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european documentation

a survey

EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

General directorate of parliamentary
documentation and information

In addition to the official acts published in the Official Gazette of the European Communities, the activities of the European Communities are reported on in publications appearing at regular intervals.

Thus, the Commission of the European Communities publishes a Monthly Bulletin on the activities of the Communities while the European Parliament issues a periodical Information Bulletin on its own activities.

The Council of Ministers issues a press release after all its sessions. Its activities are also reported on in a special section of the Bulletin of the European Communities.

The Survey of European Documentation is intended to serve as a supplement to the above publications. It deals with salient features of the process of European integration taking place outside Community bodies.

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P a r t I

DEVELOPMENT OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION

at the National Level

I. GOVERNMENTS AND PARLIAMENTS

Austria

Mr. Waldheim, Austrian Foreign Minister, discusses Austria's
association with the European Community

Mr. Waldheim, Austrian Foreign Minister, paid an official visit to the Netherlands from 17 to 20 June. He said that his Government did not want the EEC to hold talks first with the four applicant States and defer to a later date its discussions with countries such as Austria which were not interested in full membership.

Austria expected the same treatment as other applicants, he said, but wished to make it quite clear that it definitely intended to remain neutral.

In reply to a question as to whether he thought that a European defence conference would take place in the near future, Mr. Waldheim said that the possibility of holding such a conference was now being explored and that only later on would it be known whether it could actually be held.

In a communiqué the Netherlands stated that it fully understood Austria's position regarding European integration and that it would continue to support Austria.

Mr. Waldheim said that Austria took a realistic view of the facts as regards its own bid for integration and it would take every step to make the necessary priority adjustments in the Austrian economy.

(Nieuwe Rotterdamse Courant, 19 and 21 June 1968)

Czechoslovakia

Czechoslovakia and the Common Market

In an interview with the Prague paper Mr. Oldrich Cernik, Prime Minister of Czechoslovakia, defined his country's relations with the member States of the European Community : 'Czechoslovakia respects the existence of the European Economic Community and wishes to establish favourable economic and commercial relations with all its member countries. It also proposes to intensify its relations with the member countries of COMECON, its nearest neighbours. COMECON is in fact a large and interesting market with good prospects. We wish to maintain relations based on equality with all the member countries of the Common Market and we are rather concerned at the possibility that the process of integration among these countries might create artificial barriers to contacts with us.'

In Mr. Cernik's opinion, Czechoslovakia's relations with the Common Market could pave the way for a fruitful mutual exploitation of the advantages offered by an international sharing of labour. Such a situation would be beneficial both to Czechoslovakia and to the consolidation of peace in Europe.

The Prime Minister was in favour of improving his country's relations with the Federal Republic of Germany. He pointed out, however, that such relations could only be achieved if Western Germany acknowledged the present set-up, which resulted from the second world war and if it recognized, in particular, present frontiers.

(L'Echo de la Bourse, 13 June 1968)

France

1. France and the question of Spain's entry into the Common Market

When Mr. Nungesser, Secretary of State for Economic and Financial Affairs, visited Madrid on 23 April, the French Embassy published a communiqué stating that France was 'particularly favourable' to Spain's request for association with the EEC. This was in the interest of both countries and would have a favourable effect on the economic development of Western Europe.

Mr. Nungesser said before leaving that if France had recently opposed the request for membership made by a third country, this had been because of specific problems and not as a matter of principle.

(Le Monde, 25 April 1968)

2. European Affairs discussed in a debate at the National Assembly on scientific research

On 7 May, the National Assembly opened a debate on scientific research. Mr. Maurice Schumann, the then Minister for Scientific Research and Atomic and Space Questions, made an introductory statement in which he dealt in particular with the brain drain : 'At Government level, the best way of averting the brain drain is certainly to pursue the efforts made in connexion with scientific research and means of improving the working conditions of research workers.

As observed by Mr. Cousté, our national effort can only assume its full significance within the framework of a European technological policy.

On 31 October 1968, the Ministers responsible for research in the European Economic Community adopted an important resolution. They decided that the possibilities of practical co-operation should be immediately developed in a number of fields or, to be precise, in seven essential sectors.

Preparatory work was carried out in an excellent atmosphere. There are encouraging prospects and there is certainly room for assuming,

in the light of the work already carried out, that the Europe of the Six could, in the near future, develop a large data processing equipment.

I shall only mention, as proof of this, the reports drawn up by the Brussels Commission, that is, the Community institution par excellence, on Britain's application.

This report aptly points out that, in certain technical fields, the Six would find it rather difficult to reach a world-wide scale without Britain's contribution. The report lays down the principle which should really settle the point : 'If the Communities are to derive any profit from Britain's contribution, this will only be in so far as they themselves are capable of setting up a common policy in the field of science and technology.'

We would find ourselves faced with a dangerous contradiction if we put forward the problems of Britain's relations with the Community as a reason for deferring the execution of the decisions taken in Luxembourg. It is only in so far as, faithful to our undertakings, we shall go on promoting the Community's economic growth through technological co-operation that, as we now find, we shall be able to discuss our common future usefully and in practical terms with Great Britain. For its part, France has said and proved that it was ready to do so.

To what extent does this effect Euratom ? May I remind you in this respect that I suggested to our Euratom partners to consider, with the sole object of reimbursing to the member States the amount of their subscriptions, a programme genuinely designed to achieve Europe's independence in the field of energy.'

Mr. Jacques Duhamel (PDM) drew two conclusions from Britain's refusal to take part in the construction of European satellites. The first was that, from a technological viewpoint, Britain's presence in the European Community would, no doubt, be decisive if Europe wished to bridge the ever-growing gap that separates it from the United States. In fact the gap was wider in 1968 than in 1945 when Europe had been practically destroyed by the war.

It was not really possible to admit Britain into a technological Europe and to reject it from an economic Europe.

The idea of a technological Europe was suggested by Mr. Wilson even before his country's actual admission to the Common Market. But the fact still remained that, once the requirements for Britain's entry into the Common Market had been met, there should be no doubt as to its final admission.

Mr. Duhamel went on to say :

'For Europe to be able to develop a common research policy, it must first achieve political union.

There will come a time - and that time is approaching - when the Common Market will no longer be able to produce its full technical, economic and social effect unless it is the expression of a political union. Otherwise the programmes will be chaotic and failures probably inevitable.'

Mr. Jacques Baumel (Gaullist) put forward a different view : 'France's effort should be better understood and better supported for, in fact, neither America nor Russia would find it in their interests to be faced with a European space power.

Giving up space research and development would not only mean a blow to Europe's prestige or the end of a certain grandeur, but it would in fact mean that Europe would be open to broadcasts relayed by satellites and the invasion of our homes by pictures and ideas from the two super-powers.

This makes it all the more to be regretted that Britain should have decided to give up the ELDO project and that Italy should now be reluctant to pursue the ESRO project.

What a contradiction for Britain to give up one of the major European projects of our age at the very moment when it wishes to create a European technological community!

What a contradiction for Britain's friends to allege that country's problems in support of a proposed adjournment which might slow down or even completely arrest the process of building a scientific Europe!

I believe that, in so far as we promote European technological co-ordination, this will enable us to discuss later on our relations in that field with Britain.

What a contradiction it is to pretend to aim at a political Europe and a political merger when, in fact, we must begin by making Europe where it can easily be achieved!

Europe must neither accept the American monopoly nor the Russian-American duopoly with regard to communication satellites. Europe and France must therefore endeavour to save in common their communication satellite project (Symphonie).'

The debate was resumed on 8 May. Mr. de Lipkowski (Gaullist) asked: 'What has Europe done up till now?' Have its efforts been really satisfactory? If not, what should it do? What has it done with regard to technological co-operation with third countries, in particular Britain? How could it reinforce this co-operation?

'First, a depressing fact: the Europe of the Six has only woken up belatedly to the reality of these essential problems.

It may be argued that research is a matter that falls mainly under the jurisdiction of Euratom or even the ECSC, particularly with regard to some of its aspects. But experience has shown how deplorable it had been that those who should have had an overall view of European problems - the EEC Commission in the first place - did not have that overall view with regard to scientific affairs.

That technological co-operation with Britain is desirable, I would gladly acknowledge and I shall discuss this again later on. The fact remains that the question of Britain's membership should in no way be used as a pretext for delaying the Community effort which the Six must urgently make. The leeway is already far too wide for them to be able to afford further delays in introducing a Community research policy.

To these political obstacles, particularly the lack of political will, must be added a further legal obstacle.

The ECSC's failure is a secret for no-one: after ten years of efforts it has not succeeded in establishing a common energy policy.

What is the position with regard to Euratom? I will say straight-away that I am not against integration; I do not think that we should reject any form of integration.

After ten years, the Treaty, with regard to pure research, has not been respected.

Thus in the vital field of booster generators we are witnessing common German, Belgian and Dutch designs or, on the other hand, independent French designs, but nothing within the framework of Euratom.

Has Euratom at least promoted a genuine European policy ?

The result of its scattered policy efforts has led the Commission to practise the unfortunate "fair return policy".'

The President of the Federation of the Left, Mr. Mitterrand, then took the floor. He said : 'I am one of those who believes in the force and in the dynamic nature of the European construction. I feel it is a necessary venture if Europe is to resist the American and Russian super-powers. It is essential for France to become part of a much larger political, economic and technical framework, namely that grouping of which the Europe of the Six is the nucleus.'

Mr. Mitterrand went on to say : 'We wish to enlarge that Europe, geographically. We wish to increase its powers. We believe it is only the beginning of a great design. But this design should not be completely ruined at the very outset.

What is happening in fact? On the one hand, Britain is withdrawing its co-operation on space research with France and Germany. On the other France is competing with the German-Belgian-Dutch "trio". Italy invokes the "fair return" theory while the Netherlands is not far from entertaining similar ideas. In short, each of these countries, encouraged by France's bad example, wishes to derive the full benefit of its individual contribution. This is bound to destroy the Community spirit.

We are living in the wreckage of Europe. A national spirit, bordering on nationalism, seems to have prevailed.

I fail to see what would now come out of the debates, however interesting these may be - of the European Parliament, the Council of Europe, the European Commission or the Council of Ministers. Everything is coming apart.'

Addressing directly Mr. Schumann, Mr. Mitterrand added : 'You have no right to say that Britain is refusing to build Europe with you because it is not prepared to accept the particular procedure you wish to impose on it to the detriment of a general policy. Your argument flows from a clever dialectical approach, but it is self-destructive.

It is the choice of a political Community controlling its technical, commercial and economic components that would enable Europe to develop.'

To this Mr. Schumann replied : 'I am a European, too, Mr. Mitterrand and I am for the Europe that is being built. If I may use the particular expression which you have introduced, I would say that I, too, believe in the dynamic force of the European construction.

Thus, considering that a resolution as important as that of 31 October 1967 was voted unconditionally, I cannot understand why there should now be any suspicion of the motives of the country that proposed it and carried it into effect and not of the countries which, under various pretexts, are preventing its implementation.

The Brussels Commission, as I said, was not only entitled but, in fact, obliged to make proposals of a political character for 1969 and the ensuing years. We are still waiting for these proposals, for since the merger of the Commissions, nothing has been put forward.'

(National Assembly, Parliamentary Debates of 7 and 8 May 1968)

3. Mr. Edgar Faure advocates giving the agricultural policy a new emphasis

Addressing the 50th Congress of the Agricultural Co-operation and Credit Organization in Grenoble on 7 May, Mr. Edgar Faure outlined France's forthcoming agricultural policy.

He spoke first of the milk problem which was one of immediate interest. He recalled that in an association everyone had to make concessions; his position in Brussels, as President of the Council, implied a European outlook. With disconcerting frankness, Mr. Faure pointed out that what mattered was

to reach an agreement on the milk market. He further stated that if someone had to wreck the building of Europe, he would not be the one responsible.

Another delicate issue was that of financing the agricultural Europe. To make those countries which were not responsible for surpluses pay for them was out of the question; the Six thus had to reconsider the problem of the apportionment key governing contributions. To conclude, he recalled that Europe represented an opportunity not only for agriculture but for the economy as a whole.

(Le Figaro, 8 May 1968)

4. General de Gaulle's visit to Rumania

On his arrival in Rumania on May 14, General de Gaulle declared :
'..... Today Europe is beginning to re-establish itself through the independence of each one of its nations and through co-operation between all of them for peace and progress.

What Rumania and France have to do together, to contribute towards this great European work, and consequently this great world work, these are the subject of the talks we are going to have.'

For his part, Mr. Ceausescu stated : '..... the position of France in regard to a whole series of essential international problems is highly appreciated in Rumania as is your remarkable activity, Mr. President, in working to ensure a wide measure of co-operation between countries, to promote the principle of national sovereignty and independence in relations between States and to avert another world war'.

At a luncheon offered by Mr. Ceausescu, General de Gaulle stated :
'..... but the joint action of Rumania and France cannot be limited to an exchange of goods, of knowledge and of experts, nor can it be limited to the reciprocation of cordial greetings between the two partners.

If these two countries are independent and therefore responsible both towards themselves and others, then the age we live in requires that they make a joint political effort, the aim of which must, because of their very nature, be the union of Europe.

The Third Reich's desire to dominate tore Europe apart, leaving it terribly divided; and today every state in Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals realizes this division is becoming daily more onerous, daily more difficult to justify. This is no doubt felt nowhere more strongly than in Paris, but is this not also the case in Bucharest? How can we allow a situation to persist in Europe - whose countries are so well endowed with reason and experience - where many of these countries find themselves divided into two opposing blocs, where they have to conform to the political, economic and military dictates of an outside source and have to accept the permanent presence of foreign forces on their territory? No, here, as in France, the view is that this cold war, this sequel to the Yalta agreement, is unlikely to produce anything but a sterile and artificial separation (unless it becomes a fatal one) and that it is alien to the nature of Europe, which throughout the centuries has ceaselessly tended towards unity and which today, more clearly than ever, sees the opportunity and the obligation to achieve this unity and that there are thus no longer any ideologies or hegemonies which have any value in comparison with the benefits of an easing of tension, of agreement and of co-operation between all of Europe's constituent states.

..... What our continent expects from Bucharest, Moscow and Paris, as from Bonn, Rome and all its other capitals, is a great movement to unite Europe for peace and for progress.

France, Mr. President, is determined to forge ahead towards this goal and is more than willing to do this side by side with Rumania. It hopes that our meeting will lead our two countries to tighten their political links.

Indeed, they have, in their hard history, often done so, but this has only been to defend themselves. This time both have together to help the whole of Europe to build and to renew itself.'

In Craiova, General de Gaulle declared : '.... We have together to build Europe - a Europe without an Iron Curtain in which every nation is master of its own destiny and all co-operate for progress and peace. This is what Europe has been trying to do for a thousand years and this is what we have together to accomplish, if indeed, this is what you want.'

(Le Figaro, 17 May 1968;
Le Monde, 15 and 16 May 1968)

Germany

1. Chancellor's and Minister's views on European policy

Views of the Federal Chancellor :

On 2 April, in the course of the second reading of the Federal budget for 1968, Dr. Kiesinger made some references to European policy. Many Americans - he said - saw in Bonn's European policy the possibility of an unfriendly attitude to Washington. Moreover, there existed in America some confusion about the political attitude of Europeans. He did not take these reports lightly. The U.S. Government, however, had firmly assured him that these were not its own views.

It had to be admitted that the European scene was a confused one. France was going it alone. The Federal Government had continued to cultivate Franco-German relations and to pursue a consistent policy under these difficult circumstances so as to avoid a crisis in the EEC. He knew no other way of overcoming the present stalemate. 'All we have done is to try to reconcile conflicting opinions, to soothe ruffled tempers and to clear up misunderstandings.' The Paris agreements on the 'arrangement' with Great Britain were admittedly on the vague side, but the Federal Government - in contrast to the French - had stressed its readiness to enter into negotiations with Great Britain without delay.

Statement by Mr. Strauss, the Federal Finance Minister :

Mr. Strauss, the Federal Finance Minister, speaking in Bonn on 6 May 1968 before the Federal Chamber of Tax Agents, said that the division of Europe could be healed without changing the political systems, and that this was essential if Germany was to be reunited. The countries of the West could possibly help their eastern neighbours to catch up in the industrial, technical and transport sectors. This called, however, for a measure of financial flexibility - something the Federal Republic would not have if high expenditure on consumer goods continued to be criticized as in the past. A wider margin of expenditure for political ends would, however, extend the scope of European policy. The Federal Government - Mr. Strauss pointed out - was doing its utmost to improve relations with Eastern neighbours. Recent events in Czechoslovakia were an attempt to improve the economic situation of that country, with its people's co-operation, on more liberal lines.

Mr. Strauss made a strong plea for an enlargement of the European Communities and for British entry into the EEC. Europe could not become united until it numbered Great Britain among its active members. The Common Market must be open to all who were willing and able to join it and supported the aim of political union. The geographical boundaries of the Common Market and of the political union would not at first have to coincide.

Mr. Strauss said that it would be intolerable for the countries of Europe to have to be protected militarily by North America indefinitely. For that matter, this was also asking too much of the Americans themselves.

On 9 June, Mr. Strauss, CSU Chairman and Finance Minister, called, in a speech delivered to the Bavarian Youth Union, for new European initiatives. Hagglng over every penny in the price of milk could no longer be regarded as an adequate contribution to European progress. The moment for political action had now arrived. Mr. Strauss urgently appealed to the Germans to assist their hard pressed friends to their utmost. Europeans could no longer live tranquilly on the sheltered side of world politics. Europe's recovery meant a great deal to Germany which had no wish to see its own house cave in. The catchword 'détente' had led to a disastrous obscuring of objectives.

The people could no longer stomach exaggerated ideas of national sovereignty. Europe had to come. Mr. Strauss spoke out in favour of maintaining the Atlantic Alliance - what was needed, however, was a redistribution of forces. The European countries would be unable to meet the challenge until a broader-based Europe was created. 'The door must be left open to everyone but we cannot wait for the very last straggler.' Whatever combination was finally adopted, France could not be done without. Concordance of German and French policies provided the foundation for Europe. 'I want to become a European so that I can remain a German.'

Mr. Strauss felt that the Germans ought to display a little more national dignity and continuity with the main stream of German history, even in a larger Europe. He called for far-reaching internal reforms. Ideas ought not to be blindly accepted merely because they had been regarded as faultless for a hundred years.

On 20 June Mr. Strauss delivered a speech at a meeting of the 'Welt-Raiffeisntag' (international agricultural credit co-operative) in which, without mentioning Great Britain directly, he bluntly criticized the French attitude to European policy. The European States must realize that world political events compelled them to give their passive rôle and to adopt an

active one. If the Europeans failed to establish a common approach and to take joint political action, others who were not of European origin would call the tune in Europe. The EEC offered a splendid basis for a subsequent political union. It must, however, leave the door open to others, and its member States must be prepared to pass through and beyond economic union to a political community.

Interview with the Federal Economics Minister Schiller

Following the recent political events in France, Professor Schiller expects a 'major review of European policy and consideration of common European interests'.

Interviewed on 31 May by the German Press Agency, Professor Schiller said that the future would certainly see a certain shift in emphasis among the Six. A review of European policy would be necessitated by the situation within the EEC, which was unsatisfactory not only because of France's differing attitude to British entry but also because the other four partners of France and of the Federal Republic by no means fully agreed over major issues, and were indeed moving away from each other more and more.

Statement by the Federal Foreign Minister, Mr. Brandt

On 5 June Mr. Brandt, the Federal Foreign Minister, announced that the SPD would urge its coalition partner to carry out the Government programme.

European policy would have to be pursued more vigorously. The customs union would be completed, as planned, on 1 July. Delays in other spheres of EEC policy were to be reckoned with since, as Mr. Brandt put it, new faces from London, Paris, and perhaps Rome, were making their appearance among the Foreign Ministers.

On the last point Mr. Brandt added that EEC policy would have to be revitalized to ensure that modernization of farming was not held up and that unnecessary burdens were not placed on the German consumer. Mr. Brandt considered that an end should be put to the existing methods of financing agriculture.

In an article published on 1 June 1968 in the Yugoslavian journal 'International Politics' Mr. Brandt dealt with 'the realities of political activity'. On the question of integration policy he stated :

'Europe is faced with considerable tasks. Failure to achieve ampler and broader-based co-operation will threaten its economic growth, the improvement of its scientific and technological capacity, the utilization of its human and material resources, the living standard of its peoples and its whole political future. It is not only in terms of time that we are today closer to the year 2000 than to 1900. The self-sufficient European nation-state belongs to the past. If we are really in earnest about Europe, we must show ourselves able to rise above a regional standpoint.

What we have started out on in the West with the European Communities could serve as a model for a broader-based form of co-operation. The benefits derived from the coming together of the Six have far outweighed the difficulties of adaptation. Indeed, the results have greatly exceeded expectations. Those countries which at first were highly nervous about exposure to competition have been particularly successful. There is every reason to believe that, as co-operation is put on a broader basis, this process will repeat itself with the same satisfactory results.

The present size of the EEC is clearly not adequate to ensure the sort of co-operation the future will demand. In the absence of Great Britain, for example, the tasks that lie ahead of us in Europe can scarcely be accomplished. Nor do we wish to forgo the co-operation of the Scandinavian and other interested countries. We are working for a Europe that is larger than the EEC. Further, we want a Europe larger than Western Europe. Only an all-embracing Europe in a setting of peace, security and co-operation could act as a powerful force for stability. It could play a decisive rôle, beyond its own territory, in ensuring peace and material welfare at world level.

I believe that the developed nations of Western and Eastern Europe have a common task to perform. It is the duty of all of us to ensure that the future of mankind is not imperilled by the contrast between the 'haves' and the 'have-nots'. We should all get together to give the 'have-nots' a chance to improve their lot. It would be senseless to go on frittering away our energies in fruitless squabbles. Rather should we utilize our pooled resources in the most rational way possible.

It is here, and in grappling with the scientific and technological revolution, that the creative tasks of our age are to be found. It is this that will show whether the European people can tear away their eyes from the past,

take up the challenge of the future and cope with the tasks ahead. I hope that we shall after all grasp the meaning of the signs of the times.'

On 10 June, during an official visit to Austria, Mr. Brandt gave an address before the Austrian Institute for Foreign Affairs in Vienna on the theme 'An understanding with Eastern Europe'. In the course of this he also touched on the subject of European co-operation :

'The European Community of peoples cannot rest content with merely neighbourly relations. The continent's future depends on finding timely formulas for active co-operation - and why should a German foreign minister not broach the question of active co-existence? As far as the Federal Republic is concerned, I can only again dwell on the lively interest felt in building up economic, cultural and other relations with all East European States. From the point of view of subsequent development, we attach particular importance to the exchange of technological know-how and to co-operation in this sphere. We shall always be ready to take part in discussions where exchanges of knowledge and co-operation - and even more so, freedom of movement and information - can be facilitated through agreements between States.

Our trade relations with Eastern Europe are developing on highly satisfactory lines. West European economic union has created for us a number of difficulties in this respect. We hope that a European Economic Community, augmented by further accessions and associations, will be in a better position to pursue trade policy towards the East and therefore to devote closer attention to the task of smoothing out differences in the balances of trade. Where such a state of equilibrium is ruled out for structural reasons, long-term credits will have to be considered.

Without pinning exaggerated hopes on co-operation from and with individual undertakings, we welcome projects of this kind. They will be of particular interest to non-member countries. Development policy should be regarded as an all-European responsibility to a far greater extent than in the past. I should like to appeal to the governments of the East European countries, and above all to that of the Soviet Union, to join us in this task in a spirit of friendly rivalry.

.....

"The will to ensure peace and understanding among the peoples," runs the programme of the government whose Foreign Minister and Vice Chancellor I am, "is the first principle of German foreign policy". Our aim

to develop co-operation with our immediate and more distant neighbours in the east of Europe, in the same way as we have in the west and in the rest of the world, is in no way unrealistic.

We hope that the policy of détente and co-operation will derive fresh impetus from the trends which have set in so noticeably in Europe and know no frontiers. This policy should make it possible to banish the state of anxiety and mistrust in Europe.

A sensible policy must spring from realities. But it would be a bad thing for the world and for the future of us all if we were not also to try to replace bad realities by better ones. Only a few political realities are so good that they deserve unquestioning and permanent acceptance.'

(Die Welt, 7 May, 6, 10 and 11 June 1968;
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 4 and 7 May, 6, 10 and 21 June 1968;
Stuttgarter Zeitung, 1, 10 and 21 June 1968;
Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 11 June 1968;
Bulletin des Presse und Informationsamtes der Bundesregierung, N° 70,
5 June 1968 and N° 73, 12 June 1968)

2. Mr. Schiller's reactions to the outcome of the Monetary Conference in Stockholm

Speaking in Bonn after his return from Stockholm on 1 April 1968, Mr. Schiller, Federal Minister for Economic Affairs, discussed what had transpired at the Group of Ten Conference. Its most important result had been that all those involved, including France, had realized they must be prepared to negotiate in order to try and stabilize international monetary relations. There had been no disagreement on this point. This also meant that a decision, such as that taken on 17 March concerning the position of gold and the dollar, could no longer be taken by the issuing banks acting on their own. In future, the Governments as well as the Presidents of the issuing banks would be involved in such agreements. Addressing journalists, he emphasized that although France had decided not to follow the common line of her five EEC partners with respect to their request to America concerning the utilization of special drawing rights, these had lost none of their force. On the contrary these requests were more to the point than ever. The remaining EEC States had hereby established the point that because France was 'going it alone' they were no longer in a position to oppose special drawing rights being made available; hence additional safety measures were necessary.

Dr. Emminger, a member of the Governing Board of the Federal German Bank said he was pleased at the outcome of the Stockholm Conference. Speaking in Frankfurt, he said that France's opposition had meant that the best possible results had not been achieved; the fact remained that during the next nine to twelve months all the other IMF member States could be relied on to ratify the special drawing rights agreement so that it could come into operation in the Spring of 1969.

Mr. Münchmeyer, President of the German Federation of Private Banks, said that the defence of the current monetary system was a prerequisite for the operation of international trade and that it was of vital concern to the German economy. In a statement on behalf of the Federation concerning the Stockholm Conference, Mr. Münchmeyer declared that he trusted that the assurances he had given would help to restore calm to the markets. Despite the fact that the outcome had not been fully satisfactory, it had provided an opportunity to keep the gold-exchange standard operating efficiently. Whether this opportunity would be taken advantage of depended on the United States and to a lesser extent on France. He was still not convinced that the Washington decisions of 17 March would throw the special drawing rights and our whole monetary system onto the dunghill, as the French Economics Minister had said. He believed that this dunghill would act as a fertilizer which would help the monetary system to bloom again. He left no doubt in his statement that the collapse of the Bretton Woods system would have unforeseeable consequences for German trade.

(Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 2 April 1968)

3. Federal Government statement on foreign and European policy

During Whitsun 1968 the Federal Government met at Schloss Heimerzheim near Bonn to discuss foreign policy in closed session. The Federal Chancellor had called the meeting, to which German ambassadors from all the main capitals were also invited, to combat the impression that German foreign policy had become rigid. He and the Foreign Minister were equally worried about the future of the European Community, in which discussions on relations with the United Kingdom and the other applicant States were marking time. They were even more worried about the new Eastern bloc policy.

During the Heimerzheim talks no attempt was made to conceal the fact that Dr. Kiesinger's call to Paris for a generous interpretation of the

joint agreements on an arrangement with Great Britain had so far awakened no response. Dr. Kiesinger's use of the word 'generous' was seen as a polite hint that the arrangements he had agreed upon with President de Gaulle should be respected. The more convinced the other Community member States became that Paris saw in economic arrangements with Great Britain the final means of avoiding that country's entry into the EEC, the more difficult became the Federal Government's situation in the EEC and the more certainly the internal development of the Community would come to a halt. It is believed that this subject was discussed more openly in Heimerzheim than has been the case in public utterances.

On 20 June, at the 180th sitting of the Bundestag, Foreign Minister Brandt replied on behalf of the Federal Government, in a written statement, to a question on foreign policy put by the CDU/CSU group.

On European unification the statement reads :

The Federal Government has never left room to doubt that the economic and political unification of the countries of Western Europe is one of its principal aims on the road to a peaceful order throughout Europe. This is a question of crucial importance.

The sheer weight of the super powers makes it essential that the European peoples and States pool their efforts. Only thus can Europe impart any influence to her voice and defend her own interests. Only thus can Europe make to the world of tomorrow the contribution expected from her by virtue of the abilities and achievements of her peoples and commensurate with her historical importance.

Modern developments in key sectors of science and technology demand a broad and substantial basis of research establishments and industrial capacity and capital. The constricted national framework of European nation-States is inadequate for this purpose. Even that of the European Communities of the Six is too narrow.

We realize that the relationship between the industrialized and the developing countries makes heavier and heavier demands on us. There can be no doubt that a united Europe could do far more to narrow the gap between developed and developing countries. But this task too is beyond the capacity of individual European States. It must be performed in common if the gap between the haves and the have-nots is not to widen so much as to constitute a threat for Europe as well.

A yawning gap still exists between what is aimed at and what has actually been achieved. Admittedly the last ten years have seen great and encouraging progress in the economic sphere. The drive displayed by the Communities - and particularly by the EEC - and the 'pull' exercised by them, are also reflected in the applications for entry of Great Britain and other countries as well as in the requests of other States to enter into a closer relationship with the EEC.

No one, however, can deny that the project for enlarging the Communities is at present making no headway. The Federal Government deplores the fact. It has put forward a number of proposals for dealing with this situation. It would recall the carefully-thought-out proposals it made for an interim arrangement between the EEC and Great Britain and other applicants for admission.

Among some of the Six new governments are about to be formed. Directly they are complete, negotiations can be resumed. The Federal Government will firmly back any move calculated to carry matters a stage further and make its own contribution. It will do all in its power to urge ahead both the enlargement and the external relations and internal development of the Communities.

Whether or not concessions in the Common Market are matched by counter-concessions is not only a question of economic statistics. This also holds for the associated countries. All the same, the Federal Republic has made substantial contributions to European unification, among them economic ones. Since the EEC was established our exports to the other member States have risen by 240 per cent. Our exports to non-member States, on the other hand, rose by only a little more than 100 per cent. Exports to Community countries from Italy rose by 450 per cent, from France by over 300 per cent, from the Netherlands by 200 per cent, and from Belgium-Luxembourg by 220 per cent. The fact that the Federal Republic's absolute increase in exports to Community States was lower than those of France and Italy is accounted for by the circumstance that its exports to its partners at the beginning of the period when intra-Community exports were steadily rising already stood relatively high, and by the fact that, during the same period, its exports to non-member States increased more rapidly than those of the other EEC member States.

This pattern of development led to a close interweaving of interests among private enterprises, greater exchanges of technical know-how, a wider variety of products and a higher standard of living. As far as the continued development of the Common Market is concerned, the Federal Government must nevertheless pay the closest attention to the following points :

- (a) As the Community's agricultural policy threatens to entail intolerable financial burdens which could threaten the existence of the Common Market, we shall fairly soon have to tackle the task of reviewing the whole policy;
- (b) Financial burdens - mainly in the agricultural sphere but also as regards the Investment Fund for the associated countries - have so far been disproportionately shared to our disadvantage. In the light of the basic Community principles, this situation cannot go on permanently;
- (c) We shall continue to advocate within the Community an outward-looking trade policy towards the developing countries and the East European States, and we hope that greater notice will be paid to our demand for such a policy.

The weighing-up of advantages and disadvantages cannot be confined to a specific point of time. The European Community is a long-term institution which is only now entering on the second stage of its development - customs union - and which is to culminate in political union. In the interval any discrepancies which have arisen during previous development can be smoothed out. This is a dynamic process which warrants certain sacrifices in individual transitional stages, always provided that progress towards ultimate European unification continues to be made.

(Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 4 May 1968;
Bulletin des Presse- und Informationsamtes der Bundesregierung, N° 77,
21 June 1968;
Deutscher Bundestag, 180th sitting, 20 June 1968, pp. 9702 C and 9764 C)

4. German Bundestag adopts the four resolutions of the Action Committee for the United States of Europe

On 13 March 1968 the Bundestag Committee on Industry and Middle-Class Affairs discussed the inter-group motion tabled on 10 October 1967 on the resolutions of the Action Committee for the United States of Europe. This motion requests the Federal Government to take the resolutions contained in the joint statement of the Action Committee for the United States of Europe of 15 June 1967 into account in its future European policy.

The Committee's discussions were mainly concerned with avoiding, in developing a European-type company, the disadvantages which might result

from the workers' right to have a say in management at present in force in the Federal Republic. The motion of the three Bundestag groups referred to above was amplified accordingly.

The European company should be so organized as to entail no disadvantages for the German economy. With this additional recommendation of the Bundestag Committee on Industry and Middle-Class Affairs the Bundestag endorsed, on 3 April 1968, the Action Committee's four resolutions of the previous year and urged the Federal Government to take them into account in its European policy.

The Committee on Industry at first felt some misgivings about part of the second resolution in which the establishment of European companies is made subject to 'respect of the rights granted to workers under the existing laws' because some of its members saw it as prejudging, in political terms, the negotiations on workers' participation in European company law. The additional recommendation referred to, which also received the full backing of the responsible Committee on External Affairs, took these fears into account.

The other recommendations of the Action Committee, a group of leading members of the democratic parties of Europe and of trade-union leaders set up by Mr. Jean Monnet in 1955, relate to British entry of the European Economic Community, technological development in the EEC, the establishment of relations with the United States on an equal footing, and co-operation between the EEC and the Soviet Union and Eastern bloc countries.

In discussing these resolutions, the Committee on External Affairs dwelt on the need to prepare a European programme for technological development as soon as possible, such a programme being essential for the future of Europe. In this connexion Great Britain's co-operation was particularly important. It was not thought advisable, however, to set up a fourth Community to deal, jointly with Great Britain, with these technological development problems. The Committee felt that these tasks had to be performed in close liaison with the already existing Communities, more particularly Euratom. As regards relations with the USA, the suggestion that a liaison committee be set up between the EEC Commission and the US Government was viewed favourably. It was essential, however, to adopt in each case a common European approach to the subjects treated in any negotiations.

Of particular interest from the external policy angle is item 4 of the resolution in which the Government is urged to persuade the EEC institutions to set up a co-operation committee with the Soviet Union and the other

Eastern bloc countries to hold permanent consultations on economic and cultural matters of common interest. The first aims specified are the adoption of a multilateral settlement-of-payments system, possible credit facilities and wider exchanges of technical know-how.

Whether or not a co-operation committee was a suitable means of securing closer co-operation between the EEC and Eastern bloc countries was disputed as hotly on the Committee on External Affairs as whether it should be set up now or later. It was doubted whether COMECON, because of its underlying structure, was suited to such a form of co-operation. Moreover, it was noted that to include the 'DDR' among 'countries of Eastern Europe' was contrary to the terms of the Treaties, since Eastern Germany is to be regarded under the Rome Treaties, as falling within the EEC. Finally these aims had to be made subject to two conditions : enlargement of the European Communities and more effective German policy on trade with the Eastern bloc.

On the other hand, the Committee on External Affairs itself agreed that the basic idea of the resolution on economic co-operation with the Eastern bloc countries tied in with the Federal Government's policy of détente and would at the same time enhance the attraction exercised by the EEC on East European countries.

(Industriekurier, 4 April 1968;
Le Monde, 4 April 1968)

5. Members of the Bundestag demand that European policy measures be speeded up

The Federal Government is now faced in the Bundestag by a considerable majority pressing for vigorous moves in European policy. In view of the trends in Eastern policy, they obviously wish to arouse interest in West European affairs. By 10 April 1968 313 members of all parties had sent in postcards backing a statement submitted to the Federal Government by ten members that it should take steps to ensure completion of the Common Market by the end of 1969, the abolition of tariff and tax barriers, and freedom of movement of workers. The statement makes reference to France's 'lock-out' policy. The initiative of this statement goes back to the members of Parliament Blumenfeld, Dichgans, Illerhaus, Majonica and Lenz of the CDU, Hubert Metzger, Mommer and Schulz of the SPD and Rutschke of the FDP. Bundestag's President Gerstenmaier, CSU of the Land group's president Stücklen, the delegates Birrenbach, Klepsch and Mrs Brauksiepe of the Union, Schöttle,

Apel, Lohmar, Wienand and Berkhan of the SPD, Bucher, Merten and Opitz of the FDP, among others, signed the statement. The majority of votes comes from the CDU/CSU.

On 25 June 1968 about half the members of the Bundestag urged the Federal Government to take steps with a view to holding a conference of Foreign Ministers of the Six and of the four applicants for entry to the EEC - the United Kingdom, Denmark, Norway and Ireland. The Federal Government should aim at such a conference even if all ten countries did not wish to take part in it. 131 CDU/CSU, 87 SPD and about 30 FDP members have so far signed a motion calling on the Bundestag to address a request to this effect to the Federal Government. The motion is to be presented after the summer recess.

This initiative follows recommendations made by a conference of parliamentarians of the ten States held in Bonn on 3 and 4 May. Considerable weight is attached in Bonn to the fact that more than half the Union group and almost half the SPD group have endorsed this new approach to the European question - one which in no way corresponds to the ideas entertained by the Federal Chancellor.

Although no one in Bonn expects a change in the French attitude to the European question - the general feeling being that it is more likely to harden - the supporters of the motion believe that everything will come to a halt if every fresh move is to depend on French approval. The right of veto on the final acceptance of new members should not be applied in anticipation.

(Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 3 and 11 April 1968, 26 June 1968)

6. Franco-German talks in Bonn

During the visit to Bonn of Mr. Couve de Murville, the French Foreign Minister, on 22 April 1968, Federal Foreign Minister Brandt made a fresh attempt to jerk European policy out of its immobility.

In a radio interview preceding the talks Mr. Brandt said that continued lack of progress in the question of British entry would have adverse effects on the work of the six countries. It was to be feared that 'a great many things are being undone'.

The two foreign ministers discussed the question of French approval of the German proposals for closer links between the EEC and Great Britain. At the same time, the Federal Chancellor launched an urgent appeal at an election meeting in Upper Swabia to 'our French friends' to interpret the arrangements agreed with President de Gaulle in generous terms, and to the other four member States to refrain from adopting a dogmatic approach.

In German eyes the attitude adopted by the French Foreign Minister at the last meeting of the EEC Council of Ministers indicated that discussion of the 'Paris agreements' between Bonn and Paris could be useful. In Bonn, the Paris statement is considered not to be unconnected with the Federal Government's repeatedly expressed wish to enlarge the European Community by admitting Great Britain and other applicants.

The impression in Bonn is that the emphasis laid on existing measures as stepping-stones to an enlarged Community in the report of the European Commission has stiffened the French attitude. On the other hand, Mr. Brandt left no doubt in Mr. Couve de Murville's mind that, while recognizing that French agreement to these proposals would in no way affect France's subsequent decision on British entry, the Federal Government was in favour of it. It is clearly difficult to establish common ground under these circumstances.

For this reason the deputy Government spokesman also stressed Dr. Kiesinger's appeal before the press. The German view was that the Federal Government's proposals could serve as the basis of a compromise if all member States of the EEC proved to be as ready to come to one. So far no proposal of a more realistic kind had been put forward, so that there was no point in putting forward new ones.

Following the talks between Mr. Brandt and Mr. Couve de Murville, both felt that in May the Council of Ministers of the European Community should deal with practical aspects of a trading arrangement between the EEC and Great Britain, Denmark, Norway and Ireland. France, however, did not want these discussions to be the prelude to negotiations on enlarging the Community, a matter on which Paris reserved full freedom to make its own decision.

While respecting this attitude, Bonn considers that the arrangement ought not be regarded as a substitute for the entry of Great Britain and the other States and as the final settlement of the relations between them and the EEC. In Bonn attention is drawn to the statement made by Mr. Brandt to Mr. Couve de Murville to the effect that any further decisions within the EEC

would be very difficult if France were to regard tariff cuts as the most that could be conceded in relations between the EEC and Great Britain. Paris ought to be highly interested in the expansion of the Community and ought therefore to take careful note of these misgivings.

Until the Council of Ministers meets, Bonn and Paris intend to hold further talks on the practical possibilities of an economic arrangement - the magnitude of tariff cuts, how long they would be in force, and what exceptions would be made to them. So far full agreement has not been reached on any of these matters. Nor can one speak of a complete understanding as regards technological co-operation between the Community and the other countries.

(Die Welt, 22 April 1968;
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 23 and 24 April 1968;
Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 24 April 1968)

7. Visit to Bonn of Mr. Baunsgaard, the Danish Prime Minister

The Danish Prime Minister, Mr. Baunsgaard, and his Economics Minister, Mr. Nyboe Andersen, arrived in Bonn for political talks on 16 May 1968.

These centred mainly on the enlargement of the European Communities, the nuclear non-proliferation treaty and the German and Berlin problem. The most difficult question between the two countries was that of Germany's obligations to import a large number of Danish cattle. Price differences having in the meantime arisen, the Federal Government had to accommodate the Danes. Although the latter were on the whole satisfied, it appears that the cattle exports originally envisaged have fallen short of Danish expectations. The Federal Republic's attempts to arrive at an interim solution of the problem by way of the cattle market organization, pending Denmark's entry into the EEC, have run up against difficulties in Brussels with some of the Community member States.

Shortly before his visit Mr. Nyboe Andersen had pointed out that Denmark's export deficit with the Federal Republic was mainly due to the obstacles presented by the EEC to Danish farm products, which in the past year had risen by D.Kr. 300m. to more than D.Kr. 2,000m.

Dr. Kiesinger welcomed Mr. Baunsgaard as the representative of a friendly neighbour and ally with whom Federal Germany had close economic, cultural and political ties. He looked forward to the talks with considerable interest and felt sure they would draw these ties still closer.

Mr. Baunsgaard said that Denmark greatly valued the friendly development of relations with the Federal Republic. Mutual respect and understanding were considerable. A problem common to the Federal Republic and Denmark was European security policy. Each was searching for a policy which would also permit the German question to be solved.

Other problems arose in the economic sector from the fact that Denmark and the Federal Republic belonged to separate European market blocs. Mr. Baunsgaard was convinced of the need for a large-scale European Community. Difficult though this might be to achieve, it would be wrong to give up hope since it would enable the economic division of Europe to be healed.

At a press conference in Bonn on 17 May Mr. Baunsgaard said that even after the talks with the Federal Government Danish concern about agricultural exports to the Federal Republic and the problems of European integration was in no way lessened.

Denmark - he pointed out - purchased twice as much from the Federal Republic as it sold to it. Danish imports from Germany in the past year amounted to D.Kr. 4,200m., its exports to only D.Kr. 2,200m. At the same time the deficit was widening. This trend could not be allowed to go on indefinitely. Its main cause was the restrictive agricultural policy which made it virtually impossible to export more Danish goods to the Federal Republic, while the latter's products could enter Denmark unhindered.

The Danish Government was also concerned about the serious difficulties surrounding European integration. Denmark aimed at full membership of the EEC with Great Britain and the other Scandinavian countries. Mr. Baunsgaard regretted that negotiations could not be started up. The Danish Government would put forward ideas for an arrangement, but this would have to embody integration.

Denmark would stay in EFTA. Agreement existed in EFTA that the time had arrived for progress in this sector. This was why, at the last meeting of the Council of Ministers, it had been decided to embark on far-reaching co-operation between the Nordic countries. The aim was not to cut oneself off from Europe but rather to help in this way to keep the wheels of European integration turning.

Asked whether Denmark would, under certain conditions, consider entering the EEC on its own, the Danish Prime Minister dwelt on the close economic ties existing between his country and Great Britain. The Federal Republic and Great Britain ranked equal as trading partners of Denmark. In the Federal Republic Denmark bought twice as much as it exported; the Danish balance of trade was restored by its transactions with Great Britain, to which Denmark exported more than it imported. It was therefore essential for Danish trade to continue working with Great Britain. To this should be added political factors. The Danish Prime Minister was firmly convinced that without Great Britain there could be no real Europe. 'I believe that it will be a matter of outstanding political importance for Europe for Britain to be a member of the European Community. My answer to the question of whether Denmark would enter the EEC on its own must therefore be "no".'

(Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 15, 17 and 18 May 1968;
Die Welt, 18 May 1968)

8. Visit to Bonn of Mr. Torsten Nilsson, Swedish Foreign Minister

On 17 June Mr. Torsten Nilsson held a lengthy conversation with Foreign Minister Brandt, mainly on East-West policy in Europe and questions connected with enlarging the European Communities.

The absence of bilateral problems between the two countries accounted, said Mr. Brandt, for the satisfactory German-Swedish relations.

Mr. Brandt briefed Mr. Nilsson on the latest developments in West Germany's policy towards the East, as well as on the visit to Belgrade, the talks in the Soviet Union on renouncing the use of force, Berlin and relations with other Eastern bloc countries. He thanked the Swedish Government for its support of German East European policy in non-member countries.

Sweden is keenly interested in the European plans for dismantling tariff barriers by means of which the Federal Republic wants to facilitate subsequent entry by Great Britain and other interested countries to the EEC. In a talk with his German colleague, Mr. Willy Brandt, Mr. Torsten Nilsson expressed his interest in the German plans at present being investigated by the Six. It is understood that Mr. Nilsson also said that Sweden would like to attend the talks on tariff dismantlement between the EEC and EFTA right from the start as soon as the Six had worked out a joint proposal on the basis of the Bonn plans.

After the Foreign Ministers' talks diplomatic observers in Bonn pointed out that Mr. Brandt had thus received the firmest backing yet for his efforts to secure a trade policy arrangement with Great Britain and the other interested EFTA countries. Sweden, like Switzerland and Austria, is one of the neutrals which, although they have not applied for entry, want closer co-operation with the Economic Community.

(Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 18 June 1968)

Great-Britain

Mr. Wilson's appeal to Europe

In an interview with Raymond Tournoux (of Paris-Match) Mr. Harold Wilson was asked for his views on the disengagement of some European nations. Mr. Wilson replied: 'I do not agree with those who allege that we have become "little Englanders"'. We have world-wide contacts. We see world problems on a world scale, like many of our European friends.

Our peace establishment is now concentrated in Europe. And Europe includes Britain. Our economic policy is entirely directed towards a larger, more powerful and more united Europe. We are not "little Englanders" and we have no intention whatever of becoming "little Europeans".'

With regard to Britain's aeronautical co-operation with Europe, Mr. Wilson considered that this was just plain common sense: 'The concentration of our military strength and the economic effort which we intend to deploy towards Europe will be found, as a result of joint aeronautical design and construction, of mutual advantage. Joining forces means reducing the cost of production, enlarging the market and developing an industrial basis which will enable us all to sell in America and on other world markets.

Our common interest in Europe is for us to produce more, the ones for the others, in order to reduce Europe's dependence on American technology. This also applies to non-military technology: the cost of development has become too heavy for a single country.'

Asked for his opinion on the state of Anglo-French relations, Mr. Wilson did not conceal the fact that France's latest veto on Britain's application for accession to the European Community had damaged these relations. Seen in a larger context, this had been less of a blow to Anglo-French relations than to the real interests of France, Great Britain and Europe.

Mr. Wilson also stated his views on his country's accession to the EEC by refuting General de Gaulle's arguments. He said that he had taken and would continue to take these arguments very seriously, but he did not agree with them. General de Gaulle's desire to achieve greater independence in regard to the United States was shared by the British Government. But it would

not become a reality through speeches or through political attitudes. General de Gaulle's craving for independence could be given a practical form by bridging the technological gap between America and Europe: 'In the first place, if we all became less dependent upon American industry in vital industrial sectors.'

'France today depends on America for its computers, as well as for other important technological sectors. This is my answer to the question of independence.'

'Independence means European technological power. It also means a single European market. Thus, the logic of General de Gaulle's legitimate demand concerning an independent Europe requires Britain's entry into the Common Market. Calling for the one and rejecting the other is a contradiction in terms. The technological gap is becoming wider. Europe is losing ground every year. Naturally, a certain amount of time would be needed for negotiating the conditions of our entry.

Since Britain has unreservedly accepted the Rome Treaty and since it has also stated the problems to be investigated, it would not take long to get to the essential stage leading to Europe's political and economic unity - provided there was the necessary political will.'

(Paris-Match, 20 April 1968)

Italy

1. An interview with Mr. Andreotti, Minister for Industry, on the state of the Italian industry prior to 1 July 1968

On 12 April 1968 Mr. Giulio Andreotti, Italian Minister for Industry, gave an interview to 'La vie française' of which the following is an extract:

Q. : 'On 1 July 1968 the customs union between the Six will be complete. In France, Germany and Benelux, industrialists and governments alike regard this date with some misgiving because of the resulting competition and other dangers their countries' economies may have to face. Does Italian industry share these fears?'

A. : 'This event cannot cause any surprise among the economies of the EEC member States since it was foreseen as long ago as 1957. Italian industry, like that of the other EEC countries, has long been facing stiffer competition on the international market. This is proved by the fact that the abolition of tariffs within the Community and the adoption of a single customs tariff towards non-member countries simply represent the final phase of the adjustment of European and Italian industry to the Common Market. Previous cuts in duties have had no adverse effects on Italian industry. A common external tariff lower than the Italian tariff will expose Italy to fiercer competition from non-member countries. Difficulties might be caused in certain industries (aluminium, ferrous alloys) by the increased competitiveness of other countries, particularly the Scandinavian.'

Q. : 'How has Italian industry prepared itself for the target date of 1 July? Have there been more concentrations of undertakings?'

A. : 'The Italian Government, with a view to making it easier for undertakings to adjust to the changed market conditions, has invoked a law of 1965 which grants tax privileges to companies or firms undergoing conversion, merger or concentration. This caters for the need for greater competitiveness of Italian industry, and is in any case a condition of economic integration and technological progress.'

Q.: 'It has often been said that Italian industry enjoys the advantage of State aid to exports and that its costs of production are particularly low owing to the lowness of Italian wages. Could you comment on this?'

A.: 'Some European countries have recently asked the EEC Commission to adopt safeguard measures against imports - particularly from Italy - of certain industrial products. Requests have been made by the Netherlands and Federal Germany with respect to woollen materials and from France with respect to domestic electrical appliances. The rise in such exports is due not to State support but to the high productivity of the Italian industries concerned. This was borne out by the decision taken by the EEC Commission in response to the demand for safeguard measures put forward by the Dutch woollen industry and to similar demands from Federal Germany and France'.

Q.: 'To facilitate increased trade following customs union, Italian industry needs a simplified customs procedure and appropriate tax regulations. What is the Italian administration doing to adapt current legislation to future needs?'

A.: 'The Italian Government is studying how the tax system can best facilitate the competitive alignment of undertakings. It will also be necessary to work hand in hand with the EEC Commission and the member States to prevent Italy from suffering the disadvantages experienced in other countries when the new added-value tax system is introduced.'

(La vie française, 12 April 1968)

2. Interview with Mr. Zagari, Italian Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, on the relations between rich and poor countries and European co-operation

In an interview given to the ADN Kronos Agency, Mr. Mario Zagari, Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, discussed, among other international policy issues, relations between the 'haves' and 'have-nots' and co-operation between the European countries.

The contrast between the 'haves' and 'have-nots', between whites and coloured people, between youth and social structures, could be lessened at world level only through a global peace policy. First and foremost, the

problem of underdevelopment had to be tackled. UNCTAD had shown the need for a radical change in the system rather than marginal and piecemeal improvements. This was why an overall scheme for the development of the third world was a matter of urgency.

The last reserves and misunderstandings between East and West must also give way to multilateral co-operation so as to set the problems of European security and of Germany in a new light. The moment had come to call a pan-European conference to study outstanding problems and lay the foundations for effective economic, scientific and technological collaboration between the two parts of Europe.

Thirdly, Western Europe would have to cast off the lethargy from which it was suffering. Greater Europe, with Great Britain as a member, would have to be established to drive back the tides of nationalism that had re-emerged in the various countries. Then there was disarmament: the path of the non-proliferation treaty was not made easier by the excessive number of sectarian interests the various countries intended to safeguard.

Everyone, and Europeans in particular, ought to rise above incidental interests and regard the treaty as the essential prelude to general disarmament. The European cause could not be identified with nuclear strength. Therefore, rather than leave the door open for every country to acquire nuclear arms, the aim should be joint action by the non-nuclear powers to persuade the nuclear powers to take the path leading to total disarmament. Finally, UNO should be strengthened and universalized by admitting China, so as to endow the United Nations with the authoritative character essential to it.

(Avanti, 23 April 1968)

Netherlands

1. The Government's NATO policy

A memorandum on the NATO and defence policies pursued by the Dutch Government in 1968 deals in detail with relations within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. After dwelling on the obstacles put in NATO's path by the French Government and the consequent weakening of the West's political and military power, the memorandum raises the principles of democracy, personal freedom and justice referred to in the preamble to the Treaty. The situation in certain member States was causing concern to the Dutch Government. In considering what steps should be taken - for example suspension or expulsion of one of these States - it should be asked whether refusing to co-operate with these countries would help them to become more democratic. The Government felt that allies had a duty to do all they could to restore democracy in the countries in question, particularly as under present circumstances absolute priority should be given to the security of the Alliance as a whole.

With regard to relations between Europe and the USA, the memorandum briefly outlines the Government's attitude. On the one hand this left plenty of scope for the pursuit of European integration with, as the ultimate goal, a united Europe which, in its ideal form, would be democratic, federal and outward-looking; on the other hand, it set out from the principle that European unification could not, and should not, be accompanied by any slackening of the close links that had been forged within the Atlantic Alliance, and that a united Europe could do more to improve the international situation within the wider framework of an Atlantic Community in which the US and Europe would be on a strictly equal footing, politically and economically, and would share responsibilities.

Pending the advent of a united Europe and an Atlantic Community, it was essential to step up co-operation within the Atlantic Alliance; but at the same time, to ensure that relations within the Alliance developed smoothly, account should be taken of the requirements of broader-based European unity. Only thus could co-operation within the Atlantic Alliance retain a healthy and natural character.

Such co-operation was equally necessary for the easing of tension between East and West. The essential for a lasting agreement between East and West was not to upset the existing stability which it had taken so much effort to establish.

As regards the European security conference proposed by Eastern Europe, the allies, while in principle in favour of it, felt that it would have an adverse effect if it were to come to nothing. There must therefore be good reason to believe it could lead to solutions acceptable to both sides before it was embarked upon. In view of the many disputes still subsisting between East and West, this meant that the countries of Western Europe would first have to hold many preparatory talks among themselves and with the countries of the Eastern bloc. A final solution of the problems of European security could obviously not be expected of a single conference, and the parties would have to get together again and again. For its part, the Dutch Government would do all it could to make the talks a success. This had been the sole object of the many bilateral contacts it had established since the beginning of 1967 with the countries of the Eastern bloc. The participation of the US and Canada at a conference of this kind was essential in view of the crucial rôle these two countries had to play in European security.

While an arrangement between the East and West could only be reached through multilateral negotiations, it was still necessary in the meantime to try to improve mutual relations. Discussions within the Alliance had brought to light a remarkable degree of agreement on the necessity to adopt a joint approach aimed at consolidating the existing relations between the countries of the East and those of the West and at finding new forms of co-operation, in each case both at bilateral and at multilateral level.

At bilateral level this implied efforts to improve and step up political contacts between statesmen from Eastern and Western Europe, particularly through official visits, and to widen the scope of relations in the economic, technical, scientific and cultural fields. The Dutch Government was determined to pursue an active policy in this matter and would make the results known to the people. At multilateral level, co-operation between East and West could, for example, be carried out in appropriate international organizations and institutions such as the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe. Then there was the Group of Nine - increased to ten with the accession of the Netherlands - which had been set up in December 1965, on the basis of a UN resolution proposed by Rumania and unanimously adopted, to help establish better relations between European countries. The Dutch Government was doing all it could to facilitate informal talks within the Group of Ten in the hope of laying the bases for negotiations of a more substantial kind.

(Memorandum on the NATO and defence policies of the Dutch Government - 1967-68 session, No. 9635)

2. Mr. Luns - 'Europe must extend from the Urals to the Rocky Mountains'

Under the title 'An excessively French vision of Europe has already caused the downfall of Napoleon', which sums up in a lapidary way Mr. Luns' opinion on the Gaullist conception of European unity, Mr. Raymond Tournoux, published in 'Paris Match' of 23 April, the answers given by the Netherlands Foreign Minister to the questions that were put to him.

Mr. Luns observed with regret that Europe's political integration did not follow its economic integration. He was in favour of enlarging the Europe of the Six which was 'too small to be called a united Europe'. He deplored that negotiations were not opened with the United Kingdom for its entry into the Common Market. 'On this issue', Mr. Luns said, 'France has probably a complex. It does not realize its true position in Europe. It fails to see that, even with Britain included, it would have a legitimate preponderance in a Europe of seven, eight, or even nine member countries.'

The Dutch Minister felt that American assistance for the defence of Europe remained necessary. To the idea of a European 'third force' between East and West, he preferred that of an Atlantic Community 'including Europe and our sons, brothers and cousins from the other side of the Atlantic Ocean; in other words, Europe from the Urals to the Rocky Mountains.'

At the end of the interview Mr. Luns said that in 1958 and in the years that followed, General de Gaulle would undoubtedly have been the most likely candidate for the dignity of first President of the United States of Europe, 'if France had shown any interest in that idea.' Mr. Luns added that France was now basing its policy on national sovereignty and nation-States: 'it is not prepared to accept supranationality... Napoleon's failing - much more so than that of present-day France - was his excessively French vision of Europe's future. He thus provoked the hostility which in the end proved disastrous to him.'

(Le Figaro, 23 April 1968)

3. Mr. Luns on an official visit to Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore

At the beginning of July, Mr. Luns, Dutch Foreign Minister, made an official visit to Indonesia to sign an economic and cultural agreement. Mr. Adam Malik, Indonesian Minister, asked for Dutch support in solving the difficulties experienced by his country in marketing its products in the European Community.

In Malaysia, Mr. Luns spoke with Mr. Abdul Rasak, the Vice-Premier, concerning the request of the Federation to be associated with the European Community.

In Singapore Mr. Luns had talks with the Prime Minister and the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Finance and suggested the creation of a common market in south-east Asia along the lines of the EEC. He said that such an economic community could have the interests of the partners more at heart in relations with the European market and other economic blocs. Another subject of discussion was that of drawing up a list of products from Singapore which might be considered for preferential tariffs in the Common Market.

(Nieuwe Rotterdamse Courant, 9 July 1968)

4. The First Chamber discusses European policy

On 11 June, during a debate in the First Chamber on the 1968 foreign affairs estimates, Mr. Burger (Labour Party) was critical of the policy pursued by the Foreign Minister on the Council of the European Communities, particularly concerning the question of Britain's accession. He dealt in detail with the procedure followed by the Council and criticized the way in which it took decisions, reached agreements, approved resolutions, outlined policies, concluded conventions and adopted provisions.

He said that resolutions did not derive from the Treaty. Agreements were probably disguised forms of Treaties, whereas conventions were halfway house between Council decisions and Treaties. As for procedure which, apart from press releases, escaped any form of control or public attention, Mr. Burger said that he did not think highly of it. To prove his point, he quoted a Council press release of 29 May 1968, in which it was said that the latter had agreed to confirm the introduction of a levy on vegetable or marine fats intended for use in foodstuffs, whether produced in or imported into the Community. Mr. Burger took exception to the strange phraseology used whereby a collegial body did not 'decide' but 'agreed'; indeed this simply meant that the decision relating to the tax on margarine had been decided once and for all. In a footnote, however, it is pointed out that the German delegation considered that it was not committed and that the Dutch delegation would act on this provision only provided that the budgetary powers of the European Parliament were simultaneously increased.

If two Governments had reservations, Mr. Burger asked from what legal standpoint had anything really been 'agreed'. It appeared that the majority rule was ignored. Mr. Burger asked what sense it made if the Dutch Government had reservations, when the same press release stated that the Council had decided to follow up the statement concerning the consolidation of the budgetary powers of the European Parliament, as was noted in the Council minutes of the closed session held on 23 December 1963.

If the Dutch Government were serious about increasing Parliament's powers, as stated in the press release, how was one to consider the reply given by Mr. Luns to a written question from Mr. Vredeling, in which he felt bound to point out that it was not possible at present to make any change in the powers of the European Parliament.

On 8 March, Mr. Vredeling had asked if, with reference to harmonizing taxation systems within the EEC, the need had emerged to introduce control by the European Parliament of the important powers being transferred from the national parliaments. On 1 April the Minister replied that, from the Dutch point of view, the question had not, as yet, been placed on the agenda.

With these examples, the speaker wished to demonstrate the price that parliamentary democracy had to pay to 'enlightened European despotism'. The Netherlands thus was not the only country in danger of becoming a satellite of France. There was also the prospect that within a decade 80 per cent of the fiscal receipts of the member States would be subject to Council decisions and not to any parliamentary control. The only way of avoiding this danger was to induce the Council to replace diplomatic agreements by a real Community policy.

As for the discussion on the Council on the United Kingdom's application for membership, Mr. Burger criticized the lack of any political plan on the part of the Dutch Government. During the discussion on the Council about the British application, the Dutch Government failed to take into account the possibility of a further French veto so that by their disagreement the Five played into French hands; the French Government was thus able to pursue its own policy without running any risk. The Council, for its part, failed to note that there was a majority in favour of the procedure proposed by the Commission - which asked the Council to authorize discussions with Britain on specific problems - and thus committed a serious error. Mr. Burger went on to say that the Minister had replied that it had not been possible to establish this fact because otherwise it would have been clear that the attitude assumed by a given member State was used to conceal ulterior motives. Mr. Burger criticized the Five for pursuing an ostrich policy in relation to General de Gaulle. They should have taken him seriously when he announced that the

Community would be shattered. They should have let his policy run its course and, instead of acting empirically, they should have opposed General de Gaulle with a policy of their own. The Five were faced with a choice of two things: either France, like the rest of them, could not do without the Community and this would have demonstrated that the Community could still go on and it would have put an end to the status of French satellites to which they had been reduced, or France could do without the Community and, in this case, it would be hazardous for the Five to weaken and leave the initiative to France.

Mr. Burger concluded by thanking the Ministers for stating their willingness to keep the Chamber informed about the position adopted by the Dutch delegation on the Council of Ministers and he reminded the Government of its responsibilities to the Dutch Parliament; he asked it, after every session of the Council, to inform the Dutch Parliament of the position assumed by the Dutch delegation.

Mr. Burger further asked if, owing to the fact that the British application was still on the Council agenda, Mr. Luns was prepared to ask for the procedure proposed by the European Commission to be approved; this related to certain problems connected with Britain's application. Mr. Burger also asked the Minister if he was ready and really able to say whether the Netherlands would refuse to endorse the Community fiscal measures if there were not a simultaneous increase in the budgetary powers of the European Parliament.

Mr. Luns stated that, at the Council session of 19 December 1967, the five member States in favour of Britain's entry had - for the first time - taken a firm stand against France's negative attitude. In this connexion, it was particularly significant that the united front formed by the Five had compelled the French representative to show his own cards, which previously he had carefully avoided doing. A further point gained by the Five was the fact that the British application had remained on the agenda. If, as a result of a vote, the British application had been removed from the agenda, this would have represented an undeserved and undesirable triumph for the French Government.

Mr. Luns gave a strong assurance that the Dutch Government would continue to do everything within its power in order that negotiations may be started.

Finally, he said that the Dutch Government was currently investigating all the alternatives to the Benelux Memorandum to reach co-operation

with the applicant States in all those sectors not specifically covered by the Treaty of Rome.

Referring to Mr. Burger's request that the Government should not endorse the European Community's decision on the harmonization of taxes unless agreement were reached on the question of strengthening the powers of the European Parliament, Mr. De Koster declined to give specific assurances. The Government would do its utmost to see that the powers of the European Parliament were increased, but it reserved the right to examine the pros and cons in every instance. Moreover, there would be further opportunities for achieving this end, for example whenever Community's own resources would be discussed in accordance with Article 211, the matter would be raised. Mr. De Koster repeated that the Government would not approve of the tax on margarine unless the budgetary powers of the European Parliament were increased.

Mr. Van Riel (People's Party for Freedom and Democracy) joined with Mr. Burger in asking the Government to report to Parliament, in a manner consistent with institutional standards, on the Council's activities, particularly concerning agricultural policy and its financial implications. Mr. De Koster replied that the Minister already gave oral reports to the responsible Committees and that Mr. Van Riel's proposal would be discussed with Mr. Luns.

In reply to a question from Mr. Van Hulst (Christian Historical Union) concerning the Community's external relations, Mr. De Koster said that the agreement between the Five and the Commission had obliged France to give up its opposition to an association with Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania. As for Austria, on the other hand, the French Government had found an ally in Italy in opposing the association of that country with the Community.

Similarly, the French Government had assumed a minimalistic attitude regarding Israel, arguing that it had obtained sufficient concessions as a result of the Kennedy Round. The Dutch Government did not share this view. Germany and Luxembourg were convinced that the form of association best suited to meet Israel's wishes would consist in a free trade area or a customs union. Belgium and Italy, on the other hand, were in favour of a preferential system.

As for merging the Treaties, the Dutch Government argued that the Governments which had applied for membership ought also to be able to give their views on the texts of the new Treaty resulting from merging the three

present ones. It was aware that this would once again raise the issue of democratizing the institutions.

(Debate in the First Chamber, 1967-1968 Session - Foreign Affairs, 11 and 12 June 1968)

5. Parliamentary Questions

Attitude of the Netherlands to the harmonization of tax systems

On 8 March Mr. Vredeling (Labour Party) put a question to the Dutch Government on the position adopted by the Netherlands, within the Council, concerning the European Commission's proposals on the harmonization of tax systems in the EEC countries. In particular, it was asked whether the Dutch representative on the Council had raised the political point that harmonizing tax systems within the EEC depended on the transfer of the essential powers that would be withdrawn from the national Parliaments to the European Parliament, the only democratic body capable of supervising the policy to be followed in the European Communities.

On 1 April 1968 the Minister for Foreign Affairs, speaking for himself and the Secretary of State for Finance, stated that at a recent meeting of the EEC Council views had been exchanged on the harmonization of the various deductions at source applied by member States to dividends and debenture interest.

The Dutch member of the Council had supported the general view that progress would also have to be made in harmonizing direct taxes. As regards harmonization of deductions at source, it would be necessary to know beforehand the likely effects of the decision to be taken on the organization of a European capital market and the functions to be assigned to it. The Commission would in due course report on this question.

While the Dutch Government realized that the existing system was far from satisfactory in regard to the powers of the European Parliament, it could not but accept the impossibility of amending it in the present circumstances.

In compliance with the motion of the Second Chamber (1), the Government had decided to consult the Dutch Parliament before final decisions were taken by the Council of the European Communities on common provisions relating to the scope and apportionment of the tax charge.

Support given by the Dutch Government to certain farm, horticultural and fishery products

On 14 March Mr. Vredeling asked the Minister of Agriculture for his views on the European Commission's reply to a question by Mr. Deringer (2) on the incompatibility of support measures taken by the Dutch Government. The Netherlands levied a tax both on the national production and on the imports of seeds, various cereals and cereal by-products, poultry, fruit, vegetables, fish and fish preserves; support was, however, only given to national production.

The Minister of Agriculture replied on 4 April that these charges were not of a fiscal nature but ought to be regarded as charges imposed for producer federations. He could not see how it could be concluded from the European Commission's reply that these measures were in themselves contrary to the Treaty. The Dutch Government felt that it was for the European Commission to judge, in the light of Articles 92ff. of the EEC Treaty, whether these measures were compatible with the Common Market, particularly as regards the appropriation of the funds in question.

Decision reached on 25 July 1967 by representatives of the member States on special provisions governing oleaginous products from the Associated States

On 24 April, in reply to a written question by Mr. Vredeling on national procedures for applying the above decision (3), the Minister for Foreign Affairs stated that, under Dutch legislation, this had to be submitted to the States-General for ratification. Ratification was required because neither the EEC Treaty, nor the Yaoundé Convention, nor the Council's decision on the association of overseas countries and territories with the EEC provided a legal basis for financing aid to imports into the Community of oleaginous

(1) Berg motion of 12 January 1967, Doc. 8556.

(2) Written Question No. 227, 1967-1968, European Parliament.

(3) Official Gazette of the European Communities No. 173, 67

products from the associated countries and territories. As all the articles of this decision related to such financing, it was the decision as a whole that would be submitted for ratification by the States-General.

Aid to the French iron and steel industry

On 2 April 1968 Mr. Nederhorst (Labour Party) asked whether the Dutch Government would call upon the European Commission to elicit details from the French Government of the aid it was giving to the iron and steel industry. Mr. Nederhorst asked the Dutch Government for an assurance that, once it had received this information, it would (i) pass it on as rapidly as possible to the Dutch Parliament, and (ii) immediately secure a legal opinion as to whether or not the subsidies in question were contrary to Article 4(c) of the ECSC Treaty.

Should the legal opinion justify such a measure, Mr. Nederhorst wanted to know whether the Dutch Government was prepared to give an assurance that if, contrary to the spirit and letter of Article 4(c), the Commission did not prohibit these subsidies, it would immediately refer the matter to the Court of Justice of the European Communities.

On 18 April the Minister for Economic Affairs replied that during the EEC Council sessions held on 5 and 29 June 1967 the Dutch representatives had urged that the High Authority should say whether or not the French measures were compatible with the ECSC Treaty.

The Minister thought that account should be taken of the merger of the executives and that the members of the new Commission should be given time to reach an agreement. However, he had recently invited the Commission to submit, at one of the next Council sessions, a reasoned opinion on French support for the iron and steel industry. The Minister would then study the procedure to be followed in the light of the conclusions arrived at in the Council's debates. He was, of course, prepared to supply the Dutch Parliament with information on this subject as soon as possible.

Export subsidies

On 4 April Mr. Oele (Labour Party) asked the Minister for Foreign Affairs what he thought of the French Government's measures in support of the footwear industry and what the Dutch Government felt about the difficulties of the footwear industry in the Netherlands.

The Government shared the European Commission's oft-repeated view that export subsidies were incompatible with the Common Market and therefore contrary to Article 92 of the Treaty.

The Minister did not know whether the French Government intended taking such measures in support of the French footwear industry, but an inquiry was under way on the possibilities of strengthening the position of that industry.

In the course of the investigation ordered by the Commission and the member States into the measures the French Government contemplated taking in support of the footwear industry, the Dutch Government would guard against any change in competitive relations at the expense of the Dutch footwear industry.

The Minister refused to accept that the procedure laid down in Article 93 would yield negative results in the matter of any support measures that might be taken by France. He therefore thought there was no point in commenting on counter-measures to safeguard the Dutch footwear industry in the present state of affairs.

Negotiations between the European Community and the East African countries

On 9 May 1968 Mr. De Block, Economics Minister, replying to a written question put by Mr. Dankert (Labour Party) on 16 April on the negotiations between the Community and certain East African countries concerning preferences, stated that the additional mandate given by the Council to the Commission of the European Communities for the purpose of negotiations with Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania had in view a measure of reciprocity on the part of the East African countries.

The Dutch Government had approved this mandate because the negotiations fell into line with the Council's Declaration of Intent of 1963 which opened the door to African countries having an economic structure similar to that of the Associated African and Malagasy States to accede to the Yaoundé Convention, or to conclude either a special association agreement or a trade agreement with the EEC. On the strength of that declaration, the negotiations with the East African countries aimed at concluding an association agreement to expire on 1 June 1969, at the same time as the Yaoundé Convention, as in the case of the EEC-Nigeria Agreement. In view of the reference made to the Yaoundé Convention, and the close analogy with the Lagos Agreement, both of

which provided for a measure of reciprocal preference, it would not be fair to make an exception of the East African countries and exempt them from conceding some degree of reciprocal treatment. In adopting this attitude, the Dutch Government was in no way anticipating the general preference system, details of which were yet to be laid down. Moreover, there was still no identity of views among the Community countries regarding the problem of reciprocal preferences at world level.

Mr. De Block did not think that the conclusion of an agreement with the East African countries providing for reciprocal preference could stand in the way of the establishment of a general system based on non-reciprocity. There was no chance of the problem of preferences being settled at world level before 1 June 1969. In the event of a prolongation it would be a good thing to look into the possibility of including in a general preference system an agreement with the East African countries in question and other regional preference arrangements applicable to the developing countries.

(Second Chamber, 1967-1968 Session, Annexes 937, 961, 1043, 1093, 1079, 1209)

Special trade agreement between the EEC and Great Britain

On 31 May, in reply to a written question put on 14 May by Mr. Van der Mei (Historical Christian Union), Mr. De Block, Economics Minister, stated that a trade agreement between the EEC and the United Kingdom on the lines contemplated by some member States would have to comply with the provisions of Article XXIV of GATT, which provides for exceptions to the principles of the most-favoured nation and of non-discrimination in the event of a customs union or free trade area, or of the conclusion of commercial agreements leading up to a free trade area. These exceptions were subject to a number of conditions.

Any arrangement which, according to certain member States, would govern only the first stages of tariff dismantlement would, in the view of the Dutch Government, have to include a plan and timetable for the elimination of obstacles to trade within a reasonable period, in accordance with the provisions of Article XXIV of GATT. Apart from the need to comply with GATT provisions, the Dutch Government thought that a trade agreement ought to be worked out against the background of ultimate British accession to the Communities.

Mr. De Block considered that the conclusion of an agreement which did not comply with the rules of GATT by trading powers as important, at world level, as the EEC and the United Kingdom would be a real threat to the future of world trade.

The Dutch Government would therefore do its utmost during consultations within the EEC to dissuade its partners from embarking on a course which would amount to contravening such international undertakings. It would continue to guard against the adoption of any arrangement contrary to the provisions of GATT.

(Second Chamber, 1967-1968 session, Annex 1369)

Spain and the European Community

In reply to a question from Mr. Den Uyl (Labour Party) Mr. Luns, Foreign Minister, said that the Dutch Government had, in the present situation, to refrain from making any promise in connexion with the vote on an association between Spain and the European Community. He rejected the allegation made by the Information Service of the Spanish Foreign Ministry (1) to the effect that the Dutch Government was in favour of Spain's association with the Common Market.

(1) Espana Semanal, 24 June 1968

Scandinavian countries

Summit conference of Nordic States in Copenhagen

On 17 April 1968 Mr. Gunnar Lange, Swedish Minister of Trade, said that Sweden, Denmark, Norway and Finland were all determined to strengthen their relations with the EEC. They had agreed to engage in closer economic co-operation so long as the problem of entry remained unsolved. Mr. Lange was addressing a meeting of the Scandinavian Ministers of Trade in Stockholm at which the basis was laid for the summit conference of Nordic Prime Ministers and Foreign Ministers to be held in Copenhagen a few days later. A Nordic customs union was discussed but, Norway having raised a number of objections of a technical nature, no decision was reached. Finally, following Mr. Lange's address, closer co-operation in agricultural matters was also discussed.

Between 22 and 23 April 1968 the Heads of Government of Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden met in Copenhagen, together with their Foreign and Trade Ministers, at the Nordic summit conference, which had been suggested by the Danish Prime Minister, Mr. Baunsgaard. Iceland was represented by its Minister of Trade.

The meeting was held to discuss closer co-operation among the Nordic countries on trade policy and economic questions. A joint committee of experts submitted a programme which would substantially strengthen the economic integration of the Nordic countries. The plans included the setting up of an economic union with common customs tariffs, and a common agricultural market or some other longer-term arrangement for agriculture and fisheries. Industrial legislation would be harmonized and economic policy more closely co-ordinated, always with an eye to approximating to conditions in the EEC.

On the very first day of the summit conference it became clear that Norway's resistance had prevented binding decisions from being taken by the Nordic countries on a broader-based economic co-operation. It was however agreed to get experts to prepare, by a given date, draft plans for a broader measure of integration, starting with details of customs harmonization or even customs union. Both the Swedish and Danish Prime Ministers wanted to regard this step as already accepted in principle, but Mr. Borten, the Norwegian Prime Minister, reserved the right either to accept or to reject the experts' findings in due course.

The summit conference closed on 23 April 1968 with the publication of a comprehensive official statement. In this the members of the Danish, Finnish, Norwegian and Swedish Governments concerned set out their views on relations between the Nordic countries and the EEC and EFTA and laid down guidelines for a working party which was to prepare concrete proposals for closer economic co-operation between the four countries. These guidelines largely correspond to the recommendations of the committee of experts whose work had provided the basis of the Copenhagen meeting.

In the official statement the Nordic countries announce their common interest in a large European market and in transitional provisions that could facilitate the flow of European trade until their admission to the EEC. All EFTA countries interested should be permitted from the outset to take part in negotiations on an eventual arrangement. Co-operation between the Nordic countries on the question of integration should be stepped up and the approach to new proposals for narrowing or closing the economic gap in Europe co-ordinated.

In the light of the current integration policy situation, special importance is attached to EFTA co-operation, which ought to be carried a step further. At the forthcoming meeting of the Council of Ministers in London, joint Nordic proposals for strengthening the organization are being put forward. These relate to tariffs, trade policy, rules on competition, agriculture and fisheries.

The official statement deals in detail with Nordic co-operation, catalogues achievements to date and describes participation in a European market embracing the greatest possible number of countries as the ultimate goal. Closer economic co-operation between the Nordic countries would help not only them but also EFTA and other European integration movements; at the same time it would strengthen the Nordic countries' trade position. The time had come for a further step forward. The Prime Ministers agreed that this would have to take account of the EFTA obligations of the countries concerned and of Iceland, which was considering linking up with EFTA. Foreign and defence policies remained beyond the sphere of the co-operation envisaged.

The Governments were to be presented with additional surveys and concrete proposals for closer Nordic co-operation in the following fields. First, the setting up of a Nordic customs union whose external tariff would be based on the weighted average of the tariffs of the four countries. Where possible, tariff rates should be adjusted or approximated to the EEC tariff level. Consideration was being given to quotas and suspensions, as well as to transitional regulations, to overcome the difficulties of certain countries.

The second field was that of agricultural co-operation. Common trade in farm products should be progressively expanded by means of Nordic preferences, price agreements, anti-dumping measures, protection against subsidized agricultural imports from third countries, the abolition of the industrial protection element in duties and charges on industrially processed farm products, and common arrangements such as pricing policy measures for agricultural exports to third countries. To meet difficulties arising in individual countries, steps would be taken to facilitate adaptation by the four countries to a common Nordic market and a Nordic agricultural policy in harmony with agricultural integration in Europe.

Provisions on competition in the various countries should be brought closer into line so as to create freer, non-discriminatory competitive conditions. Closer co-operation would be sought also in industry, in the energy sector and in research and development policy. Institutional systems would be set up as appeared necessary.

Sweden, Denmark and Norway remain in favour of full membership of the European Common Market. As Mr. Nils Montan, Swedish Ambassador to the Federal Republic, pointed out on 24 April 1968 at the opening in Frankfurt of a programme of events devoted to Sweden, organized by the Hessische Landesbank and the Deutsche Unionbank, the Nordic States were not demanding any complicated transitional arrangements. They were prepared to enter into all the obligations, but also to assume all the rights, stipulated in the Rome Treaties.

Sweden's foreign policy - based on freedom of alliance - the NATO membership, under special conditions, of Denmark, Norway and Iceland, and Finland's neutrality, were all easily reconcilable with the spirit and letter of the Rome Treaties.

The recent German move for an interim arrangement for enlarging the EEC - said Mr. Montan - had the backing of the Swedish Government; it was essential, however, to respect the close co-operation already achieved, both at political and at economic level, by all the Nordic States as a plain fact of political development. Bilateral agreements between the EEC and individual Nordic countries had no real prospects of success.

(Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 24 and 25 April 1968;
Die Welt, 19 April 1968;
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 18, 19, 23 and 24 April 1968;
Industriekurier, 30 April 1968)

United States

President Johnson looks for a rapprochement between Europe and the United States

President Johnson received King Olav of Norway in Washington on 25 April. In his speech of welcome, he pledged the continued great interest of the United States in the affairs of Europe and repeatedly recalled America's efforts during the years of the Marshall Plan and the Truman Doctrine to assist in European reconstruction.

The President said that although today there was no doubt that Europe was once again very vital and prosperous there should be no doubt that the United States stood as close to Europe as it did immediately after World War II.

'The real question today is, are we still partners?' Mr. Johnson asked, and he replied immediately: 'Of course we are partners.'

'But', Mr. Johnson continued, 'the real question is what are we partners for?'

Then Mr. Johnson said: 'The original concept of the Truman Doctrine and of the Marshall Plan is as valid today as we stand here.'

'There is nothing the United States and Europe together cannot do', he went on.

(Herald Tribune, 26 May 1968)

II. PARTIES AND PROMINENT POLITICIANS

1. European policy at the party conference of the German Social Democrats in Nuremberg

The SPD party conference held in Nuremberg from 18 to 22 March 1968, in the course of discussing the party's prospects in the late sixties and early seventies and its contribution to the solution of current problems of German policy, also dealt with foreign and European policy, regarding which the following observations were made:

Peace in Europe at present rested mainly on the military balance between the two systems of alliances. Its prospects could be improved if the harsh contrast between the two blocs were softened by bilateral and multilateral forms of co-operation aimed at establishing a security system for Europe. In the process, the balance would have to be preserved and the leading powers of the alliances ought not to be released from their responsibility for Europe's security.

In this way conditions could be created to ensure that the division of Germany could be healed at the same time as the division of Europe. German moves in this direction not only were in the German interest but were the service Germany was called upon to render Europe.

The production, acquisition, ownership and co-ownership of nuclear weapons could not be reconciled with such a policy. This would be made quite clear - as already demanded at the party conference in Dortmund - by a 'yes' to the non-proliferation treaty. A 'yes' was made easier by the ban contained in the present text of the treaty on any hindrance to the civil research and application of nuclear energy. The Federal Government ought to ensure that this principle was strictly complied with in applying the treaty, and particularly of the article governing supervision.

A policy of détente towards the East called for close co-operation in the West. The Atlantic Alliance therefore had to be kept functioning properly until a working security system covering all Europe had been established. NATO reforms should not weaken the Alliance but enable it to contribute to the easing of East-West tension. The EEC should therefore be further strengthened, internally by progressive development and externally by allowing the EFTA countries, and particularly Great Britain, to join its ranks. Time was

ripe to set the process of enlarging the Community in motion. Franco-German friendship, without which German peace policy would be of no avail, therefore had to be deepened.

There was no question of choosing between a Western policy and an Eastern policy. Eastern policy called for restraint, co-operation and co-ordination in the West. A constructive Eastern policy strengthened the influence of the Federal Republic also in the West. The two policies were of equal importance - both served Europe as a whole.

The SPD party conference then turned to the field of economic policy. The Federal Republic, as the second trading nation of the world, was closely tied up with the world economy. One of the aims of Social Democrat economic policy was therefore to step up co-operation in international and supranational institutions.

The Federal Republic's economy was largely bound up with that of the European Economic Community. Economic and social conditions in the Community must therefore be harmonized still further. It was essential to enlarge the European Community, to expand trade with the Eastern bloc countries and to improve conditions for domestic German trade. This meant establishing a stable world monetary system and abolishing distortions in competition between States. Technological development in Europe should not be allowed to lag behind that of other industrial nations.

The SPD conference dwelt on a number of other points in European policy:

A Europe that was nothing more than the aggregate of national States or alliances could not play a decisive rôle in the world today.

The need for nuclear equilibrium and their global commitment had so far obliged the USA and the Soviet Union to accept the military status quo in Europe. Europe's situation would therefore continue to be determined by the balance established between the world powers. The European States would not therefore have to reckon with the threat of a nuclear war in the foreseeable future, although the occurrence of grave crisis in Europe could not be entirely ruled out.

This general trend would probably not be upset by the fact that the 'status quo' policy of the world powers had widened the room for manoeuvre of this or that European ally in the Eastern and Western sphere of influence.

There were signs of a slackening both in the communist and in the Atlantic bloc; consciousness of national interests was on the increase throughout Europe and even in the communist parties and countries. This circumstance was helping to make co-operation between the Western and Eastern countries somewhat easier.

In contrast to the success of economic co-operation within the EEC, the Soviet Union, because of its own unsolved economic problems, had run up against difficulties in its co-operation with the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance. This had led to the appearance of movements for economic policy reform in the communist countries.

All this had created better conditions for future economic and technological co-operation between the European peoples because European States, both in the East and in the West, were becoming more and more interested in trading with each other and in exchanging information on technological and economic questions.

These developments could provide a surer basis for overcoming the division of Europe. Welcome though they were, under certain circumstances they might slow down the process of West European unification in the next few years.

Already, attempts to develop and enlarge the West European Communities set up in the fifties were coming up against one obstacle after the other, because supposed national interests were still being put before the interests of the European people as a whole. The enlargement of the Community through the entry of Great Britain, Ireland and the Scandinavian countries, and the expansion of the European institutions, remained on the agenda and were perfectly consistent with increasing co-operation between all the European States. Fresh efforts were needed to establish the highest possible degree of co-operation in the political, economic and cultural fields. Europe had to be organized as a community of peoples.

(SPD-Parteitag 1968, Tatsachen - Argumente, Nr. 242 u. 243/1968)

2. The Italian European Movement calls on the democratic parties to enter into an electoral commitment on European policy

The European Movement, in view of the coming elections, has sent to the secretariats of the Italian political parties that favour European unity and a democratic and supranational Europe, a document calling for a joint electoral commitment on European policy.

This stated that the approaching elections faced the Italians with responsibilities rendered even graver and more urgent by the international situation. Under the irresistible pressure of technical progress, the world was growing smaller and smaller, binding all men together in a common fate. In this world, always threatened with a disastrous flare-up of the sources of conflict, the European peoples, once themselves makers of history, were now merely spectators dependent on others for their security. At the same time the age-old disputes which had been the main cause of Europe's decline largely remained. Just as, in the nineteenth century, the Risorgimento had led to the establishment of a single State in a previously fragmented Italy, so today the renaissance of Europe required the progressive establishment of a federal State, without which the progress made in the technological and economic sectors would only widen the existing gap. The Community's institutions - which significantly, though only partially, foreshadowed such a federal State - must therefore be preserved at all costs and rendered both more authoritative and more democratic. After all, the process of economic integration set in motion with the creation of the Common Market could only be controlled by institutions equipped with the necessary powers. Moreover, only by transferring to them substantial powers could these institutions be made truly representative. In this respect, the democratic cause and the federalist cause today coincided in Europe.

Progress towards federalism in the European Communities was also essential to enable the European people to serve the interests of peace - now indivisible - namely, to make their contribution to the common economic and civil progress which is the surest safeguard of peace.

The Italian Council of the European Movement invited member parties to enter into a clearly-defined legislative commitment which, as regards the responsibilities falling respectively on the Italian Parliament and Government, could be summed up as follows:

- '(a) renewal, at the beginning of the next legislative period, of Italian Parliamentary representatives in the various European organizations;

- (b) immediate legislative measures for the election of members of the European Parliament by direct universal suffrage;
- (c) clearly-defined and suitable measures aimed at investing the European Parliament with ample real powers;
- (d) constant action to defend and strengthen the Community Executive's powers of initiative and financial autonomy;
- (e) discharge of the obligations flowing from the European Treaties or assumed by Italy within the Community;
- (f) constant encouragement, by suitable institutional means, of parliamentary initiatives and of more effective co-ordination of governmental action in the field of European policy, with a view also to dealing with national problems against the background of the prospects of European integration;
- (g) open and systematic support of any initiative likely to facilitate the admission to the European Economic Community in its present form of Great Britain and other interested democratic countries that are ready and willing to exercise rights and assume obligations jointly with the present member States;
- (h) tackling problems connected with the merger of the European Communities and with their geographic enlargement in such a way as to facilitate progress towards federal-type institutional structures.'

(Avanti, 23 March 1968)

3. Views of Mr. Mitterrand on Europe

'Only a united and socialist Europe is likely to be able to meet the American challenge on terms of equality.' This was the argument put forward by Mr. François Mitterrand, President of the Federation of the Democratic and Socialist Left (FGDS), during a debate on 1 April at the American Cultural Centre. The subject under discussion was 'The American challenge: should it be taken up or should it merely be endured?'. Mr. Mitterrand considered that

the 'challenge', which was recently analyzed in a book by Mr. Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber, was not a concerted plan to dominate. It simply followed from the situation of a great power: the United States vis-à-vis the Europe of today which was, he said 'a mosaic of disorganized States'.

'Whether in the political, monetary or technological fields', he said, 'the six countries of the Common Market only have partial views and these constitute a broken chess-board'.

Mr. Mitterrand felt that to choose the liberal Europe, which had been the goal of its founders, would mean accepting the American Europe; this in turn meant meeting the challenge not with success but with failure. The milk problem was the best example of the liberal failure, he felt, because milk production had not been planned in time.

A point had been reached where all the EAGGF credits would be employed in the service of an obsolete economy and would not be available for agricultural structures.

'My answer to the American challenge is a Socialist France carrying Europe along with it'.

On 8 April, Mr. Mitterrand was the guest on a live television feature entitled 'En direct avec'

What would a socialist France do in a non-socialist Europe?
Mr. Mitterrand replied by referring to the milk product crisis in the common agricultural market. He considered that the liberal Europe had been caught in its own trap and that it did not meet the aims of true Europeans. Planning was necessary and the liberal Europe had to change its methods and take the lead from France.

(Combat, 1 April 1968;
Le Figaro, 9 April 1968;
Le Monde, 10 April 1968)

4. Mr. Pisani appraises French agricultural policy from the European standpoint

Speaking in Angers on 8 April at the first conference held by the Economic Training Centre for Farmers (C.I.F.E.A.) of which he is President, Mr. Pisani, the former Minister, laid emphasis on the growing importance of agriculture: 'At the very moment when we are building the economic Europe, it already appears to belong to the past. History may perhaps serve to show that the Europe of the Six has been no more than an economic apprenticeship in international trade.' The CIFEA was still taking its first hesitant steps and its achievements had been modest. Mr. Pisani felt that it had to become both a centre for reflexion - with its windows wide open on the Scandinavian, Anglo-Saxon, Socialist and under-developed countries as much as on the established West - and it had to be a means of action 'from the outside', aimed at the young farmers' élite. At a time when the 'intermediate' agricultural policies pursued in Paris and in Brussels were on the point of failing and at a time when certain East European countries such as Czechoslovakia were seeking a new course, the initiative could be of interest.

(Le Monde, 9 April 1968)

5. For Mr. Spaak the political progress of Europe is insignificant.

Addressing on 10 April 1968 the fourth congress of the European Teachers' Association, Mr. Spaak questioned Europe's progress after twenty years of efforts.

Mr. Spaak felt that, with regard to the aim of achieving economic integration, this had been largely fulfilled and countries that were in the past hostile to the Community were now asking to join it. The essential thing, however, was political integration and Mr. Spaak pointed out that, in this respect, a mistake had been made in assuming that economic integration would lead to political integration almost automatically.

'We find', he said, 'that political progress so far has been less than insignificant'. It may be asked, moreover, whether the idea of a political Europe is not losing ground in relation to the original concept. We are witnessing, in France above all, a revival of nationalism at a time when there is no longer nowadays a single European State that is capable of settling its own problems alone. It is inevitable for such a feeling, once aroused in a given

country, to spread to others. 'How can we explain to the Germans', said Mr. Spaak, 'that nationalism is all right for the French, but not for them!'

'It may also be asked if, even in the field of economic integration, we are certain to have reached the point of no return. For in the absence of real European solidarity, there is the danger of a collapse, if a crisis should occur, of the structures set up so far. And even if there were no crisis, can one really imagine that further stages in economic integration (fiscal or monetary, for example) could be reached by the Six if they have different foreign policies? Will Germany go on subsidizing the agriculture of its partners if these do not endorse its foreign policy? What saved us in this respect is the common policy pursued within the Atlantic Alliance.'

(Le Soir, 11 April 1968)

6. Europe in the election programmes of the Italian political parties

Prior to the elections of 19 and 20 May 1968, all the Italian political parties set out in their programmes the action they felt Italy ought to take in the field of foreign policy, without, of course, disregarding the principles of the Atlantic Alliance and of European integration.

The Christian Democrats, while in favour of Italy's presence in the Atlantic Alliance, suggested it should develop the method of 'articulated' association and the model of a Euro-Atlantic political society based on the values of peace, democracy and equality implicit in its treaty and in the principle of interdependence.

As regards European policy, the Europeist ideal remained the linchpin of Christian Democracy which had made to it, with its statesmen and its political tradition, an indispensable contribution.

For the Christian Democrats the Europeist ideal ranked as a firm commitment which needed to be stressed at a time when it appeared to have lost its lustre. It was being relaunched in European political consciousness and in the action of the governments as an obligation deserving of priority in that 'on it depends our survival in historical terms'.

The Europe the Christian Democrats were striving for therefore remained that 'outlined in the Treaties of Rome - supranational, democratic, open to new members and capable of ensuring its own defence'.

The following measures would therefore have to be introduced in the next legislative period:

- (a) renewal, at the beginning of the next legislative period, of Italian Parliamentary representatives in the various European organizations;
- (b) immediate legislative measures for the election of members of the European Parliament by direct universal suffrage;
- (c) clearly-defined and suitable measures aimed at investing the European Parliament with ample real powers;
- (d) constant action to defend and strengthen the Community Executive's powers of initiative and financial autonomy;
- (e) discharge of the obligations flowing from the European Treaties or assumed by Italy within the Community;
- (f) constant encouragement, by suitable institutional means, of parliamentary initiatives and of more effective co-ordination of governmental action in the field of European policy, with a view also to dealing with national problems against the background of the prospects of European integration;
- (g) open and systematic support of any initiative likely to facilitate the admission to the European Economic Community in its present form of Great Britain and other interested democratic countries that are ready and willing to exercise rights and assume obligations jointly with the present member States;
- (h) tackling problems connected with the merger of the European Communities and with their geographic enlargement in such a way as to facilitate progress towards federal-type institutional structures.

For the Unified Socialist Party the major task for Italy's international economic policy, which also largely governed its dealings with the developing countries and its efforts to build up trade with the East, was the affirmation and progress of the European Communities. The Socialists were striving for European integration not only for political reasons but also because they regarded it a suitable means of achieving specific economic and social ends. Italy had taken up the challenge of the Common Market with courage and energy despite the fact that, of the six founder countries, it had been not only the weakest economically but also situated, geographically and psychologically, to the edge of the main streams of European tradition. Forecasts that Italy would be reduced to playing a minor rôle as a marginal producer of agricultural products and tourist centre had been belied by the facts, thanks to the drive and energy of the Italian workers.

The European Community should stay open to the world outside... The Kennedy Round had shown that Europeans could negotiate far more effectively on economic, commercial and financial problems with the United States if they could decide on a common approach. The same could be said for relations with Eastern bloc countries. These had passed from a position of reticence, accounted for by the climate of the cold war, to a more relaxed attitude; some, like Poland and Yugoslavia, had established trade relations with the Community. The European Community should continue to move forward along this road and build up its rôle of magnet and point of departure for the unification of Europe as a whole, pursuing outward-looking and liberal aims by means of a non-protectionist commercial policy. The economic obstacles to British entry could not be regarded as insuperable.

In its turn, the Executive of the Socialist Party passed a motion on the problem of parliamentary representation in the European Parliament. This announced that by 31 October 1968 the Socialist parliamentary groups of Senate and Chamber, having by then established the necessary contacts with the socialist groups of the national parliaments of the EEC member States and with the corresponding socialist parties, as well as with the other parliamentary groups and national parties of the European Democratic Front and with the political groups of the European Parliament, would table a motion in the two sections of the Italian Parliament, calling for an agreement between the ministers of the six governments in the Council of the Community on the election of the European Parliament by direct universal suffrage, in accordance with the draft submitted to the Council by the European Parliamentary Assembly. These elections were to be held not later than in 1969. Failing unanimity in the Community Council of Ministers, the Italian socialist parliamentary groups would promote, subject to the same time-limit, direct election by universal suffrage of the national delegations to the European Parliament in countries where the parties of the European Democratic Front have a parliamentary majority, and therefore - it could then be assumed - in Italy.

On this assumption the Socialist Party undertook to bring up the problem of the ordinary renewal - with second-degree election - of the Italian delegation to the European Parliament when they started consultations on the formation of the new government, excluding any form of participation in that government until such renewal had been decided upon as the first act of the new majority.

The Italian Republican Party, in an election publication dealing with foreign policy, confirmed its determination to fight for the creation of a large-scale uniform European political and economic area. The Italian Government ought to make a firm stand against Gaullist France's unceasing attempts to establish a hegemony and against the veto which, since 1963, it had been constantly opposing to British entry to the Common Market. To underline Italian disapproval of Gaullist attempts to establish ascendancy in Europe, Italy could take effective action during the next legislative period by concluding a permanent pact for political consultation with Great Britain. The Republican Party's views were confirmed by a statement made by its secretary, Mr. La Malfa, in an interview granted to the weekly 'Panorama': 'Gaullism, with its nationalist foundation, has seriously slowed down European unification. In our view, Italy should take the lead in the anti-Gaullist battle and find points of agreement with all countries and forces that oppose the Gaullist vision. The French veto on Great Britain's entry into the Common Market is purely political and is governed not by economic but by political objectives.

As a practical example of Italy's wish to oppose this design, we have suggested a pact for consultation between Italy and Great Britain. This idea, which dates back to 1963 at the time of General de Gaulle's first veto and the inception of the Franco-German pact, was rejected as at variance with the Common Market's policy. But this is the only lever we have with which to demonstrate our opposition to the Gaullist design. As to the pressures France is putting on Germany, the Anglo-Italian consultation pact would serve as a pole of resistance to that so doggedly pursued by General de Gaulle. We are therefore for an active policy and not merely one aimed at containing Gaullist pretensions. Moreover, we are today drawn to Great Britain not only by considerations of European and international policy but also by certain economic measures adopted by Mr. Wilson to raise the technological and social level of the British economy.'

The Italian Liberal Party stated in its programme that to enable each of the European peoples to progress culturally, economically and socially, and to develop their individuality to the utmost in a climate of peace and security and contribute to the development of other peoples, Europe must unite, with the participation and in the decisive interest of Italy. In agreement with the other liberal parties, the PLI was striving:

- (a) to overcome Gaullist opposition to Great Britain's admission and to the Community's conversion to a democratic political community (United States of Europe);
- (b) for the election of the European Parliament by direct universal suffrage;
- (c) for a general system of European security comprising, on the one hand, the European Community and the United States and, on the other, Eastern Europe and Soviet Russia.

For its part, the Italian Communist Party stated that, firmly opposed as it was to any form of autarchy, it demanded the 'suspension' of the weightier Community 'regulations' and the amendment of the treaties establishing the Common Market, with a view to setting up wider forms of economic co-operation between all the countries of Europe and establishing fresh relations with the developing countries - first and foremost in Africa and in the Middle East - so as to help democratic and social forces to progress and resist domination by large industrial and financial concentrations and neo-colonialism in whatever form.

The Italian Socialist Party for Proletarian Unity (PSIUP) lined up with the Communist position, criticizing the Italian Government for wishing to wind up the current legislative period by 'reaffirming, even through formal initiatives, its faith in the Atlantic Alliance and its support for Europeanism'.

In the economic field, the shortcomings and contradictions of the Italian Government's Atlantic and European policy had been reflected in the vicissitudes undergone by the Common Market, the recent devaluation of sterling and the dollar crisis. The crisis of the reserve currencies had brought to the surface a long-standing trend - the progressive indebtedness of the United States to Europe and the exercise of a real dictatorship by the debtor over the creditor.

The PSIUP therefore hoped to see a new and independent Italian foreign policy which would help to break up the opposing military blocs and to create a system of European security. A position of active neutrality could enable Italy to serve as a weighty factor for peace in Europe and in the Mediterranean.

The Italian Socialist Movement saw European unity as a converging of culture and interests, of history and politics, capable of resisting any

attempt to break it up, whether from the East or from the West. The Italian Socialist Movement thought of European unity in terms of nations and peoples, but the radicalism so dear to the Centre Left wanted to make it the subject of a factious agreement between parties, thus destroying any real prospects of its being achieved.

Finally, the Italian Democratic Party of Monarchical Unity asserted its faith in European unity. It would fight to achieve it because only if all the forces of the continent were pooled could the supreme values of Western civilization be saved. There was no point in repeating the numerous arguments put forward by the champions of a united Europe. Some of these, however, were behaving at this difficult moment as though they wished to defer, rather than bring forward, the achievement of the desired goal.

(Il Popolo, 13 April; Avanti, 9-10-11 April; La Voce Repubblicana, 18 April; Panorama, 18 April; Posizione liberale, 9 April; Programma elettorale del PSIUP, Comunità europea, April)

7. A warning to Europe from Mr. Guy Mollet

On 25 April, Mr. Guy Mollet, Secretary-General of the SFIO (Socialist Party) was the guest of honour at a dinner-debate organized by the European Federalist Movement, of which Mr. Hirsch is President.

He outlined the views of the Left and made frequent reference to his own opinions on European problems; he accused General de Gaulle of 'killing Europe'.

He said that General de Gaulle had condemned Yalta but that he was preparing a second Yalta. If the countries of Europe did not speak with one voice, they would cease to count.

Mr. Mollet also stressed that the agreement reached between the two political groups was not a programme for governing with the Communists as long as they maintained their present attitudes, particularly on Europe. He was, however, convinced that the Communist party would evolve and he referred to what had just happened in Czechoslovakia, a country from which he had recently returned: 'This is the most important event of the second part of the twentieth century and I think that within six months Czechoslovakia will ask to be associated with the Common Market.'

(Le Monde, 27 April 1968)

8. Mr. Mendès-France for 'Europeanization' of the pound

Mr. Mendès-France, former French Prime Minister and at present PSU Deputy for Grenoble, sent to the 'Force Ouvrière' union of chemical industries, on the occasion of a congress in Grenoble, a message on the subject of 'Trade unionism, Europe and the Left'.

In that message he recalled his opposition to 'the capitalist and free trade policy which had been adopted on setting up the Common Market.' He pointed out that priority had only been given to monetary stability considerations. The Governments concerned had introduced deflationary policies that were slowing down salary increases, sacrificing productive investments and inducing, with regard to social benefits, undesirable 'downward alignments.' Limited as it was, 'to meet the wishes of conservative and liberal forces', to the mere opening of frontiers, the Common Market was running the risk of 'becoming an instrument for propagating deflation and unemployment', a closed field for fierce competition that did not take into account 'the human and social factors which we have no right to overlook in the twentieth century.'

'For men who claimed to believe in socialism, Europe must not be allowed to surrender to the natural machinery of the market nor to the omnipotence of cartels and mergers... This is why we affirm the need for member countries to co-ordinate their economic activities and for closer co-operation that will finally lead to a true European planning system.'

Mr. Mendès-France advocated the creation of a 'European payments agency' which would carry out the essential harmonization of credit subscriptions.

He then stressed that 'in the new forms of action that must lead to a democratic planning system on a European scale, trade unions have a particularly important part to play.'

He declared that 'without Britain, it was unrealistic to claim to be building a balanced Europe', and he was convinced that solutions could be found to the difficulties connected with Britain's entry into the Common Market.

In order to solve the most complex of these difficulties, he suggested that sterling should be 'Europeanized', for as long as Britain continued to pursue, because of its monetary situation, a deflationist policy, it would remain a bad customer for the countries of the continent, as well as for the underdeveloped countries.

(Combat, 28 April 1968; Le Monde, 30 April 1968)

9. The Committee for Europe's independence issues a 'manifesto' against 'American hegemony'

The Committee for Europe's independence was founded ten months ago with the object of 'creating the necessary political and material conditions for grouping together progressive leaders and intellectuals with a view to organizing co-ordinated action against American hegemony, for the independence and modernization of Europe'... The Committee issued a 'manifesto for Europe's independence' which reads, inter alia, as follows: 'the progressive union of Europe cannot truly be achieved without economic, political and cultural independence. It is a matter not only of deciding whether Europe will be responsible for its own future, but also of realizing that in accepting to be the bridge-head of American hegemony, Western Europe would become party to a policy of world aggression and the target of a universal revolt. Opposing this hegemony implies, in particular for Europe, radically refusing the present international monetary system and the exorbitant privileges enjoyed by the American dollar... The Common Market, founded on the Rome Treaty, is an important instrument of West European unity. Its development will be decisive for Western Europe and, consequently, for the whole of Europe. Any enlargement of the Common Market is desirable provided it strengthens European independence. The basic criterion of any enlargement is, therefore based on the degree of economic and political emancipation of the applicant countries in relation to the United States... Europe's progressive unity must be founded - in the economic sector - on modern and strict methods rejecting liberal capitalism and the economic, political and ideological structures deriving from it. It is, therefore, as part of the action against imperialism and within the framework of an independent Europe that the problem of changing man's condition and means of production will lie in future.'

The first signatories to this manifesto include the following Emmanuel d'Astier de la Vigerie, René Capitant, Jacques Debû-Bridel, Jean-Marie Domenach, François Mauriac, François Perroux, Philippe de Saint-Robert.

(Le Monde, 4 May 1968)

10. The European policy of the French Unified Socialist Party (PSU)

Mr. Michel Rocard, National Secretary of the PSU, defined the major options facing his party with regard to European questions at a press conference in Strasbourg on 3 May.

He explained that the PSU rejected the supranational idea in its present form because it would simply culminate in a consolidation of the capitalist structures in Europe. European co-operation had to be revived starting from the basis. The pressure of the working classes, he felt, should be strong enough to impose a policy for individual sectors within the framework of the Six. This involved increased intervention by the public authorities. The PSU would be in favour of functional supranationality adjusted to certain quite specific sectors in which the rôle of the public authorities might be the dominant one.

(Le Monde, 4 May 1968)

11. Mr. Servan-Schreiber's visit to Sweden revives interest in Europe

At the invitation of the Swedish Government, Mr. Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber recently paid a four-day visit to Sweden. What prompted Mr. Erlander to invite the author of 'The American Challenge', was the wish to revive Sweden's interest in Europe.

The Government thus scored against the opposition which had blamed it for not taking any initiative on the question of Sweden's entry into the Common Market. In fact, the Swedish Government had been waiting for over two years for the reply of the Six to Britain's application in order to determine its own attitude. In its letter to the Brussels Commission of July last, the Swedish Government had not specified the type of admission it was seeking i. e. full membership or association.

The Government had now realized that its approach had been so ambiguous that it stood no chance at all of success. The particular wording of the Government's letter was due to the need to maintain neutrality, a basic tenet of Sweden's foreign policy.

Mr. Servan-Schreiber felt that neutrality, far from being an obstacle to Sweden's accession to the Common Market, was regarded by General de Gaulle as an advantage since Sweden was not a member of the Atlantic organization. To this argument, the Swedes replied that their country could act alone, having accepted certain joint commitments with Norway and Denmark, both of which are full members of NATO. For the time being the deadlock continued.

Mr. Vickman visited Brussels on 6 May for talks with Mr. Raymond Barre, Vice-President of the European Commission. At a recent meeting of the EFTA Ministers in London, Mr. Vickman explained to the British his Government's intentions. Moreover, the General Labour Confederation will open a branch in Brussels in order to promote contacts with trade unions in the Community countries. While the majority of trade unionists is still apprehensive and reticent with regard to the idea of opening Sweden's frontiers, the leaders are far less so. Mr. Geijer, leader of the Labour Confederation, supports Mr. Erlander's policy in seeking a rapprochement with the EEC.

Sweden's desire not to follow in Britain's wake, to have done with isolation and to become integrated into a larger Europe is the result of a slow change in the minds of the people. This evolution has been going on for the past two years at Government level and amid employers, trade unions and the public. Only the juvenile supporters of the National Liberation Front, the Communists and fellow-travellers or even the liberals are very 'sensitive' to the problems of the developing countries. They are hostile to Sweden's integration in a 'capitalist' Europe in which they feel their country would not be strong enough to direct its policy towards the socialist community of which they are dreaming.

(Le Monde, 12/13 May 1968)

12. Views of Dr. Bock, former Austrian Vice-Chancellor, on the Austrian integration policy

On 21 May Dr. Bock, former Austrian Vice-Chancellor and Minister for Trade, made known his views on Austrian foreign policy. On Austrian integration policy, he observed:

As regards Austria's neutrality, the conclusion of a treaty with Brussels sought by Austria was the main prerequisite for the expansion of the Austrian economy and therefore had to be considered also in connexion with his country's prosperity and, therefore, integrity. Membership of the EEC was incompatible with neutral status, but at the same time Austria had to deal on a large-scale West European market if her integration problem was ever to be solved. The only answer, therefore, was a treaty so framed as to take Austria's special circumstances into account while satisfying the needs of integration and not upsetting the inner workings and development of the European Communities. Concessions would be needed on both sides. That this was possible had been demonstrated by the EEC Commission at the close of the last round of negotiations.

What significance would such a treaty have for Austrian foreign policy? One had only to consider what would happen if such a treaty was not concluded. Austria, a country dependent on a high level of exports, could not survive economically unless these were maintained and even expanded. So important was the treaty with the European Communities in this respect that, if it failed to materialize, Austria would have to divert its external trade to a disproportionate degree to the Eastern bloc countries. This could not, however, but alter Austria's overall foreign policy position.

Under these circumstances the treaty with Brussels, although strictly speaking intended to serve economic ends, was in fact one of the bases on which the foreign policy pursued by Austria to date could be continued. This was in no way altered by the fact that at the moment, as a result of the complete standstill in the field of European integration brought about by French policy, no discussions could take place between Austria and the Communities. Mention should also be made of the current Italian veto. Free Europe should therefore realize the importance for it too of the treaty sought by Austria.

Austrian foreign policy was part of overall European policy directed at the survival of a country whose existence was essential to peace in Europe. Since Austria was a western country, the needs of its foreign policy tallied with the interests of the free democratic world.

(Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 21 May 1968)

13. The National Congress of the Luxembourg Labour Party

The Socialist Labour Party of Luxembourg held its Ordinary National Congress on 12 and 22 May. With reference to foreign policy, it passed a resolution and the sections concerning the development of the European Communities read as follows:

'The National Political Congress of the Luxembourg Socialist Labour Party considers it regrettable that the accession of further democratic member States to the European Community has foundered on the veto of the Government of one member State and that there thus seems to be no real progress towards the political and economic unity of the peoples of the Community; it considers it desirable that this dangerous paralysis of Community policy should be overcome (a) by forging ahead in building the Economic Union, (b) through a progressive introduction of financial autonomy for the European Communities

and (c) through an appropriate adaptation of the powers of the European Parliament to make them consistent with the significance of Community legislation. It advocates an active social policy for the European Communities, particularly as regards offsetting adverse effects which economic redevelopment might have for the workers. '

(Tageblatt, 25 May 1968)

14. Professor Hallstein on relations between the USA and Europe

In a speech delivered in Cologne on 28 May 1968 before representatives of the Federal Association of German Wholesalers and Exporters and Federal Ministers and Secretaries of State, Professor Walter Hallstein reported that doubts as to the ability and will of Europeans to unite and to enlarge the Community were as widespread as doubts of their readiness to take over, jointly with the USA, a rôle in international politics.

General de Gaulle's policy had had devastating effects in the USA. If relations between the USA and Europe were to be put on a realistic bases adaptable to future demands, the concept of partnership elaborated by President Kennedy would have to be extended beyond co-operation in trade and development policies.

(Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 29 May 1968)

15. Lecture of Mr. Pescatore, Judge at the Court of Justice of the European Communities on the rights and duties of the European citizen

The 18th Course in the European civic education campaign took place in Luxembourg on 4 and 5 June 1968. It was organized by the Centre européen de la Culture in Geneva and was attended by about 40 teachers, from most of the west European countries. During the course, Mr. Pierre Pescatore, Judge at the Court of Justice of the European Communities, spoke about problems of the rights of man raised by European integration.

He considered that the Treaties had brought into being a new organization of the west European States in the form of European Communities; this was firstly an economic organization but was to become a political organization. In contrast to national constitutions, this one included no catalogue of fundamental rights and made no reference to such rights. Yet this should not cause too much concern because as things stood at present there had been no problem to solve concerning the respect of fundamental rights. None the less, there was an element of insecurity and it had to be asked what would happen when in due course such problems arose. Mr. Pescatore thought that the Community constitution included a number of features which could be used to develop adequate safeguards for the fundamental rights, should the need arise. The lack of safeguards was only apparent. Indeed the Community constitution officially recognized the principle of the paramountcy of Community law and the structure of the Community included an institution to ensure it was applied, namely the Court of Justice.

The organization of the Court matched up to the criteria of impartiality and independence of the national courts. The work it had done so far showed that its methods would not have to be changed to deal with problems of human rights. The European Treaties, furthermore, contained certain definite directions which could be used to advantage. It was a question of making the most of the material content of the Treaties and there was at the Court of Justice a jurisprudence that had to be developed and extended. If, apart from Article 3 of the Constitution of the Council of Europe, nothing practical could be found to solve the problems arising, a number of features could be taken from the constitutional laws of the member States where these coincided. It might even be said that for them to coincide completely was not necessary and that all that was needed was a reasonable degree of similarity. Consequently, the unity of the Community should not be challenged by theoretical and unprofitable speculation; if practical problems arose, the common institutions and the Court of Justice would solve them.

The European Convention on Human Rights was the subject of a speech by Mr. Jean Raymond, Principal Administrator at the Secretariat of the European Commission for Human Rights. He began by showing that the Convention included a catalogue of fundamental rights and freedoms and a system for controlling their application. He recapitulated the history of the Convention in practice, referring to the private initiative from which it had sprung; he also analyzed its political and sociological origins. Since the end of the war the threat of totalitarianism had ceased to be the main concern so that the principles of the Declaration today obtained independently. The Convention had become a genuine law which was applied every day in practical cases and it constituted a jurisprudence. In comparison with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, it was more modest. This could hardly be called a weak point because although the United Nations Organization's Declaration simply constituted an objective to attain - which explained why it had been accepted unanimously - the European Convention included formal commitments which had

immediate effect. It included the rights of the individual which were not subject to any reservation and others which might be subject to restriction in certain cases. Those responsible for the Convention had opted for effectiveness and they seem to have been right because no signatory State had yet withdrawn and there had not yet been any open conflict with judicial authorities. The number of cases dealt with was indeed small but it was worth considering that each case deemed admissible implied questioning a given national institution and that the scope of the decisions taken was very far-reaching in view of the very large moral authority that this supreme court had acquired. Thanks, too, to the European Convention, settlements out of Court had been possible. It had also to be pointed out that nations were very sensitive to the moral sanction of the Commission and that national courts took its jurisprudence into account when reaching decisions and, again, that the European Convention had been maintained in certain overseas territories where it had been introduced by the former colonial power.

Lastly, Mr. Raymond stressed the importance of the European Convention in promoting the rights of the individual who had, as a result, become a subject of international law; it was also conducive to the unification of Europe because it obliged the signatory States to renounce some measure of their national sovereignty.

(Luxemburger Wort, 6 and 7 June 1968)

16. The German Deputy Blumenfeld (CDU) stresses the importance of political and technological integration for Europe's future

On 10 June, Mr. Blumenfeld gave a talk on 'the Europe of tomorrow' at the Institute of International Political Studies in Milan.

The author, after reviewing the student problem in Europe and in the Federal Republic of Germany, said that Europe was today confronted with difficulties which America had already overcome, while America was already concerned with problems of its future generation. America recognized that, in the present technological era, man must give a social significance to technology, a social content that had hitherto only been applied to the field of industry. In future, the main political problem would no longer be that of the manual work of countless individuals but rather the problem of intellectual activity within a technological society. Mr. Blumenfeld went to say: 'Europe is endeavouring to remove the apparent contradiction between action and thought while clinging, at the same time, to antiquated theories. It is paradoxical but, nevertheless,

true that the so-called scientific socialism of Karl Marx is of no help in this age of progressive democratization of science and "scientification" of democracy. Democratization of science means in practice that Europe, too, must advance towards what is called on the other side of the Atlantic "big science". This implies a reorganization of Europe's ideas in the technological, economic and political fields.'

Mr. Blumenfeld, therefore, attaches special importance to the American model and to co-operation with that country: 'Co-operation in fact is the "currency" of a future European development. That future can only be for a "great" Europe. It should, however, be borne in mind that the United States of Europe cannot have a beginning without a history. It is, therefore, necessary to find some instrument that would make it possible to arrive at a fair peace-time order for that concomitant phenomenon called European political unification. That instrument is, in fact, the "tous azimuts" co-operation, without external or internal hegemony. The future of Europe is a vital problem as well for the developing countries. Our world is not only divided by opposing political forces East and West but also by the economic gap between North and South. This economic gap demands that Europe should become one of the most advanced productive centres of the world.'

Referring to the political structure of a united Europe, the speaker came out in favour of a confederation of States which he regarded as the most suitable system for achieving common objectives. 'Finally', Mr. Blumenfeld concluded 'let us not delude ourselves. The only possible policy for Europe is a European policy and this can only mean a policy aiming at a "larger" Europe. Only this aim is of a truly political nature. All other aims have, more or less, the character of administrative measures and do not call for the intervention of statesmen. However, great strides have been made in that direction if we consider that the previous generation could not even conceive the problem in such precise terms. But this is also a challenge for the European policy of the next generation, and history will tell whether and to what extent our present European policy has taken up that challenge.'

(Relazioni Internazionali, 15 June 1968)

17. On the European policy of Britain
Two British opinions

Sir Con O'Neill, Ambassador to the European Communities in Brussels from 1963 to 1965 and leader of the British delegation to negotiate

entry into the Common Market in 1967 sent a letter to the 'Times' in which he declared the following:

'..... The only conclusion to which this article tends is that the best course for the British Government is to wait and see.

What follows assumes - there is no room to argue the case here - that it will remain Britain's best policy to join the Communities as a full member; and that a North Atlantic Free Trade Area is not, and will not become, a realistic or a satisfactory alternative.

..... There have been three French vetoes, with a depressingly regular periodicity: on the Free Trade Area negotiations in 1958; on the first negotiations for entry in January 1963; on the second attempt to enter in December 1967. After last December, one conclusion was obvious. So long as General de Gaulle remains in control of France, Britain will be kept out.

..... Up till the British application of 1967, it had been accepted in all Community countries, including France, that transitional periods would have to be granted to any new member. They would be part, and no doubt a large part, of the "conditions of admission" referred to in Article 237, which would "be the subject of the agreement" admitting the applicant state. It had been universally assumed that transitional periods would run from membership, not precede it. Transitional periods of this kind were a major topic of the 1962 negotiations.

In 1967, the French reacted by standing this assumption on its head. They had to, if they were to avoid a negotiation. Skilfully exploiting British economic weakness, they developed a new doctrine. Applicant states must qualify for membership by reaching certain standards of economic health, and by adapting their practices to those of the Community. Then and then only could negotiation for membership begin; and then of course, added the French, they could be extremely short, for neither derogations nor transitional periods would be needed. In other words, the whole process of adaption and transition must precede negotiations, not follow on from entry as a member.

..... The assumption that Britain should aim to enter the Communities assumes in turn that they will remain a successful concern worth joining. I believe they will, but at present they are in rather poor shape.

So, in a different way, are we. Our two attempts to join turned out to be badly timed. In 1967 especially the relationship between our aspirations

and our economic performance was disastrous. Seen from across the Channel, we are not yet a very attractive proposition. We must get our economy in better shape, and convince others that it will stay that way, before we shall succeed. That will take time.

It will take time too before there is any prospect of a reassessment by France of her interest, and a change in her present determination to exclude us. Without such a change we shall not succeed-unless through French weakness so great as to be dangerous to all. France must want us in, and Germany must still want us in. Of the others we can be more confident. My own best hope is that the Community as a whole will come to recognize that only its enlargement can renew its dynamism. That will take time, so we must wait and see.'

Mr. Stanley Henig, Labour M.P. for Lancaster wrote an answer to this letter, stating that it 's 'Timely for Britain to make European reappraisal' He went on :

'..... Any arrangements we make with Community countries must include France, so that the Benelux plan - welcomed by the Foreign Office as a drowning man clutches a straw - must be a non-starter. On the other hand, pressure on France to accommodate us is equally unlikely.

..... Equally, the "all or nothing" tactic is misconceived.

..... A group of Dutch journalists I met recently all insisted that the right action for us now was to seek an accommodation with France.

It is certainly worth considering the likely nature of a compromise or intermediate solution. Granted we cannot regulate our relations with the Six through Article 237 of the Rome Treaty (dealing with new members) and that Articles 111/3 deal only with nonpreferential tariff agreements in order to meet the rules of Gatt, the remaining possibility must be Article 238 on association. George Brown as Foreign Secretary expressed himself against association in such emotive terms that one might have thought Article 238 laid down a precise and unacceptable formula. In fact it is a framework article, permitting of any relationship with the Community from one slightly closer than that of third country to one just short of full membership. It follows that arrangements made under this article for Greece and Turkey need have no particular relevance for us. Moreover, to argue that it would be undignified for us to use the same article as these smaller countries has the same logic as suggesting that we cannot join a Community which has members the size of Belgium or Luxembourg.

In the long run Britain certainly needs full membership. We want to participate in all the political and economic advantages of the Community and we need an equal say in its evolution. In the shorter term, if full membership is unattainable more flexible criteria must apply. Association could be conceived as an interim measure offering an organic link with the Community.

..... In demonstrating to a public, increasingly bored with the European issue, that something positive had been achieved, the Government would be gaining and giving a guarantee against the kind of loss of interest which occurred in Britain between 1963 and 1966.


Essentially, such ideas are worth considering if only because France has continually championed an arrangement along these lines. For a long time, we in this country have made little effort to acquire a clear appreciation of French and Gaullist policy.

..... Had Britain during the probe asked de Gaulle his price for our membership, the answer might have been embarrassing, but this is no excuse for not putting the question. To France the acid test of our "European" sincerity almost certainly lies in our willingness to make common defensive arrangements perhaps going as far as an Anglo-French nuclear force. In this connexion, it is pretty futile to expect the next French Government unilaterally to renounce its force de frappe, in view of the example set by the British Labour Government. While it is difficult to evince real enthusiasm for joint nuclear forces and the like, if they genuinely constitute our entry card into Europe, they must form agenda for that great debate and not be hushed up.

The tragedy of the contemporary European scene is that at present Britain and France in agreement could mould events as they wished. Their failure to agree might result in the future, as in the past, in others gaining the initiative - to our mutual discomfort. If we are really serious about seeking entry into Europe, we place ourselves in a straitjacket by refusing to talk to France about ideas such as Association or nuclear pacts.

..... Certainly, as soon as a new constellation of political forces in France becomes clear, we should be ready with a new and relevant bilateral approach.'

(The Times, 4 and 26 June 1968)



III. ORGANIZATIONS AND GROUPINGS

1. The views of German industry concerning European policy and relations between Europe and the United States

On 27 March 1968, the Augsburg Chamber of Commerce and Industry held its annual general meeting; Dr. Dietrich Wilhelm von Menges thought that Europe and particularly the Federal Republic, still had an economic chance in the changing world markets. Criticizing Mr. Servan-Schreiber's 'The American Challenge' he argued that the future did not lie in an antithesis between Europe and the USA but in a synthesis of the two. He said that there was a new strain growing up in north-south relations and this had to be overcome by a definite solidarity between the USA and the USSR. The stronger the European economy became, the better equipped it would be to co-operate and solve the problems that the USA and the USSR no longer appeared able to solve on their own.

The structure of the world's economy had changed fundamentally as a result of technological developments and the new economic blocs that had come into being - East Europe, East Asia, Africa and, incidentally, South America. In 1967, the volume of trade with Eastern Europe had risen by 16 per cent as a result of the liberalization in progress and this offered Europe a whole series of new opportunities both as a supplier and as a customer. Europe and indeed the Federal Republic, had triumphed here where the USA had not.

The Americans would have to reconsider the management of the European economy in relation to the East European countries. We had to accept the Eastern partners as industrial nations and attempt with them to make available to third countries, including the developing ones, the resources of their united industrial strength. Through the new economic areas and the developing countries, Europe was in a completely new position of economic power.

The German prospects on the world market depended on an efficient international monetary and payments system. Too much was asked of the dollar, both politically and economically. The fact that German currency was particularly strong and at present not subject to any pressure would serve no purpose if German products were no longer able to compete because of the devaluation of other currencies. The idea of external trade security was today as much an illusion as was the self-sufficiency doctrine prevalent in the

thirties. The value of a currency was not its gold equivalent but its purchasing power. A European currency was indeed a fine idea for convinced Europeans but it involved the danger of monetary isolation - as opposed to an international monetary order that was still worth striving for.

On 2 April 1968, Mr. Berg, President of the Federation of German Industry, spoke in favour of a unilateral, ahead-of-schedule, introduction of the customs duty reductions agreed upon at the Kennedy Round. At a meeting of the German group of the International Chamber of Trade in Nuremberg, he stressed that Europe now had the chance to do something for America, not only with words. For Europe, which was at present economically secure, to help America would not only be fulfilling a debt of gratitude; it would also be giving itself a chance.

He argued that if one did nothing now there was a great danger that the Americans would be forced to take refuge in measures that would set off a chain reaction of protectionism. This would threaten all the achievements of the last twenty years. Mr. Berg trusted that Europeans would, in their own interest, be ready, as soon as possible, to give effect to the customs duty reduction proposals. Making things easier for American exports would make it possible for the USA to refrain from clamping down on imports.

'If we do not make any appreciable reduction in the customs burden for the Americans, then the American Government might go too far, under pressure of an increasingly protectionist public opinion, in taking measures to achieve this end.' It was therefore important for the Americans themselves to restore confidence in the dollar and, however impossible it might seem, to ask them to pursue a radical, deflationary policy. Such drastic action would inevitably affect Europe directly, given the close ties between all areas of world trade.

Mr. Berg was critical of the way in which every one was suddenly talking too much, and too hysterically about a monetary crisis. 'They are sawing off the bough of trust on which we are all sitting.' Evidence of this lay in the fact that the dollar would, as was always the case in the context of any monetary policy decision, 'continue to be of decisive importance for the whole world because it was the currency of the largest industrial nation.' He strongly warned against talk of monetary or currency policy theories and speculations about a devaluation of the dollar. 'Such a measure would show us what a real recession looks like and within a very short period.'

Mr. Arthur K. Watson, President of the International Chamber of Commerce in Paris, also advocated an early implementation of the Kennedy Round. Speaking at a meeting of the Board, he came out strongly against any arrangements or regulations that might affect international trade or lead to any direct or indirect discrimination. There was no longer any room for protectionism. The whole world had today to work to remove trade restrictions and to promote an expansion of trade.

With regard to contacts with the East, he said that the Chamber of Commerce and Industry represented private enterprise only. This did not mean that exploratory talks could not be held. Immediately private enterprise settled down in this field, the Eastern States would be accepted as members. They had however decided not to accept governmental positions in this context, he stressed.

Contacts with Chambers of the East European countries had so far been exceptionally favourable, added Mr. Otto Wolff von Amerongen, President of the German group of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry. He supported the appeal to help the Americans in their measures to make good their dollar deficit because 'American worries could quickly become our own.' If the American currency was not restored to health soon, other countries would have to reckon with economic and political difficulties of their own.

(Industriekurier, 28 March 1968; Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 3 April 1968; Die Welt, 3 April 1968)

2. Observations of the secretariat of the CGIL-CGT on the European Social Fund

The secretariat of the standing committee for co-ordination between the CGIL and CGT trade unions recently sent to the European Commission a memorandum containing proposals concerning the functioning of the European Social Fund.

This stated that the Social Fund had virtually not come into operation. Its effectiveness and scope had been severely limited and its initiative blighted by its adherence to the logic of monopolistic concentration, rationalization and efficiency.

The responsibility lay with the governments, which refused to support the Fund (an allegation largely proven) and with the Community institutions, which were reproached - not, it seemed, with justification - for a certain lack of interest. A major factor was the absence of joint action on the part of the national trade unions and the workers.

The Committee, while recognizing the contribution of the CGIL-CGT secretariats, maintained that the absence of the CGT and CGIL had helped to brake, if not paralyse, constructive efforts by the workers to acquire new rights at European level.

The Committee believed, however, that the European Social Fund, once it had been overhauled and was democratically administered, would prove to be an effective instrument of an active employment policy - subject, of course, to certain conditions, i. e. within a given social context (employment policy, social policy, democratization of community institutions, etc.).

Setting out from these principles, the Committee defined the true rôle, sphere of activity, structure and basic resources of the Fund:

- The Fund should work hand in hand with other organizations (European Investment Bank, EAGGF) and within the context of Community programmes;
- It should be administered on democratic lines;
- It could serve as a Community extension of trade union action at national level in respect of an entire series of claims;
- It should be the European projection of trade union efforts in every country to ensure full employment, occupational training and retraining policies, social protection of the free movement of workers etc. For this purpose, provision could be made for a wide range of action by European trade unions;
- The Fund should function in a practical way so as to contribute to a progressive policy in the widest variety of sectors specified.

To this end, the Fund must have adequate financial resources and its machinery would have to be overhauled. The memorandum also envisaged

drawing on independent Community funds on the basis of Article 201 of the Treaty.

(Avanti, 3 April 1968)

3. The Boerenbond (Belgian Farmers Union) and the common agricultural policy

Speaking on the Dutch service of Belgian television on 12 April, Mr. Boon, President of the Boerenbond, stated his views on the agricultural prices and structures policy of the European Community.

He said that at a time when there was a growing surplus of butter, they found themselves confronted with a structure policy that was still lacking in substance; a price policy had been proposed which was designed to bring about a reduction in output. This attitude was one which he found surprising. Price policy was required to secure incomes in the immediate and, in the long term, to give direction to production policy. The European Commission recognized that this had not been achieved through price policy although it was proposed to reduce the price of milk; this would further aggravate the incomes situation. To offset this loss reference was made to a vague structure policy which could obviously only produce results in the long term and then only in those regions where improvements were actually possible. It was inconceivable in the society of today that incomes should be reduced by decisions from on high against vague promises concerning the long term future. Senior officials of the European Commission had indicated unofficially what they thought might be the future structure of agriculture; this involved a change in the traditional approach which might still be current here and there. Yet these views had caused concern to the whole farming community and even those who had for a long time been working hard to make the necessary adjustments in their farm enterprises. They said that the structure to be aimed for was a really large scale farm; if this were the case, he said, then all their efforts had been in vain because they could never individually achieve the size of large scale farms on their own.

With regard to the size of farms, Mr. Boon did not think it was necessary to take as a standard those of 1, 000 to 2, 000 hectares with 400/500 cows and run by about six workers.

No one could deny that it was technologically possible to achieve this kind of scale but business economists who had the relevant figures to hand knew that this sort of enterprise could contribute to the economy at large. It was quite wrong to argue that cheaper products would, as a result, be offered to the consumer. It was the reverse that was true because, even with this scale of farm enterprise and even when the calculations were made on a yield per active person basis, this would still be well above the optimal scale in the economic context of today. The optimal scale was not dependent on techniques but rather on what could be achieved through labour, area and capital in conjunction. It was here that the farmer realized that he had to rely far more on machines - i. e. capital - because of the constant rise in labour costs. This was a gradual process rather than one that came about in defined stages, as was clear from developments in recent years.

Gradualness was necessary for social reasons. Until recently the expansion of the economy meant that manpower leaving the farms could be absorbed elsewhere. At that time, however, industry was in full expansion. Now industry was faced, not only in Belgium but all over Europe, with an urgent need to redevelop and the number of jobs available had fallen sharply while the creation of new employment possibilities demanded increasingly heavy financial sacrifices.

As he further stated to a Flemish newspaper, Mr. Boon felt that the Commission was deliberately holding up any Community solution for dairy produce in the hope that prices would collapse. It could then argue it was justified in advocating a reduction in milk prices. In his opinion, a high guaranteed price for milk might not stimulate an improvement in structures but it did make it possible because it was a question of capital. Taking a long term view of the position, Mr. Boon did not share the opinion of those who anticipated a continuous increase in milk production, primarily for reasons of stabilization. In Belgium the number of dairy cows per farm had increased appreciably. There were few farms where production was not rationalized. With regard to small farms a social policy had to be devised whereby indemnity allowances could be paid to those that had to close down, as well as pecuniary compensation for the slaughtering of dairy cows. This policy could be applied in all the Community countries, although perhaps to a lesser extent in the Netherlands where the problem was not so acute.

There was a second reason for believing that milk production would not continue to increase. Young farmers preferred activities which gave them more freedom than milk production, which involved numerous work ties.

In any event, a reduction in the milk price could only induce the small farmer to produce more to obtain a more or less equal income.

(De Boer, 20 April 1968; De Standaard, 26 April 1968)

4. The attitude of the Austrian Federation of Industry to integration policy

On 20 May 1968, the Federation of Austrian Industrialists called for an interim arrangement with the Community because, after years of effort in this direction, there was practically no prospect of any special arrangement being concluded between Austria and the EEC in the immediate future.

This was more to the point because such arrangements had been aired between the EEC and States that had applied for full membership. Whether and to what extent there were any prospects of success in this regard was, of course, not clear. As the Federation of Austrian Industrialists pointed out in its annual report, however, it would be pointless - and it would be to disregard the present situation - to go ahead with interim plans if these necessitated long-drawn-out negotiations. Similarly Austria should not regard successful negotiations in Brussels through such an interim solution as a matter to be taken lightly. Trade with such major industrial States of the EEC was important to Austria and a closer relationship could make many problems easier to solve but it would also raise some quite new ones. It would therefore be wrong to expect that all the difficulties would automatically be overcome through economic integration. It was more necessary than ever for Austria to put its own house in order.

The Austrian Federation of Industrialists further pointed out that a noteworthy structural change was being carried through in Austrian industry; this meant, inter alia, that an increasing proportion of its exports were finished goods. The existence of a widely-diversified industry, such as existed at present in Austria, did not, of course, make it into an industrial State. To achieve this there had to be an industrial policy and an industrial outlook among the population at large.

(Industriekurier, 21 May 1968)

5. The President of Bremen's Landeszentralbank speaks on the problem of the monetary union in the European Economic Community

On 20 May 1968, Dr. Leonhard Gleske, President of Bremen's Landeszentralbank, addressed a group from the German Trade and Transport School in Bremen and representatives of the European Union in that city on 'Economic and monetary problems in "Little Europe" and "Large Europe".' He said that the transition to a monetary union in the EEC would indeed be an important step towards the further stabilization and advancement of the Common Market; at the same time, greater integration in other branches of the economy, particularly a budgetary policy common to all member States as opposed to the present amalgam of domestic and foreign policy objectives would call for political decisions. Before going to Bremen, Dr. Gleske was a Director for monetary and financial questions in the EEC Commission in Brussels and a member of the ECSC Monetary Committee.

In Dr. Gleske's opinion, the completion of a monetary union, in which joint decisions would be needed for any change in parity of the member States' currencies in relation to each other's or those of third countries, would mean the Six would have to give up having independent monetary policies and their being subject to decisions from a Community institution. It was true that the development of the Common Market had, meanwhile, reached the stage where the monetary and financial independence of the member States was already severely restricted because of the pressure to integrate; but there was still a major difference between whether a State freely took into account the resulting implications and hence retained the possibility of taking its own decisions and whether it gave up any freedom of decision once and for all.

'The question of monetary integration is one of those issues contingent on closer political integration' he said. It was obviously why the member Governments hesitated to start out towards a monetary union. Dr. Gleske thought that the material pressure of integration was still not strong enough to necessitate a common monetary policy within the EEC. The objections to a standard currency as a further impetus to integration and towards strengthening the Community both internally and in its external relations could thus only be appraised from the political standpoint. The question of a standard or different denominations for the currency units in the individual countries after finally fixing the exchange rates was, he felt, still only of purely political and sociological significance.

(Industriekurier, 21 May 1968)

6. The German Federation of Wholesale Traders and Exporters discusses EEC policy at its Annual General Meeting

On 28 May 1968, Mr. Barzel, Chairman of the CDU/CSU Majority, made a noteworthy proposal for increased co-operation with the East European countries; he was speaking in Bad Godesberg at the Annual General Meeting of the German Federation of Wholesale Traders and Exporters.

'In trade with the Eastern States, the credit of the West was subject to certain limitations both from our standpoint and theirs. It should therefore be considered through which European institutions this flow of goods and payments could be freed from the strict bilateralism of the past.' Mr. Barzel argued that the EEC and the other Western European countries would do well to discuss these problems together and to make proposals to the East European States. The model that frequently suggested itself to him was the former European Payments Union with whose help - prior to the introduction of free convertibility of currencies - the flow of payments had been handled in the West.

The widespread concern in the Federal Republic about the EEC's agricultural policy was discussed by Mr. Dietz, President of the German Wholesalers and Exporters. His criticism was that it was becoming increasingly obvious that the common European agricultural market had been very dearly purchased.

Mr. Dietz spoke with surprising frankness. Neither had agricultural surpluses been prevented nor was the Brussels agricultural policy contributing to the expansion of world trade. 'We are today faced with the fact that the EEC agricultural policy has led us to the very dead-lock against which we have always warned every one.' It could be imagined that a stage would be reached when German exports were seriously threatened. The countries importing German goods were no longer in a position to deliver their traditional products to the German market because they could not get them over the hurdle of the levies system. With the increasingly dirigiste and protectionist dispensation in the whole agricultural sector, an outward-looking EEC policy on external trade would become increasingly unlikely. The expansion of German exports should not blind us to the fact that the long term view is fraught with doubts; trading partners who can no longer supply will, by the same token, not be in a position to buy.

It was a pity that one could not rely on the fact that the trade policy arguments of third countries have influenced the price policy decisions of the EEC; on the contrary, further import restrictions were now being devised in

Brussels to widen the scope of the market regulations for processed agricultural products. The proposed market regulation for canned products seriously affected imports from the developing countries. To date, these countries had supplied 44 per cent of these products in the Federal Republic. Similarly, the EEC, through its export subsidies, was to an increasing extent becoming a competitor of states which were the traditional suppliers of agricultural products.

Hence, the EEC's import policy worked against the interests of the small and medium-sized firms because of its lack of clarity. The large firms were almost the only ones able today to keep track of the machinery of constantly changing and additional levies. If the idea of a liberal import policy in the agricultural sector were finally abandoned, it would be in the interests of German exports to settle for increased imports of industrial products. Foreign trade was no one-way street; any regression to the profiteering of the nineteenth century would, because of the large scale of its external trade, mean serious danger to the German economy.

One of Mr. Dietz's recommendations was that it should be considered whether imports of raw materials and semi-finished products could not receive fiscal assistance. On the one hand, people were being encouraged to invest in the developing countries and yet, at the same time, these investments were threatened by a trade policy which was hostile to imports.

Considerable concern was being caused in German foreign trade circles because of the Brussels plans for creating product communities and common programmes and because of the intentions, which the Bonn Coalition Party was following through concerning a market structure and structure fund law.

(Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 22 May 1968; Die Welt, 29 May 1968; Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 31 May 1968)

7. The Federation of Belgian Industries and the future of European integration

When Mr. Eyskens and Mr. Merlot formed the new Government, the Federation of Belgian Industries (FIB) considered it desirable, on the eve of the entry into force of the Customs Union, to draw their attention to certain economic and social problems to which the Federation attached special

importance.

The FIB drew up a memorandum in which it discussed domestic issues, notably the early introduction of the added value tax, with reference to which it wrote: 'Belgian industry strongly urges that the added value tax should come into operation soon'.

The attitude of the FIB was outlined in 'Industry and the added-value tax'.

Pending the introduction of the added-value tax, it would be desirable to tighten up the countervailing measures at the frontiers and to draw up new lists of fixed-sum export drawbacks so as to reduce fiscal handicaps from which Belgian industry was at present suffering because of the introduction of the added-value tax or because of countervailing measures taken in the other member States.

With reference to European integration, the FIB looked into the following points:

I. Customs Union

The Customs Union will become operative on 1 July 1968; for it to be effective a number of common regulations will have to be taken.

If regulations, varying according to country, remained in force concerning imports of sensitive products from third countries, this would restrict the free movement of goods within the Community.

For this reason, too, it would be desirable for the Council, as soon as possible, to look into the working programme submitted by the Commission for eliminating technical obstacles to trade.

II. Common agricultural policy

The full implementation of the common agricultural policy in the form of market organizations is coupled with that of the industrial Customs Union on 1 July.

The Belgian Government should make its approval conditional on the practical application of this policy in some cases and on a respect for the essential conditions for economic and financial equilibrium.

III. Economic Union

The Economic Union is the essential complement to the Customs Union. We feel bound here to stress the importance of:

1. closer co-ordination of the monetary policies of the member States;
2. the earliest possible introduction in Belgium of the system of added value taxation, system laid down by the Community in February 1967;
3. to give practical expression to the efforts to co-ordinate research and development, pursuant to the decisions taken by the Council of Ministers in Luxembourg on 31 October 1967.

IV. Patent rights

It would appear highly desirable for the Belgian Government to take the necessary steps, within the framework of an active scientific research policy to improve the scientific and technical information systems; this, bearing in mind prospects that emerged from the third ministerial Conference on Science which took place under the aegis of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development in March 1968.

For this purpose, the Six should prepare to negotiate on the conditions governing the use of patents and licences which are the property of governments, the use of which is subject to their decision, because the research is state-financed.

The plan for international co-operation on patents, details of which were outlined in a major document drawn up by the International Patent Offices in connexion with the protection of patent rights, should be actively supported by the Government.

V. Bringing the structures of enterprises into line with the Common Market

The legal and fiscal obstacles to bringing the structures of enterprises into line with the structures of the Common Market urgently needed eliminating.

At EEC level, work should be speeded up on a convention, pursuant to Article 220 of the Treaty of Rome, for international mergers. If mergers and participations between enterprises in the Common Market were to be encouraged, a special taxation system would appear to be essential as a first stage towards harmonizing direct taxation in the Community. In addition, a unilateral agreement must be reached between the member States to avoid double taxation.

The EEC Commission should continue its work to achieve early harmonization of company law and should do so by recourse to directives.

Lastly, the FIB looked for a conclusion to the studies concerning articles of association for 'European-type' company; this should also facilitate mergers.

VI. Co-operation between enterprises

The FIB was concerned not only that the Belgian economy should swing into line with the continental market; it also attached special importance to co-operation agreements.

There were two major factors which made such a development possible: a concentration of enterprises or a concentration of their resources. Among the latter, pride of place must be given to joint research and specialization and rationalization agreements.

These problems were being given positive attention by the Commission of the European Communities, particularly from the competition rules angle, even though economic issues are involved.

VII. Social policy

As Article 117 of the Treaty of Rome indicates, the harmonization of social systems should come as a result of the operation of the Common Market before special procedures were resorted to.

To promote this harmonization and to preclude recourse to Community intervention, which might be artificial and involve no more than all member States' moving into line with the most advanced regulations, the Belgian Government should see to it that social reforms were devised with an eye to an approximation with the corresponding regulations in other member States.

VIII. A geographic enlargement of the Community

With reference to the countries which requested accession in 1967, the FIB could only approve the interim arrangements envisaged, provided they were conducive to an increasingly close union culminating in economic integration.

(Bulletin de la Fédération des Industries belges, No. 17 of 10 July 1968)

AT THE COMMUNITY AND INTERNATIONAL LEVEL

I. COMMUNITY'S EXECUTIVE

1. Mr. Jean Rey on the clash of views among Europeans

On 25 April Mr. Jean Rey, President of the Commission of the European Communities, stated in Paris, at the congress of the European Centre of Public Undertakings, that it was for the present generation, not the next, to construct the European edifice.

The European Executive could be expected one day to assume a different political complexion; the European Parliament, today appointed, would then be elected and the Executive would be answerable to it.

Mr. Rey was surprised at the objections being put up to enlarging the Community since the member governments had unanimously accepted the need in 1961. Since then Britain had moved much closer to the Communities, which were much stronger than in 1963 at the time the first negotiations between the Community and Great Britain were suspended.

This was the fourth disagreement splitting the Community. The first had occurred in 1954 with the rejection of the European Defence Community; the second in 1963 with the breakdown of the negotiations between the Community and Great Britain; the third, in 1965, had been caused by the crisis over the powers of the Commission and Parliament. Today the Community was faced with a fourth disagreement but it would surmount it as it had done the three earlier ones.

(Combat, 25 April 1968; Le Monde, 26 April 1968)

2. Mr. Mansholt suggests greatly increased expenditure on modernizing the agriculture of the Six

In an interview given to 'Jeunes Agriculteurs', the farming journal, Mr. Sicco Mansholt, Vice-President of the Commission of the European Communities, explained why he had courted unpopularity by advocating the introduction of curbs on milk production at the beginning of March.

He wanted to see a measure of balance established between production and available outlets. No answer had yet been found. That was why the milk price had been restricted to 38 Pfennigs. Even at that price it was expected that there would be annual surpluses of 80,000 tons of butter, which would go up by 40,000 tons a year. He could not see how such quantities could be disposed of.

It might of course be said, as had been said in the European Parliament, that the price of milk ought not to be reduced. But no solution was offered. Mr. Mansholt feared that if minor steps were not immediately taken (and to refrain from increasing the milk price was in itself a minor step), there would be enormous waste in the next two or three years. This would mean limiting the support of agriculture. There would have to be a ceiling such as already existed for the Guidance Section of the EAGGF. That was what Mr. Mansholt feared.

His measures were not popular. But sometimes it was necessary to do what was unpopular.

A tax on margarine might be suggested. But such a tax, high though it might be, would not solve the problem of milk surpluses. Moreover, the consumer would not accept it. What, then, was the answer? Mr. Mansholt could not yet think of one. No doubt it would lie in improving structures, in effecting a radical change in the pattern of agricultural production. Work had been going on for years on this question. The Commission would make proposals in this connexion, as promised to the Council of Ministers.

These proposals would be aimed at the situation of farmers around 1990, that is, in a society quite different from ours. When Mr. Mansholt had spoken of them in public, he had been greeted with: 'But this is revolutionary'. To which he had replied that it was the only way to ensure, in the future, a healthy agriculture and happy farmers. Unless production and marketing structures were radically altered, the problem would never be solved.

Mr. Mansholt wanted farmers to enjoy not only a financial and material living standard comparable to that of other workers, but also, at social level, an equivalent way of life. Why should not farmers take holidays? Why should those who look after pigs and cows have to work seven days out of seven? At the moment, farmers had no chance of living as others did. They worked more and gained less, and even then with no security. And it was the small farmers who were the worst off and found themselves at the greatest social disadvantage. It was this that had to be changed.

Immense financial efforts would be required of the Community member States and the entire European population. The necessary structural reforms would call for sums five, even ten, times greater than at present disbursed. And agricultural workers would have to be faced with these measures. But, as these would be so costly, some caution would be necessary; it would be necessary to bring home to them, at the time the price of milk or butter is fixed, that it was desired to solve the problem.

This meant cutting down support for the markets, but presenting the bill in the structural sphere. Evidence must be put forward of a desire to limit the guarantee funds of the EAGGF, but the Commission might still propose an orientation fund ten times greater than that which at present exists.

(Jeunes Agriculteurs, April 1968)

3. The Community's position at the eve of July 1, as reflected in an interview with Mr. Barre, Vice-President of the European Community Executive

Mr. Raymond Barre, Vice-President of the European Community Executive was interviewed by the 'Corriere della Sera' on some of the problems with which the Common Market was faced following recent events in France and the first of July date Limit for the customs union.

In answer to the question whether the Common Market was endangered by the situation in France, Mr. Barre said that it was too early to make any forecast: 'At any rate it is important for all the countries of Europe, even when faced with serious difficulties, not to renounce a policy which for the past ten years has made it possible to liberalize intra-Community trade as well as international trade and has contributed to the expansion of commerce.'

Protectionism remains, of all the possible remedies, the most dangerous one for the countries of Europe.'

Turning next to the problems that would be raised by the 1 July deadline, Mr. Barre pointed out that if the elimination of customs dues were restricted to the six member countries there would be no undue difficulties. In fact what now remained to be removed was the 15 per cent initial customs duty which had been in force in 1957 i. e. before the Rome Treaty came into being. The real problem was that of lowering the Community's external tariff, which derived from commitments under the Kennedy Round. Two Community countries, France and Italy, would have to make an additional effort because they have the highest tariffs to start with. 'From the first of July next', Mr. Barre pointed out, 'European enterprises will be confronted with international competition from industrialized countries and from those developing countries that are now exporting at competitive conditions for very much lower production costs than ours, lower wages and a fairly good technological standard. To meet the challenge of international competition, European industry must specialize in those sectors where it enjoys the most favourable position, that is to say, in industrial activities which presuppose large capital, sophisticated technology and considerable industrial management capacity. It is in activities of that sort that the countries of the Common Market can compete with outside markets and meet increasingly keener competition.'

Referring in particular to the Italian economy, Mr. Barre observed that Italy had prepared itself for foreign competition in a selected number of sectors in which it had concentrated investment and research. Italian industrial development had not taken place in width but in depth. The most typical example is that of Italy's domestic appliances industry, as well as its engineering and electrical industries.

Italy had derived the benefits of extensive post-war industrialization, that is at a time when the greatest technological strides were made. On the whole, Italy's industrial policy had proved both efficient and bold.

(Corriere della Sera, 6 June 1968)

4. EEC's financial and monetary problems seen by Mr. Barre and Mr. Coppé.

In an address delivered in New York in June 1968 Mr. Raymond Barre, Vice-President of the Commission of the European Communities,

stated that the events that would take place in Great Britain and in the United States in the coming months would be of crucial importance for international monetary stability.

Even after sterling devaluation England's monetary situation remained precarious. Since the beginning of 1968 the Commission had underlined the gravity of the problem of sterling balances and advocated its speediest possible international solution.

As to the dollar, Mr. Barre said that the stringent Federal Reserve monetary policy had been welcomed in Europe, but that the crucial factor for restoring confidence would be the adoption by the Federal Government of appropriate tax and budget measures. Europeans could not understand why the United States had still not taken steps to settle its balance of payments problem. While they were aware of the political difficulties, they felt that after the recent crisis any further delay would be extremely dangerous.

As regards France's economic situation, Mr. Barre saw little reason to take a gloomy view. The economic and financial cost of current events in France was high. But while it was only to be expected that the competitiveness of the French economy would suffer, a number of favourable factors suggested that the economy would be able to absorb the effects of the higher production costs and finance the probable balance of payments deficits out of the considerable monetary reserves.

As to the rumours of a devaluation of the franc, Mr. Barre regarded such a step as absurd in the present situation. Devaluation on the heels of a general rise in wages was difficult to entertain for political reasons. It would also be bad economics to fix a new parity for the franc without knowing the likely future pattern of wages and prices not only in France but also in the other industrial countries. In the longer term, the problem of the franc could not be dissociated from that of the entire international monetary system.

Mr. Barre went on to point out that although the main responsibility for improving the international monetary situation lay with the US, the countries of the European Economic Community had helped to steady the position by making a substantial commercial, economic and financial contribution, thus showing the value they attached to international co-operation. Underlining the importance of the Community's offer to speed up the Kennedy Round, he said that everyone in the Community was convinced that further protectionist legislation by the USA would lead to retaliatory measures by many other countries, particularly coming as they would from the most powerful economy in the world. With a view to combating all protectionist forces and

avoiding any checks to the liberalization of international trade, the Community had made a political gesture to the United States, despite the sacrifices which new concessions would entail for some Community countries, in particular France and Italy. Mr. Barre insisted that it was not easy to alter the conditions of the Kennedy Round without arousing strong reactions from European industries, particularly when the American Selling Price - a symbol, as it were, of American protectionism - was strongly and successfully defended in the US, and when the introduction of new protectionist measures was being considered there. He hoped that the United States would see its way to accepting the offer to accelerate the Kennedy Round.

A round table was organized in Bogota in April 1968 by the Inter-American Development Bank and Mr. Coppé, a member of the European Commission discussed some of the problems of the Community's financial policy.

Referring to foreign and notably American investments in Western Europe, Mr. Coppé stated: 'With the growth of our Customs Union there has been a concomitant and considerable increase in foreign investment; this has occasioned some concern. People have been surprised by the unexpectedly large scale of these investments which have raised issues affecting our economic independence and the European way of life. Without wishing to dispute that this concern is justified, I think that the solution to these problems should be within the grasp of a stronger community. For this should enable us to find our own sources of capital, taking over from outside sources as they dry up. As regards respect for the European way of life I am deeply convinced that it should not make us reject what technology can do for us. It should rather encourage us to rethink our traditional system of values so that we may, once again in our history, achieve a synthesis between man and technology. This is the true meaning of the American challenge.'

Mr. Coppé discussed the experience gained by the European Coal and Steel Community in the field of investments: 'To begin with we were obliged to devise methods and find means of achieving a common financial policy. The High Authority was able to harmonize the investments made between competing ECSC enterprises by means of its provisional estimates concerning investment capabilities and possibilities. Such a method could also be applied outside the strict limits of the coal and steel sector.'

(L'Echo de la Bourse, 14 June 1968; La Libre Belgique, 26 April 1968; De Standaard, 27/28 April 1968)

5. Statement on European policy by Mr. von der Groeben

A growing apathy about Europe now prevalent in the member States could only be overcome, Mr. von der Groeben felt, by a new thrust forward and this meant re-defining the economic and political aims of European integration. Mr. von der Groeben was speaking at the Munich Export Club on 24 June. The answers of the nation States to the political and economic changes that had occurred since 1958 - and there had been particularly pronounced changes in recent months - had fallen short of the mark and had, frankly, been lacking in credibility.

The whole of Europe must find an answer to the new situation that had come into being. The EEC today involved not only the everyday economic and technical issues but also the basic issues of European company law which could not be satisfactorily discussed and solved in the nation State context. There were certain points that should be raised at the Community level:

- (a) the distribution of income;
- (b) the formation of capital;
- (c) joint decision-taking;
- (d) the law on the constitution of businesses;
- (e) capital structures;
- (f) the mobilization of capital reserves now lying fallow.

Even deliberations on reforms to the national constitution should not overlook the European involvement out of account and should preserve a measure of consistency with a democratic and federal community constitution.

Europe, which also appealed to the younger generation as a political objective, could only be achieved provided that we did not stop at the Customs Union now operating. The reality of the Common Market, stripped of frontier controls or formalities, was still not clearly in sight and, indeed it had to expand into the Economic Union, with its common currency, common economic and social policies, common trade policy and its common policy on development assistance. A full-scale political union was also part of the Economic Union, with democratic institutions, a common foreign policy, a common defence and common science and education policies. The Common Market, with its fully developed economic potential, gave a basic guarantee for European security and hence for a solution to the German problem.

(Industriekurier, 25 June 1968)

6. Mr. Coppé calls for a summit meeting of the Six

In an interview given to a Belgian journal, Mr. Coppé, member of the Commission of the European Communities, outlined the position of economic and political integration at 1 July 1968.

It would - he said - be an over-simplification to think that the member States had so far not engaged in politics but had merely been content to lower customs tariffs. This was why 1 July 1968 was at once a goal reached and a stage. During the last ten years the Community had kept to, and even brought forward, the timetable for tariff cuts. At the same time it had tried to prepare the ground for the ensuing stage by searching for common policies.

Today no one attempted to gloss over the accumulated backlog. While, in a broad sense, the Six had an agricultural policy (and certain points were still in dispute) they had not made any noticeable progress in the social and transport sectors.

The most urgent need was undoubtedly a monetary policy. The core of the problem lay in the increasing dearth of means of payment which were falling further and further below the level of international trade. At the same time, the EEC remained the largest trading bloc in the world. Two approaches were possible. France was for increasing the gold price. Although this would increase the volume of currency in circulation, it would reduce its value. On the other hand the European Commission - and particularly its Vice-President, Mr. Barre, a Frenchman - wanted to increase liquidity by creating a single currency (a project which had also been put forward by Luxembourg). The two proposals clashed but, in any case, whether or not a general devaluation of currency was carried out, solidarity in the monetary field demanded a more stable solution than the emergency measures taken, for example, to help Great Britain each time its creditors drained its banks of sterling.

Turning to the decision-making procedure of the Communities, Mr. Coppé said that the principle of unanimity belonged to cartel practice. This method of voting had produced but mediocre results.

Technological policy was hopelessly bogged down because member States, instead of freely pooling their resources, only extended a hand to take with the other, following a barren policy of 'a fair return'. The Community, though now spending as much on nuclear energy as the USA, was achieving only a tenth of the results (Euratom's setback had been a case in point). It

would be impossible to get out of the rut by means of the methods so far applied, i. e. agreements between governments (witness the setbacks suffered by European space technology in ELDO and ESRO) or Community decisions which, because they have to be unanimous, slow down the convoy to the speed of the slowest truck.

The blocking of British entry also showed that unanimity not having been reached on this point, the problem threatened to fester and harm not only the British but, in the long run, the Six themselves.

The way a Community took decisions served as a touchstone. Unanimity was usually reached only by eliminating the snags attaching to a decision and leaving them to be borne by third parties. The recent Community sugar agreements had, for example, merely resulted in the Community's expanding its production and exports at the expense of developing countries that produced that commodity.

On the other hand, the majority rule, which ought already to have won the day, whatever the percentage of votes required, forced the parties to make concessions and joint sacrifices in order to arrive at decisions fair to all.

Mr. Coppé then replied to a question concerning the problems of students and other young people in whose eyes the Community institutions appeared to be an integral part of the consumer society they so violently rejected.

The university had - said Mr. Coppé - remained an aristocratic institution, as it had been before 1789. Students had been sent there in their thousands without giving a thought to the need for adjustments, let alone for far-reaching reforms. The statistics spoke for themselves: the numbers attending university and similar establishments had increased between 1961-62 and 1966-67 as follows: Belgium 53%, Germany 21.3%, France 121%, Italy 48%, Luxembourg (which sent its students to foreign universities) 145%, Netherlands 64.5%. The increase for the EEC as a whole had been 70.67% in five years.

It was said that young persons had not grasped the true nature of Europe and the political idea underlying it. But the older generation too had sinned with its jubilant cries of 'victory!' when, for example, the guaranteed price of pork to producers was raised.

Europe offered to young people its outward-looking spirit. The free movement of consumer goods or capital would be a mockery unless it was accompanied by the removal of obstacles to the free movement of persons, among them students and members of the teaching profession. This was the very pith of an education policy programme, the main feature of which was the equivalence of degrees and diplomas. Europe could offer its young people immense openings, and these would have to be systematically planned.

As the Community had been designed as an open-ended affair by its founders, the Europe of the Six carried special responsibilities towards the developing countries, particularly those that had entered into association. These countries lacked teachers, doctors, farming experts and engineers of all kinds. Two or three years spent abroad, in lieu of military service, provided useful experience and enabled the most to be made of a degree. Special measures would have to be taken to ensure the young persons concerned secured employment on their return.

The political aspect of development aid took two forms: bilateral relations and multilateral relations. The first had had a bad press, it having been alleged, rightly or wrongly, that they were tainted with neo-colonialism. A wonderful opportunity presented itself for the Community to 'europeanize' its relations with the developing countries.

Finally, Mr. Coppé said that 1 July 1968 could prove to be an ideal moment for a general high-level reappraisal of the situation by members of the Community. A summit meeting, at which the chances of real unification would be discussed, was essential if Europe was to meet all the existing challenges, whether from the United States, the Soviet Union or the have-nots.

(Le Soir, 28 June 1968)

II. MOVEMENTS, ORGANIZATIONS AND PROMINENT FIGURES

1. The ninth Franco-German Conference in Bad Godesberg

The ninth Franco-German Conference took place in Bad Godesberg from 22 to 24 March 1968; it was attended by parliamentarians, representatives of the European Movement, professors and journalists; the subject under discussion was 'The future of Europe seen in relation to developments in the East and the West'.

Nearly four years had elapsed between the eighth and the ninth of these conferences which shows that relations between France and Germany since the signing of the Treaty had not been entirely free from strains.

In 1968 the Franco-German Conference considered that close and friendly co-operation between the two countries went without saying and that it could not be called into question by any fundamental disagreement on matters of principle. With similar unanimity, those taking part emphasized the need for European co-operation even though there might still be conflict on points of form and phrasing.

This confident statement should not, however, blind one to the fact that there were one or two weak points in the Bad Godesberg meeting and in Franco-German relations. The French delegation was unfortunately not very representative; the Federation of the Left was not present. The two former Socialist Ministers, Mr. Jules Moch and Mr. Alain Savary spoke only in their own names and not as representatives of France's opposition of the Left. Even Mr. Lecanuet and Mr. Duhamel of France's opposition of the Centre did not appear to be convinced of the priority of Franco-German discussions at this juncture.

Even in the Gaullist delegation there were no really authorized spokesmen. Mr. Terrenoire, a former Minister, had a rather devious speech read for him in his absence. A second former Minister, Mr. Habib Deloncle, who is responsible, within the party organization, for looking after European relations, also failed to attend the Conference. There is no doubt that Mr. Léo Hamon expressed the Gaullist views with great perseverance, intelligence, skill and tactfulness but, because of his leaning to the left, he found himself in a difficult position and he did depart quite appreciably from the line of his Government on one or two important points, such as East European policy.

The major coalition of the Federal Republic presented a united front even though it may have evinced certain tensions elsewhere.

With certain reservations, its spokesman said that Parliament and public opinion were far more in disagreement about French policy than the CDU/SPD Government which was ready for reasonable compromises.

Dr. Karl Mommer, Vice-President of the Bundestag, was the most forthright spokesman of the German delegation; whilst generally praising Franco-German friendship, he, none the less, summed up the Conference as follows : there were, between German and French policies, more points of disagreement than of agreement. This drawback should in reality be ignored to some extent. If he were right, then Franco-German friendship had no solid foundation. If however one examined things more closely, one would find that there was agreement over the major issues of the future such as the policy vis-à-vis Eastern Europe, trends in European development, relations with the United States (bearing in mind its attempts to achieve a rapprochement with the Soviet Union); current problems, however, stemmed from friction and disagreements on routine points in Brussels, on German support for the United States and on Britain's accession to the Common Market.

It would of course be too easy to explain the present strains as being due simply to various tactical considerations or simply to the independent line taken by de Gaulle. Yet what lay behind it was a difference of approach which was, to some extent, due to the bonds of the past.

Franco-German friendly relations were and remained the heart and the abiding crux of a new organization of the European continent. Mr. Karl Ackermann, Social Democrat member of the Bundestag, said in his opening speech that the text of the Franco-German Treaty compelled a continuous approximation of the aims of both States. Both sides had more earnestly than ever before to learn to accept the basis of common political realities if they were to avoid a paralysis of their relations and if they wished to contribute towards a growing understanding of all that they had in common.

The aim of Germany's policy on Europe was to maintain, consolidate and enlarge the EEC. Here, a free trade area between the EEC and the four applicant States was essential. At the end of any transitional phase, the applicants had to become members with full rights and obligations. He conceded that the procedure concerning the application question involved serious differences between Germany and France.

German sympathy for France's reservations about enlarging the Community would be greater if France had not opposed the complete implementation of the Rome Treaties. In this connexion he advocated an enlargement of the powers of the European Parliament and the direct election of its members. An enlargement of the European Community to embrace common economic, trade, taxation, transport, defence and foreign policies was also necessary.

(Europäische Gemeinschaft, 4/1968;
Informationen der Sozialdemokratischen Fraktion im Deutschen Bundestag,
Wochenbericht 12/68, 29 March 1968)

2. Conference in Milan on Energy Sources in the EEC

The Italian Society for International Organization held a seminar in Milan on European Community studies.

Professor Giulio Cesoni, who is responsible for the 'G. Agnelli' nuclear engineering course at the Turin Polytechnic, addressed the conference on 'the execution of the European Community programme for raw materials and energy sources'.

He pointed out that the 461 million coal equivalent tons of 1960 had in 1975 to become 848 million. In other words, the total energy consumption of the EEC would double in a period of 15 years. Community reserves of energy represented from 5 to 6 per cent of the world total whereas EEC consumption was equal to 10 per cent of this same total. Hence the Community was to a large extent dependent on outside sources for its energy supplies.

In 1965, Community energy production represented 52.9 per cent of total consumption; the remaining 47.1 per cent was imported. Despite the flow of nuclear energy, imports would represent nearly two thirds of the complete supplies in 1975.

With regard to supplies of nuclear raw materials, practical experience had shown a marked trend towards the use of enriched uranium reactors. Hence, serious consideration had been given to the plan for a European enrichment plant which would make the Europe of the Six independent of the USA, the UK and the USSR. Such a plant would cost Europe not less than 500,000m. lire.

Professor Cesoni concluded by recalling the immediate objectives of the common energy policy which were :

- (a) increasing the security of the Community hydro-carbon supplies;
- (b) strengthening the competitive position of Community enterprises to enable them to meet the challenge of the major international oil companies;
- (c) ensuring that a certain level of raw materials and energy continued to be produced in the Community.

(II Sole, 24 Ore, 4 April 1968)

3. Conclusions reached by the European Teachers' Association (A. E. D. E.)

Following the fourth congress of the A. E. D. E. (European Teachers' Association), its President, Mr. Alers, answered a number of questions put to him by the press.

The Association had been set up in view of the setbacks and delays suffered by European unification. It had been felt desirable to form a direct body of opinion by bringing together champions of Community Europe who were members of the teaching profession. The A. E. D. E. worked in co-operation with government and inter-governmental bodies and private associations. It received substantial moral and material backing from the Ministry of National Education, the Ministry for Cultural Affairs and the Federation for Free Education.

Mr. Alers told the press that work was in hand to bring study syllabuses into line so as to prepare the ground for the equivalence of degrees and diplomas. As regards history, no work existed which, without neglecting national history, had been planned on a European scale so as to present a picture of a civilization on the march to which wars were accidents encountered en route. In the literary sphere, a series of works would shortly come out showing that trends had existed at different periods of European history towards unification.

Mr. Alers went on to summarize the conclusions reached by the congress. It had succeeded in drawing up a European Charter for Education. This catalogued a number of joint achievements and indicated the requirements to be satisfied by the school of the future against a European setting displaying two main features : (i) the emphasis placed on the social aspect (group work instead of individual effort) and (ii) the balance established between technological progress and the preservation of humanist values. The Association also urged that a European science institute be set up to co-ordinate research carried out in this field by the various countries. It hoped to stimulate European civic consciousness by bringing together young people of various nationalities to discuss various aspects of the European movement and the attendant obligations. It wanted to avoid the growth of European nationalism and was trying to interest young people in the problems of other continents, particularly those of the developing countries.

(Le Soir, 13 April 1968)

4. Conference of the Club 'Europe 2000' on Britain's entry into the Common Market

On 24 April 1968 the Club 'Europe 2000', in conjunction with the European Federalist Movement and the France-Great Britain Association, organized a conference on 'Britain's entry into the Common Market'. The opening address was delivered in French by Mr. Robert MacLennan, Labour M. P. for Caithness and Sutherland. For Mr. MacLennan it is not so much Britain's geographical position as historical events that have delayed its conversion to the European concept. Now, however, Britain is firmly resolved to join the EEC as a full member; 'The snub we have suffered from the President of the French Republic has not changed in the least the determination of the British people.'

The speaker then stressed the efforts made by the various Governments for closer ties with the Community. He dwelt on the measures taken by Mr. Wilson's Government to restore Britain's economic and financial situation. He pointed out that Britain's economy and industry were very much stronger than people generally assumed. Mr. MacLennan added : 'The Government and the people of Britain are deeply convinced that our country could give the Community fresh impetus towards unity and a new commercial and industrial strength.' Referring to the need for technical co-operation between the countries of Europe, the British MP made it clear that Britain's motives were primarily political : Britain wanted to enable Europe to play its full part in

the world. The speaker optimistically concluded : 'The day is not far off when Britain will be a member of the EEC.'

(Dernières Nouvelles d'Alsace, 26 April 1968)

5. European scientific research discussed at the 21st Economic Congress of the Benelux countries

Science policy was the main theme of the Benelux Economic Congress which was held in Amsterdam on 26 April. The opening addresses were delivered by Professor Böttcher, Chairman of the Dutch Science Policy Council, and Mr. Theo Lefèvre, Belgian Minister of State. Professor Böttcher thought that European integration had to solve the problems deriving from the fact that the member States had structures, institutions and internal organizations which were still not properly adjusted to the radically changed situation resulting from the rapid advances in the natural sciences and technology and the massive science-based industrialization. Even after this kind of adjustment has been achieved the countries of Europe will still have to go on co-operating with each other. In the world today there were more than three million people engaged in research and in the development work stemming from it. The social application of the results of this research represented a tremendous challenge to mankind. At the same time, however, there were more difficult problems than ever to be faced : the greatest being the rapid increase in the world population in relation to the attainable increase in foodstuffs production over the next twenty years. World-wide co-operation and, above all, European co-operation in systematically harnessing the continuous flow of research results was becoming increasingly urgent.

All these problems made it necessary for the Benelux countries to continue to work together towards European integration. Regular consultations concerning the attitude of the Benelux countries to the whole range of science policy problems, at both national and international levels, were also desirable.

After Professor Böttcher's outline of scientific research in the Netherlands, Mr. Theo Lefèvre discussed science policy in Belgium. He advocated a further democratization of the university system through a larger-scale award of scholarships.

He also advocated a new approach to European co-operation in research. Too little had so far been done in connexion with nuclear power and space research in Europe. There was a lack of political perseverance and no programme for making common industrial use of the results achieved. The major States wished to keep economic advantages gained from common research to themselves. In other words, there was co-operation in the field of research but not in the industrial applications of research. Mr. Lefèvre concluded by saying that in this way Europe would never be able to meet the American challenge.

(Handels Transport Courant, 27 and 29 April 1968)

6. The Young European Federalists hold their Eighteenth Congress in Bad Godesberg

The Young European Federalists held their 18th Congress in Bad Godesberg on 28 April 1968. About a hundred members were present. The Young Federalists are the junior branch of Germany's European Union. The subject under discussion was 'The future of the European Communities'.

Dr. Hans von der Groeben, a member of the European Commission, warned against what he called 'a growing irritability about integration'. He said that now was the time to devise new ideas for the unity of Europe instead of simply formally fulfilling the existing Treaties. He criticized the programme of the CDU and the SPD. Their advance financial planning on discussions on co-management in business left the impression that a Community Europe was 'no longer a point for discussion'. He came out strongly in favour of the accession of the United Kingdom to the EEC. For the United Kingdom this step was 'almost vital'.

(Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 27 April 1968)
(Die Welt, 29 April 1968)

7. Conference of European Parliamentarians in Bonn

A conference was held in the Bundeshaus in Bonn on 3 and 4 May 1968; 80 parliamentarians from the Six, the United Kingdom, Ireland,

Denmark, Norway, Sweden and Austria were present; the subject was 'Towards a greater Europe'; the discussion turned on what steps to enlarge the Community could be taken simultaneously in the individual countries. The conference was held at the invitation of the German Council of the European Movement and individual working parties discussed 'Economics, monetary matters and technology' and 'Foreign policy and defence'. Speakers included: Mr. Brandt, German Foreign Minister, Lord Chalfont, British Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, Professor Walter Hallstein, Mr. Gaston Defferre, the French Socialist leader and Mr. Théo Lefèvre, former Belgian Prime Minister. Mr. Duncan Sandys from the U.K., Mr. Olin from Sweden, and Mr. Pittermann were present, as were Mr. Jahn and Mr. Lahr, German Secretaries of State and the Ambassadors of all those countries taking part.

In his capacity as president Mr. Ernst Majonica, M.P., opened the conference by proposing that it should assume the form of an institution. It should meet at regular intervals and at least once a year; it should have a liaison bureau to co-ordinate parliamentary initiatives. 'If the work we do here is worthwhile, then the greater Europe will become a reality at the parliamentary level even before governments sign treaties to this effect.'

He described the meeting as a 'Conference of dissatisfaction' at the present state of European development. It was not directed against anyone and it was pursuing a positive objective: the greater Europe. The alternative to the greater Europe was its final exit from the world political stage. He deplored the 'return to nationalism' in Europe, which had led to greater powers for the Council of Ministers in Brussels and to correspondingly lesser powers for the European Commission.

He referred to the European action of the German Bundestag; more than 320 of its members had endorsed a declaration urging the Federal Government to take new European initiatives. 'The largest coalition in the Bundestag is the European one' he said.

Speaking in Bonn on 3 May, Lord Chalfont, British Minister for European Affairs, said that the United Kingdom was ready at once to take part in a conference of the Foreign Ministers of the Six and of the four applicant States. Speaking for his Government, he repeated Britain's resolve to enter into the EEC as a full member and to take part in creating a European political union.

'Our application for membership is still on the table and our word remains good' he said. The United Kingdom not only wanted economic integration but also political integration and was determined to play its part in part-

nership with the countries of continental Europe. He gave an assurance that Britain desired no hegemony in Europe. The idea of a hegemony being wielded in Europe was alien to the British mind, he said. British public opinion did not expect Britain to take 'the' leading rôle but only 'a' leading rôle in the Common Market. The United Kingdom could best play its part in the world from within a United Europe.

Lord Chalfont also took up the idea mentioned in a resolution that there should be a summit conference of the Heads of Government of the ten countries. He thought however that this step should not be taken precipitately. He expressed the British Government's satisfaction at this joint conference of parliamentarians of the Six and the applicant States, their first meeting since the French veto on Britain's entry.

With references to the compromise proposals put forward by the Benelux countries, Italy and the Federal Republic, he said that Britain would examine these proposals to see how far they might take his country towards full membership of the Community. It was quite wrong to argue that Britain wanted all or nothing. It would be paradoxical if those who at one time were asking Britain to assume the obligations of full membership were now to ask his country to accept less. Partial solutions that did not clearly lead to membership would lead to deadlock. Any interim proposal from the Community had to fulfil one condition i. e. it had to lead to the objective we had all set ourselves : a united, democratic, economically sound Europe.

Lord Chalfont said that his country was ready to take part in close political consultations with the Six on foreign policy and to participate in a 'European programme' for economic and technological co-operation. He proposed that there should be co-operation in the fields of nuclear energy, aeronautical engineering and the manufacture of computers in Europe. He repeated Mr. Wilson's proposal for setting up a European Technological Centre. Britain was ready to take part in a joint action in this key area, he said. It was now up to the European countries to say whether they wished to pursue this course with Britain.

Extending the welcome of the Federal Government Mr. Gerhard Jahn, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, said that his Government heartily endorsed the idea of a greater Europe. Achieving it, however, depended not only on the governments but also on parliamentarians, who were expected to help in overcoming the difficulties.

Mr. Walter Hallstein, President of the European Movement, said in his analysis of the state of Europe 'If we fail to incorporate the positive

national values in our large-area arrangements, then we shall fail'. He warned against alternative solutions and against establishing the wrong timeschedules. It would be wrong to say; either a West or an East policy or first reunification and then an easing of tension or either the small Europe or the large Europe.

The former President of the EEC Commission said it was a mistake to say that the USA no longer had any interests in Europe. The concept of an Atlantic partnership still had political currency in the United States. The defence policy had not been abandoned; it had, on the contrary, been enlarged with a policy for easing tension which was directed at securing peace structurally. He emphasized that without a European defence, there could be no successful policy vis-à-vis the East European countries.

European integration had greatly impressed the young technocrats in East Europe. A move towards democratization was in progress there. The West had to reflect on the consequences that might follow from this development.

Mr. Willy Brandt, German Foreign Minister, said he agreed with the idea of a conference of the Foreign Ministers of the Six and of the four applicant States. At the close of the conference he said that the Six had first to agree on the content of a trade policy arrangement and on technological co-operation with the United Kingdom. The day before Lord Chalfont had advocated a conference of the ten foreign ministers.

In a seven-point programme, to release European policy from the deadlock which had obtained since France vetoed negotiations with Britain, the European parliamentarians also advocated a conference of the ten foreign ministers. The programme was to be submitted to all the Governments, Parliaments and political groupings of the ten European countries taking part. Similarly, the neutral States which were interested in Association would receive the Bonn programme.

It emerged from Mr. Brandt's speech that the German Government stood by its earlier proposals for customs duty cuts despite the diffident reactions of the United Kingdom and of the other member States. He described these as a reasonable way of ushering in a rapprochement and of ensuring that the economies of the Six and the applicant States expanded together. The German proposals were clearly devised to facilitate and prepare accession. He said, however, that he was ready to look into all forms of consultation between the EEC and the applicant States provided these were not prejudicial to the internal life of the Community.

The Federal Government had not lost sight of the aim of enlarging the Community, he said. Yet it wished to work for the accession of the United Kingdom and the other applicant States patiently and perseveringly rather than impatiently or by taking a 'tough' line, for the latter might have unfortunate repercussions. 'We Germans are ready to use our offices, where applicable, to help in the search for solutions' he said.

Mr. Brandt listed six points on which the Federal Government would concentrate :

1. the internal completion of the Community up to the stage of a final Economic Union;
2. merging the Treaties;
3. making the applications for membership a subject for consultations at every meeting of the Council;
4. for the EEC Commission to state its position concerning the readiness for membership of the applicant States;
5. standing consultations with the applicant States on points of common interest;
6. co-operation between the EEC and the applicant States through interim trade policy arrangements and in the field of advanced technology.

In a resolution passed unanimously, the conference decided to assume the form of an institution. The parliamentarians of the Six and the European countries that had applied for membership or other forms of close association, wanted to meet at least once a year to talk over the unresolved issues of integration. A 'liaison committee' having a 'permanent secretariat' was to be set up. The conference would co-operate with the European Parliament, the Assembly of Western European Union, the Council of Europe, the European Movement and with the Action Committee for the United States of Europe.

In a closing speech, Mr. Gaston Defferre, the French Socialist and Vice-President of the European Movement, described the German Foreign Minister's statement as encouraging. Germany could set a new European policy in motion, he said. If there were opposition from the French Government, it had to be remembered that France could not separate itself from Germany now that it had separated itself from other countries by vetoing their applications for membership.

(Die Welt, 4 and 6 May 1968)

(Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 3, 4 and 6 May 1968)

(Industriekurier, 4 May 1968)

(Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 5 June 1968)

8. Problems of European integration discussed at the Sixth Conference of European Buyers in Zurich

The Sixth European Buyers' Conference was held in Zurich from 16 to 18 May 1968. It opened with three noteworthy speeches concerning Europe and its future. Mr. R. Bonvin, a Federal Councillor, was the first of a series of prominent political speakers and he discussed international financial and monetary problems.

Mr. Bonvin gave a brief outline of the main monetary policy events of recent months, the most important being the introduction of the two-tier gold price. In monetary terms, there had been a shift in the international balance of power and this was highly relevant to what was happening; this had come about slowly since the end of the war. The proof of this, Mr. Bonvin said, was the simple fact that in 1948, the United States still held over 70 per cent of the world gold reserves whereas in 1960, the ten leading industrial States together held reserves totalling almost as much as those held by the United States. The growing American balance of payments deficit - the real cause of the present international monetary difficulties - could not simply be made to disappear overnight.

It was clear, added Mr. Bonvin, that the measures taken by the United States would, whatever their nature, affect Europe economically. He said it was simply nonsensical to ask the Americans to take strong action and, at the same time, to criticize them for actually doing so. There were two sides to the balance of payments problem and this meant that not only the country with a deficit but also the countries with surpluses should help to solve it. The solution of course should not be paid for with a regression to protectionism. Purely expansive and stimulating measures could lead to a situation where he would like to see the European contribution primarily as a greater willingness to introduce customs duty reductions. In any case, restoring the equilibrium of the American balance of payments should be regarded as a collective duty.

The second speaker, Professor Erhard, former Federal German Chancellor, discussed the objectives of the European idea which, he felt, had recently lost a good deal of its impact. Although the European idea was quite clearly in the throes of a crisis, which was detectable primarily as a reaction to a 'deliberately engendered feeling of euphoria', Europe had by no means lost. 'An escape from the impasse would only be successful if we approached our responsibilities with greater realism and did not dissipate our energies over technical issues.'

Professor Erhard came out quite decisively against the inclination to wait until new conditions concerning personalities obtained so that the paths now closed would open up again on their own. Without directly saying whom he was attacking he strongly condemned the trend towards a 'hegemonially administered' Europe. 'We would sooner agree to some measure of economic co-operation with the Communist-dominated economies than lend ourselves to subjection to any form of hegemonial power or agree to any ill-conceived nationalism in Europe.'

Integration developments to date clearly showed that wherever large economic areas had failed to free themselves from national ties, they were on 'shaky foundations'; there was no 'historical evidence' to prove that States had achieved this on the basis of economic interests alone but it was clear that the 'awareness of belonging together to a State' made it possible to unite economies. The oft-quoted example of the German Zollvereins had been misunderstood in that the German rise to political statehood had derived its impetus not from economic causes, as was always argued; the operative force had been 'a desire and longing for unity'.

He felt that the European Community would remain a 'purely technical instrument' for dealing with economic responsibilities until the desire for unity took cogent shape. What had been achieved so far towards a greater supranationality appeared to him worthy of only very limited recognition. The pursuit of economic objectives, which were not simultaneously coupled with a full political agreement, were thus - and he had the vision of political unity constantly before his eyes - no serviceable basis for a real, closer, economic unity let alone a political merger. He found it commendable that the larger economic area was in itself consistent with the liberal idea; on the other hand, he warned that even these could for 'nationalistic, egotistical or protectionist' reasons very easily assume the character of economic blocs.

Perhaps, Professor Erhard went on to say, we must start again at the beginning; for to wait until new conditions concerning personalities obtained would be a wholly unworthy political attitude involving as it did the fate of our peoples. The rejection of the United Kingdom twice over had been a severe blow to the credibility of the EEC. To show that the supranational idea was lacking in power, he quoted the failure of the ECSC States to amend the Treaty to deal with the ten year old coal crisis in Europe.

At the close of his speech, in which he expressed great concern about the future of Europe, Professor Erhard again appealed urgently for the will 'to solve and heal'; only this could bring an end to the 'anachronistic and unnaturally depressing state' of a divided Europe. The greatest danger for

Europe, he said in conclusion, was in the 'technological and technocratic perfectionism' of this part of the world which must inevitably lead to collectivization.

The European problem was tackled from an entirely different standpoint, by the third speaker, Dr. F. Bock, former Austrian Vice-Chancellor. In contrast to Dr. Erhard, he spoke only about economic integration, the only option open to a neutral State. Austria had, for reasons of State, refrained from moves towards political integration; this was of course easier to bear because there was nothing in European policy today which even showed what the outlines of political integration might be.

After outlining Austria's integration endeavours, which had begun hopefully, Dr. Bock said that these had led to a dead-end in the autumn of 1967 because of the French *volte-face*. He then suggested how Europe - looking at it from the economic standpoint - should in fact go forward. Of the two alternatives for enlargement referred to in the Treaties of Rome, i.e. membership or association, the latter was 'blocked off' because it was now being interpreted too narrowly. The fact that the term 'association' used in the EEC Treaties was not more clearly defined, constituted a challenge to the Community to be flexible in its foreign relations. The thing lacking in Brussels was a 'pragmatic policy'. The interim and transitional solutions which were arousing widespread hopes were no substitute here. Close co-operation in the field of nuclear research, aeronautical engineering, the standardization of industrial property laws and co-operation in trade policy on third country markets, were 'all very fine aims' but they only related marginally to integration. A true alternative solution could be a reciprocal linear or sector reduction in customs duties which came under GATT preference; such measures would, however, lead to a genuine integration treaty. Here too, the French veto was in evidence.

Dr. Bock said that real progress could not be expected, at least at present; of course this did not mean that one should now give up. On the contrary, now was the time to work out a design that - in accordance with the new French ideas - did not restrict the problem to one country but offered a general solution for all applicant States. A multilateral solution could, he felt, be effected by recourse to the following programme :

- (a) phasing out international customs duties within four or five years in the industrial sector;
- (b) harmonization of industrial policies in so far as this is necessary to overcome competitive distortions;
- (c) approximation of external tariffs vis-à-vis third countries by reference to an average rate and
- (d) harmonization by sectors of the agricultural market regulations.

Such a plan would also be consistent with GATT and - this appeared to be equally important - a running-in period would not affect a further internal development of the European Communities because in each of its stages, the advantages and disadvantages of this plan would be the same for the EEC and the EFTA States and lastly, it left the possibility open to all States wishing to accede to the Communities to give to their integration policies the scale and scope which seemed best to suit their purpose.

(Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 17 May 1968)

(Industriekurier, 18 May 1968)

(Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 18 May 1968)

9. The Europe of the Left Movement holds a conference in London

At the invitation of the Labour Committee for Europe an international conference of the European Left Movement was held in London on 24 and 25 May 1968. The Social Democrat organizations of the following countries were represented : Belgium, Germany, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom.

Dr. Karl Mommer (SPD), Vice-President of the Bundestag, thought that the time had come for a new offensive to enlarge the European Economic Community. He told journalists that the events in France had shown that General de Gaulle was in a weak position. He thought that it would be 'truly astounding' if he were allowed in future to impose his will on other European countries.

De Gaulle's prestige had been so weakened that his position at the conference table would no longer be the same as it was. Dr. Mommer felt that advantage should be taken of the present situation which was more favourable than ever before. It was for the United Kingdom to uphold its application for membership until the door opened.

Lord Chalfont, British Minister for European Affairs, said that his Government did not rule out the possibility that the present unrest in France might lead to changes in France's EEC policy. Opening the conference, he said that he was not one of those who felt that the French attitude was immutable. In fact recent events in France had shown that changes were possible even when they were least expected. Lord Chalfont said that the British application would continue to remain on the table but he rejected the alternative idea of a North Atlantic free trade area as being unrealistic.

At the close of the conference, the following resolution on European policy was passed :

'The conference of the European Left, which represents the social democrat organizations of nine countries, considers that the enlargement of the EEC through the accession of the United Kingdom is the main aim of its policy and a prerequisite for the development of a democratic and politically united Europe. At the same time negotiations should be initiated with the other applicant States and with the neutral countries which have applied for association.

The main challenge facing our movement is the development of the EEC and its striving towards democratic institutions. It is today a fact that the enlargement of the Community would constitute an important factor in its development.

As Social Democrats, we must together convince the Governments of the member States that they should start negotiations for the accession of the United Kingdom and a general enlargement of the Community. In the meantime, we must work actively for the practical application of all proposals for co-operation between as many European States as possible - in such fields as technology and foreign policy - and bring pressure to bear on our Governments to call a ministerial conference for this purpose.

We must show Europe's disillusioned younger generation that the ideal of European unity opens new prospects for the future and that it is the best contribution that can be made to a world of peace, freedom and social justice.'

(Sozialdemokratische Europa-Korrespondenz, May 1968)

10. Atlantic Conference in Rome on technological development

A conference on the strategy of technological development in the Atlantic Community was organized by the Atlantic Institute in Rome from 24 to 26 May.

Mr. David Rockefeller, President of the Chase Manhattan Bank of New York, took the chair.

Those taking part were received at the Quirinale by Mr. Saragat, President of the Italian Republic; Italy, he said, had been aware of its economic weakness and had experienced a feeling of diffidence because of this; but it had overcome this diffidence and it had become one of the leading exponents of free trade.

'We pursued this course', he said, 'bearing in mind that our country's greatest moments were coincidental with and contingent on the high-water marks of international trade and the flow of ideas. We also see a connexion between the considerable increase in earnings over the last 18 years and the sound judgment and far-sightedness thanks to which we acted boldly and in good faith in opening up our market and faced up to competition from countries whose economic position was stronger than our own.'

He stressed the danger to the world of turning back and the danger of one or more countries' surrendering to the illusion that they could solve their own problems by reference to an historical concept of power; this today did not solve anything for anybody. President Saragat then emphasized the need to bridge the technological gap between Europe and the United States as soon as possible.

In conclusion he said that in Europe, Britain was the country which devoted the greatest volume of its resources to scientific research. It was, as a result, leading the world in some sectors of advanced technology. The strength of the United Kingdom, as compared with that of other European countries - not only in research but also in its industrial applications - could impart a valuable stimulus to the various countries' national programmes and strengthen the position of the whole of Europe, safeguarding it against the risk of being overtaken by other countries.

At the close of the conference, the following recommendations were approved :

This conference considers that there are what have been described as technological gaps between developed countries but considers that they are not decisive. The fundamental differences between North America, Europe and Japan are due rather to the differences in their respective systems of attitudes and values, their management techniques, their institutions, the availability of capital and in the order of priorities drawn up as between the various regions

and nations. Technological information flowed fast round the scientific world through the agency of international companies and other channels so that wherever gaps occurred in this field, they did not usually last long.

The discussion of this problem in recent years had acted as a stimulus in narrowing technological gaps, especially in Europe. Thus existing differences were not a threat to economic co-operation in the Atlantic Community, provided they were suitably tackled and even though they represented a constant challenge.

The quickening pace of technical progress stemmed from improvements in a whole series of social fields. But rapid solutions did not exist. Hand in hand with research into new technological advances, there should be an attempt to look into their probable social consequences and to find ways of dealing with these satisfactorily.

The areas in which improvements were needed were :

- (a) the educational system
- (b) management
- (c) the diffusion of technical information
- (d) the capital markets
- (e) market conditions, including effective competition .

Europe should give special priority to economic and technical progress. To this end, it should review its own educational system, particularly the training of young people for careers in industry. This review should be undertaken in co-operation with the economic operators in every country. The reform should embrace

- a) extending and improving the school and university systems and
- b) training for management.

To facilitate the dissemination of knowledge in the applied sciences, it was to be hoped that there would be greater mobility between the spheres of governments, universities and economic operators and that there would be an international education and exchanges in the world of business.

Financial power, the first requisite of which was to operate profitably, was an important factor in technological competition. Hence attention was drawn to the importance of efficiently-operating capital markets, especially for businesses that were being redeveloped. Europe's capital markets had

greatly improved in recent years, but they needed to be further consolidated to extend the capital structure and to provide adequate funds to finance research and development. It was, therefore, to be hoped that the capital markets in the United States would be re-opened as soon as possible.

The best way to disseminate knowledge was through free markets, through trade and the free movement of capital in the Atlantic Community. Governments should open the way to international investment and eliminate any barriers.

Encouragement ought to be given to the operations of international companies which facilitated the diffusion of technology. The efforts made to create international companies should be intensified especially those between European companies. Any legal and financial obstacles to setting up such companies should be eliminated.

Of late, Atlantic co-operation, particularly in the private sector, had helped appreciably towards bridging the technological gap. This co-operation had to be kept up and accelerated not only in the private sector, but also between Governments and such inter-governmental organizations as the OECD. The Atlantic Community and Japan had at all times to be aware of their responsibility of reducing the technological and economic gap between themselves and the developing countries.

To maintain the enthusiasm generated by this and other conferences, the Atlantic Institute was asked by the conference to study the specific proposals put forward during the discussions relating to :

- (a) the sociological implications of technology,
- (b) European company law,
- (c) current problems of European economic integration,
- (d) the desirability of creating an Atlantic research centre and of making the necessary documentation available.

The Institute was also asked to establish which proposals and programmes deserved both to be supported and executed and the form this should take.

(Corriera della Sera, 26 May 1968)

(Relazioni Internazionali, 1 June 1968)

11. European farmers (C.O.P.A.) and the common policies for the milk and beef and veal sectors

The Decisions taken by the Council of Ministers on 29 May 1968, concerning the common policy for the milk sector and the final settlement for beef and veal were discussed by the executive of the Confederation of Agricultural Producers Organizations (COPA) meeting under the chairmanship of Mr. Dumont de Chassart.

1. The executive noted that the Council had taken decisions on the milk and beef and veal regulations. These were necessary to the implementation of the common agricultural policy.

With reference to the milk sector, however, the executive deplored the fact that the Council decision, laying down levels of support which varied from one country to another, had not established any real single market even though this had been agreed on in July 1966.

It urged that the market should become a common one as soon as possible so that Community milk producers might obtain the target price without discrimination and so as to eliminate obstacles to trade.

It considered that the present difficulties in the milk market were no reasons for challenging the principles underlying the common agricultural policy or the basis upon which it had originally been constructed.

2. It noted with satisfaction that the Council had agreed to look into all the problems affecting the future of agriculture in the Community, particularly the structural ones; the latter were to be considered from the economic, social and regional standpoints by reference to an annual report on agriculture and the agricultural market in the Community and to a Commission memorandum to serve as a basis for working out a common viewpoint and for the necessary measures in the matter of agricultural structure policy.

It again stressed that there should be close co-operation with COPA and the farming organizations in the member States in establishing the objectives to be attained and resources to be used.

It stressed however that price policy was still the essential feature of the common agricultural policy.

3. The executive recalled that the Community had to have adequate financial resources to ensure the operation of the common agricultural policy.

Although the principle of making a charge on fats of vegetable and marine origin consumed in the Community had been endorsed, the executive found it regrettable that the rate decided upon was lower than the minimum proposed by COPA (o. 50 DM/kg - with the exception of olive oil).

4. As regards beef and veal, the executive noted with satisfaction that the Council's decision was broadly in line with what COPA had asked for.

5. It pointed out however that the effectiveness of some of the regulations would be largely dependent on the implementing decisions to follow. The executive therefore asked that COPA should be associated in their elaboration and execution.

6. Lastly the executive expressed its heartiest congratulations to the members of the agricultural associations who had come from every region of the Community and who had shown solidarity in supporting the requests made by COPA.

(L'Agriculteur, 8 June 1968)

12. European Space Conference in Munich

From 18 to 21 June 1968 the members of the Eurospace organization attended the third USA-Europe Space Conference in Munich to discuss current problems connected with setting up European space travel facilities. The conference, unlike the previous one held in Philadelphia, was also attended not only by Eurospace industrialists but also by numerous official representatives from many countries.

At the opening of the Conference Mr. Stoltenberg, Federal Science Minister, deplored the fact that almost every European government had so far failed to accord to space research the place it deserved. In many countries the industry had hesitated to set up undertakings of the size needed to satisfy the large-scale requirements of modern air and space travel. Such difficulties had certainly encouraged the doubts entertained about major projects of European

space research reflected, for example, in Italy's negative attitude to important new European projects and Britain's refusal to accept concrete proposals for the development of telecommunication satellites and a future launcher programme.

Mr. Stoltenberg described the situation as serious. The complete abandonment of joint European work on satellites for practical applications and of launcher development would also affect existing co-operation in research and thus call any significant supranational contribution of Europe into question. That would be a cardinal error, an irrevocable decision against a substantial level of achievement by Europe, which ought to keep pace with developments in the major powers in clearly defined and selected fields. Fortunately, in the last eighteen months a development had been set in motion, both at national level and in the sphere of international co-operation, which could lead to the removal of a number of errors and weaknesses.

Mr. Stoltenberg described the goal as an organizational merger of the European space organizations ELDO and ESRO. A loose co-ordination of programmes would not suffice. In the interest of the smaller countries, member States should be free to decide whether to participate in one or two or all three sections of the programme : research satellites, satellites for practical applications and launcher development. Co-operation with the United States would be desirable. Mr. Stoltenberg went on to point out that since 1965 the Federal Republic of Germany had increased credits for space research from DM, 150m, to DM, 325m. The plan was to bring this up to nearly DM, 500m, by 1970, a level to be regarded as an upper limit. The State organization was being modified, the technical capacity of research institutes had been increased this summer and, after lengthy negotiations, important decisions on mergers had at last been taken in the industry.

The total contribution of the European States to space research and technology amounted for the current year to about DM, 1,200m. The programme committee had proposed that this should be raised by 10 per cent each year - a realistic goal. 'We must, however', added Mr. Stoltenberg, 'display a real political determination to unite and to find constructive solutions. Otherwise we will fall behind irrevocably.' It was not enough for each European country to have its own priorities for scientific and technical co-operation.

Mr. Delorme, President of Eurospace, stated that it was only in friendly co-operation between Europe and the United States in this field that the development of both continents could be achieved. The president of the Federal Association of the German Air and Space Travel Industry, Claudius Dornier Jr. remarked that in the last few years substantial progress had been made in the sphere of co-operation. It was to be expected from the present

conference that it too would make a contribution towards achieving a truly European space travel programme.

Dr. Burckhardt summed up the results of the four-day conference. All the problems of future space travel had been discussed. The need was for a European space travel programme to be promoted by a European company to be set up for the purpose. Plans should first be worked out for an effective publicity campaign aimed at arousing general understanding of the problems involved. These were not to be confused, for example, with manned space-flights to the moon or neighbouring planets. What was of vital importance to all Europeans was that progress be made in space travel techniques and practical fields such as telecommunications, air safety etc. The projected central organization, for which the name 'Eurosat' had been proposed, could be either a private or a semi-public undertaking.

(Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 26 June 1968;
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 19 June 1968;
Le Soir, 19 and 23/24 June 1968;
Agence Europe, 7 June 1968)

13. Brussels Conference on Europe and Space

On 24 June 1968, Mr. Radoux, a member of the Belgian Chamber of Representatives and delegate to the European Parliament, gave a press conference in the Palais des Congrès at which he outlined the conclusions drawn during a 'Europe and Space' conference held at the Château Karreveld (Brussels). This conference was organized by the Belgian 'Centre International du Dialogue', whose aim is to foster an international spirit by submitting international issues to experts for them to discuss.

Those taking part in the conference made several points. A viable programme had to be kept in motion in the field of science. It was of real interest to make use of telecommunication satellites, particularly for the purposes of television, navigation, meteorology and the study of the world's resources both internationally and in the European context.

The conference recommended early decisions regarding telecommunications to meet the needs of Eurovision.

With reference to launchers, the conference recommended a careful study be made of how Europe could become independent, while bearing in mind that if it were not independent, its opportunities in the field of satellites would be limited.

Lastly, the conference recognized that the problems of space had been seen against the wider background of advanced technology.

With reference to setting up a European technological centre, the conference listened with close attention to the proposal made by Mr. Brown (the British MP) which it found particularly interesting and which deserved to be examined at a later date; it felt, however, that more immediate problems arising in the context of Europe and space, had to be tackled as a matter of urgency.

Mr. Bondi (Director-General of ESRO) drew attention to the importance of co-operation between Governments and advocated a wide-ranging organization to promote research; there had to be an adequate willingness to look for two-way benefits.

Mr. Rubinacci (Italian Minister for Scientific Research) stated that although no very precise conclusions had emerged, the conference had been very useful. He stressed the need for a merger of space agencies and for Europe to progress with launchers. The viability of such projects had to be carefully assessed so that they might be helpful to the economies of the various countries.

(Le Soir, 25 June 1968)

14. The 'Ibero-America' Society urges world-wide preference system

At a meeting held in Hamburg on 26 June the Ibero-Amerika Verein e. V. expressed the view that the forthcoming association of the East African States of Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania with the EEC was having serious psychological effects in the developing countries of Latin America. Favoured treatment of these countries could moreover lend fresh impetus to attempts to secure U.S. preferences for Latin America.

The advantages flowing from the association would be greatly outweighed by these adverse effects. The Society therefore urged that the preferential tariffs for the Associated African countries, coming up for review on 30 June 1969, should not be renewed, and that the EEC's preference policy should tie in with the world wide preference system approved in principle in UNCTAD.

(Die Welt, 27 June 1968)

15. Roman Seminar on 'Latin America, Italy and the EEC'

In the latter part of June a seminar on 'Latin America, Italy and the EEC', organized by the Italo-Latin American Institute, was held in Rome.

The many speakers included Mr. Fanfani, President of the Senate, who stated that the enterprise of the Italians and the hospitality of a continent named America after a Florentine, accounted for the close relations now being established in every sector between the peoples of the Italian peninsula and of the American subcontinent. It was hardly surprising, therefore, that a wish had been repeatedly expressed in high places in the Italian Republic during the last decade that Latin America should occupy a place in the world commensurate with its size and population, its natural and political situation, its present capacities and its immense future potential.

Mr. Fanfani then recalled that following the Italo-Mexican meeting of May 1965 and President Saragat's visit to Latin America that year, the Italian Government had suggested to the friendly Republics that a new and special instrument be put at the service of co-operation between Italy and Latin America, and - through Italy - between Latin America and Europe. The suggestion was accepted and on 1 June 1966 the Treaty of Rome was signed. This had made it possible to set up the Italo-Latin American Institute a year later.

Mr. Fanfani expressed the hope that the seminar would bring to light the best means of enabling Latin America to develop in freedom and in accordance with the ideals of justice which no one was now prepared to forgo.

Italy would, he was sure, not only offer prudent advice but also make considerable efforts to ensure that Latin America shared in the free

and peaceful development of the world, so that it could assume among the community of peoples the special place that belonged to it.

At the end of the seminar a report was approved in which reference was made to the prospects of setting up a common market in Latin America. This stressed the similarity between present conditions in Latin America and those that existed in Europe before the signing of the Rome Treaty.

Italy's participation in the EEC, taken as an example of a relatively developed country, appears to be a model that could hardly apply to Latin America because Italy had specific characteristics deriving from historical and economic conditions, such as the advanced stage of development of industry in the North of the country, as well as its trade liberalization policy and the expansion of demand, which were all prior to the integration process.

There was no doubt that Europe's economic integration could be regarded as a positive factor for the equilibrium of world relations and particularly for those with the Latin American continent. It had, however, been found that it would be necessary to revise the whole of the EEC's economic co-operation policy with regard to Latin-America in respect of commerce, finance and technical co-operation. Technical co-operation or association agreements would not exclude the possibility of three-cornered operations between Europe, the United States and Latin America, on the understanding that these relations should be as flexible as possible in order to take into account the particular internal conditions of the various countries concerned.

For Latin America, the Community's farming policy, with its high prices and its protectionist system, was a source of deep concern. Latin America was in particular uneasy about the association agreement between the Community and the AAMS. This consolidated a preferential area in contradiction with a general and non-discriminatory liberalization policy in respect of exports from developing countries.

The report concluded by referring to various aspects of financial co-operation between Europe and Latin America. These aspects clearly brought out the following facts:

1. Co-operation between Europe and Latin America was at present rather limited in relation to both Europe's economic capacity and the volume of capital transferred from that area to the rest of the world;

2. The favourable experience of private Italian investments in Latin America and existing possibilities of increasing such investments; these would promote closer trade relations and technological progress;

3. The major part of European capital transfers to Latin America was in the form of supply credits, the terms of which were not always consonant with development requirements. It was, therefore, hoped that means would be found of substantially increasing Europe's financial assistance to Latin America, not only with regard to the nature of investments but also with a view to improving the terms;

4. The need to find suitable methods of achieving financial co-operation as suggested in a report presented by the International Development Bank to the EEC; among the various specific possibilities outlined in that report, there was the necessity to promote an effective opening of private capital markets, of regarding the International Development Bank as similar to other world financial organizations and of making use of all these organizations to initiate a multilateral European financial policy for Latin America. The report also dwelt on the need to find a suitable way of making use of the European Investment Bank for increasing the flow of financial investments in Latin America.

In this context, the Italo-Latin-American Institute, within the framework of the commitments assigned to it by the constituent agreement, was requested by the seminar to follow the progress of Community policy and, in particular, the forthcoming negotiations for renewing the Association Agreement between the EEC and the AAMS. It was also requested to formulate in due course, through the appropriate channels, the most suitable proposals for an eventual common action.

(Il Popolo, 25 June 1968;
Relazioni Internazionali, 13 July 1968)

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