sudan took in 460,000 Ethiopian and Eritrean refugees. The High Commissioner has recently been informed of the arrival in eastern Sudan of about 13,000 refugees from Ethiopia. This migration is partly explained by the drought in the regions of origin.

The Sudanese government's policy is to continue to take in refugees in areas of organized settlement and to encourage them to achieve self-sufficiency through agriculture.

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1 Source: Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, op. cit.

2 Estimate of the Office of the High Commissioner, op. cit.; the Sudan has also accepted 170,000 refugees from Uganda, 2,000 from Chad and 5,000 from Zaire.

3 Office of the High Commissioner, op. cit.
VIII - THE POSITION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND A COMMUNITY STRATEGY

Before direct elections, the European Parliament adopted a resolution on respect for human rights in Ethiopia\(^1\). Since direct elections, it has adopted as many as five resolutions on the Horn of Africa, which bear witness to the interest evinced in the problems of the region.

The first resolution was adopted on 14 December 1979\(^2\), the second on 23 May 1980\(^3\), the third in July 1980\(^4\), the fourth on 18 November 1982\(^5\) and the fifth and last on 14 April 1983\(^6\).

The first resolution concerns 'the tragic plight of refugees, particularly children, in the Horn of Africa' and the appalling conditions in which they live in the refugee camps. The European Parliament called on the Member States to take prompt and special action with a view to elaborating a programme of economic aid. It reaffirmed the need to convene an international conference, under the aegis of the United Nations and the OAU and with the direct participation of the countries of the Horn of Africa, with the aim of establishing a regional cooperation policy. The principal objectives of the programme would be to facilitate peaceful solutions, promote the integration or voluntary repatriation of refugees and improve the transport facilities needed for the despatch and distribution of economic aid. Parliament condemned the superpower policy of sending excessive supplies of arms to the area at the expense of humanitarian aid and the social and economic development of the peoples concerned.

The second resolution, on 23 May 1980, concerns the terrible conditions in the refugee camps in Somalia. Parliament addressed an urgent appeal to the Council and Commission to ensure that Community food aid was provided immediately so as to avert a further worsening of the situation.

The third resolution, of July 1980, called for an increase in Community food aid to meet the increasing needs of the region. Such aid had become all the more urgent because of the crisis affecting Somalia.

\(^{1}\) OJ C 140/82 of 5.6.1979
\(^{2}\) OJ C 4/75 of 7.1.1980
\(^{3}\) OJ C 147/120 of 16.6.1980
\(^{4}\) OJ C 197/81 of 4.8.1980
\(^{5}\) OJ C 334/84 of 20.12.1982
\(^{6}\) OJ C 128/63 of 16.5.1983
The fourth resolution, of 18 November 1982, focuses on the situation in Somalia. Parliament condemned the continuing aggressive incursions of the Ethiopian army into Somalia and argued that the European Community should decide not to commit further aid to Ethiopia until a report on the matter had been made by the Commission to Parliament.

In the fifth resolution, of 14 April 1983, Parliament requested that emergency aid to Ethiopia should be channelled through the NGOs and suitable international agencies in order to ensure that the real objectives of the Community's aid programme were met, bearing in mind that the present instability of the region might otherwise cause the aid to be used for the wrong purposes.

These resolutions called attention to the fact that the Commission should provide not just food aid, but also and above all humanitarian aid and support for the thousands of people in refugee camps. Moreover, the aid should be destined in particular for the children living in these camps.

In July 1981, a European Parliament delegation visited Ethiopia and reported that the country had made responsible and effective use of the food and other aid provided by the Community. It felt that this should encourage the Community to continue to pursue a policy aimed at the economic development and social advancement of the region.

In June 1983, a European Parliament delegation led by Mr Poniatowski, chairman of the Committee on Development and Cooperation, visited Ethiopia, Djibouti and Somalia in order to assess the conditions under which Community food aid was distributed. The delegation found that it is being distributed properly but that difficulties still arise after the goods have been put ashore. The facilities available for transporting the aid from the ports to the villages and refugee camps for which it is intended are unsatisfactory. The goods arrive extremely late and when they do arrive they are usually in a bad condition. The delegation inspected the refugee camps and concluded that they were satisfactory both in terms of food supplies and in terms of health and hygiene facilities. However, the 'quasi-permanent' state of these camps is unacceptable, since there is a danger of creating a Palestinian-type situation, which would pose a threat to the internal stability of Somalia and Ethiopia.
We can, however, take heart from the fact that the flow of refugees has been arrested and even reversed, since groups of refugees are already returning to Ethiopia.

Today, there can be no objection to the Community opening negotiations with the countries of the Horn of Africa, since the tensions in the region are gradually subsiding. The Community should pursue a policy of economic cooperation which would enable the region to work its way out of the present difficult stage in its history. The first priority, however, must be to alleviate the suffering of the children in the refugee camps.
CONCLUSIONS

As has been shown in the foregoing pages, the problems of the Horn of Africa will be extremely difficult to solve. Yet, despite their exceptional complexity, the European Community cannot remain indifferent to them. While for the Ten there are strategic interests at stake, it cannot be forgotten that the countries of the region - Ethiopia, Somalia and Djibouti, but also the Sudan and Kenya - are signatories to the Convention of Lomé and as such closely associated with the Community.

The Ten must firmly condemn the countless interventions of the Eastern bloc countries, which have triggered in the region a process of major power confrontation and rearmament.

The Ten should bring pressure to bear on the Soviet Union in the hope of persuading it to withdraw its own troops and those of its allies and to help the international community resolve the tragic and destabilizing refugee problem.

By virtue of their former colonial interests, some of the Community Member States still maintain more or less close relations with the countries of the Horn of Africa. Yet a common position allowing a concerted response and concerted action on the part of the Ten would still seem to be lacking. Consequently, the first step should be to introduce a common programme of action to promote a settlement of the prevailing conflicts, particularly that between Ethiopia and Eritrea. Since, however, the situation is so complex and so delicate, it is plain that the Community must proceed with extreme caution and pursue a policy of mediation based on the accepted rules of diplomacy.

The Ten should also exert discreet but firm pressure on the governments of the region with a view to securing respect for human rights, both generally and in specific cases and situations. Special efforts should be made to protect human rights in Ethiopia, since it is in that country that the gravest violations seem to have occurred. One of the most distressing problems of the region, in both moral and human terms, is that of the refugee camps which, by their very nature, also pose a threat to stability; indeed, the existence of these camps could well create a Palestinian-type situation, which would have perilous consequence both for the host countries and for the region as a whole.
Consequently, while the Community should do all within its power to alleviate the plight of the refugees with food and financial aid, it should also seek to encourage their repatriation.
OPINION OF THE COMMITTEE ON DEVELOPMENT AND COOPERATION

Draftsman: Mr M. PONIATOWSKI

On 29 September 1983, the Committee on Development and Cooperation appointed Mr Michel PONIATOWSKI draftsman of the opinion.

The committee considered the draft opinion at its meeting of 26 January 1984. It adopted its findings unanimously on 2 February 1984.

The following took part in the vote: Mr BERSANI (vice-chairman, acting chairman), Mr DENIS (vice-chairman), Mr COHEN, Mr DESCHAMPS (deputizing for Mr NADUCCI), Mrs DURY, Mr ENRIGHT, Mr FERRERO, Mr HOWELL (deputizing for Mr de COURCY LING, Mr IRMER, Mr JACKSON, Mr LEZZI, Mr LOO, Mr J.D. TAYLOR (deputizing for Mr SHERLOCK), Mr VANKERKHOVEN, Mr VERGEER and Mr WEDEKIND.
The Committee on Development and Cooperation requests the Political Affairs Committee to take into account the following points and also the explanatory statement:

- stresses that Community aid, and more particularly food aid and emergency relief, have greatly contributed to the chances of survival of the peoples in this region, who are victims simultaneously of both drought and political conflict;

- points out that the European Parliament delegation which visited this region in June 1983 found that aid, and particularly food aid, was apparently being put to proper use in Ethiopia, Djibouti and Somalia;

- stresses the need for the Community to continue and, indeed step up, its cooperation on development in these countries, thus helping to stabilize this region;

- also stresses the importance of ensuring that emergency aid reaches those in need, irrespective of the political situation;

- considers that the Tripartite Agreement concluded between Ethiopia, Djibouti and the HCR on the voluntary repatriation of refugees represents a good solution, provided:

  - that repatriation is on a genuinely voluntary basis, duly verifiable by independent observers,

  - that Ethiopia guarantees the safety of those repatriated,

  - that the international community, including the European Community, contributes to the financing of the repatriation and resettlement operation;

- considers that an agreement between Ethiopia, Somalia and the HCR, based on the same principles, would be desirable and that an agreement of this sort would represent a first step towards normalization of relations between Ethiopia and Somalia;
INTRODUCTION

Having regard to several motions for resolutions (tabled pursuant to Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure) on the 'situation in Eritrea' or 'the forced repatriation of refugees in Djibouti' and 'granting emergency food aid to Ethiopia', the Political Affairs Committee decided to draw up a report on the situation in the Horn of Africa.

Owing to its very general nature, such a title comprises an inherent risk. The complexity of the situation in this region of Africa, the interplay between the problems, the very different levels at which these problems are pitched, may well lead the European Parliament astray when adopting its position.

Before demarcating the scope of our opinion, this being a function of the terms of reference of our committee, it is useful to recall the limits within which the European Parliament has to work. These are primarily dictated by the principle of non-interference.

For conclusions reached when examining how Community aid is used, how the needs of the countries in this region are developing - through natural disasters or the works of man - and when analysing the refugee situation, ought not to lead:

- to pronouncements on the political systems in the countries of this region,
- to pronouncements on the system of alliances and agreements entered into by these countries,
- to pronouncements for or against the various more or less overt acts of rebellion or guerrilla warfare which may be taking place in these countries.

The principle of non-interference prohibits the Community from adopting such positions. Moreover the situation in the Horn of Africa is at present so confused that the Community would have everything to lose by seeking to set itself up as an arbiter.
The content of this, our committee's opinion for the Political Affairs Committee will be confined:

- to the aid which the Community gives or should give to the countries in the Horn of Africa, taking into account their specific difficulties;

- to the problems of refugees.

A delegation from our committee visited Ethiopia, Djibouti and Somalia from 19 to 29 June 1983. On the basis of their visits to these countries and their talks with political leaders, they were able to form an opinion on the two above aspects. In addition they were also able to take stock of developments in the situation in Eritrea and more particularly in the regions of Asmara and Massawa.

I. STATES PARTICIPATING IN THE COOPERATION BETWEEN THE COUNTRIES OF THE HORN OF AFRICA AND THE EEC

(a) Ethiopia

With 33.5 million inhabitants (and a surface area of 1,221,900 km²) Ethiopia is, after Nigeria, the most populous country in Africa below the Sahel.

With a gross national product estimated at 140 dollars per head (1981 figure), it is one of the poorest countries of Africa. These simple facts explain straightaway why this country is the major beneficiary of financial and technical aid from the European Community under the Convention of Lomé (indicative programme for the Fifth EDF: from 125 to 144 million ECU).

Ethiopia is also one of the major beneficiaries of food aid from the Community.

This amounted in 1983 to: 23,000 tonnes of cereals; 3,700 tonnes of milk powder and 625 tonnes of butteroil.

1 Led by Mr PONIATOWSKI and comprising Mr BERSANI, Mr KUHN, Mr PEARCE, Mr FERRERO and Mr de La MALÈNE

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This aid is further supplemented by emergency aid, which in 1983 amounted to:

- 23,500 tonnes of cereals,
- 2,200 tonnes of milk powder,
- 600 tonnes of butteroil,
- 250,000 ECU for the purchase of beans and
- 2 million ECU for drought victims.

Apart from Community aid, which, depending on the year, represents either a third or a half of all aid received, Ethiopia also receives a good deal of bilateral aid, either from Member States or from Western countries such as Canada and Australia.

- On the use of aid

Through its various visits in the area (to Asosa, Ebnet, Asmara and Massawa) its meetings with Ethiopian leaders, its discussions with members of the HCR and various non-governmental organizations, the delegation from the European Parliament was able to satisfy itself that food aid had been properly used and, contrary to certain allegations, had not been diverted from its goal. This is also confirmed by a report drawn up by the services of the Commission of the Communities (PE 85.415). In its press release issued following the visit, the European Parliament delegation declared:

- that the statements by the Ethiopian authorities on the receipt, accounting, channelling and distribution of aid were confirmed by the representatives of the international authorities operating in the area, and by the agents of non-governmental organizations,

- that, following unloading and an initial period of storage at the port of Assaua, food aid was transported by convoy to the various disaster-stricken regions. Thus a part of this aid was channelled to Asmara, from whose storage centre it was shared among the various distribution centres.

Reference should also be made to a difficulty connected with the distribution of food aid which, though not specifically confined to Ethiopia, is particularly worrying in this country because of its size and geography:
namely the chronic shortage of the vehicles needed to transport aid to the interior of the country. The international community of donors, and in particular the European Community, should in future pay greater heed to this aspect as it is vital to the effectiveness of their food aid.

(b) Djibouti

Independent since June 1977, the Republic of Djibouti (21,783 km²) has an estimated population of 350,000 inhabitants (per capita GNP 480 dollars). Apart from its geographical and climatic situation, it is noted for one of the highest population growth rates in the world (49 per thousand). More than half of the inhabitants of the country are under 20 years of age. The delegation was able to take stock of the serious consequences of the drought. Between 1978 and 1980 one-third of the nomad population were the victims of drought; 40% of their livestock was lost. During this period the Djibouti authorities set up some 20 camps to accommodate and help those affected. Thanks to international aid, including that from the Community, those living in the camps were fed for one year. The camps were subsequently phased out and now contain only 6,000 people (divided between 2 camps). 'Food for work' programmes were recently instituted but, according to those in charge, increased aid is required if they are to continue.

Under the Fifth EDF, Djibouti should receive aid amounting to between 4.8 and 5.4 million ECU. In addition there is annual food aid consisting of: 4,000 tonnes of cereal, 200 tonnes of milk and 100 tonnes of butteroil.

Finally, like the other countries in the Horn of Africa, Djibouti has regularly received emergency aid to help it cope with natural disasters.

While Community aid is very much appreciated, the authorities in Djibouti have voiced a certain number of criticisms. The most fundamental criticism concerns the Community's failure to take into account, in calculating the amount from the Fifth EDF allocated to Djibouti, the special geographical situation of the country and the consequences of its late accession to independence. The Minister for Foreign Affairs talked at great length on the subject of Djibouti's economic dependence on Ethiopia and Somalia, which is due to its position. However, the latter country is in a very difficult economic situation and economic revival is very slow in coming to Ethiopia.
Both these factors have repercussions for the Djibouti economy. Finally, as it only became independent 6 years ago, the Community has not given this country aid in proportion to that given to the other ACP countries.

(c) Somalia

With a surface area of 637,857 km², Somalia has only 3.8 million inhabitants. Its GNP is estimated to be slightly higher than Ethiopia's (140 dollars). However 70% of the population reaches a level of subsistence equivalent to 200 - 250 dollars for a family of 5 people.

According to the indicative programmes for the Fifth EDF, Somalia should, under the Convention of Lomé II, receive Community aid worth between 73 and 83 million ECU. There is in addition food aid and emergency aid from the Community, which in 1983 was broken down as follows:

- Food aid: 23,000 tonnes of cereals
  3,700 tonnes of milk powder
  625 tonnes of butteroil

- Emergency aid: 15,100 tonnes of cereal
  1,280 tonnes of sugar
  900 tonnes of colza oil
  1,000 tonnes of milk powder
  3,000 tonnes of beans
  700 tonnes of butteroil and
  500,000 ECU for the purchase of beans.

All the ministers to whom the delegation talked stressed the inadequacy of the Community aid allocated to Somalia, the excessive delay in the delivery of food aid (there was the case of a vessel which unloaded its food aid supplies only after it had been at sea for 9 months), the delays in the appraisal and carrying out of projects and, finally, the absolute necessity for the development, in particular through the next Convention, of Somalia's fish resources (more than 3,000 kilometres of coastline).
II. THE PROBLEM OF REFUGEES

There are currently about 735,000 Ethiopian refugees, of whom 35,000 are in Djibouti and 700,000 in Somalia.

The delegation visited the camps at Ali-Sabieh (Djibouti), Saba'ad d'Arri Addeyse and Yalalaqusi (Somalia). On the whole it found that the food and sanitary situation were satisfactory (tuberculosis was the most common disease). The satisfactory state of affairs was due to international aid, including that from the Community, and the devoted efforts of volunteers from non-governmental organizations, all under the efficient control of the HCR. The HCR authorities in Somalia had, however, noted a marked deterioration in the food situation in the camp in 1983, when food aid was granted for a population of only 500,000 refugees whereas 700,000 rations had to be found.

The delegation also realized that the continuation of a situation in which refugees were more or less permanent would give rise to serious difficulties. For human, social and political considerations, their status as inactive, assisted persons cannot be allowed to persist for too long. There is, moreover, the possibility of a 'Palestinian' situation developing in this region, which represents a danger both for Somalia and for Ethiopia. Finally, despite international aid, refugees represent an unacceptable burden on Djibouti or Somalia in the long-term.

Aware of these risks, the delegation discussed with the three heads of state a basis for a possible agreement on the resettlement of refugees. It emerged during the course of these talks that both Djibouti and Ethiopia were satisfied with the Tripartite Agreement concluded between these two countries and the HCR concerning the repatriation of Ethiopian refugees, and with the aid from the international community, including the European Community, for this resettlement operation (cost estimated by the HCR: 8 million dollars).

President MENGISTU made it clear that he would accept a similar procedure (Ethiopia, Somalia, HCR Agreement - repatriation on a voluntary basis - aid from the international community, including the European Community, for the implementation of a resettlement programme) for Ethiopian refugees in Somalia, if it were proposed by the European Community. President Siad BARRE also
said he was favourably disposed to such a possibility, always providing that the European Community would be acting on the same terms as in the case of refugees from Djibouti and that the implementation of any such agreement would be monitored and guaranteed by international organizations and non-governmental organizations respectively.

The two Presidents' standpoints represent an important development in the attitude of Ethiopia and Somalia. According to observers present in the Horn of Africa, this development has been in evidence for some time now; for it ever to come to anything, there is need of a third party to take the initiative to consolidate the will of the two countries to find a solution to the refugee problem. According to those who spoke to the delegation, the Community ought to take this initiative, particularly as, being politically neutral, its intervention will be regarded as solely in the interests of the peoples concerned.

In the view of your draftsman the conclusion of an agreement of this sort between Ethiopia and Somalia, under the patronage of the HCR, could represent a first step towards normalization of relations between these countries, and thus help to stabilize this region of Africa.

Finally, the delegation wishes to point out the value of setting up a nationalities institute, as planned by the Ethiopian Government, to study the assimilation of the various nationalities into the Ethiopian institutional system and to make proposals for the organization of the state to this end.
MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION (DOCUMENT 1-1129/82)

tabled by Mr PEDINI, Mr BARBI, Mr RUMOR, Mr KLEPSCH,
Mr CROUX, Mr HABSBURG, Mr PFLIMLIN, Mr VERGEER,
Mrs CASSANMAGNAGO-CERRETTI, Mr BOURNIAS, Mr ESTGEN,
Mr PENDERS, Mr DESCHAMPS, Mr von HASSEL, Mr ANTONIOZZI,
Mrs LENZ, Mr GEROKOSTOPOULOS, Mr Konrad SCHÖN,
Mrs GIOTTI de BIASE, Mr KATZER, Mr O'DONNELL and
Mr LANGES

on behalf of the EPP Group (Christian Democratic Group)
pursuant to Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure
on the situation in the region of Eritrea

The European Parliament,

A. disturbed by the continuing conflict which is all too often forgotten
and which has raged through the Region of Eritrea for almost twenty
years, causing bloodshed and constant suffering for the people,

B. convinced that a peaceful solution to the conflict can be found by
guaranteeing, within the political unity of the Ethiopian State,
advanced forms of autonomy which have regard for the unique ethnic,
historical and cultural identity of the Eritrean peoples,

C. whereas one of the central principles of the Convention of Lomé, of
which Ethiopia is a member, is respect for the peaceful co-existence
of peoples, ethnic groups and different cultures,

D. whereas in the spirit of solidarity which informs that Convention,
its members should help each other to solve their problems while
respecting each other's sovereignty,

1. Calls on the Council of Ministers, within the framework of the
Convention, to use its good offices with the Addis Ababa Government
to promote measures to bring the conflict to an end and, to the
extent that special needs underlie that conflict, to ensure
that the aid instruments of the Lomé Convention can be used in the
implementation of special schemes;

2. Calls on the Commission:

(a) to provide all possible information on events in Eritrea and
their development;

(b) to promote through humanitarian organizations measures to assist
the victims of the prolonged war, thus demonstrating its commitment
to solidarity among peoples.
MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION (Doc. 1-23/83)
tabled by Mr HAHN, Mrs LENZ
and Mr von HASSEL

pursuant to Rule 47 of
the Rules of Procedure

on the forcible repatriation of
Ethiopian refugees in Djibouti

The European Parliament,

A. conscious of the vulnerable position of the Ethiopian refugees in the
DIKHOL and ALI SABIEH camps in Djibouti,

B. aware that the refugees fled from the repression prevailing in Ethiopia
at the risk of their lives,

C. aware that the fledgling Republic of Djibouti is experiencing difficulties
in accommodating within its territory the tens of thousands of refugees
who are placing a severe strain on its economy,

D. regretting that the Djibouti authorities have begun forcibly repatriating
to Ethiopia certain refugees whom they regard as illegal immigrants,

E. wishing to ensure that the right of asylum is respected,

1. Requests the Djibouti authorities not to forcibly repatriate Ethiopian
refugees fleeing from a regime which threatens their lives,

2. Requests the Commission and UN humanitarian organizations such as the
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees to increase
their aid to Djibouti in order to improve the position of the Ethiopian
refugees on its territory,

3. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Commission,
the Council, the Government of Djibouti and the UN.
ANNEX III

MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION

tabled by Mr ALMIRANTE, Mr ROMUALDI,
Mr BUTTAFOCO and Mr PETRONIO

pursuant to Rule 47 of
the Rules of Procedure
on the situation in ERITREA

The European Parliament,

A - whereas the Eritrean war of liberation between the people of Eritrea and the Ethiopian army has now lasted more than twenty years,

B - whereas, despite the change of regime in Addis Abeba, Ethiopia is continuing to deny the Eritrean people the right to self-determination,

C - whereas the war in Eritrea has intensified under the new Ethiopian authorities, with the involvement of 10,000 Cuban soldiers, numerous East German military instructors and a number of Russian military advisers,

D - whereas Ethiopia's aggression, fuelled by the use of more sophisticated arms including chemical and bacteriological weapons, is increasingly assuming the appearance and proportions of a veritable genocide,

E - having regard to the profound attachment of the Eritrean people to their own identity, history and culture, which distinguishes them totally from their Ethiopian neighbour,

Calls for:

1. The recognition of the Eritrean Liberation Front as the sole representative of the Eritrean people;

2. The Council of Ministers to request the withdrawal of all foreign troops currently in Eritrea;

3. The respect of Eritrea's territorial integrity;

4. Emergency aid to be sent to the populations afflicted by the war;

5. Consideration to be given to a financial aid programme in favour of the Eritrean Liberal Front, for the construction of hospitals and schools in the zones it has already liberated;

6. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Commission and the Council.