

**EUROPEAN SECURITY AND DEFENCE  
POLICY**

**INFORMATION PACK FOR  
DELEGATIONS**

**JULY 2000**



**EUROPEAN COMMISSION**  
EXTERNAL RELATIONS DIRECTORATE GENERAL  
DIRECTORATE CFSP  
**Security aspects including liaison with WEU and NATO**

## **INFORMATION AFTER THE FEIRA EUROPEAN COUNCIL REGARDING ESDP**

Developments concerning the European Security and Defence Policy keep moving ahead very quickly. Further to the note on the same matter sent on the 14<sup>th</sup> April, we have compiled an up to date information pack to keep you abreast of events.

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## BRIEFING FOR DELEGATIONS REGARDING CESDP IN THE WAKE OF THE FEIRA SUMMIT

### 1. Framing of a common defence policy which might lead to a common defence (art.17.1 TEU) - Progress to date

#### 1.1. Background to the issues

- In the language of the Vienna European Council, “**in order for the European Union to be in a position to play its full role on the international stage, the CFSP must be backed by credible operational capabilities**”. The priority has therefore been the development of such a capability.
- The Vienna European Council welcomed the Franco-British Declaration of St Malo of December 4<sup>th</sup> 1998 which constituted a concrete step towards the implementation of the Amsterdam Treaty before its entry into force and **invited German Presidency to progress ESDP**.
- The Cologne European Council made a **Declaration on strengthening the common European policy on security and defence**. The Declaration set the objectives, guiding principles and principal institutional arrangements for the new policy.

#### 1.2. State of Play after the Helsinki Council

- The Helsinki European Council took concrete decisions implementing the Cologne European Council Declaration - in practice **to build up EU operational capabilities**.
- This began with the double-hatting of **Mr Solana** as
  - **Secretary General of the EU Council Secretariat and High Representative for the CFSP** and
  - **Secretary General of the WEU (decided formally on WEU side 23 November 1999 at WEU Ministerial in Luxembourg)**.
- An important catalyst was the Franco-British summit of November 1999.
- The **Finnish Presidency** prepared **two progress reports** for Helsinki. One on security and defence covering decision-making, military capabilities, and co-

operation with non-EU partners and NATO. Strengthening of capabilities will be a key component. A WEU audit on collective and Member States' assets clarified the scale and type of military forces needed for crisis management operations, where the gaps are and how to fill them. The report for Helsinki identified a **headline goal for force surging and force deployment**.

- A separate progress report on **non-military aspects of crisis management**. This report is established on the basis of **contributions of Member States and an inventory of Community instruments**. The report identifies existing non-military crisis response tools both at Union and Member States level and examines how synergy could be improved. The idea is to create **additional capabilities** (for instance police, monitors, human rights experts), **databanks and a mechanism for rapid co-ordination and deployment**.
- Helsinki stressed that these two reports are **complementary** and underlined the ability of the Union to have recourse to the whole range of **political, economic, humanitarian and military instruments**. It also underlined determination to **enhance the effectiveness** of its instruments for crisis prevention and management.
- Helsinki agreed the establishment of **new interim structures**, since decided formally by GAC 15 Feb 2000.
  - a **Political and Security Committee (PSC)**
  - a **Military Committee** (Commission not full member)
  - a **Civilian Crisis Management Mechanism** (which became a fully-fledged committee on 22 May 2000 and met for the first time on 16 June 2000).
  - **Military staff within the Council Secretariat**

### 1.3. State of play after the Feira Council

- The **two main texts** adopted by the Feira European Council are
  - Report of the Presidency on “the **strengthening of ESDP**”
  - A military report on the “**elaboration of the Headline Goal**”.
- These documents were **agreed without debate** at the GAC on 12/13 June.
- The **Report of the Presidency** constitutes a remarkable achievement - fulfilling entirely the mandate given by the Helsinki European Council.
  - Appropriate arrangements have been identified for the **participation of third countries in EU military crisis management**.
  - **Principles and modalities** have been agreed for developing **EU-NATO relations**.

- The **headline goal** has been further elaborated and the procedure has been agreed for holding a successful **Capabilities Commitment Conference** in the autumn.
- The **Committee for civilian aspects of crisis management** has been **set up**.
- The **study to define concrete targets in the area of civilian aspects of crisis management** has been concluded and **concrete targets have been identified for civilian police**.
- **Conflict prevention** has been recognised as an area where EU action can be improved.
- **Definition of Treaty changes** needed to establish final structure ESDP and procedures has been left to the Nice Council – it is the **only controversial point of substance**. It means that the **transfer of WEU functions to EU and operational implications**, and the **establishment of modalities for the "legacy" of WEU** is also left to French Presidency.
- Regarding the **Military Aspects of Crisis Management**, the Presidency Report establishes the following:
  - a capabilities commitment conference will be held under F Presidency.
  - EU decision-making autonomy, military efficiency,
  - Interim Military Body to make proposals on headline goals and define capabilities needs together with DSACEUR and NATO experts, (taking NATO defence planning and possible contribution of non-EU NATO countries into consideration). These proposals to be basis for MS reflections on national commitments.
  - Further reflection on issue of interim bodies becoming permanent.
  - Co-operation with other countries (Ukraine, Canada, Russia etc) welcomed.
  - 4 EU/NATO working groups to be established: **Security issues, Capabilities goals, EU access to NATO assets, permanent EU/NATO collaboration arrangements** (Comm. not to participate in specifically military discussions).
- On the **Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management** the Presidency Report covers:
  - enhancement of **non-military crisis response tools** – special emphasis on **rapid reaction**,
  - achieved establishment of **civilian crisis management committee**,
  - **Council co-ordinating mechanism**,
  - start on **data-base provision with police**,
  - **collaboration with HR's situation centre**,

- study on concrete targets, **police target 5000 policemen by 2003, 1000 of which deployable within 30 days.**

#### 1.4. Follow-up

- **French Presidency by Nice should:**
  - **Propose headline goal (after pledging conference)**
  - **Make interim bodies permanent after Nice**
  - **Include WEU Petersberg tasks in EU**
  - **Implement decisions on third country participation and consultation with NATO**
  - **Develop EU non-military crisis and set targets**
- **HR and Comm to make recommendations to improve EU conflict prevention tools**
- **A new politico-military working group should be set up**



## MODEL SPEECH ON ESDP FOR COMMISSION DELEGATIONS

### 1. ESDP in general

### 2. The role of the Commission

#### 1. ESDP in general

##### Background

- A common security and defence policy has been an aspiration of the EU since its very early days – as shown by the French-proposed and French-defeated European Defence Community of 1958, the Plan Fouchet, etc.
- The adoption of the three-pillar structure after Maastricht and Amsterdam placed ESDP within CFSP, the second, inter-institutional pillar.

##### Treaty basis

- The Treaty basis for ESDP is Article 17.1 of the Amsterdam Treaty, which speaks of the ‘progressive framing of a common defence policy (...) which might lead to a common defence’, considers the WEU the partner with operational capabilities, and suggests its potential incorporation into the Union. Furthermore, it proposes to support this ‘progressive framing’ by co-operation in the field of armament.
- Article 17.2 specifically includes the so-called Petersberg tasks among the questions covered by CESDP, to wit: humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking.

##### International implications of ESDP

- For the member states, but also for all the countries in Europe and in the international community, a politically strong and security-minded EU is a huge advantage in ensuring peace and stability in Europe and in the world.
- This does not mean that the EU forgets its traditional alliance with NATO: in fact, EU-led operations will normally have recourse to NATO assets. The Atlantic Alliance will remain the cornerstone for collective defence.
- NATO is a unique and irreplaceable instrument for transatlantic cooperation and consultation. ESDP, however, will mean that EU operations are possible as well, relying on self-sufficient means, which up to now has not been the case.

- The Union and its member states are the world's biggest aid donors, contributing two thirds of all humanitarian assistance, and one third of the UN budget, but it is clearly not good enough solely to foot the bill. Only if the EU acquires the means to carry out on its own the missions that its security and defence policy demand will it have a defined identity - the lack of that capability has been a severe obstacle to the development of a coherent EU foreign policy.

### **Recent developments**

- Since the ratification of the Amsterdam Treaty, and spurred by external events such as the Kosovo crisis, developments concerning the CESDP have moved ahead rapidly. Notable milestones have been the Cologne, Helsinki and Feira Councils.
- The decisions taken in these summits should end the inconsistency between the EU's economic and political presence in world affairs. The necessary capabilities that allow an effective and efficient external policy can and will be developed now by the Union.

### **High Representative**

- The first step in the process was the double-hatting of Mr Solana as Secretary General of the EU Council Secretariat and High Representative for the CFSP (a new position created by the Amsterdam Treaty) and Secretary General of the WEU.

### **New structures**

- New and tailor-made structures in the political and military areas are being set up in Brussels in order to enable decision-making in crisis situations. The emerging framework incorporates both military and non-military bodies and capabilities. The final structure will not be decided until the Nice Summit.
- Three committees have been created for the interim period: The interim Military Body (iMB), the interim Political and Security Committee (iPSC), and the Civilian Crisis Management Committee (CCMC). Furthermore, military staff from Member States have been seconded to the Council Secretariat to provide military expertise.
- It is foreseen that these interim bodies become permanent. The seconded national military experts will eventually form the Military Staff of the Council (MS).
- The iPSC is tasked to work in close co-operation with the HR, to prepare recommendations on the future functioning of CESDP and to deal with day-to-day CFSP affairs. The existing Political Committee will deal with strategic and longer term matters.

### **Military capabilities**

- In the military capabilities field, Member States will develop common capabilities for crisis management, following the adoption of a headline goal that all members will have to work towards - to be able by 2003 to deploy within 60 days a force of up to 60,000 men and sustain it on the ground for at least one year, in order to implement the so-called Petersberg tasks. The iMB has that task as its main priority. A Capabilities Commitment Conference is scheduled for this autumn – NB. Germany has already pledged 20,000 men and to cover 20% of the cost.

## **Civilian capabilities**

- The EU is also determined to develop its civilian capabilities, improve their effectiveness and combine them with national ones; the non-military side of crisis management cannot be ignored. The array of matters under this headline is vast: police and security institutions, human rights protection, electoral supervision, independent media support, reconstruction, demilitarisation, border management, de-mining, disarmament, etc. To avoid falling into generalisations and lack of practical commitments, the Union is working towards the development of concrete targets. At Feira, a target for civil police has been set: to have 5,000 deployable policemen by 2003, 1,000 of which could be deployed within 30 days. Further work is taking place.
- The area of conflict prevention has been identified at Feira as one where significant improvements can and should be made.

## **WEU/NATO**

- All WEU tasks except territorial defence are being transferred to the Council Secretariat.
- Great care is being taken in developing a close working relationship with NATO. Four 'ad hoc' working groups have been created on the issues identified in the context of EU/NATO relations: security issues, capabilities goals, modalities enabling EU access to NATO assets and capabilities and the definition of permanent arrangements for EU – NATO consultation.

## **Third Countries**

- Several institutional imbalances exist, there are EU members who are not part of NATO (Ireland, Austria, Finland and Sweden), NATO members not in the EU (USA, Canada, Iceland and Norway), and NATO members who are candidates for accession to the EU (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Turkey). This entails competing decision-making frameworks and diverse public support in the area of security and defence.
- A major aim is to ensure a coherent system of decision-making which avoids duplication and allows all states involved to contribute according to their political will and operational capacity.

## **2. Role of the Commission**

- The Commission is fully associated with CFSP, which includes ESDP. However, the level of the Commission's involvement is less prominent in areas with a strong emphasis on military aspects as opposed to those with significant Community elements.
- In the related areas of non-military crisis management and conflict prevention specifically, and thanks to its experience and institutional knowledge, the Commission has an important input to make. Delegations on the ground are particularly well positioned to play a leading role.
- A Commission proposal for the creation of a Rapid Reaction Facility, to complement the humanitarian resources of the European Community Humanitarian Office (ECHO),

was adopted on the 11<sup>th</sup> April and is being discussed in the Council. This will allow the disbursement of funds within days for crisis prevention and management. Funding will be for a limited time and be followed by longer term funding.

- The Commission is fully associated with the new iPSC and the Civilian Crisis Management Committee, but for the time being is excluded from the iMB.
- The setting up of an EU military structure does not always concern the Commission or Community responsibilities directly. The Commission does not have military expertise or competence. Nevertheless, in areas such as the defence industry or military support to humanitarian operations, the Commission can make significant contributions

### **Conclusion**

- CFSP has long been criticised as too little, usually too late and for being the diplomacy of declarations. Now it is set to become an operational contribution to the EU's foreign relations. There remains much to be done, however.



**COUNCIL OF  
THE EUROPEAN UNION**

**Brussels, 15 June 2000**

**9149/00**

**PESC 281  
COSDP 21**

**FORWARDING NOTE**

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from :           Presidency

to     :           EUROPEAN COUNCIL

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**Subject :        Strengthening the Common European Security and Defence Policy  
                  – Presidency Report to the Feira European Council**

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Delegations will find attached the final version of the Presidency Report to the European Council at Feira on "Strengthening the Common European Security and Defence Policy".

**PRESIDENCY REPORT**  
**TO THE FEIRA EUROPEAN COUNCIL ON**  
**"STRENGTHENING THE COMMON**  
**EUROPEAN POLICY ON SECURITY AND DEFENCE"**

**I. INTRODUCTION**

1. In Cologne, the European Council expressed its resolve that the EU should play its full role on the international stage and that to that end the EU should be provided with all the necessary means and capabilities to assume its responsibilities regarding a common European policy on security and defence. Since Cologne, the European Union has been engaged in a process aiming at building the necessary means and capabilities which will allow it to take decisions on, and to carry out, the full range of conflict prevention and crisis management tasks defined in the Treaty on European Union ("Petersberg tasks"). These developments are an integral part of the enhancement of the Common Foreign and Security Policy and are based on the principles set out in Helsinki. The Union will contribute to international peace and security in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter.

2. Having approved the two Finnish Presidency progress reports on military and non-military aspects of crisis management, including the common European headline goal and the collective capabilities goals, the European Council in Helsinki asked the Portuguese Presidency, together with the Secretary-General/High Representative, to carry work forward in the General Affairs Council on all aspects, as a matter of priority. The Portuguese Presidency was invited to draw up a first progress report to the Lisbon European Council and an overall report to be presented to the Feira European Council containing appropriate recommendations and proposals, as well as an indication of whether or not Treaty amendment is judged necessary.
3. A first progress report, reflecting the work carried forward by the Presidency, together with the Secretary-General/High Representative, within the General Affairs Council was presented to the Lisbon European Council. The European Council of Lisbon welcomed the progress already achieved and in particular the fact that the interim bodies had been established and had started to function effectively and that the Council had identified a process for elaborating the headline goal and identifying national contributions so as to meet the military capability target.
4. The European Council in Lisbon looked forward to the further work that the Presidency, together with the Secretary-General/High Representative, would pursue in the Council and to the Presidency's overall report to the Feira European Council, including proposals on the involvement of third countries in EU military crisis management and the further development of the EU's relationship with NATO.
5. The Lisbon European Council furthermore appreciated what had been achieved in the non-military crisis management track and invited the Council to establish by, or at, Feira a Committee for Civilian Crisis Management.

6. Since then, work has been carried forward on all aspects of military and non-military crisis management and substantive progress has been made, in particular with the identification of appropriate arrangements for the participation of third countries to EU military crisis management, as well as of principles and modalities for developing EU-NATO relations. The headline goal has been further elaborated; a committee for civilian aspects of crisis management has been set up; a coordinating mechanism, fully interacting with the Commission services, has been established at the Council Secretariat; the study to define concrete targets in the area of civilian aspects of crisis management has been concluded; concrete targets for civilian police have been identified.
7. The Presidency submits herewith its overall report to the Feira European Council covering, in Chapter II, the military aspects and, in Chapter III, the non-military aspects of crisis management. Work has also been carried out on conflict prevention. The usefulness of finding ways of improving the coherence and effectiveness of the EU action in the field of conflict prevention has been recognised.
8. In the course of the work during the Presidency on the strengthening of military and non-military crisis management and conflict prevention, the importance has been underlined of ensuring an extensive relationship in crisis management by the Union between the military and civilian fields, as well as cooperation between the EU rapidly-evolving crisis management capacity and the UN, OSCE and the Council of Europe.
9. In presenting this report, the Presidency has taken note of the fact that Denmark has recalled Protocol No 5 to the Amsterdam Treaty on the position of Denmark.

## **II. MILITARY ASPECTS OF CRISIS MANAGEMENT**

### **A. Elaboration of the Headline and the collective capabilities goals**

1. Concerning the development of the Headline and the collective capabilities goals, the General Affairs Council, reinforced with Ministers of Defence, concluded at its meeting of 20 March that the "Food for thought" paper on the "Elaboration of the Headline Goal", including the timetable set out therein leading to a Capabilities Commitment Conference to be convened by the end of 2000, constitutes a basis for future work to be conducted by the competent bodies.
2. The General Affairs Council, at its session of 13 June, with the participation of Ministers of Defence, approved the work carried out by the Interim Military Body and forwarded through the IPSC, up to the "First Seminar of National Experts in Defence Planning" held in Brussels on 22-24 May 2000. The Council, inviting the competent bodies to continue on that basis, adopted the following guidelines for further work:
  - The development of the Headline and collective capabilities goals, which have been agreed at the European Council in Helsinki, should be conducted by the 15, in accordance with the decision-making autonomy of the EU as well as the requirements regarding military efficiency.
  - The Interim Military Body, with the political guidance of the IPSC, will propose the elements which will encompass the Headline Goal.
  - In order to do this, the Interim Military Body will identify the capabilities necessary for the EU to respond to the full range of the Petersberg Tasks.

- In elaborating the Headline and collective capabilities goals by drawing on Member States contributions, the IMB, including representatives from capitals, will also call meetings with DSACEUR and NATO experts in order to draw on NATO's military expertise on the requirements of the Headline and collective capabilities goals.
- In this connection, transparency and dialogue between the EU and NATO will in addition be provided by the Ad Hoc Working Group on the capabilities goal provided for in Appendix 2.
- The Headline Goal requirements agreed by the IMB at CHODs level will, after endorsement by the Council, be the basis for the Member States in considering their initial offers of national contributions to the Headline Goal. These contributions will be examined by the Interim Military Body. This process must be concluded before the convening of the Capability Commitment Conference.
- It will be important to ensure coherence, for those Member States concerned, with NATO's defence planning process and the Planning and Review Process.
- In accordance with the determination expressed at Helsinki and Lisbon, once the needs and resources available have been identified, Member States will announce, at the Capability Commitment Conference, their commitments with a view to enabling the EU to fulfil the Headline Goal and the collective capabilities goals. It will be also important to create a review mechanism for measuring progress towards the achievement of those goals.

- The European Union will encourage third countries to contribute through supplementary commitments. In order to enable those countries to contribute to improving European military capabilities, appropriate arrangements will be made by the incoming presidency regarding the Capabilities Commitment Conference. These arrangements will take into account the capabilities of the six non-EU European NATO members. The offers of capabilities already made by Turkey, Poland, the Czech Republic and Norway are welcomed.

**B. Recommendations on the institutional development of the new permanent political and military bodies related to the CESDP within the EU**

The interim political and military bodies were established on 1 March 2000. In the light of the experience gained since their establishment, work has been carried out on the institutional development of the new permanent political and military bodies, in accordance with the Helsinki conclusions. Further work is under way, in order to ensure as soon as possible the start of the permanent phase and of the EU operational capacity for crisis management.

**C. Proposals on appropriate arrangements to be concluded by the Council on modalities of consultation and/or participation that will allow the third States concerned to contribute to EU military crisis management**

Work has been carried forward on the modalities of consultation and/or participation concerning the non-EU European NATO members and other countries who are candidates for accession to the EU.

In this context, the aim has been to identify, in accordance with the Helsinki conclusions, arrangements for dialogue, consultation and cooperation on issues related to crisis management ensuring the decision-making autonomy of the EU. These arrangements will provide for the interim period meetings with the abovementioned countries, which will take place within a single inclusive structure and will supplement the meetings held as part of the reinforced political dialogue on CFSP matters. Within this structure there will be exchanges with the non-EU NATO European members when the subject matter requires it. For the permanent phase, arrangements will take into account the different needs arising in the routine phase and in the operational phase. The outcome of the Council deliberations is contained in Appendix 1 to this report.

Exchanges took place on 11 May 2000 between the EU Member States' Political Directors and their counterparts of the non-EU NATO European members and other candidate countries as well as between the EU Member States' Political Directors and their counterparts of the non-EU NATO European members.

Russia, Ukraine, other European States engaged in political dialogue with the Union and other interested States, may be invited to take part in EU-led operations. In this context, the EU welcomes the interest shown by Canada.

The French Presidency is invited, together with the Secretary General/High Representative, to carry forward further work within the General Affairs Council in order to make initial proposals to the Nice European Council on appropriate arrangements for consultation and/or participation to allow these other prospective partners to contribute to EU-led military crisis management.

**D. Proposals on principles for consultation with NATO on military issues and recommendations on developing modalities for EU/NATO relations, to permit cooperation on the appropriate military response to a crisis**

The Council has identified the principles on the basis of which consultation and cooperation with NATO should be developed. As to modalities, the Council has recommended that the EU should propose to NATO the creation of four "ad hoc working groups" between the EU and NATO on the issues which have been identified in that context: security issues, capabilities goals, modalities enabling EU access to NATO assets and capabilities and the definition of permanent arrangements for EU-NATO consultation.

The outcome of the Council deliberations is contained in Appendix 2 to this report.

**E. Indication of whether or not Treaty amendment is judged necessary**

The existing provisions of the TEU define the questions relating to the security of the Union, including the progressive framing of a common defence policy as part of the Common Foreign and Security Policy governed by Title V of the Treaty. On this basis, the Council has decided to establish the interim Political and Security Committee and the Interim Military Body, and to reinforce the Council Secretariat with military experts seconded from Member States. Article 17 TEU expressly includes the Petersberg tasks in the CFSP. The Presidency took note of the opinion of the Council Legal Service the conclusion of which reads as follows:

"The Council's Legal Service is of the opinion that the conclusions of the Cologne and Helsinki European Councils regarding European security and defence policy can be implemented without it being legally necessary to amend the Treaty on European Union. However, such amendments would be necessary if the intention is to transfer the Council's decision-making powers to a body made up of officials, or to amend the Treaty's provisions regarding the WEU. Furthermore, it is for Member States to determine whether amendments to the Treaty would be politically desirable or operationally appropriate."

The Presidency suggests that the issue of Treaty revision should continue to be examined between the Feira and Nice European Councils.

### III. CIVILIAN ASPECTS OF CRISIS MANAGEMENT

1. The Presidency has, together with the Secretary General/High Representative, responded as a matter of priority to the Helsinki European Council's invitation to carry work forward on all aspects of civilian crisis management, as defined in Annex 2 to Annex IV to the Helsinki conclusions.
2. The aim of this work has been to enhance and better coordinate the Union's and the Members States' non-military crisis management response tools, with special emphasis on a rapid reaction capability. This will also improve the EU's contribution to crisis management operations led by international and regional organisations.
3. As a concrete result of this intensive work, the following measures have been taken:
  - (a) A Committee for civilian aspects of crisis management has been set up by a Council decision adopted on 22 May 2000. The Committee held its first meeting on 16 June 2000.
  - (b) A coordinating mechanism, fully interacting with the Commission services, has been set up at the Council Secretariat. Further developing the inventory of Member States and Union resources relevant for non-military crisis management, it has, as a first priority, established a database on civilian police capabilities in order to maintain and share information, to propose capabilities initiatives and to facilitate the definition of concrete targets for EU Member States collective non-military response. The coordinating mechanism has further developed its close cooperation with the interim Situation Centre/Crisis Cell established by the Secretary General/High Representative.

- (c) A study (Appendix 3), drawing on experience from recent and current crises, on the expertise of the Member States and on the results of the seminar on civilian crisis management in Lisbon on 3-4 April 2000, has been carried out to define concrete targets in the area of civilian aspects of crisis management. This study identifies priorities on which the EU will focus its coordinated efforts in a first phase, without excluding the use of all the other tools available to the Union and to Member States.
  - (d) Concrete targets for civilian police capabilities have been identified and are set out in Appendix 4. In particular, Member States should, cooperating voluntarily, as a final objective by 2003 be able to provide up to 5000 police officers for international missions across the range of conflict prevention and crisis management operations and in response to the specific needs at the different stages of these operations. Within the target for overall EU capabilities, Member States undertake to be able to identify and deploy, within 30 days, up to 1 000 police officers. Furthermore, work will be pursued to develop EU guidelines and references for international policing.
4. In addition to these measures, the Council has received and is examining the Commission's proposal for a Council Regulation creating a Rapid Reaction Facility to support EU activities as outlined in the Helsinki Report.

#### **IV. FOLLOW-UP**

1. The French Presidency is invited, together with the Secretary General/High Representative, to carry work forward within the General Affairs Council on strengthening the Common European Security and Defence Policy. The French Presidency is invited to report to the European Council in Nice, in particular on:
  - (a) the elaboration of the headline goal and the collective capabilities goal agreed at Helsinki, including results reached at the Capabilities Commitment Conference to be convened before Nice;
  - (b) the establishment of the permanent political and military structures to be put in place as soon as possible after the Nice European Council;
  - (c) the inclusion in the EU of the appropriate functions of the WEU in the field of the Petersberg tasks;
  - (d) the implementation of the Feira decisions on :
    - the arrangements that will allow consultations with and participation of third countries in EU-led military crisis management;
    - the development of the arrangements ensuring consultation and cooperation with NATO in military crisis management on the basis of the work undertaken in the relevant EU-NATO "ad hoc working groups";
  - (e) the development and the implementation of EU capabilities in civilian aspects of crisis management, including the definition of concrete targets.

2. The issue of Treaty revision should continue to be examined between the Feira and Nice European Councils.
  
3. The Secretary General/High Representative and the Commission are invited to submit to the Nice European Council, as a basis for further work, concrete recommendations on how to improve the coherence and the effectiveness of the European Union action in the field of conflict prevention, fully taking into account and building upon existing instruments, capabilities and policy guidelines.

**ARRANGEMENTS TO BE CONCLUDED BY THE COUNCIL ON MODALITIES OF  
CONSULTATION AND/OR PARTICIPATION THAT WILL ALLOW THE  
NON-EU EUROPEAN NATO MEMBERS  
AND OTHER COUNTRIES WHICH ARE CANDIDATES FOR ACCESSION TO THE EU  
TO CONTRIBUTE TO EU MILITARY CRISIS MANAGEMENT**

**Mandate**

1. In the Helsinki European Council Conclusions the Portuguese Presidency is "...invited to report to the European Council in Feira on the progress made, including (...) proposals on appropriate arrangements to be concluded by the Council on modalities of consultation and/or participation that will allow the third States concerned to contribute to EU military crisis management".

**Guiding Principles**

2. The Union will ensure the necessary dialogue, consultation and cooperation with non-EU European NATO members and other countries who are candidates for accession to the EU on EU-led crisis management.
3. Appropriate arrangements will be established for dialogue and information on issues related to security and defence policy and crisis management.
4. There will be full respect for the decision-making autonomy of the EU and its single institutional framework.

5. There will be a single, inclusive structure in which all the 15 countries concerned (the non-EU European NATO members and the candidates for accession to the EU) can enjoy the necessary dialogue, consultation and cooperation with the EU.
  
6. There will, within this structure, be exchanges with the non-EU European NATO members where the subject matter requires it, such as on questions concerning the nature and functioning of EU-led operations using NATO assets and capabilities.

### **Modalities**

7. Modalities for the participation of non-EU European NATO members and candidate countries, to be established for the permanent phase, will need to take into account the different needs arising in different situations:
  - routine non-crisis phase: mechanism for a regular dialogue;
  
  - operational phase, including two stages:
    - (a) pre-operational phase when options for action are considered, in which dialogue and consultations will be intensified;
  
    - (b) operational phase "stricto sensu", which starts when the Council takes the decision to launch an operation, and an ad hoc Committee of Contributors is set up.

Full account should be taken of the role of the Secretary General/High Representative in the EU's CFSP and CESDP.

**A. For the interim period**

8. Until the implementation of the modalities established for the permanent phase, meetings with the 15 countries concerned (non-EU European NATO members and other candidates for accession to the EU) will take place within the single inclusive structure referred to in paragraph 5. The choice of the appropriate form and modalities will be based on considerations of pragmatism and efficiency, depending on the circumstances, subject-matter and needs.
9. A minimum of two meetings in EU+15 format will be organised in each Presidency on ESDP matters. These will supplement the meetings held as part of the reinforced political dialogue on CFSP matters.
10. Within this framework, a minimum of two meetings will be organised with the six non-EU European NATO members (in EU+6 format) in each Presidency. Additional exchanges will be organised if the need arises upon decision by the Council or the IPSC.
11. A meeting at Ministerial level within the framework referred to in paragraph 8, will be organised in each Presidency with the 15 and with the 6.
12. The exchanges provided for in paragraphs 9 and 10 will cover the elaboration of the headline and capability goals as well, so as fully to inform non-EU members of ongoing work on the list of necessary means. In order to enable those countries to contribute to improving European military capabilities, appropriate arrangements will be made by the incoming Presidency regarding the capabilities pledging conference. These arrangements will take into account the capabilities of the 6 non-EU European NATO members.

## **B. For the permanent phase**

### **– Routine Phase**

13. Exchanges on issues related to security and defence policy and, in particular, on progress within the EU in establishing its crisis-management capabilities, will take place during the routine phase.

14. During the routine phase there should be, in the course of each semester,

- regular meetings in EU+15 format, at the appropriate level;
- at least two meetings with the participation of the non-EU European NATO members in EU+6 format;
- additional meetings will be organised if the need arises upon decision by the Council or the PSC.

PSC will play a leading role in the implementation of these arrangements, which should also include exchanges at military level.

15. Arrangements for Ministerial meetings during the permanent phase will be based upon the experience gained during the interim phase.

16. The exchanges will facilitate participation of the concerned countries to EU-led operations.

– ***Operational Phase***

(a) Pre-operational phase

17. In the event of a crisis, dialogue and consultation will be intensified.
18. When the possibility of an EU-led military crisis management operation is under consideration, these consultations will provide a framework for exchanges of views and discussion on any related security concerns raised by the countries concerned. Where the EU recourse to NATO assets is under active consideration, particular attention will be given to consultation with the six non-EU European NATO members.

(b) Operational phase "stricto sensu"

19. When deciding on the military option, the EU will address participation of non-EU NATO members and other countries which are candidates to accession to the EU according to the provisions agreed in Helsinki:

"Upon a decision by the Council to launch an operation, the non-EU European NATO members will participate if they so wish, in the event of an operation requiring recourse to NATO assets and capabilities. They will, on a decision by the Council, be invited to take part in operations where the EU does not use NATO assets.

Other countries who are candidates for accession to the EU may also be invited by the Council to take part in EU-led operations once the Council has decided to launch such an operation."

20. The operational phase will start when the Council decides to launch a military crisis management operation. Those non-EU European NATO members and countries candidates for accession which have confirmed their participation in an EU-led operation by deploying significant military forces, will have the same rights and obligations as the EU participating Member States in the day to day conduct of that operation.
  
21. An ad hoc committee of contributors will be set up comprising all EU Member States and the other participating countries for the day to day conduct of the operation. The Council/PSC will be responsible for the political control and strategic direction of the operation. For the military day to day conduct of the operation, functions and roles of the MC and of the operation commander will be set out in the relevant arrangements.
  
22. The decision to end an operation shall be taken by the Council after consultation between participating states within the ad hoc committee of contributors.

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23. The Council will formalise the necessary arrangements in due time and will examine the options for doing so.

**PRINCIPLES FOR CONSULTATION WITH NATO ON MILITARY ISSUES  
AND RECOMMENDATIONS ON DEVELOPING MODALITIES  
FOR EU/NATO RELATIONS**

**The Mandate**

The European Council in Helsinki invited the Portuguese Presidency to report to the European Council in Feira on the progress made, including "proposals on principles for consultation with NATO on military issues and recommendations on developing modalities for EU/NATO relations, to permit cooperation on the appropriate military response to a crisis, as set out in Washington and at Cologne".

**The Principles**

1. Development of consultation and cooperation between the EU and NATO must take place in full respect of the autonomy of EU decision-making.
  
2. The EU and NATO have undertaken further to strengthen and develop their cooperation in military crisis-management on the basis of shared values, equality and in a spirit of partnership. The aim is to achieve full and effective consultation, cooperation and transparency in order to identify and take rapid decisions on the most appropriate military response to a crisis and to ensure efficient crisis-management. In this context, EU-objectives in the field of military capabilities and those arising, for those countries concerned, from NATO's Defence Capabilities Initiative, will be mutually reinforcing.

3. While being mutually reinforcing in crisis management, the EU and NATO are organisations of a different nature. This will be taken into account in the arrangements concerning their relations and in the assessment to be made by the EU of existing procedures governing WEU-NATO relations with a view to their possible adaptation to an EU-NATO framework.
4. Arrangements and modalities for relations between the EU and NATO will reflect the fact that each Organisation will be dealing with the other on an equal footing.
5. In the relations between the EU and NATO as institutions, there will be no discrimination against any of the Member States.

## **ISSUES AND MODALITIES FOR THE INTERIM PERIOD**

Contacts with NATO (informal contacts by SGs, briefings by the Portuguese Presidency at the NAC) have taken place in accordance with the Helsinki definition for the initial phase in which the EU-interim bodies have concentrated on establishing themselves. There is now a need for a further evolution in EU-NATO relations.

### **A. Issues**

1. **Security:** EU efforts towards finalising its own security arrangements (physical and personal security, and work towards an EU security agreement) are an absolute priority. On this basis, the Union will have to establish a dialogue with NATO to define security arrangements between the two organisations. These discussions should lead to an agreement, which will govern inter alia information exchange and access by designated officials from the EU and its Member States to NATO planning structures.

2. **Defining capability goals:** to ensure that “these objectives and those arising, for those countries concerned, from NATO’s Defence Capabilities Initiative (DCI) will be mutually reinforcing”, modalities for consultation on these issues will need to be established. These modalities should permit the EU to draw, as needed, on NATO military expertise, as the EU elaborates its headline goal by drawing on Member State contributions. Having elaborated the headline and capability goals, the EU, as agreed in Helsinki, will develop a method of consultation through which these goals can be met and maintained, and through which national contributions reflecting Member States’ political will and commitment towards these goals can be defined by each Member State, with a regular review of progress made. In addition, Member States would use existing defence planning procedures including, as appropriate, those available in NATO and the Planning and Review Process of the PFP.
  
3. **Arrangements enabling the EU access to NATO assets and capabilities (Berlin and Washington agreements):** Helsinki and Cologne defined two approaches to implementing EU operations: with or without NATO assets. To use NATO assets, it is important to make progress on defining together how this will work in practice in order to draw up an agreement. This agreement should be ready by the time the EU becomes operational. To make this possible, the EU looks forward to substantial progress within NATO.
  
4. **Defining permanent arrangements:** Following the Feira European Council, discussion will be needed to determine the nature of the permanent arrangements, which will govern relations between the EU and NATO. These arrangements should be based upon the principles defined above.

The groundwork undertaken on these four issues will pave the way for establishing permanent arrangements between NATO and the EU. Our aim is that these should be ready at the same time as the EU permanent structures are put in place after the Nice European Council.

## **B. Modalities**

1. The Feira European Council should decide to propose to NATO the creation of “ad hoc working groups” between the EU and NATO for each of the issues mentioned above.
2. The “ad hoc working groups” would have the following tasks:
  - (a) for security issues: preparation of an EU-NATO security agreement;
  - (b) for capability goals: the implementation of information exchange and discussion with NATO on elaborating capability goals. It is understood that DSACEUR could participate, as appropriate;
  - (c) for modalities enabling EU access to NATO assets (Berlin and Washington agreements): preparation of an agreement on the modalities for EU access to NATO assets and capabilities as agreed at Washington (draft framework agreement on Berlin Plus implementation). It is understood that DSACEUR should participate;
  - (d) for the definition of permanent arrangements: defining the main parameters of an EU/NATO agreement which would formalise structures and procedures for consultation between the two organisations in times of crisis and non-crisis.
3. If, having regard to the principles set above, new issues were to arise which were recognised as requiring consultation between the EU and NATO, further “ad hoc working groups” could be considered.
4. On the EU side, the IPSC will have a coordinating role for the work of the "ad hoc working groups", and will be a focal point for dialogue.

## STUDY ON CONCRETE TARGETS ON CIVILIAN ASPECTS OF CRISIS MANAGEMENT

### A. Introduction

The European Council expressed its determination to increase and improve the effectiveness of the Union's capacity to respond to crises, including by actions in civilian areas. This increased effectiveness could be used both in response to request of a lead agency like the UN or the OSCE, or, where appropriate, in autonomous EU actions.

The Union should seek to enhance its capability in civilian aspects of crisis management in all relevant areas, with the objective of improving its potential for saving human lives in crisis situations, for maintaining basic public order, preventing further escalation, facilitating the return to a peaceful, stable and self-sustainable situation, for managing adverse effects on EU countries and for addressing relevant problems of coordination. Particular attention could be paid to those areas where the international community so far has demonstrated weaknesses. It would provide "added value" as it would improve the Union's capacity to react as well as the Union's capability to meet the requests of the other lead organisations: they would be able to count – on a more systematic basis – on a sizeable quantitative and qualitative contribution which could represent the nucleus of some of their missions. This would, in turn, increase the Union's visibility.

The reinforcement of the Union's capabilities in civilian aspects of crisis management should, above all, provide it with adequate means to face complex political crises by:

- acting to prevent the eruption or escalation of conflicts;
- consolidating peace and internal stability in periods of transition.
- ensuring complementarity between the military and civilian aspects of crisis management covering the full range of Petersberg tasks.

It has been agreed that the identification of concrete targets should be premised on a pragmatic, bottom-up approach, focusing on operational requirements, and reflecting the political concerns of the European Council.

The inventories which have been drawn up clearly show that Member States, the Union, or both have accumulated considerable experience or have considerable resources in a large number of areas, a number of which are resources already being used in development cooperation. Fully taking into account, and building upon, existing experiences, instruments and resources, the Union should as a matter of priority concentrate its efforts on the areas where a rapid reaction is most needed, and where the added value of an increased and coordinated effort by the Union and Member States is most evident. This process could be built outwards step-by-step to cover a wide range of limited as well as complex civil crisis management operations. However, the identification of priorities on which the EU will focus its coordinated efforts in a first phase does by no means exclude the use of all other tools available to the Union and to Member States.

## **B. Priorities**

The first priority area, identified in the light of the crises Europe has had to face in recent times and is still facing now, is police.

## **I. POLICE**

Concrete targets on police capabilities, to be reached by 2003, have been established by Member States, cooperating voluntarily within the framework of Article 12, fifth indent, of the TEU. These concrete targets are elaborated in detail in Appendix 4 to the Presidency report.

## **II. STRENGTHENING OF THE RULE OF LAW**

Intensified work on police must necessarily be accompanied by work in other areas that are felt as necessary if a positive outcome of a police mission is to be ensured. The area most specifically concerned is assistance for the re-establishment of a judicial and penal system. The following measures could be considered:

- (i) Member States could establish national arrangements for selection of judges, prosecutors, penal experts and other relevant categories within the judicial and penal system, to deploy at short notice to peace support operations, and consider ways to train them appropriately;
- (ii) the EU could aim at promoting guidelines for the selection and training of international judges and penal experts in liaison with the United Nations and regional organisations (particularly the Council of Europe and the OSCE);
- (iii) the EU could consider ways of supporting the establishment/renovation of infrastructures of local courts and prisons as well as recruitment of local court personnel and prison officers in the context of peace support operations.

### **III. STRENGTHENING CIVILIAN ADMINISTRATION**

Yet another area which it is necessary to enhance, in order to succeed in supporting societies in transition, is the area of civil administration.

- (i) Member States could consider improving the selection, training and deployment of civil administration experts for duties in the re-establishment of collapsed administrative systems;
- (ii) Member States could also consider taking on the training of local civil administration officials in societies in transition.

### **IV. CIVIL PROTECTION**

In addition to the priority areas mentioned before, Member States have identified civil protection, including search and rescue in disaster relief operations. It is necessary to draw a distinction between operations of civil protection within the framework of crisis management operations, and other types of disaster relief operations. The latter kind of operations have specific characteristics.

This being said, in crisis management operations within CFSP, it should also be possible to resort to EU Member States' tools and capabilities for civil protection.

Even though specific coordination mechanisms already exist in the field of civil protection, it is felt that, in the light of experience gleaned in recent major natural disasters, improvement is needed and is possible.

Ideas aimed at ensuring a better organisation of the Union's reaction, such as a lead-nation concept as well as specialisation, have been put forward. Work currently under way within the Council and involving experts in the field will permit the definition of concrete targets also in this area.

Such concrete targets could be defined in terms of human and material resources that each Member State could make available, type of mandate and status of the operation for participating countries as well as promotion of compatibility of equipment between Member States.

### **C. Resources**

Improved coordination at EU level can lead to an increased effectiveness and synergy in the Union's reaction. Together with the definition of concrete targets by the European Council, this will ensure tangible improvements in the Union's contribution to crisis management operations.

### **D. Further Work on Concrete Targets after Feira**

The Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management could work on the development and further elaboration of the concrete targets set out by Feira European Council as well as on areas going beyond the priority areas already identified. To this end, the Committee should be integrated with experts from the relevant national administrations, i.a. providing specialist advice on police, judicial and penal aspects, civilian administration, humanitarian assistance as well as the interface between crisis management and development cooperation.

Further work could also address the identification of national capabilities with a view to reaching collective targets, taking into account national areas of expertise/specialisation.

It is noted that the Commission will submit shortly an operational inventory of actions already led by the Union as well as proposals in the civil protection area.

## CONCRETE TARGETS FOR POLICE

### A. CONCRETE TARGETS

To develop police capabilities, Member States, cooperating voluntarily within the framework of Article 12, fifth indent, of the Treaty on European Union, have set themselves the following concrete targets, to be reached by 2003.

The targets are related but highlight different aspects of EU police capabilities. In this regard, the target for rapid deployment capability (2) is defined as lying within the target for overall EU capabilities (1).

#### 1. OVERALL EU CAPABILITIES

Recognising the central role of police in international crisis management operations, and the increasing need for police officers for such operations, EU Member States undertake to strengthen their capability to provide police officers for international police operations to which they voluntarily decide to contribute. Member States' contributions will take account of their own particular arrangements for national policing and the type of police expertise which they can provide.

Strengthening their capabilities in phases, EU Member States should, as a final objective, be able to provide up to 5 000 police officers to international missions across the range of crisis prevention and crisis management operations and in response to the specific needs at the different stages of these operations. The current total deployment of EU Member States is approximately 3 300 persons.

This will require the pre-identification and training of a sufficiently large pool of police staff, covering all fields of police work required internationally and taking into account the comparative advantages as well as the specific constraints of Member States' police. It may also necessitate the reinforcement of mechanisms for rotation and sufficient financial and logistical resources.

Member States will share national experience with a view to producing specific recommendations on increasing the number of police officers available for international missions (looking inter alia at a greater use of retiring or recently retired officers and the freeing-up of police capability through greater involvement of experts from adjacent fields). In this respect, due consideration will be given to the possibility of putting a greater emphasis on the training of local police, as this can contribute to reduce the size and period of international police deployments.

The target on overall EU police capabilities may be extended to cover also international support to local justice and penal systems, the deficiency of which in some crises can have a significant impact on the credibility and effectiveness of an international police presence.

## 2. RAPID DEPLOYMENT CAPABILITY

The EU police deployment can either be in response to a request from an international lead organisation, in particular the United Nations or the OSCE, or can constitute an EU autonomous police operation, possibly as part of a larger EU-led crisis management operation, once the necessary EU planning and logistical framework has been defined.

Within the target for overall EU capabilities, Member States undertake to be able to identify and deploy, within 30 days, police able to implement operations and missions of police advice, training, monitoring as well as executive policing:

- in order to prevent or mitigate internal crises and conflicts (such as e.g. MINUGUA in Guatemala);
- in non-stabilised situations, such as e.g. immediate post-conflict situations, requiring robust forces able to restore law and order; (such as e.g. UNMIK/KFOR in Kosovo and UNTAET in East Timor);
- in support of local police, ensuring respect for basic human rights standards (such as e.g. WEU/MAPE in Albania, WEUPOL in Mostar and ONUSAL in El Salvador), and, where international police performs an executive role, allowing the rapid return of responsibility for law enforcement to local police (such as e.g. OSCE/KPSS in Kosovo).

Experience has shown that the most demanding of crisis management tasks may require the deployment of up to 1 000 EU Member State police within 30 days. For each of these generic target missions, further elaboration by proper Council instances will be needed.

Given the specific requirements on international police performing executive tasks in non-stabilised situations, and in particular during the transition from initial military command to subsequent civil command, special attention will be given to the proposal for the development of robust, rapidly deployable, flexible and interoperable European Union integrated police units, as well as to the possibility of a smaller number of Member States cooperating to build capabilities in this specific field.

In order to reach the deployment time target, Member States and the EU will further strengthen, as appropriate, the capacity to contribute with the required expertise to an advance team headed by the international lead organisation - as well as, in due course, deploy EU advance teams of experienced police experts in charge of assessing the risks of, defining, planning and establishing an EU-led police mission. In this context, the EU should be able to contribute with, and deploy, legal experts in order to prepare for support to local judicial and penal systems, as well as experts in engineering, logistical and administrative support.

Member States will exchange information and experience on methods of creating rapidly deployable police forces, inter alia through the use of pre-identified police forces which, while actively taking part in national police work, would be available at short notice for police missions.

### 3. RAISING STANDARDS FOR INTERNATIONAL POLICE MISSIONS

Member States and the EU can play a catalysing role in raising standards for international police operations, including within and through the United Nations and the OSCE. Therefore the EU and its Member States will initiate work in view of the definition of an EU concept for international police operations. This work will be carried out in close cooperation with UN/DPKO, on the basis of existing UN guidelines and without duplicating work being carried out in the UN, and will draw on Member State and EU police expertise. First discussions on this subject have identified the need, inter alia, to:

- (1) define the categories of police officers and experts most appropriate for the different policing tasks, including priorities for deployment, on the basis of scenarios or illustrative profiles covering the role of police across the range of, and at the different phases of, crisis prevention and crisis management operations, and taking into account the need for flexibility of intervention;
- (2) contribute to the development of a general concept of executive policing, notably as regards the interaction between military forces and police forces in post-conflict situations where both are deployed in parallel;
- (3) contribute to the clarification of the legislative framework in which international police missions operate;
- (4) contribute to the definition of clear international mandates for police missions.

The development of an EU concept would facilitate the drawing up of EU guidelines and references for international policing, including on rules of engagement, as well as contribute to the further refinement of the categories of police and experts in Member State and EU databases.

Member States and the EU will also, in the framework of the cooperation in the field of justice and home affairs, and taking into account requirements of different types of police missions, continue efforts to define standard selection criteria and basic training programmes, based on, and compatible with, existing UN, OSCE and Council of Europe standards, in order to ensure that police sent by EU Member States on international missions meet high standards and that the pool of pre-identified and trained police officers is sufficiently large to meet the capability and deployment targets defined above. These efforts will take into account the Lisbon seminar organised in this context on 29-31 May 2000 and earlier work on police training for peacekeeping missions carried out within the framework of the European Union and will reflect the central role of the EU and its Member States in contributing to improved international policing standards.

## **B. IMPLEMENTATION**

The specific concrete targets are the expression of the political will and commitment of Member States. The targets will be further elaborated by the appropriate Council instances. A method will be developed through which these phased targets can be met and maintained through voluntary contributions. The comparative advantages of national police taking into account e.g. national rotational requirements and the possible use of retirees, can be defined by each Member State, with a regular review of progress made. This work will be carried out in close cooperation with police experts.

General information on pre-identified police capabilities, their readiness, as well as on specific national expertise, in particular for advance teams, will be fed into the police database established at the Council Secretariat as part of the Coordinating Mechanism set up following the conclusions of the European Council in Helsinki. Further work will be undertaken concerning national arrangements, including on specific information on pre-identified police capabilities and single national contact points.

The European Council in Helsinki set the objective of developing the EU's contributions to international organisations, in particular the UN and OSCE, as well as its capabilities for EU autonomous actions. To that end the EU will coordinate closely with the United Nations Department of Peace Keeping Operations (UN/DPKO), the OSCE, notably the REACT Task Force, and with the Council of Europe and Member States contact points, in order to ensure that EU efforts and those of these organisations are compatible and mutually reinforcing, to avoid duplication as well as to facilitate the exchange of information relating to new police missions.

In addition, a detailed study on the feasibility and implications of planning, launching and leading autonomous EU missions will be carried out.

*Check against delivery*  
**Thursday 15 June 2000**  
**20:00**

# **A European Foreign Policy: Ambition and Reality**

The Right Honourable Chris Patten  
Commissioner for External Relations

Institut Français des Relations Internationales  
15 June 2000

Au temps où j'étais Président du Parti Conservateur, Valéry Giscard d'Estaing était passé me voir juste après avoir fait un discours à l'Université de Cambridge. Il avait commencé son intervention en exprimant son vif plaisir d'être accueilli dans une des universités les plus vénérables d'Europe. Un haut lieu de culture et d'érudition. Enfin un endroit où il pourrait s'exprimer dans sa propre langue! Mais ils'était vite aperçu qu'autour de lui les visages de ses auditeurs étaient défaits à l'idée de cette épreuve à venir. Il avait poursuivi en français le temps de quelques phrases puis, sans effort, il était passé à l'anglais.

Il prit cette décision empreinte de courtoisie, se rendant bien compte des limites de son auditoire. A mon tour, je sollicite de votre part la même bienveillance étant donné mes propres insuffisances linguistiques.

1. More than 40 years ago the European Commission's first President, Walter Hallstein, wanted to formalise the Commission's relations with the representatives of third countries in Brussels. President de Gaulle slapped him down, pooh-poohing this 'artificial country springing from the brow of a technocrat'. I suppose that some – not least in what we would call, within the Commission, 'the country that I know best' - would regard this speech as a similarly reprehensible trespass into that artificial country. None of this is surprising. For foreign policy goes to the heart of what it means to be a nation. And the Commission's role is still disputed. When it comes to trade policy or agriculture, we know where we stand. The Commission acts, more or less, according to Jean Monnet's brilliant vision. But what exactly is the Common Foreign and Security Policy? Should the Member States be willing to curb their national instincts for the sake of it?

2. These questions have never been answered to anyone's satisfaction. History is littered with failed attempts to create a Common Foreign and Security Policy which could be more than the sum of its parts. The Pleven Plan; the de Gasperi Plan; the Fouchet Plan... With European Political Co-operation, in 1970, the baby at least survived. Indeed it grew. But it was always rather a sickly creature. After twenty years, in 1989, it boasted an impressive jungle of committees; it issued ringing declarations (usually a week or two after they could influence

events); but – as some academic commentators put it recently - “the structure resembled a diplomatic game, providing work for officials without engaging or informing Parliaments or press, let alone public opinion. It thus failed to promote any substantial convergence of national attitudes.”<sup>1</sup>

3. Since then, the European Union has started to raise its game. The Maastricht Treaty of 1992 created the Common Foreign and Security Policy. The Amsterdam Treaty called into being the High Representative, “Monsieur PESC”. And the Helsinki European Council last December took the first big step into defence policy. What caused this new impetus? I would suggest three reasons in particular:

- First, the mismatch between the time and effort being put into Political Co-operation, and the feeble outcome, had become too glaring. As the European Union matured in other respects, with enlargement, the advent of the Single Market and the drive towards a single currency – it became ever clearer that foreign policy was lagging behind.
- Second, the fall of the Berlin Wall changed the whole landscape of Europe. We had always known what we were against. Now we had to work out what we were for. And we needed to be able to tackle instability on our borders. Europe’s weakness was exposed, in particular, by our humiliating ‘hour of Europe’ in Bosnia, where we could neither stop the fighting, nor bring about any serious negotiation until the Americans chose to intervene. Europe’s subsequent reliance on US military capacity in Kosovo had a similarly galvanising effect. The Member States recognised that they needed a genuine Common Foreign and Security Policy to reverse this tide.
- And third, perhaps, there has been a changing relationship with the US. American engagement in Europe since the Second World War has been a blessing in almost every respect. Yet America has divided us. Some Europeans – foolishly in my view – have measured their devotion to the cause of Europe by their anti-Americanism. Others have shied away from a muscular European foreign policy, and especially defence policy, for fear that this would sever the all-important transatlantic link. Both have been wrong. And both are coming to see it. Europe and America need one another. The danger is not of US isolationism, but of unilateralism - accompanied,

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<sup>1</sup> Anthony Forster and William Wallace: *Policy-making in the European Union*. 4<sup>th</sup>ed. OUP 2000

sometimes, by disregard for the great abroad. Europe will encourage that tendency if it is not seen to be doing more for itself.

4. So we have our new CFSP. Javier Solana, as its High Representative, also presides over the Council Secretariat. As the Commissioner for External Relations, I combine responsibilities which used to be spread between several Commissioners. I do not want to turn this into a speech about institutions – but I should discuss very briefly one central issue, which is the role of the Commission in the emerging structure of CFSP.

5. In the important advances achieved in CFSP in the last decade, the Member States have not given the Commission a sole right of initiative; nor, in general, have they agreed to abide by majority votes; nor do they accept that Europe has ‘occupied the space’ reducing national freedom of action. It is important to understand this, and particularly important that the European Commission should understand it. Foreign policy remains primarily a matter for democratically elected Member State governments.

6. But it is equally necessary that all Member States should acknowledge what those actually doing the work of CFSP have long understood: that mere inter-Governmentalism is a recipe for weakness and mediocrity: for a European foreign policy of the lowest common denominator. That will become more and more obvious as the Union takes in new members. The larger Member States can blunt the deficiencies of inter-Governmentalism by playing a prominent role. As President Chirac said in his important foreign policy speech of 30 May: “some members can act as a driving force...” to give Europe a coherent, high-profile foreign policy. But force of will and the appeal to shared values are not enough. That is why the Member States decided at Maastricht and at Amsterdam to combine the Community and the inter-Governmental methods. Only in this way would they be able to sing, if not in unison, at least in closer harmony.

7. What they came up with is far from perfect. Luckily Javier Solana and I work extremely well together - but we are not much helped in that by the new institutional machinery. CFSP is a work in progress which will be further streamlined in the years to come. The important point is that – however awkward they may be - the new structures, procedures and instruments of CFSP recognise the need to harness the strengths of the European Community in the service of European foreign policy. That is why the Treaty ‘fully associates’ the European Commission with CFSP. We participate fully in the decision-making process in the Council, with a shared right of initiative which we shall exercise. Our role cannot be reduced to one of ‘painting by numbers’ – simply filling in the blanks

on a canvas drawn by others. Nor should it be. It would be absurd to divorce European foreign policy from the institutions which have been given responsibility for most of the instruments for its accomplishment: for external trade questions, including sanctions; for European external assistance; for many of the external aspects of Justice and Home Affairs.

8. What is needed is a sensible and sensitive partnership between the institutions of the Union and the Member States. We should be engaged not in trench warfare, but in a common enterprise to ensure that the world's largest trading block also makes its presence felt politically.

9. Let me move from this institutional hors d'oeuvre to the main course. What we are actually trying to do together? What do the Member States **want** to do with their new structures? And how should we measure our success?

10. The EU has wide responsibilities and interests – and CFSP must have a global reach. But, within that, we need to focus our efforts. I suggest that the EU might set itself three overall goals:

- The first is to manage more effectively our relationships with our nearest neighbours. The US, because of its boundless confidence in technology, its pre-eminence as a world power and its geographical position, can contemplate technical solutions – such as National Missile Defence – to the threats that it faces. Whatever scepticism or enthusiasm one may have about this approach – and for what it's worth I remain to be wholly convinced – it is symptomatic of a belief that the world can be kept at bay. Interestingly, this belief has increased US reliance on tools (military threats and action) which, in Europe, are a Member State competence. In Europe, by contrast, our geography rules out such an approach, even were we to believe in it. We can only achieve security by engaging constructively with our nearest neighbours. This requires the application of tools such as trade, external assistance, political dialogue, environmental co-operation, competition policy and so on, which are matters of Community competence. The Member States cannot, separately, pursue a wholly effective external relations policy not just because they are too small, but because such a policy depends upon instruments over which they have wisely decided to pool their resources.
- A second goal we should set ourselves is to apply our experience of multilateral co-operation to a wider stage. The EU has been a unique, and a uniquely successful, experiment in regional integration. It seeks to preserve what is best about its members: their separate cultures,

languages, traditions, and historical identities – while overcoming what has been worst: nationalism, xenophobia, mutually destructive trade and monetary policies, and (ultimately) their tendency to go to war with one another. There have been many frustrations and failures along the way. For my own taste, the EU has been too interventionist. I sympathise with the demand that we should be more enthusiastic about subsidiarity. The EU is sometimes wasteful and inefficient, partly because Member States have often denied us the resources we need to manage our affairs better. The EU is not loved. Yet it has been a tremendous force for stability and prosperity on this continent – and a pole of attraction for countries emerging from dictatorship. Michael Prowse suggested in a recent column in the *Financial Times*<sup>2</sup> that in the coming century Europe will offer the world a “satisfying overall combination of individual liberty, economic opportunity and social inclusion. It will offer the individual more personal freedom than intolerant Asia. And the value of this freedom will be enhanced by a sense of community and commitment to social welfare that is largely missing in atomistic America”. That is an optimistic vision. I hope it is true. But it sets a challenge for the European Union’s external relations, too. For the skills we are developing to manage our own affairs are enormously relevant to a world that is still struggling to evolve an economic, legal and political framework to contain the passions of states, to help manage relations between them, and to channel globalisation in beneficent directions. Not only can the EU contribute to the world’s stumbling efforts to co-operate more effectively in multilateral frameworks (in the UN, the WTO, and so on). But our own model of integration is inspiring regional experiments from Asia to Latin America. And through our commitment to human rights we can explode the absurd notion that there is a tension between commercial interests and active support for freedom. It has long been clear to me that the freest societies are also the best neighbours and the best places to invest and do business. The EU’s ambition must be to reflect abroad what is best about our own model. Our sense of civil society. The balance we seek to strike between national freedoms and common disciplines.

- A third overall goal the European Union should set itself is to become a serious counterpart to the United States. As I have said, it is a fallacy to imagine that there is a choice to be made between Europeanism and Atlanticism. They are mutually reinforcing. We need to work closely with the United States, which has been, and remains, a staunch friend

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<sup>2</sup> Weekend FT, 13 May 2000

of Europe. There is much – very much – to admire in the US. But there are also many areas in which I think they have got it wrong. The UN, for example, environmental policy and a pursuit of extraterritorial powers combined with a neuralgic hostility to any external authority over their own affairs. But we will not win arguments like these unless we are ourselves taken seriously. At present, in many areas, we are not. Nor do we deserve to be. By working more effectively together, developing the Common Foreign and Security Policy so that it allows us better to project our combined potential, we may hope to contribute to a healthier global balance.

11. Let me turn now from the general to the particular. What should be the ambition of CFSP in key areas of policy - and how should the European Commission be making its contribution?

12. Our first responsibility is *internal* rather than external: to help create a **dynamic European economy** which can fuel a serious foreign policy. “Give me the coal” said the first post-war British Foreign Secretary, Ernie Bevin, “And I’ll give you the policy”. But the Commission’s *external* trade policy is also a crucial part of CFSP:

- First, the EU must contribute to open, rule-based international trade. The EU must be a champion of globalisation, which is a force for good not only for the economic benefits which trade can bring to the poorest countries, but because it also serves to promote open societies and liberal ideas. I welcome the recent WTO deal which Pascal Lamy has negotiated with China;
- But globalisation is not some force of nature beyond our control. For example, we must address the risk of polarisation between the connected and the isolated. Liberal trade and advanced technology are making people better off, but not everywhere and not in every country. Europe spends some €11 billion a year on ice-cream. Yet 174 out of every 1000 African children fail to reach the age of five.

13. And this brings me at once to **external assistance** - an area in which the EU reality, at present, falls embarrassingly far below its potential. The EU and its Member States account for 55% of all official international development assistance, and some 66% of all grant aid. Yet the money is not well managed. In saying that, I do not want to cast aspersions on the many excellent and dedicated staff who have worked their hearts out trying to turn things around. But they have been saddled with lousy procedures. And there are too few of them. EC aid volumes have increased two or three times as fast as the staff at our disposal to

manage the funds. We have to work with absurdly heavy procedures imposed by Member States wanting to micromanage projects, and to secure contracts. As a result, in the last 5 years the average delay in disbursement of committed funds has increased from 3 years to 4.5 years. For certain programmes the backlog of outstanding commitments is equivalent to more than 8.5 years' payments.

14. Last month we announced our plans to clean up this mess. We are proposing to the budgetary authority that a proportion of each assistance programme should be committed to its management. With these additional resources:

- We can do a better job of multiannual programming, and seek to involve the Member States at that stage, so that they do not delay the projects themselves by excessive oversight procedures.
- We can create a single office of the Commission, to be called EuropeAid, which will identify projects and then oversee their implementation, from start to finish.
- And we can devolve more work to our overseas delegations, bringing management nearer to the projects themselves, and involving beneficiary countries more closely in decision-making.

15. This is perhaps my highest single priority in my present job – working closely with Poul Nielson who has particular responsibility for development co-operation. If we cannot manage our funds effectively, we should not manage them at all. Yet if funds are well managed, external assistance is an area where there is an obvious value-added in action at a Community level.

16. Nowhere is it more important that we should be fast and effective in delivering assistance than in the Western **Balkans**. This region poses a tremendous challenge for Europe and for CFSP - and for me and Javier Solana in particular. I was delighted when President Chirac announced, in his speech of 30 May, that the Balkans would be at the top of the French Presidency's CFSP agenda. I welcome the prospect of another Summit, as I welcome his call for a more coherent, forceful and determined strategy. The Commission has explained in some detail what such a strategy means in terms of EU spending. The EU's overall approach is clear. We are working for:

- the gradual integration of these countries into the Union by way of *Stabilisation and Association Agreements*;

- that will involve the regeneration of these economies through intra-regional trade, as well as through *asymmetric trade concessions* by the EU to encourage the transition towards free trade;
- but in the first instance it means the most rapid possible reconstruction of shattered lives, shattered societies and shattered infrastructure. Not only have we established a *Reconstruction Agency* to oversee this work in Kosovo, but we have proposed a *new Regulation* to draw the work together within a single legal instrument;

In all this we are working closely with the UN and with the Stability Pact under Bodo Hombach. There is a huge job to be done.

17. These are not inherently wicked or violent societies. They are people, rather, still living with the consequences of a flawed regional construction following the Congress of Berlin more than a hundred years ago. And in Serbia they are suffering under appalling leadership. Despite some encouraging developments, such as recent changes in Croatia, the present reality is ugly. We must light the path to Europe.

18. In the **Mediterranean**, too, the EU has the capacity to make a real difference. Not so long ago the EU's Mediterranean policy was conceived primarily in terms of development co-operation. That time has long passed. We do have a massive development programme, of course. It has grown exponentially in recent years, and now represents about a quarter of the Union's entire external assistance effort. But aid is only one facet of a much wider policy. Five years ago we launched the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership – the so-called “Barcelona Process”. We are seeking a shared area of peace, prosperity and security to our south, rooted in free trade – the Mediterranean equivalent of NAFTA. We seek to promote human rights, democracy and the rule of law throughout the region. And we seek a co-operative partnership that can help to sustain the coming peace in the Middle East.

19. There is a risk that words like partnership become mere platitudes of diplomatic intercourse if they are not backed by hard targets and timetables. That is why I am determined to relaunch the Barcelona Process. Ministers have called on the European Commission to propose ideas before the summer break.

20. I could continue on a world tour almost indefinitely – indeed my present life sometimes feels like that: imprisoned in aeroplanes. You will be relieved to hear that I do not propose in this speech to expand on the

ambition or the reality of the EU's engagement in Latin America, or Africa, or Asia, or in the Middle East. Let me conclude, however, with brief comments on three further topics of particular importance for Europe's whole future: Russia; the EU's imminent enlargement; and the beginnings of an independent European military capacity.

21. **Russia**, first, whose transformation has been one of the most significant features of the last 50 years. Russia's future relationship with the EU is an issue of profound importance for our continent – and it remains a conundrum. For Russia is undoubtedly European. But she is not Western. Russia a great power. Yet her enfeebled economy is only 8% the size of the EU's while depending on us for 40% of its external trade. Where does this leave our long-term relationship? And where does it leave countries from Central Asia to the Caucasus to Ukraine which lie between the great continental poles? This is a question which can provoke passionate theoretical debate about the geographical limits of the Union; and about religious and cultural divides. My own approach is pragmatic. Our interest and our obligation is to engage with all these countries, and with Russia above all, to help them develop the structures they need for sound economic and political development. Let us focus, for now, on that priority.

22. The Russians have always placed greater faith in strong leaders than in strong institutions. But if they are now to attract investment; if they are to overcome their huge problems of nuclear safety; if they are to defeat their cancer of corruption and fraud; if they are to reemerge, in short, as the great power they should be – they need strong and effective institutions to underpin the rule of law. No amount of good laws will make any difference if they cannot be applied in practice, and if the courts are too weak to enforce them.

23. The EU is keen to work in partnership with Russia. At the EU-Russia Summit in Moscow at the end of last month I could sense the hope of a fresh start under Mr Putin. But we can only help if Russia shows its own commitment to individual rights and the rule of law. Events in Chechnya continue to cast a long shadow.

24. As I said, the future of Russia has a profound bearing on the EU's own **enlargement**, which is going to transform the European Union over the coming years. The full implications of taking in so many new members are impossible to predict. It will require radical changes in our present institutions, which has already provoked the fascinating debate launched by Joschka Fischer last month. I will not join that debate here except to say that while I have some sympathy for Joschka's conception of nation states sharing sovereignty within a constitutional contract

subject to greater democratic control and accountability, I am concerned that powers should be vested upwards from the separate nations in the central structure that is created – not downwards from that structure. Nation states are the basic political unit and will remain the main focus of public loyalty. Enlargement of the EU will also require radical changes in EU policies, including the Common Agricultural Policy. That could be a helpful stimulus, and not a disbenefit of enlargement, if we approach it sensibly.

25. Whatever its structural and policy consequences, enlargement constitutes the single greatest contribution the EU can make to European – even to global – stability. I see the projection of stability as the EU's essential mission, and the central objective of CFSP. The enlargement of the EU itself is the greatest example of that policy. We have already seen, in Greece, Spain and Portugal, how membership of the EU has helped to stabilise countries emerging from dictatorship.

26. Finally, I promised to say a few words about **security**, and the Commission's role within the emerging structures. Heads of Government have stated their immediate goal very clearly. By the year 2003 they want to be able to deploy 50 - 60 000 troops capable of the full range of what are known as the Petersberg tasks: humanitarian and rescue work, crisis management, peace-keeping, and even peace-making. The French have made clear their determination to drive full throttle for that goal during their Presidency. Javier Solana is deeply involved both on the operational side, building command and control structures for European operations, and on the institutional side, too, tackling the complexities of the EU-NATO relationship including the involvement of non-NATO members of the EU and non-EU members of NATO. All this is work that I strongly support. Yet I do so in many respects as an interested observer rather than as a contributor.

27. Does this mean that the Commission should keep out of the whole field? Some – even in this hall perhaps – would answer yes: military questions are for the Member States, and the Community institutions should mind their own business. That is wrong for two reasons at least:

- First, while the Commission has nothing to say – nor do we seek a role – in defence, it is impossible to separate purely military matters from related issues in which we are competent, and have a real contribution to make. Military and the non-military actions cannot be placed neatly into separate boxes. Not should they be, because they need to be closely co-ordinated in the service of a single strategy. The Commission, for example, may be bankrolling police support to help

head off a conflict; or we may be arranging the training of border services where uncontrolled mass migration is generating conflict; or we may be helping to re-establish administrative structures in countries emerging from crisis – as we see in the Balkans today. The Commission has an impressive range of instruments and expertise which need to be incorporated into the EU's overall approach in crisis situations – from de-mining projects to mediation to support for independent media. All this means that we need to be involved in the day to day work of the emerging security structures of the EU. The Commission is currently working with the Member States to develop non-military headline goals that will complement the military goal.

- The second reason it makes no sense to try to fence off the emerging security structures from the Commission is that defence trade and production cannot be treated as a *chasse gardée* within the Single Market. Competition between defence companies. Research and development. Exports of defence equipment. Internal market aspects of defence trade, and dual-use goods which have civil as well as military applications. All these are areas in which the benefits of the Single Market should not be denied to European industry.

28. These are areas in which the Commission needs to tread with great sensitivity. As I have said, we do not seek a role in defence or military decision-making. But I would plead for the indivisibility of European foreign policy, which cannot be confined to one pillar of the Treaty. The Commission needs to be fully associated with all of CFSP.

Let me conclude with this:

29. The Common Foreign and Security Policy has developed slowly in the European Union, and is still weak, because it is an area in which the Member States are rightly jealous of their national prerogatives. There are distinct limits on how far they want to go in pooling their capacity, and on how much they want to spend. But in recent years they have begun to fashion a Common Foreign and Security Policy which can be more than just declaratory. And they have recognised that this needs to integrate three strands: national policies, Community policies, and CFSP itself (the so-called 'Second Pillar'). European foreign policy must combine all three, and it will become stronger as that combination becomes seamless.

30. The Commission will play its role in this important work. If CFSP is to be taken seriously, this will involve hard choices. The Commission will try to make Member States face up to those choices, which will sometimes mean saying things that are unpopular. We shall tell the

Member States, for example, when we consider that they are willing the end without providing the budgetary means. But if we are to do that we must retain the independence which is our strength as an institution.

31. Europe's foreign policy ambition should extend a long way beyond the present reality. CFSP is still in its infancy. If it is to grow to maturity it needs the nurture of both its parents: the member states, and the Community institutions. And – as any psychologist will tell you – the child is more likely to be happy and healthy if those parents love one another.

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EUROPEAN COMMISSION  
EXTERNAL RELATIONS DIRECTORATE GENERAL

DIRECTORATE GENERAL MATTERS AND MULTILATERAL  
RELATIONS

**Security aspects including liaison with WEU and NATO**

**GLOSSARY OF ESDP-RELATED ACRONYMS AND EXPRESSIONS**

**KEY EXPRESSIONS**

**AFOR –Albania Force**

Force Designated by the Alliance to support humanitarian efforts in Albania during the Kosovo crisis.

**CFE –Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty**

The CFE Treaty is a major arms supervise treaty and a cornerstone of European security. More than 58,000 pieces of military equipment have been destroyed in Europe since NATO Allies and members of the then Warsaw Treaty Organisation signed the CFE in 1990. In March 1999, Russia, NATO and other European states reached agreement on all major CFE issues, opening the way for the adaptation of the CFE Treaty in time for the Summit of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe in Istanbul in November 1999.

**EAPC –The Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council**

Set up in May 1997 as the successor to the North Atlantic Cooperation Council, the EAPC provides the overarching framework for an expanded political dimension to PfP and for closer practical cooperation. It brings together representatives of the NATO Allies and Partners – 44 countries in all. A Summit Meeting of EAPC Heads of State and Government was held in Washington in April 1999, the day after the NATO Summit.

**EPC – European Political Cooperation**

System of cooperation in the field of foreign policy adopted by the Foreign Ministers in Luxembourg on 27 October 1970. The process was carried out by consulting regularly, harmonizing views, concerting attitudes and, where possible, undertaking joint action. The process was put on a more formal basis in the Single European Act in 1986 giving to it a Treaty foundation. Its scope was 'any foreign policy matters of general interest'. In 1992 the EPC was replaced by the CFSP in the Treaty of the European Union.

## **ESDI –European Security and Defence Identity**

The aim of developing ESDI within the Alliance is to enable all European Allies to make a more coherent and effective contribution to NATO as an expression of their shared responsibilities, and to reinforce the transatlantic partnership while at the same time enabling them to act together in a European context. ESDI is an essential part of the adaptation of Alliance structures.

## **KFOR –Kosovo Force**

Multinational force established in Kosovo under the auspices of the United Nations, in accordance with UN Security Resolution 1244 of 10 June 1999. An advance enabling force for KFOR was stationed in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 1 by NATO in anticipation of a settlement. These troops were placed under the operational supervise of the Commander of the Allied Command Europe (ACE) Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC) at the start of NATO's air campaign at the end of March. They were subsequently reassigned to humanitarian tasks in response to the escalating refugee crisis. With additional forces sent to the region, these forces fulfilled essential tasks in providing direct support to the refugees in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia as well as assisting the international humanitarian agencies.

## **NAC –North Atlantic Council**

Comprised of representatives of the Alliance's member countries this is the organisation's highest decision-making body. It meets regularly in Brussels at the level of Ambassadors, at least twice a year at the level of Foreign and Defence Ministers and occasionally – as in Washington in 1999 – in summit session at the level of Heads of State and Government.

## **NATO-RUSSIA PJC –Permanent Joint Council**

The PJC was established under the NATO-Russia Founding Act signed in May 1997. The Founding Act provides for regular meetings of the PJC at ambassadorial level as well as bi-annual meetings at the level of Foreign Ministers. Its purpose is to provide a venue for consultation, cooperation and consensus-building in discussions of political and security matters.

Following the beginning of Allied air operations to bring about an end to the conflict of Kosovo, Russia suspended its participation in this forum. The Alliance expressed its regret at this decision, recognising its common interests with Russia in reaching a political solution to the crisis in Kosovo. NATO countries continued to work closely with Russia in the context of diplomatic initiatives to end the conflict.

## **NATO-UKRAINE COMMISSION**

The NATO-Ukraine Commission was established under the terms of the Charter on a Distinctive Partnership between NATO and Ukraine. The Commission meets at least twice a year to review progress in the development of the relationship between NATO

and Ukraine. A Summit session of Heads of State and Government of the Allies and Ukraine was held in Washington on 24 April 1999.

### **PARP –PfP Planning and Review Process**

PARP was established in November 1994 as a separate activity within the Partnership for Peace programme, for those Partner countries wishing to participate. It aims to encourage transparency in defence planning and to develop the interoperability of Partner country forces with those of NATO countries, by developing and reviewing mutually agreed planning targets. Seventeen Partner countries currently participate in PARP.

### **Petersberg Tasks**

They were defined by the WEU during its meeting of 19 June 1992 and then adopted by the EU with the Treaty of Amsterdam. They include humanitarian action and rescue, peacekeeping and crisis management, including peace-making operations if required with adequate military forces.

### **PfP –Partnership for Peace**

Set up in January 1994, PfP offers the Alliance's Partners the opportunity to take part, with NATO, in security cooperation programmes tailored to their individual requirements. These include activities such as military exercises and civil emergency operations. PfP has been enhanced to give Partners greater say in planning and directing future programmes. There are currently 24 PfP countries.

### **PPEWU – Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit**

Set up in January 2000, after the agreement reached at the Helsinki Conference, the PPEWU will monitor and analyse developments in areas relevant to the CFSP, will provide assessments of the Union's foreign and security policy interests as well as timely assessments and early warning of events or situations which may have significant repercussions for the Union's foreign and security policy. Finally, it will be in charge of producing analyses, recommendations and strategies for the CFSP.

### **PSC – Political and Security Committee; MC – Military Committee; MS – Military Staff**

The three bodies of a permanent structure to be prepared by an interim political-military body of the European Council by March 2000. Modeled on NATO, the PSC, normally constituted at its highest level by foreign and defense ministers, is to exercise the political control and strategic direction of military operations in a crisis. It would be advised by a military committee, formed by their chiefs of defense, who would give military directives to the military staff. The latter, representatives of all branches of the member nations' armed forces, would provide expert advice to the military committee and assume the conduct of military operations.

## **SACEUR and SACLANT –The Supreme Allied Commander Europe and The Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic**

SACEUR and SACLANT are the two major commanders responsible for the Alliance's integrated military structure.

### **SFOR and IFOR**

The NATO-led Stabilisation Force (SFOR) has been deployed in Bosnia and Herzegovina since December 1996 as part of efforts to underpin the Dayton Peace Agreement in the former Yugoslavia. It replaced the Implementation Force (IFOR), which was responsible for overseeing the fulfilment of the military aspects of the peace agreement. More than 35 NATO and non-NATO countries have contributed forces to SFOR, whose strength totals more than 30,000 troops.

### **SHAPE –Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe**

Located near Mons, Belgium, this is the headquarters of Allied Command Europe.

### **Strategic Concept**

The Strategic Concept is the authoritative statement of the Alliance's objectives and provides the highest level guidance on the political and military means to be used in achieving them. It sets out the rationale for the Alliance and its activities, and provides the NATO Military Authorities direction for developing military capabilities and preparing for possible operations. The Strategic Concept was first published in 1991, after the two meetings of the North Atlantic Council in London and Rome. The most recent version of the Strategic Concept was approved and published at the Washington Summit in 1999.

In addition to taking account of political and military developments since 1991, the Strategic Concept confirms the Alliance's commitment to maintaining collective defence and the transatlantic link.

## **ABBREVIATIONS IN COMMON USE**

ACA – Agency for the Control of Armaments  
ACLANT – Allied Command Atlantic  
AFCENT – Allied Forces Central Europe  
AFNORTH – Allied Forces Northern Europe  
AFSOUTH – Allied Forces Southern Europe  
APAG – Atlantic Policy Advisory Group  
ATA – Atlantic Treaty Association  
C41 – Command, control, communications, computers and intelligence  
CEAC – Committee for European Airspace Coordination  
CENTAG – Central Army Group, Central Europe  
CENTAG – Central Army Group, Central Europe  
CEOA – Central Europe Operating Agency  
CHODs – Chiefs of Defence Staff

CIS – Commonwealth of Independent States  
CIS – Communications and Information Systems  
CISC – Communications and Information Systems Committee  
CJPS – Combined Joint Task Forces  
COREPER – Committee of the Permanent Representatives (European Council)  
CSCE – Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe  
CWG – Council Working Group  
DPC – Defence Planning Committee  
DRC – Defence Review Committee  
DRG – Defence Representatives Group  
ECSC – European Coal and Steel Community  
EDC – European Defence Community  
EDIG – European Defence Industry Group  
EEC – European Economic Community  
ESA – European Space Agency  
EUCLID – European Cooperation for the Long Term in Defence  
EW – Electronic Warfare  
EWG – Executive Working Group  
FAWEU – Forces answerable to WEU  
GIS – Geographical Information Survey  
HLTF – High Level Task Force  
IEPG – Independent European Programme Group  
ISS – Institute for Security Studies  
IISS – Institute for International Strategic Studies  
IMS – International Military Staff  
LTDP – Long-Term defence Programme  
MAPE/MAPEXT – Multinational Advisory Police Element/Extended mandate  
MARAIRMED – Maritime Air Forces Mediterranean  
MDG – Military Delegates Group  
MDWG – Military Delegates Working Group  
MNPF – Multinational Police Force  
MNC – Major NATO Commander  
NAA – North Atlantic Assembly  
NACC – North Atlantic Cooperation Council  
NACISA – NATO Communications and Information Systems Agency  
NACMA – NATO Air Command Control Systems Management Agency  
NADs – National Armaments Directors  
NAVOCFORMED – NATO On-Call Force, Mediterranean  
NBC – nuclear, biological and chemical weapons  
NIAG – NATO Industrial Advisory Group  
NICS – NATO Integrated Communications System  
NMD – National Missile Defence (US)  
NPG – Nuclear Planning Group (NATO)  
NSC – NATO Supply Centre  
OECD – Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development  
PMG – Politico-Military Group  
PMWG – Politico-Military Working Group  
PSC – Political and Security Committee  
SAC – Standing Armaments Committee  
SAC – Strategic Air Command

SC – Security Committee  
SDI – Strategic Defence Initiative  
SG – Space Group  
SHAPE – Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe  
SIAF – Spanish-Italian Amphibious Force  
SNF – Short-Range Nuclear Forces  
STANAVFORCHAN – Standing Naval Force Channel  
STANAVFORLANT – Standing Naval Force Atlantic  
STANAVFORMED – Standing Naval Force Mediterranean  
SWG – Special Working Group  
TNF – Theatre Nuclear Forces  
UN – United Nations  
UNCTAD – United Nations Conference on Trade and Development  
UNHCR – United Nations High Commission on Refugees  
UXO – Un-exploded ordinance  
WEAG – Western European Armaments Group  
WEAO – Western European Armaments Organisation  
WELG – Western European Logistics Group  
WEUCOM – WEU telecommunications network  
WEUDAM – WEU Demining Advisory Mission  
WMWG – WEU Mobility Working Group  
WSMWG - WEU Strategic Mobility Group

