Proceedings of the Symposium

Building the future together

organized by the European Commission
to mark the 40th anniversary
of the Declaration of 9 May 1950

Brussels, 8 May 1990

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

Robert SCHUMAN

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President Jacques DELORS opening the Symposium

Address by Mr Jacques DELORS

President of the Commission

Ladies and Gentlemen,

Before presenting the theme of this commemorative symposium, I should like to thank you all for accepting the Commission's invitation to attend.

On this 40th anniversary of the Schuman Declaration, the Commission has no special message to deliver; it merely wishes to encourage Europeans to remember those who made the development of European integration possible and devised the Community system which has stood the test of time.

Mr Gerard COLLINS, President of the Council and Irish Minister for Foreign Affairs, will now read the joint declaration adopted by the three decision-making institutions — the Commission, the Council and Parliament.

Mr Gerard COLLINS, *Irish Minister for Foreign Affairs*

Forty years ago the Schuman Declaration paved the way for the Treaty of Paris, whose signatories, within a few months, laid the foundations for institutions that were to 'give direction to a destiny henceforward shared'.

The immediate aim of the Declaration of 9 May 1950 was to underpin Franco-German reconciliation by pooling their production, and that of other European countries, in two limited but at the time strategically important industries — coal and steel.

However, Robert SCHUMAN and Jean MONNET also had a longer-term political objective in mind — the gradual evolution of the European Community, by concrete achievements, from economic integration to political union.

After 40 years of pooled sovereignty between six and later 12 countries, the Community has fulfilled the aspirations of the Declaration's authors: it has become an economic success for its inhabitants, a focal point for Europe and a force for peace in the world at large.

The bonds of solidarity between the Member States and the peoples of the Community have grown strong enough for them to be able to cope today with the sudden overthrow of the structures inherited from the war. As in 1950, the answer to the challenges and hopes arising from these recent revolutionary changes lies in 'an organized and living Europe'.

In 1990 the Community is well placed to begin a new stage of its journey towards unity. No doubt it will look once again to the Schuman Declaration in search of the principles it needs to further European integration within the framework of common institutions which have already proved their worth but which need to be reinforced in order to meet the challenges of the decade ahead of us.

Mr Jacques DELORS

I would like to extend my thanks to Mr Bernard CLAPPIER for agreeing to open this seminar. As former head of Robert SCHUMAN's ministerial staff, he is better qualified than any of us to describe the problems and the general atmosphere of the period and to stimulate discussion by our panel, which consists of eminent individuals who were involved in or witnessed the birth of the Community and who will be able to give us the essential background to the events of the 1950s and at the same time, since they are still young, to make a few predictions for the future.

Bernard CLAPPIER, former *Directeur de cabinet* to Robert SCHUMAN

Opening address

by Mr Bernard CLAPPIER

Mr DELORS has asked me to introduce this seminar by recalling my personal memories of 1949 and 1950 — which for me were years of intense activity. Of course I don't entirely trust my own memory, so I have looked up a few historians such as François and Pascal FONTAINE on Jean MONNET and Professor POIDEVIN on Robert SCHUMAN — and we could add many other names from the growing list of those who have followed in the footsteps of these two great personalities.

Having enlisted the support of these authors, I shall begin by evoking the political climate which prevailed in Europe in mid-1949. Europe was in the throes of the Cold War: the Berlin blockade had begun a year earlier, the North Atlantic Treaty was signed in April 1949 and in September the Soviet Union detonated its first atomic bomb.

Faced with this situation, the Western allies were seeking ways of strengthening the bonds that united them. The question soon arose whether or not to bring Germany into the fold and if so, on what terms. For some time the foreign ministers of the three Western allies had been meeting virtually every three months to discuss the problem. When they met in Washington in September 1949 the Federal Republic had just come into being with Konrad ADENAUER at the helm of its first government. It was becoming a matter of urgency to establish a common policy on relations with the new Germany.

It so happened that I myself was present at that meeting of the three foreign ministers — my presence was unusual but the fact is that Robert SCHUMAN did not have a very good command of English and had asked me to interpret for him. During the meeting the American Secretary of State, Dean ACHESON, asked Robert SCHUMAN to reflect on the German question and come up with proposals which the three ministers could then put forward in the near future.

This was a clever suggestion: firstly because it was the relationship between France and Germany which was at the root of the problem, and secondly because Dean ACHESON knew that, as a man from the frontier region, Robert SCHUMAN was

the best-placed French politician to solve these difficulties. So throughout the autumn and winter of 1949-50 he spent the bulk of his time and energy examining the various points at issue between France and Germany and trying to find viable solutions.

Anxious to obtain full sovereignty, the West German Government wanted to establish equal rights with its Western allies as soon as possible, while France feared the consequences of the resurgence of Germany as a political and economic power and was looking for safeguards; at the very least it wanted a special status for the Saar and international control of the Ruhr area.

Six months were spent in the quest for an impossible solution amid an atmosphere which became increasingly critical with each week that passed, especially as some observers were now discussing the possibility of German rearmament, and even the need for it.

The failure of these efforts to solve the Franco-German problem through traditional channels convinced Robert SCHUMAN that new ways must be found. Meanwhile, as Pascal FONTAINE describes in his remarkable book, Jean MONNET was becoming weary of the increasingly routine nature of his duties; he was also haunted by the fear that French-German relations might blight the chances of peace in Europe and endanger the future of the West. He had known Robert SCHUMAN since the latter's spell as finance minister and their relationship had developed over the years in an atmosphere of mutual trust.

When Jean MONNET sent Robert SCHUMAN his proposals for pooling the coal and steel industries at the end of April 1950, they won his immediate support. Of course many similar schemes had been put forward since the end of 1948, but they were always rather vague concepts, proposals for bilateral or multilateral agreements along traditional lines and thus inherently unstable.

The great novelty of the Monnet plan was that it placed a whole sector of the economy in the hands of a supranational body — a High Authority which would be independent of governments. This novel feature was the main reason for the success of the venture launched on 9 May 1950. It broke the Franco-German deadlock and pointed the way for the future of Europe as a whole.

I shall not dwell on the Treaty of Paris, which founded the European Coal and Steel Community with Jean MONNET as President of the High Authority. It was regarded as a model of its kind.

However, the system of pooling coal and steel resources, although still within its limits, soon had teething troubles. The first of these concerned the United Kingdom.

France was very much in favour of Great Britain becoming a member of the European Coal and Steel Community right from its inception, but on one condition: Britain must accept the principle of a European authority with responsibility for managing the Community. The British refused to commit themselves to this and maintained this position despite the laudable efforts of Jean MONNET to persuade them to change their minds. Monnet concluded that Britain was by nature sceptical of any radical innovation but might come round later if the venture proved successful.

But the British were not the only ones to express reservations about supranational structures. Another clear example was the rejection of the European Defence Community by the French Parliament a couple of years later. Undeterred, Robert SCHUMAN and Jean MONNET continued their crusade for gradual European integration. After a few years as President of the ECSC, Jean MONNET set up the Action Committee for the United States of Europe, which brought together political and trade union leaders from all the countries concerned. Meanwhile Robert SCHUMAN called repeatedly for greater European integration and a practical means of achieving it. He reiterated the basic idea which underlies the Declaration of 9 May: 'Europe will not be made all at once, or according to a single plan. It will be built through concrete achievements which first create a *de facto* solidarity. The coming together of the nations of Europe requires the elimination of the age-old opposition of France and Germany. Any action taken must in the first place concern these two countries.' These few sentences express more clearly than any number of speeches the central philosophy of the Declaration of 9 May 1950.

In 40 years much progress has been achieved; yet a great deal of work remains to be done. I am delighted by the initiative taken by the Commission in organizing this symposium and hope that it will be emulated by the countries involved in the European venture. I say this because the Commission has a vital task to perform and I am keenly aware of the major role it must play in the unification of Europe.

Members of the Round Table (from left to right):

Mr Franco BOBBA, Mr Max KOHNSTAMM, Mr Dirk SPIERENBURG, Mr Georges BERTHOIN, Mr Albert COPPÉ, Mr Karl-Heinz NARJES and Mr Pierre URI.

Address by Mr Georges BERTHOIN

Chairman of the Round Table
(former Chef de cabinet *to Jean MONNET at the ECSC,*
European Chairman of the Trilateral Commission)

Quite a number of you, through your diplomatic functions, represent national sovereignties. The whole point on 9 May 1950 was to ensure that the national sovereignties could be fully voiced in a brand new way.

Five years earlier, on 8 May 1945, where did we stand? Those of us who were alive then will not have forgotten the distress and the tragedies of that time. And where do we stand today? Anyone travelling around Western Europe can gauge the distance covered in 45 years. The historic upheavals which, only recently, have once again put Europe into the limelight force us to consider where we are bound for now and how we proposed to get there. Reappraised against that backdrop, the Declaration of 9 May 1950 takes on an altogether special meaning. What men like Robert SCHUMAN and Jean MONNET did, as the former Governor of the Bank of France, Mr Bernard CLAPPIER, has just reminded us, was a novel departure: instead of bowing before history, they took hold of it so as to harness its energy.

The new strategy launched on 9 May 1950 has underpinned every major step forward in European integration.

The question for us, then, is this: are we to abandon what has worked so well for 40 years or should we not rather carry on the work of those who have gone before us? That is the question that each one of us at this round table will be trying to address. To lead off the discussion, let me offer six brief points for consideration:

1. The Declaration of 9 May 1950 was born of the conjunction of two different but complementary men: one floated the idea and the other had the political status and the democratic legitimacy needed to turn it into a political act. Both contributions were essential. Such is the foundation of the European Community's institutional set-up. One authority — the Commission, representing the general interest — proposes; the other — the Council of Ministers — disposes. This balance of forces defines the encounter between Jean MONNET and Robert

SCHUMAN, and flows from it. It lies at the very heart of the European Coal and Steel Community, and it has never ceased to be fundamental for the Community. To tamper with it would strike at the very roots of Community development.

2. The moral and philosophical dimension of the Declaration of 9 May 1950 lies in the establishment of a different relationship between antagonists riven by the curses of history who nevertheless resolve to build the future together. Let us never forget that this mutual respect between antagonists is still there today! In countries like Greece, Spain and Portugal, democracy, and membership of the Community, are founded on cohabitation between antagonists formerly divided by war, civil war or other types of conflict. This lesson is particularly relevant today, with Eastern Europe on the boil.
3. The Declaration of 9 May 1950 carries no European 'rhetoric'. Jean MONNET and Robert SCHUMAN were no armchair philosophers — stylistic exercises were nothing to them. They were men who put all their efforts into getting things done; by successfully attacking on well-chosen fronts, they ensured that the process advanced as a whole.
4. Mr Bernard CLAPPIER has reminded us of something vitally important: Robert SCHUMAN was a member of parliament for the Lorraine. He had lived through the tragic events of border regions; in the Declaration drafted for him by Jean MONNET and Pierre URI, he found a solution to a tragedy which had marked him for life. This is no less relevant today when in several areas of greater Europe the problem of minorities, and the problem of the frontiers, is again a tragic reality. The Declaration of 9 May helped to highlight frontiers no longer as walls but as links.
5. One goal: European federation. The Declaration of 9 May 1950 shows the direction in which we can move. Knowing where you are going gives you a sense of security, which makes you much easier to live with. The Declaration of 9 May 1950 gives a sense of purpose and direction and with it a sense of common destiny for the Germans, the French, the other four countries that responded to the initiative and many another besides. It can still do so today for the countries of Central and Eastern Europe.
6. Finally, the first paragraph of the Declaration of 9 May by Robert SCHUMAN and Jean MONNET is intended as a material contribution to peace in Europe, and therefore to peace in the rest of the world, for we are all aware, to our shame, that the wars that bloodied the world had their beginnings in Europe.

Mr Pierre URI, *colleague of Jean MONNET, economist, former Financial Director of the ECSC High Authority*

The Schuman Declaration was beamed first and foremost at France and Germany, and might have been made yesterday, with Germany now in the throes of a sea change. Let me mention here Jean MONNET's formula which had most impressed

Konrad ADENAUER: the idea that France and Germany should stand as equals, whatever was to become of the Saar and German reunification.

What did the Schuman Plan mean in institutional terms? It meant that they must not produce an abstract concept — castles in the air — but institutions with practical and material tasks, anchored to reality. Those selected at the time were crucial to production and, at the same time, were symbols of war and peace.

The initial configuration emphasized supranationality. But the word was swiftly discarded. The whole set-up was eminently practical.

So how are valid decisions to be taken by a group of wholly independent countries? We were too used to unanimous decisions, in other words to the veto and inertia. Moreover, the United Nations and the Monetary Fund had already shown where majority decisions led, that is to factions or horsetrading. The great novelty — and I use the word advisedly, since there was no precedent — was that of a common authority which proposed and obtained Council decisions.

It was a system at once fair and effective. And, from the very first day, it proved to be a sound basis for the subsequent developments that did not fail to occur. We started with coal and steel, we got Euratom, thanks to Jean MONNET, then the Common Market and we are now making for monetary union and political union, which have always been what the founders sought to attain.

Of course, the procedures were put on hold at certain junctures.

We had the 'Luxembourg compromise', which has been grossly overworked by some governments so that even the most trifling decisions, such as the size of the European passport, had to be taken unanimously. And we ground to a halt. Now, thank heavens, we have men forceful enough to insist that everyone abides by the rules of the Treaties and follows the procedures.

On the economic front, a kind of new synthesis was achieved: a market, but a regulated market that lived in the present. State intervention is liable to create distortion. If you want the full cooperation of the workers, bearing in mind that there is no progress without change, they must be shielded from the hazards of change; conversion must therefore be organized. And long-term forecasts are needed to guide investments. If I had to sum up in so many words what was, and must continue to be, the spirit of that Treaty, I would say that it is the constant conciliation of freedom and justice. Even so, there are a few things I am not too happy about. I think I would have preferred a different and fairer agricultural policy, kinder to the small farmers'

incomes and less intent on price support, the generosity of which rises in proportion to the size of the farm.

As to the future, monetary union may be a more complex issue than has hitherto been claimed. For it is not simply a matter of central banks; budgetary, taxation and incomes policies are also affected. We shall be returning to this.

Political union is going to call for imagination: how do we achieve it gradually? On the economic side, it is easy to say we will reduce customs duties or increase quotas year by year. Politically, that is in terms of defence and diplomacy, power must apparently shift overnight from the States to the Union. Perhaps there are a few simple ways of doing this in stages: proposals have been floated and I should like to convey them to the President of Parliament.

As a result of this tremendous effort of imagination and courage, we can be proud to assert that it is the European Community which has triggered the present frenzy of liberalization in the East. The credit lies neither with America nor with Japan, because their conception of the market virtually excludes any amalgam with social protection. Now, it is precisely that combination of efficiency and equity that could attract nations and draw them into the democratic fold.

This welcome wind of change is blowing problems our way, for the aid which we are going to provide for the East must not be given at the cost of cutting aid to the South, which needs more aid than ever.

Their problems are different. I believe that the East has the men it needs, but that an overcentralized system has not taught them how to run a company. Consequently, what the East needs is technical assistance. But what the South needs, because it does not have the trained men, is finance. All of which means that Europe's obligations — upon which the fate of the world hangs to an unprecedented extent — are not incompatible with one another, if we can design, on one side, technical assistance for management training and, on the other, finance to provide the means of survival first and the qualified people thereafter.

There is now hope that Europe will cease to be split in two. Will we see political union on one side and, on the other, what the French President has referred to as 'confederation', or will we initially see things developing in an organization — the Council of Europe — with a potentially more active role play? It's worth thinking about.

What I do think we can take for granted is that what is now happening in the East — after what happened between France and Germany — has given even wider import

to the sentence at the foot of Jean MONNET's plaque in the Panthéon: 'Il lègue à tous, amis ou ennemis de la veille, la mission, de répandre dans le monde la liberté et la paix.'[1]

Mr Dirk SPIERENBURG, *former negotiator of the ECSC Treaty for the Netherlands and Vice-President of the High Authority*

As Bernard CLAPPIER and Pierre URI have spoken about Germany before me, I think I can be brief. In 1950 Germany needed to regain its sovereignty and its place in the European family of nations without provoking the rebirth of German nationalism. The situation today is much the same, for a reunified Germany has to be given its place in the Europe of the Twelve. In 1950 the intention was to develop Europe decisively through coal and steel, the two strategic industries which, I believe, were then essential. Today, we must again act on a decisive issue — economic and monetary union — without which we cannot truly achieve the Common Market.

The Community will never really work if it does not have that foundation. The objective today is the same as it always was — to get the countries of Europe moving along the path towards economic integration and political union.

The Schuman Plan sought to pool the production of coal and steel. The aim was to build the common market, a common market with rules. To apply those rules, decisions had to be taken, and that meant there had to be institutions with powers to take them. As Pierre URI reminded us, the High Authority got them, and even direct powers. Nevertheless, for some issues with repercussions on the economy at large, the governments were to have the right of assent in certain areas.

On this point, Pierre URI will no doubt let me make a slight correction to what he said about the structure we had at the beginning. At the Paris negotiations the French Delegation had simply proposed a high authority and a common assembly. It was with great difficulty and under a sustained barrage of criticism that the Belgians, the Luxembourgers and myself, on behalf of the Dutch Government, succeeded in adding the Council of Ministers. I venture to ask him: where would Europe be today without the Council? At the time, I was accused of trying to wreck the Schuman Plan. Happily, Jean MONNET was a wise man, wise enough to realize that governments had to be allowed to do their job.

Finally, many people, I'm sure, will not agree with me when I say that the creation of the ECSC was at least made easier by the fact that we were a relatively small

[1] He bequeaths to all, yesterday's friends or yesterday's enemies, the task of spreading freedom and peace in the world.

number of countries at a comparable level of development, whose governments had the great advantage of being supported by public opinion won over to the idea — and even the word, though I don't care for it very much — of supranationality.

Since President Jacques DELORS has asked us to draw conclusions from all that, what is the goal now? It is economic and monetary union. For me, that means replacing national currencies by a European currency once and for all on an agreed date. The Treaty must include provisions requiring the governments to reach agreement on monetary and budgetary policies.

It is crucially important that the governments agree, in the Treaty, to transfer to the union institutions certain essential powers regarding currencies and the budget. Otherwise we had better forget the whole business, because it just won't work. Of course, there will have to be stages for bringing the Member States' economic policies gradually into line with each other. But the thing is to make them mandatory: the Werner Plan failed because when the bell rang the governments refused to move on to the next stage.

So the governments must realize — they assuredly will, but there is no harm in rubbing it in — that they have to agree to relinquish a limited — albeit extensive — portion of their sovereignty on an issue which has hitherto been at the heart of the business of national government. Otherwise we will never achieve economic and monetary union.

The institutions we need are probably a bank, the Commission, the Council of Ministers and Parliament. For the system to function, the Commission must be given powers, and the Council of Ministers too. But the Council should not be able to block decisions that are capable of being taken by a majority, nor follow the example of the ministers of agriculture and haggle for months and months before reaching a conclusion. Implementation of the Treaty cannot brook such delays. Regarding the volume of the budget, the size of the deficit and its financing, the Community institutions, in my view, simply must have adequate powers and capacity for action.

What role will the governments play? From personal experience as a negotiator in Paris I can only say that my efforts resulted, despite opposition, in the creation of the Council of Ministers. A few years later the French and German governments, who had accused me of trying to wreck the Schuman Plan when I was simply trying to make it work, did a complete about-turn: they no longer wanted the High Authority. While the idea until then was that the High Authority should take the decisions, the Council sometimes having to give its assent, the Rome Treaty gives the Commission the initiative in administration and negotiation, but the decisions are

left to the Council. Which is altogether different. As for political union, economic and monetary union must be the first stage of that.

Economic and monetary union is possible without political union, but the reverse is not true. Now I fear there are those who want to begin with a very loose political union, as in 1972. I must warn you, Mr Chairman, of the precedents: when Jean MONNET and Robert SCHUMAN wanted to go too fast and found a defence Community and a political Community, the result was disaster. So let's be careful: fools rush in where angels fear to tread!

Let us concentrate on the tremendous challenge of economic and monetary union. Of course, the political Community will have to follow sooner or later. But that will entail a still greater loss of sovereignty, because foreign policy, security policy, social policy and environment policy will all have to be pooled despite entirely different national stances, and that is certainly not going to be easy.

Let me conclude with a sentence from Robert SCHUMAN that I found in Professor POIDEVIN: 'Des impatiences inconsidérées, au lieu de hâter, risquent de compromettre le résultat.'[1]

(Remarking that Mr Dirk SPIERENBURG was still as outspoken as ever, Mr Georges BERTHOIN then introduced Karl-Heinz NARJES, who was Vice-President of the European Commission, having been, as a young German diplomat, *Chef de cabinet* to Professor HALLSTEIN at the time when Hallstein was President of the Commission.)

Address by Karl-Heinz NARJES, *former German diplomat, former* Chef de cabinet *to Professor HALLSTEIN and former Vice-President of the Commission*

I propose to make a few remarks which have nothing to do with economic and monetary union or the internal market, before drawing one or two conclusions.

1. Today, even more than in 1950, I admire the courage of Robert SCHUMAN and Jean MONNET in going for trust, in being bold enough to tread the path of trust, resisting the spirit of suspicion and the associations of Versailles.

2. I admire the courage they showed in launching, as much as 40 years ago, a pattern of development — a gradual revolution — that has marked a whole generation.

[1] Rash impatience will not hasten the outcome but compromise it.

3. I admire the courage they had in beginning with six countries, in not following the often contradictory advice of various countries which were then seeking a variety of solutions in the much broader context of the Council of Europe.

I also admire the fact that those countries, that group of pioneers, accepted the discipline of permanent institutions, which meant giving up conventional forms of cooperation, and finally recognized the political goal of a united Europe with federal structures, thus laying the foundations of a viable peace.

Today we are faced with the urgent task of developing peace structures for Central and Eastern Europe. We are asked, if we truly wish to change the course of things irreversibly and credibly, to show the same sort of courage and, in particular, to look beyond our noses to 2010-20.

As far as the Community is concerned, I am pleased to note that it is increasingly having the courage to stick to the methods of our pioneers or, rather, our pioneer group: for example, the European Monetary System, the innovatory approach to patents and so many other new departures are welcome evidence of the death of the veto mentality that might have blocked the Community's development.

Nevertheless, if we are to advance towards a peace structure in the East, if we are to create a political union and a security union as suggested by François MITTERRAND's message at the Dublin Summit, then I think we must have the courage to face the possible need to limit the number of member countries for the time being so as to give the other countries time to think further about their possible accession.

On the institutional side, there are several situations that are quite incompatible with the original philosophy. The 'Presidency', for example, existed neither in the Treaty of Rome nor in the ECSC Treaty: the institutional balance of the 1950s has thus been distorted in favour of the national bureaucracies.

Added to this is the urgent need to enlarge the Community's democratic base. The democratic deficit is, as I see it, the Community's great institutional problem, considering the lack of balance between the Commission and the national bureaucracies. If we are going to win over Eastern Europe, now is the time to play the card of an authentic European Parliament. But there are other arguments. Only the democratic approach, for instance, will enable us to tackle the issues involved in Europe's security successfully. Whether we like it or not, these issues are now on the agenda.

Let us not be guided solely by what is happening inside the Community; we should also consider the impact on Europe of new situations engendered by disarmament,

perestroika and their implications for the United States. The Europeans will have to react to the new circumstances. But first we must have a more practical vision of a quality of peace in Europe which is different from that currently offered by the institutions of the 'Europe of 35' (CSCE).

The 'collective security' system of the nineteenth century sought to confine the duration of conflicts and their potential damage. That is no longer enough for us. The Community needs a system that will completely eliminate the possibility of war, of any armed conflict. For that reason, its prime task should be to develop security structures that will ensure a peace of unprecedented quality, at all events systematically better than that offered by the framework of the 35: a mini-United Nations is not sufficient and therefore unacceptable for us! So we must be vigilant in order not to be overtaken by events or lulled by the ceremonial speeches which normally accompany such operations. That is why I believe, Mr Chairman, that economic and monetary union and the internal market are, apart from the Kohl-Mitterrand message, the cues for a swift and practical search for solutions to the great issues now facing us as a result of the accelerated pace of development in East-West relations.

We now give the floor to Max KOHNSTAMM, another Dutch negotiator of the Paris Treaty. He was First Secretary of the High Authority — the equivalent of the present-day Secretary-General of the Commission. It therefore fell to him to organize the establishment of all the institutional structures created at the time. He was subsequently Vice-Chairman of the Action Committee for the United States of Europe, formed and chaired by Jean MONNET.

Mr Max KOHNSTAMM, *Dutch negotiator of the Paris Treaty, First Secretary of the High Authority, Vice-Chairman of the Action Committee for the United States of Europe*

I did not have the privilege of really knowing Robert SCHUMAN. But there was an encounter with him that I have never forgotten. It was right at the beginning of the negotiations that came after his Declaration, when we were working at the Quai d'Orsay. One day, a door opens and Robert SCHUMAN enters the room where we all are. We try to get up, but he waves us back into our seats. He goes to the end of the table, saying: 'carry on'. After a little while, he gets up: 'Fine, you're not negotiating, but looking for solutions!', and out he goes.

It might be worth carving those words on all the tables in the Community conference rooms!

As for Jean MONNET, I had the extraordinary good fortune to work with him for a quarter of a century. Working with him meant being in constant conversation with

him. I could not get rid of the habit and I am still, even today, conversing with him. But before I say a few things about Jean MONNET and the future of the Community, I must repeat what his wife told me after his death: 'Keep thinking and working along his lines, but never imagine you know for sure what Jean would have thought or done, because he was capable of finding solutions that nobody else would ever have come up with'. So I am warning you: I will try to keep Monnet's way of seeing things, but I'm not Jean Monnet!

And now for the few things I wanted to say.

To begin with, Jean MONNET would have rejoiced at all that has been happening these last few years within the Community, and particularly at the turn of events since the wall separating the two Germanys has come down. After all, he considered the union of Germany in the Community to be an essential prerequisite to the organization of peace between East and West.

Then, from 1950 right up to the time of UK accession, I was witness to the tenacity with which Jean MONNET desired and sought Britain's entry into the Community. For him, there was but one condition: no country was to be at once inside and outside. I believe — but I repeat my warning of a few moments ago — that Jean MONNET would now tell the EFTA countries: you are asking the impossible, you want to be inside and outside at the same time. To those afraid that enlargement to embrace those countries could weaken the Community, he would reiterate what he has written: 'the Community is neither a small Europe nor a restricted community. Its boundaries are not fixed by ourselves. They are determined by those very countries which, for the moment, have not joined us. It is up to them to decide whether our boundaries are extended and whether the barriers that separate our countries of Europe ... are gradually removed'.

To the question: 'But how can the Community function with so many members?' he would have replied: it's very simple, by strengthening its institutions. How do we do that? Well, that's the very problem now confronting our foreign ministers. It is also something that was always on Jean MONNET's mind. It would be interesting to collate all the suggestions made in the resolutions of his Committee and elsewhere. I was amused, in any case, to find among my own papers a note of a conversation I had with Jean MONNET and Mr von BRENTANO, then Chairman of the CDU-CSU Group in the Bundestag. They were agreeing on the following proposal: 'The European Parliament shall appoint the President of the Commission, who shall then appoint its Members'. I hope that this 1963 proposal does not sound too revolutionary 27 years on!

Lastly, for Jean MONNET — as he has clearly said in his memoirs — the Community was not an end in itself, but an essential factor for peace between East and West.

How to achieve it? I quote one of his memos, dating from 1963: 'The aim of European integration is to banish the spirit of superiority, of domination, which has motivated the various nations of Europe and led them to war — to the last two wars in particular — and virtually destroyed Europe ... How are we to do it?

Apply between nations the principles of nations themselves and of civilization (rules, institutions):

In creating Europe, we establish a balance with the United States;

By creating the partnership that then becomes possible between Europe and the United States, we make agreement between East and West possible. Then we have the beginning of the organization of peace. Otherwise, domination continues and, with nuclear weapons, it will mean the destruction of mankind'.

How are we to achieve all this in the present circumstances? Forty years ago, Robert SCHUMAN and Jean MONNET, thinking mainly at the time of Germany and France, told us: 'Europe will not be built all at once, or as a single whole: it will be built by concrete achievements which first create *de facto* solidarity'.

We therefore need an architecture for a greater Europe, with Germany unified and not neutral: a special status for Germany would be destructive for all.

I believe that today, as he did 40 years ago, Jean MONNET would call for limited but practical action that would prompt East and West — looking beyond the balance of forces — to equip themselves with an organization issuing rules binding upon everybody, initially in a still limited but material area. Only freely accepted constraints can permanently guarantee peace.

This time that area will assuredly not be coal and steel. Why shouldn't the CSCE member countries set up an organization responsible for monitoring progress on arms limitation and spurring force reductions? And why not set up in it a small group of independent figures reporting to the ministers of the CSCE member countries and responsible — at the outset — exclusively for evaluating the reports by teams monitoring the undertakings made by the various members, and for submitting to the ministers their ideas on how to continue the process towards a guaranteed and lasting peace. You may not think this is such a good idea, but it is certainly no more far-fetched or revolutionary than was Robert SCHUMAN's Declaration 40 years ago, only a few years after the end of what was by no means a cold war, but a war as real as it was cruel.

To those who fear that the Community may disappear in such a construct, Jean MONNET would say: 'Don't be afraid, because the Community is by definition its

dynamo, its example and its backbone. The Community's not strong enough for that? Then let's strengthen it!'

(Mr Georges BERTHOIN then announced Albert COPPÉ, negotiator for Belgium of the first European Treaty, who was Vice-President of the High Authority of the European Coal and Steel Community)

Mr Albert COPPÉ, *negotiator for Belgium of the first European Treaty, former Vice-President of the High Authority of the ECSC*

I have five points to make by way of comment on what has already been said.

Mr Karl-Heinz NARJES said he admired the political courage of Robert SCHUMAN and Konrad ADENAUER; but we must still not forget that the time was ripe. To tell the truth, Germany wanted at any cost to regain her place in the community of nations, whilst France was terrified that authority over the Ruhr be restored to its former owners. Hence the British proposal to socialize the Ruhr. The American answer to that was that America had not won the war to spread socialism. It was just then that Jean MONNET presented his proposal to Europeanize the issue and the solution. He had had it up his sleeve for quite a while. The proposal was promptly accepted. So his courage was displayed in the right place at the right time.

I would like to draw an inference here for today. If the time was ripe in 1950 for one step towards economic integration, it is just as ripe for a leap towards economic and monetary union, and even towards political union. The success of the economic, political, social and philosophical reconstruction of the East depends on structures 'made in Western Europe'. If we fail to strengthen our own structures, we shall fail to accomplish that essential task which corresponds, 40 years on, to the original Franco-German reconciliation based on coal and steel.

So the time is ripe again, but there won't be a second chance. 'Everything in this life has its decisive moment', said Cardinal DE RITZ.

My second comment is also addressed to Karl-Heinz NARJES and concerns Jean MONNET's courage in beginning with six. I don't think it was so much great courage, but rather a very expedient approach that suited the circumstances, the idea of a two-speed Europe. 'Let's make a success of our business — he always spoke of the European Coal and Steel Community as a business — and the British will come knocking at the door, even if it takes 20 years'. He was right: it did take 20 years.

We began with six, and if we hadn't done so we wouldn't be here now. At the time, we had to begin as six, and with that one little bit of sovereignty represented by coal and steel. God knows if, 10 years later, these two industries would find themselves financially and economically with their backs to the wall; but at the time, they were regarded as vital in avoiding any future war between France and Germany.

Today we are again, in my opinion, facing the prospect of a two-speed Europe: it is our internal market, in which the British will be present, and for ever, even if they stay out of political union and monetary union. Either they join us or they don't, but there will be no reward for them.

But, as I see it, economic and monetary union is the complement to the internal market, as the security union must be to political union. What we have to do today is forge new forms (mainly through security and currency) of the *de facto* solidarity which already exists and to which Robert SCHUMAN was referring in 1950.

Third point: the main opposition has never come from employers' associations, nor from the trade unions, but always from the bureaucracies! Far be it from me to speak ill of them, but I was Minister for Economic Affairs long enough to know how a government or an administration negotiates a treaty like the ECSC Treaty. It likes to keep what it has and is loath to yield power.

To illustrate what Robert SCHUMAN meant when he said, 'You are not negotiating, but looking for solutions', I will relate an anecdote which shows the contribution that each negotiator could make when he wanted to (who wanted nothing else but the single market, which is the case with the British), when he was convinced of the purpose to be served. At one point, a Dutch negotiator exclaims: 'All that I've been saying for the last two hours may seem daft to you ...' and then, when all the others are staring at him, goes on: '... But if you could see my instructions, you wouldn't think so any more!' This is just to show that if the officials responsible for negotiating don't use some initiative, if they don't agree, if they're not convinced or if — as is often the case — the minister has neither the power nor the authority to impose his views, all that remains is to gamble on the powers of persuasion of the partners and pray that a veto isn't lurking round the corner.

My fourth point concerns the 'anchorage' of the European Community, which has been said to be France and Germany. It's true! Let me tell you another story about this. I was Minister for Economic Affairs and someone asked me: 'Coppé, what are we going to do: the French and Germans have just proposed a European coal and steel union?' I will always remember my answer: 'If the French and the Germans propose a common market, even if it is only a market in slippers, we cannot stay out.' I was, of course, reacting in my capacity as Minister for Economic Affairs; Mr

VAN ZEELAND was responsible for the political reaction. Today, instead of slippers, we're looking at economic and monetary union, monetary stability.

My fifth point concerns the single big mistake we made: agreeing at The Hague Summit in 1969 to widen the Community before deepening it. I remember at the time making an anxious telephone call to VAN ELSLANDE: 'Surely you're not going to do that: after all, we are inside and we will have to run that enlarged Community. You are going to enlarge us to let in countries that are far from convinced of the need for majority voting or supranationality. You're going to enlarge us to let them in without having begun to deepen our own relationship ...' The answer was: 'It's too late, we're committed!'

One last point. I'm sometimes astonished at the progress we have made in the reconciliation between all the Western Europeans. If we were to bring in political union tomorrow and give Community citizens voting rights at local elections (except in a place that Mr EYSKENS and I know well ...), we would have no difficulty: the Italians are regarded as compatriots, the Spaniards too, and so on. This is the result of 40 years working together. It is what Robert SCHUMAN would have called *de facto* solidarity. And what have the Communists achieved? Nothing!

Mr Franco BOBBA, *Italian negotiator of the Treaty of Rome, former official at the Italian embassy in Luxembourg, with responsibility for monitoring the activities of the High Authority and the gradual establishment of the institutions*

We have very little time left and I do not want to delay the ceremony, so I will confine myself to a few brief remarks.

Our Chairman has recalled that in 1952 I was sent, at the personal request of Mr Alcide DE GASPERI (one of the three statesmen who launched the ship of European unity) to my country's embassy in Luxembourg, where I was to observe that ship's maiden voyage at first hand. I had already followed the negotiation of the EDC, which in its turn begat the preparations for the Treaty on the political Community.

In Luxembourg, I was also initiated into the mysteries of coal and steel under Pierre URI's expert guidance; from there, I made my way to the negotiations for the Treaty of Rome, and finally graduated into the ranks of the Commission.

All this experience taught me one vital lesson. The Schuman formula — one objective: European federation; one method: solidarity of interests and institutions vested with powers — has worked and has marked an era, the era of the decline of the tragic nationalism of the last two centuries, for the Community has demonstrated its capacity

to help it through its death throes. Now, the cold war has come to an end under the pressure of the West's military challenge, guided by the United States, and of the success of our pattern of economic development rooted in freedom and solidarity.

As I see it, *perestroika* is no more than the admission that a political and economic system has finally collapsed. But the problem thus resolved has, as always down the centuries, generated others.

The dream long nurtured by many in the West — especially on the left — that 'true socialism' would evolve into democracy is fading fast. The belief was that the Soviet system, despite all the dictatorial and bureaucratic forms and superstructures which 'adorned' it, would have allowed, even stimulated, economic modernization and development: in short, progress comparable to what the West was enjoying.

But the end of the cold war has shown that behind the facade of 'true socialism' there was little if anything in the way of substance. The papers related that at a recent May Day procession in Moscow, one poster — worthy of Tacitus — was proclaiming '72 years of progress towards the void'. There's the problem: the Russian empire is breaking up, but 40 years of 'true socialism' have smothered the spirit of work and initiative in the satellite countries. The social pressures, on the other hand, are still enormous: the democracies germinating there are delicate; each of these countries is now back with its own heritage of nationalist rivalries and demands, uneasy minorities, religious and ethnic problems. *Mutatis mutandis,* the picture is not unlike the Europe of 1918.

And historical Russia is confronted, within, with the same problems on a far larger scale.

All this, which should be considered in greater depth, strikes me as being the biggest issue with which the Community will have to contend over the next decade or two.

Hence the decision to strengthen the Community — after the decision to create economic and monetary union — by political union, so as to give it the means of acting effectively and swiftly both on foreign policy and on external economic policy.

The Community's history is strewn with more or less ambitious proposals for a political Community: the plan for a political Community provided for in the EDC Treaty, devised in Paris and sunk without trace with its originator; the EDC Treaty itself; the Fouquet plan in de Gaulle's time; the 1971 Pompidou proposals; and finally the Spinelli plan voted through in Strasbourg in 1984.

Our history nevertheless proves that men of different schools — and at different times — have seen the need to give Europe a political architecture. Here I would make only three points, which certainly cannot claim to cover everything.

We must above all avoid tampering with the powers of the Commission as enshrined in the Treaty, unless it is to extend them. The Commission is the sole institution that can safeguard — through its power of initiative — the interests of all Member States and of each of them, keeping a lookout for a valid compromise whenever the need arises. More than 30 years of experience bear this out!

We must above all ensure that the new structures do not serve to put a strait-jacket on the Commission's room for manoeuvre and power of initiative. Some of the previous proposals on this subject looked rather suspicious! Frankly, anything would be better than that.

Finally, to meet the demands of efficiency and speed of which I have already spoken, the Council should extend the scope for majority voting. The unanimity rule is frequently a barrier to sound decisions.

And to conclude, one ingenuous question. On the same day when François MITTERRAND and Helmut KOHL relaunched the idea of a political Community, they sent a letter of advice to the Lithuanian President. Wasn't that an opportunity to step up unified policy-making between all the members of the Community?

Discussion

Mr Georges BERTHOIN

You will all have noticed different shades of opinion among the various speakers; yet what matters most is the extent of the common ground among them. They all share the conviction that the approach adopted by the Declaration of 9 May 1950 was the right one for the time — it matched the circumstances and fulfilled a particular need — and that it remains valid today.

Mr Dirk SPIERENBURG

I agree with what my friend Albert COPPÉ said about opposition from national governments. However, his description of the industrialists makes them out to be paragons of virtue, whereas the objective truth is that they were not always cooperative: witness their opposition to the rules on cartels in Article 65 ECSC.

As regards the Hague Summit, which I attended, I believe that the decision to enlarge the Community was only possible because France, represented by its President, Georges POMPIDOU, proposed at the same time that steps be taken to strengthen it too. In actual fact we only enlarged the Community and didn't strengthen it. Today we must develop the Community further before admitting new members.

Mr Albert COPPÉ

This may be a minor detail, but if my memory serves me right, Article 65 was drafted in Washington: Jean MONNET was keen to do all he could to ensure that we were not seen as the successors of the international steel cartel of the prewar years.

Moreover, the industrialists had hardly any say in the negotiations, especially not the Belgians who were rather on the sidelines and well aware of it! This is why the High Authority was given increased powers in the fields of adjustment, conversion, etc., thereby providing a guarantee for the 'weaker brethren' while the wealthier firms were expected to fend for themselves. And let us not forget that we were very successful in introducing conversion measures in two industries which were vital to

the Community and, being labour-intensive, posed a greater conversion problem than other industries.

Mr Pierre URI

I would like to make two points. Firstly, Mr Dirk SPIERENBURG can rest assured: we are all aware that he was the one who proposed that a Council of Ministers be set up to work alongside the High Authority. Jean MONNET immediately took up the idea and our first reaction was to admit that we needed a link between the pooled industries and the parts of the economy which were to remain in national hands. We regretted not having thought of it earlier.

So there really wasn't a battle at all: on the contrary we were grateful to the Dutch for drawing our attention to this question.

As regards cooperation from industrialists, I have to admit that in France we did have a problem or two ... .

Mr Karl-Heinz NARJES

Let me make just one small point on the question of Central Europe. We are faced with a type of conflict which is totally new and whose seriousness we have been slow to recognize: between the Baltic and the Black Sea there are no less than eight potential flashpoints! The United States is clearly not prepared to play an active part in resolving these problems, so it is up to us to come up with solutions as quickly as possible. The quicker and more effective these solutions are, the greater the chances of avoiding this kind of conflict.

Mr Georges BERTHOIN

I would like to round off the discussion with a few observations to illustrate the new attitude towards the European Community in the rest of the world. A few weeks ago I was invited to Moscow to speak about what happened on 9 May 1950, the methods of Jean MONNET and the general political climate of that period. In my speech I tried to explore how far the methods which were developed as a result of the Schuman Declaration could be applied in practice to help the Central and Eastern European countries tackle their own internal problems and how they could use them in establishing new relations with the Community. I also attempted to assess the strength of the foundations on which the Community has been built.

Another, more spectacular, acknowledgement of the Community's success came at the Paris Summit in July 1989 when the G-7 countries entrusted not just the Community but specifically the Commission with the task of coordinating emergency aid to Poland and Hungary. What is particularly remarkable is that this decision was taken not only by Europeans but also by the Japanese, the Canadians, the Americans, etc. This recognition proves that what began humbly in a limited field has now become the springboard for Europe's return to the world political scene.

In building the European Community, the countries of Western Europe have become partners: their relations are no longer those between the dominant and the dominated. This development — which is significant for non-member countries too — has changed not only the nature of the Community itself, but also its image and the impression it makes on the wider world. The Community is not the instrument of European imperialism; it stands as a model of partnership between great and small — where 'greatness' is determined solely by a country's population — and has consequently inspired confidence throughout the world. In other words, the declaration of Robert SCHUMAN and Jean MONNET has given rise to a new vision, a radically new way of looking at history and acting on it, which has not only transformed relations within Europe but given Europe a new place and role in the world.

Let me end with two quotations. The first is from Robert SCHUMAN, who said: 'The Europe we are building has as its *raison d'être* the principles of solidarity and international cooperation, the rational organization of the world of which it must form an essential part.' On 9 May 1950 our aim was not just to resolve the problems between France and Germany or between Europeans — but to go much further.

Secondly, though this may sound blasphemous, I would like to make a slight alteration to the first paragraph of the Declaration of 9 May in view of the challenges facing us today:

'World peace cannot be established without the making of creative efforts proportionate to the opportunities open to us. The contribution which an organized and living Europe can bring to civilization is indispensable to the development of a peaceful world order.'

I would like to thank you all for taking part in this discussion, for sharing with us the legacy of a particular view of Europe and for bringing the past alive with such vigour and such humour. The President of the European Parliament will now say a few words to mark this auspicious occasion.



Enrique BARÓN CRESPO, President of the European Parliament

Address by Mr Enrique BARÓN CRESPO

President of the European Parliament

Our presence here today is testimony to the fact that the Europe born on 9 May 1950 is still very much alive; and as we look towards a future that is gradually taking clearer shape, we can see that the political message proclaimed by Robert SCHUMAN on 9 May 1950 retains just as much relevance, realism and inspiration 40 years later.

In 1950 Europe was taking its first hesitant steps, against a forbidding post-war background of East-West tension centred mainly on the status of Germany. But so strong were the hopes and determination shared by our 'founding fathers' that these ideas remain the cornerstone of the philosophy underlying our common enterprise today.

Of course, there have been ups and downs: high hopes awakened, and disappointment because the tangible achievements have fallen short of people's expectations. But, although accused of moving too slowly and criticized on many counts, Europe has withstood the 'rough winds' that have shaken it.

We live in a continent blessed by peace: a wonderful achievement after so many centuries of fratricidal conflict!

Since those early days our Community has grown and prospered and rather more recently a number of new Member States have found in it a guarantor of their newly fledged democracies.

Today we celebrate the anniversary of the Community's inception through the Schuman plan with the added pleasure of knowing that it has now taken on a special significance: 1990 marks a genuine 'renaissance' of Europe, a renaissance of its goals and ideals, a renaissance of the practical action it calls for and of the solidarity on which it must rest.

The new-found vitality of the Twelve is further heightened by the many changes taking place just beyond our borders. We feel a close sense of solidarity with the countries and peoples of Central and Eastern Europe as they embark on free multi-

party elections, laying the foundations for the parliamentary democracy which will go to make up our common home, if such it is to be.

The unification of Germany is a clear signal that the continent of Europe is firmly on the road to a new era of cooperation, liberty and peace, and the quickening pace of these historic events has to some extent forced the pace of European integration to quicken, too.

We are particularly glad to see the natural destiny of the German nation being fulfilled inside the Community framework. And although this momentous step prompted unease in some quarters, arousing fears that the progress of European integration might be held back, a positive approach has prevailed in the end. German unification has given a boost to the process of European union, as the Dublin European Council confirmed. To meet all these new challenges, political union and economic and monetary union are essential.

The principles and vision embodied in the Schuman Declaration, then, are not outdated; far from it. I should like to single out some especially telling examples of the farsightedness of Robert SCHUMAN's words that day.

The essential political message of the Declaration lay in its spirit of reconciliation between former enemies — France and Germany in particular. The six founder members of the ECSC shared a common resolve to create a peaceful Europe.

The idea of reconciliation was the driving force behind the progress of European integration over the past decades. And tomorrow's Europe will be the natural home for a reconciled and united German nation.

The idea launched in Dublin at the initiative of President François MITTERRAND and Chancellor Helmut KOHL is not new but it has taken a long time to mature, for ranged against it stood national sovereignty and egoism. Now, however, the goal of political union — which the European Parliament has championed ceaselessly since 1984 — opens up a new dimension for Europe.

It marks a step towards the European union to which we aspire for the sake of ordinary men and women. And although the term 'European union' does not appear explicitly in Robert SCHUMAN's Declaration of 9 May 1950, the underlying idea is there in the words 'this proposal will lay the first concrete foundations of the European federation which is indispensable to the preservation of peace.'

Some years later the Treaty of Rome spelled it out more explicitly in the phrase 'an ever-closer union among the peoples of Europe', and in 1985 the Single Act formally enshrined the goal of a European union. I am convinced that if Robert SCHUMAN were still here today, he would be urging us to 'accomplish it as swiftly as possible.'

The institution of which I am honoured to be President played a crucial part in those developments and has always advocated an approach aptly described by some as Utopian or maximalist. The strategy pursued by the European Parliament, as the guarantor and embodiment of democratic legitimacy, has indeed been to exploit the opportunities offered by the Single Act to the full and to persevere undaunted, loyal to the spirit of Altiero SPINELLI's draft Treaty on European union.

In March 1990, Parliament voted by a large majority to adopt the Martin Report, which clearly signals its intention 'rapidly to transform the European Community into a European union of federal type ... going beyond the single market and economic and monetary union' and maps out the institutional reforms that this will require.

The Community will only function effectively if it is based on a satisfactory balance between the institutions — a balance which will have to bridge the current 'democratic deficit', as it is termed.

I told the Heads of State or Government in Dublin that the time for caution, for the gradualist approach, had passed. The Community has to make a quantum leap forward commensurate with Europe's needs in the closing years of the century. In Dublin the Twelve seemed to understand that a comprehensive, coherent response was required to meet the challenges confronting us now. We welcome that.

The brief they gave to the Foreign Ministers is of crucial importance: I believe that in June they will have to propose a Community that is more solidly based on parliamentary democracy. That alone will give political union its full dimension. The constitutional task before us marks a fascinating enterprise — and one that concerns us all.

On the eve of this fundamental reform of the founding Treaties a preparatory interinstitutional conference has been convened at our initiative to launch a dialogue between the Council, the Member States, the Commission and Parliament, opening on 17 May in Strasbourg. In this forum we will discuss together the agenda for the two intergovernmental conferences and consider how Parliament can participate.

For the sake of maximum coherence, the European Parliament would prefer there to be only a single intergovernmental conference. The mechanism to be set up following the second Dublin European Council must be consistent and effective. At all events we intend to keep a watchful eye on both conferences — on political union and economic and monetary union — to ensure that they proceed consistently, run in parallel and end together.

The first of January 1993 is due to mark the completion of the single market and the entry into force of economic and monetary union and political union. It should also mark the resolve of the 12 Member States to create a federal Europe by the end of the century. The European Parliament fervently hopes so. It would be a tremendous

vindication of the man who taught us that it is the sum of practical achievements which first of all create real solidarity.

United internally, Europe could then speak with one voice to the outside world. That, however, requires a genuine common foreign and security policy. Here again, I would like to return to a passage from Robert SCHUMAN's Declaration: 'The contribution which an organized and vital Europe can make to civilization is indispensable to the maintenance of peaceful relations.' At a time when the contours of our continent are being redrawn this is the only approach that will guarantee the Twelve an active part in events and enable them to meet the expectations of their neighbours.

In this connection Robert SCHUMAN also spoke of 'an organization open to the participation of the other countries of Europe'. Our Community has grown since 1950. What will it look like tomorrow? How far will the comity of European nations extend?

There is no denying the attraction which the Community exerts on a number of other European countries: the cooperation agreements already concluded between the Community and the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, soon due to be transformed into association agreements, and the forthcoming negotiations between the Community and EFTA on the creation of a European economic area — not to mention the membership applications already received from some countries and the declarations of intent by others to apply in the medium term — only serve to highlight the fact.

Once the union is created, our task will be to meet the aspirations of those who wish to participate in working for the same goals of solidarity, cooperation and freedom.

A number of schemes have been put forward ... but one thing is certain: the European Community will be one of the main pillars of this old continent of ours. (Indeed, with all the changes under way and the dynamism it has shown, 'continent of tomorrow' would now be more appropriate.)

We shall probably see a realignment in various arenas — I am thinking especially of the CSCE — with some of them possibly even overlapping in certain complementary fields.

But the Europe of tomorrow will also have to pay heed to appeals from elsewhere. It will have to show solidarity with the poorest countries, especially in the Mediterranean, Africa and Latin America. It will continue to play a mediating role in North-South relations, and it is our duty to show our partners that the closer links being forged with the countries of Eastern Europe will not work to their detriment.

Our Community will not be selfish. It will have to shoulder its responsibilities and act in solidarity with other countries to combat the perils pressing in on us: hunger, drug abuse, overpopulation, environmental destruction, disease.

In conclusion, I should like to return to the opening words of Robert SCHUMAN's Declaration: 'World peace can be safeguarded only by constructive efforts commensurate with the dangers that threaten it.'

The European Community must continue its constructive effort to become a haven of peace — and by peace I mean something embracing far more than the simple absence of war, for the dangers that face us now no longer reside in the threat of arms. May this haven of peace enable our citizens to live in harmony underpinned by shared democratic, human and cultural values, and by its shining example encourage all those throughout the world who share the same goals.

If we succeed in our enterprise, we shall have been faithful to the ideals of our founding fathers. But the road ahead is still long and hard. We must press on together.

Gerard COLLINS, President of the Council

Address by Mr Gerard COLLINS

President of the Council

Ladies and Gentlemen,

We are here today to commemorate Robert SCHUMAN, to honour his achievements, to reaffirm our faith in his ideas and, of course, to salute his contemporaries, some of whom we are deeply honoured to have present with us today.

Robert SCHUMAN would, I have no doubt, have been humble about his own achievements. He once commented that 'we are all instruments, indeed imperfect instruments, of a providence which plays a role in the achievement of great plans which are beyond our understanding.'

If Robert SCHUMAN, Jean MONNET and those who worked closely with them were indeed instruments of providence, truly they were remarkable instruments.

In his Declaration on 9 May 1950, Robert SCHUMAN spoke of the need to make 'creative efforts proportionate to the dangers which threaten'. The 'creative efforts' of which he spoke are as necessary today as they were 40 years ago, but it is a measure of Robert SCHUMAN's achievement and that of his contemporaries that we can truly speak today of directing such creative efforts not so much towards the 'dangers which threaten' Europe as towards the opportunities for our continent which are unfolding before our eyes.

As we look towards the future of Europe with even greater confidence than would have seemed justified only a matter of months ago, we might be tempted at today's ceremony to set our eyes only on that future.

It is important that we should set aside a few hours, as we have done today, to look to the great figures who inspired the creation of the European Community. It is important not just because it is right that they should be so honoured; but because it is in reflecting on their deeply held convictions as well as on their practical ideas that we will draw inspiration for the challenges which lie ahead.

What is most remarkable about the Schuman Declaration is its contemporary relevance. Its key elements remain at the heart of the process of European integration.

In a sense, the task of our generation is and will remain to put flesh on the structure which was outlined by Robert SCHUMAN 40 years ago.

I would like, therefore, today, to reflect briefly on four of the elements so wisely identified by Jean MONNET and Robert SCHUMAN, which made up that structure and which remain of the utmost relevance to our common task.

First, the Schuman Declaration reflected the need to combine an ambitious vision with pragmatic and gradual progress. Thus, on the one hand, Robert SCHUMAN set out a lofty vision which must at the time have seemed little more than a dream — a united Europe in which any war was 'not merely unthinkable, but materially impossible'. On the other hand, the Schuman Declaration recognized that 'Europe will not be constructed all at once, or according to a single plan. It will be built through concrete achievements ...'.

The recognition that imagination and realism had to go hand in hand has been a vital element in the construction of our Community. The vision without the realism would, so to speak, have been a car without wheels. The realism without the vision would have been a car without an engine.

As we look towards negotiations later this year on further necessary changes to the Community Treaties, we must do so with the same combination of imagination and realism which has been the successful inspiration of our common enterprise from the outset.

The second important insight in the Schuman Declaration which I wish to underline today was its recognition that the process of European integration should remain open to others.

Robert SCHUMAN proposed to place the new arrangement for the Franco-German production of coal and steel 'within the framework of an organization open to the participation of the other countries of Europe'. It is I think particularly fitting that this concept should be given expression here today by a President of the Council who comes from a country which was not one of the original Member States of the European Community.

The non-exclusive nature of the vision described by Robert SCHUMAN has not just been a vital factor in the development of the Community but it remains at the heart

of the momentous developments which have been taking place throughout the continent.

Indeed the openness of the Schuman Declaration went beyond our continent when it promised that the proposed joint production of coal and steel would, and I quote, 'be offered to the world as a whole without distinction or exception'.

It is neither necessary nor possible to define today precisely the form which closer relations with all our neighbours in Europe and beyond will take in the longer term. What is necessary is that the openness prescribed by SCHUMAN should continue to guide our enterprise. To borrow Shakespeare's words 'the readiness is all'.

The third important element which we should recall today is the importance of our common institutions and the rules which govern them. The proposal 40 years ago to set up a common High Authority was the boldest step of all into the brave new world which Robert SCHUMAN described and indeed made possible.

Of course, the Community institutions have developed in a remarkable way. We now have a vibrant, democratically elected Parliament, a European Commission the remarkable effectiveness of which has been most recently recognized in the decision to confer on it responsibility for coordinating assistance to Eastern Europe from countries extending way beyond the Community itself. We have a Council of Ministers which takes common decisions for the benefit of all its citizens in a manner unparalleled anywhere in the world or indeed at any time in history, and a Court of Justice universally respected and exercising a formative role of the greatest importance in its interpretation of Community law.

Of course the working of these institutions, which have already been strengthened, must be further improved, but the seed from which they have grown may already be found in the rich soil of the Schuman Declaration.

Finally the fourth aspect of the Declaration to which I wish to draw your attention briefly today is that it envisaged a Community in the real sense of that word rather than just a common market. The Declaration spoke of production but it also spoke of peace.

It spoke of modernization and markets but it also spoke of equalizing and improving living conditions of workers. We have come a long way since then in terms of the social dimension and cohesion, in terms of a people's Europe and the environment. The essential insight, however, remains unchanged that while the market lies at the centre of our enterprise, it will utterly fail to meet the aspirations

of the people of Europe if the process of transforming it into a real Community is not maintained.

Our enterprise is doomed to fail if its races are always to the swift, its battles to the strong and if its weakest are expected to go to the wall.

Of course, that was not Robert SCHUMAN's vision of a Community 40 years ago. It is not our vision today — and that is why we may look forward to our future in Europe with confidence and hope.

Ole DUE, President of the Court of Justice

Address by Mr Ole DUE

President of the Court of Justice of the European Communities

Ladies and Gentlemen,

I have learnt a lot from the members of the Round Table today, and I have been most impressed by the topicality of what they have had to say.

Political vision and action: those are the essential features of the Schuman Declaration. It does not in itself constitute what the lawyers would term a source of law, but it remains, with its underlying ideas, a source of inspiration for the Court of Justice and all the other Community institutions.

It was, above all, an act of peace. The aim was to replace economic nationalism by solidarity. The means envisioned was to pool together, under common institutions, powers that had until then been the preserve of national sovereignty.

The Declaration proposed setting up a system based on the rule of law: not traditional international law, but a new kind of law which would apply to firms and enterprises as well as to States.

Set up under the ECSC Treaty with the general task of ensuring that 'in the interpretation and application of this Treaty ... the law is observed' — an obligation later confirmed by the other two Treaties — the Court has followed these innovative ideas in its rulings to this day.

It has taken great pains to avoid interpreting the Community Treaties as if they were simply treaties under traditional international law. It has elaborated a range of principles designed to safeguard the full freedom of the institutions to exercise their powers and to ensure the genuine effectiveness of Community rules. It has held that any rule which imposes clear, unambiguous and unconditional obligations on the Member States has direct effect in their domestic legal orders; and where rules do not satisfy this test, it has stressed that all national judicial and administrative

authorities are bound to give effect to them as far as is within their powers and compatible with national law.

In exercising the powers conferred on it by the Treaties, and notably in its close cooperation with national courts over references for preliminary rulings, the Court has done its utmost to put into practice the ideas underlying the Schuman Declaration. That it has been able to do so is thanks to its complete independence, an independence guaranteed by the Treaties and always fully respected by the Member States and the other institutions.

How can the Court continue to play its vital role in the development of Community law inside a consolidated, strengthened and, in the longer term, enlarged Community? An initial response was given last year, with the establishment of a Court of First Instance, but this was only a partial answer, particularly in view of the limited jurisdiction granted to the new Court.

Any institutional reform to meet the challenge posed by new areas of Community activity will therefore have to include a careful review of the rules governing the Court of Justice. The Court itself will not fail in its duty to put forward proposals when the time comes.

So far, political debate on this issue has concentrated on ways of making Community law more effective. Today is not the occasion to comment on the ideas that have been put forward. But I would like to stress the importance, especially in this context, of cooperation between national courts and the Court of Justice and of the effect accorded by the Court to the rules of Community law in the national legal orders.

Increasingly, Community citizens are coming to realize that this law is not just a foreign system imposed on their country by remote outside authorities that cannot be challenged in the courts, but that it is their own law which they can invoke against their own local and national authorities before their own courts.

In his memorandum of 3 May 1950 Jean MONNET wrote: 'To alter the course of events, people's attitudes must be changed.' Perhaps the realization I have just spoken of is a sign of the kind of change in attitudes that Jean MONNET hoped for. Surely that is the best guarantee, in the long run, to ensure the effectiveness of Community law and ultimately achieve the vision set out in the Schuman Declaration.

Closing address by the President of the Commission

Closing address by Mr Jacques DELORS

President of the Commission of the European Communities

Ladies and Gentlemen,

A few closing remarks, if I may.

I have said before that everything was contained in the Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community, and hence in Robert SCHUMAN's Declaration. I would like to illustrate the point by considering three things:

— the inception and direction of change;

— political motivation;

— the validity of the institutional pattern established at that time.

All this when it is more important than ever for us to combine vision and pragmatism. Just as in 1950, we currently face a world full of unknowns.

We cannot tell what fate awaits the experiment of *perestroika,* or what new threats are going to emerge to trouble our citizens' security and peace, or ... I could go on. Vision and pragmatism are what is required of us — now, as then.

First the inception and direction of change. Jean MONNET said: 'Change has to come from the outside by force of necessity.' In 1949 and 1950 the necessity was there, in the shape of the German question as it stood then and the cold war. Mr Bernard CLAPPIER has recalled the failure of traditional methods to resolve the problems: there are some who would do well to remember it today.

Necessity also held us in its grip in 1984-85, although the circumstances were less dramatic. On that occasion we placed the accent on economic necessity — a prospect admittedly less stirring, but real and immediate nevertheless. The results are clear for all to see: before 1985 the annual growth rate of the European economy lay somewhere in the region of 1.5%, whereas now it is 3.5% or even higher. Before 1985, jobs were

being lost at a rate of 600 000 a year, whereas now 1 800 000 new ones are created annually.

Furthermore, in February 1988, under the German Presidency (a fact we should not forget in view of Germany's financial contribution to the Community), we put in place an array of financial instruments with resources exceeding the Marshall Plan to enable the regions to benefit from the potential offered by a large single economic area.

Now necessity has intervened again. We are confronted by a new German question and, perhaps, the end of the cold war. Necessity faces us once more, but this time an eminently political necessity. For, while economic and monetary union is still closely bound up with the strategy we have been pursuing since 1985, political union (or what I would prefer to call strengthening the political and institutional dimension of Europe) is dictated, as it were, by historical necessity.

However, the underlying motives were — and still are — political. This was so in 1984-85, even if we first had to prove that the necessity was there. I would like to quote something that Robert SCHUMAN said in October 1953 in a talk at the College of Europe in Bruges: 'We started' he said, 'from political considerations far more than from economic ones. To disempoison relations between France and Germany. To safeguard peace. To create a climate of cooperation throughout Europe. Those were our prime objectives.'

We could replace 'France' by the other countries of Europe and the statement would still hold good today.

Peace in Europe, the search for a new security framework — a formidable question that overshadows everything else, even if no one says so openly because it is so heavily charged with the unknown — the need for the world to face up to new dangers and to the problems of underdevelopment and inequality of opportunity, the creation of a climate of cooperation across Europe: these are the challenges confronting us now — a clear testimony to the enduring relevance of the Schuman Declaration.

Sometimes, though, I wonder whether the method is still the right one: right for the Community and right for greater Europe as well. My answer is: yes, it is still valid, and I will illustrate this by one or two topical points.

First we must keep a careful eye on the institutional balance. For that is what has enabled the Community, regardless of individuals and the capricious whims of history, to continue to advance — sometimes slowly, other times more swiftly. That is where the strength of our institutions lies. If some governments wish to alter any one of

them, then they must also suggest ways of maintaining a balance that is just as dynamic, institutions that are just as strong — in other words, institutions that have a bounden duty to produce results and which will enable us to reach decisions. This could, of course, be taken as an opportunity to mount a defence and illustration of one of the institutions — namely the Commission. However, I will refrain from doing so here.

The second topical issue I would like to raise is 'democratization'. This is a vital task. I often have the impression that what we have done in the past 40 years — and especially the past five, where the economic aspect has predominated — has been rather elitist in its approach and remote from the ordinary citizen. One way to bring ourselves closer is democratization.

The mere idea, of course, sends a shiver of apprehension through some of our governments — and parliaments too. Yet this is very strange indeed — a contradiction, even — when they themselves never tire of telling the countries of Eastern Europe that one of the conditions for success — including material success — is to apply the recipe of pluralist democracy and direct popular representation.

The logic of democratization, ladies and gentlemen, is simple; and before we cloud the issue in discussion, we should remember one thing: an executive should be accountable to a parliament, a parliament that will legislate and sanction the executive's actions, and a court of justice that can extend its powers to become a constitutional court precisely in order to ensure that the rights of all are respected.

To depart from that logic would be to build on sand. You may think I have forgotten the European Council and the Council of Ministers. Far from it, and least of all the Council of Ministers, as I think of another saying of Robert SCHUMAN's — one which I did not know before but which I cannot get out of my head now: 'You are not negotiating, you are trying to find a solution'. To anyone who thinks we could abandon the *acquis communautaire* and build a grand new manor in its place I would say: 'Come with me and sit in the corner at a General Affairs Council and Coreper. Then you'll see. They seek solutions, they are duty-bound to come up with results, they are imbued through and through with the Community spirit.' No, I have not forgotten them.

The simple fact is, however, that neither the European Council nor the Council of Ministers entertains the slightest notion of being accountable to the European Parliament. Yet a logical structure has to be found, all the same. The European Council has been playing an increasingly important role although it did not form part of the original ECSC scheme, and we are bound to admit that, acting on

proposals from the Commission or the Council, it does perform its task of weighing up matters and setting things in motion quite well.

As for the Council of Ministers, it too will have its part to play.

But if we want to make fundamental changes to the system established by the ECSC Treaty, then we must always bear in mind the two principles of institutional balance and the simple law of democratization.

Whatever people may say, it is perfectly possible to implement those two principles without abandoning either national diversity (the Germans will still be German, the French, French and so on) or subsidiarity and so eventually arrive by a pragmatic route at a realistic — though not, of course, definitive — division of powers and responsibilities.

It seems to me, then, that the philosophy and pattern of the institutions bequeathed to us by Robert Schuman's Declaration are still relevant today. But there are two further objections to be dealt with.

The first comes from those who question whether this approach is still valid when it comes to extending the Community to include foreign policy and security. The answer is: no, not initially. The Community has to be allowed to mature. Political cooperation cannot move forward as fast as economic integration. Each country has its own diplomatic traditions, its own historical ties, its own geopolitical interests.

But with so many demands now being made on us throughout the world, the question being asked of our heads of government is: 'Can you agree on some essential common interests in a strictly limited number of areas that will serve as a basis for common action?'

Those essential common interests will enable you to exert an influence commensurate with your economic strength, to assume the responsibilities to match the expectations of the less wealthy, the less affluent. And those essential common interests will have to be agreed on. The task need not necessarily be given to the Commission, but a method along these lines will have to be found. Otherwise we will relapse into negotiation rather than the search for a solution, as happens all too often in the case of political cooperation.

The second objection that could be raised is whether this is a realistic scheme for the greater Europe of tomorrow. Max KOHNSTAMM, enthusiastic and dynamic as ever, has made a two-faceted proposal. 'Why not,' he suggests, 'apply the same

method in the CSCE, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe?' And the answer he gives is: 'Yes, but provided the Community is strengthened.' The question is — which is the chicken and which is the egg?

As true, careful Europeans we shall have to keep a watchful eye on the *acquis communautaire* during the coming months, to avoid throwing out the baby with the bath water.

Imagine the clamour we would face if, in a hastily cobbled-together package, confounding vision with pragmatism, we were to dream up a new structure in order to satisfy straight away the wishes — however ardent — of the Czechs, Poles, Norwegians, Austrians, etc. What would we do, knowing that inside the Community the spirit of Jean MONNET and Robert SCHUMAN has to be rekindled anew every day as we learn to manage and exercise our joint sovereignty?

Let us, then, stretch out a welcoming hand to the other countries of Europe; but let us not throw away what we have gained through Robert SCHUMAN, Jean MONNET, and all who worked with them.

Thank you.

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

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

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

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