REPORT

by the Committee on Foreign Affairs and Security

on developments in East-West relations in Europe and their impact on European security

Rapporteur: Mr Alexander LANGER
At the sitting of 13 March 1991 the President of the European Parliament announced that he had forwarded the motion for a resolution by Mr Poettering and Mr Sakellariou on developments in East-West relations in Europe and their impact on European security (B3-0150/91), pursuant to Rule 63 of the Rules of Procedure, to the Committee on Foreign Affairs and Security as the committee responsible.

At its meeting of 24 April 1991 the committee decided to draw up a report and appointed Mr Langer rapporteur.

The Subcommittee on Security and Disarmament considered the draft report.

The committee considered the draft report at its meetings of 16 February and 23 March 1993.

At the latter meeting it adopted the motion for a resolution by 17 votes to 7, with 9 abstentions.

The following took part in the vote: Baron Crespo, chairman; Langer, rapporteur; Aglietta, Avgerinos, Barton (for Balfe), Bertens, Cheysson, Christensen Ib (for Canavarro), Colajanni (for Occhetta), Dillen, Fernandez Albor, Ferrer (for Bonetti), Holzfuss, Lagakos (for Lenz), Lalor, Llorca Vilaplana, McMillan-Scott, Newens, Penders, Piecyk, Pirk1, Planas, Poettering, Rawlings (for Bethell), Schmid, Suarez Gonzalez (for Lacaze), Titley, Trivelli, Veil, Verde I Aldea (for Moran Lopez), Woltjer, Kostopoulos (for Puerta pursuant to Rule 111(2)), Miranda de Lage (for Trautman pursuant to Rule 111(2)) and Quistorp (for Onesta pursuant to Rule 111(2)).

The report was tabled on 24 March 1993.

The deadline for tabling amendments will appear on the draft agenda for the sitting at which the report is to be considered.
MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION

on developments in East-West relations in Europe and their impact on European security

The European Parliament,

- having regard to the motion for a resolution tabled by Mr Poettering and Mr Sakellariou on developments in East-West relations in Europe and their impact on European security (B3-0150/91),
- having regard to its resolution of 14 March 1989 on arms exports\(^\text{1}\) and the report on the same subject by Mr Ford on behalf of Parliament's Political Affairs Committee,
- having regard to its resolution of 13 July 1990 on disarmament, the conversion of defence industries and arms exports\(^\text{2}\),
- having regard to its resolution of 9 October 1990 on the CSCE\(^\text{3}\) and the report on the same subject by Mr Romeos on behalf of Parliament's Political Affairs Committee,
- having regard to its resolution of 18 April 1991 on the arms trade\(^\text{4}\),
- having regard to its resolution of 17 May 1991 on the role of Europe in relation to security in the Mediterranean\(^\text{5}\) and the report on the same subject by Mrs van den Brink on behalf of Parliament's Political Affairs Committee,
- having regard to its resolution of 10 June 1991 on the outlook for a European security policy and its implications for European Union\(^\text{6}\) and the report on the same subject by Mr Poettering on behalf of Parliament's Political Affairs Committee,
- having regard to its resolution of 11 July 1991 on the CSCE\(^\text{7}\),

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1 OJ No. C 96, 17.4.1989, p. 34
3 OJ No. C 284, 12.11.1990, p. 36
4 OJ No. C 129, 20.5.1991, p. 139
6 OJ No. C 183, 15.7.1991, p. 18
having regard to its resolution of 12 September 1991 on employment affected by reductions in military spending,

having regard to its resolution of 17 September 1992 on the Final Declaration of the CSCE II conference in Helsinki,

having regard to its resolution of 17 September 1992 on the role of the Community in controlling arms exports and the defence industry and the report on the same subject by Mr Ford on behalf of the Committee on Foreign Affairs and Security,

having regard to its resolution of 9 February 1993 on disarmament, energy and development and the report by Mr Romeos on behalf of the Committee on Foreign Affairs and Security,

having regard to the Paris Charter for a New Europe, signed at the CSCE Summit in Paris on 21 November 1990, which expressly calls for disarmament and confidence-building measures, warns against the new dangers and provides for the further development of mechanisms for the peaceful settlement of conflicts,

having regard to the Final Document of the CSCE Summit in Helsinki on 9-10 July 1992, which was signed by 51 States and provides for further progress in the field of early warning, conflict prevention, crisis management, peaceful settlement of disputes and the establishment of a new CSCE forum for security cooperation,

having regard to the Maastricht Treaty on European Union and Parliament's resolution of 7 April 1992,

having regard to the report by the Committee on Foreign Affairs and Security (A3-0108/93),

A. whereas, in view of the far-reaching changes which have occurred in Central and Eastern Europe since 1989, there is now a new basis for European security policy and for the first times for many decades there exists the possibility of a European security policy,

B. convinced that Western Europe and the European Community must boldly address themselves to the changes that are needed and that, despite the general failure of its Yugoslavia policy, the Community can make a significant contribution to a new European security architecture;

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2 OJ No. C 284, 2.11.1992, p. 132
3 OJ No. C 284, 2.11.1992, p. 138
4 Minutes of the sitting of 9 February 1993
5 OJ No. C 125, 18.5.1992, p. 81

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C. whereas European security policy in East-West relations is currently primarily a matter of pursuing the pan-European integration process and offering all Europeans the firm and early prospect of a 'common European home', and whereas the European Community can be the motive force to achieve this, if it also is prepared to change;

D. convinced that the Community's influence in Europe as a whole will be enhanced if it succeeds in pushing ahead with the unification process to create a genuine European Union,

E. convinced that European security can form part of a global security policy in which regional security systems, in the context of the United Nations and regional integration processes, can ensure peace and prevent or solve conflicts throughout the world;

F. Determined to fulfil the Community's responsibilities in respect of a common foreign and security policy as a contribution towards peacekeeping in Europe,

1. Takes the view that, in addition to the threats to European security in East-West relations which existed until recently, new trouble-spots are emerging and that action should be taken accordingly;

2. Considers the increasing tendency of armed forces and weapons systems to be beyond political control, the breaking up of nations, border conflicts and the ethnic or national tensions and conflicts in Central and Eastern Europe, the social and economic disparity between East and West, impending environmental disasters or those which have already occurred, in particular those caused by past malpractice, for example in the field of nuclear safety, and the continuing effects of the dissolution of the former area of Soviet influence to be the most serious threats to security in East-West relations in Europe;

3. Takes the view that action should be taken against such destabilizing factors primarily by political means by working resolutely towards a pan-European process of democratic, political, economic and institutional convergence, and that a new European policy for East-West security must above all move in this direction;

4. Considers it essential that tensions be reduced by the creation of an economic, social, ecological, political and military balance and is aware that the richer and more stable parts of Europe must make a particular contribution to bring about this state of equilibrium, which in the long term will prove economically beneficial to all the states of Europe, in both East and West;

5. Further emphasizes that economic regeneration in Central and Eastern Europe is a fundamental prerequisite for maintaining peace and stability in Europe as a whole and supports, first and foremost, efforts towards the promotion of economic development in the region;

6. Regards simultaneous and balanced disarmament and arms conversion throughout Europe as a security policy priority; support must be given to arms conversion, arms production and military research throughout Europe as a
matters of urgency by providing appropriate economic compensation and subsidies;

7. Calls, therefore, on the Commission to submit as soon as possible a proposal for a regulation to implement the CONVER programme, which Parliament supported in its resolution of 29 October 1992;  

8. Calls, in particular, for the present historic opportunity for nuclear disarmament throughout Europe not to be missed;  

9. Considers that the preconditions for further significant reductions of arms and troops in Europe already exist and calls for the relevant agreements (START, CFE, NPT, etc.) to be ratified or extended and signed and observed by all countries, including newly formed countries;  

10. Stresses that in the future, too, American soldiers (if necessary 70 000) will be welcome and needed in Europe to safeguard the transatlantic partnership;  

11. Considers the desire of all European countries to participate on full and equal terms in a European security system to be entirely justified;  

12. Demands that the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) be more active in the present conflict in Europe;  

13. Nevertheless regards the CSCE as an appropriate instrument to become a regional organization of the United Nations pursuant to Chapter VIII of the UN Charter and an effective and exemplary regional security system under the United Nations;  

14. Hopes that one of the results of defining a common foreign and security policy will be that the Community speaks with one voice in the CSCE and the UN (in particular the Security Council) and helps to strengthen these organizations;  

15. Wishes to see the Community and its Member States, in the context of the CSCE, helping to strengthen and implement mechanisms for preventing and solving conflicts and for bringing about peaceful settlements of crises which would be binding on all sides, and lending political and financial support to the CSCE process to the best of their ability;  

16. Calls for the role of civilians (including those from non-governmental organizations) in conflict reduction, conflict settlement and crisis management mechanisms to be studied and tested in the context of a common foreign and security policy, and for support to be given to appropriate institutions and organizations;  

17. Calls on the European Community to commit itself at all levels to building up a common, concordant, pan-European security system within the framework of the CSCE, within which the existing structures (NATO, WEU, etc.) should be integrated; in the Mediterranean area a similar peace and security policy should be founded on a C SCM (Conference for Security and Cooperation in the Mediterranean);

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1 OJ No. C 305, 23.11.1992

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18. Calls on EPC and the Member States to take initiatives along these lines within NATO and the WEU;

19. Considers that admission to a system of this sort should be open to the countries of the former Soviet Union, provided there is evidence that they satisfy the Community's conditions;

20. Criticizes the large-scale arms sales by Russia and other countries of the former Soviet Union, which encourages an arms build-up in other regions of the world (in particular the Near East and the Middle East);

21. Regards the measures decided by the CSCE's 1992 Helsinki Summit on early warning, conflict prevention, crisis management and peaceful settlement of disputes as an important step towards improving confidence and increasing security in Europe, and hopes to see further progress in this connection in the near future;

22. Regards the early despatch of observer missions to crisis areas as very important, and takes the view that it is not sufficient to retain the consensus principle: desirable though the consensus and cooperation of the states concerned are, it must be possible to act without it under certain conditions;

23. Regards the involvement of non-governmental organizations and the resources of civil society as an important factor in a security policy designed to build confidence and preserve peace and therefore calls for these instruments to be increasingly used and supported;

24. Takes the view that effective steps should be taken in the CSCE without delay to provide appropriate training for civilian and military personnel for deployment on observer missions and in connection with measures to keep the peace, build confidence and promote dialogue;

25. Attaches the greatest importance to the further development of the peaceful settlement of disputes, inter alia by setting up bodies to act as intermediaries, conciliators and possibly arbitrators, and calls upon EPC to promote a coordinated move in this direction by the Member States in the CSCE and emphatically support appropriate proposals;

26. Welcomes the new round of negotiations on arms control, disarmament and confidence- and security-building measures decided upon by the CSCE, the planned setting-up of a new CSCE forum for security cooperation and the strengthening of the conflict prevention centre;

27. Regards the potential for conflict which may arise from tensions with an ethnic and/or national aspect and inspire a desire for ethnic cleansing as a growing and very serious threat and calls for every effort to be made to help people and ethnic groups to live together without antagonism and to promote good-neighbourliness between states, before a policy of ethnic homogenization and cleansing can wreak any further havoc in Europe;

28. Is convinced that this is an area in which the activities of non-governmental organizations can be particularly helpful in promoting inter-ethnic dialogue and cooperation and calls for systematic support for them;
29. Welcomes the appointment of a CSCE High Commissioner for National Minorities announced in Chapter II of the Helsinki Decisions; regrets, however, that his terms of reference are very narrow; hopes that the preparatory work performed at the CSCE conference of experts in Geneva in July 1991 will lead to the early adoption of common binding principles for the protection of ethnic, national and linguistic minorities and ensure that people can live together in multi-ethnic societies under just conditions; calls upon the Community to provide impetus and bring pressure to bear to this end at all levels (CSCE, Council of Europe, UN);

30. Is convinced that the establishment of a binding system of law and appropriate conciliation bodies could defuse many threats to security in this field; urges the Member States of the Council of Europe, and in particular those of the Community, to sign and ratify without delay the draft convention for a European charter of regional and minority languages which has been submitted to the Council of Europe and which has already been adopted by the Committee of Ministers;

31. Stresses the fundamental importance of impartial, non-nationalistic information in connection with confidence building and conflict prevention and calls upon the European Community to take every possible step to support such information;

32. Is convinced that a binding and monitored disarmament process and willingness to participate in a system of solving conflicts by political and legal means rather than military force are the political preconditions for full participation in an all-European security system of this sort;

33. Believes that in borderline cases where military force must be brought to bear on lawbreakers to prevent even greater violence and to secure or maintain peace, this should be carried out as an international police action, pursuant to the Charter of the United Nations, and calls on the Community and its Member States to play an appropriate role in this;

34. Wishes organizations such as NATO and the WEU to be involved as far as possible in this work;

35. Calls for a policy of convergence and burden-sharing between the various European and Euro-Atlantic institutions in the light of the above principles, and considers that institutions which have become superfluous could be wound up entirely (following the example of the Warsaw Pact);

36. Desires effective parliamentary participation in the process of pan-European security and integration, in the context of both the CSCE parliamentary Assembly and through the establishment of a permanent forum for discussion between the European Parliament and the parliaments of European countries outside the Community which desire to take part and which represent countries with which the EC has concluded agreements (on the model of the EC-ACP Joint Assembly), and advocates simplification of the various institutions working towards convergence in Europe, and more links between them;

37. Calls on the Council and Commission to take prompt and resolute action to support a pan-European security system of this sort, before the new threats become acute and the possibility of European convergence perhaps recedes again into the distance, and to draw up and put forward appropriate
proposals, and calls on EPC to coordinate and implement the policies of the Member States to this end in international bodies, particularly the UN, the CSCE, NATO and the WEU;

38. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, Commission, EPC, the United Nations, the CSCE, NATO and WEU.
1. Dissolution of the Eastern bloc, consolidation of the West

After the upheavals of 1989/90 in Central and Eastern Europe the entire security policy of Europe and the world has to be put on a new basis. Pressure from the many resistance and citizens' movements within Eastern European societies and from the West brought about the rapid collapse of the Communist system on which the Eastern bloc was based, with relatively little violence. The formal dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, the military alliance dominated by the Soviet Union which had been the Eastern bloc's security system, was a logical reaction to the new situation. The dissolution of the Soviet Union itself (late 1991) and many other changes in the pattern of Central and Eastern Europe, with the break-up of existing states and the formation of new ones, all with new constitutions and potential alliances, are part of a process whose course and outcome we cannot predict with any certainty.

What does stand out is the disintegration of the former Eastern bloc and its components, while the Western bloc and its components currently appear solid, and strong and attractive in relation to their Eastern neighbours. While the Eastern European system has fallen apart, the Western European system has strengthened, and has not dissolved any of its existing political, constitutional, alliance or military structures. Neither NATO nor the Community, nor any other Western structure in Europe (EFTA, for example, and the countries of Central and Eastern Europe) are perceptibly turning towards them, seeking anything from cooperation up to direct and full integration. All-European structures, which in the period of confrontation to some extent bridged or blurred the gap between the blocs (from the CSCE to the Council of Europe), have so far proved, despite considerable change and expansion, only partly capable of providing an attractive and effective model for pan-European integration.

It is on that basis that we shall be considering developments in East-West relations in Europe and their impact on European security.

2. What threat, and what need for security?

The security threat on which Western Europe used to concentrate its attention, came from the USSR and its power bloc. That is now a thing of the past; there is no longer a USSR, and certainly not as the dominant partner in an eastern pact system. However, new factors of uncertainty in East-West relations are beginning to emerge, in particular

- the proliferation of 'leaderless' armed forces, weapons systems scientists and technologists; in Central and Eastern Europe arms manufacturing capacity far outstrips political control; and the former Soviet troops stationed abroad present a particular problem;

- the disintegration of states and the formation of new ones, the demarcation of new spheres of influence etc. are continuing, and giving rise to friction, conflict and threats;
- nationalism, ethnic movements, border disputes, territorial claims, ancient enmities, religious and even 'racist' tensions and the like are reappearing (even in the western part of Europe) and posing a growing and rapidly spreading threat;

- Central and Eastern Europe in particular are being shaken by social deprivation, poverty, economic crisis and collapse, tensions, migration and flows of refugees;

- the environmental crisis (as a consequence of reckless industrialization, pollution, radioactive contamination, mining etc.) and increased environmental demands, as well as disputes over natural resources (e.g. water) make action to restore stability and avoid exacerbating the situation urgently necessary;

- the impact of political change in Central and Eastern Europe has also been felt in the Mediterranean, with the disappearance of old alliances and partnerships, as a result of which some governments and groupings may also become 'leaderless', giving rise to disorientation and a power vacuum etc.

Security in East-West relations in Europe will therefore no longer consist in having the best possible protection against one superpower, by a balance of terror for example. A new security policy is required.

3. Security - not an exclusively or even primarily military problem - security needs in Eastern and Western Europe

Security policy as part of East-West relations depends increasingly less on the military dimension, than on a policy of global stability (economic, social, ethnic, ecological ...), which military means are powerless to achieve. The countries of Central and Eastern Europe feel the need for security primarily against their neighbours and the successors to the former dominant power, and hope for effective integration into an all-European political and security system based on the West's past experience and structures (NATO, Community, etc.). They would be prepared to relinquish much of their defence production and make the corresponding savings, and are perhaps in some cases looking to be paid to do so. The Western Europeans feel the need for security primarily against the process of disintegration in the East and its impact on Europe as a whole (particularly in certain regions) and would like to protect themselves towards the East and South against destabilization and possible threats. To some degree they would be prepared for a more European and less Atlanticist security policy.

Ethnic, national, religious and/or 'racially' driven conflicts are rapidly growing in importance, difficulties raised by co-existence are preferably resolved by ethnic cleansing and the highest possible degree of homogeneity (which encourages xenophobia, intolerance and exclusivism), new lines of demarcation are being drawn, expulsions planned, put to the test or even effected, living alongside people of different ethnic origin is considered an imposition. Those who feel strong enough seek revenge for the deprivation of ethnic rights and the oppression they have suffered in the past. It was significant how many of the heads of state or government who spoke at the final CSCE conference in Helsinki (9/10 July 1992) gave vent to their concern at this situation, but also reacted strangely in some respects.
4. Possible solutions

Among the lines security policy might take there are theoretically several alternatives, which might be summed up as follows:

(a) the West could attempt largely to assimilate the East: this could mean simply attaching the states of Central and Eastern Europe to the West for security purposes. The unification of Germany, in which this course was adopted, is an example of this option.

However desirable this is thought to be by some in the East and perhaps also in the West, it would be not only very difficult to achieve (in economic, political and military terms) but also of doubtful value: while some tensions would be eliminated, others would emerge, and it would once again deprive the peoples of Central and Eastern Europe of the independence they had been deprived of for so long;

(b) the West could seek to develop a security policy for its own territory, which treated the East primarily as a glacis: a second-class security status for Central and Eastern European partner countries could be introduced, and they could be given at most observer status on the various competent bodies;

(c) a fundamental aim of pan-European political integration could be adopted, i.e. the countries of Central and Eastern Europe could be offered a promising and not too distant process of integration in which East and West converged at several levels and developed common structures (involving not only CSCE but also the Community). In this case security policy would become a joint concern.

The third option is preferable and most likely to offer lasting prospects of balance and stability. It would be part of a policy of Community expansion throughout Europe and the corresponding changes to the Community's fabric. The importance of intermediate stages such as the North Atlantic Cooperation Council would vary according to the direction the process was going in; associate or observer status as a consolation prize for not being allowed full participation would not be the same as if it were a step towards convergence.

At all events priority has to be given to drastic and sustained disarmament and conversion of industry and research, not restricted to the East, and in the NBC field in particular. It may be worth financially encouraging or even paying for this process in Central and Eastern Europe, as it is in our obvious security interest. Many Central and Eastern European countries would find their economic interests very much affected if they cut back their arms output and exports.

A broad process of demilitarization could help produce greater security. It would however have to be accompanied by non-military machinery for resolving conflict, if strength or brutality were not to prevail. Since the November 1990 Paris conference efforts have been made within the CSCE to this end, and some machinery of this kind is being tried out (especially in respect of conflicts between states, and ethnic group and minority problems). Progress is at present very slow, but the need has been widely recognized. On a recent (May 1992) visit to Estonia President Mitterrand clearly advocated strengthening the CSCE progress and the establishment of a code of conduct for all its members, possibly to lead to a genuine multilateral security treaty at some later date. And the CSCE summit conference held in Helsinki on 9/10 July 1992 and attended
by 51 heads of state or government took some new steps towards the establishment of a CSCE forum for security cooperation.

Political incorporation in Europe as a whole requires the Community to adopt a pan-European approach and an increasingly European rather than Atlanticist security policy.

The political and not just geographical definition of the eastern and southern borders of Europe is still an open question.

The Community can reasonably be expected to work out a plan and then take political steps to implement it; what we have outlined here is to be considered as a proposal put forward by Parliament for debate within the Community.

5. Ethnic conflicts

Now that the division of Europe into two opposing political and military blocs has been overcome, numerous ethnic conflicts are breaking out, particularly in the eastern and south-eastern parts of the continent. They are a mixture of constructive and destructive elements, from the reawakening of suppressed ethnic or national identities to resistance to enforced modernization and internationalism and even to xenophobia, intolerance, a chauvinistic need to make up lost ground and feelings of resentment.

The desire for ethnic exclusivity - and nationhood, wherever possible - is mobilizing strong and destabilizing forces, posing a potential threat to security. All the more importance must therefore be attached to any policy of ethnic balance and co-existence. Legal and political measures to preserve and gain acceptance for human, ethnic and minority rights, mediation, arbitration, the recognition of autonomy and self-government, etc. - like those being prepared and agreed, in particular, within the CSCE and Council of Europe - are playing a major role, and the example set by the EC and the western part of Europe in this respect may also have an important part to play.

6. Security through conflict prevention

There is a growing awareness that conflict prevention can remove many difficulties and tensions. For this the CSCE in particular has established a new, still weak, but promising set of instruments: early recognition and warning, observer missions, discussions among senior officials or foreign ministers, crisis management, etc. Security in relations between the western and eastern parts of Europe will largely depend on the success of these measures. It is therefore in the interests of everyone, including the EC, to ensure that the structures and mechanisms being developed for this purpose have support, resources and authority.

7. The role of the non-governmental organizations (NGOs)

The less the maintenance of peace and security are seen as purely military tasks and the more they depend on an economic, social, ethnic, ecological and political balance being struck, the more effectively the public and non-governmental organizations can and must be involved. 'Diplomacy from below' does not mean making ministers, generals and diplomats redundant. But the more frequent and intensive the twinning of towns, meetings, inter-ethnic friendship initiatives, cross-border contacts, exchanges of young people, cultural links, impartial, critical information, etc. become, the more likely it is that the
potential for conflict will disappear as confidence grows. The CSCE therefore had good reason to devote a separate chapter to this subject.

8. The CSCE as a framework

The CSCE summit conference held in Helsinki in 1992 showed that, despite some expectations or fears, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe is seen by all concerned - from the leading powers to countries that have only recently become independent and sovereign - as an important and useful framework for a common security policy. This was clearly indicated by presidents and heads of government from Bush to Mitterrand, from Yeltsin, Major and Kohl to Shevardnaze and Vranitzky: for Eastern Europe the Helsinki Conference was the first major 'welcoming event', at which all the new states were represented; for the whole of Europe (and the USA and Canada, and even Japan, present at Finland's invitation) it was the first opportunity to appear in its new form. The Paris Charter of 1990 was signed by 34 countries - the final Helsinki document bears 51 signatures ('Yugoslavia' was not admitted as such).

9. Possible steps in this direction

Possible steps in the direction outlined in this report include:

- eliminating military factors of uncertainty, including nuclear weapons, the removal of which from Europe as a whole is now on the agenda; conventional weapon and force reductions; a policy of not transferring nuclear weapons; pan-European coordination of arms control and arms exports;

- setting up a system of political security guarantees for all participants throughout Europe, making it possible and attractive to shed military potential;

- promoting conflict-preventing and conflict-resolving institutions to cope with any problems arising from tensions with an ethnic and/or nationalistic slant, minority questions, border disputes, etc; at its recent meetings the CSCE has made considerable progress at the various levels;

- greater involvement of non-governmental organizations, social forces capable of peace-making and dialogue and organizations close to the public in measures in the areas of peace policy and confidence-building;

- a definite policy of social and ecological balance between the Western and Eastern halves of Europe, embodying the constraints and self-restraint by the West that it entails; effective cooperation and economic aid to partners in Central and Eastern Europe, joint prevention of environmental disasters and the removal of gross environmental damage are also a highly important aspect of security policy;

- the dismantling of the alliances inherited from the period of confrontation and which have not yet been stood down, in favour of a pan-European security treaty and system in which all our partners in Central and Eastern Europe can play a full and equal part;

- hence, a pronounced Europeanization of security policy, although still with links to the USA and Canada, for which the CSCE offers a framework; the development of a common European security policy in the Mediterranean area...
via a CSCM (Conference for Security and Cooperation in the Mediterranean) process;

- a policy of linkage and a comprehensive division of labour between the Community and other European institutions such as the CSCE and the Council of Europe rather than between the Community and NATO; placing existing alliance structures (NATO and the WEU) within a joint pan-European security system under the CSCE;

- a policy of pan-European integration, open to the successors to the Soviet Union in particular, if they so wish and if they qualify;

- the inauguration - in which the Community should play a part - of a pan-European parliamentary forum (e.g. a joint parliamentary assembly comprising the EP and the parliaments of the non-members, possibly on the pattern of the EEC-ACP Joint Assembly) and linkage to relevant similar parliamentary institutions (parliamentary assemblies of the Council of Europe and CSCE).
MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION (B3-1050/91)
pursuant to Rule 63 of the Rules of Procedure
by Mr POETTERING and Mr SAKELLARIOU

on developments in East-West relations in Europe and their implications for
European security

The European Parliament,

A. having regard to the Paris Charter for a New Europe signed on 21 November
1990 by the heads of government of the 34 CSCE States,

B. whereas the recent reduction in political and military antagonisms between
East and West in Europe has opened the door to economic, political and
security cooperation between the nations of Europe,

C. whereas the governments and peoples of Europe look to the CSCE process for
a decisive contribution to détente, guarantees of peace, disarmament, and
security, especially in Europe,

D. whereas the European Community has to be the cornerstone of the new
arrangements in Europe, and must evolve into Political Union,

1. Considers that a searching appraisal of, and detailed proposals on, the
reshaping and development of European security, action to encourage security
cooperation in Europe and the establishment of comprehensive European
security structures are necessary;

2. Calls on the institutions of the European Community and the organizations
and institutes concerned with security matters to study closely the scope
for reshaping and developing security relations in Europe and to propose
appropriate political guidelines.