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a survey

EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

General directorate of parliamentary
documentation and information

In addition to the official acts published in the Official Gazette of the European Communities, the activities of the European Communities are reported on in publications appearing at regular intervals.

Thus, the Commission of the European Communities publishes a Monthly Bulletin on the activities of the Communities while the European Parliament issues a periodical Information Bulletin on its own activities.

The Council of Ministers issues a press release after all its sessions. Its activities are also reported on in a special section of the Bulletin of the European Communities.

The Survey of European Documentation is intended to serve as a supplement to the above publications. It deals with salient features of the process of European integration taking place outside Community bodies.

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P a r t I

PROBLEMS OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION

at the National Level

I. GOVERNMENTS AND PARLIAMENTS

Germany

1. Statement by Chancellor Kiesinger on European policy : the completion of the European customs union and a European summit conference

At a reception in Bad Godesberg, held to mark the completion of the European customs union on 1 July 1968, Chancellor Kiesinger made a speech in which he had this to say about European policy. 'July the first 1968 brings in the completion of the European customs union; this is a very important milestone in the history of European unification... it is a day when we may feel pleased and satisfied but it is also a time for reminding ourselves of our concerns. The efforts to achieve European unity are liable, because of a series of circumstances to come to a dead end. Unfortunately the members of the European Community are no longer all in agreement on the aims and methods to be applied in enlarging the Community beyond its present membership. Added to this - particularly in the last year - a number of member States have experienced domestic difficulties which may perhaps have helped somewhat to diminish the vigour that is needed for this great work of unification.

Yet such domestic difficulties must be overcome if we are to achieve European unification - for a union of weak members cannot bring a sound entity into being; it is equally true that such domestic difficulties could be dealt

with more easily if we were to take positive steps towards European unification and if we could make this progress clearly visible to our peoples.

It is therefore high time we got over this stagnation and, particularly for us not to allow discussions about enlarging our membership to hamper internal construction of the Communities. This means that we must impart them with a strong, new impetus and that we must fill out the framework of the Treaty of Rome, acting with energy and speed; indeed we must consider extending the scope of our work beyond the existing framework. It also means that despite all the difficulties involved, we must, vigorously, realistically and pragmatically help those countries which also wish to become members in their progress towards the Community; lastly, it means that we must not lose sight of the great, ultimate goal of our efforts, the political unification of Europe.

Every thinking European knows that if we fail to come to a common approach on world policy as soon as possible we shall, to an increasing extent, continue to be left out in shaping the future of our world; for we are bound one day to reach the point where others will decide on our fate, on the fate of the scattered resources and States of Europe. This must not be allowed to happen. We must therefore find a new impulse, a new resolve and a new realism'.

Addressing the home and foreign press in Bonn on 5 July 1968, Chancellor Kiesinger reviewed the internal and external situation of the Federal Republic. In reply to a journalist who asked him how he saw the future of European policy (to which he had referred in his speech on the completion of the customs union) and what was his attitude in connexion with the measures of solidarity of the Five concerning France, he replied : 'The EEC partners must think on a large scale in the context of these support measures. In saying this, however, I simply mean that we have gradually reached an untenable position. A major political issue, perhaps the greatest for the future of Europe, has gradually become completely obliterated from the minds of the general public in Europe. Instead of a major impetus, we have had a state of affairs which only a small number of experts can appreciate and which has long since been beyond the range of the general public. It would be worthwhile making it clear what has been achieved. It would be very fine if, on 1 July when the customs union was completed, the turnstiles had been removed and if the customs officials had been disbanded. The normal traveller, however, finds the situation unchanged and asks where is the customs union? It is very difficult to explain to him that there remain a substantial number of fiscal approximation measures to be taken pending which these turnstiles must remain. If, however they were removed, this would be regarded as a sign of Europe's progress. I simply mean that we should take seriously this dispute over the accession of Britain and other applicant States. We should take France's attitude seriously

and try patiently to find a solution. Yet where we really must be in agreement - and this includes France, which also wants the Community and not a free trade area - is on vigorously pursuing the further development of the European Communities, and not only in the technical idiom of the experts. The Governments must, perhaps through a European summit conference - I am still asking for the European summit conference that was decided on in Rome - take up these great issues once again.

In this somewhat uneasy mood now prevailing in Europe and in the world, in which perhaps many young people have the feeling that political circles are no longer able to carry through anything on a large scale, this would be a sign of hope for them. For its part, the Federal Government will try to impart this impetus. '

On 7 July in a TV interview, Chancellor Kiesinger again asked for steps to be taken to further the construction of the Community; he again called for a summit conference of heads of Government of the Six. Of course agreement had first to be reached on the subjects concerning which all the Six would really be prepared to talk.

The Chancellor emphasized the need for a political community. The Europeans had to arrive at a common attitude on international policy. 'They must in order to act together be able to exercise an influence in the world. '

On 12 and 13 July, the CDU held its annual general meeting in Munich under the chairmanship of Mr. Franz Josef Strauss, its 'Land' Chairman. In accordance with tradition, Chancellor Kiesinger, as the most prominent member of the CDU, made a short visit to the meeting.

In his speech Chancellor Kiesinger dealt with electoral law and European policy. The unification of Europe - a subject which was discussed only very incidentally in comparison with the meetings in previous years - was described by the Chancellor as 'the challenge facing this generation of Europeans'. But the whole thing 'has somehow slipped out of our hands. The great European drive we once had has ebbed away'. He quoted as an example the fact that there were now only a few experts on European problems who understood anything. It was no longer possible to get an overall view of the European task, including what had been done so far - such as the recently completed customs union. The Chancellor said that tangible evidence must be

forthcoming and he returned to his plea that, at long last, there should be a summit conference of the heads of Government of the Six.

(Bulletin of the Press and Information Service of the German Government, No. 83 of 2 July 1968 and No. 86 of 9 July 1968; Die Welt, 6 July 1968; Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 9 and 16 July 1968)

2. Mr. Schiller, German Minister for Economic Affairs, puts the case for the economic union

On the completion of the European customs union, on 1 July 1968, the Federal Minister for Economic Affairs wrote an article on the future aims of European integration.

In detail what he said was as follows :

On 1 July 1968 - eighteen months before the end of the transition period - the customs union was completed. Simultaneously the first of the customs duty reductions agreed on at the Kennedy Round came into effect; similarly market regulations for most of the agricultural products had by then been established. A major aim had been achieved: this can also be regarded as satisfactory against the background of the events in France and the difficulties with the milk market regulations. Yet still not enough has been done. With the completion of this stage, the even greater and more difficult tasks that have to be tackled, stand out in greater relief. This success cannot blind us to the growing feeling that Community policy is stagnating; although this is, to a large extent, due to the disagreement over new memberships, its real causes are much more general and diverse. The major tasks confronting us and the present state of a European policy call for a thorough review of the means and ends of this policy and a new awareness among the member States of the common European interest.

The customs union was an important goal. It is, however, only a step towards implementing a common market and no more than a starting point for building a genuine economic union.

Still no real internal market

To build up internal market relations in the Community there are still a great many restrictions, on the freedom of movement of goods, the freedom of establishment and to supply services and the freedom of movement of persons and capital, which have to be removed. The disappearance of the internal customs duties and quantitative restrictions make it even more urgent to remove the remaining obstacles to trade and to go further in approximating competitive conditions. The general programme submitted by the Commission for removing technical restrictions to trade and the long-haul efforts to approximate national legal and administrative provisions, (particularly in the fields of foodstuffs, the law on pharmaceutical products and veterinary practice) show, because of the number of obstacles involved, how much still remains to be done. As long as differences in the burdens borne through taxes, company law and transport and energy costs subsist, there will still be differences in competitive conditions in the economic area coming into being. The question arises whether a greater effort should not be made to draw up a list of priorities. Just as the detail work of integration is so necessary, so it appears urgent at the present stage of the Common Market to clear away the main obstacles as a matter of priority.

The progressive implementation of the internal market creates the conditions for an integration of the economies through the enterprises themselves. The main ultimate objective of the economic union will, in fact, only be achieved when Community bodies, member States and enterprises work together and stimulate each other to this end. There will be no economic union through the agency of laws and regulations. In the European context, too, concerted action is necessary.

In view of the increasing interpenetration of the economies of the member States and because of the increased tempo of structural changes resulting from the creation of a large economic area, developments towards an economic union call increasingly for a harmonization of the economic policies of the member States and a common Community line. It is here that the political will of the member States to achieve economic integration will be tested.

The cyclical policy recommendations of the Council, the programmes for the medium-term economic policy, the agreed approach on international monetary questions represent a beginning. It cannot be denied however that the member States still continue in many cases to cling to a rather defensive 'nation-State' attitude; this may even have become more pronounced. Yet all those responsible should realize that unless there is a new awareness of the common interest and unless there is a greater drive towards solidarity, European integration will only progress with difficulty.

Accent on the industrial policy

In important sectors, such as energy, research and technology, common measures are necessary. Although in recent years the development of the agricultural market has been given some priority, we must now introduce a deliberate and rational policy for industry. Ways must be found of establishing a common capital market and competition policy must be adjusted to what has been achieved and to what we are striving for in integration. It would be easier to carry through these tasks if there were a merger of the three treaties. On the other hand progress towards a merger of the treaties will only be possible through agreement on specific common policies.

The customs union was indeed a definite objective and was achieved as planned. The completion of the internal market, and above all the construction of the economic union will be more difficult because the forms and ways of integration have first to be approximated more closely here. This is, moreover, one of the underlying causes for the present stagnation.

Greater solidarity

As well as the Community bodies and particularly the Commission, the member States have a decisive part to play in solving the problems of the future. The more integration progresses, the more the nucleus of nationally orientated policies will be affected. Hence there must be a greater feeling of solidarity between the member States and a political will to pursue the integration process. Recent developments in France have made it clear to the member States how much they depend on each other. We may hope that out of this situation there may come a new chance to consolidate and expand the Community.

(Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 1 July 1968,
Industriekurier, Special Edition 27 June 1968)

3. Bonn visit of Mr. Medici, Italian Foreign Minister

The Italian and German Foreign Ministers met in Bonn on 1 August 1968 for political talks.

Mr. Brandt and Mr. Medici agreed, in the course of lengthy discussions, to make an 'earnest new attempt', after the summer, to secure the enlargement of the European Community. They agreed that the question of the entry of the United Kingdom and the other applicant States - Denmark, Norway and Ireland - ought not be put on ice. So long as this was the case, further internal development in the Community would be impeded.

Mr. Brandt assured his Italian colleague that the Bonn proposals for an 'arrangement' with applicant States did not mean that the Federal Government would not be prepared to consider other proposals if these were practical. As regards a trading arrangement, Mr. Medici said that in the Italian view this would have to be clearly linked with some machinery for entry. The Federal Government had always stated that it always viewed such trade agreements in the light of eventual British entry and never as a substitute for it. So far only the French had insisted that such an arrangement ought in no way to prejudice the question of entry.

In this respect Italian and French attitudes clashed just as sharply as over whether the EEC States and non-member States could consult each other on matters falling outside the province of the Community. Italy desired such consultation, and a motion to the same effect had been announced in the Bundestag.

During the talks the way in which the proviso clause agreed upon by the European Council of Ministers ought to be handled when signing the non-proliferation treaty was discussed in detail. The members of Euratom - with the exception of France which was not acceding to the Treaty - wanted to make it clear through a proviso that their parliaments would not ratify the treaty until a satisfactory agreement had been reached between Euratom and the International Atomic Energy Authority (IAEA) in Vienna. This proviso, which would be deposited either orally or in writing at the time the treaty was signed, would also take account of the objections of the German Atomforum to twin supervision by IAEA and Euratom as well as its demand that supervision by Brussels should be maintained. This clause naturally did not prevent the parliaments of Euratom member States from entering into consultation on the treaty before agreement on supervisory powers had been reached.

In the talks between Mr. Brandt and Mr. Medici the possibility that no agreement would be reached between Brussels and Vienna was not touched upon. Both Ministers took it for granted that a solution acceptable to Euratom could be found - within the period stipulated in the treaty - in the course of the negotiations, which would have to be opened six months after the general

entry into force of the Treaty and completed after a further eighteen months. Bonn welcomed the opportunity offered by this interval to clear up the remaining questions in dispute.

Mr. Brandt and Mr. Medici shared the view that Bonn and Rome should jointly try to counteract any tendency for the non-proliferation treaty to endanger Europe's economic development.

(Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 2 and 3 August 1968;
Die Welt, 2 August 1968;
Industriekurier, 3 August 1968)

4. European talks between German and Dutch ministers

Mr. de Jong, Prime Minister, and Dr. Luns, Foreign Minister, arrived in Bonn on 18 September 1968 for talks with the Federal Government. The talks were part of a series of discussions which had already been held by the Federal Government with its Italian and Belgian partners and came to a close with the visit of Mr. Grégoire, the Luxembourg Foreign Minister.

The talks, which were conducted by Federal Chancellor Kiesinger and Foreign Minister Brandt on the one side and Mr. de Jong and Dr. Luns on the other, evidently narrowed the differences as to the best method of enlarging and building up the European Economic Community. The Dutch delegation left with the impression that the German proposals in the memorandum of 9 March for the EEC Council of Ministers had in the meantime been formulated more satisfactorily than had been expected.

Dr. Luns made it clear that the Dutch Government saw only two ways in which progress could be made in Europe : (i) political integration among the six EEC member States, and (ii) enlargement of the Communities at the earliest possible date.

The joint communiqué speaks of measures to step up co-operation with applicant States in the political, economic and technological fields so as to prepare for and facilitate their eventual accession. It was the aim of both Governments to 'enlarge, build up and merge the European Communities'.

At a press conference, Mr. de Jong said that the 'Europe of the nation-States' was too weak to make its voice heard in the world. Europe had to integrate but - as the French attitude to events in Czechoslovakia had shown - there was no sign of a change in mood in Paris.

Although the German attitude towards the question of entry also remained unchanged, the German-Dutch talks had clearly helped to dispel Dutch doubts about German motives. As one of the participants put it, they had been able to convince themselves that Bonn's policy was not simply jogging along in the wake of French diplomacy.

The communiqué deals in greater detail with the talks on questions of European security. The NATO alliance is regarded - following the occupation of Czechoslovakia - as absolutely essential. It ought to be not only maintained but even strengthened, at all events politically and, if the need arose, also militarily. The phrase 'if necessary' had been inserted - explained Mr. de Jong - because NATO would have to decide to strengthen military forces if the heightened threat arising from the presence of Soviet troops in Czechoslovakia was to become permanent. The communiqué called for the withdrawal of the occupying troops, adding that the occupation should be condemned as a violation of human rights and of the UN Charter. The Soviet Union's attempts to cast suspicion on the Federal Government's policy in this matter ought to be censured.

Both governments announced in the communiqué their intention to continue a policy aimed at easing tensions and preserving peace. This also included a lasting and just settlement of the issues that had led to the division of Europe, of the world and of Germany.

(Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 19 and 20 September 1968;
Die Welt, 20 September 1968;
Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 21 September 1968)

5. Visit of the Luxembourg Foreign Minister

A few days prior to the Franco-German consultations, Mr. Brandt, Foreign Minister, concluded his series of bilateral talks to sound opinions on enlarging and developing the European Communities, when he saw Mr. Grégoire, the Luxembourg Foreign Minister, in Bonn on 24 September 1968.

In Bonn the hope was expressed that Luxembourg would, at the next meeting of the EEC Council on 27 September, assume a role midway between the concern of the Dutch to press onward and the tendency of the French to hold back.

The hope that a decision may be reached on opening negotiations with the British about accession had now been abandoned by Bonn in view of the unchanged French attitude. Mr. Brandt would concentrate every effort in trying to ensure that the question of accession was not 'buried' at the Council meeting.

(Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 25 September 1968;
Die Welt, 25 September 1968)

6. Foreign policy debate in the Bundestag

On 25 September 1968 the Bundestag resumed after its summer recess, opening with a government statement by Federal Chancellor Kiesinger.

The Federal Chancellor stated in the Bundestag that in view of the continued stationing of Soviet troops in Czechoslovakia NATO had to review the strength of its forces in Europe; the Federal Government and Parliament would see to it that the German army was given the necessary manpower and material equipment. He stressed that the policy of peace would be pursued : 'We are going neither to give up nor to bow to the demands of the Soviet Union. Europe needs a legitimate order of peace'.

He called upon the peoples of Western Europe to increase their efforts towards European integration. 'It seems to me that the time has come to try, with a new drive by the peoples of Europe acting together, to get over this dangerous stagnation which has for some time been paralyzing the work of European unification.' Long before the events in Czechoslovakia, the Federal Government had been thinking what could be done. Essentially there were three main problems :

1. Merging the three European Communities and intensifying their work until the economic union was completed;
2. Enlarging the circle of members of the Community; and

3. Developing a common political will for a joint approach in external affairs as a first step towards political union.

Important steps in this direction could be to achieve a co-ordination of the monetary, economic and cyclical policies, to devise a new European policy for energy and policies of European science and technology. A start had been made in European technological co-operation on 31 October; since then, however, little had happened, although the Federal Government had made proposals.

The other main problem was the enlargement of the European Communities. The accession of the United Kingdom and the three other States was still an important political objective for the Federal Government. At present, negotiations could not be opened for obvious reasons. 'But this does not relieve us of the duty of trying to find interim solutions that could facilitate accession.'

The Chancellor hoped that progress would be made at the meeting of the Foreign Ministers in Brussels on 27 September and that the way might thereby be opened with the United Kingdom and the three other States. 'We stand by our proposal for a trade policy arrangement. Here in Bonn we shall, in a few days time, have an opportunity of discussing this matter with our French partners. We shall go on from the Franco-German statement of 16 February.'

In recent years Europe had seen far-reaching political changes almost, as it were, in front of its doors without being able to exert the least influence over them. It was disturbing to see how manifest Europe's political weakness was in the face of such events, for Europe was, apart from this, enjoying an unprecedented economic expansion. 'Our main responsibility is not only to secure freedom and peace for Western Europe but also to build a road to a lasting peace for the whole of Europe which will lead to a fair solution of the German question. We can only achieve this with united forces and a common resolve. If we do, this Europe will develop into a great power for establishing and securing world peace. If we fail, the decision over our future in a world that is too full of dangers will pass to others and prevent us from having any say in the future shape of our world.'

The Federal Chancellor concluded his observations on European policy by saying that the Government considered its most urgent and important task to be to do everything in its power to achieve this great objective, and to do so in the near rather than the distant future.

On 26 September, the Chancellor's foreign policy statement was debated and the spokesmen for all groups advocated continuing to pursue the policy of peace, at the same time stressing the need for a common defence policy within the western alliance.

Mr. Barzel, Chairman of the CDU/CSU Group, opened the debate by criticizing the Russian intervention in Czechoslovakia and gave an assurance that Germany's sympathy lay with the people of that country. In his view, this intervention had been part of the psychological and political war waged by Russia against the Federal Republic. 'The intention of intimidating us is unfortunately as unmistakable as the determination to defame our policy of peace by calling it political aggression.'

In the opinion of Mr. Barzel certain moves were necessary because of the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia :

1. Defence efforts : the permanent and undiminished presence of allied troops was vital. Instead of the yearly debate about the currency problem, the Federal Government should endeavour to devise some long-term compensation arrangement. Since the security of free Europe was involved, other Europeans must share the expenditure with the Federal Republic.
2. Political solidarity : the partners in the alliance should agree with each other on their policy and pursue the same course. The Soviet Union had to know that the alliance would react to pressure with firmness and to threats with boldness. The Soviet claims had to be countered politically and suitable security precautions had to be taken.
3. Europe : Germany and France should together draw the relevant conclusions. These could only be articulated as a greater European effectiveness. New fields for European co-operation which the Rome Treaty did not cover must be tackled in a European spirit. He added: 'We wish to do nothing without France.'
4. Policy on Eastern Europe : the peace policy must be pursued but it had to be asked whether there were any to whom it could be directed. As a monologue, it would raise problems. It had to be seen whether there was any point in trying to deal with East Berlin, the countries of Eastern and Central Europe and the Soviet Union with the same degree of concern.
5. Non-proliferation treaty : without a satisfactory answer to the German security problem, this treaty could not be signed.

Mr. Schmidt, Chairman of the SPD Group, endorsed the Government statement; he thought the Western Alliance as a whole had to examine the situation and draw the relevant conclusions. If the French did not wish to pursue the same course, the decisions had to be taken even without French participation in the interest of the security of Germany and its partners in the Alliance.

Analyzing defence, Mr. Schmidt came to the conclusion that the division of forces in the two sides of Europe had changed to the disadvantage of the West; on the other hand, especially with regard to strategic nuclear weapons held by the USSR and the USA, there was a balance between the Western and Eastern defence potentials and this continued to obtain. The balance depended decisively on the reliability of the response of defence forces stationed far from Europe in coming to the joint defence of Europe. Mr. Schmidt summed up his conclusions as follows :

1. First the governments had to have talks and NATO had to take a decision, after which the expenditure on additional equipment could be determined. If this transpired, the Bundestag must give a corresponding agreement with respect to Germany's involvement; here Mr. Schmidt spoke expressly for the SPD Group.
2. The defence balance could and would be maintained.
3. An order of peace in Europe could only be achieved if all were willing to contribute.
4. It would be 'most unreasonable' to give up the aim of normalizing a peace dispensation in Europe.
5. Just as, on the one hand, everything needed for the safety of the people would be done so too the proposals for a general renunciation of power and an order of peace in Europe had to be adhered to.

With reference to the non-proliferation treaty, Mr. Schmidt said : 'Where the contents are not yet clear and where there does not appear to be any resolve to respect the law, the *raison d'être* for an international treaty is seriously open to question.'

Mr. Walter Scheel, Chairman of the Free Democrat Opposition, concluded from the present situation that political efforts to achieve an order of peace in Europe had to take precedence over defence efforts. The spokesman for the Free Democrats made the following points :

1. There was no reason to doubt the loyalty to the Alliance of those involved. As long as the NATO Alliance existed, any military intervention in the Federal Republic would mean war.
2. The military capability of the Warsaw Pact countries had not been strengthened but rather weakened by recent events; the troops of Czechoslovakia and to some extent those of Rumania had dropped out and there were signs of demoralization among the Soviets.
3. There appeared little chance of a further strengthening of NATO. The Free Democrats recognized the Alliance but it was not out of question that France, for example, might become even more entrenched in its present stand; similarly the USA was faced with other problems; thus the limits of any defence efforts were clear.

Richard Stücklen, Chairman of the CSU Land Party in the Bundestag, addressed an appeal to France in which he said : 'We must, at long last, begin with a policy, jointly defined, co-ordinated and implemented for defence and foreign affairs'. On the eve of President de Gaulle's visit to Bonn, Mr. Stücklen called for a standing Franco-German governmental committee to be set up, to be responsible for co-ordinating the defence, foreign and finance policies of the two countries.

In the resolution passed by the CDU/CSU Coalition Group and the SPD, it was stated, inter alia :

'The Bundestag has always supported the government's endeavours to pursue a reasonable and effective policy for peace with all countries. This policy is designed to bring about an order of peace in Europe. It will be pursued, in spite of the serious setback it suffered when the Soviets marched into Czechoslovakia.

The freedom and security of the Federal Republic of Germany depend on the Atlantic Alliance. The Bundestag will therefore support the government in all necessary endeavours to consolidate and strengthen the Atlantic Alliance. It does not expect that there will be any unilateral reduction in the defence capability of the Alliance in Europe.

The Bundestag is in favour of international agreements on reciprocal measures for armaments control and limitation and for disarmament. The Federal Government has given an undertaking to its partners in the Alliance that it will prohibit the manufacture of nuclear, biological and chemical armaments and agreed to submit to appropriate international controls. It seeks no national supply authority for nuclear weapons and no national ownership of such weapons.

The existing European Communities must be developed internally, merged and expanded.

Only if there is close co-operation between all the peoples of Europe will it be possible to create an order of peace in Europe and to increase its political, economic, scientific and cultural influence in the world; only then will Europe be able to contribute towards solving the major problems of the world in a way that is expected of our continent.

(Die Welt, 26 and 27 July 1968;

Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 26 and 27 September 1968)

7. Government criticism of the financing system of the Community farming policy

In the Federal Government's Bulletin of 20 September 1968 Secretary of State Grund of the Federal Finance Ministry launched a sharp attack from Government circles on agricultural financing in Brussels. He pointed out that during the year 1969/70 more than DM 12, 000 million would have to be spent on the European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund (EAGGF). The question that arose was whether the EEC would be able to go on accepting ever-mounting farm production and the difficulties it created.

Mr. Grund said that the burden of Brussels' agricultural policy fell particularly heavily on the Federal Republic. This was obliged to raise DM 1, 650 million of the DM 5, 300 million paid into the EAGGF in the year 1967/68, but was getting only DM 610 million back. Germany was therefore paying in nearly three times more than it was being refunded. France, on the other hand, received twice what it paid in. EAGGF refunds per farmer amounted for Germany to only DM 277 as compared with DM 705 for France and DM 2, 333 for the Netherlands. Moreover, the new market organizations

for wine, tobacco and fishery products would reduce the German share in refunds still further. France, on the other hand, figured to an exceptional degree in all these market organizations.

Mr. Grund wondered whether the Federal Republic could go on indefinitely carrying the burden represented by the difference between a 31 per cent contribution to the Fund and a refund of only 15 to 18 per cent. In the interests of a balanced national budget, the Federal Republic was forced to seek a more even spread of expenditure among member States. EEC expenditure on agriculture had to be restricted. Mr. Grund advocated staggered scales of contribution within the Fund and urged the Commission to display clear-cut responsibility in the matter of finance policy.

Speaking at the annual meeting of the Association of German Toy Manufacturers in Garmisch-Partenkirchen on 22 September, Mr. Leicht, Parliamentary Secretary of State in the Federal Finance Ministry, said that new arrangements would have to be devised for financing in the EEC.

He felt that that what was required was some kind of European Finance Minister. It would in the long run be wholly unreasonable to expect the Federal Republic to contribute 31 per cent to common agricultural financing, which would total DM 7,200 million in 1967/68 and rise to DM 11,100 million in the following year, while the most it could hope to get back - under the most favourable conditions - would be only 18 per cent.

In this connexion Mr. Leicht criticized the Community's attempts to secure EEC customs duties as a source of revenue for its own exclusive use. This could only be done at the expense of the major importing countries and, therefore, of the Federal Republic. The resulting additional burden on the Federal budget would be quite unacceptable. Financial planning in the Community extending over several years would have to be insisted upon. The EEC Commission ought to be obliged to embody its proposals in the various sectors in an overall financial programme. Individual general directorates should no longer deal independently with their own budgets, nor should the existing form of hand-to-mouth system of financing be maintained.

(Bulletin der Bundesregierung, 20 September 1968;
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 21 and 23 September 1968;
Industriekurier, 21 September 1968;
Die Welt, 21 September 1968)

8. General de Gaulle's political talks in Bonn

On 27 and 28 September 1968 President de Gaulle held political talks in Bonn.

In an initial conversation with the French President, Federal Chancellor Dr. Kiesinger made it clear that he gave preference to a joint European policy towards Eastern Europe. He was convinced that since 1965 the Soviet Union had been passing through a re-stabilization phase and that, contrary to General de Gaulle's expectations, it would therefore shut itself off more and more. The danger that the men in the Kremlin would seek flight in adventure ought to be taken in earnest. Precisely for that reason the Soviet Union ought to be treated with extreme caution by Western Europe.

General de Gaulle outlined his views on European policy. The two partners should step up and broaden the scope of bilateral co-operation ('coopération préférentielle'). Speaking at a dinner, Dr. Kiesinger quoted Victor Hugo in support of his plea for an enlarged European Community : 'The day will come when you, France, you, Russia, you, Italy, you, Germany, all you nations of the continent will merge into a higher unity and form a European brotherhood. . .' General de Gaulle retorted that a Europe that wanted to be European must look at and into itself and make a start with those who wanted such a Europe, that is, with the most reasonable - say, with Germany and France and perhaps with a few others. Once again, as on the signing of the treaty of friendship in January 1963, General de Gaulle made an offer to start with the Franco-German nucleus for Europe.

He spoke even more bluntly in the closing talks in the presence of both delegations, after Dr. Kiesinger had assured him that he regarded the idea of carrying on with integrating Europe, if need be, without France, as destructive for European policy. General de Gaulle insisted that there could be no Community without France. If it were built with States other than the Six, disintegration would follow. France had long lived without the Common Market; it could also continue to exist without the Common Market, though it would regret this.

On General de Gaulle's 'coopération préférentielle', which was intended to step up collaboration between the two States, an assurance had already been given that there was no question of introducing an independent policy. This increased collaboration would have a stimulating effect both inside and outside the Community. Mr. Brandt and Mr. Debré would soon be meeting to get the new phase of intensified co-operation under way. Its field of application would extend beyond matters covered by the Treaty. Energy

policy, space travel and armaments were mentioned. As is generally known, prior to the summit meeting the CSU had called above all for co-operation in the fields of strategy and armaments.

General de Gaulle assured the Federal Chancellor that France would stand by the Federal Republic if the Czechoslovakian crisis developed into an international disaster. Between such a tragic possibility and the condemnation of aggression - and both statesmen insisted that the occupying troops be withdrawn - there lay a wide field of diplomatic action for a policy of détente. They agreed that the peace policy towards the East ought to be continued - according to General de Gaulle the only way of solving the German question. General de Gaulle stated that France did not recognize the Soviet Union's right to intervene in the Federal Republic's affairs.

Differences on security policy were also discussed. For the Federal Republic, which was immediately adjacent to the Eastern bloc, the military changes were of great importance. Nevertheless - said Dr. Kiesinger - the situation had not been dramatized in any way, as borne out by the medium-term financial programme in which defence expenditure had not been raised. Dr. Kiesinger bluntly stated that the security of the Federal Republic hinged on the presence of American troops. While showing understanding for this different assessment of the situation, General de Gaulle emphasized that France had no cause to alter its policy in any way whatever; on the contrary, it had more reason than ever to practise it and to make it known.

It was agreed between Mr. Strauss and Mr. Ortoli that a joint committee should look into tax problems. The subjects discussed would cover the conclusion of a revised double-taxation agreement by the end of the year; a regulation on the taxation of dividends; working out joint proposals for facilitating mergers, and harmonization of economic and fiscal measures for the alcohol and tobacco-processing industry in the EEC.

In a conversation with Mr. Ortoli, Dr. Schiller, Federal Economics Minister, welcomed the fact that the French Government, in tackling its economic difficulties, had not resorted to major restrictions but aimed at controlled expansion. Both Ministers thought that the economic prospects in their countries were fairly promising. They also agreed that trade relations between the European Communities and the European States not forming part of an economic bloc ought to be stepped up. This implies above all the conclusion of a trade agreement between the EEC and Yugoslavia.

In a report on his talks with General de Gaulle, Dr. Kiesinger told members of the CDU/CSU Group that it was not true that he had said that not a step could be taken in European development without France. Dr. Barzel, chairman of the Group, told journalists that the Chancellor and the Group agreed that Europe could not be built without France and that England belonged to Europe. There were - he said - new spheres not contemplated in the EEC Treaties open to European co-operation, especially technological co-operation with non-EEC countries.

The CDU/CSU Group also wanted Franco-German co-operation to be bilateral where possible, and called for at least a gradual rapprochement between the Community and countries that had applied for entry.

In contrast to Dr. Kiesinger, Mr. Majonica wrote in a CDU publication : 'In fields not governed by the existing European treaties, the Federal Republic must seek closer co-operation with all European States that are willing to take part in it. Only thus can Europe's influence make itself more strongly felt in the Atlantic Alliance.'

Mr. Fritz-Rudolf Schultz, FDP Bundestag representative, said that the view of the Parliamentary Secretary of State in the Federal Chancellery, Baron von und zu Guttenberg, that France had the right to say no to Britain's entry into the EEC was both uninformed and an unnecessary gift to de Gaulle. Mr. Schultz pointed out that the preamble to the EEC Treaty itself expressly called upon the other peoples of Europe to join in the efforts of the parties to the Treaty. They therefore had a right to enter the EEC and no EEC member had the right to thwart their aspirations on the flimsiest of grounds.

Mr. Schultz was afraid that through its attitude to the European question the Federal Government would finish up by pleasing nobody. In Brussels it was feared that a group would be formed within the EEC. The other member States - the Benelux countries and Italy - were already consulting each other with a view to offsetting the influence of France and the Federal Republic. There was a real danger that the Federal Government would fail not only to impress General de Gaulle but also to convince the other European States that it was in earnest about enlarging the European Community.

After the Federal Chancellor had assured the CDU/CSU Group that he had never said that no progress could be made in the European Community without France, all the Bundestag groups will discuss what steps can be taken to bring the European Community and the applicant States closer together so long as the French veto blocks their entry.

It is felt, however, that the formula devised by Mr. Barzel for his Group : 'Europe cannot be built without France and England belongs to Europe' gives no indication of how Europe is to be built if France will not let England enter. Mr. Helmut Schmidt, Chairman of the SPD Group, said that something would have to be done without France if France went on saying no to everything. The coalition groups were thus largely in agreement on this point.

A week before General de Gaulle's visit to Bonn on 20 September 1968, the Federal Foreign Ministry submitted to the EEC member States a memorandum on the activation of EEC policy and on the question of British entry. This was discussed at the Conference of EEC Foreign Ministers in Brussels on 27 September. The essential part of the Bonn proposals is the original plan progressively to cut customs duties between the EEC and EFTA up to 1972 so as to facilitate entry by Britain, Denmark, Norway and Ireland.

The deputy Government Spokesman, Mr. Ahlers, confirmed to the press that the Federal Government had taken a new initiative for enlarging the European Communities. This was reflected more especially in the proposals which the Federal Government had sent to the other EEC member States in memorandum form. Mr. Ahlers merely said that the proposals related to the Community's enlargement and internal development and to the merger of the Treaties. Interim Bonn proposals related to closer trade and technological co-operation and to general contacts. A further initiative, which Federal Chancellor Kiesinger only announced for the period following President de Gaulle's visit, related to the internal development of the Communities.

(Die Welt, 21, 25, 28 and 30 September 1968, 1 and 2 October 1968;
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 21 and 26 September 1968, 1 and
2 October 1968;
Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 30 September 1968, 2 October 1968)

Austria

1. Statement by Mr. Mitterer, Austrian Minister for Trade, on the problem of Austria's relations with the Community

At the meeting held by the EFTA Council in Geneva on 10 July, Mr. Otto Mitterer, Austrian Minister for Commerce and Industry, told the press that the Austrian negotiations in Brussels had gone well up till the time when they were suspended. They were, however, still held up by the Italian veto and no one knew how long this would last. As a result of the French veto on Britain's accession into the EEC, the question of the Community's enlargement had simply been shelved. Austria was, none the less, determined to come to some special kind of arrangement with the EEC so as to obtain free access to the Community markets without discrimination and yet without becoming a full member of the EEC.

He stressed that a rapprochement between Austria and the EEC was of great importance to his country's economy although in recent years many new industries had geared their activity to the EFTA markets. Austrian exports, in contrast to those of Switzerland, were engaged in a very much tougher struggle against international competition. He referred to the unfavourable effect of the EEC customs and quotas discrimination against Austria; this mainly related to the German market. He stressed the soundness of the dynamism inherent in the EEC.

Turning to the development of EFTA, Mr. Mitterer said that non-tariff obstacles to trade needed to be further reduced. EFTA trade had to be expanded but nothing should be done which might prejudice relations with the EEC. The point made by the late Federal Chancellor Raab that one should not constantly twist the tail of a lion if one sat in the same cage was still valid. Austria was keeping in close touch with the European Commission and the Governments of member States and it was still trying to find a loop-hole which it might wriggle through in Brussels. It would welcome any trade policy measures or arrangements in so far as they did not threaten its rapprochement with the EEC.

(Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 12 July 1968)

2. Vienna's official approach to the EEC States and to the Community bodies in connexion with the EEC-Austria negotiations

On 11 July Mr. Schober, Austrian Ambassador to Brussels, informed the European Commission (as did other Austrian Ambassadors in EEC capitals) that Austria wished to take part, from the beginning, in any negotiations on trade policy arrangements with States that had applied for membership. This approach did not, of course, mean that Austria had given up its objective of achieving a special arrangement with the EEC which took into account Austria's special situation and economic needs. These negotiations were suspended several months ago. The fact that Italy had no government with a clear majority in Parliament had dampened Austria's hopes of undoing the knot which had been tied fast by the Italian veto and French misgivings by the autumn. Austria had therefore now drawn attention to the fact that it would like to take part, in any circumstances, in any negotiations with the other EFTA States that may be started in the autumn.

(Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 12 July 1968;
Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 13 July 1968)

Belgium

1. Parliament debates European policy

A general election was held on 31 May 1968 and a Social Christian-Socialist government was formed under the leadership of Mr. G. Eyskens. Parliament then heard and approved the Government's statement and immediately began its study of the budgets for the current financial year.

The governmental agreement

The text of the agreement between the Social Christian Party and the Socialist Party was appended to the report of the Parliament's debate.

With reference to foreign policy, the agreement stated that the Government will give priority to three objectives, the main one being accelerating European unification, viz :

- (a) carrying out the Benelux Economic treaty;
- (b) achieving the economic union planned in the Treaty of Rome: common trade, monetary and financial policies;
- (c) extending Community co-operation to the fields of advanced technology;
- (d) finding ways of promoting the creation of a European political structure.

The Government was convinced that if all the free and democratic peoples of Europe, who shared this desire, were to support this joint endeavour, this would help creating a united Europe.

The two other aims were consolidating peace in the world and co-operating on development.

The budget for foreign affairs

In the Chamber of Representatives, the foreign affairs budget was debated at the 4 July session. Mr. Radoux (Socialist) listed the major issues that the European Community still had to tackle. He added: 'With a view to merging the Communities, the charter for European action must be reframed and the basis laid for the future economic union. The new pact must be situated between the future, federal pact and the existing provisions.'

Since 1965 we have been living not in the era of the Treaties of Rome but in that of the Luxembourg agreements, i.e. that of "an agreement on disagreements". To get Europe moving again, we shall have to find a way of dealing with the Community machinery which is not being operated. In November 1967, the veto system was applied to the enlargement of the Community. It is true that observations could be made to Britain regarding its attitude but I believe that the problems would be easier to solve with rather than without the United Kingdom. I do not think that in the coming period we shall be able to do what we have not done in the past when, for such a long time, we have been just plodding on.

I do not think it possible for countries like Germany to continue to make sacrifices in the agricultural context if we do not succeed, if not in uniting, at least in harmonizing our foreign policies. Is it of such great interest for a European country to pursue an independent policy if it counts for nothing in the course of negotiations and when these are about to be concluded? Europe was absent in 1945 at the time when the peace proposals were formulated; it is absent from the negotiations on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. Is it possible, Sir, that any change may be made in this situation in the weeks and months ahead? How can a relationship of equality with the United States be achieved if we, ourselves, do not succeed in forming an entity?

When it expressed satisfaction at the success of the Kennedy Round, the European Assembly said it would like negotiations to be held on the setting up of a joint USA-EEC "committee on understanding". I believe that this policy is a good one.

Secondly the Assembly asked that the USSR be approached with a view to increasing economic and cultural exchanges of common interest. One first result would be to increase the scale of trade which should facilitate a growing measure of co-operation between East and West in other fields.

If Europe, including the United Kingdom, became an economic union, it could take world problems a stage nearer to peace by negotiating on an equal footing with the United States and the USSR. The months ahead will show if we are able together to progress and to achieve something.'

Speaking for the Communist Group, Mr. Moulin had certain criticisms to make concerning the Common Market: 'We celebrated the 1st July 1968 without enthusiasm. The record is, moreover, a disappointing one. There was, for example, the unrest among farmers whose enterprises are no longer profitable. There has been a flight from the farms. Industrial firms have closed down. Unemployment is rampant and Article 119, which provides for equal pay for men and women, is not being complied with. There has also been an invasion by the bureaucrats. There are no less than 14,000 officials in Brussels. This is the reign of technocracy. The fact was acknowledged by Mr. Jean Rey when he spoke of the lack of democracy in the operation of all these bodies. We are strongly opposed to the policy of the present Common Market but we are in favour of a European policy in the service of the worker, a progressive Europe which will put paid to the account of the giant capitalist trusts which are doing very nicely.'

Speaking in the Senate on 11 July, Mr. Leemans (Christian Democrat) said that he could not be as patient as the Minister with regard to certain European problems:

'I am sorry that the EEC Commission has not yet organized its administration and that it has made no effort to adjust its internal organization. While we go on talking about management and technology, the EEC Commission is lagging behind and falling short in a disturbing way.

We find that the merger of administrative divisions is dealt with by the principal private secretaries rather than by the members of the Commission. The latter is inclined to avoid difficult problems and to entrust them to officials who have, no doubt, great political ability but appear to be unsuitable for managing the European Community on new lines.

It is with some enthusiasm or, at any rate, with some satisfaction that one notes that the emergency measures proposed by France will go through the European Economic Commission before being submitted to the Council of Ministers. Was not the Commission empowered to find a solution to these very difficult problems because the Council of Ministers could not solve them? To me it seems curious that, with respect to the concessions to be made to France, recourse should have been had to quotas for imports of

steel and textile products. If too much emphasis is placed on the quota system, this is liable to jam the sales machinery and make normal sales impossible.

With regard to technological co-operation, everyone is putting forward general opinions and sometimes proposals are submitted. There was an Italian proposal and there were the ESRO and ELDO proposals although the latter were on another level. Yet there is still no tangible result. We have allocated vast sums of money to the space development project but this money has not served any very useful purpose.

As regards electronic equipment, we do not even have the basic tools for co-operation. There is neither a "European-type" company nor a European law on patents. In this field there have been reports and opinions but nothing practical has emerged.

With regard to Euratom, the countries of Europe tend - when it suits them - to be as nationalistic as General de Gaulle even though some assert that he is the last nationalist in Europe.

All these facts deserve greater attention. We should find a policy line and, with regard to our country, we should get the chance to make a more important contribution.'

Mr. Ballet (Volksunie) felt it would serve no purpose to recall the trials recently experienced by the Common Market, particularly because of France's attitude : 'It is an irony of fate that France has had to be helped by the countries on which it thought to inflict financial damage by attacking the dollar and the pound. It is gratifying to note that these countries have defended the French franc and it is to be hoped that this gesture will give pause to the man who was, not long since, taking an inflexible and unreasonable attitude; this could lead to an integration going beyond the customs union of the 1st of July. Yet we are still a long way from a real economic union which, according to Chancellor Kiesinger, pre-supposes greater political unity. I hope that the Minister will pursue his plan for integration flexibly and diplomatically but at the same time with firmness.'

Speaking for the 'French-speaking and Walloon Party', Mr. Thiry felt that the Benelux union becomes a danger when it strays from the right path into the cultural, military, legal and political fields : 'The political aspect of the Benelux entity is seriously disturbing the Walloons and the people of Brussels. Indeed, what is involved is not a treaty between three parties of equal strength. There are 4 or 5 million French-speaking Belgians faced

with 15 million of their fellow-countrymen who speak Flemish and their Dutch neighbours who do not necessarily share their views on European policy.'

Mr. Harmel, Minister for Foreign Affairs, explained why, in recent months, he had laid stress on expanding and developing the Community : 'We were well aware that there was an obstacle that prevented the Six from opening negotiations to enlarge the Community right away; we knew that a way had to be found whereby, in spite of everything, progress could be made on the most important issues. Indeed, the development of European technology at present seems to be the most serious cause for the Community's leeway. We must go beyond the Treaty of Rome and try to revive the unification of Europe, I mean the political Europe, which was hard hit by the delays encountered in creating the economic Europe.'

I have been very impressed by some texts; they amount to a charter of Belgium's commitment to solidarity with the other countries of Europe. Perhaps it is because the Treaty of Rome is the most recent of these that one often pauses at the preamble where it discusses European unification. May I remind you of the wording: "... determined to establish the foundations of an ever closer union among the European peoples; resolved by the establishment of this combination of resources to strengthen the safeguards of peace and liberty and calling upon the other peoples of Europe who share their ideal to join in their efforts ...".

Ten years earlier, in the Treaty of Brussels, which was amplified in 1954 by the Treaty of Paris and the Western European Union, we had commitments which we have not repudiated. The proof is that we met less than two days ago in Bonn in the Western European Union.

The Treaty of Brussels of 1948, amplified by the Treaty of Paris in 1954, has real substance. The 1948 agreements bound us not only with our Common Market partners but also with the United Kingdom and they were positive in character not only in their preamble but also in the very text of their articles.

The part of the preamble to this Treaty which is of interest to us reads :

"Resolved ... to promote the unity and to encourage the progressive integration of Europe ... the High Contracting Parties will so organize and co-ordinate their economic activities as to produce the best possible results, by the elimination of conflict in their economic policies, the co-ordination of

production and the development of commercial exchanges." Article 8 stipulates : "For the purposes of strengthening peace and security and of promoting unity and of encouraging the progressive integration of Europe and closer cooperation between them and with other European organizations, the High Contracting Parties to the Brussels Treaty shall create a Council to consider matters concerning the execution of this Treaty and of its Protocols and their Annexes."

I believe it is worthwhile referring to these two commitments to solidarity by saying that they should as soon as possible allow for development and extension in the two fields I referred to in the first part of my speech, i. e. the creation of a technological community with the other States that have applied for accession to the Treaty of Rome and progress in building a European political community. In these two ventures, namely developing technology and creating the political Europe, we believe that Europe can and must progress. We remain firmly attached to the accession procedure introduced by four States and if it depended only on ourselves, negotiations would begin at once. Yet we cannot wait until this obstacle is out of the way before trying, in spite of everything, to make headway.'

The budget for agriculture

A debate was held on this budget and questions of European policy were raised in many speeches.

Speaking in the Chamber on 9 July, Miss Devos (Christian Democrat) opened the debate by drawing attention to farm incomes : 'As far as Belgium is concerned, unit prices mean either a stabilization or a reduction and even a levelling off of farm incomes because production costs are increasing.

With particular reference to the price of milk, which is the main income of a very large number of family farms, Mr. Héger, the Minister, obtained the maximum result. It is doubtful, however, if it will be possible to maintain the present price of milk with the present intervention prices i. e. 88 francs for butter and 22 francs for skimmed milk in powder.

For every reduction of 10 centimes in the price of a litre of milk, there is a reduction in the income of farm workers of 3 francs an hour.

If the agricultural fund subsidy is abolished on 1 April 1969 for the quality milk bonus, the yield per litre of milk will fall again by between 8 and 9 centimes per litre.

We are faced with enormous agricultural surpluses and an imbalance on the world market; the expenditure of the EAGGF is liable to assume enormous proportions.

The common agricultural policy must be brought into line with the resolutions passed at the Stresa Conference in 1958; the prices and markets policy must go hand in hand with the structure policy. The former is liable to lead to the collapse of the world market. There is already a demand that the contributions to the EAGGF be radically limited yet there is no concern about the effect of this reduction on farm incomes or on Treaty of Rome commitments.

Apart from some minor achievements on structural policy, the European Commission has little to show here. Yet the modification of these structures was inevitable.

The EEC should have encouraged this modification by reference to an agreed plan, taking the market situation into account. We strongly oppose any structural modification based on price policy because this would be disadvantageous to the small enterprises which are unable to make the necessary adjustments within the prescribed period. In the case of these farms, there should be EAGGF subsidies to promote an increase in volume rather than a cessation of operations.

This fund should be earmarked for social concessions rather than for creating new production areas.

World agricultural surpluses are increasing all the time; yet so too is world hunger. The Kennedy Round gave some hope through the introduction of food aid for the developing countries.

If every country gave 1 per cent of its gross national product to help the developing countries, this would be a much greater contribution to world peace. It would, at the same time, solve a great many economic and agrarian problems. This is why I hope that international agreements will shortly be concluded on this subject. '

Like the other speakers, Mr. Danschutter (Socialist) congratulated Mr. Héger, the Minister for Agriculture, for the milk price concessions he had won on the Council of Ministers. He wanted, however, to have some explanation about the increase in expenditure that the agreement would involve. He thought that the difficulty in securing income parity for farmers stemmed from a rise in production costs and this, to a large extent, negated the productivity drive. Mr. Danschutter stressed a series of measures likely to better the position of the farmer: re-organizing distribution, making greater use of farming co-operatives, improving conditions for ceasing activity, overhauling the law on farm tenancies and discouraging speculation.

Mr. René Lefebvre (Liberal) felt the need to erase the impression that the Belgian budget for agriculture had gone up suddenly and markedly in 1968. The budget had varied little since the previous year. It did, however, include 309, 000m francs representing Belgium's contribution to the EAGGF. No doubt these amounts were not wholly profitable to Belgian agriculture. In fact the amounts paid to the EAGGF affected industry as well as agriculture for if there were no common agricultural market, there would not be a common market for industry either. Lastly, Mr. Lefebvre requested the Minister for Agriculture to give him details of the assets and liabilities involved in Belgium's participation in the EAGGF.

On 16 July 1968 the budget for agriculture was discussed by the Senate. Mr. Sledsens (Christian Democrat) said 'It is high time to stop repeating that agriculture involves too heavy a burden for the national community and that the costs involved are excessive in relation to the needs of the other branches of our economy. It is too often argued that the sums earmarked for the EAGGF and the Agricultural Fund bring no benefit to our agriculture or horticulture but only represent the political price that we must pay for participating in the economic integration of the Six. Since the Treaty of Rome came into force, we have nearly doubled our exports of farm produce. What is described as a political price is thus also profitable for Belgian agriculture. Our agriculture derives benefits from the expenditure of the Agricultural Fund. Even if there were no common agricultural policy, the expenditure would be the same if price levels and freedom to produce, which the EEC policy is aiming at, were to apply. It is true that our Community commitments make it harder to pursue a specifically national agricultural policy but one could draw the wrong conclusion.

It is, indeed, because of our commitments that we must enable our farmers and horticulturists to become more competitive in the Common Market. The next budget will have to reflect a greater concern for improving the production conditions, the basic services and farming structures.'

The common policy for the fisheries was discussed by Mr. DeKeyzer (Socialist): 'Draft regulations have been submitted to the Council as regards the common policies for structures and common regulations for the markets. There is no doubt that the Minister will strongly defend Belgian interests. I should like, however, to draw attention to one or two points. In the future negotiations, the concessions granted for ship conversions and for designing new types of vessels must be borne in mind.'

The protectionist measures recently taken by France are a source of uncertainty and have led to major losses. We should negotiate with France preferably in the EEC framework because the Netherlands and West Germany are experiencing similar difficulties.'

Mr De Keyzer trusted that the possibilities open under the Belgian system for supporting the market would not be impaired by the future policy for the fisheries of the EEC.

Mr. Martens (Christian Democrat) discussed Belgium's participation in the EAGGF : 'The farmers have no cause for satisfaction at the results achieved because their incomes will fall or at best stay at the same level. The increase in appropriations for agriculture will not lead to any increase in farm incomes - which is a step backwards in comparison with other branches of the economy - and the net intervention of the EAGGF is the price that Belgium is paying for freeing trade in all goods within the EEC. It goes without saying that it is beneficial to agriculture but Belgium's contribution is more than proportionate to its GNP and its agricultural production.'

I am not criticizing the Government for the concessions it was obliged to make. Nevertheless, it cannot describe the intervention of the EAGGF as being a gift to the Belgian farmers; nor can it argue that the increase in the EAGGF appropriation justifies any cut in the budget for agriculture. A very large proportion of this budget - approximately 4,000m francs - is allocated in relation to the common policy. After deducting the expenditure of the EAGGF and the Agricultural Fund and consumption expenditure, the Minister will only have 2,000m francs left for the national agricultural policy; this is much too little.'

With regard to over-production, Mr. Martens stated: 'The EEC must learn to live with agricultural surpluses just as the US have done for 40 years. There is no doubt that the agricultural surpluses in the US have been a tremendous contribution to peace by attenuating world famine.'

After the second world war the Americans achieved a considerable trade demand in Japan by applying the system of agricultural surpluses.

Have the Community authorities already envisaged similar steps ? It is certainly wrong to suggest that there is no room for a welfare programme in the EEC, especially since the dairy surpluses do not amount to more than 3 or 4 per cent of production. '

Mr. Dupont (Christian Democrat), commenting on the dairy produce agreement under the common policy said: 'A press release of 28 May stated that the Community appropriation for the agricultural policy would amount to 630m u. a.

These 630m are not enough and they will not make it possible to reach the end of the year. The original estimate of 800m has already been over-shot by a long way; Mr. Mansholt is speaking in terms of 950m and perhaps of a 1,000m, i. e. 50,000m Belgian francs.

There are two alternatives: either we proceed with caution because the funds are insufficient and the price will fall below the support level or we carry on as before and think again when the funds are exhausted. I think it is the latter course which is being followed because it emerges from the press release referred to that once the 630m u. a. are exhausted, the problem will be re-examined as part of the general agricultural policy and possible measures will be considered. This is not very reassuring. I conclude from this that the price of 4.55 francs is not guaranteed for the whole year but only for the period up to the time when these 630m are exhausted. Does the Minister believe that the dairy industry will be able to pay the producer 4.55 francs if the price of butter is maintained ? My answer is no. A major group of dairies has decided to reduce the price by 25 centimes. This measure could have a considerable effect. '

With reference to the problem of agricultural structures, Mr. Dupont further stated that a structure policy effected through a price policy would necessarily be a bad one because it would force many farmers to give up farming.

Mr. Beauduin (Christian Democrat) said that too many people thought that Belgian agriculture was very expensive: 'Price stabilization and EAGGF interventions are beneficial to the farming and food industries as they are to all the enterprises serving agriculture. The importance of agriculture in our economy is self-evident.'

Mr. Beauduin then gave the reasons for a prefinancing of farm subsidies by the State: 'Over the last five years the Belgian allocation has amounted to 31m u. a. out of a theoretical overall total of 853m u. a. Yet the final figures for 1964/65 only show an advance of 60 per cent; the relevant figures for the subsequent year are 75 per cent and the estimated figure for 1966/67 is the same. The actual amount has, however, fallen to 22m u. a. and the real level of this is even lower because of the delay.'

Lastly the speaker looked into the question of overproduction: 'The Community dairy producers are criticized for producing surpluses amounting to 150,000 tons of butter and of emptying the EAGGF's treasury because of the export interventions. Yet the Community output of animal fats only covers 45 per cent of the total needs of the six countries. The remaining 55 per cent is covered by imports at what represent starvation prices for the producers. Economic dumping is thus being coupled with social dumping. In reality, the dairy surplus from the Community output is only a small proportion of the 45 per cent of the animal fats needs of the six countries.'

The overall organization of this market remains the key to the problem and it is no longer permissible under these conditions to talk of overproduction. It is not the timid taxation measures envisaged which can be regarded as a start to solving the problem. This policy of taxation and quotas is legally based on the preferential clause which is laid down as the foundation of any common economic policy. This preference should not be regarded as applicable solely to animal fats but to the whole sector of fats including those of vegetable origin and to a degree consistent with the economic and social interests involved.'

Mr. Roelants (Socialist) tackled the question of malpractice: 'A large proportion of the EAGGF resources has been wrongly used. There has been malpractice mainly in the dairy sector. Then again the "doctoring" of butter affects the level of butter stocks as it does the consumption of this product whose quality the public no longer trusts. We have, furthermore, no guarantee that butter in transit is actually exported. In January the Minister asked for an explanation about 17,000 tons of butter imported from the East European countries in 1966 and 1967 and re-exported to Italy via Switzerland after further processing in Belgium.'

When asked what guarantee there was that this butter would be re-exported, the Minister replied that the Community system of taxes on made-up products was so designed as to make exceptional trade practices seem impossible. Yet it had been seen that such practices had been used to keep foreign butter in Belgium and to export other products. The Minister had also answered that legal and other difficulties needed to be overcome so that Belgian butter could be processed; these difficulties had now been dealt with. The fact remained that although the butter surpluses in the six countries had gone up from 81,900t (1962) to 152,300t, thousands of tons of butter had been imported into the EEC. Large sums of money were needed to stockpile this butter and doubts as to its quality had certainly not stimulated consumption. An international regulation in the EEC was essential. "We have to ensure that sharp practice becomes impossible."

Mr. Stroobants (French-speaking, Walloon Group) asked that EAGGF assistance be forthcoming to modernize slaughter houses especially those where meat auctions were held. Mr. Demarneffe (Christian Democrat) endorsed this request. He was also concerned at the overproduction of fruit and vegetables: 'The amount of produce destroyed compared with total sales is negligible but the expense involved is what matters; this has partly been covered by the EAGGF. I would, none the less, point out that one should no more misuse EEC financial resources than one should misuse national financial resources.'

Was there, in any case, a glut of fruit on the market? In September 1967, 1.9m kg. of apples were destroyed while 1.7m kg. were bought in France at higher prices. This proves that the situation is unsatisfactory when it comes to the way distribution and markets are organized,' Mr. Strivay (Liberal), said he could not understand the provision of a Community regulation which had induced the dairies to make a reduction of 25 centimes as from 1 August in the price paid to producers for a litre of milk.

In reply to speakers in the Chamber of representatives, Mr. Héger, Minister for Agriculture, stated that the price of BF 4.55 for milk was not a guaranteed price but a guide price: 'Until a short time ago we, in Belgium, were the only ones to obtain this price through subsidies. When there are no more subsidies we shall no longer be able to insist on the payment of the guide price but we hope that the dairies will pay producers this price and that healthy competition will prove profitable.'

The payment for milk by reference to quality which we used to make became impossible after 1 April 1968 because there was no compensation. As a result of joint discussions, we obtained the right to continue these payments without compensation on condition that they were phased out to achieve a real

compensation by 1 January 1969. We hope that by that time the new milk regulation will have been issued because this will allow for payments by reference to quality.

Payment for quality is made through the Agricultural Fund. The budget will have to regularize this expenditure. '

Speaking in the Senate, the Minister was surprised and disconcerted by the announcement of a cut in the price of milk paid to producers. 'It would, however, have been easy for those concerned to tell me about this directly in one of the many meetings I held in my office with representatives of the professional farming association.

We are obviously going through a difficult period because we are changing over from one system to another. In August we shall even have a reduction in the price of butter which will be offset by an intervention at the production level. Some measures have been, moreover, taken to help those concerned to apply the Community decisions. What Mr. Strivay has told us is serious. Obviously if I were asked if all butter should be sold at an intervention price and if all skimmed milk should attract an intervention I should say "no". There are in fact examples of this kind, notably cereals. With regard to the dairies to which Mr. Strivay referred, however, what matters is whether this is a deliberate policy designed to jeopardize what we are trying to create in the Community. Perhaps, too, it is a question of a product for which there is no buyer on the national market.

I know that this is a difficult problem which calls for a period of adjustment. With regard to cheese, we had difficulties following the decisions taken by one of our neighbours. This led to less cheese being produced and more butter being made, and this called for additional interventions. If I were today to meet my colleagues in the Community, I should ask for an additional credit for the milk sector for three reasons: (a) the deterioration in market prices; (b) the increase in the production of butter at the expense of cheese and (c) an increase of nearly 2 per cent in the national production compared with the 1 per cent we estimated when we drew up our budget. At that time the butter surplus was estimated at 150, 000 tons but stocks will soon reach 250, 000 tons!

We must be able to rely on the goodwill of all to set the Common Market in motion. The State cannot do everything! It cannot guarantee a price but it can allow for the maximum valorization of quality products. The milk quality bonus, incidentally, which should have been abolished on 1 April 1968 will continue until 1 April 1969 provided that it is phased out. '

With reference to the problem of farm structures, Mr. Héger stated: 'Community structures have to be overhauled. I believe that the idea of a Community plan for structures is now out of date. Those who drew them up intended to increase the productivity of land whereas today we are faced with the problem of surpluses.'

Our whole attention should now be devoted to relating production to markets. More quality meat, for example, and less milk needs to be produced. The principles which are valid in industry are also valid for the agricultural sector. Efforts should be concentrated on means to direct production as desired and on the regions where these means could be most satisfactorily used.

In the weeks ahead and as part of the review of the common agricultural policy which normally takes place at the end of the year, these problems will have to be viewed as a whole. This review will have to be a comprehensive one. We have always refused to follow those who wished us to pursue a policy of restrictions regarding milk production because we thought, on the contrary, that we should follow identical rules until the problems had been reviewed as a whole.'

The Minister agreed that Belgium's contribution to the EAGGF was a heavy burden: 'But it is valid for the whole of our economy. If it is not set at 8 per cent, this is because our country exports industrial products. We should not, however, make the opposite error of believing that our contribution to the EAGGF is of no interest to our farms. The truth lies halfway between. For 1966/67 the net contribution of our country to the guarantee section of the EAGGF was 584m. For 1967/68, our contribution to the total expenditure of the EAGGF will amount to 6,319m, whereas Belgium's expenditure to be reimbursed will be around 4,945m. Is it not therefore wrong to assert that our agriculture is no longer involved ?

It is wrong to consider that there is necessarily a policy of return in the EAGGF. Indeed no country can get back what it pays into this fund. With regard to land improvement, some countries are better provided for than others. It is therefore reasonable that not every country receives exactly what it pays.'

(Verbatim report; 4, 9 and 11 July)

2. Signing of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty

Following the signing by Belgium on 20 August 1968 of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Belgian Ministry for Foreign Affairs issued an official statement to the press outlining the problems raised by the provisions of the Euratom Treaty.

At European level Belgium had seen to it that the non-proliferation treaty would not hinder either what had already been achieved or future progress in the construction and unification of Europe.

The aims pursued by the non-proliferation treaty and by Euratom did not clash in any way. As to the guarantees afforded by the treaty, this merely referred to agreements to be concluded with the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna. To ensure that application of the non-proliferation treaty would be compatible with compliance with the provisions of the Euratom Treaty, these guarantees ought to be defined in such a way that the rights and obligations of Community member States were preserved intact, in accordance with the Opinion submitted by the Commission under Article 103 of the Euratom Treaty.

With this in view, the Commission of the European Communities ought to enter into negotiations with the International Atomic Energy Agency.

The Belgian Government did not intend to go ahead with the ratification of the non-proliferation treaty before the negotiations between the Commission and the Agency had led to an agreement.

(Le Soir, 21 August 1968)

3. Mr. Harmel, Belgian Foreign Minister, tours the WEU capitals
(6 August - 18 September 1968)

Mr. Harmel, Belgian Foreign Minister, made a tour of the Western European Union capitals in his private capacity to discuss current European issues with the other foreign ministers or heads of government prior to putting forward a plan for the furtherance of European integration at the next WEU meeting.

On 6 August he was in Paris where he was entertained to lunch by Mr. Debré. Following this working luncheon, Mr. Harmel stated : 'We devoted a great deal of time to European problems and the prospects for Europe were discussed on both sides with great frankness.'

On 3 September, Mr. Harmel was received in Luxembourg by Mr. Grégoire, the Foreign Minister of the Grand-Duchy. A press release issued after the talks read : 'The policies of our two Governments are identical both as regards developing and enlarging the Communities and in respect of European problems generally.'

On 9 September, Mr. Harmel met his German opposite number, Mr. Brandt, in Bonn. 'In the course of the general discussions we considered possibilities of paving the way for an enlargement of the Community', said a spokesman for the Foreign Office at the close of the talks between the two Foreign Ministers. 'Mr. Brandt referred to the German proposals for a trade arrangement which should help facilitate Britain's later accession, Mr. Harmel, however, doubted whether France could be won over to the German proposals.'

On 12 and 13 September, Mr. Harmel was in Rome where he met Mr. Medici, Italian Foreign Minister and currently President of the EEC Council of Ministers. The communiqué released after the talks stated that : 'The two Ministers and their Ambassadors in the respective capitals and their principal officials had a detailed discussion centering on the European situation and the problems of the Common Market. They were in full agreement on the urgency of making every effort with a view to overcoming obstacles to Europe's integration and to enlarging the Community; this had been made clearer and its necessity underlined by recent events in Central Europe.'

Lastly, on 18 September Mr. Harmel arrived in London where he paid a brief personal visit to Mr. Stewart, British Foreign Secretary and Mr. Wilson, Prime Minister.

Mr. Harmel had, like Mr. Stewart, just returned from Bucharest so that the talks focused both on the problems of East-West relations and those of uniting Europe. Apart from very slight differences of approach, they thought alike in committing themselves closely and fully to NATO at the strategical level. As for Britain's accession to the Common Market, the Belgian and British attitudes had changed only in becoming more forthright, a change rendered imperative for the United Kingdom by reason of circumstances.

(Le Monde, 6 August 1968;
Bulletin de documentation, Ministère d'Etat du Luxembourg,
N° 8, 3 September 1968;
Le Soir, 10 September 1968;
Il Popolo, 14 September 1968;
Le Soir, 19 September 1968;
The Times, 19 September 1968)

4. Statement by Mr. Lefèvre on European technological problems

In July 1968, Mr. Théo Lefèvre, Belgian Minister for Science Policy and Planning was entrusted with a fact-finding mission to the ELDO (European Launcher Development Organization) member States. The object of the enquiry was to ascertain whether the participating countries were ready to continue with a research programme involving a reduction in the volume of work and a change in the scale of the tasks entrusted to the States concerned.

Addressing the Catholic Management Association in Antwerp on 24 September 1968, Mr. Lefèvre criticized the present approach to international co-operation on science. In essence he said that Belgium was making an annual contribution of BF 1,000m to international programmes. This was a very heavy burden and if there were no substantial benefit, it was a costly luxury which the taxpayer could do without. This concern was at present justified in this instance. The United Kingdom, which took pride in its advocacy of a wide European technological community, had not hesitated to withdraw from certain projects. It was to leave ELDO in 1972 and would not be associated with the envisaged enlargement of CERN (European Nuclear Research Centre). The European countries had got together for the purposes of scientific research but as soon as it had come to exploiting the results industrially or commercially, Belgium's major partners had opted, each on their own account and to the extent of their means, for pursuing their own national programmes. The present system led to internationalization of costs and a nationalization of profits - which were highly promising in the sectors

using advanced technology. Under these conditions, Belgium could hardly hope for more than the rôle of a sub-contractor for its larger partners.

Mr. Lefèvre then outlined his budget for 1969 with regard to the credit earmarked for the science policy. This would show an increase of approximately 15 per cent over 1968 and total BF 11,700m. The only sector in which science would suffer a cut would be that of international co-operation, where the allocation would be below 7 per cent, as compared with 8.5 per cent in 1968.

At the end of the ELDO Ministerial meeting held in Paris on 1 October 1968, Mr. Lefèvre told the press of his impressions of the atmosphere surrounding 'Europe and space'; he said : 'The difficulties we are now experiencing in ELDO are simply a localized manifestation of a more widespread phenomenon: a calling into question of the methods, institutions and programmes for scientific and technological co-operation which we drew up together 10 years ago.

The faults in our institutions for co-operation in this context, the hazards to which they expose us and the failures to which they lead are, in fact, the consequence of the lack of liaison between research programmes and the problems of structure and market size.

It is at this level, which is very far-reaching, that the core of our difficulties is to be found and it is at this level that we must try to deal with them if there is still time

I am fully convinced that technological co-operation will not progress and expand in Europe unless we change the methods and the bodies responsible for this co-operation, so that they do effectively serve the industrial progress of this continent and unless each participating State has an assurance that it will reap some economic benefits from its contribution.

This presupposes introducing more unity into our programmes, our institutions and the research budget and it also requires that we take the principle of solidarity beyond the stage of research and development to that of production and the commercialization of results. It will therefore not be in trying to find some expedient solution in the present context - which is,

moreover, impossible at present - that we shall lastingly and without too much risk be able to satisfy the essential concerns which should be those of "Europe and space".'

(De Standaard, 25 September 1968;
Le Soir, 25 September and 3 October 1968)

France

1. European problems are discussed during the debates on the Government's policy statement made by Mr. Couve de Murville (17-18 July)

At the National Assembly

When the National Assembly debated the government policy statement on 17 July (1), Mr. Michel Habib-Deloncle (Union for the Defence of the Republic) addressed the Prime Minister in these terms : 'I would congratulate you on opting, as the previous Government did, for first honouring our commitments despite the crisis; but I would beg you to go further.

Do not let Europe be stolen from you. You are accused of being less European than our partners; you are accused of being less European than some in France. Put everyone on the defensive by assuming the offensive yourself. Propose to them that we should achieve a "social Europe" not only by proceeding at once to the harmonization of taxation systems, social burdens, social security systems, the length of the working week, retirement age, family allowances and assistance to the old-aged to make these comparable throughout the Community but also and above all by making a European enterprise out of the principle of participation.

This idea is one that will meet with a greater response outside France than might at first be imagined. Several years ago Germany entered on this course for certain enterprises. Systems of participation also exist in the Netherlands. It is not a problem which concerns us alone. Did not General de Gaulle say that the great question of the century was how to find a human balance for civilization and for the modern industrial society?

How could we imagine that the "great question of the century" is limited to our own country? And who can answer this, except Europe? It is Europe which must answer the question of this century and which must, there too, find an exemplary answer and it must do so at France's initiative.

It is well known that to find an answer to this question the President of the Republic referred to three possible alternatives :

(1) O.G., National Assembly, Debates, 17 July 1968

1. the Communist answer, which is represented, above all, by the USSR;
2. the capitalist answer, of which we have a living model before our eyes... in the society of the United States, and
3. who, better than the Europeans, could form the humanist society of which we dream?

In reply to several speakers, Mr. Maurice Couve de Murville, Prime Minister, stated: 'I would refer to a last general point, that of European policy. Here I have no complexes because I have now been close to this problem for ten years and I think I have been very active and assiduous in attending to it; I believe I have done something concrete as regards the uniting of Europe.'

I would add, as I have often said, that if the political Europe does not now exist - and Mr. Fabre said this could console us for the disappointments of the Common Market - it is really not the fault of France, which has frequently proposed it. I would, in passing, remind you of this. In any event, I would repeat, we intend to continue pursuing the European policy.'

On the following day, when the amended finance bill for 1968 was being discussed (1), Mr. Roland Boscary-Monsservin (Independent Republican) outlined the agricultural policy of his party in the following terms:

'It has taken us ten years to arrive at common regulations for organizing the markets and setting prices. Over the last ten years, circumstances have often been in our favour. We have often caused the French view to prevail or at least the compromises reached have to a very large extent stemmed from the views which we have put forward. The Common Market has opened up a market of 200m inhabitants for French production; it has at the same time created a particularly effective stimulus.'

It is quite clear that if it were mainly ourselves who called for a revision of the common agricultural policy, as so far established, our partners would submit numerous counter-claims and I am in no way convinced that the climate would now be more favourable to us than it was before as regards reaching a successful conclusion over again.

Lastly, I think that any attempt to refashion the regulations that have already been passed would be fraught with dangers for our agriculture.

(1) O.G., National Assembly, Debates, 18 July 1968

Since we have stressed the connexion between implementing the common regulations and the crisis affecting some products and some regions, it is our duty to take our analysis a stage further and I, for my part, conclude that the common agricultural policy constitutes an entity of which we have unfortunately so far only completed a small fraction.

It is true that we have organized markets and set prices; but the common agricultural policy also means harmonizing structures; it also - and above all - means an intra-community policy for trade whose introduction would require wide-open frontiers and the removal of all obstacles, even those disguised as health regulations.'

'I also think one cause for the crisis is the fact that when the markets were organized at the community level and when prices were set, they had to be set off against the principle of regionalization on which both national and Community efforts were focused.

The common policy, with all it implies in terms of unity, will only be valid if it is counter-balanced, if this paradox may be permitted, by a consolidation of the principle of the region, with all that this implies.

For us Independent Republicans, therefore, our policy is very clear: whatever the present crisis, we must not go back nor must we even suggest a fresh look at measures previously taken at the European level. On the contrary, we must proceed at once to the final measures because the common policy will only be valid when it is applied in its entirety. It will, moreover, be essential to couple it with a thorough regional policy, in implementing which all those concerned should be closely associated, bearing in mind the concern to open them up, to which the Prime Minister gave expression yesterday.

In the Senate

On 17 July, during the debate in the Senate on the Government's policy statement, Mr. André Colin (Democratic Party of the Centre) said: 'No reference has been made to European solidarity, which has, however, recently been manifest in the form of help for the French economy in its recovery drive. You decided to abide by the 1 July deadline and not to oppose opening frontiers in the Common Market. You have, at the same time, unilaterally taken measures to safeguard some branches of the French economy which are under particular threat. Despite this, you have not only been received with friendship and understanding but you have above all in the immediate

past been greeted with evidence of solidarity and of the will to lend support to the common future which now unites the peoples of Europe. This solidarity goes as far as to envisage the intervention of the European Social Fund in the French Government's initiatives to attenuate what are called imbalances in the sphere of employment.

It would appear that in this way the Europe of the peoples is coming into being and making itself manifest. Are you, therefore, seizing this opportunity and using it to its best advantage, going again to take up an idea which is new and which does not age, despite your shilly-shallying and opposition, are you going again to take up the new idea of building the United States of Europe, which will give our country and our continent a chance to achieve progress and true greatness?

Through all the great changes in the offing and where the fate of man is at stake, at a time when the outlines of a new civilization are being sketched out, it is on this level that we must envisage them, at the level of an outward-looking Europe, powerful in its influence, its cohesion, its chances of progress, so that it may, in the great adventure which is before us, have every chance of success, for it is the great adventure of democratic humanism.

(Official Gazette, Senate, 18 July 1968)

2. Mr. Debré's talks with Mr. Brandt

After receiving Mr. Medici, the Italian Foreign Minister, on 29 August, Mr. Michel Debré received his German opposite number, Mr. Willy Brandt, in the Quai d'Orsay on 9 September; this visit was under the Franco-German Treaty whereby meetings of this kind are held every three months.

The Franco-German talks were referred to by Mr. Debré in an interview on French television when he stated: 'The August events, that is to say the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia, were bound, quite apart from their effect on the whole of Europe to change the emphasis of this meeting. It was in the nature of things that this should have been one of the main topics at our meeting.'

'Do I need to add', Mr. Debré went on, 'that the way in which the French and German Governments envisage Europe's future is governed by the concern to establish co-operation in keeping with the desire for peace of both countries. This common resolve shows that, despite certain differences in our ways of looking at immediate issues, the basis of our discussions is, quite frankly, our common desire to see to it that France and Germany broadly follow the same course from now on.'

(Le Figaro, 9 September 1968)

3. Speech by Mr. Michel Debré, French Foreign Minister to the Diplomatic Press Association

Entertained to lunch by the French Diplomatic Press Association, Mr. Michel Debré discussed the two principles underlying French democratic action since the beginning of the Fifth Republic: independence and solidarity.

'The freedom to which France reserves the right offends no one, but is very well suited to international co-operation.'

He said that although France's joining the Common Market stemmed from obvious material interests, it also derived from France's awareness of living in the age of larger groupings.

Mr. Debré stressed the need to create the conditions for European independence. As for the methods needed to achieve this aim, he laid emphasis on the rôle that fell to the States in terms of initiative and authority and he discussed the prospect of enlarging the Communities. On this point French policy had not changed. This still consisted in 'not letting go of the substance in favour of the shadow', in 'not leaping into the unknown' and in 'not calling into question what has been achieved'. In plainer language, this meant upholding the refusal to accept the British application because Britain, in the eyes of Mr. Debré, constituted a danger to European independence. This was not stated expressly but there was a strong underlying suggestion to this effect.

Going on to deal with East-West relations, Mr. Debré condemned the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia; he said that a deadly shadow had been cast over the détente which threatened to resuscitate the old ghosts of the cold war. It was none the less vital to take advantage of any opportunity

to change relations with the USSR; France had as many reasons, if not more, than the USA for wanting to do so. The way the détente had to be achieved was through an early withdrawal of the Soviet occupation troops.

Mr. Debré touched briefly on other points of French policy: Vietnam, the Middle East, Nigeria and Quebec. With reference to the Atlantic Alliance, he said France would stand by the Atlantic Pact unless - as General de Gaulle had said in 1966 - there were any events which changed the fundamental emphasis of East-West relations. He said that the events in question were not those that had occurred in Czechoslovakia.

(Le Monde, Le Figaro, 17 September 1968)

United Kingdom

1. The German Minister for Economic Affairs visits London

On 28 August 1968, Mr. Schiller, Economic Affairs Minister, went to London for political discussions.

The friendly atmosphere which surrounded the visit was generally welcomed in London as a sign of the present excellent Anglo-German co-operation. In its leader of 27 August, 'The Times' observed that the special relationship which was perhaps now being established between Mr. Jenkins and Professor Schiller could serve a similar purpose to that which had obtained between Mr. Jenkins's predecessor, Mr. Callaghan and the former American Secretary of State, Mr. Fowler.

Naturally enough, the talks focussed mainly on economic and monetary questions. There were, however, two points on the informal agenda which related directly to political problems. The two ministers discussed the present state of the Common Market and its future enlargement; at this latter discussion, Lord Chalfont, Minister of State at the Foreign Office with special responsibility for European questions, was also present.

As Professor Schiller pointed out at a press conference, the Federal Republic would, in the autumn, make a new effort to intensify and enlarge the EEC; before flying to London he had discussed this with Chancellor Kiesinger and the German Foreign Minister. He wanted above all to give a political content to the German proposal for a trade agreement between Britain and the Common Market.

The British Government was no longer as hostile as previously to the German plan for a gradual rapprochement between the applicant States and the EEC. It expected, however, that such a proposal should come not from the German Government alone but from all the Six member States.

This was the impression that Mr. Schiller took away from his London talks with Lord Chalfont. So far the British Government had always stuck to the idea of full membership, rejecting any possibility of an interim solution. The corresponding implications of its present decision could, therefore, only gain in significance.

Lastly the Ministers discussed the general international situation in the light of recent events in Czechoslovakia. There was full agreement on the need to strengthen the Western Alliance although it was also felt that an attempt should be made to go further with the policy of détente. The German proposal for a meeting of the Alliance at the highest level was not discussed with Lord Chalfont, but Mr. Schiller voiced the serious concern of the German Government that the EEC and NATO should be consolidated. Recent events should lead to a revival of the European spirit.

(Industriekurier, 29 August 1968;
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 29 August 1968;
The Times, 27 August 1968)

2. Anglo-Dutch talks in London

Dr. Joseph Luns, the Netherlands Foreign Minister, had talks in London on August 30 with Mr. Michael Stewart, the Foreign Secretary.

At a press conference Dr. Luns said that public opinion and most of the governments of the Common Market felt that events in Czechoslovakia and the changed situation in Central Europe were underlining the necessity of making progress in the process of unifying Western Europe. He had told Mr. Stewart that the Benelux plan for close and regular consultation between Britain and the Six, on a British entry into the Common Market, would be brought back into the political forefront. He noted that so far there had been no indication in Paris that the French Government had changed its position.

(The Times, 31 August 1968;
The Guardian, 31 August 1968)

Italy

1. The Italian Parliament's debate on European policy

The two houses of the Italian Parliament discussed problems relating to Europe.

Mr. Leone, President of the Council, outlining his Government's programme, stressed that although Italy was in favour of the non-proliferation treaty it considered that the treaty should not lead to any discrimination, in the field of research for peaceful purposes, between the nuclear powers and those who did not wish to assume that status.

Italy, he said, would easily have been able to become a nuclear power, but it had preferred to use the relevant resources for the purposes of peace and civilization.

Europe, he added, would not succeed in fulfilling the great hopes raised by the Treaties of Rome unless the customs union led to a true economic union; this would be possible if progress, however gradual, were made towards political union.

The Europe that Italy wanted had to be united, democratic and open to other States of Europe which accepted its principles, particularly the United Kingdom, which still appeared an integral part of the Continent. The Government was aware of the value of elections by direct universal suffrage of the representatives of the European Parliament to enhance its democratic character. In the meantime, the Government pointed out that the policy it had announced could help promote agreements between parties as this would give the widest possible expression to the political forces represented in Parliament.

Mr. Fanfani, President of the Senate, and Mr. Pertini, President of the Chamber of Deputies, respectively stated that their institutions would renew the representations to the European Parliament after the summer recess.

Senator Nencioni, endorsing the statements made by the President of the Council, said that the Italian Social Movement (neo-Fascist) was opposed

to the non-proliferation treaty not because of its ultimate objective but because its Article 3 implied an unacceptable control - through an international association, the International Atomic Energy Authority - over all the economic, political and military activities of the countries. This control was unacceptable on legal and constitutional grounds because Article 11 of the Constitution agreed to restrictions on sovereignty where these were necessary to establish an order of peace and justice between nations but only on conditions of equality with the other States; these conditions did not obtain under the control provided for in the non-proliferation treaty.

In reply, Mr. Medici, the Foreign Minister, said the Government was confident that there was no legal inconsistency between this treaty and Article 11 of the Constitution. This point, however, was being carefully examined and the Government would return to it when the law of ratification was discussed in Parliament.

Italy, he said, had stated in the General Assembly of the UN that it was ready to sign the treaty in the conviction that it was consistent with the Euratom Treaty and that nothing in it would impede the unification of Western Europe.

In the statement referred to, note was taken of the assurance given by the delegations involved in drafting the treaty that there would be no obstacle to the freedom of scientific and technological research and that the prohibitions in the treaty would relate solely to explosive nuclear devices which did not differ from nuclear weapons; hence when technological progress made such a distinction possible, explosive nuclear devices used for peaceful purposes would no longer be required. The Italian Government also made known its opinion that the controls should be applied to all exports of nuclear materials whatever their destination, including the 'nuclear' States.

In the Euratom context, the Government had proposed Community consultations about the non-proliferation treaty. Here Italy would like to see the controls applied on the basis of an agreement between Euratom and the International Atomic Energy Authority. As for the Commission, the Minister repeated that it had laid down two conditions to ensure the two treaties were fully compatible: the first was that the member States should make signature dependent on a reservation that the entry into force of Article 3 should be geared to an agreement concluded between Euratom and the IAEA of the United Nations; the second was that the member States should withhold depositing the instruments of ratification until a satisfactory agreement was concluded with the IAEA or until other measures having similar effect were taken.

The Italian representative at the Ministerial Session of the Atlantic Council noted that the non-proliferation treaty did not constitute an obstacle to co-operation between the NATO partners in the field of nuclear planning. The Soviet Union had been informed of this interpretation. Lastly, Mr. Medici recalled that the American Secretary of State had told the US Senate that the treaty was not tied to the problem of European unification and would not prevent the accession of a new and federal State of Europe to nuclear status, nor indeed that of any one of its component States. The new Federal European State would have to have control over all its external security functions including defence and foreign policy matters relating to external security.

Mr. Scelba returned to this argument pointing out that the treaty reduced rather than eliminated the risks of nuclear war; he pointed to the disparity between nuclear and non-nuclear powers which was justifiable in view of the highest aim of peace which was envisioned. This disparity, however, had not to be extended beyond the scope covered by the treaty and it would be inconsistent with the treaty itself if any attempt were made by the nuclear powers to perpetuate this disparity or to give it expression in forms or measures which were not necessarily needed to pursue the ends in view. In this connexion, the power of the non-nuclear nations which grouped 2,000m people should be used to impose disarmament on the nuclear powers within the shortest time possible, in compliance with their own commitment.

Mr. Scelba then pointed out that there had been some criticisms of the treaty. It was argued, for example, that the treaty was illogical: if the two big powers wished to eliminate the risks of a nuclear war they should start on disarmament for this would greatly facilitate non-proliferation in the world. This argument was not without foundation even though the two big powers have announced proposals which could be a decisive step towards nuclear disarmament. A further objection had to do with the negative effect that the non-proliferation treaty could have on the process of political integration in Europe. This was - some argued - because there could be no political unity without a common defence in Europe and this necessarily implied nuclear weapons. In reality, therefore, the treaty would have the effect of preventing European political integration. This argument was not justified firstly because the treaty had originated from a vote of the United Nations Assembly and it was inconceivable that the UN should attempt to impede European unity and secondly because the signatories to the treaty included the United States and the United Kingdom which both had a great interest in this unity. Mr. Scelba went on to say that the process of political unification in Europe had been held up for reasons quite different from the treaty, and for as long as France's present attitude lasted, there would be no immediate prospect of unity. Under these circumstances it would be unreasonable to reject the immediate and definite benefits of the treaty for what still appeared to be a distant prospect.

Mr. Scelba then went on to consider the reasonable concern that the first drafts of the treaty had occasioned with reference to Euratom. The final version took this concern into account and provided for the possibility of negotiations between the IAEA and Euratom concerning controls. The actual form of controls laid down in Article 3 of the treaty raised problems that had still not been solved; there was also the question of what would happen if the negotiations between the two bodies were not successfully concluded on schedule. The speaker concluded by saying that the reservations of the Commission of the Communities were therefore justified and that the Minister for Foreign Affairs endorsed these reservations.

(Senate of the Republic - Summary Minutes, 5, 18 and 25 July 1968;
Chamber of Deputies - Summary Minutes, 5 July 1968)

2. Statement in the Senate by Mr. Sedati, Minister for Agriculture, on the common agricultural policy

Speaking in a debate in the Senate, Mr. Sedati pointed out that the financial relationship between Italy and the EAGGF, which had been showing a deficit, had undergone an appreciable improvement so that Italy was now showing a credit balance. Going on to discuss the effects of the common policy on Italian agriculture, he stressed the gradual adjustment to the new European reality. Referring to the difficult conditions surrounding stock-breeding in Italy and the consequent difficulties for integrating them fully within the Community area, Mr. Sedati said that all the regulations in force represented a system in which the market prices tended to approximate to the pre-set levels. With regard to milk, there was the problem of surplus which was affecting the whole Community, but the Italian delegation had striven to restrict the relevant financial burdens stemming from this overproduction to the surplus-producing countries.

Turning to the problems of the structure policy, he observed that in the theory and practice of the common policy, action on the market had to go hand in hand with action affecting structures; he said that a prices policy was also necessary to avoid any deterioration in the position of farmers in relation to other economic operators and to ensure that agriculture, where longer time intervals were needed, developed under stable market conditions. Hence the importance of adequately adjusting the structures to daily realities was laid down as a first principle of the agricultural policy.

The Minister then rejected suggestions made in some quarters that the common agricultural policy had a bias towards self-sufficiency; he stressed that these were disapproved by the appreciable increase in trade between Italy on the one hand and Russia, Poland and Yugoslavia on the other.

He then spoke of the destruction effected by the AIMA (State concern for subsidizing the agricultural market) of substantial quantities of agricultural products. He said that this company had been forced to destroy foodstuffs like cauliflowers and oranges because of their perishable nature and because of the transport difficulties involved in ensuring they could be consumed at once. This was, however, exceptional because normally the produce taken over by the AIMA was used for assistance purposes and in the manufacture of alcohol, in animal foodstuffs or for ordinary foodstuffs purposes.

(Senato della Repubblica, Summary Minutes, 25 July 1968)

Luxembourg

The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

The press and information service of the Luxembourg Government has issued the following communiqué:

'On 14 August 1968 the Luxembourg Ambassadors in London, Washington and Moscow signed, on behalf of the Government, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (TNP) and the agreement on the rescue and return of astronauts.

As regards the TNP, the Luxembourg Government does not consider that the aims pursued by this treaty and the Euratom treaty clash in any way.

The guarantees afforded by Article 3 of the TNP will be made the subject of agreements to be concluded with the International Atomic Energy Agency (I. A. E. A.).

To ensure that application of the TNP will be compatible with compliance with the provisions of the Euratom Treaty, these guarantees ought to be defined in such a way that the rights and obligations of Community member States are preserved intact, in accordance with the Opinion submitted by the Commission under Article 103.

With this in view, the Commission of the European Communities ought to enter into negotiations with the I. A. E. A.

The Government does not intend to go ahead with the ratification of the TNP before the negotiations between the Commission and the I. A. E. A. have led to an agreement.

(Bulletin de documentation, Ministère d'Etat du Grand-Duché de Luxembourg, No 8, 30 September 1968)

Netherlands

1. Discussions held by parliamentary committees on the Community policy for dairy produce, beef and veal

The Standing Committees for Agriculture, Economic Affairs and Finance held a joint meeting with the Ministers for Agriculture and Economic Affairs on 11 June to discuss the agreements concluded by the EEC Council on the common policies for dairy produce, beef and veal.

Mr. Lardinois, Minister for Agriculture, reported on the Council Session held in Brussels on 29 May. He pointed out that while the agreement reached still did not mean that there was a full-scale market for dairy produce, it was a major step towards a common market for these products and for beef and veal.

He also pointed out that the Council had agreed about levying a tax on vegetable fats and oils. The tax on vegetable primary products used in making margarine, whether these were imported or produced in the EEC would mean that the Community would be able to enjoy its own resources for the tax would yield an estimated 87.5m a.u. annually. The Council had thus acted on its 1963 resolution to introduce a tax of this nature. Since the European Parliament had no budgetary rights, the resolution had been relegated to the background. The Council noted that implementing this decision would lead to some measure of budgetary competence being extended to the European Parliament. The Minister pointed out that the tax had its basis in Article 201 of the EEC Treaty and not in Article 43; this meant that before these levies could be applied, they had to be passed by the six national parliaments.

Mr. Lardinois pointed out that the Dutch Government had never been very strongly predisposed to the introduction of this tax and had always stated that it would only give its approval if certain budgetary rights were, at the same time, extended to the European Parliament.

The Minister said that no decision had yet been reached by the Council on the longer-term policy to improve the balance between production and markets. This issue was closely bound up with the whole agricultural policy and with the policy for structures.

In reply to a question from the meeting as to whether it was legitimate to speak of 'enhanced' budgetary powers for the European Parliament, the Minister replied in the affirmative; indeed, the Assembly had a nucleus of budgetary responsibilities, albeit limited ones. The Council, however, had not yet ruled on how this budgetary right was to assume practical shape. The Council said it was for the European Commission to draw up proposals for this purpose, which the Council would then examine.

In reply to a further question from a member of the Committee as to whether the budgetary right involved setting the amount of the tax - a reference to the tax on margarine - another member of the Committee recalled that, under the Dutch constitution, the law on budgets included all public expenditure; setting these amounts was a matter for the law, as was the allocation of resources. It was also important in this context to note that taxes could only be charged pursuant to a law, which did not necessarily mean that the law on budgets must incorporate this specific feature anywhere else.

The Minister then pointed out that the income from the tax on margarine would not be particularly earmarked for financing the policy on dairy produce.

A fairly exhaustive discussion followed on the statement by the German delegation on the margarine tax. The Minister again stressed that, from the Dutch point of view, no need was felt to confirm the 1964 resolution. He asked whether the German delegation had the right to state that it was not obliged to refer the charging of this tax to the national parliament. Indeed, it was a question here of the Community's own resources, under Article 201 of the EEC Treaty. The Minister thought that the German Government wished to reserve the right not to let the burden of this tax rest on the consumer.

In reply to a question from a member of the Committee, the Minister then pointed out that, as regards financing, the Community policy as a whole could not be based on the guidance provisions laid down in the EEC Treaty. This, of course, also applied to the more detailed measures still to be taken; these would obviously have to fit in with the common agricultural policy as a whole.

The Minister for Finance pointed out that he thought it would be desirable for the other Finance Ministers to participate in the discussions as soon as possible. The Government should attach special importance to the financial implications of the common agricultural policy.

The Minister for Economic Affairs was asked whether the planned margarine tax was consistent with the resolutions passed by UNCTAD II and he replied that the relevant resolution went back to 1964 and was only now confirmed. He also acknowledged that this resolution was not entirely consistent with the recommendations of that Conference; hence the Dutch had objected to this tax from the beginning but, bearing in mind the need to reach a valid result on the Council, the Dutch delegation had finally assented to the resolution, subject to the reservation referred to.

(Report of an oral debate on the EEC agreement of 29 May 1968 on the common policy for dairy produce, beef and veal - 1967-68 session, Doc. 9668, 2 July 1968)

2. The Standing Committee for Trade Policy makes a statement concerning Britain's accession to the EEC and East-West relations

On 22 August, the Standing Committee for Trade Policy made an oral review of some points of government policy.

The Minister for Economic Affairs began by observing that the French tactics of indefinitely adjourning Britain's accession, without provoking a crisis in the Community, had been perfectly successful. Despite a series of proposals from Italy, Germany and the Benelux countries, the only result of the Council's discussions on the applications to join the EEC had been to provoke disappointment and continually to curtail the basis for discussion. There was disappointment about the unsuccessful German attempts to arrive at a common standpoint of the Six, at the obvious failure to establish a common front for the Five and lastly the fact that the United Kingdom found itself driven back into an increasingly untenable position. With regard to the gradual curtailment of the basis for discussion, the situation following the most recent Council meetings was as follows: the Council was confronted with a kind of trade arrangement about which there was doubt on two points (i) if it were consistent with GATT requirements and (ii) if it were to be considered as a prelude to accession (Article 237).

The Dutch Government would maintain its stand that no trade arrangement should be proposed to the United Kingdom if it did not lead to accession and if it were not in line with Article XXIV of the GATT (abolition of trade restrictions for most commodities to be effected within a reasonable period according to a pre-arranged plan and schedule). For the moment it would seem that any trade regulation consistent with this requirement is out of the question;

consequently the Government would continue to try to obtain fresh support for the Benelux memorandum.

Although the United Kingdom had let it be known that it preferred the Benelux memorandum to the attempts at an arrangement made by the German Government, it had not given up trying to find a solution along these lines. At the EEC Council meeting of 30 May, the German delegation defined more explicitly its ideas for an arrangement. It would consist in a trade agreement based on Article XXIV of the GATT under which there would be an annual two-way cut in customs duties averaging 10 per cent during a first three-year phase; this would apply to the tariffs in force before the Kennedy Round and it would leave open the possibilities of a limited number of exceptions and of a safeguard clause. With regard to agricultural products, regulations were proposed involving a comparable increase in trade. The last phase of customs dismantlement, about which no details were put forward, could coincide with accession.

The French representative at this meeting felt unable to give a clear account of his Government's position concerning the timing of any arrangement or concerning the scale of customs duty reduction to be planned.

On the Dutch side, it was stated at this meeting that any arrangement had to be consistent with Article XXIV of the GATT and should also lead to accession.

The Minister said that the Council would probably continue looking into the possibility of concluding an arrangement.

In reply to a question about the desirability of a common trade policy for the East European countries the Minister of Economic Affairs stressed that here, too, France was in a special position among the member States. France would not think of discussing a common trade policy, at least not before 1970. The Minister agreed that it was regrettable that the EEC did not have a trade policy for this would allow of a joint examination of complaints about imports of agricultural products at dumping prices; it might, where necessary, thus be possible to deal with them.

(Report on an oral review - Economic Affairs, Public Budget for 1968, 1967/68 Session, Doc. 9300)

3. Parliamentary questions

Margarine levy and the strengthening of the budgetary powers of the European Parliament

Mr. Schuijt and Mr. Van der Ploeg (Catholic People's Party) put a question to the Netherlands Government on the bracketing together of the margarine levy and the strengthening of the European Parliament's budgetary powers which it is understood the Dutch representative demanded at the Council meeting of 28 and 29 May 1968.

On 4 July Mr. Lardinois, Minister for Agriculture, said that the Commission had long ago put forward a number of motions for resolutions aimed at laying the basis for market organizations for milk and milk products and for beef and veal. In one of these resolutions the Council was asked to confirm its intention of introducing a tax on fats as agreed in 1964. Another desired the Council to carry out the intention - expressed by it a considerable time ago - to strengthen the budgetary powers of the European Parliament. Although these two resolutions formed part and parcel of a set of decisions to be taken, the Netherlands Government thought this was not enough and that the implementation of each should be made subject to implementation of the other. This was why the Minister had maintained at the Council meeting of 28 and 29 May 1968 that the Netherlands Government could only accept the tax on fats if at the same time the European Parliament's budgetary powers were satisfactorily strengthened.

In the relevant resolution the Council had confirmed that it would introduce a tax on fats derived from vegetables, or extracted from fish and marine mammals, imported or produced in the Community, as specified in the Council Decision No. 64/128/EEC (1).

Asked what had been the practical results of these decisions, the Minister had nothing to say. It appears that much will depend on how the Council carries out its intention of strengthening the European Parliament's budgetary powers.

(Second Chamber, 1967-68 session, Annex, p. 1575)

(1) Official Gazette of the European Communities of 27 February 1964.

Enlargement of the Community

In reply to a question put by Mr. Van der Stoel (Labour Party) on 27 June regarding international discussions on co-operation with countries that had applied to enter the EEC, the Netherlands Government stated on 22 July 1968 that it remained of the opinion that the most should be made of the opportunities for such co-operation on the basis of the Benelux Memorandum.

The Government would continue to keep in close touch with its Benelux partners with a view to seizing every chance of applying the ideas set out in the Memorandum.

(Second Chamber, 1967-68 session, Annex, p. 1613)

Procurement of uranium

On 9 July 1968 Mr. Nederhorst (Labour Party) put a written question to the Netherlands Government on the conjectured large-scale purchases of uranium by France which could secure a monopoly in the European Community in this sector.

On 29 July the Minister for Economic Affairs replied that the Government had been unable to ascertain whether the French Government had concluded with South Africa a secret agreement under which it would buy, over a period of ten years, the bulk of that country's uranium output.

According to available information, the French Nuclear Energy Authority (CEA) had four years ago entered into an agreement with South Africa for a relatively small quantity of uranium. As far as was known France had then called in Euratom's Supply Agency.

Moreover, France was known to be actively pursuing a policy for the procurement of uranium and to have negotiated and concluded agreements with various countries. In the absence of information as to the range of the French military programme or the extent of the purchases and options secured,

it could not be said whether the uranium stocks held by the French authorities were too large to be confined to purely military purposes.

The state of the world uranium market did not bear out fears of a French monopoly in the Community making the other member States dependent on France for their nuclear development.

In view of the foregoing, the Government declined to say whether the French Government's action was compatible with the letter and spirit of the Euratom Treaty and, if not, whether it was going to draw the European Commission's attention to the fact.

(Second Chamber, 1967-68 session, Annex, p. 1739)

4. The implementation of Community regulations

On 23 August Mr. Van der Ploeg (Labour Party) asked for an assurance that the Netherlands Government was squarely in favour of EEC regulations being applied in their entirety, that is, without additions, restrictions, or complications of a national character. He felt this important because the principle had been violated in the application of the Council regulation of 27 June 1968 (1) on skimmed-milk powder. In fact, only Dutch skimmed-milk powder could be delivered to the Netherlands Food Buying and Selling Agency, although the EEC regulations contained no such restrictive and discriminatory provision.

On 10 September Mr. Lardinois, Minister for Agriculture, replied to the question - in principle - in the affirmative. He added, however, that the Agency could not establish with adequate certainty, from the provisions of these regulations on the information to be shown on packages of skimmed-milk powder, whether the powder came from member States or from third countries. The Minister said that pending clearer decisions that would clear up this practical difficulty, he thought it necessary to restrict deliveries to the Agency to Dutch skimmed-milk powder.

(Debates of the Second Chamber, 1967-68 session, N° 1895)

(1) Official Gazette of the European Community N° L 148.

5. Visit of the Turkish Foreign Minister

At a press conference given in The Hague, Mr. Ihsan Sabri Caglayangil, Turkish Foreign Minister, who was in the Netherlands from 19 to 21 July, said that Turkey, at present linked with the EEC under an association agreement, hoped that it would one day become a full member of the Community.

He then spoke of the 'Group of Ten', the ten countries of both East and West which were endeavouring by lobbying to secure a better understanding between East and West. Mr. Caglayangil said that his country subscribed to this objective and was prepared to support it without, at the same time, wishing to be a member of the Group.

(Nieuwe Rotterdamse Courant, 19 July 1968)

II. PARTIES AND PROMINENT POLITICIANS

1. Mr. von Wrangel, the Christian Democrat MP, puts forward a European policy programme

Progress could only be made on the policy for Germany and the East if European policy could be revived. This opinion was expressed by Mr. Olaf von Wrangel, in Ratzeburg on 8 July. Speaking at an all-German meeting of the Youth Union in the Duchy of Lauenburg, which borders on the German Democratic Republic, he put forward a European policy programme.

He advocated a summit conference of the EEC and measures to harmonize legislations completely, including capital and fiscal policies. He further advocated a repudiation of particularist thinking in the Federal Republic and asked for it to be demonstrated that a referendum on the implementation of a political union of Europe would be meaningful. New powers for the European Parliament in Strasbourg should, he said, also be prepared.

(Die Welt, 9 July 1968)

2. The FDP (Free Democratic Party) Group of the Bundestag puts forward its own proposals on agricultural policy

The working party on agricultural policy of the FDP Group held a two-day closed session after which, on 25 July it put forward its own proposals for this policy and, at the same time, stated its attitude to the programme of the Federal Government. The most urgent task in reviewing the agricultural policy had to be to arrive at a fair sharing of burdens in the EEC. The costs of the Community policy should leave the national agricultural policies paralyzed; the FDP therefore advocated national production targets for particular products over and above which the common financial responsibility of the Community would no longer apply. The Federal Government was concerned with issues which could only be solved in the long-term; it was neglecting the current problems facing agriculture.

In detail, the Free Democrats proposed that agriculture must participate in a concerted plan so that it shared in the general development of in-

comes. An active price policy had to continue to function as a key component of the agricultural policy. The FDP repeated its price claims for 1969/70 : 475DM/T for soft wheat, 450DM/T for fodder. It also proposed 0.30DM/Kg as the production price for milk, 280 DM/Dz as the marginal guidance price for beef and an increase in the basic pig-meat price.

The FDP, as the Federal Government proposed in its programme, called for a review of the apportionment key of the Agricultural Fund in proportion to the national volume of production. It therefore welcomed the Government proposal for a marketing promotion company and broadly agreed with the structure policy proposals in the Government programme.

(Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 26 July 1968)

3. A proposal by Mr. Dichgans, the Christian Democrat MP : the Eurofranc should take the place of the Eurodollar as the seventh currency of the EEC States

Writing in the July edition of the European Review of the Christian Democratic Group in the European Parliament, Mr. Dichgans proposed that a Eurofranc should be issued by a common European bank (to be founded by the six national issuing banks) and should take the place of Eurodollar as an instrument of credit.

This article went back to a speech he made to the Group in Nice on 2 May. Mr. Dichgans had already given a brief outline of this problem at the European Parliament's session in Strasbourg on 13 March.

As the seventh currency in the Community, the Eurofranc should play a similar part in monetary credit as the special drawing rights of the International Monetary Fund. He argued that what the IMF could do, the European Community could do, too. It could not offer anonymous credit within a world-wide organization but could provide specific credits commensurate with the needs of the European economy. The money-creating system of the Eurofranc would go hand in hand with the special drawing rights agreed on in Rio and not stand in opposition to them.

These credits would not disrupt the world monetary system but rather would ease the strain, for then the European issuing banks would only

need to envisage using the special drawing rights when they could not obtain a means of payment in any other way. The European Community bank ought not, he felt, to issue any notes of its own but operate with loan bonds and discount credit to all appearances in the same way as all other currency banks in the world. The scope of this discount credit could be used in a set proportion to the total discount credit of the six national issuing banks, possibly allowing for a margin of fluctuation. The Community bank would issue bonds and some treasury bills to provide a means of payment in world trade. This would be covered by a deficiency guarantee given by the national issuing banks and this would be a genuine Community operation.

Dr. Dichgans emphasized that the only perfect solution would be a European monetary union. For political reasons, however, it was not feasible; nor indeed was it desirable. As long as it remained impossible to prevent the Governments of the member States from pursuing unreasonable economic policies, the safety valve of a possible devaluation by an individual state acting on its own had to remain operative.

As regards the national issuing banks, their liabilities would be expressed in Eurofrancs, including guaranteed and currency liabilities. If, contrary to all expectations, an individual currency had to be devalued then its liability would also be increased in Eurofrancs, as is the case with liabilities expressed in dollars.

The arrangement with national issuing banks would give the Eurofranc the same gold cover as the national currencies now have. The transfer of part of the national gold reserves to the European Community bank might be envisaged in proportion to the share of the national issuing banks in the Community bank. All the banks in the Community would have the right to operate accounts in Eurofrancs as well as in their national currencies.

Dr. Dichgans asked whether the issuing banks of the Community should, under such a system replace the spread on either side of par of 3 per cent with a fixed rate of exchange. The six issuing banks would then, reciprocally, have to provide the necessary credits so that the current absorption of all currencies offered could be borne by the banks concerned. The interest machinery of these credits would then cover the operations at present characterized by fluctuations.

The credit that the issuing banks extended reciprocally would have to be handled with an eye to the possible devaluation of currency credits. In contrast to the normal world currencies, the issuing banks of the Communities

would have to work as a united bloc to deal with currency fluctuations in the same way as the national issuing banks have so far done individually.

Mr. Dichgans argued that the position of the EEC countries was needlessly weakened over monetary policy as the American position would if the States of California, Alabama or New York acted independently in currency matters.

A new European currency could assume a significance for the whole area of Europe and Africa, giving it parity with the dollar. The Eurofranc could replace the Eurodollar which was, at present, the seventh currency of the Community and played a major rôle on the capital market of the Community and financed the expansion of American industry in the EEC.

A large proportion of these Eurodollars came from Community investors but they had no influence over them. The Eurodollar is controlled by Washington and was, outside the Community, the preferred currency especially in London and Zurich. If there were any doubt whether the money market would accept a currency for which there were no bank notes, it had to be remembered that the fact that Eurodollars could not be changed into bank notes was immaterial for the Eurodollar market. In practice the conversion was never made. Dr. Dichgans further argued that the dollar attracted a premium in its official valuations which was honoured by its additional usability as a world currency, because anything in the world could be bought with the dollar.

Dr. Dichgans suggested that the issuing of European coin should be coupled with the creation of the Eurofranc as a Central Bank currency, even if there were no bank notes. European policy had to be clear. The objection to the current practices was a technical difficulty: the banks had to create additional currency payment machinery. Such difficulties ought not, however, to stand in the way of the European idea.

(European Review of the Christian Democrat Group of the European Parliament, No. 27, July 1968, pp. 3-11).

4. SPD Bundestag representative proposes the setting up of a WEU Technological Committee

Gerhard Flämig, SPD Bundestag representative and member of the Council of Europe, intends to propose, on behalf of the WEU Committee on Science and Technology at the autumn session of the WEU to be held in Paris from 14 to 18 October 1968, that a Standing Technological Committee be set up in Western European Union. Mr. Flämig stated in Hanau on 4 September that the new committee of the WEU, which is composed of the EEC member States and Great Britain, would be made up of the science ministers of the WEU countries.

He added that the Committee should co-ordinate the scientific and technological efforts of the member countries. At the same time it would ensure the collaboration of Great Britain in a key sector pending settlement of the question of British entry into the European Communities. Only by achieving integration in the scientific and technological spheres would Europe have a chance of safeguarding its economic future.

(VWD-Europa, 4 September 1968)

5. Statement by Mr. George Brown, deputy leader of the Labour Party, on Britain's rôle in Europe

On a campaign tour of his constituency, Mr. George Brown, deputy leader of the Labour Party, made the following statement :

'I am very much against a world in which it is said there are two super powers who divide up between themselves, and the rest of us have to put up with what they decide. That is how you get your Czechoslovakias and your Cubas, and I don't like this at all.

I believe the second thing to becoming economically strong again is to get back our age-old influential rôle in the world. That means us leading Europe and leading it to being a new power grouping that will prevent the world being divided up by two so-called super powers.'

(The Guardian, 16 September 1968)

6. Address by Prince Bernhard of the Netherlands on European co-operation in aviation and space travel

In an address delivered in London on 18 September before the Society of British Aerospace Companies Ltd. (an organization comprising 300 European enterprises) Prince Bernhard of the Netherlands advocated closer European co-operation in aviation and space travel. The need for co-operation at European level was generally recognized and, indeed desired; the question was whether all were really prepared to accept the necessary conditions.

Industrial integration of Europe was impossible without greater political integration. But before this could be achieved, a host of obstacles had to be overcome. What was important now was to grasp the full significance of political integration. The Prince spoke of the fear growing among European politicians, economists and industrialists that the United States would so outdistance Europe in industrial development that it would prove impossible to close the technological gap. The secret of America's success was largely that it continued unflinchingly to support training and research. The United States was in fact spending thirty times as much on spatial research as Europe.

Methods of organization in Europe would have to be radically changed and the relations between industry and government overhauled. Moreover, technical research and training at national level was not enough. Here again closer and closer co-operation at European level was needed. In sectors in which co-operation already existed, precious time should at all costs be saved by avoiding protracted negotiations and political squabbles. Practical results could only be achieved if both government and industry grasped the need for sacrifices and for surrendering a measure of independence.

Prince Bernhard thought that co-operation in outer space would present even thornier problems than aviation. Nevertheless, if the European countries wanted to make progress in the exploration of space such co-operation was essential. Europe had the governmental organizations ELDO and ESRO, the European Conference on satellite communications, and, at industrial level, Eurospace. But it was still without a coherent policy on European space activities. One could not but regret the decision taken a few months ago by the British Government to withdraw from the ELDO project before 1971. With about three-quarters of mankind living in areas served only by primitive means of communication, a dazzling future faced communication satellites. Enormous benefits could be expected in the social, economic and political sectors. How, then - asked Prince Bernhard - could ELDO be regarded merely as a prestige project? Was Europe permanently to depend on the United States' goodwill in launching its satellites?

The Prince quoted the following passage from a publication by Eurospace, an organization of 300 European enterprises employing some two million workers : 'If Europe were to abandon its activities in the field of space travel, this would be not only an economic but also a historic event, marking the beginning of its self-imposed decline.'

Prince Bernhard wound up by voicing the conviction that Europe's technical knowledge, its inventive genius and creative powers could still enable it successfully to meet the challenge presented to it.

(Handels Transport Courant, 19 September 1968)

7. The CSU Land Group discusses European defence policy

At a closed meeting held in Bad Berneck on 20 September 1968 the CSU Bundestag Land Group passed a resolution on foreign and defence policy. The main points covered were refusal to sign the nuclear non-proliferation treaty, the creation of the basic conditions for an integrated European defence potential and a far-reaching alignment of the defence and foreign policies of the Federal Republic and France.

The French and Germans ought finally to take their joint responsibility for Europe in earnest. Regional strengthening of the Western Alliance must be sought on the basis of foreign and defence policies binding on both sides. To facilitate the creation of a West European community of peoples to serve as a prop for an overall European order, the completion of the EEC on the economic plane was just as necessary as a trading arrangement with Britain and the other applicant countries.

So long as the nuclear powers continued their arms race and declined to submit to generally supervised disarmament, the balance established by the deterrent would remain precarious. This situation, far from being remedied, would be aggravated by signing the treaty. In invading Czechoslovakia, the Soviet Union had violated the principles of the UN Charter; at the same time it was trying, as Germany's former opponent in the war, to claim the special right to apply force against the Federal Republic. The Federal Republic therefore needed political and institutional guarantees that would afford it nuclear protection against aggression and blackmail until the conditions for building an integrated European deterrent had been created.

America's attempts to encourage its Western partners in the alliance to do more for their own security were basically justified. To strengthen the Atlantic Alliance a West European Armaments Community and a European Defence Community would have to be set up.

Mr. Richard Stücklen, Chairman of the CSU Land Group in the Bundestag, said after the meeting that the Party laid great emphasis on the need for decisions in European and Alliance policies. Unless something was done here and now, Europe would probably suffer severe setbacks. The Party favoured a political and military union between the Federal Republic and France.

Despite a packed agenda, the three-day conference was dominated by the call for progress in European policy. This followed the course traced out by CSU Chairman Franz Josef Strauss in July at the Munich Party Conference when he spoke out for a major European initiative. In the light of the Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia, the CSU representatives associated their demands more closely than before with security policy considerations.

As explained to 'Die Welt' by Friedrich Zimmermann, Chairman of the Bundestag Defence Committee, the CSU wanted the group of West European countries to work more closely together. For this, a joint policy with France was a prerequisite. If, however, Paris declined to go along with this, closer dependence of the Federal Republic on the United States would soon be unavoidable.

(Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 21 September 1968; Die Welt, 21 and 23 September 1968; Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 23 September 1968)

8. Professor Hallstein, former President of the EEC Commission, calls for the reorganization of European defence policy

Speaking at the Party Conference of Christian Democrats (Westphalia) in Recklinghausen on 22 September 1968, Professor Hallstein painted a gloomy picture of the situation of the Federal Republic and Western Europe.

Western ideas on security had been virtually shattered by the events in Prague. There could be no doubt that Russia's European policy was aimed not only at establishing a hegemony in the Baltic and Mediterranean but also at foisting on the Federal Republic a status akin to Finland's so as to block fur-

ther integration in free Europe. Recent events had shown that in the vital sphere of security Europe was non-existent. There was no responsible voice that spoke for Europe.

Prof. Hallstein pleaded for a reorganization of European defence policy within NATO. This step would have to be taken, if need be, at first without France. Statements by American statemen like Rusk and Katzenbach suggested that the USA was not averse to a new form of European Defence Community with American backing. A bipolar arrangement of this kind within the Atlantic Alliance would not call for any dramatic changes to the Treaty. Reorganization of European defence, if carried out in stages, could at the same time serve to speed up progress towards political union. Free Europe must realize that its security could not be left entirely in the hands of the super-powers. The question of security had now been raised in an acute form; there had been, and there still was, no early warning period.

Prof. Hallstein repeated his proposals at the European Conference of the Schleswig-Holstein CDU Land Union in Kiel on 29 September. NATO should cease to be an alliance between a giant and a number of pigmies. Europe's ability to defend itself must be consolidated and the Americans faced with a resolute body of European opinion.

It was no exaggeration to say that Soviet diplomacy aimed at imposing a Finnish status on the Federal Republic, the idea being that all foreign policy decisions would always have to be taken in the light of what the giant might have to say on the subject.

Mr. Helmut Lemke, Prime Minister of Schleswig-Holstein, observed in his opening address that Europe should reorganize its defence in NATO, if need be without France.

(Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 23 September 1968, Die Welt, 30 September 1968)

9. Conference by Mr. Toncic-Sorinj, former Austrian foreign minister on "The European Community seen from the outside"

At the invitation of the European Movement in Luxembourg, Mr. Lujo Toncic-Sorinj, former Austrian foreign monister, spoke about the EEC

as seen from the outside and about the hopes that the East European countries built on the materialization of the Community.

He began by going back to the origins of European integration : 'The EEC led out of the era of stagnation and resignation to that of integration. In the beginning there were many emotional reservations on the part of those who were "left out". The EEC was criticized for the tough line it took, which was described as a "misconception" and "split" doomed to failure. As I said, there were emotional remonstrances on both sides which have today disappeared because both sides want to talk. Just as the whole dream of a large, united Europe has not been achieved, so too there is no longer such an intolerant attitude on the part of the EEC. An effort is being made to find more flexible transitional arrangements. The discussions held in The Hague twenty years ago were not only concerned with creating a Western Europe. At that time there was no mention of a Europe to the Urals but rather of one going to the frontiers of the Soviet Union, including the present satellite States. That was the point of departure then.'

Mr. Toncic-Sorinj then recalled Austria's attitude to European integration : 'Austria has always respected the EEC's views and defended the status of its country vis-à-vis the new entity. Up till now, its attempt to achieve a rapprochement has neither been concluded nor has it failed. At present there is a moratorium which also applies to other European countries. The EEC explains that there are certain frontiers which at present allow of no "openings". Thus there were serious difficulties for the EFTA countries. These did not apply to Africa; the EEC's attitude here is not so doctrinaire. Naturally, the problems of the East have to be sketched in. From the ideological standpoint, the East is completely subject, economically and culturally, to the military power of Russia and regards the EEC as a thrust at the East. In the view of the Soviet Union, the EEC is led by its strongest partner, Germany. In the final analysis the Austrians could as neutrals measure the Kremlin's degree of enmity by reference to the political emphasis recently given to economic and cultural affairs. The reaction of the East is simply the continuation of a policy of several hundred years' standing. Any central formation in Europe is regarded by the Russians as an alliance against their country. And this policy is today being continued unaltered in a new guise.'

Referring to the aggression of the Warsaw Pact countries against Czechoslovakia, he called upon the member States of the EEC to continue their contacts with the East European countries: 'These personal contacts have been very successful. Without them this development in the East would never have occurred, but it would be pure idiocy for the West to break these contracts now. It must not abandon the people in the East for they, too, belong to Europe. For this reason the contacts with their governments must be continued and from the psychological point of view, peoples under domination must not be disappointed by the West. It should pursue its integration efforts but not in too

dogmatic or doctrinaire a manner. There is no mention anywhere of integral institutions. Wherever possible, a change should be made from obligations to co-operation. It would be wrong to expect a miracle but above all the traditional aims (of removing frontiers) have already been achieved and will be of advantage to the others. The people in Eastern Europe have great hopes of European integration. We have given them more than they assume. If these yoked peoples could, they would be the best Europeans. The West must not, therefore, disappoint them.'

(Tageblatt, 23 September 1968)

III. ORGANIZATIONS AND GROUPINGS

1. The French crisis as seen in German economic spheres

Speaking in M \ddot{u} nich on 7 June, Mr. Otto Wolff von Amerongen, one of the governors of the German Chamber of Commerce and Industry, said that the French crisis represented a serious test for world trade, which affected the Federal Republic more than many other industrialized States. The occasion was the 125th anniversary of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry for M \ddot{u} nich and Upper Bavaria. He said everything should be done to maintain the EEC's position as the strongest and most promising bloc in world trade.

Dr. Johann Baptist Sch \ddot{o} llhorn, Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, also argued that they should stand by France: 'It concerns us when our neighbour's house is burning.'

There was at present no definite indication that a devaluation of the franc was to be expected. Professor Ludwig Erhard came to the same conclusion when he addressed on 8 July in Heidelberg a management seminar held by the labour community for economic management. The seminar was studying the effects of the French crisis on the German economy. The French import restrictions, export incentives and retreat to exchange controls were rather a sign that Paris wished to defend the parity of the franc and to restore order in its own house. The question as to chances of success of this attempt was something he would not answer for although he made no secret of his scepticism.

He felt that price supervision, price controls and price ceilings would not subdue the currents at work in France. He expected price increases of 6 to 7 per cent in France for 1968 and 1969.

Dr. Vogel of the German Institute for Industry made a detailed analysis of France's balance of payments and came to the conclusion that it no longer had any reserves with which to contain the recent increase in costs. France's currency reserves had been reduced by 25 per cent to \$5,500 million. No policy could take the place of currency reserves and would not keep a currency strong for long; if this were the case, the German mark would have been a still-born child at the outset. Without a devaluation of the franc, however, it would not be possible to fulfil the two medium-term needs of internal expansion and external balance. A devaluation of the franc would give French

exporters more scope for expansion, which France urgently needed to overcome its unemployment.

Speaking at a joint meeting of the Technical High School and the Chamber of Industry and Commerce in Darmstadt on 10 July, Dr. Albrecht Dürren, Chief Executive of the German Chamber of Commerce and Industry deplored the unwillingness of the French Government to apply EEC Treaty rules to overcome its domestic crisis. He found this development exceptional. Such an attitude was an example of a denial of the European Commission's right to act as an independent Community body. There appeared no obvious sign that this attitude would change.

Dr. Dürren felt that the EEC was in a dilemma. Now at the time of its greatest outward success, completing the customs union eighteen months ahead of schedule, the conditions were unfavourable for an effective and rapid furtherance of integration. He pointed out that while world trade had increased by 80 per cent since the EEC was founded, trade within the Community had increased by 200 per cent; trade with third countries had gone up by 90 per cent.

In view of the French Government's attitude in recent years, the question arose as to whether and when France's partners would defend their own interests and position in the Community with equal firmness. Dr. Dürren referred here to the harshness with which the French spokesmen had again rejected the idea of Britain's membership of the EEC at a recent WEU meeting.

(Die Welt, 1 and 8 June 1968;
Industriekurier, 8 June 1968;
Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 29 June 1968;
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 9 July 1968)

2. Hamburg and the Common Market as seen by Senator H. Kern

In a summing up Hamburg's current situation and the prospects for the future, following the entry into force of the customs union on 1 July 1968 - one and a half years earlier than foreseen in the EEC Treaty - Senator Helmuth Kern, chairman of Hamburg's Economic and Transport Authority, stated that over a period of more than ten years that city's economy had been able, by and large, to keep abreast of economic development in the Federal Republic and in the EEC member States.

He was sure that Hamburg's economy had derived a greater momentum from the dynamism generated by the EEC than would have been the case in the absence of this integrative force. The prospects for further expansion of Hamburg's external trade were not unfavourable. If greater emphasis were placed on the EEC market and on the African market, it would be possible, while strengthening the traditional links with Latin America, Asia and the USA, to make the most of the new possibilities.

An enlarged EEC would, however, act as a fresh stimulus for growth from which Hamburg too would benefit. If Hamburg was to reap the benefits held out by the EEC and its possible enlargement, it would have to show greater readiness to adapt itself so as to be able to profit by, and eventually pass on, the stimulus to growth stemming from an ever-changing environment in Europe and overseas.

Senator Kern pointed out that the EEC was only the second best solution. There could be no doubt that the volume of trade could have been stepped up still further in an enlarged EEC. The extent of the progress made by the EEC was shown, however, by the fact that trade between member States had increased from about DM 58,000m. in 1958 to DM 195,000m. in 1967, i.e. by 239 per cent. During the same period trade with non-member countries rose by 85 per cent to DM 250m. The development of the EEC was, however, being slowed down by the inadequacy of the powers of the supranational organizations.

In this connexion, it should be mentioned that Mr. Hans Apel, SPD Bundestag representative, asked the Brussels Commission whether it was ready to co-operate fully, and with the requisite sense of urgency, with the Governments concerned in abolishing distorted competition which was detrimental to German seaports and incompatible with a common transport policy. If necessary, compensatory payments could for the time being be introduced in cross-frontier transport, until the Commission had fully harmonized fuel prices, tax and insurance systems and working conditions.

As a member of the European Parliament, Mr. Apel drew the Commission's attention to the fact that differences in the way the EEC transport markets were organized seriously damaged the interests of German seaports.

(Die Welt, 1 July 1968)

3. The German CEPES Group and European integration

On 15 July, the European Union for Economic and Social Development (CEPES), which was founded in 1952 by industrialists, bankers and business men in various European countries, issued a statement through its German Branch. The statement, which was addressed to the EEC Commission and the Federal Government, suggested practical action plans for setting up an economic union.

The German CEPES Group advocated a standard system of indirect taxes, including harmonized rates of tax, in the EEC. It also urged that obstacles to co-operation and mergers stemming from the laws governing taxation, companies and competition, be removed and European-type companies be created.

France's current economic problems would, in the view of the German Group, only be satisfactorily solved within the Community and not bilaterally. The cyclical and monetary policy of the member States had, above all, to be directed towards achieving monetary stability. The cyclical policy recommendations of the Council of Ministers ought in future to be more immediately applicable, much more detailed and binding on all the Governments of the member States.

Creating the conditions for the accession of Britain and other countries to the Community was not only the EEC's responsibility but also that of the applicant States. These had to evince a more receptive attitude towards the economic and political integration of Europe. As long as Britain did not accept political integration as the logical consequence of its desire for accession, interim trade policy arrangements midway between the present situation and full membership would have to be considered.

Finally the German CEPES Group called for a review of the common agricultural policy to deal with the increasing lack of representation of the consumer and the taxpayer.

(Industriekurier, 16 July 1968)

4. Statement by the German-Swiss Chamber of Commerce on European policy

In an article published in the 19 August edition of the journal of the German-Swiss Chamber of Commerce in Zürich, Dr. Meyer-Marsilius, director of that institution, describes the results of an inquiry made into the progress of integration as 'meagre and anything but encouraging'.

The proposal for a trade agreement between the EEC and Switzerland had already been made a long time ago by the German-Swiss Chamber of Commerce. The much-quoted 'foot in the door' seemed important enough to warrant a solution which in itself did not amount to a great deal. Dr. Meyer-Marsilius did not think the proposal had at present much chance of being acted upon. The case might be otherwise if the EEC and Switzerland were to sit down together. But a possible, if limited, solution of the integration problem by means of a trade arrangement was hampered by the question of the 'preliminary step towards full British membership' of the EEC.

That the EEC was passing through an institutional crisis was no secret. After all, it had not emerged without damage from the earlier crises, which had sapped the vitality of the Community and largely deprived the EEC Commission of its rôle as a driving force. The EEC, however, derived its impetus in the main from the speed of the progress made (customs union and the agricultural market system). It had lost, however, not only its inner drive but also much of the 'pull' it exerted on the world at large. 'How, in the present circumstances can it be made more attractive to a sober, down-to-earth Swiss citizen?'

But EFTA too did not offer Switzerland any answer to the integration problem. This was ruled out by the heterogeneous character of that organization. It had, however, fulfilled its purpose as an interim solution. Events had shown that neither the EEC nor EFTA was capable of overcoming the self-centred attitude of the European States, even though useful initial results and experience had been obtained which it would be wrong to ignore.

The article winds up by considering what might be done to speed up integration. The widening technological gap separating the USA and Europe might one day force the Europeans to come closer together. Perhaps technological co-operation might open the way to a form of collaboration between Switzerland and the EEC freed from emotion and governed only by the force of facts and the inescapable dictates of technological development.

(Industriekurier, 20 August 1968)

5. The Belgian dairy market and the Community's policy

The Belgian farmers' unions have made known their views on the difficulties that arose on the dairy market following the slump in prices of the summer of 1968.

In mid-August the National Federation of Farmers' Unions (UPA) urged that the price of Bfrs. 4.55 per litre of milk with a 3.3 per cent fat content, fixed by the European Economic Community, should be paid to producers and that dairies should be enabled to obtain sufficient receipts from the market to settle up with their suppliers at that price. The UPA considered that transitional measures for safeguarding and supporting the market should at once be taken at national level in order to protect producers and dairies from abnormal competition from various partner countries. These measures should be kept in force until the necessary amendments had been made to Community regulations as regards (i) the intervention price for the main by-products and (ii) the alignment of the conditions of production and the basic review of the general policy on fats.

At the same time the steering committee of the Belgian Boerenbond (farmers' union) held an extraordinary meeting presided over by Professor Boon. This reviewed developments on the dairy market since 29 July 1968, when the European common policy on milk products had come into force and a common milk guide-price had been adopted.

The committee observed that the dairy industry in other partner countries was not paying the guide price and was thus exerting pressure on the milk market. This was aggravated by the fact that some partner countries were granting subsidies to the milk sector. As a result, even efficiently-run Belgian dairies could not pay the recommended guide price.

The Belgian Boerenbond therefore demanded:

- (i) that normal competitive conditions should be established between the EEC member States;
- (ii) that in view of the unsound market situation a state of emergency should be immediately declared for the Belgian cheese market and adequate measures taken;
- (iii) that intervention prices should be so adjusted as to permit the guide price to be attained;
- (iv) that, with a view to ensuring a fair return to the producer, the determination of the butyric fat content by third parties should be immediately made compulsory by law.

The Belgian Boerenbond welcomed the fact that the authorities had followed up its appeal for the establishment of a body to concert the efforts of all the parties concerned in the milk sector so as to ensure market transparency and permit the requisite action to be taken.

The Belgian Boerenbond held fast to the view that, under the existing circumstances, it was wrong that certain dairies should adjust their processing margin to the detriment of the milk price to be paid to the producer.

(De Boer, 24 August 1968; Le Soir, 20 August 1968)

6. The attitude of German industry to the association of African States

The extent to which the eighteen African and Malagasy States (AAMS) associated with the EEC lag behind other development areas is regarded by German industry as a good reason for the European Community to continue giving them special assistance.

In a statement intended for the Federal Government, the key organizations of German industry represented on the 'Working Party on developing countries' (Federal Association of German Industry, German Industrial and Trade Conference, Federal Association of Private Banks, Federal Association of German Wholesalers and Exporters and Union of German Exporters' Associations) emphasized that closer collaboration with the EEC in the Association had helped to make the countries concerned more stable politically and economically. Industry therefore had nothing against prolonging the Association provided that the previous agreement was amended in a number of important points and placed greater emphasis on integrating the African States into the world economy.

As pointed out by the Federal Association of German Industry (BDI), industry was particularly keen to see the Associated States' preference margin on tropical products widened during the coming negotiations. Although it had been found that these preferences were of little material help to the AAMS, they were of great psychological damage to German industry, particularly in Latin America. At the same time the Associated States' demands for firm delivery undertakings were causing considerable concern.

The Working Party on developing countries stated that the Association's entire preference arrangements - including the 'counter-preferences' granted by the AAMS on EEC products - would have to be reviewed again once negotiations on general preferences for finished and semi-finished manufactures of all developing countries and on world-wide primary commodity agreements had yielded tangible results.

The essential element of the Association would continue to be the common financial assistance channelled through a European Development Fund. The Working Party on developing countries approved the setting up of a further Fund for a specific period but was against increasing the volume of financial aid. It regarded it, however, as essential to improve the conditions governing such aid and the methods by which it was made available, so as (i) to abolish the lopsided relationship between the Federal Republic's financial contributions and its participation in contracts and (ii) to increase the efficacy of financial aid. The changes regarded as essential by industry included greater emphasis on revenue-earning projects and the partial replacement of non-repayable grants by loans on special terms and wider resort to the European Investment Bank. At the same time, improvements in methods of allocation and payments were essential.

(VWD-Europa, 26 August 1968)

7. Netherlands Federation of Iron and Steel Unions and European integration

On 30 August 1968 the annual conference of the General Netherlands Federation of Iron and Steel Unions passed a resolution in Amsterdam on European integration. This claimed that numerous political, social and economic problems could no longer be solved within the narrow context of national frontiers; a real European Community had therefore become an absolute necessity and a new European treaty ought to embody the following principles:

1. the principle of supranationality;
2. democratic supervision by a directly elected parliament;
3. financial autonomy and independence of the supreme European institution;
4. the Community to be open to all democratic European countries;
5. loss of Community membership, or suspension of an association agreement, in the case of any country whose government ceases to be democratic;

6. maintenance and extension of the rights of consultation of workers' organizations on policy decisions, as already provided by the ECSC Treaty.

Considering:

that the trend towards larger economic areas extending beyond the national frontiers presents fresh problems to the European trade union movement in the performance of its main task of defending workers' interests;

the Assembly invites the Executive:

to take all necessary steps to ensure a high degree of integration and the closest possible co-operation between the iron and steel and electronics industries in EEC member States;

to urge the Netherlands Trades Union Federation to keep up its efforts to achieve a high degree of integration and establish the closest possible co-operation between the Trades Union Federations of the EEC countries, in line with the resolution passed by the Netherlands Trades Union Federation at its 24th general meeting.

(Metaalkoerier, 6 September 1968)

8. A majority of Germany's European Union is in favour of a more active integration policy

Meeting in Bonn on 5 September 1968, the European Union of Germany drew the attention of the Federal Government to the fact that there was a broad section of the general public which would welcome new steps in European policy.

'Wriggling will not get the bogged-down integration process off to a new start' stressed Mr. Gerhard Eickhorn, the secretary-general in a statement to the press.

267 members of the Bundestag support a proposed new move to revive Germany's policy on Europe.

The Emnid Institute conducted an opinion poll in which only ten per cent of those asked answered 'yes' to the question: 'Do you think European co-operation has improved over the last year?' This was the lowest point recorded for thirteen years.

(VWD-Europa, 5 September 1968)

9. Mr. Münchmeyer, Chairman of the Federal Association of Private Banks, calls for a European monetary union

On 13 September 1968 Mr. Alwin Münchmeyer, Chairman of the Federal Association of Private Banks, recommended that a European monetary union be set up as a way out of the current monetary policy difficulties. As he had pointed out before industrialists in Dusseldorf, revaluation of the Deutsche Mark was neither necessary nor calculated to help in solving monetary problems. A European monetary union did not have to be the crowning piece of European integration but could perfectly well act as its main driving force. Such a policy would ensure that Germany would not remain alone in the line of fire in the present currency battle. It was highly unsatisfactory that Germany was being pressed on all sides to shoulder the responsibility for a situation brought into being by a lack of monetary discipline on the part of others.

If a European monetary union was set up and the Community developed into an internal market, this would strengthen the bloc's tactical and bargaining powers in its dealings with the other large trading nations. It would also indirectly be put in an exceptionally strong position in negotiations on monetary policy because discussion of the balances of payments of individual member States would have to give ground to discussion of the Community's overall payments position. Mr. Münchmeyer quoted the following figures: in 1967 the Federal Republic's total trade surplus stood at DM 16,900m., of which DM 12,500m. related to non-member countries. Far more important, however, was that the EEC's total trade surplus with non-member countries now amounted to DM 3,000m. This was the figure on which discussions should centre in the event of differences of opinion regarding any external trade imbalance arising between a European monetary union and non-member countries.

The outlook for a European monetary union was brighter than might at first appear. At all events it was more encouraging than in other sectors calling for harmonization, such as social and taxation policies. The institutional core of a European federal reserve system already existed in the Council of Finance Ministers and in the EEC Monetary Committee, and ought to be built up accordingly and sanctioned by treaty as soon as possible.

Mr. Münchmeyer counted on a monetary union's speeding up the wearisome process of harmonization in the EEC. Divergences in taxation systems and in other legislation affecting competition could probably be ironed out more rapidly if monetary and credit policies throughout the EEC were based on uniform tax measures and if the free flow of money and capital was permitted itself to even out interest rate levels.

A European monetary union - said Mr. Münchmeyer - could spare Germany the dilemma it faced every two years or so, either of altering the exchange rate or of allowing itself to be drawn along in the inflationary stream of the others. It would be essential, however, for a European central monetary institution to have the backing of national governments, and for it to feel as committed to the ideal of price stability just as closely as to the ideals of growth and full employment. Mr. Münchmeyer thought that even in France and Italy the basic conditions for this had improved. Moreover, the Federal Republic could throw its economic weight into the balance more effectively through a European central bank in the event of its being necessary to dam inflationary trends.

The exchange rates of EEC currencies were virtually bonded together by the policy underlying the agricultural market regulations. To alter exchange rates was scarcely possible today since this would immediately hit farmers' incomes and necessitate yet further subsidies. Only a small step would be needed to arrive at a situation where parities were permanently fixed and margins of fluctuation abolished. Fixed rates of exchange were an essential feature of a monetary union.

(Industriekurier and Die Welt, 14 September 1968)

10. The Secretary-General of 'Force Ouvrière' : Access by the CGT to European institutions should be barred

In an address delivered at Charleville-Mezières before union delegates of the 'Force Ouvrière' (iron and steel), Mr. Antoine Laval, general secretary of the union, alluded to events in Czechoslovakia which - he said - had once again shown the profound significance of the aims of men of good will like Jean Monnet and Robert Schuman, the founders of the ECSC. It was not enough to denounce the overwhelming power wielded by the two blocs that had come into being at Yalta.

'As always, we believe that the free and democratic United States of Europe would serve as a balancing force and as an outstanding factor for peace - something which the president of the French Republic appears to want to ignore. We are therefore opposed to the admission of the French and Italian Communist unions, the CGT and the CGIL, to bodies of the European Communities. This would be to let in the Trojan horse. If the French Government were to accept responsibility for this it would have serious consequences. The free international trade union movement as a whole would then have to take appropriate steps so as not to surrender what it had struggled for over the past twenty years.'

Previously Mr. Laval had fully approved the statement made by Mr. André Bergeron, confederal secretary of the FO, following General de Gaulle's conference, regarding participation projects, and had also firmly backed a resumption of the building of a Europe enlarged by the admission of Great Britain and all the free and democratic countries of Europe. 'The Communist countries of the East, as well as Greece, Spain and Portugal, have no place here because their activities are those of dictatorships'.

(Combat, 16 September 1968)

11. For the Secretary-General of the French Farmers' Unions the new French agricultural policy can only assume a European form

Mr. Michel Debatisse recently attended the annual congress of the Departmental Association of the Farmers' Unions of the Charente in Angoulême.

The general secretary of the National Federation of Farmers' Unions approved the broad lines of the new policy defined by the French Minister for Agriculture which posed the problem of organizing farming so as to adapt it to the needs of the consumer. He felt, however, that the new trend in French agricultural policy would only serve a useful purpose in so far as it was applied within the framework of the European Community. Any decisions ought to be taken jointly with France's partners. That the French should accept sacrifices while its partners - the Germans or Dutch, for example - continued to act on their own, was out of the question.

(Le Monde, 24 September 1968; Le Figaro, 23 September 1968)

12. Mr. Berg, Chairman of the Federal Association of German Industry (BDI), on European development

At the opening of the Industrial Fair in Berlin the Chairman of the Federal Association of German Industry outlined the situation in the EEC.

Mr. Berg described this as favourable on balance and said that the economic upswing was receiving a powerful impetus from the larger market. Renewed drive and fresh initiatives were, however, now needed. On the road from customs union to economic union, policies and taxation, competition and trade were of major importance. Monetary and short-term economic policies throughout Europe had to be co-ordinated more closely. A number of questions had still to be settled in connexion with the merger of the three treaties. Last but not least, German industry remained in favour of throwing open the doors of the EEC to countries desirous of entering it.

Mr. Berg firmly opposed a revaluation of the Deutsche Mark. Many people clearly clung stubbornly to the view that it was the healthy person who should be operated to cure the sick. But such remedies would heal nobody. Nor did it show much economic insight to blame a country for the success of a policy of stability instead of using it as a model - a country which, incidentally, had done all it could to support other currencies.

'Our view on the subject is quite clear: only fixed exchange rates can keep the wheels of world trade turning. The Federal Republic of Germany, as the second largest world trader, is particularly keen on stepping up co-operation in the field of monetary policy and in helping to steer every country - within the framework of the EEC, the OECD and the Group of Ten - towards internal economic stability. Independent monetary policy measures would run directly counter to these aims.'

The same remarks applied to integration, a requirement that could only be met with fixed rates of exchange. Mr. Berg attached particular importance to the question of integration. German industry was working hard to smooth out differences in trade policy in Europe. It could not consent to projects or stand idly by if these brought further discrepancies into being. 'We must see to it that the European Economic Community becomes a stronghold of stability.'

(Industriekurier, 28 September 1968)



AT THE COMMUNITY AND INTERNATIONAL LEVEL

I. THE COMMUNITY EXECUTIVE

1. Speech by Mr. Jean Rey, President of the Commission of the European Communities, in the Hamburg Overseas Club

The customs union completed on 1 July had to broaden out into an effective economic union as soon as possible, said Mr. Jean Rey, speaking to the Hamburg Overseas Club on 11 July. Above all, this meant removing fiscal frontiers and all customs formalities; it also meant common policies for trade, industry and research and a standard European currency.

The Commission would, in this way, work for the merger of the three existing European Treaties in a new general treaty, endeavouring to ensure it was adapted to the needs of its function as the prime mover of further Community development and as the manager of the day-to-day business of the EEC. He pointed out that the Luxembourg decisions restricting the scope of the majority decision principle on the Council of Ministers had not been recognized by the Commission. It regarded the right of veto as antiquated and inappropriate.

The Commission would do everything to promote a closer involvement of the peoples of Europe in European affairs, particularly through the introduction of direct elections to the European Parliament.

(Die Welt, 13 July 1968)

2. The German members of the EEC Commission criticise the French measures for dealing with the economic crisis

Addressing journalists in Bonn, Messrs. Hellwig, von der Groeben and Haferkamp, the German members of the European Commission, discussed the significance of 1 July and explained the aims that the Community ought, in

the Commission's view, to pursue in its further development. With reference to the most recent French protective measures, the Commission's view was that although it agreed with the French assessment of the economic situation, it could not approve of the scope or term of the measures taken.

The Commission was, in principle, ready to acknowledge that the conditions for applying Article 109 of the EEC Treaty obtained; under this 'when a sudden crisis in the balance of payments occurs . . . the member State concerned may provisionally take the necessary protective measures'; it has the right to do so directly and independently; but, Mr. von der Groeben pointed out, these measures should be no more than a containment exercise, remaining in force for a few weeks at most and certainly not stretching over a period of six months. The Commission stressed, however, that France had acted by reference to Article 108, being the Community's 'mutual assistance' dispensation.

On the other hand, the members of the Commission stressed that France was ready to implement the customs union on 1 July as planned. This would have a greater impact than the trade and economic policy measures which Paris had taken after the domestic crisis in France. Import restrictions would affect only 20 per cent of French imports; the quotas were furthermore set higher than imports for 1967. The important point was that the French measures were not too far-reaching. They were, however, politically important because the decisions were taken by a Community body and not unilaterally by a member State. The solidarity of the other Five was involved.

Great difficulties might be expected in the near future in monetary policy. The German Commission members welcome the initiative by the German Government of supporting measures in favour of France through the Council of Ministers. The Treaty did not state what action was possible; one possibility in their opinion, however, was that the member States could reduce the rate of the turnover tax to help imports from France.

(Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 2 July 1968)

3. Mr. Victor Bodson, a member of the Commission, looks into the social policy of the Community on 1 July 1968 and the rôle of the younger generation

When the Commission of the Communities was publishing a statement on the implications of 1 July 1968, Mr. Bodson, a member of the

Commission, was speaking in Luxembourg on the social policy of the Community and on the rôle of the younger generation.

Mr. Bodson began by stressing the partial nature of the Community's social policy: 'The achievements of the High Authority and the EEC Commission - in favour of workers in other branches of the economy - still do not rank as "social policy". The social achievements of the Community have had neither the scale nor the comprehensive nature that is characteristic of a social policy; they do not embrace all aspects of living and working conditions and are not the outcome of a firmly-established overall policy; the Communities must be content only to take action when an opportunity appears and not always when technical and economic development creates a need or offers a chance. Many opportunities have been missed, particularly because the European Treaties did not give the Community bodies all the tools they need to achieve the high aims - justifiably high aims - that the Treaties proposed to them.'

In this respect there is cause for hope, for it has already been decided that a new common treaty shall come into force to replace the present three.

I hope that, in the new treaty, use will be made of the experience gained, in turn, by the ECSC High Authority, the EEC Commission and the Commission of the European Communities. I hope that it will actually have some "social weight", not only in its statement of aims but also in the means made available. I hope that the new treaty will give the Commission the necessary support from the social standpoint. In any case, it will be subject to the agreement of the governments and the support of the trade unions.'

He called upon the trade unions to readjust their structures at the European level and to create a trade union Community, adding: 'If the Commission can, with the help of this new structure, find a standing partner to talk to and if a balance of power is achieved at the Community level, this will open up the way towards establishing and applying a European social policy.'

Speaking of the rôle of the younger generation, Mr. Bodson stated that recent events had proved the aversion of the young for the consumer society, for rates of economic growth and for the gross national product. The younger generation wanted society to be transformed and was relying on a dialogue which could enable it to participate in this society on its own terms. Hence the Commission had decided to call a colloquy of European youth: 'For we have much to learn from the younger generation. We would particularly like to know what Europe the younger generation wants. The young will live in the building that we are now constructing; it is therefore quite pertinent to ask its

opinion about the building plans. If we do not do this, there is the danger of having worked for nothing. In a few years' time, in that event, the younger generation would try to destroy the work which we should, by then, only just have completed.

The colloquy will not be concerned only with production and distribution but also with the problems of business administration and cultural issues. The universities and methods of instruction as a whole will play an important part in the discussions.

It is the business of the European Commission to see to it that the Community carried through the process of change at the same time as the member States which comprise it and not to lag behind, for the delay would be attributable to the European organizations themselves and they would be completely ruined in the eyes of the workers and the younger generation.'

(Tageblatt, 2 July 1968)

4. Mr. Mansholt discusses the responsibility of the United States and Europe for expanding trade with the Third World

Interviewed by a Belgian newspaper, Mr. Mansholt, Vice-President of the European Commission, said with reference to aid for the developing countries: 'We can only bitterly regret these two successive failures. The Kennedy Round yielded nothing for the developing countries and was simply a "deal" made by the "rich men's club"'. Hopes then centred on UNCTAD; this was not because it could solve the problems arising once and for all but it was hoped that progress would be made and provisions enacted to solve the major issue of trade.

It did not work mainly because of a lack of political initiative on the part of the prosperous countries; one may even say that it was because of their political ill-will which is, in my view, mainly due to a considerable lack of foresight about this problem. The "politicians" representing the UN countries showed too little understanding here. This problem is no longer considered from the political angle because it is too small, too limited, and it is looked at from the point of view of trade. It has once again been brought home to us that an international organization is needed because, on their own, men cannot progress quickly enough.'

Mr. Mansholt certainly felt that the solution had to come through an international organization but he thought that this should be so framed that such major countries as the United States and the European Community took a hand in directing the work. In the interests of efficiency, the European Community ought, perhaps, to assume the quality of a political community. So far the European Community had fared no better than other countries; neither had it exhibited a very wide view of this issue.

The United States and the European Community had to give an example and clearly state what initiatives they were ready to take; these would have to be far-reaching.

They could then try to reach an agreement with the less-developed regions which, for their part, had to recognize that a series of guarantees must be forthcoming to assure the prosperous countries that what they would like to achieve would, in fact, be realized.

'I do not see that there would be any point in calling a further conference of 80 countries. Certain countries should first of all prepare and then try to put down on paper the broad outlines of an agreement. This could then be submitted to others. Perhaps a comparison may be made here with the Treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. Two great powers, the United States and the USSR, have reached an agreement. The broad outlines of the agreement are laid down and other countries are now free to subscribe to it or not.'

As for the food shortage in the Third World, Mr. Mansholt thought that this could be approached in different ways: 'I think that we ought to be able to increase the food level of these countries appreciably in the short term by ensuring a surplus production equal to their needs and by making a gift to them of this. Yet any final increase in the food level of these countries must be based on their own production, which means improving the technical level of their agriculture. A whole programme has been finalized for this purpose but this, too, is moving forward too slowly, mainly for lack of funds because it is very expensive.'

(De Standaard, 15 July 1968)

5. Professor Levi Sandri's views on the Franco-German meeting held in Bonn on 27 and 28 September 1968

Interviewed by the magazine 'Avanti' on the meeting in Bonn on 27 and 28 September 1968 between General de Gaulle and Chancellor Kiesinger, Professor Levi Sandri, Vice-President of the Commission of the European Communities, made the following comments:

- Q. 'What importance do you think should be attached to the General's statements, which appear to imply a distinct threat that France may leave the Common Market?
- A. I do not know which is the correct version of the statements made in Bonn. If, as I have read in the press, it is true that it was said that "France lived for a long time without the Common Market and could still do so", then one could not contradict those who argue that France wishes to live in the age of Louis XIV and not in the year of grace 1968.

All the European countries, furthermore, lived up till the second world war shunning any form of co-operation or integration. We saw the results of this in two world wars and it was here in Europe that they began. The truth is that no European State, that wishes to be really independent and does not want to become a vassal of the United States or the Soviet Union, is in a position to "go it alone" by refusing to integrate its economy in a wider market and rejecting any co-operation with other European countries which have the same interests to defend and the same traditions to safeguard. Whether we like it or not, we are in the same boat and if we "go it alone" or act in an unco-ordinated manner, the boat will not go one metre forward. France is less in a position than others to opt out of co-operating and integrating if it wishes to find a solution to its own agricultural problems - with its surplus production - and its own industry, which is weak enough, to the point when the four weeks of strikes in May called for safeguard measures to be taken by the Community.

- Q. How do you explain Chancellor Kiesinger's satisfaction at the close of the talks with General de Gaulle, considering the fact that the latter dismissed in a couple of words the proposals which Mr. Brandt made to the Council of EEC Foreign Ministers on behalf of his own government, and which the "Five" had accepted?

A. I would repeat that I do not have any precise version of the statements made and the conclusions drawn in Bonn. It is true that one cannot but be depressed by the apparent uncertainty and passive attitude of our German friends; in particular, I am thinking of Mr. Brandt, who proposed what was undoubtedly a modest plan of approach in Brussels the day before; but this solution had the merit of leaving open the door to an enlargement of the Community including Britain. I am also thinking of the statements made a few days before by Mr. Schmidt for the Socialist Group and by Mr. Barzel for the Christian Democrats. I am thinking also of the statements made by Mr. Kiesinger in reply to two speakers. And I ask how we could have accepted - if it is true that they accepted them - the conclusions apparently reached at the Bonn talks. It is obvious that the French must have made use of - let us call them considerations - which were both weighty and grave.

Q. Is it possible at this stage to go on talking of "European co-operation"?

A. It is difficult to say but it is certain that we must find a new approach. The uniting of Europe cannot come to a halt and, above all, it cannot be changed into a Community of States submitted to France. What is most striking and the cause of most concern in the present situation is this sovereign contempt exhibited by France for the "Five" even though they have made every effort to satisfy the demands of the sixth partner. Yet this sixth partner has not even taken the slightest step forward. How is it possible to talk in a situation like this of "European co-operation"?

Q. Does it still seem possible to you to talk of getting Europe off to a new start? And if so, with what means and resources? And Italian socialism and the trade unions, which in our country are already virtually European, is it possible that they should have nothing to say?

A. To get Europe going again, if it is to be done successfully, we need not only to work through the agency of governments and summit meetings but also to rely for support on the specific wishes of our people, the parties and the trade unions, which should interpret the people's aspirations. It is possible that the parties and trade unions still do not understand that the future of our country is at stake in Europe and that it is at the European level that we must take up the decisive challenge? As regards those of us who are socialists, a clearer and more definite stand, consisting not only in statements of principle but in definite acts and government programmes, is now absolutely indispensable. We should discuss this in the Congress.'

(Avanti, 2 October 1968)

II. MOVEMENTS, ORGANIZATIONS AND PROMINENT FIGURES

1. The Executive Committee of the Free Unions of the Six in favour of reviving the Community by consolidating its democratic structure

The Executive Committee of the Confederations of Free Trade Unions in the member States met in Düsseldorf from 10 to 11 July 1968, under the chairmanship of Mr. Rosenberg and took a number of decisions.

After hearing a report of Mr. Bergeron, Secretary-General of the 'Force Ouvrière' union, on its attitude to the events of last May, the Executive Committee congratulated Force Ouvrière on the results achieved at the trade union level during this difficult period.

The Executive Committee stressed that the present difficulties facing the French economy had jointly to be solved by the Six and, acting by reference to the Treaty of Rome, the Community bodies had to keep a close watch on the nature, scale and duration of the safeguard measures taken by France.

As from autumn 1968, the Executive Committee would initiate a campaign to revive the European idea at the level of the general public and particularly among workers. This would stress the need to strengthen the democratic structure of the Community and enlarge it to embrace all the other democratic countries of Europe.

The Executive Committee also wanted to see less rigid formalities at the frontiers, a harmonization of taxation systems and a watch on prices on behalf of the consumers. At the same time, it demanded the immediate introduction of a common policy for employment and occupational training.

The Executive Committee said that the creation of the future European-type company, which would lead to economic concentration, should not be detrimental to the workers.

The Executive Committee welcomed the agreement between workers and management in agriculture to harmonize the length of the working week.

The Trade Union Confederations of the Six considered that the 45-hour week was a valid basis for harmonizing the working conditions of wage-earners in agriculture and the Executive Committee saw this agreement as a first step towards the conclusion of collective agreements at European level.

(Press release from the Secretariat of the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions, 11 July 1968)

2. COPA discusses European milk problems

At a meeting held on 12 September the Committee of the Common Market's farmers' unions (COPA) noted that in every country of the European Community the milk prices paid to producers were distinctly lower than the guide price of 39 Pfennig - i. e. Bfrs. 4.55 per litre - for milk with a 3.3 per cent fat content.

The Committee attributed this situation to the inadequacy of the measures for the organization of markets adopted by the EEC Council of Ministers on 29 May 1968. COPA urged the Commission to introduce, in agreement with the farmers' trade unions, emergency measures and short and long-term facilities so as to redress the situation which had long been a source of serious concern to the farming population.

COPA wanted to discuss with the European authorities the different points which President Mansholt intended to raise before the Council of Ministers on the subject of structure policy. It hoped that the entire agricultural policy would be reviewed from the angle not only of structures but also of pricing policy, social policy, commercial policy etc.

The farmers' unions stated that the guarantees offered to producers lay between the intervention price for butter and that for skimmed milk powder but were insufficient to assure them the guide price. This had led primary dairies to reduce by Bfrs. 0.25 per litre the price paid to the producer for milk with a 3.3 per cent fat content. The price of Bfrs. 4.55 per litre had been applied since 1 April 1965. Between then and April 1968 production costs on farms had risen by 10.4 per cent. It was impossible, therefore, to permit a reduction in the milk price which would automatically entail a fall in farm revenue of Bfrs. 100,000. The bulk of the revenue affected was that of most of the small and medium-sized farms. The problem was therefore a crucial one, particularly in areas handicapped by the climate and the quality of the soil.

The free movement of goods had severely hit Belgian cheese dairies. Between August 1967 and August 1968 cheese manufacture had decreased by 48 per cent. Milk normally intended for cheese-making was being marketed in its liquid form, thus leading to fierce competition and pressure on the price to the consumer.

At the annual general meeting of the Gildes Wallones of the Boerenbond (farmers' union) held at Louvain on 17 September 1966 Mr. Héger, Belgian Minister for Agriculture, expressed disappointment at the attitude of the farmers of the other member States. Rules would have to be laid down to put an end to a chaotic situation which threatened to become even more dangerous. Price undercutting must cease. All concerned must wake up to the solidarity binding them to their partners and comply with the regulations adopted and the prices fixed by common consent.

(Le Soir, 15 and 16 September 1968;
De Standaard, 18 September 1968)

3. Problems of European agricultural policy discussed at the International Grain Conference in Hamburg

At the International Grain Conference held in Hamburg on 19 September 1968, Mr. Toepfer, chairman of the Association of Grain Dealers of the Hamburg exchange, called for a drastic restriction on grain cultivation in the EEC.

On the subject of farm surpluses, on which the discussions centred, Mr. Toepfer, like Vice-President Mansholt of the Commission of the European Communities, held that the balance of the market could no longer be restored by means of the pricing policy. He proposed that 5 million hectares should be taken out of cultivation so as to cut grain production by some 15 million tons. This would entail a mortgage of about DM 600 million to be financed by the State. In addition, farmers could also be paid certain compensatory premiums.

Mr. Mansholt agreed with Mr. Toepfer in principle that surpluses could only be abolished and farmers assured of a suitable level of income if rationalization were continued, after overhauling the agricultural structure and restricting production, in bigger farming units. This would give rise to an immense social problem for whose solution the entire population of the European Community would have to raise a sum of several thousand million units of account a year. But this expenditure would then be used to bring about

a really effective solution, unlike that incurred in pursuing the present aimless agricultural policy. No ready-made solution was however available. At the end of October, however, the Commission would lay before the Council of Ministers a document containing proposals outlining how restrictions on production should be carried out.

(Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 20 September 1968)

4. The 18th Congress of the European Christian Democrat Union (ECDU) stresses the Christian Democrat support of a united Europe.

The European Christian Democrat Parties held their 18th Congress in Venice from 12 to 15 September 1968.

In his opening address the President of the ECDU, Mr. Rumor, deplored Europe's absence from the world's political stage. Recent events, he said, had demonstrated the lameness of France's ambition to be the guardian of European security, by running its own nuclear race in isolation.

It was the long-established, firm conviction of the more realistic and enlightened observers that the integrity and independence of Europe, its capacity for initiative and its international weight could only be based on the political integration of the continent and its transition to the status of a federal State which would have parity with the United States.

There was, he said, another reason for Europe's weakness and the hoped-for progress in détente was liable to aggravate it if Europe were not unified. While it was true that the Russian intervention in Czechoslovakia had completely stripped the East European countries of their independence, it was obvious that the whole network of cultural, economic and trade relations between the European countries in both political areas would be increasingly subject to the Moscow line. There was thus a danger that Moscow would be presented with an easy opportunity to bring pressure in the contentions between the various European countries and in the context of their divergent economic and trade interests, to increase and aggravate the disparities.

Mr. Colombo expressed similar views. There were two types of détente: the détente between the Russians and the Americans, which precluded an all-out nuclear war but which did not underwrite the autonomy, freedom and sovereignty of the smaller nations and which did not preclude local conflicts;

the other type of détente was that between the Warsaw Pact countries and those of Western Europe. This brought in some of the fresh air of freedom; it attenuated the effects of the policy of blocs; it could, in the long run, lead to a wider Europe in which first co-operation and then integration could give the whole continent its own independent character. It was clear, however, that this course could only be pursued if there were a minimum of homogeneity between the various countries, that is, a minimum of freedom and democracy.

Mr. Colombo went on to say that the Russian intervention in Czechoslovakia had put a brake on the policy for by-passing the blocs; it had blotted out the wider vision of Europe. The Soviet Union had shown it did not want a détente between Europeans because it eluded the logic of the blocs; on the other hand, it could accept the policy pursued by individual Western States vis-à-vis the East European countries, as was the case with France insofar as these represented an obstacle to supranational integration and to the political construction of Europe.

What Russians feared most was the process of political unification in Europe, not least because of the attraction that it would exercise on the East European countries. When, therefore, European integration was held in check politically, this inevitably favoured the policy of the blocs. This indeed was the meaning of the mistaken answer given in Gaullist policy to the problems of Europe: to believe that the Europe of nation States was up to meeting the American challenge and that it could have real influence in world affairs.

Mr. Colombo went on to point out that there were problems affecting the growth of Europe in areas not covered by the European treaties. Here, he said, one could perhaps be guided by the principle that to make Europe with France meant having the courage to do something even without France. Some initiative on the part of the Five, guided by their supranational convictions, was therefore needed, and they should call upon each European country, particularly France and Britain, to pronounce on various proposals. These could be: (a) a monetary community; (b) a technological community; (c) a European form of Atlantic Pact and an answer to common defence problems.

The Congress concluded by passing the following resolution:

I

(A) In view of the tragic events in Czechoslovakia - the most recent Soviet violation of the independence of nations - the Christian Democrat parties

express their solidarity with the Czechoslovakian people and condemn the Soviet aggression against a nation whose only sin was the wish to remain master of its own destiny.

Once again Communism has shown its totalitarian character, not hesitating to use armed force to suppress the desire to progress and the yearning for freedom which so deeply reflect the aspirations of the people.

(B) It is becoming increasingly clear that the unity of Europe is a prerequisite for its independence, its development and its security. The Christian Democrat parties have worked effectively for this ideal and have gone some of the way towards establishing new structures but they make it clear that a tremendous effort is needed to consolidate the work of uniting Europe so as to ensure that future generations may have a real chance to progress for it is they who will enliven Europe with their dynamism and their generosity.

(C) In a world too familiar with war, the Christian Democrat parties are ready to co-operate fully to create the conditions for real peace.

They consider that the creation of a united Europe is fundamental to easing tension.

They would point out that force has proved incapable of overcoming the present conflicts, which can only be ended by negotiation.

They suggest that new moves should be made to give the United Nations greater authority and greater effectiveness.

On this twentieth anniversary of the Declaration of Human Rights, they strongly deplore the continuous violation of the provisions of this universal charter.

They strongly condemn all the totalitarian régimes which trample on freedom while, at the same time, expressing their wholehearted solidarity with the oppressed peoples.

They reaffirm that a lasting peace must be based on justice and that the solution to the problems of the developing countries is an inseparable adjunct to peace.

They repeat that it is increasingly urgent to organize co-operation with the Latin American countries.

European unity would have a decisive effect on the introduction of a policy of international co-operation, which alone could solve the problems of under-development. This co-operation would be based on loyal co-operation with the United States of America.

II

(A) The progress of Europe calls, particularly at the Community level, for:

1. The Communities to operate under conditions which safeguard and consolidate the independence of the Commission;
2. Maintaining the principle of majority decisions within the Council of Ministers;
3. Elections by direct universal suffrage to the European Parliament and an increase in its powers;
4. The enlargement of the Community to include the democratic countries of Europe and specifically the United Kingdom.

(B) The progress of Europe also calls for greater co-ordination in the action of the European Christian Democrat parties, in regard to which it is particularly necessary to look into forms of association between the EEC and Latin America.

(C) To be able to play a really valid part in world affairs, the countries of Europe must first and foremost adjust their own political structures to bring them into line with the prospect of a modern and integrated Europe.

(D) The administrative structures also need overhauling, bearing in mind the cultural and economic evolution of local communities, which in turn calls for an increased participation by the citizens in the democratic life of their country. The first aim of this new approach should be to de-centralize and multiply the centres of power; the examination of this point should be pursued actively and even more thoroughly.

(E) All these reforms to renew the national societies can only be carried through with the support of an adequate cultural policy. With this in mind, there could be a whole series of new moves towards cultural co-operation and participation on a European scale. It is here that Europe's ability to take up the challenge of our time will be tested, particularly the challenge latent in the aspirations of the younger generation, which expresses its concern through disputes.

(F) True to their own aspirations, the Christian Democrat parties must make a substantial contribution in creating new economic structures, both operationally and in terms of scale, using planning to establish a real economic democracy and satisfy man's reasonable needs. It would also seem essential to associate workers with the decision-taking functions in enterprises.

III

These observations are liable, however, to pass unheeded in Europe's present state of stagnation.

The completion of the customs union simply makes it even more urgent to stimulate a strong and coherent political will, which the Europeans have for too long been lacking.

It is for this reason that the Christian Democrats are making this earnest appeal to all democratic forces in Western Europe and primarily to the young, so that they may take up the challenge of building an enlarged, politically integrated Europe and working out together the lines of their political strategy.'

(Il Popolo, 15 and 16 September 1968)

5. The political congress of the European Movement in the Netherlands

During the political congress of the European Movement, which was held in Rotterdam from 21 to 23 September, Mr. Mansholt, Vice-President of the European Commission, stated that the economic integration of Europe would not automatically lead to its political unification. Would it be taking a risk, he went on to argue, that a political Community was neither bound to nor necessarily limited to, the countries which had already integrated their economies?

It was fatal to give birth to illusions which could not become realities. The search for a way of getting Europe out of its present deadlock should never lead to the adoption of fallacious solutions or compromises which called into question the principles of a supranational Community. 'I do think, however, that we are not violating any of these principles if we try to bring together, in a political community, all the democratic countries which now wish to belong to it.'

Referring to the events in Czechoslovakia, Mr. Mansholt said that what was claimed to be a policy for easing tension - as pursued by our national capitals to date - had led to disasters of the kind experienced by Hungary and more recently by Czechoslovakia. The usual way of explaining these events was to say there were only two alternatives: either to pursue a policy for easing tension or to return to the cold war. This political view was wrong. 'If, not wanting a cold war, the only possibility open to us were to pursue a policy for easing tension this would be tantamount to capitulating to Moscow. We must avoid pursuing a purely bilateral policy. What we need is a Community platform for our foreign policy. It is only on this condition that we shall have a basis for negotiating with the Eastern European countries. As time goes by and as we show that we can make ourselves felt at the supranational level as a democratic Community whose organization involves no submission to a hegemony, the East European countries will be able to begin gradually to introduce democracy and a more liberal dispensation. The experience we have gained from our contacts with the COMECON countries has taught us how much these countries are interested in institutions which offer an alternative to dictatorship. The decision to normalize relations between the countries of Europe is not for others to take. It is we, ourselves, who must take it.'

Professor Brugmans, principal of the European College at Bruges said that the European Movement had to return to the idea it started from twenty years ago when it put the case for a Europe which would also include the smaller countries of the Eastern bloc and recognize the security needs of the Soviet Union on its Western frontiers. Twenty years ago, the Soviet Union chose a policy of making the East European countries into satellites. The many revolts that had taken place in Eastern Europe showed, however, that this policy had been a complete failure when seen from the standpoint of history. What on the other hand had not failed had been the concept of a socialism that was based on freedom. Hence Western Europe had fully to accept the socialist regime of the East European countries, i.e. a system based on the production of goods and on the collective ownership of the means of production. It was from this point that these countries had to try and achieve integration: they had to bring into being a socialist common market which would form a confederation with the common market of Western Europe. Mr. Brugmans felt that the Council of Europe in Strasbourg could be a valid vehicle in this context.

In its final communiqué, the political congress of the European Movement stated that a politically united Europe had to have the necessary military power to be able to secure its defences. This power had to be integrated and come under governmental institutions which were subject to democratic control. The communiqué furthermore explicitly stressed that the defence policy of a united Europe could not take as its aim the creation of a new military superpower. It had on the contrary to be subject to efforts designed to control and reduce conventional and nuclear armaments throughout the world. It was in order to contribute to this that Europe ought to agree not to become an independent nuclear power. Finally the communiqué stated that the security of Europe could not be lastingly based on anything except a world defence system.

(Nieuw Europa, September 1968;

Nieuwe Rotterdamse Courant, 21 and 23 September 1968)

6. The 21st Congress of the Liberal International launches an appeal in favour of a united Europe

The Liberal International, which held its 21st Congress in The Hague from 20 to 24 September, concluded the proceedings by unanimously passing a resolution on the international situation in which, inter alia, problems relating to European unification were also discussed.

In this connexion, the resolution stated: 'Consolidating the defence capability of the free nations... calls for a better balance within NATO concerning influence and the powers of decision; it also requires major progress towards the unification of the democratic part of Europe and, lastly, a radical improvement in the Charter and effectiveness of the United Nations.

To achieve these ends, the unification of Europe is of fundamental importance. The Liberal International notes with satisfaction that the Christian Democrat International and the Social Democrat International share this view and are ready to co-operate with regard to this vital issue. The Liberal International considers that a meeting of the three Internationals could serve a very useful purpose in this context.

At present the unification and the actual defence of Europe are confronted with serious obstacles in the form of General de Gaulle's policy and in the lack of political courage, imagination and initiative on the part of the

other governments. Pursuant to the decision taken at the meeting of Liberal leaders in London in March 1968, the Liberal International is proposing to the member States, the United Kingdom, Denmark, Ireland and Norway that a start be made at once to creating common policies and common institutions; this would include direct elections to a European Parliament. The common policies should include external relations, disarmament, developing scientific research and technology, education and cultural relations and those aspects of aid, investments and trade with the developing countries and economic and monetary affairs not covered by the Treaties of Rome. In the long run, the participation of France is essential but a start could and must be made even if France were temporarily and deplorably absent: it would in no way be directed against that State but would in reality be serving its interests.

A democratically united Europe would be comparable to the USA and the USSR and would increase its moral, political and material resources. It would make a decisive contribution to world prosperity, to its balance and to its security. Gradually but inevitably, it would exercise a liberal influence on conditions in countries living under the authoritarian or totalitarian oppression in Central and Eastern Europe, in the Baltic States, in Greece, Spain and Portugal. It would facilitate solutions to certain specific problems which today threaten peace and freedom.'

(La Nuova Tribuna, October 1968)

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