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a survey

EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

Directorate General for Parliamentary

Documentation and Information

In addition to the official acts published in het Official Gazette of the European Communities, the activities of the European Communities are reported on in publications appearing at regular intervals.

Thus, the Commission of the European Communities publishes a Monthly Bulletin on the activities of the Communities while the European Parliament issues a periodical Information Bulletin on its own activities.

The Council of Ministers issues a press release after all its sessions. Its activities are also reported on in a special section of the Bulletin of the European Communities.

The Economic and Social Committee issues press releases at the close of its plenary sessions, and its overall activities are reported on in a Quarterly Information Bulletin.

The Survey of European Documentation is intended to serve as a supplement to the above publications. It deals with salient features of the process of European integration taking place outside Community bodies.

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$\label{eq:PartI} \mbox{\sc Development of European Integration}$ At the National Level

I. GOVERNMENTS AND PARLIAMENTS

Austria

Austria announces a new approach to the EEC

At a press conference held on 3 November 1969 Mr. Waldheim, Austrian Foreign Minister, announced a new Austrian bid for co-operation with the EEC. The previous week he had called a conference of all Austria's ambassadors in EEC and EFTA countries. On 4 November the Austrian Council of Ministers discussed the outcome of this conference, which Mr.Waldheim described as particularly timely in view of the forthcoming EEC summit meeting.

'At the coming EEC conference at The Hague', said Mr. Waldheim, 'Austria will be making a new attempt to get talks started up again on closer co-operation with the EEC.'

Austria's ultimate objective - he continued - was still to conclude with the EEC a special agreement which, while consistent with his country's neutrality, would allow for close co-operation with the Community. Because such an agreement was, under the present circumstances, unlikely to materialize, Vienna would now make approaches in Brussels and in the other EEC capitals to get negotiations on an interim arrangement started as soon as possible.

This interim arrangement could take the form of a trade policy settlement, on the basis of the proposals made by Mr. Debré and Mr. Brandt, leading to a preferential agreement that would abolish discrimination against Austria's exports in the Common Market.

Mr. Waldheim said that the main point was that Austria should make known its wishes in Brussels in good time. Mr. Mitterer, Minister of Trade, considered it would be only fair if one of the six EEC Governments now took the next step, because Austria had so far done everything to establish a closer economic relationship with the EEC in order to eliminate discrimination. The Foreign Minister did not think, however, that Austria could count on such a

move from the EEC. Although, as far as Austria was concerned, a lot might hang on the EEC summit meeting at The Hague, no one in Vienna expected an offer of negotiations on the enlargement of the Community; the most that could be hoped for was a decision to negotiate at some as yet unspecified date.

Like Sweden and Switzerland, Austria had already applied to the EEC, at the end of 1961, for an economic association that took into account its neutral status. In July 1962 Austria explained its standpoint in great detail. Since then, however, it has made no progress. On the other hand the precedence given to applications from Britain, Ireland, Norway and Denmark has further reduced the prospects of the neutral States' establishing special relations with the EEC. On 3 November 1969, however, Chancellor Brandt said in an interview with 'The Times' that Germany was pressing to come to special arrangements with Switzerland and Austria.

(Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 4 November 1969; Die Welt, 4 November 1969; Industriekurier, 4 November 1969; The Times, 3 November 1969)

Belgium

1. Deferred introduction of the value-added tax (VAT)

The general report on the budget for 1970 submitted by the Government to the Chamber of Representatives on 30 September explains why Belgium had asked the European Communities for authorization to defer the implementation of the value-added tax in Belgium.

'At a time when it is laying down the basic aims of its economic and financial policy for 1970, the Government has been making a complete reassessment of all the implications of introducing the value-added tax on 1 January 1970. This review has led it to suggest to the European Communities that the introduction of this tax should be deferred to 1971. This procedure is in line with the Council decision of 17 July 1969 on co-ordinating the short-term economic policies of member States.

Since the beginning of May 1969 when the Government decided to reduce some VAT rates and to amend the classification of products and services, cyclical trends have brought the economy to a point where there is undoubtedly some risk of overheating. All the available indicators lead us to expect that economic and financial tensions will persist right up to the beginning of 1970.'

The Government then puts forward data showing that both economic and financial tensions have been growing more pronounced for some months:

'Confronted with this situation, the Government felt bound to assume the responsibility for deferring the introduction of VAT for one year.

There is no point in adding to the risks of overheating referred to, another factor - the value-added tax - which would undoubtedly aggravate them. VAT would lead to a change in relative price levels which in turn could provoke, in a highly expansive economy, an excessive rise in general price levels. This would wipe out the tax reliefs inherent in the system, particularly those in favour of exports and investment.

Similarly, when the economy is in the process of expansion, it becomes more hazardous to take any budgetary risk because the State finds it harder and harder to obtain credit at reasonable rates. This budgetary risk

is a real one because the income from VAT will probably be less than that now obtained from the present transmission tax and because the bulk of the proceeds of VAT in the first month will probably only be collected six weeks later.

All these points fully justify the Government's attitude in deferring the introduction of VAT until 1 January 1971. The period of grace available to the authorities will be largely taken advantage of to promote the best economic and financial conditions for ensuring a smooth transition to the new system,'

(Chamber of Representatives, Doc. No. 4, 1969-70)

2. The Euratom crisis - question put before the Chamber of Representatives

On 20 November Mr. Glinne (Socialist) put a question in the Belgian Chamber of Representatives on 'the Euratom crisis and the measures the Government will take to safeguard the future of this institution and to guarantee the employment of several hundred European research workers.'

He deplored the fact that Euratom's programme of activities had been completely watered down. Speaking for the Socialist group, he asked that the new programme be based on three essential features: uranium enrichment, fast reactors and intermediate reactors. Euratom ought not to be used to defray the general expenses of national nuclear policies. With reference to Euratom's employees, Mr. Glinne asked for details about their future. He further questioned the Minister on Belgium's financial contribution towards Euratom's expenses.

In reply to Mr. Glinne's question Mr. Théo Lefevre, Minister for Science Policy and Planning, stated, with reference to the European nuclear research programme, that 'the Belgian Government would like all the European countries to concentrate their main nuclear activities in Euratom. It has moreover always given the common programme priority over the national programme. But the nuclear policy so far pursued in Europe has not been geared to any realistic industrial prospects. There should be a new policy based on the constitution of a few industrial consortia and a much reduced number of reactor strings selected in agreement with industry and national electricity boards. In the past we have financed very costly research on too many strings which neither industry nor the users then wanted to adopt. We must now concentrate Community efforts on fast reactors, uranium enrichment and on high-

temperature gas reactors, and leave the minor projects to the national authorities. The Belgian Government obviously regrets that a number of countries should have chosen the national context for the three key research areas, and that they should have left to the Community only minor, accessory or long-term projects, or even projects of fundamental research or in the public interest.'

On the uncertain situation of staff of Euratom Mr. Lefèvre said: 'The length of contracts in Euratom, as in any institution involving international co-operation, depends on the nature of the programmes. A coherent joint programme such as that referred to in the reply to the first question must obviously extend over several years. Where, on the other hand, marginal activities are pursued under a programme in which the key objectives play no part, common sense obliges us to set a term on our commitments. The main reasons for the Euratom crisis are political. The hold-up has gone on for three years. If there is no improvement before the end of 1970, we shall have to review the situation because the Government cannot contemplate going on indefinitely disbursing hundreds of millions of francs each year on activities whose utility becomes increasingly marginal as the institution itself runs down.'

Lastly Mr. Lefèvre stressed the disproportionately high contribution Belgium had to make to the financing of Euratom's expenditure. He thought that the rate of 9.9 per cent was far in excess of the relative size of Belgium's gross national product. 'Since 1967, therefore, Belgium has been asking that its contribution to the research and investment budget should be reduced from 9.9 per cent to a maximum of 7.9 per cent. It goes without saying that if a fairer share for Belgium is not unanimously voted for we shall respect the Treaty which we signed and ratified, and continue to finance Euratom's joint research budget at the rate of 9.9 per cent. But this inequitable rate can obviously not be applied with our consent to non-nuclear or special programmes not provided for by the Treaty and in respect of which we have no commitment. (Special programmes are those which some countries do not share in financing.) Most of our partners, moreover, accept this point of view.'

At the close of the debate Mr. Croo (Liberal) tabled a motion which was also signed by Mr. Meyers (Christian Democrat) and Mr. Radoux (Socialist). The Chamber adopted this motion on 27 November: 'The Chamber, after hearing Mr. Glinne's question, considers that it is essential to save Euratom and that this cannot be effectively done except by restoring to it a substantial joint research programme covering uranium enrichment and reactor development. It feels it is important to give the necessary assurances to European research workers and staff concerning their future both to avoid the loss of scientific skills Europe can ill afford and for reasons of a social nature ...'

Speaking for the Communist group, Mr. Levaux stated that the text of the motion was ambiguous and that he would abstain from voting: 'We believe that it is important to safeguard the future of Belgian and European research workers so that they may give Belgium and the countries of Europe the benefit of their work and also to ensure they are not tempted to emigrate to the United States; but we believe that the European body called Euratom cannot be supported, if only because of the hostile attitude it has adopted towards the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.'

(Chamber of Representatives, Summary Report, Sittings of 20 and 27 November 1969)

Denmark

Policy statement on Nordic integration by the Danish Minister for Economic Affairs and European Trade Relations

The October 1969 edition of the review 'Wirtschaftsdienst' contains a detailed article on Nordic integration by Professor P. Nyboe Andersen, Danish Minister for Economic Affairs and European Trade Relations.

'When in the fifties the Europe of the Six took its economic integration in hand, attempts were made to found a Nordic customs union. These initiatives were however overtaken by events in Europe. The European Free Trade Area was set up and joined by Denmark, Norway and Sweden, Finland becoming an associate member. As a result Western Europe was split into two markets, and every attempt to end this division of the whole European market has so far unfortunately failed.

At the beginning of 1968, when no breakthrough to European integration could be expected either through EFTA or the EEC, the Governments of the Nordic States decided to make a new attempt to push ahead with economic integration in their part of Europe. This decision was taken at a conference of the prime ministers of these countries in Copenhagen in 1968. The guiding principle of this economic integration is to prepare the four countries for a European settlement embracing a vast area ...

The aim of this Nordic co-operation is not only closer co-operation in conventional fields such as customs union, foreign trade policy, agricultural and fisheries policy, capital movements and so forth, but also in other fields such as industrial policy, education and technological and scientific research.

In mid-July 1969 a committee of experts from the Governments put forward a draft treaty for a Nordic economic union. This proposed setting up the following common institutions:

- 1. a council of ministers responsible for Nordic co-operation;
- a standing committee consisting of senior officials to prepare the decisions of the council of ministers;
- 3. a secretariat headed by four directors to take in hand the implementation of the aims set out in the treaty. The four directors would be nominated by the four Governments of the Nordic countries.

There is a wide measure of agreement on the contents of the treaty. This covers the following fields: general economic policy, capital movements, trade policy, shipping policy, industrial and energy policy, labour market questions and social policy, trade practices and rules of competition, education, and aid to research and development. For many fields the proposals do not go into detail, but at least general principles for co-operation are set out. To give effect to these, the draft treaty also deals with questions of procedure, lays down time-limits for working out guidelines and defines the terms of reference of the Nordic organizations that have to take decisions on how to carry out this co-operation. The council of ministers has to decide what form co-operation is to take, so that future requirements can be satisfied in a flexible way.

It is also proposed to set up a customs union as the basis for closer co-operation between the Nordic States. For Denmark it is important that such co-operation in the field of customs policy should not blunt the competitive edge of Danish industry. Any agreement on common customs duties for almost all industrial goods must therefore allow Denmark (and Norway) to suspend certain customs rates and to maintain exceptional tariffs.

It is proposed that this customs union should come into effect on 1 January 1972. But for reasons to be discussed later, Denmark's agreement to the customs union as a whole and as regards the timing of its entry into force will also depend on Nordic co-operation in agriculture.

The competitiveness of Nordic industries is to be promoted through closer co-operation and harmonization of industrial policies and energy policies, including nuclear energy ...

Closer co-operation among the Nordic States in agriculture hinges on the principle that food requirements that cannot be met from domestic output should be covered by imports from the other Nordic States. To ensure that these are met mainly from Nordic sources, fully effective preferences are to be introduced. Various regulations have been proposed but so far it has not been possible to reach agreement on the practical measures to be applied in the individual countries for the various groups of products, including industrially processed foodstuffs. Because the various regulations proposed will have different effects on the expansion of intra-Nordic trade, Denmark considers that there can be no question at the present stage in the discussions of estimating the effects of short-term co-operation in agriculture. Only when this problem is cleared up will it be possible to take a decision on the customs union as a whole and on when it is to come into force.

It is agreed, on the other hand, that a long-term plan for agricultural co-operation must be worked out in the next few years if the agricultural policies of the Nordic countries are to be brought into line. Such co-operation calls not only for an agricultural fund but also for the introduction of a standardized system for imports from third countries and uniform regulations for trade between the Nordic States.

• • •

The Nordic States have agreed to co-operate financially in the implementation of their other joint projects. This co-operation is aimed, interalia, at improving structures in the various branches of the economy of the Nordic countries. This purpose will be served by a general fund, an agricultural fund, a fishery fund and a Nordic investment bank.

. . .

In order to solve the problems connected with the customs union, agriculture, fisheries and financial co-operation, the Danish delegation has proposed that co-operation should be carried out in three stages:

- establishing institutions to look after co-operation when the treaty comes into force;
- 2. forms of co-operation that can be introduced in the short term should go hand in hand with the customs union;
- 3. afterwards, co-operation on the basis of decisions taken in the second phase could be intensified.

. . .

Broader economic co-operation between the Nordic States is directed at establishing a more suitable basis for their participation in a wider European market and in a broader form of European integration. The Nordic treaty was therefore drafted in such a way as to call for the fewest possible changes and adjustments in the event of the Nordic States taking part in such European integration. It is therefore expected that extensive Nordic co-operation will still be feasible within the framework of the European Common Market. The draft treaty also lays down clearly defined lines as to how the Nordic States are to act in the event of one or more or all the countries joining the Common Market or entering into any other form of co-operation with the EEC.

Broader co-operation between the Nordic States will not hamper Denmark in its endeavours to join the EEC. Denmark stands unconditionally by its application to enter at the same time as the United Kingdom, and expects negotiations between the Common Market and all applicant States to be

started up simultaneously.

There is now greater understanding in most west European countries as to the need for enlarging the Common Market. We believe that the years ahead will see a comprehensive European settlement, and I am convinced that Nordic co-operation, which will develop independently, will fit usefully into the wider European context,'

(Wirtschaftsdienst, No. X, October 1969)

France

WEU parliamentarians received by the Foreign Affairs Committee of the National Assembly

On 28 October 1969, for the first time in the history of Western Europe, the Foreign Affairs Committee of the National Assembly received WEU parliamentarians at the Palais Bourbon.

This precedent, for which Mr. De Broglie, the chairman, was responsible, will be followed in other parliaments. The Bundestag, for example, will shortly be receiving WEU parliamentarians.

All the WEU representatives expressed the fear that France, because of its craving for perfection, was hampering the Community's chances of development by placing the emphasis on its completion and strengthening rather than on its enlargement. A few days ago the Political Committee of the WEU Assembly which has just met in Paris, adopted a resolution by 12 votes to 1, with 2 abstentions, to the effect that at The Hague the Heads of State or Government should consider as of equal urgency 'the completion, the strengthening, and the enlargement of the European Communities.'

In reply to all requests for an explanation of France's position Mr. De Broglie said: 'As far as we are concerned, completing the Common Market is not a precondition but a priority.' Referring to the prospects for the summit meeting at The Hague, he said that one had to be realistic. It would be satisfactory if agreement were reached on a reasonable time-table concerning the stages for strengthening the Communities and if at long last a political will to begin negotiations for enlarging the Communities within a reasonable time were to emerge.

As to France's absence from the WEU Council Mr. De Broglie emphasized that this was only temporary. It had been due to Great Britain's attempt to force its entry into the Common Market, and to failure by WEU members to observe the unanimity rule. Today, however, the situation had changed and it would be for the summit meeting to take decisions.

(Le Monde, 30 October 1969)

2. <u>Debate on the French Government's European policy in the National</u> <u>Assembly</u>

Europe was the focal point of the debate on the Foreign Minister's budget in the National Assembly.

Mr. Arthur Conte, Rapporteur, in explaining the policy on the budget, said: 'It has now become possible to launch a Europe of realities in the recognition that Europe will either be political or never come into being at all.'

On European affairs, Mr. Schumann, Foreign Minister, recalled the three problems on the agenda for the summit meeting at The Hague. On the 'completion' of the Communities he said: 'The common market for agriculture, which marks the peak of Community achievement, must be completed on schedule.'

On the strengthening of the Communities he felt he could say that the President would not go to The Hague to talk in 'tones of timidity'; as for their enlargement 'what we propose to our present five partners is that we should draw up a kind of joint development programme to enable us to move on to the third phase - that of enlargement - in a concerted manner, knowing that we intend to follow the same course towards the same future.'

The Minister concluded by saying: 'We are urging Europe to follow our example in placing its patience at the service of its independence, and its independence at the service of peace.'

Mr. Rossi (Progress and Modern Democracy) was the first speaker in the ensuing debate. Referring to the hopes pinned on the forthcoming summit meeting at The Hague, he said: 'We have allowed nationalism to spring up again and our political will to grow weaker. Will the summit meeting mark a new leap forward? Will the French delegation attach the same meaning to the completion, strengthening and enlargement of the Common Market, and to a political Europe, as we do? The ultimate object of the plan is a federal Europe. Are we prepared to accept a body that makes proposals independently of the Governments? ... Europe has twice failed to materialize ... we still have a chance with political Europe ... let us not throw it away ...'

Mr. Boscary-Monsservin (Independent Republican) drew attention to the change of climate prevailing in European institutions, particularly in the European Parliament and in the various national bodies. The European Parliament, which stood in the vanguard, wanted its own resources but became divided when it came to down-to-earth issues. 'Must we despair of Europe? No... Europe is a matter of mutual understanding between Governments about democracy, understanding on the part of employers' and workers' organizations and of economic and social movements. As we come to the end of the transitional period we feel somewhat out of breath. If we do not get our second wind, pecuniary and material considerations will be liable to jeopardize European unification ... I trust that we shall be able to launch the political and institutional revival that is so essential.'

Mr. Etienne Fajon (Communist) condemned capitalist Europe, and was followed by Mr. Vendroux (Union of Democrats for the Republic) who said 'Europe needs our determination even more than our goodwill.' Breathing new life into the Franco-German Treaty was a prerequisite for European unification. 'We should not risk enlarging the Common Market before the Europe of the Six has been completed and strengthened . . . It is as well to assert yet again that the decisions to be taken can only flow from the very source of the Community's power - a power that must not, in whatever way, be allowed to escape the Council of Ministers which is alone answerable to the national Parliaments ... For some months now we have seen a sustained offensive by those who hanker after integration and supranationality.' Dealing with the problem of the Community's own resources, Mr. Vendroux said that these could only be made up of receipts from the common external tariff because the agricultural levy was ear-marked for a specific purpose. 'The Community budget will therefore show a deficit, and in any case member States' contributions, substantial though they be, will no doubt be insufficient to make good the deficit. We shall obviously have to resort to something like a European tax if the Community is to be financially independent. There is no doubt that it is through its complete financial independence that supranational Europe hopes to triumph over everything.' Mr. Vendroux concluded: 'We must certainly see to it that Europe is made, but the independence of the nations and the authority of the States must be respected.'

Mr. Delorme (Socialist) called for a revitalizing of European unification. 'We are sure you will understand the need to break out of this deadlock which does so much harm to our cause. It is time to abandon a policy of isolationism ... to persevere with this new outward-looking approach.' Quoting Mr. Pompidou, Mr. Delorme went on: 'A Europe that is worthy of the name and capable of playing its part calls for political awareness. We need a common policy. This, I admit, cannot be wholly true, wholly effective, until Great Britain has joined us.'

Mr. Stehlin (Progress and Modern Democracy) said that for the French there could be only one road - that leading to the unity of Europe. Asked whether they wanted to be citizens of Europe, 54 per cent of the French

had replied 'yes'.

Mr. Michel de Grailly (Union of Democrats for the Republic) spoke of Europe's independence in a state of security. 'The independence of Europe is the independence of the European continent and depends on the introduction of a system of security whose effectiveness will make it possible to remove the underlying cause of the division of this continent. An all-European security conference should be held as soon as possible but it must be adequately prepared so that it does not end in failure. The Movement for the Independence of Europe is going to publish a manifesto calling for an 'organization of European nations' complete with a permanent secretariat to take the place both of the Council of Europe and of the United Nations Commission for Europe. This would provide an institutional form for meetings and discussions for all European States, whatever their political and social systems. In this way the States could gradually come to define their common objectives and strengthen both their solidarity and their security.'

At a time when the French were uncertain about the future of Europe, Mr. Georges Gorse (Union of Democrats for the Republic) wished above all that the summit meeting would be a success. At the same time, to make good the lack of information available to the French people regarding the Community, he wanted the Government to render an account each year of the way the Treaty of Rome had been applied.

Mr. Edouard Ollivro (Progress and Modern Democracy) considered that the European ideal was the remedy for the sickness from which the younger generation was suffering.

Mr. Raymond Offroy (Union of Democrats for the Republic) feared that the summit meeting at The Hague would bring forth nothing more than a simple declaration of intent.

Mr. Raymond Bousquet (Union of Democrats for the Republic) laid stress on the European security conference and stated: 'If we want a European Europe, a Franco-British military entente is essential.'

Mr. Jean de Broglie, Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee, (Independent Republican), said that he was a firm supporter of British entry into the EEC. 'It is in France's political, strategic and economic interests.'. It is in the interests of Europe ... There cannot be a European currency without the pound ... There cannot be a European technology without the very real contribution of British technology.'

Mr. de Broglie concluded with the hope that a European policy would emerge and lead to a political Europe.

(Debates of the French National Assembly, 4 November 1969; Journal Official, 5 November 1969)

3. European problems in the French National Assembly's debate on agriculture

Mr. Duhamel, Minister of Agriculture, in presenting his budget, said that French agricultural policy would in future be set in a European context: 'We shall not allow the four principles underlying the common policy to be threatened: unity of markets, unity of prices, community preference and financial solidarity. Those who wish to join the European Community must realize this and accept it... After more than ten years the European Community is faced with two requirements: the first - an internal one - is that of its strengthening; the second, which comes from outside, is that of its enlargement. But first we have the requirement of completing and consolidating the Community. The problem is in fact a political one. We have to express a political will, to forge ahead tomorrow with the Community venture. It is to the credit of the President of the Republic that he called the conference at The Hague which should mark the relaunching of Europe... That is the key to the future.

Mr. Soisson (Independent Republican) opened the general debate by saying: 'The agricultural problem can only be solved in an expanding economy and in a European setting, the solution lying in more, and not less, Europe.' He agreed that the Common Market should be completed before being enlarged. He deplored the fact that no important decision had been taken for a year and that the Community was becoming 'a patchwork of States replacing customs barriers by monetary and fiscal barriers. So far agricultural Europe has been an assemblage of sectors; it must now be regionalized. There is no doubt that it is in the regional context that one of the main problems of agriculture - that of land tenure - must be studied.'

Many speakers followed, and Mr. Lelong (Union of Democrats for the Republic) endorsed Mr. Duhamel's European policy. He called for new price structures, and referring to the financing regulations asked: 'If financial solidarity is only a dream, how long will it last? What will we wake up to? ... Other sectors would undoubtedly lend themselves better to the uniting of Europe. Yet we must still keep a common agricultural policy, making it more flexible and taking it a stage further... Europe must not be allowed to become an abstract imperative.'

The next speaker was Mr. Edgar Faure. This was the first time the former Minister of Agriculture, then of Education, had spoken as member for Doubs (affiliated to the Union of Democrats for the Republic). 'The present situation is unacceptable. There can be no Common Market with too many and too different prices. It is incredible that a producer country like France should import pigs at a time when we are levying a tax on exports of barley.'

Mr. Faure asked Mr. Duhamel to undertake to apply normal Community prices for all animal and dairy products by 1 January 1970 at the latest. He added: 'I trust that you will get our partners and the Commission to devise a real production policy. Europe must go in for a constructive regionalization policy.'

Concluding the debate, Mr. Duhamel said: 'It is at all events in European unification that the future of French agriculture lies ...'

(Sitting of 21 November 1969; Journal Officiel, Debates in the National Assembly, 22 November 1969; Le Monde, 20, 21 November 1969)

Germany

Mr. Ertl, Federal Minister of Food, regards an overhaul of the EEC's agricultural policy as inevitable

During a discussion on the German television on 23 October 1969 Mr. Joseph Ertl (Free Democrat), the new Minister of Food, said that he intended to speak plainly in the coming talks on the EEC's agricultural policy. 'I think that I am in any case bound to talk plainly about these problems. I do not think it can do any good in Europe to keep dodging these issues.'

Mr. Ertl warned that the common agricultural policy would become a powder keg if its problems were shelved indefinitely. 'The EEC's agricultural policy', he said, 'has come to a dead end'. In the discussion on the impending revaluation of the Deutsche Mark, Mr. Ertl referred to the coalition decision of the Government that any consequent loss of income would at all events be made good to the farmers.

Far-reaching fundamental decisions on overhauling the agriculture were inevitable. In an interview with the farming journal 'Bayerisches Landwirtschaftliches Wochenblatt' on 24 October, Mr. Ertl said that the present system of market regulations could not continue. It was very difficult to find a solution that, while safeguarding German farmers' vital interests, did not imperil European co-operation.

Mr. Ertl said he would take up some of the wishes of Bavarian farmers such as a common programme for hill-farming in the Alps. He thought that feed-grain prices should be raised and the price of brewer's barley with them. He would endeavour to bring in a market regulation for hops in Brussels.

Addressing the Free Democrats on 18 November, Mr. Ertl stressed the need to overhaul the EEC's agricultural market system as quickly as possible. It was only in this way that European integration could be extricated from its present state of stagnation. Under the democratic constitutions of the EEC countries the agricultural market could not run counter to the interests of the farmer, the consumer and the taxpayer. In the past years no section of the Community had, through its sacrifices, done so much to advance European integration as agriculture. If the foundations of the Commun-

ity were not to be destroyed, the political reaction of agriculture had therefore to be taken into account.

(VWD-Europa, 24 October 1969; Bayerisches Landwirtschaftliches Wochenblatt, 24 October 1969; Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 19, 20 November 1969)

2. Mr. Stewart, British Foreign Secretary, visits Bonn

According to a spokesman of the Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs, European policy questions formed the main topic of the discussion between Mr. Stewart and Mr. Scheel, the Federal Foreign Minister, held in Bonn on 14 November 1969. Mr. Scheel briefed Mr. Stewart about his Paris talks, about the latest meeting of the EEC Council of Ministers in Brussels, and about the state of preparations for the summit meeting at The Hague.

Mr. Stewart awaited from the summit meeting at the very least a clear understanding that negotiations on British entry would be opened and not be postponed indefinitely. He told the press he was convinced that the Federal Government would use all the influence it had to bring about British entry.

He emphasized that Britain's application still stood. No decision liable to hamper British entry ought however to be taken at the summit meeting. Mr. Stewart realized that the cost to Britain would be high, as it was to Germany. But it could be imagined that if more reasonable ideas did not prevail the cost would be so high as to make British entry extremely difficult.

Mr. Stewart thought that no progress could be made towards the political unification of Western Europe in Britain's absence. It was therefore to be hoped that the summit meeting would not take any decision on this point either without Britain's participation. He regarded Western European Union as an appropriate means of promoting the political unification of Europe Mr. Stewart explained that it had not been possible to go into every problem in detail in his two-and-a-half hours' talk with Mr. Scheel. He wanted, however, to continue talks with his German colleague.

He said it was still possible that France would stipulate conditions unacceptable for Britain. But this was in no way inevitable, and Britain would

be extremely surprised if this happened. The decisive turning-point in French policy since General de Gaulle's retirement had been France's agreement in principle and will to accept British entry; negotiations would, however, certainly be very difficult.

Mr. Stewart said that the entry negotiations with Britain did not have to run concurrently with those with the other applicant States. He believed in separate self-contained discussions. In any event the countries concerned would probably enter at the same time.

(Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 15 November 1969; Die Welt, 15 November 1969; Handelsblatt, 17 November 1969)

3. Mr. Walter Scheel, Federal Foreign Minister, interviewed on European policy

On 27 November 1969 Mr. Walter Scheel, the Federal Foreign Minister, said in an interview with the 'Handelsblatt': 'If we want to enlarge the Community - and France has said it is ready to do this - then we should not make it impossible by inflicting on applicant States burdens in connexion with the financing of agriculture of which they can form no estimate. ' Agricultural surpluses in the Community were more and more of a menace because of the market regulations in force, and the costs they entailed were no longer economically acceptable. None of the Six disputed the inseparable link between agricultural policy and agricultural financing. Mr. Scheel thought that pressure of time and practical exigencies had brought into existence a 'package' which it would be one of the main tasks of the summit meeting in The Hague to handle properly. The practical and binding consequences of any decisions taken in this field would not depend solely on the Federal Re-An 'all or nothing' policy would be out of place. 'We must be certain, however, that the interrelationship of the problems referred to is preserved by means of a policy that takes into account legal standpoint as well as practical necessities.' The Federal Government would endeavour to win acceptance for this principle in the decisions taken in The Hague.

Mr. Scheel favoured bringing the transitional period in the EEC to an end on 31 December 1969, in accordance with the Treaty. The prevailing view in the member States was that the state of the Common Market's development did not call for any postponement.

'We realize that if we go on with the present agricultural policy, the outlets open to third countries in the agricultural sector will become smaller and smaller. This is another weighty reason for demanding that the market regulations be modernized. The customs union, on the other hand, has on the whole been beneficial to non-member countries in Western Europe. Since I July 1967 their exports to the Community have increased substantially, though not to the same extent as has intra-Community trade in industrial products.

The member States share a feeling of concern lest the enlargement of the Community should lead to new customs barriers in Western Europe. This particularly applies to those States that will not be joining the Community but which would like to have close institutionalized relations with it. I am certain that third countries in Western Europe will be guided by their economic interests. These interests, however, will be more and more closely geared to the Common Market if this develops on the lines planned by the member States

The Federal Government wants talks to begin with countries such as Switzerland, Austria and Sweden as soon as possible after the opening of negotiations with the applicant States, so that account can be taken of their economic interests in the context of further developments.'

(Handelsblatt, 28, 29 November 1969)

Italy

1. Debate in the Chamber of Deputies on a mandate for the Government in connexion with the third stage of the EEC and Euratom

On 3 October the Chamber of Deputies discussed the delegation of power to the Government in connexion with the third stage of the transitional period of the EEC and Euratom.

Mr. Marras (Communist) asked the Government to cease pursuing a policy that was of benefit only to other member States and enabled it to side-step parliamentary control, as happened in the Community with the Council and the Commission. He trusted that the Chamber would follow the example of the Senate in setting up an appropriate body to deal with European affairs so that the Parliament could take a practical part in debates touching on matters of concern to Italy.

Mr. Santagati (Italian Social Movement) said he was against delegating power to the Government because even though Italy had, by signing the Rome Treaties, accepted certain restraints on its sovereignty, it was unacceptable that these restraints should apply to all subsequent Community legislation. From time to time, therefore, the Government should submit to the Parliament the provisions necessary for carrying through European policy.

Mr. Giomo (Liberal) said his group agreed to the delegation of power and pointed out that European integration had become an irreversible process even though there were still many difficulties.

Mr. Macciocchi (Communist) said that his party would ask for the Community agricultural agreements of 1962 to be revised and asked that the Government should agree to consult Parliament before taking any decisions in the Community. He hoped that a parliamentary committee would be set up to look into guidelines for revising the Treaties setting up the European Community. Italy should then take the initiative in promoting a large-scale reform of the Common Market, including its enlargement to include not only the United Kingdom but all the other countries asking to join.

Mr. Zagari (Socialist) said that his party was in favour of the delegation of power, and pointed out that to deal with the present situation the emphasis should be placed on new areas such as monetary affairs, technology and space so as to impart new impetus to the Community. The European

Community had to resolve the problem of the membership of the United Kingdom and the other applicant states, which would provide decisive support in building an integrated Europe. Merely co-ordinating the various national policies led to conservative and unenterprising attitudes. The aim should be a socially progressive policy for which adequate arrangements should be made, the most important step being the election of the European Parliament by direct universal suffrage.

Mr. Lattanzi (Proletarian Unity Socialist) said that in view of the indefinite postponement of a directly elected European Parliament, one could not go on transferring the powers of the State to supranational bodies that were not representative, as this was undermining the principles of democracy. At the political level the crisis the Community was passing through ought to make the Government take a second look at its own policy in this sphere and arrange for the Parliament to resume all its prerogatives.

Mr. Storti (Christian Democrat), the Rapporteur for the majority, said he was convinced it was vital for Italy to go ahead with integration because the approaching conclusion of the transitional period would mark the consolidation of the Common Market in all outstanding sectors. It was therefore important for the European spirit to be kept alive and to take root in the minds of the people. Politicians should give an example at the summit meeting which should lead to a fresh start on the road to supranationalism, beginning with increased powers of control for the European Parliament over funds derived from agricultural levies and with the abolition of the right of veto on the Community Council.

For Mr. Bartesaghi (Communist), Rapporteur for the minority, the fact that the Government had waited so long before presenting its bill was the clearest denial of the principle that commitments under the Rome Treaty had to be fulfilled. He maintained that the delegation of power with regard to the Common Market was unconstitutional because of the lack of guarantees and democratic procedures in the law-making activities of the European Communities. It would therefore create a dangerous precedent.

Mr. Vedovato (Christian Democrat), Rapporteur for the majority, said that the attainment of the objectives of the Treaties had gone beyond all expectations. By virtue of the principle of the paramountey of Community law over national regulations, the Rome Treaties were different from and went further than any international agreement, and led to a kind of permanent change in the domestic legal provisions of member States which were either amended or rounded off by Community laws. This meant that the changes involved in translating Community regulations into domestic laws ought to take place automatically, independently of ordinary law and of executive processes.

Mr. Pedini (Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs) insisted that the delegation of power was constitutional and added that the Government had not intended to encroach on the sovereign prerogatives of Parliament. Moreover the European Parliament, in which all the political movements were represented, took part in the drawing up of Community regulations.

Mr. Pedini then pointed out that it was wrong to work out the advantages of European integration sector by sector, and rejected the charge that the Community's policy had failed; at the same time he endorsed the suggested overhaul of the agricultural policy as part of a general harmonization of the economic policies of member States.

(Chamber of Deputies, Summary Report, 3, 6, 9, October 1969)

2. Foreign policy debates in the Chamber of Deputies and in the Senate

The Chamber of Deputies held a debate on foreign policy on 21 and 22 October, and the Senate on 27 and 28 October.

Mr. Moro, Foreign Minister, explained the Government's position on the main international issues.

As regards European problems, he recalled the decision taken concerning the summit meeting in The Hague and then went on to discuss the problems tackled at the meeting of the Council of Ministers of the Communities. 'The Five were agreed that the three issues of completing, enlarging and strengthening the Communities were politically bound up with each other. The fact that the first case relates to the implementation of the Treaties and that time-limits have been laid down for the passage to the final stage means that this must come first. This should not stand in the way of enlargement, however, for this too is clearly provided for in the Treaty.' Mr. Moro was not alone in stressing that the summit meeting should tackle the problems of political developments in Europe. 'We consider that some form of political co-operation is the necessary complement to the enlargement of the Community at the economic level, and one way, however limited, of meeting the requirement that a strong European body should act today as a factor for balance and peace on the international stage.' Mr. Moro gave an assurance that the Italian Government had done, and would continue to do, its utmost to ensure the attainment of the European objectives that occupied so important a place in Italian policy.

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Mr. Cantalupo (Liberal) said that the only way of getting beyond the present policy of balances between opposing blocs was to give a new lease of life to European integration, which should be extended to cover a political federation and to all countries that had asked to take part in it. A serious policy for European unification presupposed an awareness of the mistakes committed and of past shortcomings and delays, not in order to 'freeze' but to improve and revitalize the integration process. It was necessary to speed up the building of a new political entity capable of playing its part in world affairs and of acquiring its independence and integrity.

Speaking for the Italian Socialist Party, Mr. Nenni said that European unity was far and away the most difficult problem in Italian foreign policy. Serious obstacles had been encountered of late because there was not even the nucleus of a political community in Europe. Hence the need to seize the opportunity presented by this critical moment in economic integration to work more systematically for political unification.

There was no inconsistency between enlarging and completing the Community. These aims were, on the contrary, bound up with each other because the EEC was conceived as something open to all the democratic peoples of Europe who wished to join it. The summit meeting in The Hague should therefore give the Commission a mandate to begin negotiations with the applicant States forthwith; a solution had also to be found regarding the agricultural policy and monetary harmonization. But the surest evidence of a new drive for European unification would be the setting up of a permanent political body democratically representative of all the peoples of Europe and endowed with greater powers of initiative and control, so that it could in a real sense become the champion of European unification.

Mr. Nenni therefore asked that the summit meeting should look into the various proposals so far made for the direct election of the European Parliament by universal suffrage and propose a European electoral bill as soon as possible. The Governments ought then to ratify the bill, proceed with elections immediately, and recognize the elected Parliament's right to be involved in every future act leading to European unification.

Mr. Iotti (Communist) asked Mr. Moro to take note of the critical state of the various Community bodies, due particularly to the crisis of the monetary system. There was no cause to weep over the fortunes of a Community which, in its present form, excluded members of that great popular movement - communism - from its representative bodies, and was the serf of the big monopolies.

Mr. Cariglia (Unitary Socialist) said that the Communities must be relaunched at the economic level of the institutions and, above all, at the level of political integration which alone could make the necessary contribution towards easing world tension. Italy should act at once to obtain clarification of the attitudes of its partners on this basic issue. At present the existence of the Brandt Government in Federal Germany was a positive factor and a guarantee, in the same way that Great Britain's improved economic situation could favour the enlargement of the Community.

Mr. De Marzio (Italian Social Movement) said that the difficulties to be faced in integrating Britain in the EEC did not all stem from the Community but also from Britain, which was not prepared to accept the minor limitations of sovereignty envisaged in the Treaties. It did not therefore appear either useful or realistic to make political developments in European integration dependent upon British entry. It was essential to strive for the political integration of Europe, overcoming age-old forms of nationalism which found expression in provincial attitudes, whereas the one true nationalism was the continental one. Even the Gaullist formula of a Europe of nation-States, which had been condemned, could have served as a useful stepping-stone towards political integration and would have been better than the present stalemate.

Mr. Vedovato (Christian Democrat) pointed out that although federal Europe would not spring up overnight there was nothing to prevent everyone from going forward together cautiously but at a good pace. He considered it necessary once again to draw the Government's attention to the problem of the European University in Florence; this had attracted plenty of goodwill and promises, but the project had not moved a step further.

Mr. Compagna (Republican) repeated that <u>the</u> problem remained European unity. It was obvious that those who had thought European integration to be irreversible had been nourishing an illusion: the process had clearly come to a halt. If it were not possible to go on from economic to political integration the future of Europe would be threatened. The need for closer study of the various aspects of political integration was no reason for pushing the question of the Community's enlargement into the background; national resistance to such enlargement had to be overcome. At the same time proposals for reorganizing the European Commission and for setting up a permanent political body elected by the people should have the support of the Government at the summit meeting.

In the Senate, Mr. Bettiol (Christian Democrat) pointed out that the Community idea had run into a crisis and that Europe had acquired a bureaucratic rather than a political character. At the same time some member States lacked, or seemed to lack, the political will to impart the necessary

impetus to any real unification process. Hence the anxiety and concern felt about the summit meeting and the need for Italy to do everything possible to ensure that it was not a failure.

Senator Brusasca (Christian Democrat) stressing the importance of the summit meeting, particularly in view of France's changed attitude and possible changes in German foreign policy, asked for clarification about the line the Italian Government intended to follow at that meeting. Pointing out that 31 December would mark the end of the EEC's transitional period and that both the Commission, the European Parliament and the Council of Ministers had come out against any extension of that time-limit, he asked the Minister to specify the outstanding issues in the Community concerning Italy which could be sorted out before the end of the year.

Senator D'Andrea (Liberal) said he was convinced that European unity was essential to safeguard Europe against Russian expansionism, and hoped that the summit meeting would produce a clear statement about the enlargement of the Communities.

Senator Banfi (Socialist) stressed that the problems arising in the Community were not only the end of the transitional period, the common agricultural policy and monetary co-operation, but also the enlargement of the Community to include the United Kingdom and the imbalance existing between economic and political integration. He expressed the hope that the summit meeting would adequately tackle the Community's serious problems at political level. The solution to the problem of strengthening the Community, and particularly of enlarging it, was a prerequisite to creating a real partner in any discussions on European security with the United States, the Soviet Union and the other East European countries.

Senator Calamandrei (Communist) said that the Community's real problem was to make a critical reappraisal of European unification with a view to establishing a system of free trade and economic co-operation between East and West. Both in the Community and, in general, in Atlantic policy, bold new measures ought to be taken to help close up the division of Europe and of the world into opposing blocs.

Closing the debate, Mr. Moro, Foreign Minister, stressed the need for a supranational entity. Political integration naturally presupposed overcoming the difficulties encountered in the economic integration of the Six, especially in agriculture, at a time when the reorganization of economic structures was going forward at a faster pace, and because of the inadequate harmonization of economic, fiscal and monetary policies. The Commission itself had called for a radical revision of the present structure of the EEC, and had

in particular envisaged the need for a 10-year plan for a thorough reform of agriculture.

The politically interlinked issues of completing, strengthening and enlarging the European Community should be dealt with systematically at the summit meeting, and there ought to be some real political development, however limited, which would begin to give Europe its true standing as one of the leaders in world affairs.

(Chamber of Deputies, Summary Report, 21,22 October 1969; Senate, Summary Report, 27,28 October 1969)

3. Statements about the European Economic Community by Mr. Saragat, President of the Italian Republic

On 30 October Mr. Saragat received Mr. Colombo, Minister of the Treasury, the President of the IRI (Institute for the Reconstruction of Industry) and correspondents of the European Economic and Financial Press Union visiting Rome in the course of a fact-finding mission relating to state intervention in the economic sector in European countries.

Mr. Saragat stressed that the European Community had stimulated and served as the nucleus for the process of unification and for economic and social progress and peace in Europe. It had also acted as a real fillip to trade and to more active aid to the developing countries, and had come to be thebasis for the links between the European countries and the major industrial areas of North America and of the Far East.

The present was a crucial time for Europe. Failure in the near future to tackle the work ahead with the utmost vigour and confidence, and in a spirit of European solidarity, could lead to the decline of the Community.

Mr. Saragat quoted a statement from the joint Anglo-Italian declaration signed in London on 28 April to the effect that the development of the Community was bound up with its enlargement.

(Il Corrière della Sera, 31 October 1969)

Meeting between Italian and German representatives to discuss the Euratom programme

On 21 November, in anticipation of the European summit meeting, Mr. Lattanzio, Under-Secretary of State for Industry, met Mr. Klaus von Dohnanyi, representative of the Federal Government of Germany, to discuss the problems arising from Euratom's long-range programme.

The two Governments are determined to set the nuclear policy going again by obtaining approval by 31 December for a programme of activities geared to the aims of the Community and capable of safeguarding the potential of the Joint Research Centre, an invaluable asset built up at the price of enormous investments.

Mr. Lattanzio maintained that the only way of relaunching Euratom was to concentrate its activities on certain nuclear programmes to be jointly financed and jointly executed. These programmes would have to be accompanied by similar moves among the nuclear industries of the Six with a view to setting up consortia for the design, construction and sale of reactors and other installations.

Mr. Lattanzio said that there were at least three or four sectors into which joint finance could be channelled in the common interest, and laid stress on the design, construction and sale of fast reactors for electrical power generation and heavy water reactors, and on the production of enriched uranium.

Mr. Lattanzio told Mr. von Dohnanyi that it was essential that Euratom start up non-nuclear research, rejecting the argument that this could jeopardize technological co-operation in the enlarged Community.

(Il Popolo, 22 November 1969)

Netherlands

1. Mr. Udink, Minister for development aid on the restructuring of European agriculture

At the annual general meeting of the Agricultural Committee of the Kingdom of Netherlands held at Scheveningen on 1 December, Mr. Udink urged that the EEC countries should, in introducing production control in agriculture, place greater emphasis on the needs of the developing countries.

'If we wish, under the present circumstances, characterized by steadily increasing agricultural surpluses and the attendant costs in the EEC, to give practical consideration to the interests of third countries in this policy, then there must be a radical overhaul of European agriculture. Notwithstanding its internal difficulties, the EEC must realize the great responsibility that it has to bear as the main trading partner in the world's developing countries.'

Mr. Udink thought the present state of affairs unsatisfactory from the point of view of the international division of effort. He drew attention to the counter-productive effect of the import system with its high duties and levies based on the degree of processing of the imported product. He referred to the disappointing example, in the international context, of the attitude that the EEC had taken during the negotiations on the international sugar agreement. A better control of production would only benefit third countries if the member States created wider scope for imports.

It was extremely important to strive in future for a careful balance between European and international interests. 'The Six should seriously consider how agriculture can be harmoniously adjusted to fit in with the interests of the world at large.' Mr. Udink was convinced that the generally accepted principle of an optimal international division of effort could be applied even in the difficult sphere of agriculture, and that it would ultimately yield the most benefit to all the countries concerned. 'The first thing we must do is to review our own position and be ready really to co-operate at the international level to come to satisfactory settlements.'

Mr. Udink recommended a study of the contribution the Netherlands could make in providing more extensive aid in the dairy product sector to the developing countries. The report 'Dairy products and aid to the developing countries' drawn up under the auspices of the Dairy Product Association and Agricultural Production Association strongly advocated this assistance. Mr.

Udink said: 'We must, however, consider two points carefully. The first is that the way in which help is extended must be adapted to the wants, state of development and demands of the developing countries. The second is that Dutch development aid, whatever its form will involve a choice of priorities in the current and future budgets for aid to foreign countries, so that an increase in aid in the dairy product sector will lead to a proportionate decrease in the aid given in other sectors.'

(Handels- & Transport Courant, 2 December 1969)

2. Parliamentary questions

- Compensation for the diversion of customs receipts

In reply to a question on this point put by Mr. Westerterp (Catholic People's Party) on 18 September, Mr. De Koster, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, stated on 9 October:

'As far back as May 1966 the Dutch Government, following a Council resolution on this point, took the view, which it has since repeatedly expressed on the Council, that there were no legal grounds in the Rome Treaty for the Council to introduce a system for compensating diversions of customs receipts. The Dutch argument is that such a measure could only come from an agreement between the representatives of the member States that would have to be ratified by the national Parliaments. This view was reaffirmed at the Council meeting of 15 September. The Council, however, agreed in principle on separate treatment for measures for placing such diversions of customs receipts on record and for measures relating to their compensation. The need for ratification by the national Parliaments applies only, in the Dutch Government's view, to compensatory measures.

With regard to compensation the Netherlands has in recent years always adopted a positive standpoint, subject to the need for parliamentary ratification.

An independent source of revenue for the Community in the form of transfers of the proceeds of customs duties should not only prevent any diversion of customs receipts but also lead to a considerable redistribution, as between member States, of the Community's financial burdens, the amounts

involved being substantial. It is far from certain whether a country that wants compensation for the diversion of customs receipts would also advocate transfers of customs duties. In any case it can be established that most member States are not interested in such compensation. If this were to be introduced, would these member States not lose the incentive to act to ensure that the Community would acquire revenue of its own? The different aspects of the relevant Commission proposal are still being studied by the Government but in any case its view is that the Netherlands cannot withhold its cooperation in framing an equalization regulation until it is sure that customs duties are to be transferred in full to the Community.

The Government naturally still upholds its standpoint that independent revenue for the Community should be coupled with an increase in the powers of the European Parliament, but as regards the proposal concerning the transfer of customs duties, other factors ought to be taken into account.

The Council is waiting for the Opinion of the European Parliament before taking any decision. The Government expects this Opinion to be delivered within a reasonable period and will naturally not take part in such a decision beforehand. If the European Parliament, however, declines to deliver an Opinion – a point considered in the explanatory statement attached to this question – a new situation will arise the consequences of which might be far-reaching and would have to be thoroughly examined.'

(Debates in the Second Chamber, 1969-1970 Session, Appendix, p. 191)

- Oral question and debate on Euratom

On $30\ October\ Mr.$ Westerterp (Catholic People's Party) addressed the following questions to De Block, Minister for Economic Affairs:

'Will the Minister tell us the nature of the compromise that he put forward as President of the Council of Ministers of Euratom at its meeting in Luxembourg on 28 October 1969?

Does the Minister think that the Euratom Council is in a position to agree on a draft budget for 1970 before the end of the current financial year?

Is the Government at present looking into alternative solutions in case the Six do not come to an agreement so that the potential represented by the outstanding European research workers employed in Euratom's joint research centre will not be lost to Europe?'

Mr. De Block answered that it had been sought in the compromise to maintain a 70:30 ratio as between a joint programme and special programmes. The Community programme would thus be on a much larger scale than the special programmes. The compromise proposal made provision for a certain reserve of staff to be engaged in non-nuclear work when a decision was taken on this subject. The three-year programme had been specially introduced – and on this point the Netherlands was supported by most of the other member States – because the Dutch view was that to ensure the continuity of Euratom and to preserve the morale of its workers, it was essential to have a programme extending over more than one year. The Dutch had called for a three-year programme so that there might be an opportunity of reappraising the position and carrying out a structural overhaul of Euratom.

'An attempt was made in this compromise to make the best possible use of Euratom's research staff under the present circumstances. In four of the research centres – Ispra, Karlsruhe, Geel and Petten – Euratom's scientific and technical capacities are to remain unimpaired, even though fewer people will be employed there. I should like to make it quite clear that my aim was to forestall any criticism that the Netherlands was introducing a compromise proposal which would be particularly favourable to itself. We ourselves had found it extremely difficult to accept the compromise proposal.'

It was essential that the compromise should go through. 'I can see no way out if it is not accepted. I am strengthened in this belief by the fact that, however critical I may myself be about the compromise, I heard no alternative suggested at the Council meeting. The only suggestion made was that we should have a one-year programme. I thought that it would have been very unfortunate if we had gone in for such an arrangement: we would have seen a brain drain on an even larger scale. I can only hope that the agreement, which has broad, general backing, will lead at our next meeting to an acceptance of the compromise, possibly with certain adjustments. In my view it is only in this way that Euratom can be saved.'

As regards the budgetary powers of the European Parliament the Dutch Government had been in favour of a European Parliament with real influence ever since the EEC was founded. This declaration of principle still stood. It would have as soon as possible to be put into practice but at present there was not much that could be done.

'As regards the changes that could occur after British entry into the EEC as regards the ultra-centrifuge project, I can say that we are still negotiating with the other two countries. Until these negotiations are concluded I see no point in speculating as to the likely course of events.'

Asked by Mr. Van der Ploeg (Catholic People's Party) whether he did not think that at all events an end had to be made with the social insecurity of the Euratom staff, Mr. De Block agreed but said that this question was closely bound up with the drawing up of a satisfactory programme.

Mr. Vredeling (Labour Party) asked whether the Minister was ready to bring up the Euratom deadlock at the summit meeting. Mr. De Block replied: 'Is it reasonable for a summit meeting, which has to tackle and resolve three major issues to be saddled with a problem whose solution depends on political will and on unravelling a host of technical complications? If it is tackled at the summit meeting all that will come out is a declaration of principle and that will not be of much use to us.'

Asked by Mr. Portheine (People's Party for Freedom and Democracy) whether Belgium's attitude to achieving a compromise ought not to be regarded as very disappointing Mr. De Block explained that he had indeed been taken aback by the press reports on Belgium's attitude. He promised to get in touch with Mr. Lefèvre. Finally the Minister for Economic Affairs criticized the strike of the staff of the European Communities on behalf of Euratom.

(Second Chamber, 1969-1970 Session, Sitting of 30 October 1969)

Switzerland

Switzerland calls for scientific contacts between EEC and EFTA

Switzerland favours co-operation between EEC and EFTA, as well as Ireland and Spain, in scientific and technical research, and welcomes the invitation to discuss this received from the Council of the European Communities. On 18 November 1969 the Federal Economics Department announced:

'The seven EFTA States and Ireland and Spain have been invited, on the basis of a decision of the Council of the European Communities of 28 October 1969, to take part in a joint study of European co-operation in scientific and technical research. For the time being some thirty projects are to be brought up for discussion in the following sectors: information science, telecommunications, new modes of transport, metallurgy, environmental nuisances, meteorology and oceanology.

Switzerland had just accepted the invitation after the projects mentioned had undergone a first appraisal in the governmental, scientific and industrial circles concerned. Switzerland welcomes the European Communities' move to promote wide-ranging co-operation in a further important field, and declares itself ready to take part in investigating the projects further. Final details regarding participation in the projects proposed are to be decided upon at a conference to be attended by Science Ministers of the six EEC member States and of the nine nations invited and to be held in mid-1970.'

(Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 20 November 1969)

United States

The attitude of the American Government to recent trends in European integration

a) A report on the EEC's agricultural policy

In November 1969 the American Government published a report drawn up by the Department of Agriculture reviewing the EEC's agricultural policy since 1962. The report concludes that this policy has insulated the agriculture of the Six against outside competition, and has done so at a great cost to the consumer.

The report points out that the high prices paid to European producers have led to the accumulation of surpluses without at the same time securing adequate incomes for small farmers. The artificially high prices are an obstacle to increased consumption of farm products and induce the Community to impose discriminatory taxes such as that envisaged for vegetable oils to stimulate the consumption of butter.

The report adds that by restricting the access of third countries to their market and by subsidising the exports of their agricultural surpluses without regard for the laws of supply and demand, the Six are upsetting the world market while failing to resolve the problems of their farmers.

b) Attitude to the Community's enlargement

Mr. Elliot Richardson, Undersecretary of State, accompanied by Ambassador Schaetzel and Mr. Hillebrand, paid a visit to Mr. Jean Rey, President of the European Commission, on 4 November.

Mr. Richardson officially confirmed American support for European unification before the European Commission. The two parties had a frank exchange of views on the prospects for the Community, not least in the context of its possible enlargement. It should be pointed out that the United States has never officially stated that certain trade problems could arise if the Community were enlarged. It is however understandable that there is some concern on specific points. Mr. Richardson said that his Government

was concerned about certain developments that might occur in trade in agricultural products, and stressed the need for continuous consultation to forestall real problems. The visit that Mr. Sicco Mansholt, Vice-President of the European Commission, will pay to Washington at the end of November, could be fitted into the consultations desired by the USA.

On 21 November 1969 Mr. Carl Gilbert, Representative of the President for trade negotiations, denied the rumour that there had been a change in the American Government's attitude to British membership of the Community, a rumour which had been bolstered up by certain comments made by Senator Javits. Mr. Gilbert said that the entry of the United Kingdom, Ireland and some of the Scandinavian countries into the Common Market could be advantageous from the point of view of the United States' economic and political objectives. He added, however, that a great deal would depend on the conditions under which enlargement took place.

(Le Monde, ll November 1969; Standaard, 7 November 1969; Agence-Europe, 5 and 2l November 1969)



II. PARTIES AND PROMINENT POLITICIANS

1. At their respective annual conferences the three main British political parties come out in favour of Britain's entry into the Common Market

In turn the Liberal, Labour and Conservative Parties held their annual conferences in September and October. All three stated their position regarding Britain's entry into the European Economic Community.

(a) <u>Liberals stand firm on Europe pledge</u>

Liberals at their annual conference at Brighton, 19-21 September, overwhelmingly endorsed the Party's commitment to support early negotiations for Britain's entry to the European Economic Community, in spite of opposition from two MPs. At the vote only about 15 hands were raised against the resolution.

The delegates, however, supported an amendment listing important objectives for entry covering foreign and defence policy, price levels and democratic controls.

Mr. Christopher Layton, prospective candidate for Swindon, who moved the main resolution on behalf of the executive, said that if united socially, economically and politically, Europe would no longer be the Balkans of the world whose internal divisions tempted the great powers outside to fish for trouble and to drag them down.

If Europe could speak with a single, independent political voice it could transform world politics. Instead of the plain speaking of the riff-raff of puny members of the 'great American protectorate' - that was what the European States were today - a united Europe could be a force which Russia and America would have to heed.

A President of Europe or a Foreign Minister would be something more than a poodle on the White House lawn.

The aim of European union had always had a sharp cutting edge: to solve the German problem by harnessing German energies to European ends. The European idea was still potent in Germany but would not survive much more battering through British dithering and French nationalism.

This was perhaps a watershed in German history. If the Community could be strengthened and Germany's destiny linked indissolubly with Western Europe, the foundations would be laid for the final act of reconciliation with the East.

But if Europe failed or faltered the Germans would have no choice but to turn increasingly to a nationalist pursuit of their aims. The consequences could be dire. A heavy responsibility lay on the 'Hun-haters' who, by their hostility to European unity, 'destroy our children's future for the mere self-indulgence of living in the past'.

Mr. Layton welcomed an amendment to the resolution listing six objectives in European negotiations for which a British Government should press: progressive cuts in agricultural prices; economic and monetary union; an independent foreign and non-nuclear defence policy aimed at reconciliation with Eastern Europe; democratic control of Community institutions; acompany law making international corporations responsible to workers as well as to shareholders; and a common policy to help developing countries.

(The Times, The Financial Times, 20 September 1969; The Guardian, 20 and 22 September 1969; La Dernière Heure, 20 September 1969; Europe-Documents, 23 October 1969; Le Monde, 21 September 1969)

(b) Mr. Wilson tells the Labour Party Conference: 'The British are no longer applying cap in hand'

Mr. Wilson made a major speech at the Labour Party 68th Annual Conference on 30 September. <u>Inter alia</u>, he said: 'Our application remains. Our statement of 4 July, 1967, remains, subject to changes made necessary by the passage of events. Our position is clear.

The Six have many problems, not least the present state of European agriculture. If they, the Six, are ready for negotiations to begin, we are

ready. If, in these negotiations, we achieve terms satisfactory for Britain, on the lines we have outlined, then negotiations will succeed.

But, unlike the situation in 1961, we no longer face the challenge of Europe cap in hand. Europe needs us just as much, and many would say more, than we need Europe.

It is the common interest of all of us to achieve economic unity. But if this cannot be achieved, we can stand on our own feet. At a heavy price for Britain, no doubt, but at a heavier price for Europe, and at a devastating price for Europe's influence in the world.'

Earlier Mr. Wilson said that a new assessment of the cost of British entry, particularly regarding agriculture, capital movements and the balance of payments would be made by various departments concerned. He added that the British Parliament and people would be informed of the facts before any final decision about entry into the EEC was taken ...

Mr. Michael Stewart, the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, addressed the Labour Party Committee for Europe on 1 October:

'Now, Mr. Chairman, I have stressed the economic aspects because of the anxieties over food prices: and I have stressed the importance of looking not merely at the cost of living but at the standard of living. But there is, of course, another cause of opposition or of doubt, that is the fear that entry into the Community injures the political standing of this country. In judging this matter (and here I must ask our friends on the continent to try and enter into the British frame of mind on the subject) we are naturally influenced by the splendid record of our war effort twenty-five years ago when at one time the Commonwealth stood all alone, and we cannot help being influenced by the fine record of transformation of Empire into Commonwealth which followed. Britain has done much for mankind. But these facts, despite their assured place in history, must not blind us to present realities. We have to recognize today that no State in Western Europe can now exercise by itself all the influence for good which it could exercise as part of a great group working together. In the years immediately after the war the Western European powers saw the need to co-operate among themselves and with the United States in defence against the threat of aggression from the East. That necessity of defence still remains. But if we are now entering on what President Nixon has called 'an era of negotiation' then we in Europe shall need to work together in a task more cheerful and no less necessary than that of defence - the task of working for better understanding between ourselves and the nations of Eastern Europe. We cannot do this successfully if we make no effort to co-ordinate

our policies. Any one State in Western Europe if it thinks it lives only to itself and by itself will dread making any agreement with the East for fear of what might follow. The work that we have undertaken recently with our partners in the Western European Union is a good beginning. We need to go further; and the more progress we make the more evident it becomes that political and economic interests are inseparable. You will have seen how the Community jointly defended the interests of all their members in the Kennedy Round tariff negotiations. They were able to do this because of their combined strength. We must therefore reject the argument of those who say that the enlargement of the EEC is a barrier to understanding with the rest of the world. Whether it be the United States or the countries of Eastern Europe.

There would further be great understanding of the need for a united European approach to the problem of aid to developing countries. In this connexion we ought to notice that some Community nations can today afford to contribute to aid and development more generously than we can ourselves in present circumstances.

The Government recognizes that with entry into the Community there goes acceptance of the degree of political and economic co-operation which flows from the Treaty of Rome. Indeed we want Britain to play her full part in the future stages of Community development. We fully support our friends in the Community who want to see more democratic control by a European Parliament of activities covered by the Treaty. We do not believe that in this process Britain will be swamped and submerged; we have greater faith in the political genius of our people than that. We believe that if Britain has much to gain from membership, she has also very much to give, and not least in the political field.

If anyone dreads that the political aspect of membership destroys some freedom of action that would otherwise be open to Britain, let him remember this. Freedom of action for any nation - that is, its real, not its theoretical, power to choose this course of action or that - is not determined merely by willingness or refusal to sign Treaties or enter into international obligations. It is greatly determined by the strength and economic vigour of the nation. I do not want to see us in Britain deliberately turn away from the continent in pursuit of a theoretical freedom which, in a world containing the USA, the Soviet Union and a closely knit Western Europe, is a freedom we should never enjoy in practice. We must not throw away the substance in pursuit of the shadow.

(The Times, 1 October 1969; Le Monde, 1 October 1969; Le Figaro, 1 October 1969; Le Soir, 1 October 1969; Europe-Documents No. 546, 14 October 1969; Combat, 1 October 1969)

(c) The Conservative Party Conference takes a definite stand

On the eve of the Conservative Party Conference, Mr. Heath, leader of the Opposition, took a firm and unequivocal stand on Britain's application to join the Common Market. On BBC television he said that he would go on telling the British that it was good for Britain to enter the European Community because he thought that Britain's long-term interest was to exercise political influence in Europe. He added that there were short-term difficulties and that the British should be kept fully informed. They would then realize that the long-term advantages outweighed the short-term difficulties.

In contrast to Mr. Wilson and his friends and to Mr. Powell when he was a member of the Conservative Government, Mr. Heath said he had never changed his mind about Britain's entering the Community. The Common Market did not mean a federation of the United States of Europe and he had never committed either the Conservative Party or the British people to this.

After eloquent speeches by Mr. Eldon Griffiths, Mr. Duncan Sandys and Sir Alec Douglas-Home in support of British entry, the Conservative delegates at the Congress came out strongly in support of the European motion tabled by the Party leaders which was carried by 1452 votes to 475.

(Le Monde, 8 October 1969; The Times, The Guardian, 10 October 1969)

2. The Dutch branch of the European Movement holds a congress on the economic and social policy of the European Communities and on the European Parliament

At its political congress in Leiden on 18 October, the Dutch branch of the European Movement passed resolutions on the economic and social policy of the European Communities and on the European Parliament. The first of these reads:

'Meeting in congress, the European Movement in the Netherlands

- considers that a close link should exist between economic policy and social policy;
- finds that the European Economic Community has made little progress in laying down a harmonized social policy because of the reluctance of the Six

Governments to adopt a truly Community approach to social affairs;

- points out that the lack of balance in the framing of the Community's economic and social aims will provoke the opposition of large groups of European citizens to a greater degree of integration, and that this is bound to undermine the Community;
- considers that strengthening economic links between member States has direct consequences, particularly on the labour market;
- urges the European Parliament, the Commission, the Economic and Social Committee, the Council of the European Communities and the Parliaments and Governments of the member States to ensure that rapid progress is made with:
- common economic, social and monetary policies which experience has shown to be an essential prerequisite for lasting economic unity. A common cyclical policy must be introduced and a medium-term economic policy programme worked out in practical terms to serve as a guide for economic policies of the member States;
- a policy for the Community that is not geared solely to the promotion of growth but also to creating a healthy climate for living and working; this will involve introducing regulations in the field of regional planning and concurrent Community measures to deal with the pollution of land, water and air in the short term;
- 3. integration of the social aspects of the policies of the Communities in such fields as agriculture, transport, energy, and industrial and regional development:
- 4. the overhaul of the European Social Fund to turn it into an instrument of the medium-term common structural policy:
- 5. the creation of a European Council for employment opportunities comprising representatives of employers, employees, self-employed persons, and of the Council and Commission of the Communities, with a view to framing a common policy for questions relating to employment problems which have also arisen from the introduction of new techniques in industry and agriculture;
- 6. a co-ordinated policy on workers' participation in enterprises;

7. clearing the way for the promotion of the specific interests of consumers through their own organizations on the appropriate bodies of the European Communities.'

The other resolution concerns the European Parliament

'Meeting in congress, the European Movement in the Netherlands

- notes that an increasing number of aspects of the economic and social life of the member States are being influenced or determined by the European Communities and are therefore no longer subject to the influence or decision of the national Parliaments, while at the same time the European Parliament does not have the powers needed to exert effective democratic control or to have a real say in decisions;
- is disappointed to find that the Council has still not discharged the obligation to draw up provisions for holding direct general elections for the European Parliament even though the Parliament has repeatedly pressed for this and put forward the necessary proposals as long ago as 1960;
- re-affirms the request made in its programme for the Parliament to obtain real powers as regards "democratic control, the administration of financial resources and Community legislation" by the end of the transitional period at the latest;
- appeals to the European Parliament, the European Commission, the Council of the Communities and the national Parliaments and Governments of member States to exert every effort to enact measures leading forthwith to:
- 1. recognition of the European Parliament's right to have a say in European legislation and the drawing up of the budget of the Communities;
- 2. recognition of the European Parliament's right to have a say in the appointment of members of the European Commission;
- 3. direct election of members of the European Parliament.

The European Movement in the Netherlands calls on the States-General and on the Government to enact legal measures during the lifetime of the present Parliament for the direct election of Dutch members of the European Parliament, if it becomes apparent that the Council of the Communities is not going to be able in the near future to pass regulations for the election of the whole European Parliament.

On the instructions of the congress of 1969, the European Movement in the Netherlands has brought to the attention of the President of the

European Parliament its resolution on economic and social policy in the European Community and its resolution on democracy in the Community.

(Informatiebulletin van de Europese Beweging in Nederland, Nos. 2783, 2784 and 2785, 18 October 1969; Nieuw Europa No. 11, 1969)

3. Creation of a 'Progressive European Party'

At a conference of members of socialist and other left-wing parties and groups from West European countries held in Bemelen (Maastricht) on 18 and 19 October 1969, the creation of a 'Progressive European Party' was approved. The conference decided to set up a 'European Political Action Group' to work out proposals for a congress to be called in spring 1970. A statement signed by Mr. Vredeling (Dutch Labour Party) indicated that the aim of the new party would be the democratization of Europe's political, economic and cultural life at every level. It would draw up a political programme for Europe, one of whose aims would be the direct election of the European Parliament at the earliest possible date. The programme stemmed from the wish to create conditions that would bridge the gap between the European citizen, the European institutions, and concentrations of power. In developing this action programme, the Group treats the trade unions, the socialist parties and other progressive parties and political movements as possible allies.

It therefore calls upon all progressive parties to allow their members to co-operate, individually or collectively, in the activities of the European Political Action Group. The members of the Group are to mobilize in their own countries all forces that were ready to co-operate in trying to achieve these objectives at European level.

At the conference a minority which included Dr. Oele (Dutch Labour Party), considered that it was not feasible in the immediate future to set up a European party, either from scratch or through a federative merger. Furthermore the Social Democrat Party of Federal Germany did not allow its members to belong simultaneously to a European party. Mr. Kuby, spokesman for the minority, took the view that the basis for a European Progressive Party had still to be laid in most countries. This was an important task that lay ahead. The minority, on the other hand, were in favour of conferences and of setting up transnational working parties and action groups and of an information centre, with the aid of a study group, a public relations body, joint action and policy statements, and a secretariat.

(Nieuwe Rotterdamse Courant, 28 October 1969; VWD, 29 October 1969)

4. Executive of the Italian Socialist Party adopts a motion on the common agricultural market

The Executive of the Italian Socialist Party has adopted a motion in which the main stress is laid on certain principles involved in safeguarding Italian agricultural products and the revision of regulations which had been found either inadequate or too burdensome for some products. To farmers complaints about the hold-up in agricultural expansion should be added the high price the Government had to pay as a result of the present distribution of burdens between the EEC member States. France, with an agricultural production larger than in Italy, benefited from a system of distribution of financial burdens fixed on a protectionist basis with respect to the quotas paid by member States. Germany had to bear heavier burdens than Italy but, given its high industrial potential, these were spread throughout its economy as a whole and did not make themsleves felt to the same degree. The motion was not intended to cast doubt on positive aspects of Italy's membership of the EEC. In other words the system was working well in Italy as a politicoeconomic design because it was in keeping with the principle of larger areas which favoured the movement of persons, goods and capital, and therefore trade, production and the bringing together of the organizing capacities and technical skills of groups and individuals. The motion was intended as a spur to Italian negotiators at the forthcoming meeting in Luxembourg and to the Government not to lose sight of the serious situation in Italian agriculture.

On the home front too the AIMA (Association for the support of agricultural markets), as a financially and structurally appropriate body, had not been properly fitted into the scheme of things and had thus failed to produce the results expected of it. This was also true of the development associations. Technical and economic initiatives were not enough, but would have to be accompanied by more clearly defined measures that could serve as a framework for agricultural planning for the years ahead.

(L'Avanti, 29 October 1969)

5. Mr. Jeremy Thorpe would like a Franco-British Treaty

Mr. Jeremy Thorpe (leader of the British Liberal Party) was a guest of honour at a luncheon given by the French diplomatic press on 7 November. In a strong plea for a European political community he said that without such a community, which can only evolve slowly, Europe would have little influence on international decisions despite its prosperity and material power.

To make progress with the idea of a European union Mr. Thorpe suggested a second Messina conference. This conference could be held at the same time as the negotiations on completing and enlarging the Community. It would involve the Six and the applicant States; it would be open to the neutral countries and to the countries of democratic Europe. It would deal in particular with the creation of a European currency and a defence community which would have to be a nuclear one.

Answering questions, Mr. Thorpe said that a European defence community could not be limited to conventional weapons, that the British atom ic weapon was not a deterrent and that the Atlantic Alliance had to be maintained.

Mr. Thorpe also said that the Common Market as it was today constituted a very remarkable achievement despite its shortcomings and he concluded by asking that the possibilities of a Franco-British Treaty should be studied along the lines of the Franco-German Treaty to promote a better understanding between France and the United Kingdom.

(Le Monde, 9, 10 November 1969)

- 6. <u>CDU (Christian Democratic Union) calls for an early opening of entry</u> negotiations and for a start on political co-operation
- a) Policy statement by Mr. Majonica (CDU)

With reference to the forthcoming EEC summit meeting, Mr. Majonica urged that the Heads of Government of the Community should give the green light for negotiations with the United Kingdom. In an article published in 'Deutschland-Union-Dienst' on 13 November 1969 he writes that it would be fatal for Europe if Britain had to wait outside the door any longer. Europe was at present in a sorry plight. The common agricultural market was very seriously threatened and Euratom in the throes of a crisis. And a political, though unexpressed, relationship existed between the Community's internal development and the admission of new members.

The statement continues: 'The Common Market should be completed, according to the Treaties, on 31 December 1969. But we shall not really have completed it by this date. There is still no balance between dev-

elopments in foreign trade, cyclical policy and monetary policy. It is indeed the lack of a common monetary policy that weighs so heavily on the common agricultural policy. But a common monetary policy can only be pursued if Brussels is in a position to lay down a uniform course of action. Because the Council of Ministers can only take decisions unanimously, the Commission's role is being called into question. The Commission cannot remove this source of difficulty. The net result, however, is that all the member States suffer from the lack of a common European policy. The summit meeting would score a great success if the unanimity rule were discarded and majority decisions became the rule.

The Community must be strengthened by extending its activities to other areas. Only a policy embracing the whole of Europe will enable us to avoid the frictions from which we have so far suffered. At the summit meeting a first step at least should be taken towards concerted foreign and defence policies. Once it has withdrawn from Vietnam the United States will reappraise all its overseas commitments. If there are then no real signs of a move towards a politically united Europe, such a reappraisal could have highly painful consequences for Europeans. A united Europe would persuade Washington that we were ready to share the burdens in this part of the world with the Americans. If the United States lose this hope, it might also lose interest in Europe.'

b) CDU Party Conference passes a resolution on European policy

The CDU Party Conference, held in Mainz, passed the following resolution on 18 November 1969:

'The delegates to the Seventeenth Party Conference of the Christian Democratic Union of Germany look to the forthcoming summit meeting of the Heads of State or Government of the EEC countries at The Hague for practical progress in the completion, strengthening and enlargement of the European Communities. This particularly applies to the balanced completion of the economic union, including a common monetary policy, close political co-operation between member States, and the early opening of negotiations with countries seeking admission. The European Parliament, which must be directly elected to comply with the provisions of the Treaties, must be given, without delay, greater responsibilities, particularly in budgetary matters. The Bundestag is asked to agree to the creation of an independent source of revenue for the European Communities, subject to the European Parliament's securing real budgetary rights.'

c) Chairman of the CDU-CSU group in the Bundestag warns against concessions on the European agricultural policy

On 25 November 1969 Mr. Barzel, Chairman of the CDU-CSU group in the Bundestag, referring to the coming summit meeting at The Hague, said that the Heads of State or Government of the Six should set definite dates for opening negotiations with the United Kingdom, Denmark, Ireland and Norway, and for setting up the economic and monetary union. They should fix dates for further meetings to initiate political co-operation in the Community, and make an offer of economic and scientific co-operation to the countries of East and Central Europe.

Writing in 'Deutschland-Union-Dienst', Mr. Barzel urged that German policy should not be forced to choose between completing and enlarging the EEC. Discussions should be held soon, and continued without interruption, with the United Kingdom on the important aspects of its entry. Nothing could be more wrong than to make the final decision on Britain's entry dependent on prior clarification of points of detail. The French prime minister had been right in saying that the better the Community held together, the more easily it would lend itself to enlargement. But in order to hold together it needed not only the common agricultural market but also economic and monetary union.

Mr. Barzel said that if the Federal Government were thinking of agreeing to the final settlement of the European agricultural policy as a way of obtaining France's consent to entry negotiations, this might throw up special difficulties not only for the Federal Ministers of Agriculture and Finance but also for the British Government. 'In other words, after the summit meeting we should all be further off from bringing in new members but closer to new agricultural surpluses and increased financial burdens for the Federal Republic of Germany.'

d) A co-ordinating committee on European policy

On 2 December 1969 it was announced in parliamentary circles in Bonn that the CDU-CSU coalition had decided to set up a co-ordinating committee on European policy. Mr. Erik Blumenfeld (CDU) had been appointed chairman.

The Committee is expected to co-ordinate all European policy work and parliamentary initiatives of members of the Group in the European institutions - European Parliament, Council of Europe, Western European Union and

North Atlantic Assembly. This, it was claimed, would make for an effective CDU-CSU policy in and for Europe. The groundwork for this co-ordinating committee would be covered by Professor Hallstein, member of the Bundestag and former President of the EEC Commission.

(Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 14, 26 November 1969; Die Welt, 26 November 1969; Deutschland-Union-Dienst No. 217, 13 November 1969)

7. Italian Unitary Socialist Party champions European integration

On 14 November 1969 the Italian Unitary Socialist Party published the following statement:

'The Unitary Socialist Party renews its pledge to work for the completion of the EEC within the time-limits laid down by the Rome Treaty, and for its enlargement to include the United Kingdom and other applicant States.

Completion and enlargement must go hand in hand, and steps must be taken without delay, backed by a definite move by Italy at the forthcoming summit meeting, to fix the date for opening negotiations with the applicant States - particularly with the United Kingdom which cannot be kept waiting any longer if the development of European integration is not to be completely undermined.

Integration cannot be restricted to economic affairs but should be extended to the political sphere to give the democratic Europe of the West the influence and independence of action it needs if it is to play its part in the establishment of peace and security in Europe and the rest of the world.

The agricultural policy cannot and must not be an obstacle to uniting and enlarging the Community. It should take into account the phasing of unification and the accession of EFTA countries.

The problems of European unification should become a matter of direct interest for the people at large and particularly for the younger generation.

The direct election of the European Parliament by universal suffrage

and an increase in its powers of initiative and control would serve this purpose.

Every political movement should unequivocally assume its responsibilities in regard to matters of decisive importance for Italy's future, clearly stating the European emphasis of its policy.

For this purpose the Unitary Socialist Party of Italy will propose, in the appropriate quarters, a conference of the socialist parties in the EEC and EFTA to go more deeply into the problems of European unification and to define socialist strategy in Europe.'

(l'Umanità, 14, 15 November 1969)

8. The Catholic People's Party would like to set up a European Progressive Christian Democratic Party

Meeting in Tilburg on 28 and 29 November the Council of the Catholic People's Party passed a resolution which stated:

'The Council has taken note of the wish expressed by the Party Chairman in his opening address at this session that preparations should be made with all speed for setting up a European Progressive Christian Democratic Party.

The Council endorses this wish and calls upon the Party Executive to make any appropriate moves that could lead to the establishment of a European Progressive Democratic Party as soon as possible.'

(Medeling K. V. P.)

III. ORGANIZATIONS AND GROUPINGS

1. The Chairman of the Board of the Swiss Credit Bank opposed to a European monetary bloc

Speaking in Essen on 15 October 1969 Dr. Reinhardt, Chairman of the Board of the Swiss Credit Bank in Zurich, said that following the German revaluation the Swiss franc would be kept stable. Although trade relations between Switzerland and Germany were particularly close, Switzerland was an important international financial centre and, as such, had to hold fast to stability so as to avoid the impression that a country that readily revalued could just as readily devalue its currency.

Dr. Reinhardt acknowledged that recent monetary crises had brought increased difficulties to the EEC but strongly warned against the latest French view that isolationist trends in the USA should be countered by forming a European monetary bloc. However great the temptation to do this might be, it would be a delicate and problematic undertaking. It would be better to strive for greater unity in Europe economically, and to try in two directions to achieve with monetary means what had not been achieved through trade policy.

(Industriekurier, 16 October 1969)

2. <u>Interview with the President of the IEAI (Italian Institute of Agrarian Economics)</u>

Professor Mario Bandini, President of the Italian Institute of Agrarian Economics, has replied to a number of questions put to him by an Italian newspaper on the effects the Mansholt Plan would have on Italy.

Professor Bandini said he was in favour of the proposed measures for overhauling the whole structure of agriculture, provided this was not carried out on the same predetermined lines in all member States. In Italy, for example, the family farm, provided it was of a suitable size, run on modern lines and supported by adequate external facilities, appeared to be an agricultural unit that would remain efficient in the future.

Italy would feel the effects of a switch of agricultural manpower to industry more than other member States. Necessary and advantageous as this was, it would have to be carried out gradually and not merely in response to industrial requirements, and in such a way that those who remained on the land were properly qualified. The main point, however, was to make agriculture attractive to the younger generation so that it was not allowed to run down.

The policy for supporting farm product prices should be maintained but made more effective and flexible. The path to follow with prices was to leave farmers a wide measure of freedom to choose for themselves and not to rely on production planning at Community level, which would go beyond the bounds of a normal policy.

As regards production planning measures, the period of ten years envisaged was quite meaningless because any action had to be both long-term and capable of rapid change in the face of new aspects of the problem.

As regards Italian agricultural policy, public assistance for agriculture was a reality that could not be eliminated. Self-financing would always be possible but had to be coupled with security of investment in agriculture and other forms of public finance, including easier agricultural credit.

(Avanti, 29 October 1969)

3. Central Association of German Chambers of Industry and Commerce (DIHT) draws attention to the dangers of stagnation in the EEC and calls for a new strategy for integration

At the annual general meeting of the Aachen Chamber of Industry and Commerce held on 5 November 1969 Mr. Otto Wolff von Amerongen, President of the DIHT, said that the crucial question in connexion with European integration was whether the Community was going to collapse or launch out into renewed activity. It was time to say goodbye to European notions that led nowhere, and to take a good look at the possibilities of change in terms of a greater democratic mobility. The present spectacle was one of total stagnation with 'a resurgence of nationalism and a measure of conservatism'.

Mr. Wolff von Amerongen quoted as an example the changes in the French and German exchange rates which had gone through without any real consultation at Community level. In this connexion he warned against excessive reliance on the value-added tax because of its effects on national cyclical policy. A unilateral reduction could not be reconciled with the need to harmonize VAT rates in the EEC. The problem in the EEC was that each member State had social structures that had developed differently for historical reasons, so that each paid more attention to domestic politics than to cooperation in the Community.

In a speech delivered before the German-Swiss Chamber of Commerce in Zurich on 13 November 1969, Mr. von Amerongen said that at the summit meeting in The Hague the EEC States ought to work out a new strategy for integration. This was essential for solving the difficult agricultural problem. In addition to tackling the agricultural question, the summit meeting ought to clear up the question of negotiations on Britain's entry, try to speed up the EEC's industrial development, endow it with a collective capacity in foreign trade, and strengthen the position of the European Commission.

Mr. Wolff von Amerongen considered that in the absence of a new overall design, the EEC would become more and more unbalanced and ultimately disintegrate. It had to be considered whether strict supranationality was in fact a prerequisite for further integration. Many objectives could be achieved more rapidly by co-ordinating regulations. This in turn called for a certain institutional reform of the European Commission, whose relations with the Council of Ministers had to be more effectively defined than had been the practice in recent years.

Mr. Wolff von Amerongen proposed a compromise to overcome the agricultural crisis. The German Government ought in principle to go on guaranteeing payments out of the Agricultural Fund to France. For its part, France ought to be ready, once its position was guaranteed, to agree on a definite ceiling for financing surplus agricultural production. Part of the resources of the Agricultural Fund could furthermore be diverted to a regional fund to help finance the industrialization of agricultural regions in France and Italy. As a result the policy on agricultural structures would at long last set out on a new course.

Mr. Amerongen emphasized that resolving the present crisis in the EEC called for the collective will of its member States. This also meant taking into account the change in the political situation. The main feature of this change was that the emphasis in European policy had shifted from western to central Europe.

Responsibility for a common external trade policy, which was this year to be transferred to the Community, was of particular importance for economic relations with the State-trading countries of Eastern Europe. Mr. Amerongen had recently asked the Federal Government to work for the denationalization of external trade. It would be right and proper for the Federal Government to make the first move in this matter. This could be an interesting contribution to the European Security Conference which ought indeed to deal with trade problems. Mr. Amerongen had not overlooked the distrust of the Soviet Union and others about such a development. In fact, however, the benefits for both sides would far outweigh any disadvantages. Major interests in the German economy would scarcely be harmed. The EEC, however, could make a significant contribution to the economic development of the whole of Europe.

On 3 December 1969 the DIHT declared itself satisfied with the results of the summit meeting at The Hague. It particularly stressed the clear and decisive stand taken by Federal Chancellor Brandt. It stressed, however that progress would depend on the steps taken following the conference. The DIHT welcomed the agreement to discuss the enlargement of the Community at the same time as its financing and completion. Its only regret was that the question of future procedure had not been spelt out in sufficient detail.

(Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 14 November 1969; Handelsblatt, 14, 15 November 1969; Die Welt, 4 December 1969)

4. German Farmers' Union opposes any reduction in agricultural prices and demands the abolition of the 'green dollar'

At its general meeting in Bonn on Il November 1969 the German Farmers' Union again demanded the abolition of the common accounting unit for the EEC agricultural market. Mr. von Feury, spokesman for the executive, said: 'The "green dollar" must die so that the Common Market can live'. Mr. Moews, General Secretary described the 'green dollar' as a 'menace'.

In a resolution adopted by the meeting the change in parities in the Community was no justification for reducing agricultural prices. On the contrary, the increase in wages and in the cost of plant and machinery, as well as of comparable incomes in other sectors, warranted an active price policy. To reduce agricultural prices because of their arbitrary link with the unit of account clashed with economic realities. Despite decisions to the contrary by the EEC Council of Ministers and the Federal Government, the Farmers'

Union once again called for compensation at the frontier at the level of the revaluation rate for <u>all</u> agricultural products. Only in this way could the Federal Government keep its promise that any losses of income to German farmers resulting from revaluation would be offset on a permanent basis.

The Farmers' Union rejected any compensation for loss of income whether through the planned change or in the form of compensatory payments. Not all sales would be covered by the value-added tax regulation. Compensatory payments - degressive payments were flatly rejected - threw up difficult problems. Allocating funds on an area basis - said Mr. von Feury - was out of the question. It would be a grossly unjust procedure from which agricultural processors would suffer, and would only lead to disputes in agriculture.

Mr. Feury pointed out that the Farmers' Union would accord the new Federal Government a period of grace. He had had a very useful talk with Mr. Ertl, the new Minister of Agriculture, who shared the Union's views. He would, however, find it difficult to win over the Federal Government. It could therefore only benefit Mr. Ertl if the Farmers' Union took a firm stand. It could not be denied that at the Brussels negotiations the Federal Government held a trump card in the new regulation to be adopted on financing agriculture. Mr. Feury saw a chance of exerting some influence on subsequent developments through the Parliament. But there could be no question of putting up with any attempt to offset losses of income – estimated by the Farmers' Union at nearly 20 per cent of total agricultural income – by better social benefits for farmers and additional structural measures.

At a meeting of the Central Committee for German Agriculture held in Frankfurt on 19 November, it was decided that the agricultural organizations of the Federal Republic would suspend their collaboration on EEC bodies and trade federations in the EEC until the end of the year. According to the German Farmers' Union this decision was aimed at backing the efforts of the Federal Government to secure binding decisions on common cyclical and monetary policies at the summit meeting at the beginning of December.

In addition to members of the Committee of the Agricultural Organization and of the EEC Federation of Farmers' Unions, experts from the German farming associations are represented on some twelve of the European Commission's advisory committees. These committees, however, have no powers of decision.

On 14 November Mr. Martin Schmidt (Gellersen), the SPD agricul-

tural expert, warned the leaders of the Farmers' Union against political agitation with the wrong ends in view. The Union's criticism of the present system of agricultural prices in the EEC was basically justified but a decision on the future of the agricultural market could not be taken overnight. On the contrary, the Federal Government had to try to find a solution with the Commission and the other Governments.

Mr. Schmidt found it regrettable that the leaders of the Farmers' Union had none the less thought fit to announce an 'escalation of protest measures' unless a decision consistent with their own ideas were taken overnight. These dubious 'all-or-nothing' tactics gave rise to the suspicion that they stemmed from artificially stirred up emotion rather than from concern for the real interests at stake.

The Farmers' Union was somewhat sparing of criticism of the outcome of the summit meeting at The Hague. It particularly regretted that the final communiqué made no mention of a change in policy for Community agriculture.

(Die Welt, 12, 15 and 20 November 1969; Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 12 November 1969; Handelsblatt, 12 and 18 November 1969) At the Community and International level

I. COMMUNITY INSTITUTIONS

Mr. Rey, President of the European Commission, in Switzerland

Switzerland would like to be brought into the talks on enlarging the EEC as soon as possible. Mr. Jean Rey, President of the European Commission, has taken note of this wish, which he will pass on to the Commission and the Council for sympathetic consideration. This was the nub of Mr. Rey's talks in Berne on 21 November 1969.

Mr. Rey met Mr. Spühler, Federal Councillor and Head of the Political Department, Mr. Celio, Federal Councillor and Head of the Finance Department, and Mr. Paul Jolles, Director of the Trade Section in the Economic Department.

An assurance was given by both sides that the Swiss Government has not made any form of application for membership. Reports of statements to this effect made by Mr. Hans Rathgeb of Switzerland at the Congress of the Austrian Freedom Party in Vienna on 23 November were described as having no official backing. On the other hand Switzerland wanted to leave every avenue open, not excluding full membership if and when European integration took on a new and purely economic character.

But the talks between Mr. Rey and the Swiss Government took place before the EEC summit meeting at a time of uncertainty about the Community's future political development. In view of this, Switzerland's main concern was to be kept fully informed about developments regarding the EEC's enlargement and to be brought into the relevant consultations at the earliest possible stage. In the Swiss view, giving priority to the negotiations with the actual applicant States – the United Kingdom, Denmark, Norway and Ireland – could be justified at the most on technical grounds provided that the other countries that wished to participate in the enlargement of the Common Market were constantly kept in touch with and consulted.

Mr. Spühler referred to the traditional EFTA view that any arrangements made must involve all the Seven and safeguard free trade between them. The European Commission's policy statement had undoubtedly been influenced by the economic links between EFTA States. On this point the Commission had stated that the prospect of a possible enlargement of the Community made it necessary to look into the problem of the economic organization of a large segment of Europe. Even more specific was the proposal to go into the pro-

lems arising out of the large preference area, which EFTA had created between most of these countries and the applicant States, with the other European States concerned.

Mr. Spühler welcomed the Commission's recognition of EFTA's importance. Concern was felt, however, about the distinction made between the applicant States and the other interested countries. Switzerland accepted this distinction in so far as it was based on questions of form and law. Economically, however, Switzerland could see no point in it, especially since the neutral States could contribute at least as much to economic co-operation as the applicant States. Mr. Spühler described the distinction as being all the less justified in that the European Communities had still not begun to move towards political unification, and economic integration would be likely to remain the backbone of integration in Europe for the foreseeable future.

Some phasing of the enlargement negotiations would, for practical and procedural reasons, be acceptable to Switzerland. But care had to be taken to avoid harming countries with which negotiations were to start later. It was therefore suggested that the talks and negotiations should be thoroughly co-ordinated. Mr. Spühler also felt that there should be close co-ordination between the EFTA States. He was in favour of working for the strengthening and completion of EFTA in the meantime, until the question of enlarging the EEC came up for discussion.

The ability to make a real contribution to an overall settlement of European integration would also be assessed in the light of successes achieved in EFTA. Mr. Spühler emphasized that economic integration had been pursued from the beginning not as an end in itself but as an indirect way of promoting the political unification of Europe. The EEC's hope that economic integration would automatically lead to political integration had not been fulfilled. Switzerland saw the close relationship between political and economic objectives of integration as one of the reasons it had not yet been possible to heal the economic split in Europe.

Mr. Rey indicated that his visit to Berne was one of a series of visits to the EFTA countries. Its taking place shortly before the summit meeting of the Six was purely a coincidence. There had been a thorough review of bilateral and multilateral problems but no actual negotiations.

As regards enlarging the Community Mr. Rey said that a stage had obviously been reached when the negotiations could not be put off any longer. It was a widely accepted 'working hypothesis' that the entry negotiations could

begin around Easter 1970. In the process Britain might be given a certain priority, but the negotiations with all four applicant States (Britain, Denmark, Ireland and Norway) should be concluded at the same time.

The problem of the relations of other West European States with an enlarged EEC remained. Mr. Rey recalled that in its policy statement of early October on the enlargement question the Commission had expressed the view that talks should be held with the other countries concerned before the end of negotiations on entry. All member States were agreed on that point. He had been told in Berne that Switzerland hoped to be able to begin the dialogue with Brussels as soon as possible after the new negotiations started.

The actual form of future relations between Switzerland and the Common Market had not been gone into more deeply. Similarly, the possibilities of 'political integration' had not been discussed although - Mr. Rey added - the Community hoped to consolidate its own political structures. He was asked whether there was not an important difference between the EEC's willingness 'to enter into talks' with the neutral States before the end of the entry negotiations and the neutral States' wish to bring their planned EEC negotiations to a conclusion at the same time as those with the applicant States. He replied that the aim of the neutral States to become part of a large European market depended on the EEC's success in increasing the number of its members. After the breakdown of the negotiations with the United Kingdom in 1963 only Austria had pursued the aim of a comprehensive agreement with the EEC any further.

(Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 20 and 24 November 1969; Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 21 November 1969; Handelsblatt, 24 November 1969; Die Welt, 24 November 1969)

II. MOVEMENTS, ORGANIZATIONS AND PROMINENT FIGURES

1. The European Federation of the Trade Unions of Agricultural Workers in the Community set up in Dortmund

On 22 and 23 September 1969 the fifth Conference of Trade Unions of Agricultural Workers in the Community was held in Dortmund. The Conference adopted the statutes of the European Federation of Trade Unions of Agricultural Workers (ECFTU) (1) and a resolution on trade union integration:

'With a view to promoting an all-round improvement in working conditions and wages for agricultural workers, the Conference has decided:

- to improve trade union co-operation by harmonizing policies on collective agreements. For this purpose a systematic comparison should be made of the clauses governing the duration and subject-matter of existing collective agreements. This should be done on the Joint Advisory Committee;
- 2. to step up discussions between agricultural employers and workers at Community level in order to give practical effect to the proposals of the Joint Advisory Committee, particularly as regards the working week and wages.

The Conference deplores the fact that discussions on the working week of stock raisers are proceeding so slowly, although started up on 6 June 1969 after the signing of the first agreement on harmonizing the length of the working week in agriculture.

The trade unions of agricultural workers recognize that flagrant disparities exist within and as between the various countries regarding the length of the working week and wages, and are determined to have them eliminated through freely-concluded European agreements or, failing this, through other forms of trade union action.

As regards representation of agricultural workers on the advisory committees for market and structural policies and in the social field, the Conference reaffirms the need for reorganizing these committees so that, through them, economic and social movements can really play a part in fram-

⁽¹⁾ European Confederation of Free Trade Unions

ing and applying the common agricultural policy.

The Free Trade Unions of Agricultural Workers, affiliated to the European Federation of the Trade Unions of Agricultural Workers in the Community wish to make clear that they intend to co-operate on these committees only with democratic trade union organizations that are grouped at Community level and genuinely independent to act as they think fit, and which accept European integration and are resolved to work for European unification.

The Conference adopted two further resolutions - one on the status of farm workers in the agriculture of the future and the other on the common agricultural policy - reaffirming earlier policy statements.

In a fourth resolution the Conference comments on the political situation in the Community:

'On the eve of the transition to the final stage of the Common Market on 1 January 1970, the Conference considers that the decisions taken following the devaluation of the French franc, which have isolated France's agricultural market, should not serve either as a precedent for the gradual dismantling of the common agricultural policy or as an excuse for going slow on the essential tasks of consolidating and enlarging the Communities.

It is as necessary to go ahead with the common agricultural policy as it is to achieve economic union through common policies on monetary, economic, social and fiscal affairs.

Against this background, and as regards the Commission's proposals to replace the financial contributions of the member States by a source of independent revenue for the Community and to increase the powers of the European Parliament, the Conference considers that

- 1. all duties under the common customs tariff should be transferred to the Communities as from 1971;
- 2. all funds available to the Communities themselves (proceeds of farm levies, common customs tariffs, etc.) should cover all expenditure so as to dispense with the need for member States' contributions, the calculation of which is a source of discrimination and of a type of haggling unworthy of a real Community;

3. the budgetary and legislative powers of the European Parliament must be increased so as to democratize the Communities and establish a balance between the Community institutions.

The Conference reminds the Commission of the intention announced by it in its statement on 1 July 1968 - when the customs union was completed - to call three conferences, one of which would bring together the agricultural organizations.

The representatives of the agricultural workers confirm that they intend to take a wider and more direct part in framing and implementing the common agricultural policy as well as in all decisions affecting it. It asks the Commission to keep the promise it made on 1 July 1968.

The Conference welcomes the decision of the member States to hold a summit meeting in November 1969.

The representatives of the agricultural workers trust that the results of this meeting will help:

- to stimulate the development of the Communities so that the economic and monetary unions may be brought into being alongside the customs union;
- to speed up the enlargement of the Communities through the entry of the democratic States that have applied for membership;
- 3. to promote the political union of Europe on a democratic basis, as without this the Communities will experience further crises and difficulties because of imbalances in the progress made in integration at the economic, social and political levels, and the aim of European policy, namely "unification in the interests of social progress and peace" will not be achieved."

(Papers released by the Working Party of the Trade Unions of Agricultural Workers in the EEC)

2. The United States - controversy over the Common Market

1. The Times asked Mr. Edwin Dale, Economic Correspondent of the Washington Office of the New York Times to give his personal opinion on the Common Market. In response he wrote the following article:

'The American dreams that went wrong'

Of all the grand and sad dreams of American foreign policy in the past 20 years, one of the two or three grandest and saddest is 'European unity', as represented principally by the European Economic Community.

We bought a pig in a poke. We have been taken. We are so big and so rich that the harm has not been massive, but the experience is illuminating.

There is no European unity. The main thing that came of the Common Market - and on present evidence will ever come of it - is a lovely system by which six European countries foul up world trade in farm products, including ours. With all their marathon meetings of the Council of Ministers in the Palais des Congrès in Brussels mostly devoted to such matters as the price of butter - the 'Europeans' are hardly a jot more unified than they were the day the Treaty of Rome was ratified, after half a decade of fussing about it, in 1957. A case can be made that they are less unified today than they were then, and the rest of the world is definitely worse off.

That is what we got for our romance with Jean Monnet and the dream of 'Europe'. Like George Ball and John Kennedy and Hubert Humphrey and John Foster Dulles and Dwight Eisenhower, not to mention endless officials of the State Department, I shared the romance. The girl looked gorgeous for a while. But now she is all warts. It is all very human, but the time has come to cut our losses.

This does not mean we have to hate the poor old girl, with her unattractive apparatus of Eurocrats in Brussels and her endless fussing about whether and where Heads of State should meet to discuss world politics. It simply means we should see her as she is, which is mostly a shade greedy. There are times when a pretence of love becomes self-defeating – and this is one of them ...

How did it happen? Where did we all go so wrong?

The error began with two entirely understandable logical trains of thought that led to a wrong result.

The first, looking back, is classic. The two Great Wars of our century had been started by Europeans, with Germany in a leading role. The

term 'great power' meant European powers. If one wanted to avoid war one pushed hard for anything that would avoid western European war.

In short, men concentrated on Europe and thought that that was where trouble would come again.

The second part of the error was more subtle and just as easy to make. Mr. Monnet argued from the start - and convinced any number of influential Americans that unity in Europe could come only from a set of legally constituted 'institutions', such as the Common Market Commission in Brussels, whose task would be to force the nations to seek 'common solutions to common problems'. The Treaty of Rome was well designed to that end. But the common solutions have turned out to be at the expense of outsiders, and the search for them has led to acrimony, not harmony, among the Six.

Each of the six member countries has found that it can retain full sovereignty in everything that counts - not only the political but the economic. Each has its own budget and money, which, next to an army, are the very evidence of sovereignty. Each has its own transport system, for example. The great revelation of the fallacy of Mr. Monnet's dream came in August this year when France devalued the franc (rightly so, in the generally held opinion outside Brussels).

The Common Agricultural Policy, so painfully negotiated over the years, absolutely depended on stable exchange rates among the six currencies. This was a 'common solution to a common problem'. But when a bigger problem came France overturned the entire applecart. She acted like a sovereign nation, which she was in 1957 and is in 1969 and, barring a miracle, will be in 2009. Her Finance Minister did not even bother to tell the other members in advance.

What the 'common solution to common problems', and 'partnership' with the United States, did produce was a Frankenstein Monster on the economic front. The story would be funny if it were not so tragic ...

The Kennedy Round of trade negotiations is another case in point. The Trade Expansion Act of 1962 was one of the two or three major pieces of legislation passed in the Kennedy Administration. It was devised by George Ball and others in the expectation that Britain would enter 'Europe', and was introduced with hosannas as the very instrument of 'partnership' across the Atlantic.

But what the Act led to was an extremely acrimonious negotiation between adversaries that lasted almost five years - the adversaries being the 'partners'.

The negotiation produced useful tariff reductions in the end. But the last thing it created was a partnership. The Common Market was, and remains, the crafty guy on the other side of the table - indeed, the enemy.

To explain this massive goof on all sides, by men of goodwill, it is necessary above all to understand the delicious wine of national sovereignty.

Italians want to be Italians much more than they want to be an abstraction - 'Europeans'. They are precisely as much Italians today as they were the day the Treaty of Rome was signed. But they would not have been and could not have been if they had given up their right to have their own lira and their own budget and their own system - good or foolish as it may be - of nationalized industries and subsidies for shipyards and state-supported Sardinian lead mines ...

The six countries are prospering without having to create a common money, which would mean a real act of abdication of sovereignty, or a common capital market or a common transport system. They have even managed to preserve separate and different trade relations with the Communist countries. To repeat, they are doing fine with just a customs union. That is why there is no real need to create a 'United States of Europe'.

There was, and remains, much talk about a 'European voice in the world' which could come only from unity. No doubt if there were such a thing as true unity, with a European President, some sort of new great power would have been created. But it is quite clear that none of the six States, except possibly the Netherlands, wants any part of such a thing.

It would mean giving up too much for what could turn out to be little gain - particularly since even such a Europe would be hard put to attain nuclear parity with the two giants. The dream simply isn't worth the sacrifices it would entail in terms of an always pleasant national sovereignty.

But meanwhile, because of the dream, the Common Market exists and the outside world suffers a bit from this particular exercise in false idealism. What can be done about it?

The answer is, not much - except to stop being starry-eyed. The Common Market is such a good deal for the insiders - mainly businesses that export, as distinct from consumers - that it is not about to be broken up. There is no need for the United States, having been had, to make a great fuss and try to break it up.

We shall survive our naivete. Indeed, one of the total failures of the Common Market has been in the field of creating 'European-size' firms; happily, nationalism among the Six has remained such as to leave the American business giants still dominant - more so since the Common Market was formed than before. The United States, apart from such things as a loss of some farm exports, is not threatened.

But in little ways we can change. Our diplomacy can treat British entry into the Common Market as the strictly commercial thing it is, and fight for American interests as necessary.

Presidents can decline to receive the President of the Common Market Commission (as Mr. Nixon in fact did, thought the explanation was that it was all a mistake). We can halt the rhetoric - again, Mr. Nixon has largely done so.

And in general, we can stop smoking the marijuana of 'European unity'. We don't need it. Most Europeans have long since seen, without quite admitting, that they don't really need it. In the words of the song, 'It's been great fun but it was just one of those things'.

2. A fortnight later two distinguished readers wrote to the Editor of The Times to refute this radical and emotional criticism. Mr. George Ball, a former senior official in the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations and Mr. Jean-Francois Deniau, former French Ambassador and a member of the European Commission, replied as follows:

Letters to the Editor

- From Mr. George Ball:

'Sir, - This passionate diatribe by Mr. Edwin Dale bewailed the "naivete" of the United States in letting itself be "had" - or "taken" - by those duplicitous Europeans who created the European Common Market. For Americans to have encouraged the development of the EEC was, so Mr. Dale stridently asserts, a "massive goof" - the result of "false idealism", of looking at the world "starry-eyed", or, even worse, of being "simpletons"...

The evidence suggests that his indignation stems in large part from a conviction that the Common Market is - so he repeatedly insists - "good for insiders but bad for outsiders." The "outside world", he writes, "suffers"; "they hurt a little or a lot". The Common Market, he repeats, "is such a good deal for the insiders".

If Mr. Dale be correct, then obviously he has made a powerful argument for British entry. The United States, as he sees it, is "so big and so rich" that "apart from such things as a loss of some farm exports, it is not threatened by being outside". But can the same be said for the United Kingdom? Though Mr. Dale seems obsessed with the damage to American farm exports, I cannot believe that this is the sole - or even the major - source of his anguish ...

One cannot ignore a theme of undeniable truth which runs through his lament. The EEC, as presently constituted, has - though achieving far more than its opponents predicted at the outset - still fallen short of the high hopes of its founders.

It has brought about, in little more than a decade, the free movement of goods within a market almost equal in population to that of the United States – an achievement without precedent in history. But Mr. Dale is quite right in pointing out that it still has a long way to go toward anything like complete economic integration, and little progress has yet been made in the field of political unity ...

As a result, little has been done to move forward on the large remaining agenda - such items as a European companies act, a common monetary policy, a common transport system, and the beginning of common political institutions. Nor is much progress likely to be made without the driving impulse of British entry.

Had The Times not commissioned an American view from Mr. Dale, I would never think of addressing my British friends about a decision they must make for themselves and for their own good.

But I cannot leave the impression on the record that his jaundiced

sputterings reflect informed American opinion. Viewed from the far side of the Atlantic, the central issues for Britain still stand out in clear relief, as they have done for a long while ...

I profoundly hope, therefore, that British opinion does not become bogged down in a niggling dispute over short-term adjustments that entry into Europe may entail or deflected by false optimism at a transient improvement in the balance of payments. National solutions of essentially international problems involve – even when possible – high costs in deferred investment and economic growth. That is a prime lesson of postwar experience, learned all too often the hard way.

Many Americans profoundly hope, therefore, that Britain will pursue the new opportunity to join Europe not only with vigorous diplomacy but with the determination to hasten the fulfilment of the bright vision which the authors of the Rome Treaty so clearly saw – a Europe able to combine the economic efforts of its diverse peoples for their common prosperity, while, at the same time, perfecting the institutions for political unity that alone can offer a renewed assurance of peace and tranquillity to a troubled world.

Never were those justly famed British qualities of pluck and genius more urgently needed, not only by the west but by the world.'

- From Mr. Jean-Francois Deniau:

'Sir, - I read Mr. Edwin Dale's article with much interest. Indeed, in such an outbreak of spleen, almost of jilted love, there is something which draws one's attention, not to speak of the eminent qualities of Mr. Dale himself. However, this article disturbed me considerably for it bore all the signs of a rather fundamental lack of understanding both of certain juridical and economic facts as well as of the nature of the possible and desirable relations between Europe and the United States ...

... Despite the risk of over-simplifying one can reduce the main lines of Mr. Dale's review to three embittered arguments and it is upon these that I would like to comment:

The Common Market so far has operated against the commercial and economic interests of the third countries;

There is no reason why the United States should go on paying the

commercial or economic price for the dream of European political unity;

This dream of European political unity cannot be realized and does not make sense.

I must dispute the first claim. I wish your readers could see the Community's external trade statistics. In general terms the development of trade between the Community's member States within the framework of the customs union has not been brought about to the detriment of imports from non-member countries ...

As for attitudes, what really disturbed me in Mr. Dale's article was the statement that America should no longer pay a commercial price to foster European unity. I really do not know when and how such a price would have been paid. Perhaps certain Americans themselves thought it was clever to present in this way the efforts undertaken by Europeans to reduce their absurd and costly economic fragmentation.

It seems that for Mr. Dale a trade negotiation between partners whose interests are not necessarily convergent, is a scandal. While recognizing that the Kennedy Round led to useful tariff reductions, Mr. Dale is indignant that the Community negotiators should have defended their position with firmness and he considers that this was a case of "enemies and not partners".

I do wish that countries on both sides of the Atlantic could admit that interests can diverge and compromises evolve from negotiations without the result's being called a hostile confrontation. If this is too much to ask, we can at least admit that the first aim of a tariff negotiation is to get to a new economic balance acceptable to all concerned, not to express sentiments.

As for the lack of European unity one can only share his regret. But one must realize that the process is inevitably a very slow one. Political progress depends not on spectacular decisions but on the creation day by day, year by year, of combined action for which the Customs Union is both the framework and the opportunity ...

Mr. Dale complains that Italians have remained Italians and Dutchmen have remained Dutchmen. This neither depresses nor gladdens me.

For it was never among the aims of the Treaty to suppress Italians and Dutchmen. I only wish that a little more often (and that includes the others!) they also had more sense of their common interest ...

To get upset now because the economic competition is already there but the President of the United States of Europe is not may stem from a healthy reaction against the excesses of propaganda. The point now is to stop this sort of aimless argument from going any further and get down to a new and realistic dialogue in which there is a reasonable discussion about divergent interests. There I think I can agree with Mr. Dale.

I forgot something. It is also high time that Americans who might share Mr. Dale's views should admit that disagreeing with them on soya beans, A.S.P. or any business is certainly not tantamount to being against America and in no sense justifies the adoption of a sort of isolationist anti-European spleen. As to our dreams - if they go wrong that's bad; but it's worse still if they only remain dreams.'

(The Times, 24 September, 9 October 1969)

3. The EEC's agriculture and food industries state their attitude to the Common Market

At a press conference in Brussels on 1 October 1969 Mr. W. Neutelings, Chairman of the Committee of the Agricultural and Food Industries (CIAA) of the Union of Industries of the European Community (UNICE) presented a paper on a suggested policy for the agricultural and food industries.

The paper analysed the likely effects of the future agricultural policy on the processing industries, and put forward a number of ideas about the industry itself. The intention is to provide a general framework for more detailed studies leading to practical guidelines for expanding the food industry.

The paper begins by describing the economic importance of the European food industry. It goes on to examine the conditions necessary for a dynamic food and agriculture industry and, in the light of these, comments on the measures proposed by the Commission in its 'Agriculture 1980' programme. The CIAA maintains that, whatever happens, these measures must not lead to agriculture's obtaining a dominant position in the organiza-

tion of the markets for its products, nor to an abuse of powers in its favour in the matter of prices. It would be equally unfortunate if aid given to agriculture enabled it to take over the marketing and processing of products and to suppress the law of supply and demand.

The CIAA further considers that the Commission's plan of action is too restricted in scope. It speaks of the need for an 'overall food - agriculture economy' in which agriculture would no longer be regarded as a productive end in itself but where the processing of products would also be taken into consideration.

Since it was the future of the agricultural and food industry that was at stake, its development was bound up with the maintenance of a high rate of growth, which in turn depended on utmost monetary co-operation within the EEC and throughout the world.

The CIAA said it was ready to look into the problems raised in its paper with interested parties and with the Community institutions.

('Europe', 1 October 1969; La Libre Belgique, 17 October 1969)

4. European Industry gives its opinion on the Mansholt Plan

On 2 October 1969 the Union of Industries in the European Community (UNICE) published an opinion on the European Commission's memorandum on overhauling agriculture in the EEC.

'UNICE considers that the agricultural policy provided for in Articles 38ff. of the Treaty has so far been pursued too one-sidedly. Macroeconomic inter-actions have not been given adequate consideration in taking decisions on agriculture. Agricultural policy measures have, as a result, led to:

- common agricultural prices unrelated to economic realities, and automatic intervention on markets sometimes covering unlimited quantities and, as a result, to

- steadily mounting burdens for national budgets
- trade policy difficulties with third countries.

At the same time there has been no adequate improvement in the situation in agriculture. The national and the Community agricultural policies have laid excessive stress on social aspects, and in practice this has led more to a policy of agricultural aid than to one for the economic promotion of agriculture.

UNICE is glad that the European Commission's proposals are designed to impart an impetus to the formulation of an overall design for agriculture which takes the needs of the economy as a whole into account and lays the emphasis on improving agricultural structures. It approves the aims the Commission has set for overhauling Community agriculture:

- striking a balance on the critical agricultural markets as soon as possible;
- reducing, in the long term, charges on the national budgets in respect of agricultural policy;
- action to bring about specialization in agricultural production;
- integration of agriculture in the process of macro-economic growth with consequent improvement in the living conditions of farm workers.

In view of the difficult situation in agriculture UNICE feels that regional and industrial policies should allow for the consequences of the unavoidable redevelopment of a large part of the agricultural sector. It would be easier to integrate agriculture in the economy as a whole if the Community were to undergo strong and sustained growth.

Agricultural markets policy

UNICE considers that measures to restore balanced markets should be given priority forthwith.

Efforts to conduct a 'cautious' price policy deserve full support. None the less UNICE points out that the price measures proposed do not appear sufficient to prevent further increases in production.

Agriculture ought to be made to bear a greater share in economic risks than in the past by making a change in automatic interventions on the market. This would help to avoid new and ill-advised investment, and therefore non-economic production trends.

There are at present serious imbalances on the market for certain agricultural products. To restore a more satisfactory situation there should be reductions in guaranteed prices for products of which there is an excessive surplus. At all events agriculture must in future take its share of market risks like other branches of the economy.

One way of achieving this would be to get contributions from agricultural producers so that they can share in a non-discriminatory way in financing the disposal of production surpluses.

Financing the agricultural policy

UNICE regrets that the Mansholt Plan gives definite details of the cost of the measures it advocates. These are essential for a valid assessment of the European Commission's proposals.

Assessments must, where applicable, take account of the share borne by the budgets of member States. Furthermore they should be broken down by dates on which the expenditure is to be incurred, areas, and type of intervention.

Similarly UNICE regrets the lack of details in the memorandum as to the chances of reducing the cost of the present markets policy by modernizing agricultural structures. Its view is that such a reduction should follow logically from carrying out the measures advocated in the memorandum.

UNICE considers that the expenditure of the European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund should be foreseeable and capable of being evaluated in budgetary terms; the amount involved should not depend wholly on decisions of an agricultural character.

Expenditure under the 'Guarantee' section of the EAGGF ought to be subject to strict control, where applicable by production sector. In the case of structural surpluses of certain products, measures should be taken (particularly in the form of contributions from agricultural producers) to

ensure that they share in preserving the balance of the market.

The interventions of the 'Guidance' section of the EAGC should fit in more closely with the implementation of a Community regional policy because of the interdependence existing between them.

Trade policy

UNICE points out that under Article Il0 of the Rome Treaty the Community has to contribute to the balanced development of world trade. In this connexion it has already drawn the Commission's attention to the consequences of an agricultural policy the effect of which could be described as protectionist in major production sectors.

UNICE regrets that the Commission's proposals barely touch on trade policy problems, all the more so as these proposals assign to the establishment of a balance on the agricultural markets a key role in the overhaul of Community agriculture. UNICE, like the Commission, considers that Community agriculture must be integrated with the world's economy. It therefore feels that agricultural trade relations with third countries should not be geared solely to agricultural policy on prices and markets.

There is an increasing amount of dumping of agricultural products on the world market. This is leading the various countries to try to outdo each other in export subsidies and in protection against imports. UNICE therefore supports the efforts made by the Community in the Kennedy Round to achieve an organization of the main world markets for agricultural products.

Lastly, UNICE points out that care should be taken to see that some of the new measures envisaged in the Mansholt Plan do not have insupportable effects on certain branches of industry directly concerned or on the economy as a whole, into which agriculture should be smoothly integrated.

It particularly trusts that these measures will not be used by third countries as a pretext for retaliatory measures the adverse effects of which on the Community's economy as a whole would outweigh the interests it is desired to protect, and would at the same time jeopardize the measures to free international trade decided upon at the Kennedy Round.

Improving agricultural structures

UNICE supports the European Commission's view that the improvement of agricultural structures must be part of an economic and social policy based on general economic considerations. Hence any action to modernize farm structures should be set within a regional policy context. In this connexion the Commission should take the initiative in co-ordinating policies in this sphere so that the decisive impetus to improve farm structures really does stem from a view of the economy as a whole.

The aims envisaged by the Commission as regards the number of people to be engaged in agriculture in the future are to a large extent based on observed trends and in line with the Community's second medium-term economic policy programme.

Any measure aimed at influencing the size of farms will have repercussions on the numbers employed in agriculture. Such measures should therefore take into account the possibilities of re-employing the manpower released in other sectors of the economy, at the different stages envisaged for implementing the 'Agriculture 1980' programme. They should furthermore help in cutting down structural production surpluses.

UNICE is not convinced that the proposed reduction in areas cultivated is likely, on its own, to bring about a substantial reduction in structural surpluses. It is indeed probable that only submarginal land will be withdrawn from production. Intensive cultivation of the remaining land and increased agricultural productivity are therefore liable to maintain surpluses at a high level. This is why UNICE thinks that the assessment of the land area to be withdrawn from agricultural production proposed by the Commission should not be regarded as a final objective. UNICE considers that the withdrawal of land from cultivation ought to go hand in hand with technical progress in farming, one of the lasting effects of which will be to limit structural surpluses.

UNICE is furthermore in favour of the reafforestation of the greater part of the land thus freed, as proposed by the Commission.

Lastly UNICE urges that, in view of the scale of the resources needed and of the many relationships of interdependence involved, member States should co-ordinate their policies for improving agricultural structures at the Community level.

Social aspects of overhauling agriculture

UNICE considers it is now essential to make a special effort to deal with the retraining and resettlement of ex-farm workers. These should not however be placed in too privileged a position, getting the benefit of special training or retraining. The measures taken should simply put these workers on an equal footing as regards the pursuit of an activity in another sector. If imbalances were caused by unduly accelerating the exodus from the land, this would cause serious social problems.

UNICE feels that the programme's main emphasis should be on measures on behalf of those who wish to go in for another occupation. The main point would be to create incentives for this. Provision should therefore be made not only for redeployment and the creation of new workplaces, but also for meeting the needs of those concerned during the change-over period. These measures would be preferable to steps in favour of older persons wishing to give up their jobs on the land, which would inevitably give rise to abuse. Such steps would clash with social security systems, which differ appreciably from one country to another and come under national laws.

For the same reasons (source of abuse, impossibility of working out the financial implications, damage to social security systems) it would be as well not to grant unemployment allowances because they could lead to the employment imbalances referred to.

Finally UNICE points out that the tasks to be assigned to the European Social Fund, within the framework of the social measures provided for, cannot be defined in detail until the reform of the regulations concerning the Fund itself has been discussed.

The Social Fund will only be able to act, however, in accordance with general operating rules to be laid down at a later date. It would cooperate with member States on the basis of fairly well defined criteria and under conditions to be laid down by the Council of Ministers.

Final observations

The main impetus for resolving agricultural problems should come from macro-economic developments. It is clear to UNICE that such a large-scale reform programme is not likely to be carried through within the simple framework of a customs union coupled with a common agricultural policy.

UNICE considers that implementation of the Commission's proposals presupposes:

- that the Community's development be systematically pursued so as to arrive at a real economic union, and in particular that Community decisions be taken in the light of the general interests of the Community and not only in in the light of national interests;
- that the implementation and financing of the programme be co-ordinated at Community level.

Despite the foregoing comments, UNICE considers that the Commission's reform proposals are in the right direction. They should be used as a means to develop and consolidate the Community.'

(Bulletin de la Fédération des Industries belges, No. 26, 1969)

5. Bureau of the European Organization of the WCL (World Confederation of Labour) states its views on the overhaul of the European Social Fund

On 9 October 1969 the Executive Board of the WCL's European Organization commented on the Commission's opinion to the Council concerning the overhaul of the European Social Fund.

The Board again insisted that the Fund ought to make an effective contribution to bringing in a Community employment policy. For this purpose the Fund should be given new powers and responsibilities on the basis of the Commission's proposals to the Council.

The Board regretted that the opinion of the Commission was not more forthright on the subject of supranationality, and pointed out that in the ICFTU-WCL memorandum on drawing up the single Treaty the trade union movement asked that the new treaty should provide for a commission endowed with supranational powers and answerable solely to the Parliament. Even if such an objective could not be achieved in the near future, given the present political climate, it was desirable to create machinery to enable the Commission to pursue a really dynamic employment policy within the framework of its present powers in matters concerning the European Social Fund.

As regards finances, the Board considered that the arrangement proposed by the Commission would involve some of the very risks inherent in the present one. To get over this, financial independence within the meaning given to the term in the Treaty of Paris, and allowing for effective intervention, ought to be extended to all the Communities.

The Board criticized the Commission's view of the relation existing between economic policy and social policy. It felt that social aspects should be brought more to the fore. Because of this it was inclined to reject the Commission's statement that 'the Fund is an essential tool of economic policy' and to regard the latter as a tool for achieving the social aims of the Community.

(Europe, 25 October 1969)

6. Policy statement by the trade unions of the EEC on overhauling the common agricultural policy

The Executive Committee of the European Federation of Free Trade Unions in the EEC and the Executive Board of the European Organization of the World Confederation of Labour (WCL) have issued a policy statement on the European Commission's 'Memorandum 1980'.

The two trade union movements regard the overhaul of agriculture as a matter of pressing urgency because the snags run into by the agricultural policy so far tend to lead to disenchantment among the general public about European integration. If the aims of Article 39 of the Rome Treaty are really to be achieved, there must be determined efforts to co-ordinate the component parts of the agricultural policy on a comprehensive long-term basis, and to fit them into the Community's medium-term economic policy.

The unions stress the dual need for this reform not to impair the social security of those concerned and to take more account of the interests of consumers. The success of the reform will depend on the degree of coordination achieved between the member States and on the closeness of their co-operation, particularly in their economic and cyclical policies, with a view to ensuring full employment. In this respect, regional policy will play the leading role.

The unions' analysis of the Mansholt Plan sets out from these preliminary considerations. They share the Commission's view that larger farms are needed to improve production structures. They regard the Commission's definitions of 'production unit' and 'modern farm' as sound, but not sufficiently flexible. To make of these farms 'going concerns' and prevent them from becoming parcelled out again at a later date, it was essential that land law should be standardized and updated. It was also desirable to set up public or semi-public bodies to stamp out land speculation.

As regards the allocation of social assistance, the unions are opposed to any discrimination between the various categories. 'Such assistance must be the same for workers, owners, farmers and managers'. As regards old-age pensions, the Governments should be made to enact measures providing at least a minimum of benefits. At the same time, farmers who do not benefit from general measures ought, under certain conditions, to receive personal tide-over assistance. Finally, the European Social Fund should be brought in on all measures of social assistance for the re-employment and retraining of agricultural workers.

A Community approach should be made to regional policy, which is closely bound up with agricultural reforms. 'To accelerate the exodus from the land without seeing to it that an adequate number of suitable jobs were available would be socially irresponsible.' Hence the need for long-term development of regional infrastructures. The unions also advocate the introduction of an autonomous system of financing for regional policy.

The new scale of prices recommended by the Commission should take into account the interests of the consumers 'who cannot be forced to continue financing a policy for market assistance which has so far only registered some highly dubious successes.' The trade unions want to see an appreciable cut in the prices of all products affected by the considerable imbalances on the market, and the producers bearing a share of the cost of surpluses.

On the problem of financing the agricultural policy, the unions feel that the burden borne by national and Community budgets ought eventually to be lightened. The European Investment Bank and the European Social Fund could play an important part in overhauling structures. Stress is laid on the need for financial resources available to the Community, to the exclusion of any national financing plans. Financial equalization would be worked out with due regard for the burdens that each of the member States could bear.

As to the nature of the financial support to be given, the unions agree with the Commission that the emphasis currently placed on supporting prices

and markets should be shifted as soon as possible to the structural policy.

('Europe', 24 October 1969)

7. Europa-Union Conference in Saarbrücken

Despite the stalemate and alarming crises in the European Communities, there are political movements at work determined to go ahead with the building of a united Europe. One of these is the Europa-Union of Germany whose 18th Congress was held in Saarbrücken from 23 to 25 November 1969. The theme of this year was 'A European Policy for the Seventies'.

Baron von Oppenheim, President of the Europa-Union, addressed four requests to the Federal Government in connexion with the summit meeting: these, he considered, must be satisfied if the summit were to have any point.

First, the European Commission must be put in a position to develop the Community into a comprehensive economic union. In particular, this would involve the introduction of measures to set up a monetary union. Secondly, joint financing of the agricultural market was in the interest of all countries. By the end of the year a settlement had to be found, provided it did not stand in the way of a radical overhaul of the present agricultural system. Moreover the Federal Government should press for acceptance of the principle that Community finances needed democratic control, particularly once an independent source of revenue became available. This meant increased powers for the European Parliament and the direct election of its members. Thirdly, a time-limit had to be agreed for opening negotiations with the Governments of applicant States. Fourthly, Baron von Oppenheim called for consultation machinery, as set out in Europa-Union's official aims, as the first step towards a political union.

The Europa-Union, said Baron von Oppenheim, saw no conflict of interests between European integration and Eastern bloc policy. Peace moves would in any case be pointless unless they came from the Western nations as a whole and unless the European Community was on a firm basis. Only thus could the 'proposed all-European peace conference serve as a test of Moscow's willingness to co-operate in securing a real détente'.

Baron von Oppenheimer's view that European integration was the best European peace policy was echoed by several other speakers at the congress, including Professor Hallstein, President of the European Movement, Mr. Mayhew, Labour M.P., and Mr. Poher, President of the French Senate. It was felt, therefore, that the crisis in the Community must be resolved as quickly as possible. Here too a common policy and joint parliamentary control were necessary.

Mr. Poher said that with the resurgence of national egotism in recent years, it took great courage to remain hopeful, but no Government could shoulder the responsibility for a failure of the summit meeting. Only if integration was extended into the political field could Europe throw its full weight into the scales at future negotiations between the USA and the USSR. Mr. Poher recommended the statesmen at the summit meeting to make a great leap forward.

The most recent public opinion polls in his country had shown that 68 per cent of the people were in favour of an integrated Europe, and were therefore more European than ever before. Mr. Poher strongly urged Britain's early entry into the Community. The summit meeting, the preparations for which had possibly been inadequate, ought at least to spell out a 'clear political objective' for the drive towards unity in Europe.

Mr. Wolff von Amerongen, President of the DIHT (Central Association of German Chambers of Industry and Commerce) described the occasional doubts about a vast free market expressed in industrial circles, not as a repudiation of the Common Market but as constructive criticism. tion in the agricultural sector had progressed little, and despite the administrative apparatus set up to serve it, remained a frail affair. Every effort was bound to be piecemeal unless an operative form of integration were achieved soon. This would mean voluntary sacrifices on the part of German industry too. Mr. von Amerongen did not think that the problems of monetary policy could be solved at supranational level in the foreseeable future. Nevertheless member States could co-ordinate their economic, financial and monetary policies more closely. Mr. von Amerongen concluded on a warning note: 'The state of the European Economic Community and its agricultural policy, with all its protective measures against third countries, is a standing challenge to a trade war. To begin with the EEC was outward-looking; as it is today it appears, particularly from the outside, to encapsulate the This is not the Europe championed, at some sacrifice, by a large section of German industry. It is the duty of each one of us to do his bit to remedy this state of affairs.'

The desire of the German trade unions to co-operate in the unification of Europe was underlined by Mr. Tacke, Deputy President of the German Federation of Trade Unions. He regretted that it had not yet been possible to achieve multilateral wage agreements by harmonizing social legislation in the member States. He proposed that 'European studies' should be made part of the curriculum of all schools in Europe.

A political resolution passed by the Congress states: 'The political situation in Europe is characterized by new setbacks in the integration process, but equally by new hopes. The paralysis that has struck the common agricultural market has shown that the European Economic Community of the Six cannot escape the iron logic of the Treaties: either forward to supranational unity or backward to national discord.'

The resolution adds that the Europa-Union has never thought of the task of European unification as concerning only the West. Peace policy implied willingness to offer to ensure peace in Europe along the lines of Franco-German reconciliation and West European co-operation, through all-European understanding.

The Europa-Union further calls for closer integration in all fields at present not covered, or covered inadequately, by the Community, particularly science, technology and education. 'Foreign and defence policies, regarded by the national Governments as the last bastion, must be recast in the European mould.'

(Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 24 and 25 November 1969; Handelsblatt, 25 November 1969; Saarbrücken Zeitung, 26 November 1969; Le Monde, 26 November 1969)

Zweiter Teil - Deuxiême partie - Parte seconda

Tweede Deel - Part II

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