Since 1954, two issues have preoccupied US-European security relations.  The Americans have been most concerned with getting the Europeans to increase their contribution to the common defense effort in the context of NATO; the Europeans have been most concerned with their ability to act independently outside of area and to influence American decision-making within the NATO area while maintaining the American commitment to the NATO area.  What is most remarkable is that the end of the Cold War and the progress of European union has had remarkably little impact on the way that European defense and security is understood.  From the European perspective, the old adage that the purpose of NATO was “to keep the Russians out, the Germans down and the Americans in” has changed only marginally.  The Germans are no longer down;  the Russians remain less than welcome allies but increasingly less out ^[1] ; and the Americans remain a necessary component to any concept of European security.  

In the post-Cold War period, several principles of European security seem to dominate.

1. The United States remains at the heart of the ability of Europe to act collectively.

A key test of the American role in European security took place soon after the fall of the Berlin Wall, with the wars in Yugoslavia.  The initial policy of the Clinton government was to view the conflict in Bosnia as a European problem to be dealt with through a European initiative.  Europe, however, was incapable of organizing a collective response to the Serbian aggression without the lead of the United States.  Although outside intervention probably could have halted the war in Bosnia as early as 1992, the failure of the EU peace mission in 1991 clearly demonstrated a lack of will that permitted the war to continue until NATO intervention under a UN umbrella in 1995.  Even in the early phase of the NATO intervention, Serbian forces were not effectively challenged until NATO decided to act independently of the United Nations.  Willy Claes — NATO Secretary-General at the time — argued at New York University on May 2 2002, that until NATO decided on firm action,  the United Nations actively resisted a strong stand against Serbian forces in Bosnia; he noted that there had been a secret agreement to inform Milosovic of bombing targets that were initially established.  The importance of American leadership was demonstrated once again in Kosovo in 1999.  Indeed, the entire long, unhappy episode of the Yugoslav wars is a clear demonstration of the continuing importance of American political leadership for European security, even after the end of the Cold War.  In this context, NATO is important because it remains an institutionalized means of keeping the US in Europe.  

2. The ability of Europe to act independently outside of area remains an elusive goal, perhaps more elusive than ever before.  During the Cold War period, independence seemed to focus on nuclear capability. The long debates over an independent nuclear force were never about defense — or deterrence — as such, but about independent decision-making in the context of the Cold War.

The French force de frappe was also a relatively cheap way of maintaining a degree of independence and deterrence.  Like Eisenhower’s notion of “more bang for a buck,” this nuclear force served as a substitute for more flexible and more expensive investment in defense capability.  With the end of the Cold War we might have presumed that the dependence of Europe on the United States would decline, but Bosnia and Kosovo have taught us that this is not at all the case.  Indeed....

3. European capabilities remain more tied to the United States than ever, even with the diminished importance of the US nuclear deterrent.  Essentially, Europe remains dependent on the United States for high-tech intelligence — that is clear — but also for transportation of troops.  

These general tendencies appear to have become a real crisis in the post-September 11 world.  The United States has a real interest in military action “out of area,” and is not particularly concerned about constraints from NATO allies. This orientation of American policy has often been oversimplified as “unilateralism,” which indeed it is with regard to Europe.  NATO has been nowhere to be seen in the post-September 11 world.  The United States has talked a great deal about an “alliance,” but this usually means an amorphous alliance against terror or “the axis of evil,” rather than NATO.  Indeed, there was no real consultation with Europe as such in the months after September 11, only with a succession of European leaders coming to Washington to express support for American action.  There is almost no perception in the United States that there are European troops present in Afghanistan (nor has the European press paid a great deal of attention to this presence).  For the moment, our closest ally is Pakistan.

We could write this off as a short-term, temporary phenomenon, or a peculiar predilection of the Bush government.  However, there are some changes that seem to indicate that there may be far more serious changes taking place in the balance of trans-Atlantic security relations.  History and tradition aside, behind the trans-Atlantic relationship there has always been a presumption of mutual need and mutual benefit.  Behind the cycle of tensions there has always been a strong connection.  The current trends are disturbing, however, because, with the end of the Cold War, the connection has become frayed, and the balance of dependency within that connection has become increasingly one-sided.

One element of the frayed connection is clearly the “big bang” expansion of NATO.  Beginning with the accession of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic, the process of expansion seems to have been open-ended.  Indeed, President Clinton made it clear in his letter to the US Senate that :

The purpose of NATO’s enlargement extends beyond the security of these three states... and entails a process encompassing more than their admission to the Alliance.  Accordingly, these first new members should not and will not be the last.  No qualified European democracy is ruled out as a future member.... [NATO is committed] to avoid any new division of Europe, and to contribute to its progressive integration.  (February 11, 1998)

Although Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic’s accession is closely tied with their accession to the EU, it has now become clear that accession to NATO is far less difficult than accession to the European Union, and that in some cases (e.g. Turkey and Bulgaria) it is seen as a first step in a looser Europe that is directly connected with the United States.  In the Washington of President Bush, this expansion is seen as a purposeful watering down of the Alliance, and making it a less useful instrument for joint action.  Certainly, because NATO operates on the principle of unanimity, NATO is becoming a more cumbersome instrument, with a long line of new, marginal members with little to contribute to joint action.

But, of course, the contribution of the European core members has become less useful because of the growing capability gap.  Part of the problem is that America’s European allies spend far less than the United States on their armed forces, and have been for some time.  Only Turkey and Greece — for reasons other than the common defense — spend more than the US as a percentage of GDP, and only France and Britain even come close to spending US spending levels as a proportion of GDP.   Only Germany has increased its spending on defense since September 11.

However, the last several joint actions have exposed a gap in technology between the United States and Europe that goes beyond simple spending levels.  As one recent report argues:

America’s global responsibilities, matched with sizable and growing investments in high-technology warfare, from satellite communications to Predator drones, are leaving even NATO’s most gung-ho European members farther behind.  Even after the 1999 Kosovo war, when America’s superior power was powerfully on display, Britain and France found they could not jump-start their effort to build a more effective European rapid reaction force.^[2]

Europe cannot match the sophisticated communications or the precision-guided weapons that the Americans now routinely use, but they are also increasingly dependent upon the United States for more basic elements, such as transportation.

A country as rich as rich as Germany is still unable to deliver more than a third of the troops it promised for peacekeeping in Kabul on schedule because it must rent Russian or Ukranian transport planes on the commercial market.  One country, which NATO officials refused to identify, discussed moving troops to Kabul by railroad. ^[3]

There seems to be a growing attitude in Washington that, for out-of-area action, the Europeans don’t matter.  They simply do not contribute enough to the common effort to justify the aggravation and the inevitable compromises.  From a European perspective, the issue is influence over American policy, as well as independence.  The lesson of Afghanistan seems to be that, without a substantial contribution to bring to the table, Europe will be waiting a long time for Washington to phone—and it certainly does not seem that a 60-thousand-man rapid reaction force will make a great deal of difference.

The American ambassador to NATO, Nicholas Burns, has talked about a two-tiered alliance.  But with NATO expansion the number of tiers may be more numerous, as the United States essentially acts on its own or with ad hoc alliances.  Another alternative has become more familiar: the US fights, the UN feeds, the European Union finances, European soldiers keep the peace.  Of course, this is one kind of partnership, but one that is far more unequal and unstable than in the past.

On the other hand, for the United States there are limits and constraints as well.  The first is probably the least obvious.  Although the United States is projecting important increases in military spending during the next five years, the secretary of defense is strongly resisting any increase in troop levels for any part of the armed forces. ^[4]   The largest increases will be in new weapons and research and development.  “We do not have the forces to do the missions you have outlined,” Joseph Ralston — the commander of NATO forces and US troops in Europe - recently testified in the US Congress.  Indeed, the number of armed force personnel has been declining since 1987 — to a reduction of about 30 percent.

One reason for this decline is that the annual cost of maintaining a soldier on active duty has increased 25 percent since the early 1990s, and will probably double in five years (over the costs since 1993).  Therefore, most of the $48 billion increase requested by the president will go to cover this increased cost and to weapons.  This appears to mean that, for all of the bravado coming out of Washington about not needing anyone else, we will indeed be dependent on allies to support our expansive military policy.  Although this in no way implies equality, it does imply partnership and dependency with allies.  It also implies a contradiction in American policy that is not at all helped by the increased distance from our most stable alliance.

The second constraint is the tension between global openness and the perceived need for more secure borders.  The primary goal of an open-door system of trade and investment creates problems for the need for more reliable security arrangements after September 11.  To the extent that the United States unilaterally pursues security in the largest sense, it creates impediments for the free movement of goods and capital.  Certainly, there have been efforts to coordinate “the war against terrorism” with European security agencies ^[5] , but these cooperative efforts appear to be running up against conflicts over the death penalty in the United States and the imposition of military tribunals.  It is now becoming clearer that, for the United States, there is a price to be paid for unilateral action on terrorism.

The tensions that are building between the United States and Europe have been exacerbated, on the European side, by the spurt of extreme-right successes in a number of European countries.  On one hand, each of these breakthroughs has its own domestic political roots, generally linked to immigration, crime and identity.  They do, however, have one common threat: anti-globalization and anti-Americanism, which has been linked to opposition to the European Union.  If the post-war campaign against trans-Atlantic connection was carried by the left, the cutting edge of the current campaign is carried by the populist right.  This does not mean that opposition to many aspects of American policy and culture does not resonate with voters of the left—simply that the extreme right has been more successful in mobilizing this opposition for electoral purposes.

By 1996, a broad expression of anti-Americanism had become a centerpiece of the doctrine of the French National Front that was elaborated by Le Pen in a special issue of the party revue, Identité:

It is by considering this construction of the New World Order that our change in attitude about the policies of the United States must be understood.  When the Cold War was at its worst, and the Red Army was threatening, NATO had its raison d’etre.  The American presence contributed to contain Soviet expansionism, and to assure our liberty.  Now, things have changed.  NATO is being reconverted into the mailed fist of the New World Order.  Far from being “Europeanized,” ...it imposes on the nations of Europe an Americanization of their diplomatic and military concepts.... In truth, the problem for today is no longer that of confrontation among nations, but [must be seen] in terms of cleavage between the pruning shears of the New World Order and defenders of identities, that is defenders of nations.... This is the sense of my rallying-cry: “Nationalists of all countries unite!”.... The White House has become the Trojan Horse of globalization.... It is by understanding before the others the real nature of the coming cleavages that we can deal with the new millennium with faith and confidence. ^[6]

Yvan Blot, FN deputy in the European parliament and a member of the political bureau of the National Front, added in another article:

The dollar, which [the United States] has imposed as a universal exchange currency, and the free circulation of goods which it has obtained thanks to the GATT agreement, combine to ruin the economy of its competitors.  The multilateral defense agreements..., in which it retains control, far from assuring the security of its allies, in Europe in particular, subjugates them even more. ^[7]

During the current presidential campaign in France, Le Pen has focused on these themes to mobilize voters for the second round on Sunday.  Although Le Pen will certainly lose, his approach to the United States clearly resonates among a broader public, and probably complicates the agenda of trans-Atlantic relations.

And so we are at yet another crossroads of trans-Atlantic relations, but this one is different.  On one hand, Europe is liberated from its dependence on the American nuclear deterrent; on the other hand, America feels free to ignore European sensibilities, to act alone.  Nevertheless, both America and Europe remain interdependent in important ways.  Europe very much needs the support structure of the Atlantic alliance for out-of-area operations; the United States may very well need the troops of Europe to support its own operations.  In a large sense, America and Europe share common interests, structures and values that should lead to stable relations.

However, as Tony Judt has argued recently, Europe and America are drifting apart.

On free trade, Iraq, the Middle East, international courts and many other post-cold war international issues, the Western allies are at odds.  Yet the most important difference of all frequently passes unmentioned.  Europeans today are being forced to weigh the social costs of abandoning the post-war welfare state.  The far right offers one solution—close the borders against change and newcomers and confine state-provided social and welfare services to the “native” community.  The left would retain the ideal of the social democratic state, at the expense of profit and efficiency if need be.  And both sides juxtapose their European understanding of the good society, the cohesive community, the American market-driven variant.  This widely debated contrast is the common, binding thread at the heart of European anti-Americanism, and it is set to grow, not diminish. ^[8]

So, is it entirely possible that this drift in interests cannot be reinforced by mutual dependency at a time when we lack a common enemy?  Or, is it just as likely that dependency will indeed be reinforced by history and common heritage.  The point is that for the first time since the end of the Cold War, the question can be asked without a clear answer.

 

Footnotes