To Whom Do the Baltics Belong? Jennifer Moll University of Cambridge, Pembroke College Centre for International Studies jmoll02@yahoo.com Prepared for the European Union Studies Association Bi-Annual Conference March 27 - 29, 2003 Still a work in progress, please do not cite. Comments greatly appreciated! To Whom Do the Baltics Belong? After the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, the world community prepared itself for what would follow - would Europe and the new Russian Federation be poised for a new era of cooperation or for their next round of conflict? A microcosm of EU-Russian relations took the form of the Russophone and Russian minorities in Estonia. While the leaders and citizens of the Russian Federation were keen to protect their friends and family trapped outside the Russian borders, human rights have been one of the key foci of a European identity. If there ever existed the potential for cooperation between the European Union and Russia, the issue of minority Russian rights in Estonia could have been the shining example for future cooperation. Instead, both the EU and Russia tried to lure the Baltics into their camp, causing an intense rivalry initially that finally dissolved when Russia was forced to admit that Estonia had moved towards the EU. These rivalries highlighted the differences between the West and the East, placing Estonia as the new border between the two. During the previous division between West and East, the Bolsheviks and Soviets moved into the territories of Central Asia as well as Eastern and Central Europe en masse. This attempt at colonization left more than 25 million ethnic Russians outside the borders of the motherland when the Soviet Union collapsed. In the decade that has lapsed since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the degree of interconnectedness between national identity and security has been exposed. The Russian Federation wants its former satellites to be included in its own sphere of influence, negating their independence and sovereignty. The Baltic states, however, quickly demonstrated a strong desire to drop Russia and what was perceived as the residual elements of Soviet identity, and move towards Europe. Not only do these states have the weakest connections with Moscow militarily, politically, and economically, but they are trying to rebuff their cultural and ethnic connections as well in pursuit of a new European identity. Although grouped together politically by the Russian term 'Pribaltika' under the Soviet Union, each of the Baltic states remains distinct; the purpose of this paper is not to try to lump the three together as if they lacked a distinct history, culture and identity. In fact, frequently the Baltics are unified only in their fearful stance against Russia. At the end of the 1980s, the Baltics united in their struggles for independence from the Soviet Union in order to increase their potential of success. The Western community was galvanized in August 1989 by the 'Baltic Chain' and the common cry of Estonians, Latvians, and Lithuanians for 'freedom.' Indeed, Mare Haab asserts, 'The almost theatrical expression of their common political aspirations became the hallmark of pre-independence Baltic unity and significantly contributed to the external perception that the three countries acted as a singular political unit' (Haab 1998, 3). Although united in a common goal, the means to that end were rarely similar; commonalities focused the world's attention on the threats posed by Russia and the Soviet Union and earned the Baltics support from the West. Russification, heavy militarization of the Baltics, and tense rhetoric on both sides have contributed to the near-unquestioned fear and mistrust of Russia. Similarly, the stories of Baltic relations with Russia differ: The domestic policies of Estonia and Latvia, where resident aliens comprise nearly a third of the population, have earned cries from the Russian government on behalf of its comrades abroad. Lithuania on the other hand incorporated its smaller minority Russian population after independence in order to focus on the unique problems resulting from its neighbor, Kaliningrad. Because Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania have different concerns vis-a-vis the Russian Federation, this paper will examine the relations between the EU, the Russian Federation, and the Republic of Estonia in order to answer the question, 'To Whom Do the Baltics Belong?'. I feel that it is better to speak of specific events and ideas instead of generalize for an entire region. As my primary focus, Estonia can speak both to the experiences of Latvia and Lithuania and to the other soon-to-be EU member states, and provides insights into how Russia might react to the changing nature of Central and Eastern Europe. Furthermore, Russian - EU relations will change when states previously part of the Soviet Union join these organizations. Estonia and the other Baltic states will soon be the gatekeepers between Russia and the West; the internal ramifications of this new position will be extraordinarily important for the future success of the EU and the Baltics themselves, as well as the stability of the entire region. Since 1994, the foreign policy of Estonia has been centered on the premise that the Soviet occupation was illegal. Accordingly, the 500,000 ethnic Russians who represent Soviet attempts at neo-colonization and who continue to inhabit Estonia have been treated harshly. Fearing threats to the security of Estonian state and society, the policies of the Russian state are frequently deemed to represent the sympathies of ethnic Russians. Russia has protested the treatment of ethnic Russians and has asserted its duty to protect, by force if necessary, the rights of Russians living outside its territory in nearly every major document relating to foreign policy. On the other side, the European Union, having acknowledged that a framework for the protection of individual and minority rights is integral to a stable Europe, has also exerted pressure on Estonia. The EU's success in pressuring Estonia has benefitted the treatment of the minority population, while Russian pressures initially only facilitated Estonia's equation of foreign threats in the form of an aggressive nationalist Russia with internal threats in the form of non-Estonians. The common focus of the EU and Russia begs the question, have EU-Russian relations changed since the Baltics announced their desire to accede to the Union? By examining official documents and statements of foreign policy elites, I will show that although a common focus exists, the EU and Russia have not worked together. The European Union views Eastern Europe as its region to influence, and has had much success doing so, directly countering Russian beliefs that Russia has a distinct mandate over its 'near abroad.' In the first few years of independence, there was a direct relationship between Estonian perceptions of an increasingly hostile Russian threat and Estonia's desire for integration. As Estonia has solidified its turn to the West, Russia increasingly felt the need to acknowledge the reality of the situation and pursue plans more realistic and beneficial for Russia. Russia therefore has attempted to influence Estonian policies multilaterally since the late 1990s. The Estonian Perspective About the time of the Russian Revolution, the slogan of the Estonian writers' circle Noor-Eesti (Young Estonia) was, 'Let's remain Estonians but also become Europeans' (Taagepera 1993, p.37). This dream was soon crushed by Bolshevik, then Nazi, and finally Soviet occupations, but was reborn with Estonian independence in 1991. Not long after achieving independence, the Estonian government vocalized its desire to join both the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU). Still worried by the threat emanating from the troubled Russian Federation, Estonia decided that the best way to protect the Estonian identity, language and culture as well as its sovereignty was to join these powerful Western international organizations. Estonia is the world's smallest continental nation-state with its own distinct language and fully-developed modern culture based on that language. Estonians live on the same grounds as their ancestors did 5000 years ago, and although issues of Estonian national identity and security have persisted since then, they have continually evolved. Today, Russia's foreign policy is seen as one of the main external threats to state sovereignty, while ethnic Russians are seen as internal threats to both Estonian society and the state. For these reasons, Russia is identified as the primary 'other' in Estonian national identity discourse. Furthermore, the banter going on between Russia and Estonia serve to entrench identity and security issues, making both feel less secure with the policies and stance of their neighbor. Many Estonians agree with Paul Goble's suggestion that there was an implicit contract between the Russian nation and the Soviet Union. Under this contract, the Russian nation agreed to surrender its national culture in return for a multinational Union guaranteeing Russian preeminence and an enhancement of Russia's great power status that it enjoyed under the tsars. Taagepera argues, 'Russification was very much a central goal in non-Russian areas within the borders of the USSR and at times even overruled the goals of socialism' (107). Among many other facets of Soviet life, Estonians can illustrate the supremacy of the Russian culture under the Soviet Union with the statistic that had the pace of Russification continued, it would have led to minority status for Estonians within another ten years and to the extinction of the Estonian language within a generation (Smith 2001, Taagepera 1993). The desire to downplay all Soviet or Russian aspects of society has led Estonia to seek membership in the EU. Identity themes are replayed in the pursuit of integration not only as the way to reclaim Estonia's roots in European culture but also as a fundamental prerequisite for the continued existence of all things Estonian. In this context, the answer is simple - Estonia belongs to the Estonians, but political elites feel most comfortable tying themselves to the West, through the EU for example, to secure Estonia from the East. In today's globalizing world of interdependence, it is no longer possible to achieve the full independence that Estonia enjoyed in the 1920s and 30s. Instead, Estonia had two choices after re-gaining independence: stay with a stunted East or re-join a stable, prosperous and powerful Europe. Although Russia expressed its desire for the USSR's satellites to be included in a Russian-led community, Estonia aligned with the West to secure its sovereign independence, eschewing any participation in a Russian sphere of influence. In an attempt to pursue a European identity, Estonia has disregarded its recent cultural and ethnical connections with Russia and has since been struggling with the ideas of a 'nation' and a 'state.' Indeed, as Peter van Ham argues, while the Soviet Union survived for 70 years as a state but without a coherent and unified 'nation,' the Baltics are each attempting to re-create a 'state' based on a historically united 'nation.' Van Ham's argument illustrates Estonia's contemporary domestic and international problems of identity and hails from Ferdinand Toennies's thesis that distinguishes gemeinschaft and gesellschaft. According to Toennies, gemeinschaft is created from a shared sense of belonging based on loyalties, norms, values, kinship, language, and ethnicity; gesellschaft on the other hand holds that people remain individuals but may join larger groups to profit society. In simplified terms, the battle between gemeinschaft and gesellschaft in Estonia has coalesced in a surge of linguistic and ethnic nationalism at the same time that civic nationalism demands unification with the West for political, economic, and security gains. The Problems of Russophones and Ethnic Russians in Estonia Because Estonia's first priority was to ensure its national security, closer contacts with the West were seen as the only viable solution to the threat posed by Russia. Extrapolating the threat posed by the Russian state to all Russians, Estonia embarked on a nation- and state- building programme that emphasized the Estonian language, culture and society, and thus inherently excluded the Russian minority. Although the Estonian government has signed the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, the protection it grants is restricted only to citizens. Problems persist in Estonia because of the high levels of separation between the Estonian and Russian communities. Roughly 178,000 persons, or 13 percent of the entire population are still without Estonian citizenship (2001 Regular Report on Estonia's Progress Towards Accession). By basing its policies on a return to independence instead of on the creation of a new state, Estonia demonstrated its desire to begin with a system that had been interrupted 50 years earlier. This decision implied that only interwar citizens and their descendants were true citizens, an implication that was hardened by the reinstatement of the 1938 Law on Citizenship. Others were deemed to be foreigners and thus eligible to apply for naturalization after two years of residence, a loyalty oath to the Estonian Republic, a demonstration of competence in the Estonian language, and a one-year wait for citizenship after applying. These policies left 28 percent of the entire population of Estonia unable to obtain automatic citizenship; by 1997, only five percent of those had gained citizenship (N rgaard et al 1999, 158). Although the original citizenship laws were relaxed within a few years, partly in response to European advice (Hiden and Salmon 1994, 190), and are now in accordance with international standards, Russophone insecurity and alienation has remained high. Language problems continue to directly threaten Russian speakers. A ban on the use of minority languages on public signs, even in areas predominately Russian, slashes the minority's independence. Additionally, the Estonian government is set to scale back Russian language education in 2007. Citizenship presupposes and demands a fairly high level of fluency in the Estonian language as well. According to the United Nations Development Program's 1999 survey, '50 - 70 percent of stateless adults are not, in their opinion, able to fulfil the language requirements.' In a brutish display of linguistic-centrism, all place names are required to be written in Estonian, a language that uses the Latin alphabet. Because all names must also be written in the Estonian-Latin alphabet, a Russian's patronymic may not be used. Additionally, the use of textbooks printed in the Russian Federation is unofficially prohibited. A good knowledge of Estonian continues to be required for political candidacy and employment as well. While official correspondence in Russian is generally tolerated, 'the central government has twice rejected an appeal by the city of Sillam„e (95 percent Russian speaking) to use Russian officially as an internal working language.' It is widely argued that Estonia's Russians are the principal 'losers' of independence and statistics show that the average rates of unemployment among the Russian population are higher than those of Estonians, precisely because of exclusive language laws (Smith 2001, Lieven 1993, Vetik 1993, Estonian Yearbook 1998). Ethnic Russians have often been portrayed by the media as illegitimate and inferior inhabitants who inherently threaten Estonians, the innocent victims of history. Russians are not frequently vindicated as the Estonian Law on Language restricts the volume of Russian broadcast to approximately 45 minutes of programming and 15 minutes of Russian language news daily. Not only does the Estonian media vilify ethnic Russians, it does not provide Russians with adequate knowledge of current events and programming which ethnic Estonians take for granted. These problems also serve to enhance the mistrust of ethnic Russians for the Estonian state. These tensions prompted Anatol Lieven in 1993 to remark, 'In the Russian- populated Estonian town of Narva, the statue of Lenin still stands, not because of positive enthusiasm even among former Communist authorities, but purely as a visible sign of opposition to the "nationalist" government in Tallinn' (175). Restricted access to citizenship, voting, language rights, and jobs continue to limit the rights of the Russian minority, but there has been much progress as well, largely because of pressures from Europe. The Accession Partnership between Estonia and the EU that was signed on 13 November 2001 largely praises Estonia's progress, asking the Estonian government to 'continue the integration of non-citizens.' Although the 2001 Regular Report highlights such problems as a decreasing rate of nationalization, an estimated population of 30-40,000 illegal residents, and an Aliens Act which sets the immigration quota at .05 percent of the population of permanent residents, the Committee concluded, 'The rights of the Russian minority continue to be largely observed and safe-guarded' (2001 Regular Report on Estonia's Progress Towards Accession). This is no small feat for a state that hosts the largest colony of Russians living outside of Russia. The Russian Threat and Estonian Desires for Integration In the first few years of Estonian independence, Russian foreign policy documents and policy elites regularly pressured Estonia. Confused by its new role and identity, Russia wanted to build a community of former USSR satellites. 'Russia's relations with the three small Baltic states are important because Russo-Baltic relations are becoming a symbol and a barometer of the struggle of the former Soviet republics to gain full independence from Russia' (Fadeyev and Razuvayev 1994, 114). Embarrassed by its reduced size and power, Russians were distraught and felt betrayed by the fact that the Baltics wanted very little to do with them; nationalists hoped to use the situation of Russians in Estonia to enhance Russian power. Fear, first of the Soviet Union and then of its successor, the Russian Federation, has been prevalent in an Estonia that has not always seen a clear differentiation between the two. Indeed, many in Estonia have 'always used "Soviet" and "Russian" as synonyms and usually preferred the second term. . . [this] mixture, always quite common in imprecise everyday language, now became a cornerstone of policy' (Semjonov 2002, 109). Russia's residual interests in the Baltics, carried over from the Soviet era, include the necessity of peaceful relations on Russia's Western borders, access to the Baltic Sea, a basic agreement on the Kaliningrad issue, and the protection of Russian minorities in the Baltic states. These interests have allowed Russia 'an excuse' to take an active and vocal interest in Baltic affairs. Fear, mistrust, and the desire to further move towards Europe and away from Russia was reinforced by the clumsy documents and speeches of Russian foreign policy elites. It cannot be forgotten that while Soviet forces stormed the TV tower in Vilnius, Yeltsin was meeting with Estonian and Latvian heads of state to sign agreements whereby any person living on the territory of Estonia, Latvia, or Russia at the time of signing had the right to receive or retain citizenship based on his free will (Kolst 2002, 210). Following independence, however, Estonia quickly enacted the exclusive laws detailed earlier. Fearing that the large Russian minority increased Estonia's vulnerability, nationalism rose. Insulted, the Russian government felt that they had been betrayed for political expediency, and as a result, Moscow has questioned the value of further negotiations and Baltic follow-through. For these reasons, Moscow quickly linked the improvement of living conditions for ethnic Russians with the withdrawal of Soviet/Russian troops and with an agreement on the Estonian-Russian border. After gaining independence, Estonians 'neither had access to information concerning the number of Soviet troops, nor had control of their airspace' (N rgaard et al 1999, 186). Although by the summer of 1992, Russian troops were in a gradual pattern of withdrawal, Yeltsin signed a decree on 29 October 1992 unilaterally suspending the withdrawal of Russian troops until the time that a formal conclusion was made; the rights of Russian minorities was a precondition for that conclusion. This suspension humiliated the Baltic states, who were now forced to have foreign troops on their territory, compromising their sovereignty and popular support with images of past occupations. Yeltsin's show of power bolstered Estonian fears of an expansionist and aggressive Russia. The border issue is not only a practical issue, it is also a highly emotional one for many Estonians because it is tied to the 1939 Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact that allowed the Soviet Union to annex the three Baltic States. Unfortunately, Russia is still unwilling to accept what happened on the verge of World War II because its acceptance would renounce Russia's current borders and simultaneously confirm the 1920 Tartu Peace Treaty, increasing the size of Estonia and decreasing Russia's western territories. For Estonians, a Russian renunciation of the pact would be a proclamation of goodwill, a promise that Russia would not again violate Estonian sovereignty. Denied incessantly since Baltic annexation, it was again repeated in January 1998 when Russia's Deputy Foreign Minister, Alexandr Avdeev, sent an official note to the Russian State Duma arguing that the Soviet Union did not annex the Baltic states by force in 1940 (N rgaard et al 1999, 184). Vladimir Zhirinovsky's stunning success in the December 1993 elections further alarmed Russia's neighbors. Zhirinovsky campaigned on a platform that belittled Yeltsin for allowing the humiliation and mistreatment of ethnic Russians. Domestically, the fact that 'Estonia's 80,000 Russian citizens . . . voted predominately for the Communist candidate in the July 1996 presidential elections (77% of the votes cast),' demonstrated the tensions between the disenfranchised Russian minority population and the enfranchised Estonian population (van Ham 1998, 28). Fearful of what might happen should Russia elect a communist, many Estonians simply had to reflect on the history of the past fifty years. A renunciation could have assuaged fears, but instead, Russian foreign policy elites continued to deny Baltic annexation. Zhirinovsky's appeal to nationalist sentiments resulted in increasingly xenophobic and nationalistic sentiments along the Estonian-Russian border areas. In February 1994, two months after Zhirinovsky's electoral success, Russian foreign policy was described by the Estonian Parliament as betraying 'deepening imperialist tendencies' (Hiden and Salmon 1994, 192). Unwilling to incorporate even more Russians, who were increasingly nationalistic, into Estonian territory and eager to move on, Estonia abandoned all territorial demands on Russia in December 1994 and later abandoned earlier demands of references to the Tartu Treaty in a future border treaty with Russia. After the EU had put considerable pressure on Estonia to develop good neighbor relations with Russia, Estonia thought that abandoning these demands would be a good show of its 'Europeanness.' Today, the border is clearly demarcated, and is only awaiting Russian political will for ratification. Estonia's position in world politics and against Russia specifically was enhanced by a US Senate amendment in July 1994 that promised to block aid to Russia if troops were not withdrawn from the Baltics by the end of August. A breakthrough occurred on July 26, 1994 when Yeltsin and Estonian President Meri 'signed two agreements, one of which provided for the withdrawal of the Russian Army from Estonia by 31 August that year, the other extending the rights of Estonian citizens to the 10,700 military pensioners' (N rgaard et al 1999, 188). This huge foreign policy success increased Baltic self-confidence and reinforced the already dominant position that Estonia could only be secured by Western integration. In The Key Tenets of the Concept of Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation issued by the Russian Security Council in April 1993, two main objectives were established with regard to the 'near abroad:' to attain control over former Soviet territory and to deny 'outsiders' a strategic position on that territory (Tenets). Additionally, The Basic Provisions of the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation, released in November 1993, argued that the defense of Russian minorities in the 'near abroad' was a task for the Russian military. The doctrine also argues that the territorial claims of other states on Russian territory is one of the 'basic existing and potential sources of external military danger for the Russian Federation' (section 2.1). Fears of further Russian interventions in Estonia were increased by Russian analyses that promoted the idea of using Russians in the former Soviet Union to ensure Russia's great power status. Although the Baltics are not officially included in Russia's 'near abroad,' as it includes only members of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), policies like Sergei Karaganov's, have unofficially drawn the Baltics into both Russia's sphere of influence and its 'near abroad.' Karaganov openly advocated the idea of using compatriots abroad as fifth columnists in the post-Soviet space. In 1995, Estonian fears intensified when Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev threatened the use of military force in defense not only of Russian citizens living abroad, but also of 'compatriots,' or all Russians regardless of citizenship (Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 19 June 1995). Additionally, Kozyrev, Defense Minister Pavel Grachev, and Sergei Stankevich, among many others, are famous for making harsh statements concerning the situation of Russians in the Baltic states, utilizing such aggressive terms as 'apartheid' and 'ethnic cleansing.' These off-the-cuff remarks led many in Estonia to wonder the extent and prevalence of hatred for Estonia that is harbored by Russia's elites. Surely, much of this sentiment hails from Russia's embarrassment in regards to its current size. Knowing this, the government has tried to focus on strategies and issues which will create unity, such as those of territorial integrity and universal respect for Russia, its heritage, and people. In this way, the national security doctrines have united the survival of Russia with the identity of Russian culture. Indeed, nationalist purposes have been served by such comments. Valerii Dementev's 1996 article further concerned Estonia. After pointing out the strategic position of the Baltic states and their waters, Dementev claimed that 'the Baltic states (Pribaltika) is one of the most explosive regions in regards to the risk of new "hot beds" of conflicts with the use of Russian military forces' (Dementev quoted in Jonson 1998, 127). Still identified with the Soviet Union, Russia and its expansionist ideology have repeatedly been the prime motivators for Estonia's turn to Europe. Statements such as those previously mentioned only serve to highlight the possibility that Russia would attempt to restore its 'great power status' through military meanings and at the expense of Estonian sovereignty and increase Estonia's insecurity. Furthermore, Russia continues to be linked to the Soviet Union because so many of today's contemporary political elite were also elites in the Communist Party. Russia remains an unstable and unpredictable power that utilizes its instability to threaten Estonia and the other Baltics. Indeed, while Russian rhetoric cannot match the reality of what it is currently able to do, Estonians still fear a desperate attempt to solidify Russian power both in the present and future. Not only are Estonia's sovereignty and identity threatened by Russia, but so too is its economy. Until Russian troops withdrew, their presence deterred many foreign investors at a time when Yeltsin was actively promoting foreign investment in Russia. The troubled relationship has been exacerbated by Estonia's continued reliance on the Russian economy for raw material imports. Russian transit provides the single largest source of Estonia's hard currency, about $300 million annually (Pikayev 1998, 140). To further demonstrate the seriousness of its claims after Estonia refused to grant further concessions to Soviet military pensioners residing in Estonia, not only did Russia refuse to grant Estonia the preferential tariffs allotted to other former Soviet republics, it doubled the duty on Estonian imports to 60% (Smith 2001, 163). Placed in a dependent relationship by Russian raw material imports and the difficulty of exporting to the West, a circular relationship has evolved whereby economic hardships in Estonia are blamed on Russian policies aimed at harming Estonia. In retaliation, some Estonian parties toughen their policy towards the Russian minority, further angering Russia, and so on and so on. In all fairness, Russia's ability to influence events in Estonia was minimal at best because of their common history of fear, mistrust, and abuse. While Russia's aggressiveness in asserting its 'right' to interfere in Estonian sovereignty did not help either state, neither did Estonia's zeal to demonstrate its independence from Russia. Emotionally charged rhetoric, such as occurs when Estonian politicians compared contemporary Russian foreign policy with that of Hitler, or when Estonian parliamentarians issued a statement in 1995 in support of secessionist Chechnya further complicate an already bedeviled relationship (N rgaard et al 1999, 193). The EU's Impact on Estonian Policies After the collapse of the Soviet Union, both Europe and the US were keen to re- incorporate the Baltic states into Europe, and to destroy the unnatural borders that were drawn by the Iron Curtain. Taking advantage of a weakened Russia, both the US and the European Community actively courted the Baltics, drawing them from Russia's sphere of influence into their own. Indeed, Lieven asserts, 'The West is involved in the attempt to extract the Baltic states from Russia's sphere of influence, by putting pressure on Moscow to withdraw its troops and by aiding the Baltics to strengthen their economies and escape dependence on those of Russia and the rest of the former Union' (1993, 376). Unlike the struggle against Russia, Estonia's elite was all-too-eager to acquiesce in a return to Europe, as incorporation into the EU would make 'Russia's behaviour towards the Baltic states indistinguishable from its behaviour towards the EU as a whole, thereby ending Moscow's current pretensions to establish a sphere of influence over the area' (Smith 2001, 171). Securing the Estonian state and people from the historic geopolitical threat from Russia became the primary goal immediately after re-securing independence. While still debating whether Estonia will be the 'bridge' between the West and Russia or whether it will be one of the states lining the 'barrier' between the two, Estonian politicians eagerly courted the West. After it became clear that NATO would not extend membership quickly, the Baltic states turned to the EU. The extent of the EU's influence on Estonia was evident by 1995. For Estonia, the EU was a logical goal given its impeccable history of protecting small states. Estonians still weary of a highly federal system sided with a small loss of national sovereignty for all the perks that would result. Although not as valued in terms of 'hard' security, the EU is valued as a provider of 'soft' security and as a means to decrease Baltic dependency on the Russian economy and increase economic prosperity. Mare Haab asserts, 'The European Union (EC initially), has been associated with the term "existential security' i.e., a means for establishing the economic and political conditions necessary for the increased well-being and stability of the people' (1998, 9). The return to Europe is not only desirable for state and societal security, accession into the EU will prove to the world that Estonia is a prosperous, democratic, and stable state -- a member of Europe, and thus only at home in Europe. The Estonian Government asserts, 'Estonia's accession to the European Union is fostered by historical ties and common values, political as well as economic reasons' (History and Principles 2003). After independence, Estonia quickly revived previous relations with the Nordic states and modeled its modernization programs on Finland's policies. Once Sweden and Finland became EU member in 1995, Estonian desires for EU integration solidified. From then on, Estonia also benefitted from heavy Nordic lobbying in their favor. Estonia was also eager to broaden trade relationships with Finland to other EU member states: in 1991, just over two percent of Estonia's imports and exports were traded with Finland, in 1995, over 35 percent of Estonia's imports were from Finland and Finland bought 20% of its exports (Pikayev 1998, 139-140). The European Community promptly recognized Estonian independence in August 1991 and furthered Estonia's goals with the proclamation, 'It is now time after more than 50 years that these [Baltic] states resume their rightful place among the nations of Europe' (quoted in Hiden and Salmon 1994, 189). At the end of 1991, Phare was extended to Estonia, which bolstered the fledgling Estonian economy and gave the Estonians confidence that they would not be left dangling alone on the periphery of Europe. Economic concerns quickly dashed to the forefront of Estonian reasons for EU integration because, from the Estonian perspective, integration promised ease in attracting foreign investment, a future of incorporation instead of marginalization, and prosperity. In December 1993, the European Union adopted the Copenhagen criteria for the accession of candidate states, which included democratic institutions, a market economy, the ability to take on EU laws, and the respect for and protection of minority rights as requirements for accession. Estonia, aspiring to resemble the West, had quickly embarked on policies to enhance democratization, a stable market economy, and security, so the Copenhagen criteria gave the Estonian government yet another excuse to pursue these policies. 'Furthermore, as the issue of security is linked to integration into the institutions of the West, economic development and a democratic polity became preconditions for increased security' (N rgaard et al 1999, 3). Just as Estonia has felt the pressure from Moscow to improve the situation of Russian minorities, the EU also acknowledged that domestic problems for accession states with the Russian minority would cause all involved to have strained relations with Moscow. Estonia benefitted from Western Europe's belief that an expanded common market would keep the EU competitive. On January 1, 1995, the Free Trade Agreement between the EU and Estonia became fully operational, and in June of that year, Estonia signed its Association Agreement with the EU. Together, these agreements distanced Estonia economically from Russia and provided some stability in trade. Suffering from a dependence on a fragile Russia that tried to keep Estonian commodities out, and unable to compete with the quality of EU goods, Estonia was eager for these agreements to stay competitive in a globalizing world. Estonia has viewed its economic policy as a means to disentangle itself from the centralized Soviet system. The Russian financial crisis of 1998 damaged the Estonian economy and highlighted Estonia's desire to gain access to the economic benefits associated with membership in the world's largest trading bloc as quickly as possible. Estonia is also eager to become the primary bridge linking Russian raw material exports with western consumer and manufactured goods. Seriously concerned by 'the preference of Moscow for military rather than political settlement' with the situation in Chechnya, Estonia solidified its turn to Europe when it submitted its application for membership in late November 1995 (Archer 2000, 17). The 1995 Madrid Summit produced reports in 1997 that analyzed each candidate's readiness for accession. Estonia's hard work had paid off when it was announced at the 1997 Luxembourg Summit that Estonia, the only Baltic state, would be in the first round of accession negotiations. After NATO had made it clear it was not ready for a new wave of member states, Estonia's first foreign policy priority was to ensure EU accession. Estonia began its negotiations on March 31, 1998 and subsequently formed its own position for implementation of the acquis communitaire. Estonia successfully concluded its accession negotiations at the Copenhagen Summit on December 13, 2002. For many, this 'symbolized the final break with Russia, the Asian power and carried a promise of western affluence' (N rgaard et al 1993, 104). Estonia's Accession Partnership of 1999 and the 2001 Regular Report demonstrated just how much pull the EU has over Estonian policy. The partnership details a number of suggestions in preparation for membership and is directly related to Estonia's fulfillment of the Copenhagen criteria. The partnership uses a sequence of carrots and sticks to influence Estonia, 'the achievement of which will condition the degree of assistance granted and the progress of the negotiations underway' (Accession Partnership 1999). Although the political criteria relating to non-Estonians has largely been coherent with international standards, Estonia's financial assistance from the EU 'is conditional on respect by Estonia of its commitments' (Accession Partnership 1999). Estonia's successful completion of its EU priorities, has earned it much aid and trade concessions. Moving increasingly towards the EU, Estonia has benefitted from mutual trade. In 2000, Estonian exports to the EU accounted for 77 percent of total exports and EU products accounted for 85 percent of Estonia's imports. Benefitting from EU aid under Phare, SAPARD, and ISPA programs, Estonia received over 75 million euros. One of the primary beneficiaries of the Estonia's Phare funds was ethnic minorities, who received language training (2001 Regular Report on Estonia's Progress Towards Accession). The European Union was much more successful in protecting the minority Russian population because Estonia was eager to impress and court the West. As soon as it became evident that Estonia's clear priority was to join the EU, the EU's legitimacy increased as did its power to influence Estonian policies and laws. 'The linkage made by the European Union between the adoption of the high commissioner's [on national minorities] recommendations and the possibility of EU membership for Estonia was a strong inducement for the Estonian government' (Neukirch 2002, 243). With each successive achievement, Estonia felt more comfortable with its Western identity and Westernizing mission. EU-Russian Relations The past ten years of relations between Russia and the EU show Estonia's preference for the EU. Russia first reacted harshly to the EU's rising influence over Estonia, but once EU accession became merely a matter of time, Russia realized that it had lost the competition, and that if it was seen as a responsible perhaps even European actor, it had much to gain. Since the late 1990s, Russian resignation over the 'loss' of the Baltics has led to its persistence in vocally asserting its preeminence elsewhere, in the CIS for instance. At the same time, Russia has tied itself into multilateral organizations, hoping to become further attached to Europe. Both the EU and Estonia constantly reaffirm their belief that Europe can only be secure if Russia is stable. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the EU supported Russia's transition process, keen for Russia to embrace a market economy and a democratic society; at the same time, Russia has pursued a positive policy towards the EU. The European Union's status as a European rather than a Euro-Atlantic institution has increasingly been seen as one of its more attractive features and there has been a clear delineation in Russian attitudes toward the EU and NATO. One of Russia's main goals has been to encourage a 'multi-polar world' order. As the EU is sometimes defined as 'the foil to the United States,' Russia regards the EU as having the potential to act as a counter-balance to American hegemony (Gower 2000, 69). Historically, Russia's primary threat has been from invasion; the new threat for Europe and Russia is Russia's own instability. For the outside world, today's Russia is a salad bowl of policies and ideas of the Soviet Union, the tsarist empire, and the emerging line of democratic thought. Just as Russia is looking with new eyes on cooperation with Europe, Europe is qualifying exactly what it is to be a "normal" member of the international community. Vladimir Baranovsky adds, The quality of factors certifying its participation in the family of 'civilized' countries (democracy, human rights, market economy, and so on) becomes a critical test. It is quite obvious [in 1997] that the country is having serious difficulties in passing the test, which may lead to the paradoxical conclusion that Russia would have better chances of interacting with Europe as an 'outsider' rather than as an 'insider' (1997, 4) Russia itself has found it difficult to understand and adapt to the new map of Europe. When the bipolar division of Europe ended, Russia found itself pushed to the far eastern end of the continent and feels most threatened by its decreased power in world affairs. Indeed, the states of Eastern and Central Europe who only ten years ago were allied with Russia under the Soviet Union are now identifying themselves with the West. Russia's territory has diminished, specifically Russia's territory included in Europe. Without the control of the former Soviet republics that Russia enjoyed as the leading state of the USSR, Russia is now less able to affect developments in Europe. Challenging the world's encroachments in the former Soviet Union, Kozyrev announced The Concept of Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation in 1993. By this time, Estonia was already receiving EU aid and following EU policies to better align with the Copenhagen criteria. Estonia's turn to the West as it simultaneously distanced itself from the East was already apparent. After much debate, a leaner foreign policy directive, entitled The Key Tenets of the Concept of Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation was signed by President Yeltsin. Both the Concept and the Tenets demonstrated, that for the first time since 1914, Russia was not at war and while the majority of directives were defensive and domestically-oriented, point number six called for Russia to strengthen all manner of ties with the former Soviet republics (The Key Tenets of the Concept of Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation). Added to The Basic Provisions of the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation, the Russian government had authorized itself to use the military in defense of Russian minorities in the 'near abroad.' These provisions were a direct challenge to the rest of the world, especially to NATO and the EU, who were increasingly engaging with Russia's neighbors. Russia embarked on the difficult task of heckling and threatening Estonia while simultaneously trying to assert itself as a respectable world power. Because the EU was growing in importance for Russia's neighbors and external relations, Russia was eager to create a friendship that would benefit Russia domestically. The relative importance of the EU as an economic and political partner has gained prominence in Russian thought as the need for internal stability and economic growth have increased in importance. In June 1994, Russia and the EU signed the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement in which both parties hoped to combine economic cooperation and political partnership, with priority given to the economic sphere. The first crisis, Moscow's inhumane policy towards Chechnya, resulted in a delayed ratification, but the agreement represents three breakthroughs. First, both the EU and Russia pledged their support for democratic principles and human rights, which together are the basis for continued cooperation. The Partnership and Cooperation Agreement was also the first bilateral agreement in which Western countries defined Russia as a partner with a developing economy. Additionally, the agreement left the doors open to Russia's future inclusion in a wider area of cooperation in Europe. Both sides hoped that economic convergence would lead to breakthroughs in political relations as well. This Agreement presented Russia the opportunity to correlate cooperation with the EU and financial aid. The EU used the agreement as a bargaining chip with Russia, which knew that the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement with the EU, if utilized properly, could stimulate foreign investment in Russia. With the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement, the EU staked its claim to the Baltic states in a non-threatening manner for Russia. The diction used in the agreement demonstrates that while friendly, the EU clearly did not view Russia in an overwhelmingly positive light. Russia's economy was still developing and should it improve, it could allow Russian inclusion into a wider area of cooperation. Unlike the open-armed reception Estonia received a week after it reclaimed independence, the EU's reception of Russia two years later was still tempered with caution. Unsure of whether Russia could be a European partner, the EU took the high ground. As time passed, the EU would continue to celebrate Russian achievements at the same time as it distanced Russia from Europe. On the other hand, Russia's appreciation of the EU grew and it was increasingly important for Russian foreign policy to continue 'the tactic of gaining popularity among the European democracies' (Zhuryari- Ossipova 1993, 126). The 1996 Action Plan sent a strong message of EU commitment and support to reformers in Russia while pledging the EU to 'promote the democratic and economic reform process, to enhance respect for human rights, to consolidate peace, stability, and security in order to avoid new dividing lines in Europe and to achieve the full integration of Russia into the community of free and democratic nations' (1996 Action Plan). In order for Russia to integrate into the community of free and democratic nations, it had to side with the reformers who welcomed Estonia's accession negotiations with the EU. To assuage Russian fears, the EU announced that it would not draw new borders in Europe as long as Russia behaved properly. The Plan was a slap on the wrist to Kozyrev, and others who threatened force on behalf of Russians stranded outside the motherland. The EU needed to be reassured that Estonia's application for membership would not compromise the EU's security. The EU's self-image and its interests sided with the beliefs of reformers who realized that the pacifying effects of EU enlargement on Estonian domestic politics would be of great benefit to Russia and to the stability of the region. The Action Plan has allowed for a deeper and broader dialogue for cooperation to occur between the parties and paved the way for TACIS. TACIS is the main financial and policy instrument through which the EU has tried to influence the reform process in Russia by giving practical support (expertise and skills) to the development of stable democratic institutions and a functioning market economy. The money given to Russia under TACIS makes the EU the leading donor of non-repayable aid to Russia. The TACIS aid programme is designed to help Russia reform and move closer to Western models of a prosperous middle class, civil society, and respect for human rights. By this time, Estonia had already passed such tests and was a full partner of Europe. Russia, however, was not yet fully democratic and its economy was still far from par. The EU therefore continued to occupy the high ground and successfully placed Russia outside European norms. After Finland and Sweden joined the EU in 1995, the EU became more northern in composition. In order to help the enlargement process in the North, and to slowly help Russia acclimate to the EU's presence in the Baltics for the future, the EU introduced the Northern Dimension at the Luxembourg Summit of 1997. Seeking to address the challenges facing the Baltic region, while increasing cooperation between EU member states, applicant states, and Russia, the EU's Northern Dimension once again placed the EU at the center of progress. As the Northern Dimension is led by EU initiatives, it again announced the EU's lasting influence in the region and added to its legitimacy. With the broad aim to 'create security and stability in the region,' the Northern Dimension specifically aims at 'avoiding the emergence of new dividing lines as new countries join the Union' (Northern Dimension). Having successfully filled the security vacuum left in the Baltic states after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the EU needed to cater to both the Baltic states and Russia. While the Baltics needed reassurance of their security from Russia, Russia craved the confidence that through multilateral organizations and initiatives, Russia would not be excluded either from Europe or from interactions with its former satellites. While the 1997 launching of the Northern Dimension demonstrates a tip in the scales towards EU preeminence in the region, there were some setbacks. Russia attempted to overthrow conventional knowledge of what Europe is in the 'Long- Term Line of Russia Towards the Baltic States' adopted by Yeltsin in February 1997. Although Russia attempted to align itself with Europe, and place Estonians as the 'others,' the EU merely had to point to human rights violations in the war against Chechnya to prove otherwise. The document asserts, Defending compatriots' rights in the Baltic States . . . [is] a long-term task of Russia's foreign policy in the region. Among our priorities - establishing, through bilateral dialogue, conditions for citizenship for all Russian-speaking inhabitants of Estonia and Latvia, for those who possessed permanent registration there by the time of proclaiming their independence, facilitating procedure of naturalisation, providing right of citizenship based on a fact of birth and families' reunification, halting discrimination of orthodox believers in Estonia. This is our position based on European human rights standards and has nothing in common with interfering into internal affairs of the Baltic states (qtd in Pikayev 1998, 144). Yeltsin's policy stance deliberately attempts to drive a wedge in the increasingly close relations between the Baltic states and Europe. A last ditch effort by Yeltsin to reverse Estonia's turn to Europe, Russian foreign policy elites were still thinking in terms of conflict instead of favoring cooperation. By espousing a human rights position that is 'European,' Russia simultaneously placed itself with other Europeans against the Baltic 'others,' who did not meet European human rights standards, in their opinion. The stance, however, only succeeded in angering the Baltics, driving them closer to a Europe, which had already acknowledged that their human rights records were suitably aligned with international standards (Estonia: Accession Partnership 1999). After the EU had successfully become the center of Estonia's modernization efforts, it had the difficult task of assuaging Russian concerns, supporting Estonia, and satisfying current member states all within the same document. The language used in the 1999 'Common Strategy of the European Union on Russia' betrays to whom the EU is speaking to. The EU has continually reinforced Estonia's own perception that, 'the future of Russia is an essential element in the future of the continent.' Because the EU had successfully incorporated Estonia into its sphere of influence, it acknowledged, 'Russia and the Union have strategic interests and exercise particular responsibilities in the maintenance of security and stability in Europe, and in other parts of the world.' Having 'robbed' Russia of the Baltics, the EU did not want to appear as if it did not acknowledge Russian interests in the CIS. The EU then speaks of Russia's integration into a common European economic space in a way that highlights the interdependence between member states, applicant states, and Russia. 'The Union will therefore support Russia in developing and adopting the economic policies needed to strengthen the confidence necessary to increase domestic and foreign investment and to meet the requirements of international lenders.' One of Estonia's main priorities in joining the EU was to secure its economy and enter the world's largest trading bloc, unfortunately, Estonia's economy is still dependent on the Russian economy. The EU therefore wants to aid Russia knowing that a circular relationship exists between the EU, Russia, and Estonia, and that these policies will help all three. By aiding the Russian economy, the EU is also able to persuade and coax Russian policies closer to European norms with promises of aid and trade benefits instead of with threats. Committed to its relations with the EU, Russia became eager to please Europe for the benefits it reaped in return. Largely because of the need to appease Europe, Russia loosened its intense pressure on Estonia. Herd notes, 'Russia's policy in regard to the Baltic area is seen as an indication of its commitment to international laws and principles. Should the Russian Federation undermine the sovereignty and independence of these states then it would clearly reveal itself to be a threat to the stability of the international system' (1995, 13). Because Estonia and the EU were increasingly linked, Russia could not threaten one without threatening the other and their unity promised that attempts would cause more damage than Russia could gain from the situation. In the sections meant for Russian consumption in the 'Common Strategy on Russia,' the EU's purpose was threefold: to quench Russian fears caused by enlargement, to strengthen the position of reformers in Russia, and to alleviate Russian concerns that after Kosovo the balance of power had shifted. The language used in the document gave weight to Russia's power and special role in Europe: A stable, democratic and prosperous Russia, firmly anchored in a united Europe free of new dividing lines, is essential to lasting peace on the continent. The issues which the whole continent faces can be resolved only through ever closer cooperation between Russia and the European Union. The European Union welcomes Russia's return to its rightful place in the European family in a spirit of friendship, cooperation, fair accommodation of interests and on the foundations of shared values enshrined in the common heritage of European civilization (Common Strategy on Russia). This diction left Russia an open door to integrate into a common economic and social European area and stressed the future opportunities for a free trade area based on Russian legislation concurrent with EU norms. The EU's Common Strategy continued the push to demonstrate that the EU was now the legitimate overseer of domestic social norms, reinforcing its legitimacy in negotiations in Estonia. Finally, the EU asked Russia 'to remove obstacles to trade and investment, in particular through the improvement of border crossing procedures and facilities, and by examining, in accordance with EU rules and procedures, Russian concerns with respect to access to the EU market.' These directives were aimed precisely to encourage Russia to ease its tariffs on Estonian goods and ratify the border treaty with Estonia. After the EU released its Common Strategy, Moscow for the first time submitted a position paper outlining its views on the future development of relations with the EU. The "Guidelines for the Strategy of Developing Relations of the Russian Federation with the European Union" was circulated to EU member states in 1999. As it was never published, Jackie Gower's summary of the main points are given below: to create a durable all-European collective security system (i.e. to end the 'monopoly' of NATO and the US); to help create a socially oriented market economy based on the EU's model; to establish a single European space; to further promote democracy and the rule of law; to ensure environmental protection and create decent living standards; to work together to fight terrorism, drug trafficking, and transnational organized crime; to strengthen partnership between Russia and the EU in European and world affairs (Guidelines for the Strategy of Developing Relations of the Russian Federation with the European Union, qtd. in Gower 2000, 88). In response, the Russian government approved the "Medium Term Strategy for Development of Relations Between the Russian Federation and the European Union" in 1999. In the document, Russia announces its goal to make use of the EU's economic potential and experience to assist Russia in developing a socially oriented market economy and a transparent democratic state. For the first time, Russia states that it is not in its interests to join the EU as a full member and instead calls for "practical cooperation in the area of security which could counterbalance, inter alia, the NATO-centrism in Europe" (Medium Term Strategy for Development of Relations Between the Russian Federation and the European Union). While both Russia and the EU will benefit from concessions based on reciprocity, the document adds, "the development of partnership with the EU should contribute to consolidating Russia's role as a leading power in shaping up a new system of interstate political and economic relations in the CIS area" (Medium Term Strategy for Development of Relations Between the Russian Federation and the European Union). Reviving its 1993 Tenets, Russia claimed its right to comparable status in Europe, asserted its sphere of influence in the CIS and not in the Baltics and showed that its interests may diverge from the West because of its distinctive historical and geopolitical situation. It appears as if Russian elites admitted that the EU had gained pre-eminence in the Baltics. Because it still felt isolated from Europe, however, Russia maintained that interests may sometimes differ. Furthermore, as the EU has successfully drawn Estonia into its web, Russia is now further compelled to preserve its special relationship with the CIS. Conclusions As Russia has acknowledged the EU's rising influence in Estonia, it has been eager to stay involved in the Baltic area through multilateral initiatives. Russia's response to the increasing power of the EU has deepened the EU's self-perception as the key to security and stability in Europe and has added to the EU's legitimacy in the eyes of Estonia. The abilities of Russia and the EU to influence Estonian policies started on different planes, and the past ten years have only widened the gap between those planes. Estonia's main priorities after reclaiming independence were to reassert its sovereignty and reclaim its place in the European state system. In order to do this, Russia was fundamentally excluded as the primary 'other' in Estonian identity and security constructions. And thus, 'given Estonia's long-term objective of close association with the West and its need for Western security assurances vis-a-vis Russia, it could not but listen to Western recommendations' (Neukirch 2002, 243). Although many academics (Mahncke 2001, White 2000, Haukkala and Medvedev 2001) have written analyses that argue Russia does not fully understand the EU accession programme, I argue precisely the opposite. Russia has turned from a competitive stance against the EU to a conciliatory and cooperative stance for Estonia's accession. So why did Russia's position change? Continuing to pressure Estonian unilaterally, Russia by the late 1990s recognized it could rely on Western efforts to bring about the changes that both sides desired for Estonia. Additionally, Russia realizes that a more stable domestic situation between Estonians and the Russian minority population is best for the stability of both states and of Europe as a whole. The Federation appreciated that the treatment of Russians in Estonia had improved and reality argued that Russia acknowledge what the world has argued: namely, that ethnic Russians and Russophones have been treated well in Estonia since 1997. Furthermore, the more Russia acts responsibly and thus, 'European,' in multilateral organizations and by treating Estonia as a sovereign state with equal standing in international law, the more Russia benefits from a better reputation in the world and from EU financial assistance. Unlike NATO, it appears that Russia is fundamentally not threatened by the EU and in fact welcomes the stability that it has brought to the region. Internally, Russia's policy changes have largely resulted since the mid-late 1990s, when increasing domestic problems exposed the gap between the rhetoric of Russian policy elites and the capabilities of the Russian state. It seems as if Russia has perfectly understood Estonia's EU accession programme. Recognizing that Russian influence has decreased dramatically and will decrease further still when Estonia joins the EU, Russia has vocally protested the treatment of Russian minorities in bilateral discussions, international fora, and the media. Although Russia's vocal demands for influence in Estonia and for better treatment of Russians abroad led Estonia to seek EU accession, it was the pressure put on Estonia by the EU that led to improved conditions for the minority Russian population. Surely, the EU was motivated to pressure Estonia for its own security, but the EU has been a vocal proponent itself of human rights. The EU's success in Estonia has bolstered its self-image, its legitimacy in acting as an intermediary between Estonia and Russia, and the stability of Europe. Additionally, once Estonia is incorporated into the EU, its eastern border will be the EU's external border. The EU certainly does not want a border agreement that has still not been ratified with Russia, and the EU mandated border agreements for any applicant state. The lack of political will on Russia's part to ratify the treaty demonstrates that it is trying to keep as much power as possible until the last moment. Indeed, Estonia's worst fears have been confirmed 'Russia would be able to use this condition to undermine integration into Western organization' (N rgaard 179). The EU demands a border agreement because it protects EU security, in doing so, however, Russia gained the power to determine the pace of integration. Because the borders are clearly demarcated, however, it appears as if the EU cannot influence Russia to ratify the agreement and instead, accepts the current borders as permanent. Because the EU is largely seen as a guarantor of European security between democratic states, Russia has viewed EU enlargement fundamentally different from NATO's enlargement process. Russia has used its power to influence EU directives supporting Russian minorities in Estonia and is eager to continue a good relationship for economic benefits. While it seems as if all parties have gained, Estonia is certainly the big winner. Having regained independence just over a decade ago, it has since been re-incorporated into Europe with a speed and intensity that was unimaginable then. As Estonia's democratic rule and market economy continue to solidify and grow, Estonia will continue to benefit from being on the border between West and East. Incorporated into the West, this time Estonia will be included in a great power that allows Estonian identity to remain distinct. Supposing Estonians vote yes to joining the EU in September 2003's referendum (which is increasingly likely), Estonia will be further confident that not only does Estonia belong to the Estonians, but it also belongs in the family of Europe. 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